TARRIF CASES

CHEVRON
INC.,
-

PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 178759
Petitioner,
v
e
r
s
u
s

COMM
ISSIO
NER
OF
THE
BURE
AU OF
CUST
OMS,
Respondent.

party
other
than
the
importer, said importer shall
himself be required to
declare under oath and
under the penalties of
falsification or perjury that
the
declarations
and
statements contained in the
entry
are
true
and
correct: Provided,
further,
That such statements under
oath shall constitute prima
facie evidence of knowledge
and consent of the importer
of
violation
against
applicable provisions of this
Code when the importation
is
found
to
be
unlawful. (Emphasis
supplied)

ENTRY IN SECTIONS 1301 AND

1801 OF THE TCC REFERS TO BOTH
THE IED AND IEIRD
Under Section 1301 of the TCC,
imported articles must be entered within a
non-extendible period of 30 days from the
date of discharge of the last package from
a vessel. Otherwise, the BOC will deem
the imported goods impliedly abandoned
under Section 1801. Thus:

Section
1801. Abandonment, Kinds
and Effect of. - An imported
article
is deemed
abandoned under any of
the following circumstances:

Section
1301. Persons
Authorized
to
Make
Import
Entry.
- Imported articles must
be
entered
in
the
customhouse at the port
of entry within thirty
(30) days, which shall
not be extendible from
date of discharge of the
last package from the
vessel or aircraft either (a)
by the importer, being
holder
of
the
bill
of
lading, (b)
by
a
duly
licensed customs broker
acting under authority from
a holder of the bill or (c) by
a person duly empowered to
act as agent or attorney-infact
for
each
holder: Provided,
That
where the entry is filed by a

b. When the owner,

importer,
consignee
or
interested party after due
notice, fails to file an
entry within thirty (30)
days, which shall not be
extendible,
from
the
date of discharge of the
last package from the
vessel or aircraft, or having
filed such entry, fails to
claim his importation within
fifteen (15) days, which
shall
not
likewise
be
extendible, from the date of
posting of the notice to
claim
such
importation. (Emphasis
supplied)

xxx
xxx
xxx

Petitioner argues that the IED is an

entry contemplated by these sections.

According
to
it,
the
congressional
deliberations on RA 7651 which amended
the TCC to provide a non-extendible 30day period show the legislative intent to
expedite the procedure for declaring
importations as abandoned. Filing an
entry serves as notice to the BOC of the
importers willingness to complete the
importation and to pay the proper taxes,
duties and fees. Conversely, the non-filing
of the entry within the period connotes the
importers disinterest and enables the
BOC
to
consider
the
goods
as
abandoned. Since the IED is a BOC form
that serves as basis for payment of
advance duties on importation as required
under PD 1853,[20] it suffices as an entry
under Sections 1301 and 1801 of the TCC.

regulations to be filed with

such form at the time of
entry, at the port or station
by the customs official
designated to receive such
entry
papers
and
any
duties, taxes, fees and/or
other
lawful
charges
required to be paid at the
time of making such entry
have been paid or secured
to be paid with the customs
official
designated
to
receive
such
monies,
provided that the article has
previously arrived within the
limits of the port of entry.

[21]

We disagree.
The term entry in customs law
has a triple meaning. It means (1) the
documents filed at the customs house; (2)
the submission and acceptance of the
documents and (3) the procedure of
passing goods through the customs house.
[22]

The IED serves as basis for the

payment
of
advance
duties
on
importations whereas the IEIRD evidences
the final payment of duties and
taxes. The question is: was the filing of
the IED sufficient to constitute entry
under the TCC?
The law itself, in Section 205,
defines the meaning of the technical term
entered as used in the TCC:
Section 205. Entry,
or
Withdrawal
from
Warehouse,
for
Consumption. - Imported
articles shall be deemed
entered
in
the
Philippines
for
consumption when the
specified entry form is
properly
filed
and
accepted, together
with
any
related
documents
regained by the provisions
of
this
Code
and/or

