Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 143275

March 20, 2003

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us are the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and supplement to the motion for
reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 filed by movant-petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for
brevity) seeking a reversal of this Courts Decision 1 dated September 10, 2002 which denied LBPs petition
for review.
Herein respondent spouses Arlene and Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to fix the just compensation of a
parcel of land2 before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 63, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. On
December 19, 1997, the agrarian court rendered summary judgment fixing the compensation of the
subject property as follows: (1) P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and (2) P2,957,250 for the
30.4160 hectares of sugarland.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) and LBP both filed separate appeals using different
modes. DAR filed a petition for review while LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of appeal.
DARs petition for review3 was assigned to the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals while LBPs
ordinary appeal4 was assigned to the Fourth Division of the same court.
On November 6, 1998, the appellate courts Special Third Division rendered a decision in the petition for
review filed by DAR, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The decision
dated February 9, 1998 is partially reconsidered. The trial court is ordered to recompute the
compensation based on the selling price of palay at 213.00 per cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay
legal interest at 6% of the compensation so fixed from 1990 until full payment is made by the
government.5
Meanwhile, on February 15, 2000, the appellate courts Fourth Division dismissed LBPs ordinary appeal
primarily holding that LBP availed of the wrong mode of appeal. 6 LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied.
On July 14, 2000, LBP filed before this Court a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On September 10, 2002, this Court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed RESOLUTIONS, dated February 15, 2000 and May 22, 2000,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7

In affirming the dismissal by the appellate court of LBPs ordinary appeal, this Court held that Section
608 of RA 6657 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review as the
appropriate mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 9 (the provision on which
LBP bases its argument that ordinary appeal is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts) merely makes a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not categorically
prescribe ordinary appeal as the correct way of questioning decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Thus, we
interpreted Section 61 to mean that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and
other relevant procedures of appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
We likewise held that Section 60 of RA 6657 is constitutional and does not violate this Courts power to
"promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice
andprocedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar and legal assistance to
the underprivileged."10 We ruled that the Rules of Court does not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as
the exclusive mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. The reference by Section 61 to the
Rules of Court in fact even supports the mode of a petition for review as the appropriate way to appeal
decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts. Furthermore, the same Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution quoted by LBP states that "rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court." Since Section 60 is a special
procedure and this Court has not yet provided for a particular process for appeals from decisions of
agrarian courts, the said section does not encroach on our rule-making power.
Hence, LBP filed the instant motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for reconsideration
reiterating its claim in the petition for review that Section 60 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. LBP still
maintains that a legislative act like Section 60 infringes on the exclusive rule-making power of this Court in
violation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
In the event that said argument is again rejected, LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at least be
given prospective application considering that more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via
ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals are in danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds
on account of our ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as the
financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on the national treasury
and the already depressed economic condition of our country. 11 Thus, in the interest of fair play, equity and
justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give substantial consideration to the
appealed cases.
On the first ground, we find it needless to re-discuss the reasons already propounded in our September 10,
2002 Decision explaining why Section 60 of RA 6657 does not encroach on our constitutional rule-making
power.
Be that as it may, we deem it necessary to clarify our Decisions application to and effect on LBPs pending
cases filed as ordinary appeals before the Court of Appeals. It must first be stressed that the instant case
poses a novel issue; our Decision herein will be a landmark ruling on the proper way to appeal decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts. Before this case reached us, LBP had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Section 60 and 61
of RA 6657.
More importantly, the Court of Appeals has rendered conflicting decisions on this precise issue. On the
strength ofLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Feliciano Buenaventura, penned by Associate Justice
Salvador Valdez, Jr. of the Court of Appeals, certain decisions 12 of the appellate court held that an ordinary
appeal is the proper mode. On the other hand, a decision 13 of the same court, penned by Associate Justice
Romeo Brawner and subject of the instant review, held that the proper mode of appeal is a petition for
review. In another case,14 the Court of Appeals also entertained an appeal by the DAR filed as a petition for
review.

On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the
proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court
of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation
and reliance on theBuenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the
appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Hence, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the prospective
application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of our Decision is not only
grounded on equity and fair play but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules of procedure shall
not impair substantive rights.
In accordance with our constitutional power to review rules of procedure of special courts, 15 our Decision in
the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure, specifically, a rule on the proper mode of appeal
from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. In determining
whether a rule of procedure affects substantive rights, the test is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto,16 which
provides that:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as
the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. (italics supplied)
We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments of
Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given
retroactive application, it will prejudice LBPs right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of
Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It
would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a
contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.
In the 1992 case of Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals,17 respondent Pe, whose land was foreclosed by
Development Bank of the Philippines in 1977 and subsequently sold to petitioners Benzonan in 1979, tried
to invoke a 1988 Supreme Court ruling counting the five-year period to repurchase from the expiration (in
1978) of the one-year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Said 1988 ruling reversed the 1957 and
1984 doctrines which counted the five-year period to repurchase from the date of conveyance of
foreclosure sale (in 1977). Using the 1988 ruling, respondent Pe claimed that his action to repurchase in
1983 had not yet prescribed.
However, this Court refused to apply the 1988 ruling and instead held that the 1957 and 1984 doctrines
(the prevailing ruling when Pe filed the case in 1983) should govern. The 1988 ruling should not retroact to
and benefit Pes 1983 case to repurchase. Thus, the action had indeed prescribed. This Court justified the
prospective application of the 1988 ruling as follows:
We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on
February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18,
1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that
enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the
DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions

applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article
4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs
the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional(Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when they
purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in these two
cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982.
He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case
of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested as of that time
and cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisario ruling.18 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to the motion
for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the
Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a petition for review is the
correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after
the finality of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149621

May 5, 2006

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO R. TANTOCO, SR., MARIA R. TANTOCO, ZOSIMO TANTOCO, MARGARITA R.

