Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200
April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Batangas City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints 1 filed by Antonio M.
Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent),
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In
the Matter of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed
under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the
respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines
(SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that
in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave
Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and
Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure
to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as
rehabilitation receiver over SCPs objections and despite serious
conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver
for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCPs creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged
as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed
as "consultative meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in
places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a
hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she
arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the
rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also
announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation
plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a

replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent
exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and preempted the rehabilitation receivers exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal
meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had
favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with
EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and presence of
SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty.
Gabionzas financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial
adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the
rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCPs expense. Anonas is
also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas
law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or
accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion to
create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a
subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIBs witnesses to prove
the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a
management committee), the respondent denied SCPs requests
and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated
SCPs counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt
to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period
prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond
the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission
to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23,
Rule 4 of the Rules (the courts power to approve the rehabilitation
plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to
decide the matter in EPCIBs favor and made comments and rulings
in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed
special interest and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint 3 dated April 14, 2008
where he alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when
she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called

"Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for
the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper
body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated
March 18, 2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she
admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited
for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to
all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if
indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of
judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature
because judicial remedies were still available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings
and conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even
encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of
rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules 6 gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all
the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve
the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that
it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she
only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would
attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended
that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law.
She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section 11,
Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First,
she claimed that her denial of the complainants motion for inhibition was not
due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she
argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced
by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed
her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty.
Gabionza as SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the
grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she
maintained that the rest of the complainants allegations were not
substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in
not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide
matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations

were not proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also
believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the
informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted
that the photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could
hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire
is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not
forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically
made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao
v. Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are
different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondents
acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account
constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01, 11 2.0212 and
2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the
complaints as regular administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The CAs Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating
Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by
both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, 15 Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found
that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondents appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents
decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her
ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation plan
could no longer be implemented in view of SCPs financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to
present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and
deliberately acted against SCPs interests; the complaint merely relied on his
opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not
covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within
the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison
found nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were
agreed upon by all the parties, including SCPs creditors. She also found
satisfactory the respondents explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the

respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel and ruled that
her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In
the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off
the matter with what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of
her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a
judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for.
xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming
of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable. 16
On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of
maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying photos of herself
and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) even during
these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend
constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the
publics acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and
the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision17 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures
prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence
was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and
recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the
respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial
decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the
following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of
the Honorable Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene
Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial
Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty

Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from
further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not
guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her
orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the
rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the
respondents explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary
period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority
and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the
subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice
Gonzales-Sisons observations that the respondents act of posting seductive
photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set
forth by the Code.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the
OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as
indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross
ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The
absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.
On
the
Charges
of
Grave
Abuse
of
Authority;
Irregularity
in
the
Performance
of
Duty;
Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus
of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. 20 In the
present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are
devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondents
bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves,
however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice
or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent
judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance
of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions
and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial
functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant.
"An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular
or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is
available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23Errors
committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead
through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the
respondent baseless. The truth about the respondents alleged partiality
cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainants verified
complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without
respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. 25 There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion
of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and
surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the
respondents predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind
of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted
regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainants
failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.
On
the
Charges
of
Grave
Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. 27 "[A]s a
matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of
Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a
rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of
the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the
debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza,
subject to the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The
complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority
and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find,

however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith
or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance
of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption 31 or had committed an
error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in
rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his
bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with
competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot
conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a
management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the
purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad
faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the
Constitution demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be
given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent
danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-companys
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court
should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously
deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every
adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity
to present its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the
CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondents act of denying
SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As
aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM
without observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for
every erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need
not observe due care in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When
a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent,
error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross

ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondents act
of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the
benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to
punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On
the
Ground
of
Failure
to
Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by
the Rules, we find the respondents explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the
court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the
initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it
appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for
approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the
180-day period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with
particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether
Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty
clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition
within one (1) year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for
good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the
Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the
respondents approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we
find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and
for the consequent delay.
On
the
Ground
of
Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the
dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise

more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should
possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge
Carretas,42 a judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons
who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can
never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered
petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, 43 the Court
declared that "although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate
language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless
demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in
conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal
counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible
lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct
that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of
superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed
to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She
also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate
language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her]
conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable
observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or
any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and
thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in
the Internet a new medium through which more and more Filipinos
communicate with each other.45 While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we
remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They
carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that
every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light
that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted
her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not
prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking
site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom
of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless
of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom
of expression. The respondent judges act of joining Friendster is, therefore,
per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also
imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of
their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their
personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety
and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster
photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this
available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks,
judges must bear in mind that what they communicate regardless of whether
it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties creates and
contributes to the peoples opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts
the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends,
but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in
the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this
picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos would
seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member
of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges
are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport
themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and
personal matters.1wphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior
under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the
performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when
they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 018-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any
of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light
offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under
Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less
thanP1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand;
and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively
charged or found liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first
offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her
offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand
Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to
refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C.
MAGULTA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to
both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-

client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty

to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other
disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P.
Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn
Statement alleging the following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta
and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City,
who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me
the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of
the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which
he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on
January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I
needed the case filed immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the
complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of
its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or
from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that
I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait
[every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he
said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland,
Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he
personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within
the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on
that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to
go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint
to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no
record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of
the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the
court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he
has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing
fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse
me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are
attached as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I
wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty
and oppressive conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently
denying the allegations of complainant for being totally outrageous and
baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of
the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to
draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the
former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand
letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked
the process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter to the
addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a threehour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose
of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise
agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by
complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later
on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no
settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for
breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees.
When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim
was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to
respondents secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill
case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the

attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance
and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that
the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he
should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for
the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by
another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered
to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on
for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his
interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the
acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed
first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees. When
respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The
lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law
office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted
and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or
deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the
undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the
Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was
to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client,
the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover
up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement
by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer:
(a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his
appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the
Regwill complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court.
Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his
office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability
in the prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that
duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but
also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the
respect of the community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar must
do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public
in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.[6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship
existed between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents
as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very
first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is
it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults
a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established.[7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close
personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the formers fees.[8] Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed
legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer
was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had
actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the clients
interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take
up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. [9]They owe entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by
the rules of law legally applied.[10]

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt

issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The
IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel
of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously
indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the
mistake -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken
steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainants
attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the
correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to
be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is
a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence
may be attained without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as
evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter
also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. [15] Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation
of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession.[16] It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession;
that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all
effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.[18]Respondent fell short of
this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that
the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of
duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised

with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a
penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules
16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy
in respondents file.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding
respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended
from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment
from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy
Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844).
Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas
bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the
RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b)
of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to
the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal
(Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as
counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the
MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and
equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house.
Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a
petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation
and Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10,
1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be
remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the
RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in

accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA
dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections
(Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the
defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to
be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation,
unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or
lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by
fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present complaint
to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were
secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis
supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA
decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to
set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral
Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for
reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R.
No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of
petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the
petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and
November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such
resolution was likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining
Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the
Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was
premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a
writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624)
with
the
RTC,
Branch
1,
Bangued,
Abra
for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial
Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution
issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent
alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul
the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the
implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624

for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's

Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of
Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review
byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code
enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to
dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is
not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any
arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But
the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and
meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of
Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a
lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications
(Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the
following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising
from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like
the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the
sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment
(Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F.
2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully
protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal
from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and
underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the
MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending
its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond
and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for

annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA
(CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there
was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was
denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured
through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that
the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . .
. (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded,
respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for
execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA
423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to
the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is
ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with
becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no
jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the
same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v.
Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the
execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered
in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued,
Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment
of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions
filed with the Court of Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review
On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review
By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of
Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the
execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum
shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum,

defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In

the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court
explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the
Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice
and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to
add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final
and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary
action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for
willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all
good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and
honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to
get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated
the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put
up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws
(Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the
Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and
petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and
disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights
of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and
Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and

other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,

conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in
the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law

practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal

instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of
the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing
for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To

engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the
session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on
Audit. May I be allowed to make a very
brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is
that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the
provision "who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed
in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on
Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield
to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that

service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on
the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that
the work of COA, although it is auditing,
will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications
in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction
given to this is that this is equivalent to
the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice
is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of

law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22
A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known
in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's
role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal
profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip,
a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen
whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know
that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advicegiving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients
and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special

roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses
of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively
little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a crossdisciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive

contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's
or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining
the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He
is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer
who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation
he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management.
( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of

being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved
in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number
of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in
the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvardeducated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one
who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily
with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance to
the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known
as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate

lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the

resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decisionmaking within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management
of
technology.
New
collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from
industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
from
other
countries.
In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples
of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of
the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as
the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking

ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures

and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible
to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make
better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computerbased models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of
such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special
skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in
a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the

relationships needed in trying to make a global economy

work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of
the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally
with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues
if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991,
p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench)
is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit
to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will
the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he
feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination
of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than
ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts
as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's

Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks
of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference
in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform
one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but
must also state the recourse open to either party when the
other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which
in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic
and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry

no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men

learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius
and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role
of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must
be performed by the officer in which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within
the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)

acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No.

