Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abstract
This paper will explore the political terrain leading to the 2010
presidential election. It seeks to understand the nature of presidential
campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines. Utilizing survey data,
it will trace trends that reflect continuity and change in Filipino
voting behavior. Moreover, it will apply the analytical tools of political
marketing, such as market segmentation and candidate positioning,
in identifying the key elements that contributed to a successful
presidential campaign in the three most recent electoral cycles.
The paper notes that electoral campaigns in the post-authoritarian
period have been waged with competing narratives of reformism,
populism and clientelism. The tradition of Filipino-style reformist
politics has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption and good
governance campaigns. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money
politics have manifested themselves in the machine-based campaigns
that have eroded the gains of reformism. The failure of reform
politics to address the problem of poverty, coupled by the ascendancy
of the mass media, has fueled the image-based populist campaigns.
Ultimately, the rise of media and public opinion polling as influential
conduits between national candidates and the electorate underscores
the need to find the right mix and astute use of image, issues and
machinery.
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 115
Candidate
2
The standard approach to analyzing Filipino electoral and party politics has been to view power
relations within the context of the patron-client factional (pcf) framework. The pcf framework
highlights the interpersonal, specifically the familial and patron-client, nature of Philippine politics
in a rural society (Lande, 1965; Kerkvliet, 1995). Another study has concluded that elite-dominated
factions and their bifurcated inter-familial rivalries have been replaced by local political machines
geared towards multi-factionalism and characterized by the alliance of factions into temporary blocs.
This trend was further reinforced by the breakdown of the two-party system and the emergence of
a multi-party system (Kimura, 1992). The onslaught of economic transformation and increased
social mobilization has largely depersonalized patron-client relations in the rural areas. Thus, the
reciprocal relationship between leader and followers has become contractual in nature. The potency
of the kinship system as an instrument of patronage has diminished and has been replaced with the
emergence of machine politics (Kawanaka, 2002).
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 119
Electorate
Command
Comm and Votes
Votes Market Votes
Ascendancy of media
Given the physical, financial and logistical impossibility of
personally facing the electorate in a national campaign, media has
emerged as the most efficient and cost-effective way of communicating
with the public. Broadcast media (radio and television) has emerged as
the primary source of news and information for the public. Broadcast
media, with an audience reach in the millions, has supplanted print
media, which is circulated in the hundreds of thousands. However,
while broadcast media has the most audience reach, it tends to
have less substance since everything is reduced into a two- or three-
sentence sound byte. On the other hand, print media offers much
space for elaborate explanations (Carandang, 2004).
Within broadcast media, television has replaced radio as the
source of information for the masses. This trend has been manifested
since the late 1980s when television sets were sold by the hundreds
of thousands. Programming and language shifted from English to
Tagalog to reach the mass audience. By 1995, some 57 percent of
households nationwide had TV sets. This figure has risen to 85 percent,
as of 2001 (Coronel, 2003). In 2001, a 13-year old law banning political
advertising was lifted, thus opening the floodgates of media-related
expenditures for political campaigns. The 2004 elections “marked the
first time that presidential candidates spent more than half of their
total campaign expenses on advertising” (Gloria et al., 2004: 30) (see
Table 1).
122
Note: SWS utilized several survey techniques, hence only the rankings can be
compared.
Source: Posadas & Sandoval, 1992
3
The Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ) is a Christian sect founded by former Seventh Day Adventist
member Felix Manalo in 1914. The sect grew in numbers and became very influential in local and
national politics as a result of its practice of block voting.
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 127
fund for the Rebel Returnee Program were distributed to local officials
supportive of the Ramos campaign (Balgos, 1998).
Ramos, a protestant and only the second non-Catholic to seek
the presidency, secured the endorsement of two tightly-knit religious
organizations – the El Shaddai of Brother Mike Velarde and Jesus is
Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva. In terms of regional strength, he
got the bulk of his support from the country’s most heavily populated
regions: Central Luzon and the Cebuano-speaking areas of the Visayas
and Mindanao. In addition, he was exceptionally strong in two
provinces with very large populations, Pangasinan and Cebu (Lande,
1996) (see Appendix 1).