TANTOCO, AND PACITA R. TANTOCO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
(DARAB), AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, GEN. TRIAS,
CAVITE, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE AND THE DAR REGION IV
DIRECTOR, Respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the Decision, dated December 15, 2000, and Resolution, dated May 25, 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54970 entitled "Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. et al., vs. Hon. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association of San Francisco,
Gen. Trias, Cavite, et al."
Petitioners seek the cancellation of the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) or TCT No.
CLOA-1424 issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association (ARBA) of San Francisco, Gen. Trias, Cavite, on the ground that TCT No. CLOA-1424 is null and
void for having been issued illegally and unlawfully. Consequently, petitioners pray for the reinstatement of
TCT No. T-402203 in their favor over the property involved in this case.
The facts1 of the case are as follows:
Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr., Marta R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita R. Tantoco and Pacita R. Tantoco
owned a vast tract of land with a total land area of 106.5128 hectares in San Francisco, General Trias,
Cavite. This land was registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33404 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite.
A portion of said property consisting of 9.6455 hectares was declared exempt from the coverage of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, hence the Certificates Land Transfer (CLTs) that had been previously
issued to several people were cancelled in an Order issued by then Minister of Agrarian Reform Heherson T.
Alvarez.
On April 21, 1989, petitioners donated 6.5218 hectares to Caritas de Manila, Inc., thereby leaving an
estimated area of 100 hectares to their landholding under TCT No. T-402203, which is now the subject
matter of the controversy.
Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) had been considering the land in question for
compulsory acquisition pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
On May 8, 1989, Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr., as owner and for and in behalf of the other co-owners, wrote to
DAR declaring the productive nature and agricultural suitability of the land in dispute, and offering the
same for acquisition under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the governments Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The land was offered for sale at P500,000 per hectare or for a sum
of P53,256,400.2 According to petitioners, they never heard anything from DAR thereafter.
It was only on June 25, 1993 that petitioners received a Notice of Land Valuation from DAR valuing the land
in question, which had now been accurately measured to have a total land area of 99.3 hectares, in the
amount ofP4,826,742.35.
On July 8, 1993, petitioners rejected the amount offered by DAR as compensation for the subject property
for being unreasonably below the fair market value of said lot. Petitioners likewise withdrew their voluntary
offer to sell adding that the land is not suitable for agriculture anymore and that it had been classified in
1981 for use by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) as land for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. Nevertheless, petitioners expressed that in the event that the DAR
would still insist on acquiring the land, petitioners will be exercising their right of retention over an area

aggregating to 79 hectares, divided among the co-owners at five (5) hectares each, and three (3) hectares
each to their thirteen (13) children qualified to be beneficiaries under the CARP. 3
In a letter dated July 16, 1993, after rejecting the aforestated land valuation, petitioners requested that the
offer ofP4,826,742.35 for the subject property be applied instead to their other irrigated landholding
consisting of 9.25 hectares in Brgy. Pasong Camachile, General Trias, Cavite which is covered by TCT No.
33407.4
In view of petitioners rejection of the offer, the DAR, through its Regional Director Percival C. Dalugdug,
requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) on July 22, 1993 to open a Trust Account in favor of
petitioners for the amount of FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX AND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTYTWO AND THIRTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P4,826,742.32) representing the assessed value of the subject
property. 5
A Certification was subsequently issued by the LBP Bonds Servicing Department on July 27, 1993 stating
that the sum of P4,826,742.35 in cash (P1,834,162.10) and in bonds (P2,992,580.25) had been "reserved
or earmarked" as compensation for petitioners 99.3 hectares of land under the CARPs VOS scheme. 6 The
cash portion ofP1,834, 162.10 was placed with the Trust Department but no release of payment in cash or
in bonds had been effected.7
Thereafter, or on August 30, 1993, the DAR issued a collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
over the subject property to
private respondent Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) of San Francisco, General Trias,
Cavite.8Public respondent Register of Deeds consequently issued TCT No. CLOA-1424 in favor of ARBA and
its 53 members, and accordingly cancelled petitioners TCT No. T-402203.
Upon learning of the cancellation of their TCT on the above property, petitioners filed an action for
Cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-1424, and the reinstatement of their TCT No. T-402203 before the
Adjudication Board for Region IV of the Department of Agrarian Reform on November 11, 1994. 9
Docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-003-94, the petition alleged, inter alia, that the land in question was
covered by an ongoing industrial estate development site per land use plan of the Municipality of General
Trias, Cavite; that the land had been planted with sugar and declared as such for taxation purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 12502-A; that in an Order dated September 1, 1986, of then Minister of Agrarian
Reform Heherson Alvarez, the same land was declared outside the ambit of PD No. 27; and that the
property is within the portion of Cavite that had been declared as an industrial zone in the CALABARZON
area, hence, the value of real properties included therein had greatly appreciated. 10
Petitioners alleged that as a result of the implementation of the CARL in June of 1988, and coupled with the
knowledge that the area had been declared part of the industrial zone of Cavite, persons unknown to
petitioners began to claim to be tenants or farmholders on said land, when in truth and in fact, petitioners
never had any tenant or farmworker at any time on their land, and neither did petitioners give their
consent for anyone to farm the same "which is suitable for sugarcane, residential or industrial purposes
and not for rice or corn or other industrial products.11
Petitioners added that due to the annoying persistence of DAR officials and employees who kept on coming
back to the residence of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr., in Quezon City, the latter was constrained to offer to sell
the subject land under the VOS scheme for P5 million originally per hectare; that, thereafter, petitioners
did not receive any reply from DAR, hence, they paid the real property tax due on the land for 1994 on
March 28, 1994; that, afterwards, their title to the land under TCT No. T-402203 dated April 19, 1994 was
cancelled without prior notice and in lieu thereof, TCT No. CLOA-1424 dated August 30, 1993 was issued by