L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it
to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised
two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years.
Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of
the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is

indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the

incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee
by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body
in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the
spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened
to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit
only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and
after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification
by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and
even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had
not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least
ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition
is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of
the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section
1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn

and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining

constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers
to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished
from mere
possession
of
knowledge;
it
connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine."
A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice
his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed
as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or
attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen,
4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when
one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People

v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p.

1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the
use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice
of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S.
462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of
law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which
requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed.,
p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the
practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from
the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which

constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors
as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must
have
presented
himself
to
be
in
theactive and continued
practice
of
the
legal
profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must
dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him
while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is
made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion
of the appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office
who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion
that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by
this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court
in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not
he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase

"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the

numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application
of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance
adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or
give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only
as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any
activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents
a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge
and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a
public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act
and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say
that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial
and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living,
or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that
he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law
whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended

over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is

doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of
law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in
fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote
behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter);
4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result
because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely
to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive
ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before
us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a
member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term
beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated
his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in
the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged
in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement
in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned
is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for

ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of

one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod
has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his
law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working
for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a
member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing
the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),
University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief
Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission
Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the
December 1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in
various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined
meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine
bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering
of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge,
such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the
legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined.People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases
cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula
or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.

"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an

attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when
the giving of such advice or rendition of such service
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E.
901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not
only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him
were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever
prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions
where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very
seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times
he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twentyone years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When
asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer
was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts
in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the
deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a
practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice
in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a realestate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in
drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes
and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.
2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person

designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used
as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney
in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb.
Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified
to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney
are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage
the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to
keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4)
to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of
acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or
a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14
SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of
law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies
customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for
the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.

146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer

before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law
in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p.
1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited
from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and
consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for
membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which
may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in
the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous.
Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling
in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288
[1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, VicePresident, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered
that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit
only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the

Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and

after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification
by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and
even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had
not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least
ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition
is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of
the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section
1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers
to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished
from mere
possession
of
knowledge;
it
connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine."
A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice

his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed

as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or
attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen,
4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when
one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the
use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice
of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806

citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S.

462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of
law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which
requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed.,
p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the
practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from
the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors
as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must
have
presented
himself
to
be
in
theactive and continued
practice
of
the
legal
profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent

Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must
dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him
while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is
made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion
of the appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office
who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion
that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by
this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court
in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not
he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the
numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application
of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance
adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or
give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only
as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any
activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be

considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents

a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge
and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a
public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act
and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on
to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living,
or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that
he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law
whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended
over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is
doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of
law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in
fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote
behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter);
4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result
because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of

discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he

viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely
to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive
ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before
us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a
member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term
beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated
his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in
the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged
in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement
in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned
is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod
has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his
law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working
for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a
member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing

the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),
University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief
Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission
Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the
December 1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that

legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in
various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined
meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life.
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine
bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering
of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge,
such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the
legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined.People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases
cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula
or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when
the giving of such advice or rendition of such service
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E.
901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not
only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him

were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever
prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions
where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very
seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times
he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twentyone years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When
asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer
was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts
in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the
deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a
practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice
in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is
concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a realestate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in
drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes
and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.
2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used
as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney
in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb.
Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified
to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney
are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage

the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to
keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4)
to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of
acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or
a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14
SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of
law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies
customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public
as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for
the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law
in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p.
1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited
from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and
consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of

practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for
membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which
may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in
the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous.
Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling
in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288
[1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, VicePresident, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered
that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts[3] of Murder
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted
by counselde parte, pleaded not guilty.

THIRD DIVISION

JOHN HILARIO y SIBAL,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 161070

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took
over representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.

On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[4] finding petitioner and
his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 14, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

count.

On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a Petition
for Relief[5] from the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

merit. In his petition, petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment, he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed

to the National Penitentiary inMuntinlupa; that he had no way of personally filing the notice

by John Hilario y Sibal (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated

of appeal thus he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to

August 19, 2003[1] and November 28 2003[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

repose his full trust and confidence to his lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file

75820.

the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he

The antecedents are as follows:

was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons,Muntinlupa City and learned from
the grapevine of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that
believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated
December 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his
representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC; that no notice of appeal

was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear instructions; and that the RTC Decision

The Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for Relief where he

showed that it was received by his counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did

contended that the petition should no longer be entertained; and that perfection of appeal

not inform him of any action taken thereon.

in the manner and within the period permitted by law was not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal rendered the judgment final and executory.

Petitioner claimed that he had a meritorious defense, to wit:

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

The Decision dated December 5, 2001, on page 16 thereof states

an imprisonment term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal - a
matter which ought to be rectified;
The undersigned is a first time offender;

The records do not show that the RTC required petitioner's counsel to whom petitioner
attributed the act of not filing the notice of appeal to file his comment.
On September 30, 2002, petitioner's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Appearance[7] from the
case with petitioner's consent. Again, the documents before us do not show the action

No ruling was laid down on the stipulated facts (Decision, p. 3)

relative to the (1) absence of counsel during the alleged inquest, and (2)
absence of warrant in arresting the accused after ten (10) days from the
commission of the crime;

taken by the RTC thereon.

Absence of a corroborating witness to the purported lone

eyewitness, as against the corroborated testimony of accusedpetitioner's alibi;

with the following disquisition:

The Commission on Human Rights investigation on the torture of the

accused-petitioner;
and others.[6]

Petitioner argued that he was meted a total of 16 years imprisonment or almost equal to
the previous capital punishment of 20 years which was given an automatic review by the
Supreme Court, thus it is of greater interest of justice that his case be reviewed by the
appellate court; and that no damage will be sustained if the appeal is given due course
since he continues to languish in jail while the Petition for Relief is pending.

In an Order[8] dated December 13, 2002, the RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for relief

After a careful study of the instant petition and the arguments raised
by the contending parties, the Court is not persuaded by
petitioner/accused's allegation that he was prevented from filing a notice of
appeal due to excusable negligence of his counsel.
Accused's allegation that he indeed specifically instructed his
counsel to file a notice of appeal of the Decision dated [sic] and the latter did
not heed his instruction is at best self-serving and unsubstantiated and thus,
unworthy of credence. At any rate, even if said omission should be considered
as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on
the client. x x x Besides, nowhere does it appear that accused/petitioner was
prevented from fairly presenting his defense nor does it appear that he was
prejudiced as the merits of this case were adequately passed upon in the
Decision dated December 5, 2001.
It must also be pointed out that in his petition for relief, he
stated that he instructed his counsel to file the necessary motion for
reconsideration or notice of appeal of the Decision dated December 5,
2001, whereas in his affidavit of merit, he claimed to have told his
counsel to simply file a notice of appeal thereof.[9] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, again by himself, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the

Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him

RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition for relief. He

for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary

claims that the delay in appealing his case without his fault constitutes excusable

relationship betweencounsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced;

negligence to warrant the granting of his petition for relief.

that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was

In a Resolution dated August 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition in this wise:

a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the

It appearing that petitioner in the instant petition for certiorari failed to attach the
following documents cited in his petition, namely:
1.
The December 5, 2001 Decision;
2.
Comment of the City Prosecutor;
3.
Manifestation of petitioner's counsel de oficio signifying his
withdrawal as petitioner's counsel.
The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and as prayed for by the Solicitor
General.[10]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28,

assailed CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the

RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner
who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an affront to the
policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon especially if it will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best
interest of justice for the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead
of dismissing the petition outright.

2003 for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, in violation of Section
1, Rule 52 of theRules of Court and for failure to attach to the petition, the relevant and
pertinent documents. The CA also stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights.

In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant
the review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be
reviewed final and not appealable; and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of

Hence, herein recourse filed by petitioner, still unassisted by counsel, raising the following
issues:

judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed

petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of
the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal,
constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention
prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?

is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would

Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review
of a final and executory judgment?