Santiago did not have a political machinery to support her
candidacy. Her People’s Reform Party had no congressional or local
candidates and it had only a partial senatorial slate, which included
five retired generals. It was only in the latter part of the campaign
that she was able to convince Ramon Magsaysay Jr. to be her vice-
presidential running-mate. What she lacked in traditional political
machinery, she made up for with a non-traditional campaign powered
largely by unpaid volunteers, made up of students and civic leaders
(Lande, 1996).
Santiago won in two of the country’s most densely populated
regions: the National Capital Region and its surrounding semi-
urban provinces, and Western Visayas, particularly vote-rich Negros
Occidental and Iloilo (Lande, 1996). While she topped most media and
campus surveys, the SWS surveys from July 1991 to early February
1992 had her running second to Ramos. By April 1992, she was able
to overtake Ramos, but her lead was not statistically significant
(Mangahas, 1994).
Keys to success
In 1992, Ramos consistently topped the surveys, articulated the
proper issue (people’s empowerment) consistent with his image
as one of the EDSA heroes, and had government resources at his
128
Ramos Santiago
Mitra
Salonga
Cojuangco
with 15.9 percent ; Senator Raul Roco was on third place with 13.8
percent ; and Emilio “Lito” Osmeña placed fourth with 11 percent of
the national vote.
Populist onslaught
Estrada’s popularity was formidable; his support from the masa
was solid. His popularity compensated for the relative handicap of
his LAMMP coalition vis-à-vis the administration Lakas party. Estrada
dominated the SWS surveys throughout the campaign period. From
January to May 1998, he did not relinquish the top position in the
opinion polls (see Table 6). Although rejected by a small but significant
ABC or middle-to-upper classes, Estrada nevertheless won as a result
of mass support from the D and E classes – the so-called masa vote.
The 1998 election was the first time that the masa came out solidly
behind a single candidate. Estrada captured 38 percent of the class D
and 48 percent of the class E votes (Mangahas, 1998).
The Estrada campaign will be remembered for one of the most
successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential
campaigns – Erap para sa mahirap (Erap for the poor). The slogan did
not only capture the core message and issue of the Estrada campaign,
it was also in synch with his image as an idol of the masses. He won
the endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and SWS exit polls indicated
that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for him. Estada was
also endorsed by El Shaddai; however, only 39 percent of its members
actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 4).
Estrada was subjected to a barrage of negative attacks revolving
around his character and competence. His opponents raised the issue
of morality, particularly regarding his mistresses, his drinking sprees
and gambling habit. His lack of advanced education was also used to
cast doubt on his competence. While these allegations had some basis
in fact, his popularity did not wane. His media strategists even used the
“Erap jokes” that were circulating to further endear him to the masses.
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 131
Estrada 19 17 23 19 28 28 28 30 33
De Venecia 1 2 5 3 11 12 14 12 15
Roco 3 6 5 9 10 9 11 10 11
Osmeña - - - 3 17 13 9 13 11
Lim - - - - 14 14 14 13 10
De Villa 1 0.5 3 4 7 6 5 5 6
Arroyo 14 17 22 19 - - - - -
Enrile - - - - - 0.9 2 2 3
Santiago 18 14 13 13 9 5 7 4 2
Marcos - - - - - 2 2 2 0.3
Undecided 0 1 3 14 4 10 7 9 9
Keys to success
In 1998, Estrada’s popularity as an actor was reinforced by his
core message (Erap para sa Mahirap), his single-issue campaign,
134
which was consistent with his image, and his machinery that was largely
provided by the LDP and NPC. He managed to secure his frontrunner
position throughout the campaign, which projected invincibility and
resulted in a bandwagon effect. De Venecia had the advantage of
having a well-financed party machinery in the form of the monolithic
administration party Lakas NUCD-UMDP, and the endorsement of
President Ramos which translated into access to government resources.