the Register of Deeds in favor of ARBA whose 53 members are not tenants and are unknown to them and
are likewise not qualified or are disqualified to be beneficiaries under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. 12
Finally, petitioners claimed that some officials and employees of DAR Region IV, the MARO of General Trias,
Cavite, the Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Register of Deeds of Cavite, with intent to gain, conspired
with other private persons and several members of ARBA to deprive petitioners of said land or its fair
market value or proceeds thereof, and committed the crime of falsification of public documents by making
it appear that the offer to sell was at P500,000 per hectare instead of P5,000,000 per hectare; that the
value of adjacent lands to petitioners property were disregarded in determining just compensation; that
no notices were received and the alleged receipts of notice were falsified; that no trust account was ever
opened in favor petitioners and neither payment in cash or bond was ever made by DAR; that ARBA and its
members are not actually tilling the land for productive farming and have not paid LBP the assigned
valuation of the land; and, that the former are negotiating to sell the land to land developers and industrial
companies, among others, in the hope of making a windfall profit.
Thus, petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the TCT No. CLOA-1424, and that TCT No-402203 in the
name of petitioners should be reinstated. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
to restrain ARBA from negotiating to sell the property in question to any interested parties.
ARBA, in its Answer, denied the allegations contained in the petition, maintaining that the farmer
beneficiaries listed in TCT No. CLOA-1424 are qualified beneficiaries as provided for in Section 22 of RA No.
6657; that due process was observed in the documentation and processing of the CARP coverage of
subject parcel of land in accordance with DAR Administrative Orders and that the issuance of TCT No.
CLOA-1424 was in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6657; and, that the subject property is
classified as agricultural land, hence, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, the
land is considered to be within the coverage of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657.
In its Supplemental Answer of December 29, 1994, ARBA further stated that after the land had been
voluntarily offered for sale to DAR the only matter to be determined is the just compensation to be given to
the landowners. Therefore, the only issue to be resolved is the valuation of the property and not the
cancellation of the CLOA.
In addition, ARBA posited that the injunctive relief prayed for in the petition is unnecessary because the
property is automatically subject to the prohibition against transfer under R.A. No. 6657 which prohibition
is indicated in TCT No. CLOA-1424.
Incidentally, petitioner Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr., died during the course of the proceedings on September 2,
1995, and was duly substituted by his surviving heirs.13
On June 17, 1997, the DAR Regional Adjudicator for Region IV, Fe Arche-Manalang, rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the subject property more particularly described in Paragraph 5 of the Petition as
properly covered under the VOS (Voluntary Offer to Sell) scheme of the governments
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, as
amended, without prejudice to the exercise by the Petitioners/co-owners of their respective right of
retention upon proper application therefor;
2) Voiding and annulling TCT No. CLOA-1424 derived from CLOA (Certificate of Land Ownership
Award) No. 00193535 issued and registered on August 27, 1995 and August 30, 1993, respectively,

in the name of the Respondent ARBA (Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association) and its 53
Farmers-members;
3) Directing the Respondent Register of Deeds of Cavite to:
a) effect the immediate cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-1424 mentioned in the preceding
paragraph;
b) revalidate and reinstate TCT No. T-402203 in the joint names of Petitioners/co-owners,
subject to its eventual coverage under CARP after the Landowners retention areas have
been properly determined/segregated and/or expressly waived;
c) annotate at the back of Petitioners title, their lawyers lien thereon equivalent to five
percent (5%) of the market value of the subject property as and by way of an adverse claim.
4) Directing the local MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) of General Trias, Cavite and PARO
(Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) of Cavite to:
a) undertake another identification and screening process and reallocate the remaining
CARPable areas to patented qualified ARBs (Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries) in the area;
b) generate individual CLOAS (Certificate of Land Ownership Awards) in favor of such
identified ARBs.
5) Denying all other claims for lack of basis;
6) Without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.14
From the aforestated decision, petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Quezon City. Said appeals were consolidated and docketed as DARAB Case
No. 6385.
The issues were summarized by DARAB as follows:
"1. Whether or not the property co-owned by Petitioners under Title No. T-33404 located at San Francisco,
General Trias, Cavite with an original area of 106.5128 hectares was properly subjected to CARP coverage
pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 (CARL);
2. In the affirmative, whether or not fatal infirmities or irregularities were committed in the valuation of the
subject property and its subsequent titling and award in favor of Respondent ARBA;
3. Whether or not the Petitioners are entitled to the ancillary remedy of injunction and other specific reliefs
sought viz: cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-1424 registered in the name of Respondent ARBA on August 30,
1993 and reinstatement of TCT No. 402203 in favor of Petitioners; [and,]
4. Whether or not the Petitioners and private Respondent ARBA are entitled to their separate claims for
damages and attorneys fees."15
In resolving the controversy, DARAB condensed the issues posed by the respective parties by addressing
the question: Can a Collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award validly issued pursuant to a Voluntary

Offer to Sell scheme acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) be cancelled on
the petition of the former owner on the mere suspicion that some of the names listed therein are not really
qualified farmer-beneficiaries?16
On July 1, 1998, the DARAB rendered its ruling modifying the appealed decision of the Regional
Adjudicator, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Affirming paragraphs 1, 5, and 6 (Nos. 1, 5 and 6) of the dispositive portion of the decision dated
June 17, 1997 of the Honorable Adjudicator a quo but;
2) Reversing paragraph Nos. 2, 3 and 4 thereof;
3) Affirming the validity, legality and efficacy of TCT- CLOA No. 1424 issued to Respondent Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Association of San Francisco, Gen. Trias, Cavite.
SO ORDERED."17
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by DARAB for lack of merit in a Resolution, dated September 6, 1999, as no new matters were
"adduced by the movants which will warrant a reversal of the Boards decision." 18
Claiming that respondent DARAB acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the aforementioned
decision and resolution, petitioners appealed the same to the Court of Appeals.
On December 15, 2000, the court a quo rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."19
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated
May 25, 2001.20
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 15, 2000, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR IN
HER DECISION DATED JUNE 17, 1997.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR A QUO
DECLARING ALL PROCEEDINGS BY DAR VOID FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT
RESPONDENTS BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LANDS
UNDER R.A. 6657, MORE PARTICULARLY, IN GIVING DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITONERS AND TO PROPERLY
IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AREAS FOR EACH LISTED FARMERS-BENEFICIARIES OF RESPONDENT ARBA.

III
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONERS WERE BRAZENLY AND
ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONERS WERE NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THEY WERE UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF
THEIR LANDHOLDING THROUGH THE DIRECT ISSUANCE OF TCT NO. CLOA -1424 TO RESPONDENT ARBA IN
GROSS VIOLATION OF R.A. 6657.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED MAY 25, 2001, DENYING
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACTUAL FINDINGS OF FACTS ON RECORD
AND OF JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 127876 ENTITLED
"ROXAS & CO., INC. VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL." PROMULGATED ON DECEMBER 17, 1999. 21
In sum, the principal issue to be resolved is whether or not the CLOA that had been issued by the DAR to
ARBA may be cancelled based on the following grounds:
1. The land in question is exempt from the coverage of CARP by reason of its inclusion in the industrial
zone of CALABARZON;
2. The DAR failed to conform strictly to the procedure for the acquisition of private agricultural lands laid
down in RA 6657, hence, violating due process and consequently denying petitioners just compensation;
3. ARBA and all its members have not paid the amortizations for the landholdings awarded to them as
required under RA 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1993;1avvphil.net
4. All 53 members of ARBA manifested their intent to negotiate for payment of disturbance compensation
in exchange for the voluntary surrender of their rights over the awarded property which is a prohibited
transaction under Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, and in gross violation of DAR Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1994; and,
5. The ARBs did not cultivate the awarded property to make it productive in violation of Section 22 22 of the
Act.
At the outset, petitioners claim that the subject property had been classified to be within the industrial
zone of General Trias, Cavite even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988, therefore, it should be
outside the coverage of CARP.23
On this, the Court accords respect to the findings of the Regional Adjudicator who has the primary
jurisdiction and competence to establish the agricultural character of the land in question which is properly
within the coverage of CARP, thus:
"Even the petitioners own evidence serves to buttress and affirm the inherent nature and character of the
subject property as an agricultural land. The same ha[d] been previously devoted to sugarcane
production but at the time it was considered for acquisition by the DAR under the VOS scheme, it was
found to be planted to various crops such as rice, corn and camote. Petitioner Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr.
himself in his letter of intent dated May 8, 1989 declared that the land offered for acquisition under [the]
VOS was productive and suitable [for] agricultural production. It seems rather peculiar that after all these
years when the subject property had already been awarded and distributed to its intended beneficiaries, it
is only now that petitioners are belatedly heard to sing a different tune by claiming that the same had