We grant the petition.

not constitute excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in

submitted and appended to the petition, the following are its options: (a) dismiss the

relation to Rule 46, on the ground that petitioner failed to attach certain documents which

petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner

the CA found to be relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiorari.

to submit the required additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period
of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the

The requirements to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1, Rule 65 is read in

required pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period.[11]

relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Section 1, Rule 65 provides:
SECTION. 1. Petition for certiorari.
xxxx

The RTC Decision dated December 5, 2001, finding petitioner guilty of two counts of
homicide, the Comment of the City Prosecutor as well as the counsel's withdrawal of
appearance were considered by the CA as relevant and pertinent to the petition
for certiorari, thus it dismissed the petition for failure to attach the same. However, the CA

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto x x x.
Section 3, Rule 46, provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements.
xxxx
[The petition] shall be x x x accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or
ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto x x x.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and
pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. If, upon its initial review of the petition, the
CA is of the view that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been

failed to consider the fact that the petition before it was filed by petitioner, a detained
prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to
know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in
the web of procedure.[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from
ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal
system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his
property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know
how to establish such right.[13] This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at
stake. As we held in Telan v. Court of Appeals:
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in
criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is
subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted
by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave
denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final
and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the
opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
xxxx

Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of

procedure. The demand as much from ordinary citizens whose
only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an
intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property
rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not
know how to establish such right.

Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all

times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be
exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client
company.

The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed late. It

No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as

the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and
that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.[14] (Emphasis
supplied)

for reconsideration on September 18, 2003, or two days late.

of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural

imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.[16]

appears that the CA Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari was received at the
address written in the petition on September 1, 2003, and that petitioner filed his motion

While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory,

The filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the
CA and should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his
counsel. Although the petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing the
RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner
was to be given the chance to file an appeal from his conviction, thus the need for a
counsel is more pronounced. To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or
interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only
in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.[15] It is
even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his
petition for relief from judgment with the RTC.

It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the

right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable;
otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.

we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla[17] we held:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared to be final.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the
late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set
forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That
is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as

they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance,

technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of
the situation.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford
every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[18]

Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or

resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of
rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided.[21]

In dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it, the CA clearly put a
Moreover, in Basco v. Court of Appeals,[19] we also held:
Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice.
If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Recognizing
this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:
SECTION 2. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[20]

premium on technicalities and brushed aside the issue raised before it by petitioner, i.e.,
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition
for relief thus preventing him from taking an appeal from his conviction.

Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled,
and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.[22] However, instead of remanding the case to the CA for a decision on the

Petitioner claims that he actually received the CA Resolution dismissing his petition

merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the final disposition of this

for certiorari only on September 4, 2003 even as the same Resolution was earlier

case.

received on September 1, 2003 at the address written in his petition, i.e., c/o Robert
S. Bacuraya, No. 9 Iris St., West Fairview, 1118, Quezon City, by a certain

The RTC denied the petition for relief as it found petitioner's claim that his counsel did not

Leonora Coronel. Apparently, Bacuraya is not a lawyer.Ordinarily, petitioner being

heed his instruction to file an appeal to be unsubstantiated and self serving; and that if

detained at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, the CA should have also sent a copy

there was indeed such omission committed by the counsel, such negligence is binding

of such Resolution to his place of detention. Considering that petitioner only received the

on the client.

Resolution on September 4, 2003, we find the two days delay in filing his motion for
reconsideration pardonable as it did not cause any prejudice to the other party. There is

Petitioner insists that the failure of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his

no showing that petitioner was motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings or obstruct

judgment of conviction despite his explicit instruction to do so constitutes excusable

the administration of justice. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since

negligence and so his petition for relief should have been granted.

the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner.

We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's
petition for relief from judgment.

considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on

Petitioner was represented in the RTC by Atty. Rivera of the PAO. Section 1, Article IV of

the client.

PAO Memorandum Circular No.18 series of 2002, the Amended Standard Office
Procedures

in

Extending

Legal

Assistance (PAO

Memorandum

Circular),

While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be condoned and should bind

provides that all appeals must be made upon the request of the client himself and only

the client,[23] the exception is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and

meritorious cases shall be appealed; whileSection 2, Article II of PAO Memorandum

inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[24] In Aguilar v. Court of

Circular provides that in criminal cases, the accused enjoys the constitutional

Appeals,[25] we held:

presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven, hence cases of defendants in

criminal actions are considered meritorious and therefore, should be appealed, upon the
client's request.

In this case, petitioner claims he had instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal. Under
the PAO Memorandum Circular, it was the duty of the latter to perfect the appeal. Thus,
in determining whether the petition for relief from judgment is based on a meritorious

x x x Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be

frowned upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
lawyer. The established jurisprudence holds:
xxxx
The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in
procedure is imputed to and binding upon the client, as any other procedural
rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance the ends of justice. When in the
circumstances of each case the rule desert its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed
to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

ground, it was crucial to ascertain whether petitioner indeed gave explicit instruction to
the PAO lawyer to file an appeal but the latter failed to do so.

xxxx
The court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

To determine the veracity of petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have
xxxx
required the PAO lawyer to comment on the petition for relief. However, it appears from
the records that the RTC only required the City Prosecutor to file a comment on the
petition.

The RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief did not touch on the question whether
the PAO lawyer was indeed negligent in not filing the appeal as it merely stated that even
if said omission,i.e., not filing the appeal despite his clients instruction to do so, should be

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so

great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client,
who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court,
the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his
case. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented
because of counsel's error or incompetence, the defendant in order to secure
a new trial must satisfy the court that he has a good defense and that the
acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted
evidence. What should guide judicial action is that a party be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.[26]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner
The PAO lawyer, Atty. Rivera, filed his Withdrawal of Appearance

prescribed by law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been

RTC

emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals[27] where we ruled that an appeal is an

rendered its assailed Order dated December 13, 2002,dismissing the petition for

essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution

relief. The RTC had ample time to require the PAO lawyer to comment on the petition for

so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant

relief from judgment, before issuing the questioned Order. Had the RTC done so, there

should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his

would have been a factual basis for the RTC to determine whether or not the PAO lawyer

cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it

was grossly negligent; and eventually, whether the petition for relief from judgment is

is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process,

meritorious. If there was no instruction from petitioner to file an appeal, then there was no

a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether

obligation on the part of the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as stated in the PAO

petitioner's loss of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at

Memorandum Circular and negligence could not be attributed to him. However, if indeed

all attributed to petitioner.

on September

30,

2002,

almost three

months

before

the

there was such an instruction to appeal but the lawyer failed to do so, he could be
considered negligent.

However,

we

cannot,

in

the

present

petition

for

review

on certiorari, make a conclusive finding that indeed there was excusable negligence on
Thus, there was no basis for the RTC to conclude that the claim

the part of the PAO lawyer which prejudiced petitioner's right to appeal his conviction. To

of petitioner that he instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as self-serving and

do so would be pure speculation or conjecture. Therefore, a remand of this case to the

unsubstantiated. The RTC's dismissal of the petition for relief was done with grave abuse

RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition for relief from judgment is

of discretion amounting to an undue denial of the petitioner's right to appeal.

just and proper.

The RTC faulted petitioner for claiming in his petition for relief that he instructed his

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 19,

counsel to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; while in his

2003 and November

affidavit of merit, he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal. We

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order datedDecember 13, 2002 of the Regional

do not find such circumstance sufficient ground to dismiss the petition considering that he

Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, is SET ASIDE. The RTC is hereby ordered to

filed the petition for relief unassisted by counsel.

require Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office to file his comment on the petition

28, 2003 of

the

Court

of

Appeals

for relief from judgment filed by petitioner, hold a hearing thereon, and thereafter rule on
the merits of the petition for relief from judgment, with dispatch.

ENBANC IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

crucial to his status as a lawyer;8 and the matter of signing in the Roll of

MICHAELA. MEDADO, Petitioner. B.M. NO. 2540 Present: SERENO, CJ,

Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.9

CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,* PERALTA** '

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

BERSAMIN,**

(MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his

MENDOZA**

DEL
'

CASTILLO,

REYES,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA,

PERLAS-BERNABE,

and

JR.,

PEREZ,

LEONEN,

JJ.

MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of

Promulgated: SEPTEMBER 24, 201 X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -

Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number. About seven years later,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X RESOLlJTION SERENO, CJ: We resolve

or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be

the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attomeys filed by petitioner Michael

allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11 The Office of the Bar Confidant

A. Medado (Medado ). Medado graduated from the University of the

(OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September

Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and passed the

201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4

same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7? ' On

February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied

leave. '* On oflicial leave 1 Rollo, p. I; Petition dated 6 February 20 i 2. 2 ld

for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14

Resolution 2 B.M. No. 2540 On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at

It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,

the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the

petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the

successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys

Roll of Attorneys.15 3 Id. at 2. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 10. 6 Id. at 2. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id.

on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly

at 3. 11 Id. at 4. 12 Id. at 20; TSN, 21 September 2012. 13 Id. at 35-43; Report

because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by

and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013. 14 Id. at 42. 15 Id.

the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6 Several

Resolution 3 B.M. No. 2540 After a judicious review of the records, we grant

years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the

Medados prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and

Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had

the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys

was probably just an attendance record.7 By the time Medado found the

would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a

notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate

penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of

and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.

members of the Bar. In this case, the records do not show that this action is

Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already

warranted. For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral

taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as

character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of

Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Courts attention

1, 11. Resolution 4 B.M. No. 2540 That said, however, we cannot fully

to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his

exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction. Petitioner

own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the

has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more

Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very

than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies

candidly replied: Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what

this behavior by characterizing his acts as neither willful nor intentional but

can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats

based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.22 We disagree.

gonna happen. At the same time, its a combination of apprehension and

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the

anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the right thing to do. I have to

legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a

come here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16 For another,

mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is

petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the

presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat;

practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals

ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Applying these principles to the case at

who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this

bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when

Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict

he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-

requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie

taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized

shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the

that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer

Philippine Bar. Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able

claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado

legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18

should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine

Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the

Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of

Energy Development Corporation.19 All these demonstrate Medados worth

signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this

to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of

knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary

law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold

steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully

this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber

engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Under the Rules of Court, the

to withstand the rigors of the profession. 16 Rollo, p. 28; Report and

unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or officer of

Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013. 17 Id. at 3; Petition

the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect

dated 6 February 2012. 18 Id. at 22; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 3. 19 Id. at

contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28

34; id. at 15. 20 Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA

Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be

reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,

unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of

while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of

P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not

court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from

allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any

making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge

act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys

pertaining thereto has been filed against him. 21 Rollo, p. 35; TSN, 21

will be dealt with severely by this Court. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to

September 2012, p. 16. 22 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012. 23

Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.

Wooden v. Civil Service Commission, 508 Phil. 500, 515 (2005). 24 Manuel

Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after

v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836 (2005). 25 Id. 26 Aguirre v. Rana, 451 Phil. 428,

receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of

435 (2003). 27 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3(e). 28 Tan v. Balajadia,

P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,

519 Phil. 632 (2006). 29 Id. 30 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3.

petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that

Resolution 5 B.M. No. 2540 Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of

doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll

law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility,

of Attorneys will be dealt witp severely by this Court. Let a copy of this

which provides: CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in

Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of

the unauthorized practice of law. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to

the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all

merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the

courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this

provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and
Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado
is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of
this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the

THIRD DIVISION
Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar
JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252
Complainant,
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16,
- versus Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross

misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court;

DECISION
and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons
PANGANIBAN, J
12.07[5] and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr.
their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined
summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:
to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial
Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those
who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of

the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among

others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different
dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding
the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the
details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c)
make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP
numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an
Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the
case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the
hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the

attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation. As to his

CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having

alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers

administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the

could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where

verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their

[their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged

Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was

respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since

allowed. He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to

they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very

documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for

essential to the ends of justice. Respondent alleged that it was complainant

affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government

who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by

offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to

the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the

before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence

assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001,

certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija --

which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and

some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence

to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted

certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial

Certifications[10] from

register for these documents.As to his alleged failure to comply with the

Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them. Lastly, he

certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal

contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass

Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the

him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the

option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was

cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against

complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the

complainant. After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through

the

Cabanatuan

City

Police

and

the

Joint

Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5,

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.

2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to
XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners
the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing,
only complainant appeared.Respondent was unable to do so, apparently

Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law

because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing

on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial

was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified
of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. Itmodified,
Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July
however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by
13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense
with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated

increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation

July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed

will be dealt with a heavier penalty. The other charges -- violation of Section

the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from

27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and

receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution. The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September
26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBPs Recommendation

12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries

public. They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and
date as part of such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and

meaning of notarization as follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot
be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them]

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the

a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the

solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance

page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.[22] Failure

of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert

to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as

utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public

notaries public.[23]

policy and are impressed with public interest.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected,

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily

considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to

admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the

notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are

documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number

presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those

became the basis of the present Complaint. As correctly pointed out by the

requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before

investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal

the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older

Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any

notaries in Nueva Ecija.

fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief

oath -- to certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is

that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law

satisfied

that

dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no

affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and

qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with

Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not

the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing

required to comply with the certification requirement. It must be emphasized

so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable

that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote

justification for breaking the law. We note further that the documents attached

respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the

to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients

forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty

Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits

carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to

relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by

keep

complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents

jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal

abreast

they

with

voluntarily

legal

executed

developments,

and

recent

understood

enactments

their

and

principles.Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able

decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of

to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the

deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended

bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes. Where

by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by

Lawyer as Witness for Client

reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before
practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to
Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi
the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent
proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the
exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal
CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.
Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.Nonetheless,
we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice
of

law. The

power

to

disbar

must

be

exercised

with

great

caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of

misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty
can

accomplish

the

end

desired,

disbarment

should

not

be

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, except:
a)
on formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;
b)
on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event
he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case
to another counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being
a witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged

communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]The reason

testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon

behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating

as partial and untruthful.[33]

their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses

are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction,

and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain

advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of

from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they

others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested

do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]Notwithstanding

witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather

this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in

than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the

following reasons:

client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and

truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as

defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a

disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their

criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the

sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not

fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the

likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own

charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable
doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if

they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.Having undertaken the

the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of

defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected

securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive

to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty

prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and

to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating

from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting

circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be

the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.[38]The investigation is

deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain

defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and

from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to

time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have

believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective

possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,

client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become

complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the

essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require him

falsity of its contents.Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a

to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this

No Proof of Harassment

instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered
which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on
insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is

never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with

liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of
respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are
corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of
the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial
Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
herebyFINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120592. March 14, 1997]

TRADERS
ROYAL
BANK
EMPLOYEES
UNIONINDEPENDENT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent
Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and Associates law
firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the
former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in
consideration of the law firms undertaking to render the services enumerated
in their contract.[1] Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was terminated by
the union on April 4, 1990.[2]
During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to
private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and yearend bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). After the
appropriate complaint was filed by private respondent, the case was certified
by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
on March 24, 1987 and docketed as NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466.[3]
On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing
case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, midyear bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential.[4] The NLRC, acting
on a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent
as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Oswald
Lorenzo.[5]
However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution,
TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the Supreme Court. The
Court, in its decision promulgated onAugust 30, 1990, [6] modified the decision
of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus
differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. [7]
The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined
the holiday pay differential to be in the amount of P175,794.32. Petitioner
never contested the amount thus found by TRB. [8] The latter duly paid its

concerned employees their respective entitlement in said sum through their

payroll.[9]
After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme
Court on September 18, 1990,[10] he notified the petitioner union, the TRB
management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys
lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October
8, 1990.[11]
Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before
Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorneys fees, praying that
ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by
TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his
attorneys fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said
amount to him.[12]
The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did
not wish to oppose or comment on private respondents motion as the claim
was directed against the union,[13]while petitioner union filed a comment and
opposition to said motion on July 15, 1991.[14] After considering the position of
the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order[15] on November 26, 1991
granting the motion of private respondent, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the TRADERS
ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION with offices at Kanlaon Towers, Roxas
Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to pay without delay the attorneys fees due
the movant law firm, E.N.A. CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount
of P17,574.43 or ten (10%) per cent of the P175,794.32 awarded by the
Supreme Court to the members of the former.
This constrained petitioner to file an appeal with the NLRC on December 27,
1991, seeking a reversal of that order.[16]
On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a
resolution affirming the order of the labor arbiter. [17] The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in a resolution
dated May 23, 1995,[18] hence the petition at bar.
Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of attorneys fees in
the amount of P17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of the P175,794.32 granted
as holiday pay differential to its members, in violation of the retainer
agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is null and
void,[19] for the reasons hereunder stated.

Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to

decide claims for attorneys fees, it contends that the award for attorneys fees
should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme
Court had already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC. Since
the claim for attorneys fees by private respondent was neither taken up nor
approved by the Supreme Court, no attorneys fees should have been allowed
by the NLRC.
Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making
the award of attorneys fees, as said act constituted a modification of a final
and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorneys
fees. It then cited decisions of the Court declaring that a decision which has
become final and executory can no longer be altered or modified even by the
court which rendered the same.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to
determine attorneys fees was just an incident of the main case where
petitioner was awarded its money claims. The grant of attorneys fees was the
consequence of his exercise of his attorneys lien. Such lien resulted from and
corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the favorable
judgment was obtained. To include the award of the attorneys fees in the main
case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party. All
that the non-inclusion of attorneys fees in the award means is that the
Supreme Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing party attorneys fees in
the concept of damages. He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion
to have his own professional fees adjudicated.
In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and
private respondent on this score, it appears necessary to explain and
consequently clarify the nature of the attorneys fees subject of this petition, in
order to dissipate the apparent confusion between and the conflicting views
of the parties.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the socalled ordinary and extraordinary.[20] In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee
is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the
fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The
basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be
made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not
to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall
pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.