However, like Mitra in 1992, he was very unpopular and suffered from a
negative trapo image.
De Venecia Estrada
Roco
Osme ña
Lim
De Villa
two for the senate and one for vice president. She got the highest
number of votes on her second run for the senate in 1995, and when
she won the vice presidency in 1998. Aside from Pampanga, she also
counted Bacolod, Negros Occidental (her husband’s province) and
Iligan, Lanao del Norte (her mother’s province) as her bailiwicks. In
successive SWS surveys, she consistently scored high in the Visayas,
where she outranked Fernando Poe Jr. She eventually consolidated
her ethno-linguistic base (i.e. Cebuano and Ilonggo) in the Visayas
and Mindanao to counter Poe’s dominance in Luzon (see Appendix
6).
In terms of presidential preference, Arroyo consistently trailed
behind other candidates. Before her October 2003 announcement
that she would seek election, she consistently trailed behind Senators
Noli de Castro and Raul Roco, except in June of the same year when
she placed first with 20 percentage points in the SWS survey. Her
numbers did not pick up after her October announcement. It was only
in January 2004 that she overtook Roco with 27 percentage points,
and placed second to Fernando Poe Jr. She benefited largely from
the decision of survey frontrunner Noli de Castro to withdraw and
become her vice-presidential candidate. By February 2004, she had
become competitive, rising two percentage points and narrowing her
margin with Poe in the SWS survey (see Table 8).
138
Jan
Dec May - Jun Aug Sep Nov Jan Feb Mar Mar Apr May
- Feb
02 Jun 03 03 03 03 03 04 04 04 04 04 04
04
De Castro 19 22 18 20 28 24 - - - - - - -
Others 12 10 15 15 8 - - - - - - - -
Candidate/ Nov ‘03 Jan ‘04 Feb ‘04 Mar ‘04 Apr ‘04
Sector (1,200) (1,800) (1,800) (4,800) (1,800)
Arroyo, G.M.
ABC 21 28 33 32 33
D 27 36 33 34 39
E 32 30 29 32 35
Poe, F. Jr.
ABC 15 25 23 22 18
D 27 33 30 27 28
E 32 43 39 41 41
Lacson, P.
ABC 17 14 14 13 19
D 12 8 11 11 12
E 10 8 10 6 7
Roco, R
ABC 41 25 17 19 12
D 32 20 17 13 7
E 24 16 13 10 5
Villanueva,
E.
- 4 2 4 7
ABC
- 1 1 4 6
D
- 1 2 3 2
E
Undecided/
None/NR
6 5 11 6 1
ABC
2 3 8 12 7
D
2 3 7 8 8
E
Populism falters
After 282 movies and 48 years as the undisputed box-office king
of Philippine cinema, Fernando Poe Jr. (popularly known as FPJ)
performed the greatest role of his life by running for the presidency
and following in the footsteps of his best friend, Joseph Estrada.
His candidacy was borne out of the efforts of several sectoral and
140
volunteer groups that urged him to run. His main political vehicle was
the hastily-formed coalition – the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) – composed of the LDP, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas
ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), and the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP).
FPJ’s electoral strength was both regional and class-based. In
Luzon, FPJ relied on his home province of Pangasinan as his major
bailiwick. He was also particularly strong in Mindanao where he had
a strong following among the Muslim communities. His campaign
hoped to capture the class D and E votes that delivered the presidency
to Estrada in 1998. FPJ’s survey numbers surged initially despite his
late declaration to run for the presidency. However, a series of negative
news stories about him, including a disqualification case filed at the
Supreme Court, succeeded in halting his upward momentum. Moreover,
FPJ’s refusal to articulate his platform or participate in debates fatally
impaired his candidacy. His public appearances were limited to smiling,
waving and saluting to the crowd, and his speeches were limited to one-
liners, which were often taken from his movies.