xxx
xxx

xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the operative act that
constitutes entry of the imported
articles at the port of entry is the filing and
acceptance of the specified entry form
together with the other documents
required by law and regulations. There is
no dispute that the specified entry form
refers to the IEIRD. Section 205 defines
the precise moment when the imported
articles are deemed entered.
Moreover, in the old case of Go Ho
Lim v. The Insular Collector of Customs,
[23]
we ruled that the word entry refers to
the regular consumption entry (which, in
our current terminology, is the IEIRD) and
not the provisional entry (the IED):
It is disputed by the
parties
whether
the
application for the special
permit. Exhibit A, containing
the misdeclared weight of
the 800 cases of eggs,
comes within the meaning
of the word "entry" used in
section 1290 of the Revised
Administrative Code, or said
word "entry" means
only
the "original entry and
importer's declaration." The
court below reversed the
decision of the Insular

Collector of Customs on the

ground that the provisions
of section 1290 of the
Revised
Administrative
Code refer to the regular
consumption entry and
not to a provisional
declaration made in an
application for a special
permit, as the one filed by
the appellee, to remove the
cases of eggs from the
customhouse.
This court is of the
opinion that certainly the
application,
Exhibit
A,
cannot be considered as a
final regular entry of the
weight of the 800 cases of
eggs
imported
by
the
appellee,
taking
into
account the fact that said
application
sought
the
delivery of said 800 cases of
eggs "from the pier after
examination,"
and
the
special
permit
granted,
Exhibit E, provided for
"delivery to be made after
examination
by
the
appraiser." All the foregoing,
together
with
the
circumstance
that
the
appellee had to file the
regular consumption entry
which he bound himself to
do, as shown by the
application,
Exhibit
A,
logically
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
declaration of the weight of
the 800 cases of eggs made
in said application, is merely
a provisional entry, and as it
is subject to verification by
the customhouse examiner,
it cannot be considered
fraudulent for the purpose
of imposing a surcharge of
customs duties upon the
importer.[24] (Emphasis
supplied)

Republic
Supreme
Manila

of

the

SECOND DIVISION
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS
and
the
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------x
Because petitioners failed to follow
the requirements enumerated by the
Revised Administrative Code, the assailed
regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO
27-3003, we likewise hold that it is
unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal
protection
clause
of
the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause means
that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws
enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place in like circumstances.
Thus, the guarantee of the equal
protection of laws is not violated if there is
a
reasonable
classification. For
a
classification to be reasonable, it must be
shown that (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.
[22]

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does

not meet these requirements. We do not
see how the quality of wheat is affected by
who imports it, where it is discharged, or
which country it came from.

Thus, on the one hand, even if

other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003
have imported food grade wheat, the
product would still be declared as feed
grade wheat, a classification subjecting
them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even
if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003
have imported feed grade wheat, they
would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus
depriving the state of the taxes due. The
regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but
even to the state.
It is also not clear how the
regulation intends to monitor more
closely wheat importations and thus
prevent their misclassification. A careful
study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not
only fails to achieve this end, but results in
the opposite. The application of the
regulation forecloses the possibility that
other corporations that are excluded from
the list import food grade wheat; at the
same time, it creates an assumption that
those who meet the criteria do not import
feed grade wheat. In the first case,
importers are unnecessarily burdened to
prove the classification of their wheat
imports; while in the second, the state
carries that burden.
Petitioner
Commissioner
of
Customs also went beyond his powers
when the regulation limited the customs
officers duties mandated by Section 1403
of the Tariff and Customs Law, as
amended. The law provides:
Section
1403.

Duties of Customs Officer

Tasked to Examine, Classify,
and
Appraise
Imported
Articles.
The
customs
officer tasked to examine,
classify,
and
appraise
imported
articles shall
determine whether the
packages designated for
examination and their
contents
are
in
accordance
with
the
declaration in the entry,
invoice
and
other
pertinent documents and
shall make return in such
a manner as to indicate