It is the first type of attorneys fees which private respondent demanded

before the labor arbiter. Also, the present controversy stems from petitioners
apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for
attorneys fees only before its judgment is reviewed and ruled upon by the
Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longer entertain claims
for attorneys fees.
It will be noted that no claim for attorneys fees was filed by private
respondent before the NLRC when it acted on the money claims of petitioner,
nor before the Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It
was only after the High Tribunal modified the judgment of the NLRC awarding
the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the NLRC for a
percentage thereof as attorneys fees.
It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC
in the first instance and for the Supreme Court thereafter to make an award
for attorneys fees when no claim therefor was pending before them. Courts
generally rule only on issues and claims presented to them for
adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment of
attorneys fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme
Court.
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus
differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondents
present claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the NLRC even though
or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and
partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be
asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been
rendered or in a separate action.[21]
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorneys
fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something
is due to the client.[22] Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition
of the court. The issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.[23]
While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is
rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount
thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the
lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the
determination to be made by the courts will be premature.[24] Of course, a
petition for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the
client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. [25]
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options
as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent

was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of
the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the awards
complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the
same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would
deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing
pronouncements of this Court.
Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner union
insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorneys fees due
to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000.00 which it
has been regularly paying to private respondent under their retainer
agreement. To be entitled to the additional attorneys fees as provided in Part
D (Special Billings) of the agreement, it avers that there must be a separate
mutual agreement between the union and the law firm prior to the performance
of the additional services by the latter. Since there was no agreement as to
the payment of the additional attorneys fees, then it is considered waived.
En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the
attorneys fees contemplated for and commensurate to the services he
rendered to petitioner. He asserts that although there was no express
agreement as to the amount of his fees for services rendered in the case for
recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants this
omission by providing for an award of ten percent (10%) of a money judgment
in a labor case as attorneys fees.
It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly
trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a
reasonable compensation for such services.[26] It will thus be appropriate, at
this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional
remuneration under the retainer agreement[27] entered into by him and
petitioner.
The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:
xxx
The Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services under the
parameters of the following terms and conditions:
A. GENERAL SERVICES
1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be
designated and be available on a day-to-day basis
depending on the Unions needs;

2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual

and/or anticipatory situation confronting any matter within
the clients normal course of business;
3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all
transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day
course of business;
4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal
document to which the union is a party signatory thereto but
prepared or caused to be prepared by any other third party;
5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a
party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body
subject to certain fees as qualified hereinafter;
6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any
papers with any government agency and/or any private
institution which is directly related to any legal matter
referred to the Law Firm.
B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES
1. Documentation of any contract and other legal
instrument/documents arising and/or required by your
Union which do not fall under the category of its ordinary
course of business activity but requires a special,
exhaustive or detailed study and preparation;
2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special
projects of the Union;
3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in
conference table negotiations with TRB management or
any other third person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the
presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except
CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific
agreement (pursuant to PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130
& 227);
4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other
pleading for and in behalf of the Union;
5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against
the Union; and,

6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding

provided that the particular member must give his/her
assent and that prior consent be granted by the principal
officers. Further, the member must conform to the rules and
policies of the Law Firm.
C. FEE STRUCTURE
In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above
when required or necessary, your Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or
before the fifth day of every month.
An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.
Any and all Attorneys Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a
successful litigation shall belong exclusively to the Law Firm.
It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our
claim for reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses covering filing fees,
transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or
authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or
that which redound to the benefit of the Union.
D. SPECIAL BILLINGS
In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B,
the Union shall pay the Law Firm an amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to
the performance of such services. The sum agreed upon shall be based on
actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance and
magnitude of the matter referred to by the Union. However, charges may
be WAIVED by the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the
particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly
reserved for the Law Firm.
xxx
The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further
interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant controversy is its
application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private
respondent does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the
labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part C of
the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the

law firms commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General

Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.
The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render
legal services and a remuneration for legal services actually rendered can
better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client
may pay his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a
special retainer.[28]
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure
his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may
arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal
action. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the
retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which
could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees
are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for
the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering
services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a
compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service
rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases
demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate
and independent contract for attorneys fees, each fee is considered a special
retainer.
As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on
its concept in Hilado vs. David[29] in this wise:
There is in legal practice what is called a retaining fee, the purpose of which
stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel
for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party,
even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of
the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the
rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for
consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. A retaining fee is a
preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future
services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity
of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, andthe
payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the
contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services
contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay
his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to
perform. (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement

between the union and the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining
fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firms pledge, or as expressly
stated therein, its commitment to render the legal services enumerated. The
fee is not payment for private respondents execution or performance of the
services listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or
permutations stated there.
Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an
express valid contract fixing the compensation for the attorney, such contract
is conclusive as to the amount of compensation.[30] We cannot, however,
apply the foregoing rule in the instant petition and treat the fixed fee
of P3,000.00 as full and sufficient consideration for private respondents
services, as petitioner would have it.
We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent and different
from the compensation which private respondent should receive in payment
for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee
for the latters promise to extend services, they were not able to come into
agreement as to the law firms actual performance of services in favor of the
union. Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of
remuneration for private respondents services.
We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner
that private respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees
because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.
Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted
to waive the additional charges in consonance with Part D of the
agreement. Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e.,
serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion to determine attorneys fees,
belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensation for
prosecuting the labor case instituted by the union. And, lastly, to adopt such
theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondents right to attorneys fees,
as the former may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special
agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm had
relinquished its right because of the absence of the same.
The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting
of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special
services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding
remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts.[31] One of the sources
of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract
premised on the Roman maxim thatnemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari
protest. As embodied in our law,[32] certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts

give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from
private respondents lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioners
cause without awaiting the latters consent and approval. Petitioner cannot
deny that it did benefit from private respondents efforts as the law firm was
able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It
cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid
to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondents
actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing
legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC,
on top of the P3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner. The
law firms services are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer
agreement. Thus, in Part C thereof on Fee Structure, it is even provided that
all attorneys fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful
litigation shall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside from petitioners
liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and
expenses enumerated therein.
A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor
dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Some of these
principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit
him; (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another;
and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us under the
same circumstances.[33]
As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional
fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack of understanding with his client
as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract.[34] Hence, it is not
necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services
rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be obligated to
pay compensation to the former. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner
should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from
private respondents services.
We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no
knowledge of, nor consented to, or protested against the lawyers
representation may not be held liable for attorneys fees even though he
benefited from the lawyers services.[35] But this doctrine may not be applied in
the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondents
appearance before the NLRC in the case for differentials.
Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained
respondents legal services and assistance regarding its claims against the

bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the
compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate contract of facio ut
des (I do that you may give).[36] This rule of law, likewise founded on the
principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the
services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioners
members.
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a
reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional
services.[37] However, the value of private respondents legal services should
not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Said
article provides:
ART. 111. Attorneys fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the
culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of
the amount of the wages recovered.
xxx
The implementing provision[38] of the foregoing article further states:
Sec. 11. Attorneys fees. - Attorneys fees in any judicial or administrative
proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount
awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning
party.
In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorneys
fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and payable to the
prevailing part. In the second place, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees
provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book
III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be
granted.[39] Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorneys fees
the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings
and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the
ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances
warrant it.[40]
The measure of compensation for private respondents services as
against his client should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum
meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction.Quantum meruit, meaning as much as
he deserves, is used as the basis for determining the lawyers professional
fees in the absence of a contract,[41] but recoverable by him from his client.
Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed
upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case,
he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. [42]

It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an

acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services
rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation therefor. The
doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on
the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without
paying for it.[43]
Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid
down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyers services. These
factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation
for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit.These
are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the
subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary
charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or
certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorneys fees in favor of
private respondent. Instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter
forthwith but erroneously set the amount of attorneys fees on the basis of
Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied on the operation of Article
111 when he fixed the amount of attorneys fees at P17,574.43.[44]Observe the
conclusion stated in his order.[45]
xxx
FIRST. Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movants
right to a ten (10%) per cent of the award due its client. In addition, this right
to ten (10%) per cent attorneys fees is supplemented bySec. 111, Rule VIII,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx
As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount
recoverable as attorneys fees in the nature of damages sustained by and
awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone
standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the
legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable
amount of attorneys fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic
award of attorneys fees in such maximum limit.