Despite the huge number of fans who attended his campaign
sorties, the failure of FPJ to mount an insurmountable lead in the
presidential surveys prevented most local politicians from endorsing
his candidacy and discouraged political financiers from infusing funds
into his campaign. In the end, he lost his hold on his core demographic
base – the class D and E votes. Ironically, he captured the youth vote,
but majority of the older voters supported Arroyo (see Appendix 9).
His campaign was also saddled by internal bickering among the
parties and organizations within the opposition coalition. His failure
to unite with recalcitrant opposition candidate Panfilo Lacson further
weakened the political opposition, weighed down his campaign
message of “national unity” and resulted in the withdrawal of support
of the influential Iglesia ni Cristo. In the end, the opposition failed to
provide the political vehicle for the charismatic Poe.
Unlike President Estrada’s Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP) coalition in 1998, which managed to assemble the requisite
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 141
Keys to Success
Despite serious charges raised by the opposition regarding
the conduct and outcome of the 2004 presidential election, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo managed to claim a new mandate and was
proclaimed victorious by Congress. On March 29, 2005, the Supreme
Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), dismissed
the election protest filed by defeated opposition candidate Fernando
Poe Jr. “on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward
within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be
substituted for the deceased protestant” (Clapano, 2005). Poe had
died from a stroke on December 14, 2004, with the resolution of his
election protest still pending. The PET dismissed the request of his
widow, Susan Roces, to substitute for her deceased husband since
the rules allowed only the registered candidates who obtained the
second and third highest votes for the presidency to file an election
protest.
The victory of President Arroyo and her running mate, Senator
Noli de Castro, was the first time a presidential and vice-presidential
ticket was not split in the three elections since 1992. The immensely
popular former television newscaster and senator, Noli de Castro,
defeated equally popular fellow newscaster and senator, Loren
Legarda. De Castro, whose name was earlier floated as a presidential
contender, contributed much to the victory of Arroyo in terms of vote
transferability, as the administration’s internal survey indicated that
an estimated 70 percent of those who would vote for de Castro would
also vote for Arroyo. The inclusion of de Castro in the president’s
ticket also allowed Arroyo to communicate with the poor, who
142
Arroyo Poe
Lacson Roco
Villanueva
Arroyo’s victory was also the first time in Philippine history that
a presidential candidate won the election by winning the southern
islands of Visayas and Mindanao but losing in the traditional locus of
political power – the northern island of Luzon. Despite the fact that
Luzon was Arroyo’s natural bailiwick, majority of its voters indicated
their preference for Poe in successive surveys conducted by SWS and
Pulse Asia prior to the election. Given her political weakness in Luzon,
she relied on the political clans and bosses in the Visayas and Mindanao
to deliver the votes for her (De Castro, 2004). The administration also
succeeded in getting the support of seven out of ten governors in vote-
rich provinces (Go, 2004).
The President’s candidacy was reinforced by the religious command
votes that were delivered by the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai (see
Appendix 7). According to estimates, each religious group can deliver
between two to four million votes. In 1998, Erap Estrada got the
endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai. The 1998 SWS
exit polls indicated that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 143
Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Feb May Jun Sep
07 07 08 08 08 08 09 09 09 09
Aquino - - - - - - - - - 60
De Castro 25 30 35 31 29 31 27 21 19 8
Villar 18 27 17 25 28 27 26 29 33 37
Estrada 5 9 14 11 13 11 13 13 25 18
Legarda 44 23 30 26 26 28 25 14 15 5
Roxas 9 20 16 13 13 10 15 18 20 12
Escudero 13 15 19 14 16 19 23 15 20 15
Lacson 18 13 12 16 17 14 14 12 7 2
Villanueva 0.5 0.4 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.7 0.8 1
Fernando 0.2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
Others 15.6 14.7 9.3 8.2 10.5 4.74 8 10.1 5.7 0.5
Don’t Know 12 12 11 15 9 7 13 20 18 6
None 6 5 5 8 9 12 7 9 - 4
Revival of reformism
At the outset, it became apparent that the 2010 electoral battle was
going to be waged in terms of an expensive media war and a pitched
battle for the mobilization of local political machineries. However, the
massive outpouring of national grief over the death of former President
and democracy icon Corazon C. Aquino on August 1, 2009 reawakened
a sense of collective nostalgia for the democratic struggle against
the Marcos dictatorship. Similar to the events of 1983 after Senator
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. was assassinated, thousands representing
a cross-section of Philippine society – from street vendors to middle-
aged professionals and their children – literally lined up in the streets of
Manila to pay their last respects to the former president. The tremendous
national grief, coupled with deep frustration over the scandal-ridden
Arroyo administration, rekindled the flames of reformist aspirations.