whether
the
articles
have been truly and
correctly declared in the
entry as regard their
quantity, measurement,
weight,
and
tarif
classification
and
not
imported
contrary
to
law. He
shall
submit
samples to the laboratory
for analysis when feasible to
do so and when such
analysis is necessary for the
proper
classification,
appraisal, and/or admission
into
the
Philippines of
imported articles.
Likewise, the
customs
officer
shall
determine the unit of
quantity in which they
are usually bought and
sold, and appraise the
imported
articles
in
accordance with Section
201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of
the customs officer to
comply with his duties shall
subject him to the penalties
prescribed under Section
3604 of this Code.
The provision mandates that the
customs officer must first assess and
determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be
imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has
already classified the article even before
the customs officer had the chance to
examine
it.
In
effect,
petitioner
Commissioner of Customs diminished the
powers granted by the Tariff and Customs
Code with regard to wheat importation
when it no longer required the customs
officers prior examination
and
assessment of the proper classification of
the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and
regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It
is required that the regulation be germane

to the objects and purposes of the law;

and that it be not in contradiction to, but
in
conformity
with,
the
standards
prescribed by law.[23]
In summary, petitioners violated
respondents right to due process in the
issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed
to observe the requirements under the
Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners
likewise violated respondents right to
equal protection of laws when they
provided for an unreasonable classification
in the application of the regulation. Finally,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs went
beyond his powers of delegated authority
when the regulation limited the powers of
the customs officer to examine and assess
imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24348

July 30, 1968

FELIClDAD
VIERNEZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS, respondent.
Juan
T.
David
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

All three assigned errors are untenable.

1. Petitioner argues that the Collector of
Customs of Jolo, who has "jurisdiction over
all matters arising from the enforcement
of tariff and customs laws within his
collection district", as provided for in
Section 703 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, is exclusively authorized to proceed
against
the
cigarettes
in
question
inasmuch as the smuggling was allegedly
perpetrated in his collection district.

Hence, petitioner concludes that the

seizure and forfeiture thereof by the
Collector of Customs of Cebu is irregular
and illegal for lack of jurisdiction.
We do not agree. First, because Section
703, on which petitioner's conclusion is
premised, is legally non-existent, the same
having
been
vetoed
by
the
President.1 Secondly,
the
Tariff
and
Customs Code clearly empowers the
Bureau of Customs to prevent and
suppress smuggling and other frauds upon
the Customs [Sec. 602 (b)] over all seas
within the jurisdiction of the Philippines
and over all coasts, ports, airports,
harbors, bays, rivers and inland waters
navigable from the sea and, in case of
"hot pursuit", even beyond the maritime
zone (Sec. 603). For the due enforcement
of this function, a Collector, among others,
is authorized to search and seize (Sec.
2203), at any place within the jurisdiction
of the said Bureau (Sec. 2204, sec. par.),
any vessel, aircraft, cargo, article, animal
or other movable property when the same
is subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under customs and tariff laws
(Sec. 2205). It is of no moment where the
introduction of the property subject to
forfeiture took place. For, to our mind, "(i)t
is the right of an officer of the customs to
seize goods which are suspected to have
been introduced into the country in
violation of the revenue laws not only in
his own district, but also in any other
district than his own". [Taylor vs. U.S., 44
U.S. (3 How.) 197, 11 L. ed. 559]. Any
other construction of the Tariff and
Customs Code, such as the one proposed
by petitioner, would virtually place the
Collector of Customs in a straitjacket and
render inutile his police power of search
and seizure, thereby frustrating effective
enforcement of the measures provided in
the Code to prevent and suppress
smuggling and other frauds upon the
Customs. This we can not sanction by
subscribing to petitioner's conclusion. The
Code, as a revenue law, is to be construed
to carry out the intention of Congress in