always been industrial. Petitioners apparently relied on the flip-flopping certifications of one Engr. Alfredo
M. Tan II of the HLURB Region IV who could not seem to make up his mind as to the exact zoning location
of the subject property. On July 10, 1990, he certified that the subject property is "within the Agricultural
Zone based on the Municipalitys approved Zoning Ordinance under HSRC Resolution No. 42-A-3 dated 09
February 1981. After the lapse of several years or on January 10, 1995 to be precise, in a dramatic turnaround, he suddenly became vague and tentative. He then proceeded to certify that the same property
"appears to be within the Industrial Area based on HSRC (now HLURB) Approved Land Use Map of General
Trias per HSRC Resolution No. R-42-A-3 dated February 11, 1981."(Vide, Exhibit "R"). A more classic display
of bureaucratic ineptitude and incompetence is hard to find and simply boggles the mind. Thus, no weight
of credence at all can be attributed to either certification due to the vacillating tenor used which is not
even worth the paper it is written on. Petitioners heavy reliance on such an irresolute document is rather
pathetic and certainly misplaced. Resolution Nos. 105 and 125 enacted by the local Sangguniang
Panlalawigan on March 25, 1988 and September 8, 1988, respectively are similarly rejected since there
is no showing that the same were duly approved by the HLURB (Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board)
or its preceding competent authorities prior to June 15, 1988 which is the date of effectivity of the CARL
and cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require
any DAR conversion clearance or authority. (Emphasis supplied) Still, owners of such agricultural lands
which have been previously reclassified or rezoned to non-agricultural uses by LGUs (Local Government
Units) and approved by the HLURB before June 15, 1988 are nonetheless required to secure exemption
clearances from the DAR based on Section 3 (c) of RA 6657, as amended, and DOJ (Department of Justice)
Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 (Vide, Dar Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1994 in relation to
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994). As stated in the aforecited DOJ Opinion, "the legal requirement
for the DAR clearance in cases of land use conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses applies
only to conversions made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of the agrarian reform laws effectivity. Prior
thereto, the powers of the HLURB and the Department of Finance to [re-categorize] lands for land use and
taxation purposes, respectively, were exclusive. It is noted that the definition of "agricultural land" in RA
6657 excludes lands which have previously been classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial and
industrial areas. Viewed against this context, the subject property cannot be considered [as] falling within
the category of reclassified lands as envisioned in Section 3(c) of RA 6657, as amended, and so specified
in the aforementioned DOJ Opinion. (Emphasis supplied) Neither can petitioners hope [to] find any relief
from the Order of then Minister Heherson T. Alvarez dated September 1, 1986 since it merely exempts the
subject property from OLT (Operation land Transfer) coverage pursuant to PD 27 which
embraces tenanted rice and corn lands only. If at all, the said Order even serves to bolster the agricultural
nature of the subject property because of its long history as sugar land. Sugarcane production is certainly
an agricultural activity by any norm or standard. The law defines the term as referring to the cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees including the harvesting of such farm products and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical. The scope and coverage of the CARL is so broad and all-embracing
as to include all lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced.24
xxx
" The inarguable [sic] fact remains that independent of such choice by the petitioners to voluntarily offer
the subject property, the same would still be under the CARL which allows landowners a retention limit of
only five (5) hectares and an additional three (3) hectares for each qualified child who at the time of the
effectivity of the law is: 1) at least 15 years of age; and, 2) actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm."25
As pointed out, the property in question can be properly subjected to CARP. It was not re-classified nor
converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use with the approval of the HLURB prior to the effectivity of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) on June 15, 1988.

Having established that the land in question can be properly subjected to CARP, the next question is
whether the DAR officials, in acquiring said property, performed their functions properly and strictly in
accordance with the law.
A perusal of the records reveal that the DAR officials or its employees failed to comply strictly with the
guidelines and operating procedures provided by law in acquiring the property subject to CARP.
Firstly, there were certain inconsistencies in the manner of selection by the DAR of the CARP beneficiaries
who are members of ARBA. As found by the Regional Adjudicator:
"As to the screening and identification of qualified potential CARP [b]eneficiaries, DAR field personnel are
presumed to be properly guided by existing law and implementing rules and regulations (Vide, Section 22
of R.A. 6657, as amended; DAR Administrative Order No. 10, series of 1990). Redistribution of CARPable
lands to the intended [b]eneficiaries may be done collectively or individually, whatever is economically
feasible. In the instant case, however, all the 42 ARBs (Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries)/Applicants opted for
individual ownership and the corresponding VOCF (Voluntary Offer Claim Folder) apparently processed as
such (Vide, Exhibits "26 UU" to "26 DDD"). But surprisingly, in some inexplicable manner, the assailed
CLOA (Certificate of Land Ownership Award) that was finally generated turned out to be collective in favor
of the [r]espondent ARBA which failed to show notwithstanding the assurances of its counsel (Vide, TSN,
Hearing of February 23, 1995, pp. 18-19) that it is duly registered with the appropriate government and
non-government agencies. Moreover, the collective title suddenly sprouted 53 names when only 43 duly
applied as [p]otential CARP [b]eneficiaries (Vide, CARP Form No. 3; Exhibits 26 EEE" to "26UUU"; Exhibits
"V-57" to "V-99." What is even more mysterious is that among the 53 ARBs listed in the aforementioned
CLOA, only 29 accomplished the required application forms and 30 signed the corresponding APFUS. There
is thus no basis for the MARO Certification of August 19, 1993 declaring all the 53 named FBs therein as
having met all the qualifications for Potential Beneficiaries under Section 22 of RA 6657 (Vide, Exhibits "27"
to "27-F"). Such unfounded action by the said official can only be described as whimsical and capricious. A
re-screening is therefore imperative in order to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice especially on the
part of those who applied and were excluded in the final award for no apparent reason at all. Upon the
other hand, the MARO Claim Folder Transmittal Memo to the PARO dated May 15, 1991 carried a total
of 42 signatories in the corresponding Application to Purchase and Farmers Undertaking (Vide, CARP Form
No. 4, Exhibits "26-UU" to "26-DD", Exhibits "V-47" to "V-56" inclusive). When called to the witness stand,
the local MARO and PARO could not adequately explain or justify the existence of such discrepancies (Vide,
TSN Hearing of February 23, 1995 pp. 62-64; 89-92) which can only give rise to the speculation that
verification and validation was done arbitrarily or in a haphazard manner. In thus committing a substantial
deviation from the procedural mandate of the law Respondent DAR official in effect tolerated the insidious
actuations of his subordinates who acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The resultant CLOA therefore and its derivative TCT is fatally flawed for having been issued without
jurisdiction. The same does not even reflect the fractional share of each ARB as required in DAR
Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1993.26
Secondly, the TCT No. CLOA-1424 was directly issued by the DAR in the name of ARBA without: (a)
payment of just compensation; and, (b) initial transfer of title to the land in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, in contravention to Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657 which states:
"(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.(Emphasis supplied) The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries."