It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances

similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and
client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the
principles of quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for
the proper determination of attorneys fees. The criteria found in the Code of
Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in
assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties
were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of
private respondents fees.
It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorneys fees is a question of
fact.[46] Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this case for further
reception of evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by
private respondent to petitioner. However, so as not to needlessly prolong the
resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and
equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorneys fees
in favor of private respondent. For that purpose, we have duly taken into
account the accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data
as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that regard. On
such premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the
amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal
services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter
and the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission affirming the order of the labor arbiter is MODIFIED,
and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees to private respondent for the latters
legal services rendered to the former.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118746 September 7, 1995

ATTY.
WILFREDO
TAGANAS, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MELCHOR ESCULTURA,
ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Atty. Wilfredo E. Taganas represented herein private respondents
in a labor suit for illegal dismissal, underpayment and non-payment of wages,
thirteenth-month pay, attorney's fees and damages conditioned upon a
contingent fee arrangement granting the equivalent of fifty percent of the
judgment award plus three hundred pesos appearance fee per hearing. 1 The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered Ultra Clean
Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI)
respondents therein, jointly and severally to reinstate herein private
respondents with full backwages, to pay wage differentials, emergency cost
of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's fee, but disallowed
the claim for damages for lack of basis. 2 This decision was appealed by Ultra
and PTSI to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and
subsequently by PTSI to the Court but to no avail. During the execution stage
of the decision, petitioner moved to enforce his attorney's charging
lien. 3 Private respondents, aggrieved for receiving a reduced award due to
the attorney's charging lien, contested the validity of the contingent fee
arrangement they have with petitioner, albeit four of the fourteen private
respondents have expressed their conformity thereto. 4
Finding the arrangement excessive, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reduction
of petitioner's contingent fee from fifty percent of the judgment award to ten

percent, except for the four private respondents who earlier expressed their
conformity. 5 Petitioner appealed to NLRC which affirmed with modification the
Labor Arbiter's order by ruling that the ten percent contingent fee should apply
also to the four respondents even if they earlier agreed to pay a higher
percentage. 6Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition for certiorari.
The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the reduction of petitioner's
contingent fee is warranted. Petitioner argues that respondent NLRC failed to
apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the factors to be considered in
determining whether or not the stipulated amount of petitioner's contingent fee
is fair and reasonable. Moreover, he contends that the invalidation of the
contingent fee agreement between petitioner and his clients was without any
legal justification especially with respect to the four clients who manifested
their conformity thereto. We are not persuaded.
A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement laid down in an express
contract between a lawyer and a client in which the lawyer's professional fee,
usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action is made to
depend upon the success of the litigation. 7 This arrangement is valid in this
jurisdiction. 8 It is, however, under the supervision and scrutiny of the court to
protect clients from unjust charges. 9 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics states that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law,
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the
risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness". Likewise, Rule 138, Section
24 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to
the proper compensation but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
A written contract for services shall control the amount to
be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
When it comes, therefore, to the validity of contingent fees, in large
measure it depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees

under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of

unreasonable attorney's fees is within the regulatory powers of the
courts. 10
We agree with the NLRC's assessment that fifty percent of the judgment
award as attorney's fees is excessive and unreasonable. The financial
capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account in
fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 11 Noting that petitioner's clients were
lowly janitors who receive miniscule salaries and that they were precisely
represented by petitioner in the labor dispute for reinstatement and claim for
backwages, wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenthmonth pay and attorney's fees to acquire what they have not been receiving
under the law and to alleviate their living condition, the reduction of petitioner's
contingent fee is proper. Labor cases, it should be stressed, call for
compassionate justice.
Furthermore, petitioner's contingent fee falls within the purview of Article 111
of the Labor Code. This article fixes the limit on the amount of attorney's fees
which a lawyer, like petitioner, may recover in any judicial or administrative
proceedings since the labor suit where he represented private respondents
asked for the claim and recovery of wages. In fact, We are not even precluded
from fixing a lower amount than the ten percent ceiling prescribed by the
article when circumstances warrant it. 12 Nonetheless, considering the
circumstances and the able handling of the case, petitioner's fee need not be
further reduced.
The manifestation of petitioner's four clients indicating their conformity with
the contingent fee contract did not make the agreement valid. The contingent
fee contract being unreasonable and unconscionable the same was correctly
disallowed by public respondent NLRC even with respect to the four private
respondents who agreed to pay higher percentage. Petitioner is reminded that
as a lawyer he is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of
assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties. When
he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects
his professional fees to judicial control. 13
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion the assailed NLRC
decision is hereby affirmed in toto.

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated

EN BANC

November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS B.M. No. 1222

Honorable Court in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioners

x ---------------------------------------- x

plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN,

Petitioner, Present:

member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.[1]

Puno, C.J.,

Quisumbing,*
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M.

No. 1222, the dispositive portion of which reads in part:
Corona,

Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
ChicoNazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Leonardo-De
Castro,
Brion,
Peralta, and
Bersamin, JJ
.
Promulgated:
April 24, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations

of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice
of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in

Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was
employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of
whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during
the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the
Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them
to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended

the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January
6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions
of which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer

to fulfill his fathers childhood dream to become one. This task was
not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure
the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already
imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to his
fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service
when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated
several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing
Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected
as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the
Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various
activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well
as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and
student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus,
he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his
graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner
immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer assigned
at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also
rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents
of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate

Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay
with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and
developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to
render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeos.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioners
flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of his license to
practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003
Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside
his house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of his
disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease
in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City Government of
Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of
the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5)
years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of
his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar
examinations. As could be borne from the records of the
investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and
took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the
2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his
actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his
mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to make him
a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the
following testimonials and endorsements of various individuals and
entities all attesting to his good moral character:
1)

Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007,

Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G.

De Guzman in his Application for Judicial

Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and
Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the
Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes dated 4
June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City
of Taguig;
2)

3)

4)

Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong

Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Southeast
Peoples
Village
Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong
sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya
ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1
June 2007 of the Southeast Peoples Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA),
Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong
Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc.
(SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran
at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007
of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek,
Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong
Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI)
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G.
Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong
Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang

Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng

mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of
Taguig;
5)

An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the

Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman
as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and
his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine
Bar dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law
Offices;

6)

Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual

Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly
Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion
dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas,
Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7)

Testimonial Letter dated 18 February 2008 of

Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern
University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far
Eastern University (FEU);

8)

Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong

Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc.
(SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran
at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 8 July 2008 of
the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc.
(SABISKA);

9)

Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, A

Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of
Danilo G. De Guzman to the Peoples Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) Taguig City, Attesting
to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the

Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other

Purposes dated 11 July 2008 of the Peoples Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10)

11)

12)

M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was

sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On
appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed
down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial

Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo
G. De Guzman dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin
R.
Sandoval,
Professor, Collegeof Law, San
Sebastian College Recoletos;
An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the
Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F.
Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of
Columbus and President, General ParentTeacher
Association, Taguig National High
School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
Testimonial Letter dated 5 September 2008 of
Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers
League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;

xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action
which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and
reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal
law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed
over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of
our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising
a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more
circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts
to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein
Petition.

13)

14)

Testimonial Letter dated 21 October 2008 of

Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
Testimonial Letter dated 28 October 2008 of
Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of
Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far
Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded

that he be afforded the same kindness and compassion in order that,
like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually
foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age,
admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the

Lawyers Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in the instant
case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we
resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the
legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath,
the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has
exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking

judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,

temerarious and uncalculating.

petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action
ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the
integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court.

xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F.
Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding
whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the
applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and
the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the
practice of law for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the
practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future
ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off
his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise,
after his disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his
constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the
community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had
already manifested his intense desire to render public service as
evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several
social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and
after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a
debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue
extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This
only proves petitioners strength of character and positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioners act in copying the
examination questions from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters
knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be
the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar
Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and

has sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the
circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension.
Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been
disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered
as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be
allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
recommended that the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioners disbarment is now commuted
to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of
the petitioners five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now
be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken

in part. We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his
penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of
the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to

correct offenders.[2] While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its
erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose.[3]

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme

has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly

penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the

with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his

remorse of the disbarred lawyer[4] and the conduct of his public life during his

peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession,

years outside of the bar.[5] For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge

Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the

However, the record shows that the long period of

respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his
misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to
demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the
exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar
and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more
than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has
been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to
show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic
and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected
public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, public officials and members
of the judiciary.[6]
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,[7] we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias
disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is
already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of
disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has
learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has
lasted long enough. x x x

ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive
impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some
hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his
achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is
warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to

uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in
the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy
to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. [8]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G.
DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7)

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him

considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner

YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from

February 4, 2004.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1222. February 4, 2004]
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in
Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the
examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug
reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject
be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September
2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved
to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination
on 04 October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available
time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The
resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would
further take on the matter.
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous
petitions and motions from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and
various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification
of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations
against the holding of another examination on the subject. Several reasons
were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these reasons being the
physical, emotional and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the
examinees, if another examination on the subject were to be held anew.
Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of the
weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to
determine and gauge the results of the examinations on the basis only of the
performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated
29 September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the submissions, resolved to
cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and
to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination
subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a
Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would
conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September
2003 resolution.
In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the
computation in the allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile
Law among the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit:
Subject Original Adjusted Relative Adjusted
Percentage Percentage Weight Relative
Weight Weight Weight