enacting it and as would most effectually

accomplish its objects (15 Am. Jur. 304).
Petitioner also attacks the jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs of Cebu on the
ground that the forfeiture of the cigarettes
is not in accordance with Section 2531 of
the Code, as the same were, at the time of
seizure, no longer in the custody and
control of the Bureau of Customs nor in
the hands, or subject to control, of the
importer, original owner, consignee, agent
or person with knowledge that the same
were imported contrary to law.
Again, we disagree. The forfeiture is
effected precisely in accordance with
Section 2531 afore-cited, which plainly
provides "that forfeiture shall be effected
when and while the article is in the
custody or within the jurisdiction of the
customs authority ... or in the hands or
subject to the control of ... some person
who shall receive, conceal, buy, sell or
transport the same ... with knowledge that
the article was imported ... contrary to
law" (Emphasis supplied). There can be no
question that the cigarettes involved were
seized and forfeited at the port of Cebu
which is within the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs and, as will be shown
later, while the cigarettes were subject to
the control of petitioner, who bought,
concealed, and transported the same
aboard the M/V "Legaspi" with knowledge
that they were imported contrary to law.
Besides, it is a settled jurisprudence that
forfeiture proceedings are in the nature of
proceedings
in
rem
wherein
the
jurisdiction to proceed against the res is
vested in the court of the district where
the same is found or seized (25 C.J.S.
572). Therefore, the Collector of Customs
of Cebu, who has the authority under the
Tariff and Customs Code to institute
forfeiture proceedings, lawfully assumed
jurisdiction to forfeit, in favor of the
Government, the smuggled cigarettes
found and seized within his collection
district.

2. Petitioner next argues that the

cigarettes in question are not merchandise
of prohibited importation inasmuch as she
had purchased the same in the open
market in Jolo; which goes to show that
she is not the importer, original owner,
consignee, agent or person who effected
the importation thereof; and that in the
absence of evidence that she bought the
same with knowledge that they were
imported contrary to law in accordance
with Section 2531, as the lack of internal
revenue stamps is not evidence of illegal
importation much less her knowledge
thereof, the said cigarettes are not subject
to forfeiture under Section 2530 (f) of the
Code.
This is not the first time that this question
has been posed before us. In the case
of Gigare
vs.
Commissioner
of
Customs (G.R. No. L-21376, August 29,
1966, 17 S.C.R.A. 1001), we disposed of
the same by holding that "(s)ince,
admittedly, the internal revenue tax on
the cigarettes indispute has not been paid,
it is clear that said cigarettes fall within
the category of "merchandise of prohibited
importation," the importation of which is
contrary to law and may justify its
forfeiture, as provided in Sections 1363 (f)
and 1364 of the Revised Administrative
Code," which correspond to Sections 2530
(f) and 2531, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code. "Moreover, the blue seals
affixed on said commodities prove
satisfactorily that they are foreign
products. Again, the importation thereof
into the Philippines is attested by the
presence of said products within our
jurisdiction"
(Ibid.)
And
concerning
petitioner's knowledge of these facts, the
following disquisition by the Court of Tax
Appeals,
lengthily
quoted
in
the Gigare case,
finds
significant
application in the case at bar:
Were the cigarettes in question
illegally
imported
into
the
Philippines? We are of the opinion
that, the Commissioner of Customs

should be sustained in his finding

that the cigarettes in question were
imported illegally. The absence of
Philippine internal revenue strip
stamps on cigarettes indicates that
they are either manufactured
clandestinely within the Philippines
or imported illegally into the
country. In the case at bar,
concomitant circumstances militate
against
the
clandestine
manufacture within the Philippines
of the cigarettes. The affixture of
blue seals on the packs of the
cigarettes, the wrappers, the
purchase of the cigarettes in the
open market of Jolo, a place where
American and other foreign made
cigarettes
are,
of
common
knowledge, frequently smuggled
from Borneo ... and the failure of
petitioner to show that the
cigarettes in question were locally
manufactured
rule
out
the
possibility that the cigarettes in
question were manufactured in the
Philippines. Consequently, we are
constrained to conclude that these
cigarettes were foreign (American)
made. They were merchandise of
prohibited
importation,
the
importation of which was contrary
to law, and should be forfeited
under Section 1363 (f) of the
Revised Administrative Code.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The fact that petitioner is merely a

buyer of the cigarettes in the open
market of Jolo does not render the
cigarrettes
immune
from
the
penalty of forfeiture. This is so
because forfeiture proceedings are
instituted
against
the res (cigarettes) ... and, by
express provision of Section 1364
of the Revised Administrative Code,
the forfeiture shall occur while the
merchandise is in the hands or
subject to control of some person