Suddenly, national attention shifted to Aquino’s son, Senator
Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, as the bearer of the reformist struggle.
In a repeat of his mother’s path to the presidency, several individuals
and private organizations launched a signature drive urging the young
Aquino to consider running for president under the Liberal Party in 2010.
Recognizing the signs of the times, Mar Roxas graciously withdrew
his presidential candidacy in favor of Aquino. His act – similar to the
withdrawal of Salvador “Doy” Laurel in favor of Cory Aquino – further
reinforced the historical parallelisms with the 1986 campaign for the
snap presidential election. A special SWS survey covering the vote-
rich Lingayen-Lucena corridor was commissioned in September 2009
to test the potentials of a Noynoy candidacy. The poll was taken a day
after Roxas’ withdrawal but weeks before Aquino’s declaration that he
would seek the presidency (see Table 11).
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 147
Region Region
Total NCR Pangasinan
III IV-A
Joseph Estrada 13 15 5 14 13
Francis Escudero 12 14 10 9 12
Noli De Castro 7 5 14 8 6
Don’t Know 2 1 0 1 3
None 1 1 1 1 2
Table 12: Pulse Asia First Choice Presidential Preference for 2010 Election
(October 22-30, 2009)
Location Class
Bal
RP NCR Vis Min ABC D E
Luz
Escudero, Francis 13 17 16 9 9 12 15 10
Estrada, Joseph 11 11 9 3 21 5 9 17
De Castro, Noli 4 2 5 5 4 1 4 6
Teodoro, Gilbert 2 4 1 1 1 4 2 1
Fernando, Bayani 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Villanueva, Eduardo 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1
Others 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
None/Refused/Undecided 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 2
Keys to Success
Some political analysts and opinion columnists have described the
surge in the surveys of Noynoy Aquino as a “game changer”. With the
rise in his numbers in the surveys, it is apparent that the core reformist
issues such as transparency, accountability and good governance have
gained ground as the central issues of the 2010 election. As political
analyst Amando Doronila (2009) observed, “the survey results reflect the
deep and broad resonance of the issue of clean and honest governance
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 149
Estrada
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Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 157