Political and
International
Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Labor and
Social
Legislation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Criminal law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Remedial
Law 20% 23.529% 4 4.71%
Legal Ethics
and Practical
Exercises 5% 5.882% 1 1.18%
100% 20%
In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the
following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the
Investigating Committee:
Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino
Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source
of leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited
therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been
responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in question
and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar
examinations.
On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report
and recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar
examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle
University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since
1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in
the said examination.[1]
Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported
the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in
mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of the leakage be
undertaken.
Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a
resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile
law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday,
October 4, 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available
time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions,
protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the

examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such

examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for
mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects
(Resolution dated October 7, 2003).
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an
Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court
to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and
recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.
The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court to compose the Committee:
Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO
Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the
source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who
benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity
of the bar examinations.
The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up
to November 7, 2003. The following witnesses appeared and testified at the
investigation:
1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug
3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez;
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;
9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity;
12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial
Application, MlSO;
The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation
and three times to deliberate on its report.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations
Committee, testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day
after the Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his
office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,[2] Rose Kawada, informed him that
one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of
hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier
University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel
in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the examination in

mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e., on Saturday

afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test
questions in that subject. She did not pay attention to the test questions
because no answers were provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her
review of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of which
there were plenty coming from various bar review centers.
However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed
that many of them were the same questions that were asked in the justconcluded-examination.
Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme
Court, but Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that
Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinsons Place, Ermita.
She agreed to do that.
Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinsons Place at the appointed time and
showed the test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of
the leaked questions and compared them with the bar questions in mercantile
law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the differences
she noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions.
Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug
who compared them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He
found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the
examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and
submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However,
not all of those questions were asked in the bar examination. According to
Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were questions prepared by
Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself, were included in the final
bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not among
the leaked test questions.
Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of
the leakage from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law
Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3),
attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing
that the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to
Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days before the examination in
mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).
ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the
Committee. She identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from
Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the
latter received the test questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying,
like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review
classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas
Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because
the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees.

ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the

law firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite
Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in November
2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar
Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law. He accepted
the assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of test
questions on the subject. Using his personal computer in the law office, he
prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test questions which
covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As
he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his
private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24,
2003). And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise
asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done
inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His secretary printed
only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the test
questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called
up Justice Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latters
office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly,
he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential
assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the
office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitugs confidential assistant to
whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 1926, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer
except to type on it. He does not know how to open and close his own
computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as
he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and
closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl
Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71).
His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which
is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day
only.
He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that
he alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the
bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the
computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of
fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Courts
Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of
Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the
computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not 9, computers
connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one (1) standalone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos law partner,
former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez
took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice.

The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos
computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)
2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared
by him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and
questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De
Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about
the bar leakage.
He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second
year law student at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating
computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the
computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos computer, without the
latters knowledge and permission.
Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations
or bar ops of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member,
but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the
MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).
The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also
a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman
admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos
computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was
convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions
in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).
Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final
bar questions and his proposed test questions, with marginal markings made
by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions are
similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage points
corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative table and
Atty. Balgos indications as to which questions were the same or different from
those given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the credit
points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed questions
constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this Report as Annex
A is the comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as
Exh. E-1.
CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the
past six years, testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted,
however, that it was she who formatted the questions and printed one copy

as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos testimony regarding

her participation in the operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that
what appears in Atty. Balgos computer can be seen in the neighborhood
network if the other computers are open and not in use; that Silvestre Atienza
of the accounting section, can access Atty. Balgos computer when the latter
is open and not in use.
ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that
on October 16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him 72
hours to explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing the
Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of the leakage
aforesaid.
On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation effective
immediately. He explained that:
Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved
condemnation and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my
mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your
memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never been part of
any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and integrity of the firm,
its partners and members. (Exh. D)
DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000.
He obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an
awardee for academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with
a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity
which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State University). As
a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and
participated in the fraternitys bar ops.
He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos
computer, (which he often did without the owners knowledge or permission),
to download materials which he thought might be useful to save for future use,
he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile law consisting of
12 pages. He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos
might be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.
He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain
Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar
examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the
2002 bar examinations, but did not pass.
On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination,
De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3)
to Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was retaking
the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the questions with other
Betan examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions.
Later, after the examination was over, Garvida texted (sent a text message on
his cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination.
Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to
another fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita

(Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself
faxed the questions to still another brod named Erwin Tan who had helped
him during the bar ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar
examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and
Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text message, that
they were guide questions, not tips, in the mercantile law examination.
When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the
examination, (news of the leakage was already in all the newspapers), De
Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his
fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions.
De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he
received the test questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions
were kalat na kalat (all over the place) even if he did not share them with
others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).
De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of
the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain.
Arlan also texted De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the
examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were
asked in the examination, pero hindi exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly
the same; there were some changes).
De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.
De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from
Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, and through self-study, by asking those
who are knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since
1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses
at home.
REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman,
submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the
reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile
law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman.
RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in
compliance with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from
FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a student
in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of the
nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It
is a chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of remission. It
causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and
fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be
impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Readers Digest
Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All
these symptoms were present when Garvida testified before the Committee
on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his involvement in the
leakage of the examiners test questions in mercantile law.
Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member
of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by

Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one and a half years. Although
they had been out of touch since he went home to the province on account of
the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone
number from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that
he was faxing him possible questions in the bar examination in mercantile law.
Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman stressed that they
were not tips but only possible test questions.
Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in
the Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee.
However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the
bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist - symptoms that his MS had
recurred.
His
physician
advised
him
to
go
to
the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did.
He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he
continued
to
attend
the
review
classes
at
the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to waste completely
the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course (Nahihinayang
ako). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking
the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law.
Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his brod Randy
Iigo who was reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied
them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the
usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who has a high regard for De
Guzman, believed that the questions were tips. Garvida did not fax the
questions to any other person than Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the
questions to Randy. I could not do that to a brod, he explained.
In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H)
bore on the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials BEAMLQU, indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda
chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most
Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that
his fraternity conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the
biggest activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers
of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until the bar
examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from
alumni brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for
the use of their barristers (bar candidates) in the various review centers,
providing meals for their brod-barristers on examination days; and to rent a
bar site or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat
members can convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans
bar site for the 2003 bar examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street,
Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the examination,
Collados fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile law
examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test questions

(Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had
received them from Randy Iigo.
Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and
initials of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU
examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members
were unable to answer the test questions despite the clamor for answers, so,
they were given out as is - without answers.
DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school
in Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical
Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review &
Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned
about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was delivering
the pre-week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked
questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the
mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in mercantile law
because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the
subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied having
bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law
to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.
FINDINGS
The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were
the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had
prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions
asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21,
2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial
and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar
examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the
mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been
assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!
The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test
questions prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage
originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar
Examinations Chairman.
Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on
his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was
Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty.
Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed
them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De
Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee.
De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his
secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida,
Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin Tan.
In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and
James Bugain.

Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan,
Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambdas] Most
Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and
distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar candidates.
Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test
questions in mercantile law from the latters computer, without his knowledge
and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual
property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos,
being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.
Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney
Balgos right to privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and
effects against unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected
by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987
Constitution).
He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.
By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of
the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given
them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law
examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity
brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well
as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar,
which provide:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.
He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble
profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations
impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar
examinations as the final measure of a law graduates academic preparedness
to embark upon the practice of law.
However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was
solely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos proposed test questions in
the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted
alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation of other persons, such
as:
Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos
himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could open and
close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was
kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it is

opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De
Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein.
Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible
for interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer with the other computers outside
Atty. Balgos room or office, and who was the only other person, besides
Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Balgos computer.
The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies
of the leaked test questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and
profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated
solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (kalat
na kalat) according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators were:
Ronan Garvida,
Arlan,
Erwin Tan,
Randy Iigo,
Ronald Collado, and
Allan Guiapal
The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law
and risked his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma
Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration
for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well
knows, covers the bar examinations.
On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions
from Atty. Balgos computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had
exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions
which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which he
admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret
the test questions that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know
the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the password
to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to which other
persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine whose potential
for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have
avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions in the
bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of
which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the
test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home, (instead of
his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of
secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos negligence in the preparation
and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in
mercantile law, was not the proximate cause of the bar leakage; it was, in fact,
the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the
secrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and
circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not have been
sullied by the scandal. He admitted that Mali siguro ako, but that was what
happened (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).