who shall receive, conceal, buy,

sell, or transport the same with
knowledge that the merchandise
was imported contrary to law.
Petitioner cannot but be charged
with the knowledge that the
cigarettes
in
question
were
imported contrary to law, for if it
were otherwise, why were these
cigarettes concealed on board the
vessel ... ? Why did she deny
ownership over said cigarettes? For
what plausible reason was she
afraid of detention? What impelled
her to believe that she would be
detained
by
the
customs
authorities? To uphold the claim of
petitioner and forego the forfeiture
would be giving a chance to
accessories after the fact of
smugglers of foreign cigarettes to
ply their trade with impunity and
with sanction of the courts. What
the executive department could
not
curb,
that
is
rampant
smuggling of foreign cigarettes, the
courts should not tolerate ...
3. Petitioner finally contends that the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs
libeling and forfeiting the cigarettes
involved in the present case for violation
of Section 2530 (m-1) of the Tariff and
Customs Code is unconstitutional, in view
of the fact that she was allegedly not
afforded an opportunity to defend the
cigarettes against such charge, said
section not being one of the original
grounds cited by the Collector of Customs
of Cebu in forfeiting the same.
The contention has no merit. Certainly, the
appellate power of the Commissioner of
Customs to review seizure and protest
cases is not limited to a review of the
issues raised on appeal. He may affirm,
modify or reverse the decision of the
Collector
(Section
2313)
on
other
questions provided that his findings and
conclusions are, as in the case at bar,
supported by evidence. It is of no

consequence whatsoever what were the

original grounds of the seizure and
forfeiture if, in point of fact, the goods are
by law subject to forfeiture [Wood vs. U.S.,
16 Pet. (U.S.) 342, 10 L. ed. 987]. As there
is evidence on record showing that the
cigarettes in question were imported and
introduced into the country without
passing through a customs house, the
same may be forfeited under said Section
2530 (m-1) of the Code, notwithstanding
that it is not one of the original charges.
As we held in Que Po Lay vs. Central Bank,
et al. (104 Phil. 853), what counts is not
the designation of the particular section of
the law that has been violated but the
description of the violation in the seizure
report.2
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner. 1wph1.t

FELICISIMO
RIETA,
147817
People

G.R. No.
Vs.

DECISION

Petitioners
contention
is
untenable. Persons found to be in
possession of smuggled items are
presumed to be engaged in smuggling,
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
[29]
The burden of proof is thus shifted to
them. To rebut this presumption, it is not
enough for petitioner to claim good faith
and lack of knowledge of the unlawful
source of the cigarettes. He should have
presented evidence to support his claim
and to convince the court of his noncomplicity.
In
the
case
adverted
to
earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:

In his discussion of
a similarly worded provision
of Republic Act No. 455, a
criminal
law
authority
explained thus:
In order that a
person may be deemed guilty of
smuggling or illegal importation
under the foregoing statute three
requisites must concur: (1) that the
merchandise must have been
fraudulently or knowingly imported
contrary to law; (2) that the
defendant, if he is not the importer
himself,
must
have
received,
concealed, bought, sold or in any
manner
facilitated
the
transportation, concealment or sale
of the merchandise; and (3) that the
defendant must be shown to have
knowledge that the merchandise
had been illegally imported. If the
defendant, however, is shown to
have had possession of the illegally
imported
merchandise,
without
satisfactory
explanation,
such
possession
shall
be
deemed
sufficient
to
authorize
conviction.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
In
the
present
case,
the
explanation given by petitioner was found
to be unacceptable and incredible by both
the RTC and the CA, which said:
Now
on
the
explanations of Police Sgt.
Rimorin of Pasay City Police
Force and Pat. Rieta of
Kawit Police Force, riders in
the loaded cargo truck
driven by Boy. Their claim
that they did not have any
knowledge about the cargo
of blue seal cigarettes is not
given credence by the
court. They tried to show
lack
of
knowledge
by
claiming that along the way,
Boy and Gonzalo Vargas
left them behind at a
certain point for snacks and
picked them up later after
the
cargo
had
been
loaded. The Court cannot

see its way through how

two policemen, joining Boy
in the dead of the night,
explicitly to give him and
his goods some protection,
which service would be
paid, yet would not know
what they are out to
protect. And neither could
the Court see reason in
Boys leaving them behind
when he was going to pick
up and load the blue seal
cigarettes. Boy knew the
risks. He wanted them for
protection, so why will he
discard
them? How
so
unnatural and so contrary
to reason.[31]