F. M. E. R. I. J. S.
Ramos Santiago Cojuangco Mitra Marcos Salonga Laurel
Language
Cebuano 4.97 -4.49 -0.24 0.45 3.84 2.54 -0.32
Tagalog -1.20 -1.46 0.97 0.43 2.29 0.51 20.06
Ilocano -0.01 -4.33 8.09 -1.97 8.51 1.18 1.21
Hiligaynon 1.17 1.15 -0.15 -1.91 4.62 0.44 -0.43
Bicolano 0.00 -0.52 -0.02 0.16 0.01 0.45 0.03
Samar-Leyte -3.20 -3.15 -2.02 -0.07 9.72 10.44 0.38
Pangasinan 14.19 0.01 0.63 -0.15 -2.76 -0.48 -1.05
Major
0.91 2.24 -0.01 -0.85 -2.21 1.34 -0.03
Language
Religion
Protestant 5.06 0.61 -1.74 0.06 -2.41 0.44 -9.43
Aglipayan -0.90 0.39 -0.15 -2.19 1.66 -1.58 0.94
Iglesia ni
0.12 0.00 1.46 0.00 -4.79 -0.31 -0.60
Cristo
Muslim 0.62 0.14 0.00 0.42 -3.52 0.36 -3.75
Other
-0.99 0.62 -0.27 1.61 -3.06 -0.01 0.01
Religion
Crops
Rice -3.73 1.72 0.41 -0.75 0.14 0.12 0.75
Corn -5.13 0.12 0.90 0.05 -0.39 -0.75 2.95
Sugar -3.25 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.99 -0.63 17.14
Tobacco -0.29 1.02 -0.55 -0.05 -0.41 -1.42 -1.03
Perm. Crops -0.31 0.54 -0.52 -0.86 -0.34 0.07 8.42
Information
College -0.46 2.99 -2.15 -2.77 -0.02 0.02 10.82
Grade School -1.38 -0.92 -0.28 0.98 1.04 2.50 0.72
No School 0.00 -1.58 -0.74 0.00 4.44 0.33 4.89
Radio 0.00 -0.68 0.00 4.78 0.01 -5.10 0.34
Estrada 38.8% 41.7% 31.1% 43.6% 49.6% 9.9% 44.7% 6.1% 7.9% 52.4% 38.9% 37.3% 52.7%
De
16.2 10.8 15.4 12.5 24.7 7.2 12.1 14.3 90.6 5.3 26.8 11.1 27.4
Venecia
Roco 13.4 19.1 3.6 3.0 5.4 80.0 22.2 0.6 1.5 5.3 15.7 4.9 1.9
Osmeña 12.1 1.5 38.8 9.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 8.3 0.0 15.3 8.7
Lim 9.1 13.8 6.6 9.1 4.1 1.0 19.3 11.4 0.0 26.7 3.4 8.8 3.8
De Villa 4.7 10.6 2.2 2.3 1.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 1.9 1.2 1.8 2.1
Santiago 3.1 1.8 0.4 19.2 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.4
Enrile 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.8
Marcos 0.9 0.0 1.7 1.1 .1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.5
Dumlao 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.8
Morato 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Estrada 38.8% 37.0% 81.4% 34.7% 29.0% 63.2% 34.7% 39.2% 51.9% 43.2% 33.0%
De
16.2 14.9 6.4 27.6 26.4 24.7 23.2 11.0 23.4 13.1 15.6
Venecia
Roco 13.4 14.7 3.4 5.1 11.0 2.3 11.7 20.9 10.0 0.0 14.2
Osmeña 12.1 12.5 2.1 9.3 16.1 1.9 11.5 4.6 6.5 38.0 13.3
Lim 9.1 9.8 3.3 8.2 7.0 3.7 8.2 11.4 8.2 5.6 14.6
De Villa 4.7 5.2 1.7 0.0 3.6 2.4 3.4 10.6 0.0 0.0 4.7
Santiago 3.1 3.2 0.0 8.5 2.9 0.0 2.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 3.0
Enrile 1.4 1.1 3.6 1.6 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Marcos 0.9 0.8 0.6 2.9 1.8 0.5 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Dumlao 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Morato 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Arroyo 41% 41 74 29 47 41 34 54 23 24 13 46
Poe 32 32 10 30 44 29 33 22 53 23 63 22
Lacson 9 10 1 8 3 9 10 7 16 0 0 8
Roco 5 6 0 3 3 3 8 6 4 3 0 7
Villanueva 5 3 0 25 0 10 4 1 2 44 0 9
No Answer 8 8 15 6 3 7 10 10 3 5 24 7
Arroyo 41% 41 41 33 38 44 44 45
Poe 32 30 33 38 33 30 31 28
Lacson 9 11 8 11 10 8 8 7
Roco 5 5 5 8 6 5 3 5
Villanueva 5 5 5 5 6 6 3 3
No Answer 8 8 8 4 6 7 10 12