As already mentioned, the DAR immediately issued the CLOA to ARBA without first registering the property
with the Registry of Deeds in favor of the Philippine Government. This administrative irregularity was made
even worse by the fact that petitioners were not given just compensation which, under the law, is a
prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.
The case of Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 illustrates that a transfer of ownership over a property
within the coverage of CARP can only be effected when just compensation has been given to the owners,
thus:
"Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to farmer beneficiaries over portions
of petitioners land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of
1988. Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State
from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or deposit by DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the
landowner. There was no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by the
government."
In the instant case, the Notice of Land Valuation that was sent by the DAR to petitioners on June 14, 1993,
offered to compensate petitioners for their property in the total amount of P4,826,742.35 based on the
valuation made by the LBP. Said amount was rejected by petitioners, prompting the DAR to open a Trust
Account in the aforestated amount with the LBP in favor of petitioners. Pursuant to this, the LBP certified
that the amount of P4,826,742.35 had been "reserved/earmarked" to cover the value of the subject
property. This, however, did not operate to effect payment for petitioners property in question as the law
requires payment of just compensation in cash or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds, not by trust
account.28
This is in line with the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,29 wherein it upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals in "ordering the LBP to
immediately deposit not merely earmark, reserve or deposit in trust with an accessible bank
designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and
in government financial instruments."30
A similar ruling was articulated by the Court in the aforementioned case of Roxas v. Court of Appeals,31to
wit:
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must
be made only in "cash" or "LBP" bonds. Respondent DARs opening of trust account deposits in petitioners
name with the Land Bank of the Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account
deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did
not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was
marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded
the basic requirement of administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the
CLOAs to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.
In the implementation of the CARP, the Special Agrarian Courts which are the Regional Trial Courts, are
given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners; and, (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
R.A. No. 6657.32 What agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate
power to decide the question.33

The New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, provides that in the event
a landowner is not satisfied with the decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the
matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, Rule XIII, Section 11 of
the aforementioned Rules states:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. -- The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
The procedure for the determination of the compensation for the landowners under the land reform
program was likewise outlined by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals:34
"Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of the lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking.35 Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to [Section] 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held 36 and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD), or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case
may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does
not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as [a] Special Agrarian Court. This
in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657."
Also, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 provides guidance on land valuation, to wit:
"Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and assessments made by the government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation."
Simply put, just compensation is the fair market value or the price which a buyer will pay without coercion
and a seller will accept without compulsion.37 Evidently, the law recognizes that the lands exact value, or
the just compensation to be given the landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with
certainty before the land titles are transferred.38 Expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657
take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.
The determination of just compensation under Section 16(d) 39 of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or
conclusive -- unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the
DAR, and the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. 40
Hence, petitioners recourse in this case is to bring the matter to the Regional Trial Court acting as a
Special Agrarian Court for the adjudication of just compensation. The price or value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the Government will be the criteria for determining just
compensation.41
As to the other grounds posited by petitioners for the cancellation of the CLOA issued to ARBA, Section IV-B
of DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994 enumerates some of the grounds for the cancellation of
registered CLOAs, namely:

1) Misuse or diversion of financial support services extended to the ARBs (Section 37 of R.A. No.
6657);
2) Misuse of the land (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657);
3) Material misrepresentation of the ARBs basic qualification as provided under Section 22 of R.A.
No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws;
4) Illegal conversion by the ARB (Section 73, Paragraph C and E of R.A. No. 6657);
5) Sale, transfer, lease or other form of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other
usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary in order to circumvent the
provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws. However, if the land
has been acquired under P.D. No.27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after full payment
of amortization by the beneficiary (Section 6 of E.O. No. 228);
6) Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortization in case of
voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force
majeure (Section 26 of R.A. No. 6657);
7) Failure of the ARBs to pay at least three (3) annual amortization to the LBP, except in cases of
fortuitous events and force majeure; (Section 26 of R.A. No. 6657);
8) Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2) calendar years
as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representatives (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657);
9) The land is found to be exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage or to be
part of the landowners retained area as determined by the Secretary or his authorized
representative; and,
10) Other grounds that will circumvent laws related to the implementation of agrarian reform
program."
Petitioners ascribe the specific prohibited acts stated in Nos. 5, 7 and 8 of the above Administrative Order
to ARBA and its member-beneficiaries which the Regional Adjudicator confirmed, thus:
"What is worse is that except for certain sporadic plantings, the land has been generally left to lie fallow
and uncultivated even with the award of the CLOA in Respondent ARBAs favor as revealed by the ocular
inspection conducted on March 23, 1993 (Vide, TSN of same date). Such neglect can only toll the death
knell for erring ARBs who also have been remiss in the payment of the annual amortization due which
should have commenced within one year from the date of CLOA registration on August 30, 1993 (Vide, DAR
Administrative Order NO. 6, series of 1993). In an undated instrument captioned as "Authorization" entered
into sometime in 1993 (Vide, Annex "A", Petitioners Ex-Parte Manifestation, etc. dated June 13, 1997, all
the 53 FB-awardees manifested their intent to negotiate for payment of disturbance compensation in
exchange for the voluntary surrender of their rights42 which is a prohibited transaction under Section 73 of
RA 6657, as amended, and DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994. Not only that. Strangely
enough, in the protracted hearings that were conducted in this case, not one CLOA Beneficiary/ARBA
member was presented to at least defend himself orally or by means of countervailing documentary
evidence."43
Based on the above, it is clear that the ARBA and its members have committed acts to justify the
revocation of the collective CLOA that had been issued by the DAR to the latter. The doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, however, does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 44
The failure of the DAR to comply with the requisites prescribed by law in the acquisition proceedings does
not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA that had been issued to ARBA. To assume the power is to
short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. DAR must be given a
chance to correct its administrative and procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. 45
It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of Agrarian
Reform is to the best advantage of petitioners since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes,
being the administrative agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter and vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform controversies. Further, the proceedings
therein are summary and the department is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the
end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive action or proceeding.46
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated December 15,
2000 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54970 are SET
ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to respondent Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for proper acquisition proceedings in accordance with the applicable administrative procedure.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34586 April 2, 1984
HOSPICIO NILO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ALMARIO GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36625 April 2, 1984
FORTUNATO CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN CASTRO, respondent.
Lavides Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:+.wph!1