Being
contrary
to
human
experience, his version of the facts is too
pat and stereotyped to be accepted at
face value. Evidence, to be believed, not
only must proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must also be credible
in itself, as when it conforms to common
experience and observation of humankind.

even without a warrant for purposes of

enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a
judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows
police authorities to enter, pass through or
search any land, enclosure, warehouse,
store or building that is not a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board; or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law.[38]

PILIPINAS
PETROLEUM
161953
CORPORATION,
-

Under the Tariff and Customs Code,

a search, seizure and arrest may be made

Petitioner
r
s

SHELL
No.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS,

[32]

The absence of any suspicious

reaction on the part of petitioner was not
in accordance with human nature. The
involvement or participation he and his coaccused had in the smuggling of the
goods was confirmed by their lack of
proper and reasonable justification for the
fact that they had been found inside the
cargo truck, seated in front, when it was
intercepted by the authorities. Despite his
protestation, it is obvious that petitioner
was aware of the strange nature of the
transaction, and that he was willing to do
his part in furtherance thereof. The
evidence presented by the prosecution
established his work of guarding and
escorting the contraband to facilitate its
transportation from the Port Area to
Malabon, an act punishable under Section
3601 of the Tax Code.

G.R.

Respondent.
Promulgated:
March 6, 2008
DECISION
Assessments inform taxpayers of
their tax liabilities.[36] Under the TCCP, the
assessment is in the form of a liquidation
made on the face of the import entry
return and approved by the Collector of
Customs.[37] Liquidation
is
the final
computation and ascertainment by
the Collector of Customs of the duties
due on imported merchandise based
on official reports as to the quantity,
character and value thereof, and the
Collector of Customs' own finding as to the
applicable rate of duty.[38] A liquidation is
considered to have been made when the
entry is officially stamped liquidated.[39]

Petitioner claims that it paid the

duties due on its importations. Section
1603 of the old TCCP stated:
Section 1603. Finality of
Liquidation. When articles
have been entered and
passed free of duty or final
adjustments
of
duties
made, with subsequent
delivery, such entry and
passage free of duty or
settlement of duties will,
after the expiration of one
year from the date of the
final payment of duties, in
the absence of fraud or
protest,
be
final
and
conclusive upon all parties,
unless the liquidation of
the import entry was
merely tentative.[40]
An assessment or liquidation by the
BoC attains finality and conclusiveness
one year from the date of the final
payment of duties except when:

or

(a)
(b)

there was fraud;

there is a pending protest

(c)

the liquidation of import

entry
was
merely
tentative.

None of the foregoing exceptions is

present in this case. There was no fraud as
petitioner claimed (and was presumed) to
be in good faith. Respondent does not
dispute this. Moreover, records show that
petitioner paid those duties without
protest using its TCCs. Finally, the
liquidation was not a tentative one as the
assessment had long become final and
incontestable. Consequently, pursuant
to Yabes[41] and
because
of
the
cancellation of the TCCs, respondent had
the right to file a collection case.
Section 1204 of the TCCP provides:
Section 1204. Liability of
Importer
for
Duties.

Unless relieved by laws

or
regulations,
the liability for duties,
taxes, fees and other
charges attaching on
importation constitutes
a personal
debt
due
from the importer to
the
government which
can be discharged only by
payment in full of all
duties, taxes, fees and
other
charges
legally
accruing.
It
also
constitutes a lien upon
the articles imported
which may be enforced
while such articles are
in
the
custody
or
subject to the control
of
the
government.
(emphasis supplied)
Under this provision, import duties
constitute a personal debt of the importer
that must be paid in full. The importers
liability therefore constitutes a lien on the
article which the government may choose
to enforce while the imported articles are
either in its custody or under its control.
When
respondent
released
petitioner's goods, its (respondents) lien
over
the
imported
goods
was
extinguished. Consequently, respondent
could only enforce the payment of
petitioner's import duties in full by filing a
case for collection against petitioner.[42]
Respondent filed its complaint for
collection on April 3, 2002. The governing
law at that time was RA[43] 1125 or the old
CTA Law. Section 7 thereof stated:
Section
7.
Jurisdiction. The Court of
Tax Appeals shall exercise
exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided

(1)
Decision of
the
Commissioner
of
Internal Revenue in cases
involving
disputed
assessment, refunds of
internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges,
penalties
imposed
in
relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws or part
of law administered by the
Bureau
of
Internal
Revenue;
(2)
Decisions
of the Commissioner of
Customs
in
cases
involving liability for
customs duties, fees or
other money charges;
seizure, detention or
release
of
property
afected; fines
and
forfeitures
or
other
penalties imposed in
relation
thereto;
or
other matters arising
under Customs Law or
other laws or part of
law administered by the
Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of the
provincial or city Boards of
Assessment Appeals in
cases
involving
the
assessment and taxation
of real property or other
matters arising under the
Assessment Law, including
rules
and
regulations
relative
thereto.
[44]
(emphasis supplied)
Inasmuch as the present case did
not
involve
a
decision
of
the
Commissioner of Customs in any of the
instances enumerated in Section 7(2) of
RA 1125, the CTA had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It was the RTC that had
jurisdiction under Section 19(6) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended:[45]

Section
19.
Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. Regional Trial
Courts
shall
exercise
exclusive
original
jurisdiction:
xxx
xxx

xxx

(6)
In all cases
not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions,
xxx.
In view of the foregoing, the RTC
should forthwith proceed with Civil Case
No. 02-103191 and determine the extent
of petitioner's liability.
We
are
not
unmindful
of
petitioner's pending petition for review in
the CTA where it is questioning the validity
of the cancellation of the TCCs. However,
respondent cannot and should not await
the resolution of that case before it
collects petitioner's outstanding customs
duties and taxes for such delay will unduly
restrain the performance of its functions.
[46]
Moreover, if the ultimate outcome of
the CTA case turns out to be favorable to
petitioner, the law affords it the adequate
remedy of seeking a refund.

G.R. No. 180597

2008

November 7,

RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B.

GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and
ROGER
A.
BASADRE, petitioners
vs.

PEOPLE
OF
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

THE

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. Petitioners
should be acquitted of the charge.
The prosecution has the burden of proving
the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, it is clear
that petitioners neither searched the
container vans nor effected seizure and
arrest. The testimony of Customs Broker
Amolata,
The information charged petitioners for
illegally flagging down, searching, and
seizing the three container vans on July
27, 2004. Petitioners, however, could not
also be held liable for these acts. It is a
fact that no search and seizure of the vans
was done on the night of July 27, 2004.
The act of flagging down the vehicles is
not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code. Mere
flagging down of the container vans is not
punishable under the said law.

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which
the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due
process clause of the Constitution
which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.
The burden of proof is on the
prosecution,
and
unless
it
discharges that burden the accused

need not even offer evidence in his

behalf, and he would be entitled to
an
acquittal.
Proof
beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of
course, mean such degree of proof
as, excluding the possibility of
error, produce absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which
produces
conviction
in
an
unprejudiced mind. The conscience
must be satisfied that the accused
is responsible for the offense
charged.21
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the
rule that the conviction of the accused
must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to
prove his innocence.22 In this case, the
prosecution failed to show that petitioners
committed the acts prohibited by Sec.
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
There is no such evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, that identifies petitioners as
responsible for the alleged illegal search.
Hence, acquittal is in order.
As regards the second issue, there is no
conflict
between
the
aforequoted
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code
and RA 6975, as amended. The jurisdiction
of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly
with regard to customs duties. Should the
PNP suspect anything, it should coordinate
with the BOC and obtain the written
authority from the Collector of Customs in
order to conduct searches, seizures, or
arrests. Coordination is emphasized in the
laws. While it is an admitted fact that
there was no such coordination initiated
by the PNP-CIDG in this instance,
nevertheless,
petitioners
cannot
be
convicted under the Tariff and Customs
Code since there is no evidence that they
did actually search the container vans.