Under Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, a landowner may eject
an agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground that the owner shall personally cultivate the land himself. On
September 10, 1971, Republic Act No. 6389, in amending Republic Act No. 3844, eliminated personal
cultivation as a ground for the ejectment of the tenant or leaseholder. The issue in these cases is whether
or not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that were filed during
the effectivity of the repealed provision.
G.R. NO. L-34586 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision ruling that
Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect.
Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio San Roque, San Rafael,
Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-76791 of the Registry
of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since
agricultural year 1964-65.
On February 22, 1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No. 1676 with the Court of Agrarian
Relations electing the leasehold system. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against
petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 which
provides:t.hqw
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding, Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment
and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the
Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential
factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes ...
Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal and retaliation
because he elected the leasehold system,
The two cases were heard jointly since they involved Identical landholding and parties. The Court of
Agrarian Relations found that there was a bona fide intention to cultivate the land personally. The
petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations. The Court found no justification to unduly interfere with the desire of Gatchalian to
personally cultivate his own land.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that "personal cultivation as a ground for
ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389". The latter law which
took effect on September 10, 1971 now provides:t.hqw
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes ....
The respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive
application.
G.R. NO. L-36625 This is an appeal raised by petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint for the ejectment of his tenant,
respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation. The landowner wants to personally cultivate
the land owned by him located in Pulilan, Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square meters. Petitioner
Fortunato Castro questioned the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended
Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court on the
ground that the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6389 fails squarely within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The complaint in this case was filed by the petitioner with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The petitioner
asked for the ejectment of his tenant Juan Castro. The latter in his answer alleged that the petitioner was
not the owner of the landholding in question and that assuming the petitioner was the owner, he is
nevertheless not qualified and fit to personally cultivate said landholding as he spends most of his time in
mahjong sessions and in cockpits.
After the enactment of Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, the respondent moved for the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground that the new law eliminated personal cultivation by the
landowmer as a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. The Court of Agrarian Relations
dismissed the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals alleging that: (1) the trial court erred in considering that Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which
amended Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 has a retroactive effect on an cases for ejectment of an
agricultural lessee 'from his landholding on the ground of personal cultivation even if the said cases were
filed long before the approval of the said Act; and (2) the trial court erred in not considering that Sec. 7 of
Republic Act No. 6389 is unconstitutional which point was raised by appellant in his opposition to
appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint and his motion for reconsideration of the order dated
December 17, 1971.
Since both cases involve the same issue of retroactivity, we shall resolve them together.

The issue of whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36 (1) of Republic
Act No. 3844, repealing as a consequence "personal cultivation" as a cause for dispossession, should be
given retroactive effect has spawned controversy. In Arambulo v. Conicon (CA-G.R. No. 46727-R, January 6,
1972) andPalpalatoc v. Pescador (CA-G.R. No. SP-00089-R, February 22, 1972), the Court of Appeals held
that the deletion of personal cultivation as a cause for ejectment has retroactive application affecting even
those cases pending in courts. The Arambulo case was elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari but
was denied in a minute resolution "for lack of merit" (G.R. No. L-34816, March 14, 1972).
In other cases, however, the Court of Appeals held that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect.
InLorenzo v. Lorenzo (CA-G.R. No. 46842-R, September 4, 1971), the Court made a categorical statement
that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect. There are other cases where the appellate court split
into two camps.
In resolving the controversy, we first apply established rules of statutory construction.
Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a
retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law
may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law,
otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in
mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted,
wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law
looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that
effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced:t.hqw
The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect,
nor is there anything found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an effect. Its
effect is, rather, by clear intendment, prospective.
It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. The cases
supporting this rule are almost without number.
In the case of Reynold v. M'Arthur (2 Pet., 416, 434), it was said that
It is a principle which has always been held sacred in the United States, that laws by which
human action is to be regulated, look forward not backward; and are never to be construed
retrospectively, unless the language of the Act shall render such construction indispensable.
In the case of Leate v. St. Louis State Bank (115 Mo., 184), it was held that
In construing statutes in regard to whether their action is to be prospective or retrospective,
all the adjudicated cases and all the text-writers with unbroken uniformity unite in declaring
'that they are to operate prospectively and not otherwise unless the intent that they are to
operate in such an unusual way, to wit, retrospectively, is manifested on the face of the
statute in a manner altogether free from ambiguity.
The case of Berdan v. Van Riper (16 N.J.L., 7) holds that where a statute is susceptible of
construction as both prospective and retrospective, the former construction will be adopted,

but especially if the retrospective operation will work injustice to anyone. ... (de Montilla v.
La Corporacion de PP. Agustinos; Ancajas v. Jakosalem, 24 Phil. 220).
The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543). Thus t.
hqw
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and
never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the
United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to
receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong,
and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of
the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive
when the legislature has not said so. ... (Farrel v. Pingree (1888), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843;
Greer v. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N. C., 495; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306;)
An earlier opinion to the same effect is In re Will of Riosa (39 Phil. 23). This is still the rule and it has stood
the test of time (Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Llanes, 49 Phil. 466; De Mesa v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53
Phil. 342; Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741; China Insurance & Surety Co. v. Judge of lst Inst. of Manila, 63
Phil. 320; La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. v. Bordman and Iloilo Commercial & Ice Co., 65 Phil. 401;
The Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, 66 Phil. 237; La Previsora Filipina v. Ledda, 66 Phil. 573;
Tolentino v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781; Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309; Tamayo v. Manila Hotel Co., 101 Phil.
810; Valencia v. Hon. Jose T. Surtida, 2 SCRA 622; Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA 682; Billiones v. Court of Industrial
Relations and Villardo v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 676; Lazaro v. Commissioner of Customs, 17
SCRA 36; Universal Corn Products, Inc. v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 1048; Cebu Portland Cement Co. v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 25 SCRA 789).
A restatement of the doctrine was made in the case of Espiritu v. Cipriano (55 SCRA 533.) Thus t.
hqw
xxx xxx xxx
... Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive
laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is
equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so
as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and
necessary implied from the language of the enactment. ... (Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App.
51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28 F (2d) 30.)
The general rule therefore, is that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein
(Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172). To exemplify this doctrine,
in Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408), we held that Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Act of
1959 has no retroactive effect. In Padasas v. Court of Appeals (82 SCRA 250), we held that the Agricultural
Land Reform Code or Republic Act No. 3844 must be enforced prospectively and not retroactively and
therefore, the rights created, granted, or recognized therein such as the right of redemption accrued upon
the enactment of said legislation and may be exercised thereafter in appropriate cases. In Jacinto v. Court
of Appeals (87 SCRA 263) reiterated in Castro v. Court of Appeals (99 SCRA 722) and in Baltazar v. Court of
Appeals (104 SCRA 619), we held that Presidential Decrees Nos. 27, 316, and 946 cannot be applied
retroactively.
More important than resort to statutory construction in determining the issue of retroactivity is the
ascertainment of the objectives sought to be realized by the Code of Agrarian Reforms.

In the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 6389, the applicable objectives are:t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the sman farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a
source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
It is the legislature which determines the policy objectives of reform legislation.
This Court would be thwarting and not promoting the objectives of Congress if we rule against the small
landowners in this case. The national goal of having independent and self reliant farmers tilling their own
small landholdings would not be achieved if persons who own only two hectares or 6,941 square meters of
land as in the instant cases cannot be allowed to work their land themselves but must be compelled to
perpetuate a lessor-lessee relationship. The desire of Congress to achieve a "dignified existence for the
small farmers" is not served if two families one landowner and one tenant must share the measly
produce from 6,941 square meters of land. Land reform and agrarian reform were intended to equalize
opportunities for land ownership, to enable a diffusion and sharing of wealth and not a sharing of poverty
or a fragmentation of tenanted farms into non-economic sizes.
We are aware of the deliberations and debates in Congress on Republic Act No. 6389. We stated
in Aisporna v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 481).t.hqw
That it was the intention of the legislature in amending paragraph (1), sec. 36 of R.A. 3844
to deprive the landowner of the right to eject his tenant on the ground that the former would
personally cultivate the land and also to abate cases brought by the landowner to eject the
tenant on the same grounds which were still pending at the time of the passage of the
amendatory act, is clear and evident from the deliberations and debate of Congress when
Republic Act 6389 was being deliberated, as published in the Senate Journal ....
This Aisporna case is, however, notably distinct from the two cases now before us. In Aisporna, the court
ordered the petitioner tenant ejected on the ground of personal cultivation by the landowner. The court
order became final and executory. One year after his ejectment, Aisporna availed himself of his remedies
under the law and filed a case for reinstatement with damages alleging that the owner failed to cultivate
the land himself. The trial court ruled in favor of Aisporna. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision stating that during the pendency of the action for reinstatement, the law was
amended and personal cultivation as a ground to eject a tenant was removed. The appellate court opined
that with the abolition of personal cultivation as a basis for ejectment, the corollary proviso on
reinstatement:t.hqw
... Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years
or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of
the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossession.
was also eliminated.

The issue in Aisporna was the right of the tenant to recover his status vis-a-vis the landholding from
whence he was ejected. To sustain the appellate decision would have resulted in a plain case of injustice to
the tenant and a condonation of bad faith. Our pronouncements on retroactivity dealt with this issue alone
and to the extent that theAisporna decision may be interpreted as covering factual situations similar to the
two cases now before us, to that extent we make it clear that it does not do so.
It is true that during the debates on the bill which was later enacted into Republic Act No. 3844, there were
statements on the floor that "the owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure"
even in cases where the owner has not really succeeded yet in ejecting the tenants (Senate Journal, Nos.
43 and 44, March 30 and 31, 1971, 2nd Regular Session 7th Congress). Nonetheless and inspite of these
remarks, Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover
ejectment cases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts.t.
hqw
... In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation
of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or
meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has
been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of
the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to
see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak,
is made up of two elements-an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is
perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the former. (59 C.J.S. 1017; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board, 107 Phil. 151).
In the case of Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board, supra, we held that legislative
debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not always safe guides
and, hence, may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is
impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the
legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did
not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other
(Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 499-501; Ramos vs. Alverez, 97 Phil. 844).
There have been cases in the past where we adhered to this doctrine. Thus, we held that individual
statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate.
Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (Casco Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v.
Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347; Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754). Accordingly, they are not controlling
in the interpretation of the law in question (Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees, Inc. v. GSIS, 14 SCRA 610).
Some statements may be deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator (Mayon Motors, Inc. vs.
Acting Com. of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 918).
The interpretation of statutes is for the courts. And the courts are not necessarily bound by one legislator's
opinion, expressed in Congressional debates, concerning the apPlication of existing laws (Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 102 Phil. 477).
The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic Act No. 6389 is a social legislation
and passed under the police power of the State, it should be liberally interpreted in favor of the tenants.
We agree with the petitioner-tenant that the law in question is social legislation. But social justice is not for
tenants alone. The disputed land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in L-34586 is
slightly bigger, about two (2) hectares. A person with only one or two hectares of land to his name is
equally deserving of social justice.

A majority of the landowners affected by the appeal of personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment
of a tenant own small landholdings. The records of Senate Bill No. 478 which eventually became Republic
Act No. 6389 reveal that the repeal has affected an estimated 75% of landowners in the country who own
tenanted lands of less than 3 hectares, 40% of those who own 5 hectares or less and 96% of landowners
who own an area of less than 10 hectares each.
Many of these landowners who filed actions for ejectment on this ground are retirees who have opted to
leave the stresses and strains of city life and to return to their home towns to personally cultivate their
small landholdings. They are teachers, clerks, nurses, and other hardworking and frugal people who in a
lifetime of sacrifice gathered their pitiful little savings and purchased small farms to supplement the
inadequate pensions from the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System. The
owners of the lots in these cases had the bona fideintention to personally cultivate their lands as proven
and found by the trial courts. To hold that they can no longer eject their tenants because of Republic Act
No. 6389 would deprive them of their right to enjoy their property which they had already asserted before
the statute was passed. Precisely, the legislators, in providing "personal cultivation" as a ground to eject
tenants intended to encourage and attract the landowners to go to their respective provinces and till their
own lands. Unfortunately, the ground of "personal cultivation" was abused and used as a pretext to eject
the tenant and this led to the amendatory law.
This unfortunate consequence should not work an injustice upon those small landowners proven to have
the bona fide intention to personally cultivate their lands. In Gonzales v. GSIS (107 SCRA 492), we held
that:t.hqw
It should also be borne in mind that Republic Act No. 3844, then known as the Agricultural
land Reform Code, is a social legislation whose implementation has been made more
imperative by Section 6, Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution. It is designed to promote
economic and social Stability. It must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to
its clear intent. This liberality in interpretation, however, should not accrue solely in favor of
actual tillers of the land, the tenant-farmers, but should extend to landowners as well,
especially those owning ,"small landholdings", by which is meant landholdings of 24
hectares and less than 24 hectares. These landowners constitute part of the economic
Middle class which the Government is trying to build. They deserve as much consideration
as the tenants themselves in order not to create an economic dislocation, were tenants
solely favored but this particular group of landowners impoverished. (See "Whereas",
clauses of LOI No. 143).
In Cabatan v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA 323), we similarly held that:t.hqw
... the reliance by the tenants-lessees on"social justice"as a reason to support the
continuance of an unjust and inequitable rental rate is not only improper but would
countenance and perpetuate an injustice against the landholder-lessor. This, the
constitutional precept of "social justice" was never meant to do.
xxx xxx xxx
Social justice as thus defined and in its true meaning is not meant to countenance, much
less perpetuate, an injustice against any group-not even as against landholders. For the
landholders as a component unit or element in our agro-industrial society are entitled to
'equal justice under law' which our courts are, above everything else, under mandate of the
Constitution to dispense fairly, without fear nor favor.
xxx xxx xxx

... A cursory study of the long line of decisions on social justice will readily reveal, however,
that the concept has been fleshed out-the principle, conceptualized as Justice Laurel
enjoined in the celebrated case of Calalang vs. Williams not thru mistaken sympathy for
or misplaced antipathy against any group whether labor or capital, landlord or tenant
but evenhandedly and fairly, thru the observance of the principle of "equal justice under
law," for all and each and every element of the body politic." (Eg. Calalang vs. Williams, 70
Phil. 726 (1940) cited, supra; Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, 47 O.G. 1848, (1949)
84 Phil. 847, a reconciliation between conflicting claims of social justice and protection to
property and rights; Militona Estate Inc. vs. De Guzman, et al., No. L-11912 (1959), 105 Phil.
1296 (unreported).
In Dequito v. Llamas, (66 SCRA 504) we ruled that the petitioner-tenant ought to know that if he has rights
to protection as a tenant, the landowner has also rights under the law. The protective mantle of social
justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to hoodwink courts of justice and undermine the rights of
landowners on the plea of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner.
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength from later
developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is impressed with a
social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself
but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of
social justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." The Constitution also ensures that
the worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life (Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta
vs, Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).
In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27,
which decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the
ownership of the land they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294). We noted the imperative need for
such a decree in Chavez v. Zobel (55 SCRA 26). We held in the latter case that "on this vital policy
question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense,
one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. ... There is no
doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now
part and parcel of the law of the land according to the present Constitution."
Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of the tenant from the bondage of the soil,
transfers to him the ownership of the land he tills, and provides instruments and mechanisms therefor, has
recognized personal cultivation as a ground for retention and, therefore, exemption from the land transfer
decree. Personal cultivation cannot be effected unless the tenant gives up the land to the owner.
Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:t.hqw
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.
The redistribution of land, restructuring of property ownership, democratization of political power, and
implementation of social justice do not require that a landowner should be deprived of everything he owns
and that even small parcels as in these two cases now before us may not be worked by the owner himself.
The evil sought to be remedied by agrarian reform is the ancient anachronism where one person owns the
land while another works on it. The evil is not present in cases of personal cultivation by the owner.

Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict requirements. In addition to proof of ownership and the
required notices to the tenant, the bona-fide intention to cultivate must be proved to the satisfaction of the
court. And as earlier stated, the tenant is Protected in case the owner fails to cultivate the land within one
year or to work the land himself for three years.
The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to landowners who do not own other
agricultural lands containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares or lands used for residential
commercial industry or other urban purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves
and their families. (Letter of Instruction No. 472 dated October 21, 1976).
To Support his petition, Fortunate Castro in L-36625 asserts that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 is
unconstitutional
The amended provision reads:t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon rommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential commercial industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shag be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years.
. There appears to be nothing unconstitutional in the above provision. If Mr. Castro is challenging agrarian
reform itself, then his challenge is puerile if not hopeless. We ruled in Vda, de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian
Relations (22 SCRA 792) that the Agricultural Land Reform Code is valid and justified. In Paulo v. Court of
Appeals (54 SCRA 253) we ruled:t.hqw
... Land Reform which is now transforming the rural existence of the farmers, has become
more imperative in view of the provisions of the New Constitution. Thus Section 6, Article II
thereof directs that 'the State shag promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare and
security of all the people,' and for the attainment of this end, directs that 'the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and diffuse of private property, and
equitably diffuse ownership and profits.' Section 6, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions
provides that the implementation of declared agrarian reforms' shall be given priority. There
is no question that the massive overhaul of the system of land ownership by the transfer to
the tenants of the ownership of the land they till and the grant to them of the instruments
and mechanisms to increase their land's productivity will decisively improve the people's
livelihood and promote political and social stability.
And, of course, Section 12 of Article XIV specifically mandates that "the State shad formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and
achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution." At any rate, there is no need to pass upon the
constitutional issue for the purpose of resolving the narrow question of retroactivity of the questioned
provision.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. L-34586 is denied for lack of merit and the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is aimed. In G.R. No. L-36625, the questioned order of the lower court is set aside and the
case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for trial on the merits.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and De
la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J. , and Teehankee, J., are on leave.