RECOMMENDATION
This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10,
2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers:
Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the
profession. In another case, it likewise intoned: We cannot overstress the duty
of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts, and to his clients. (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February
2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who violates this
precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors
and diminishes the publics respect for the legal profession, should be
disciplined.
After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:
1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is
morally unfit to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave
dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he should
make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court
for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the
mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this
institution.
2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and
likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public
scandal he brought upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care
in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law.
As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the
leakage of Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar
questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any
honorarium as examiner for that subject.
3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma,
Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James
Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal
prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test
questions in mercantile law.
With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar
examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said
examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Courts
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for
bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to
refrain from including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not
contrary, recommendations on the matter.[3]
The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the
recommendation, of the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not

countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity of the
Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court.
The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin
R. Katly, two of its employees assigned to the Management Information
Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to
inspect the computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the Courts
Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database[4] was installed in the
computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the
system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive
use of the Court. The installation thereof to any external computer would be
unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco informed the
two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De
Guzman on the computer being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would also
need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to
obtain a copy of the Courts CALR database.
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the
Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to (1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon
his receipt of this RESOLUTION;
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from
receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile Law;
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further
investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan
Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan
Guiapal with a view to determining their participation and respective
accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an
investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the
Supreme Courts CALR database.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De
Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
by the Office of the Court Administrator to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk
of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY.
MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO
PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment;
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary
action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the
Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar
Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and
1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the
grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised
for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to
him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as
by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are
strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in
other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to
the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there
is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion
therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not
one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades
were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination?
Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to
the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of
the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects
Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal
Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with office code No.
954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the
records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon
E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue
of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for
the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request
they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for reevaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the
same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the
1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to
requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p.
99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should
be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63,
32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,

respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in

amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court
to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent
Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet
with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of
examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the
correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.).
Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included
as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation
and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be
owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or
re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No.
110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to
testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon
request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as
Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon
E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries
in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another
student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing
of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not
make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was
terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required
to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent
residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence,
he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who

offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and
answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis
for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their
direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondentexaminers recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting
the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me
that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo)
make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that
candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather
low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for
re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according
to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such reevaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered
'95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all
others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered
to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10%
(emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his
April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as
it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the
same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and
Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951
I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty.
Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to
me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of
the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for
such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one
booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner
in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April
8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from
me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers
1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he
came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the
Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him
an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine
the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of
57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the
code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing
code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have
been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the

said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded
it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading
of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority
to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the
examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I
therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card
attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the
itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading
sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the
other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the
grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the
facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came
to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that
I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make
such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was
authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the
name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The
Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in
the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to
me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the
Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized
or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the
Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar
Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition
as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction,
not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other

subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of
course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades
of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was
increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did
not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the
examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the
other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still
did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with
him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit
dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books
in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in
another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in
Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law
would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing
average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise
of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised
also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I
accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest
inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains
a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal
benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated
April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house
at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to
him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook
and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained
that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because
of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his
general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought
that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether
I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was
entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the
answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other
items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that
after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after reevaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated
the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total
grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%,
herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted
for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners
the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware,
not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,

and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved
a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve,
in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%.
It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit
dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after
the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee
passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to reevaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook
(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the
contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I reevaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a
re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that
I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing
and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the
memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for reevaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them
would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right
now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have
to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final
and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me
to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation"
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in
his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was
not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did
he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not reevaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to
his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of
the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who
obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile
Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising
the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one
surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir
such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did
it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of,
his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects,
the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they

so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and

marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-aLanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February,
1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I
think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that
comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment,
the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence
of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on
which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified
and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-aLanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a
ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I
then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number
became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the
ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I
do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end
with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo;
1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971
Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as
Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in
my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941.
While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed
by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life
for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway

of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since
then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed
my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954".
As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting
me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the
writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and,
thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion
and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to
either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during
the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and
the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-aLanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15%
with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook
in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with
the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-aLanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the
same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and
pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review
or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome

since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact
that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972,
he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked
him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing
office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among
others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio
Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the
latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now
reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent
and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests
a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution.
In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated
in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded
to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the reevaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards
the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the
re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then
it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the
influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched.
Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume
this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the

members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for

the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of
anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in
the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an
unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation
is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance
of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the reevalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by
deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the
corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the
Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December,
1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law
examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the
examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the
examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh.
2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought
back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular
notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could
be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average.
Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under
the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in
his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he reevaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to
75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated

the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven
subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed
in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission
to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February,
1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner
Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously
corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent
Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade
given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook
and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of
passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that
he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet
find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent
Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact
that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a
test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given
to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the
matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion.
Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant,
had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request
was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the
presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that
particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook
and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not
make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the
latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public
International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a

notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that
particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all
other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if
the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least
75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself
from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant
informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who
are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent
Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the
re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of
10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average
was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the
correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had
already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade
in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would
make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and
seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to
75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in
the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner
Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular reevaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject,
as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the
examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was
provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the
re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general
average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects,

including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in

Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite
ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination
Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the
suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent
Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the
meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated
together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate
the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613
with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper
and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the
Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that
the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he
would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper(Vol. V,
p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one
instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that
he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report,
referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number
954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent
Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the
second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's
notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the
usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the
examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo
re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase

of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code
number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE
RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own
initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the
increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a
total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang
to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74%
the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty
percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is
likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the
Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that
respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the
borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on
the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p.
51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the
Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in
his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was
not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither
did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not
re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide
them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis
for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request
is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo
and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations
and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent
as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondentsexaminers (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-

examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show
how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is
patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue
advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and
confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived
and induced into re-evaluating the answers ofonly respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately
enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively
representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect
that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations
were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee
failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the
first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for reevaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages
and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized reevaluation are as follows:
BAI
1.
Political
Law
Public
International
Law
68%
78%
=
10
pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor
Laws
and
Social
Legislations
67%
67%
=
no
reevaluation made.
2.
Civil
Law
64%
75%
=
1
points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation
74%
74%
=
no
reevaluation made.
3.
Mercantile
Law
61%
71%
=
10
pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4.
Criminal
Law
64%
75%
=
11
pts.
or
22 weighted points.
5.
Remedial
Law
63.75%
(64)
75.5%
(75%)
=
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal
Ethics
and
Practical
Exercises
81%
81%
=
no
re-

evaluation
made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated,
Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase
of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of
the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did
this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees
Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was reevaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public International
Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to
do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail
to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it
by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee
in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done,
he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing
and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee
and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any
request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same
should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang
without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by
the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better
averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp.
46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases.
This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there
can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety
(90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to
do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the
said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of

the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of
grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good
faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance
of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better
situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one
notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to reevaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and
Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as
hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to
Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his
suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 4547. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into
the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a
man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973
or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March
19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that
it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO
PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the
aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks
of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to
the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51,
rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for
re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were
contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of
the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates
of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol.
VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees

and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented
by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his
desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the
Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the
inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of
respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was
only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and
this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.).
According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35,
rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears,
however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was
changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee
and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He
was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook
of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47
crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner
Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI,
pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any
objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a
case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to
the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee
failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain
that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that
he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of
passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by
the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code
Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and
the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day
following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number
1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number
954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was
Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any
other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared
that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee
that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg
in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8,

1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only
one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the
examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. AMontecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. BMontecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of
57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing
grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of
his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political
Law
57%
66%
=
9
pts.
or
27
weighted
points
Labor
Laws
73%
73%
=
No
reevaluation
Civil
Law
75%
75%
=
"
Taxation
69%
69%
=
"
Mercantile
Law
68%
68%
=
"
Criminal
Law
78%
78%
=
"
Remedial
Law
85%
85%
=
"
Legal
Ethics
83%
83%
=
"

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred
to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said
subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political
Law
70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was
removed are as follows:
BA
Political
Law
70%
70%
=
No
reevaluation
Labor
Laws
75%
75%
=
"
Civil
Law
89%
89%
=
"
Taxation
72%
72%
=
"
Mercantile
Law
47%
50%
=
3
pts.
or
9
weighted
points
Criminal
Law
78%
78%
=
no
reevaluation
Remedial
Law
88%
88%
=
"

Legal
Ethics
79%
79%
=
"

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers
of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the
misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law
to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of
the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral,
which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4)
subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His reevaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in
Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was
71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby
impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in
the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred
or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they
should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation
conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should
likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence
of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects
Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1)
previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing
grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin,
1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination
Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and

eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects
with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between
the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of
the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a
deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in
connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of
the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With
respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the
designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly
adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of
respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was
initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a
serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar
Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang
to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete
nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority
to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or reevaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct.
And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy
thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents
that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the
rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection,
among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to
the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar
must
be
...
of
good
moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines."
Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of
laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he
was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still
pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965

require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed
or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which
he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not
expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But
as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof
of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with
the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position
to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated
by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively,
the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused
of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving
moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him."
By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the
applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or
not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare
that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal
Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case
of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the
same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of
fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal
case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971;
and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared
under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court,
respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations
seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well
settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court,

to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter

as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to
whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his
name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of
the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the
time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court,
with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal
case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in
that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself,
who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate
his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He
is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of
the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973,
apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet
he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular
manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order
the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its

confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized

member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
in this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had
on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on
applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of
Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in
their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399
and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez
(Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and
Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the reevaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of
the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the
said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or
expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the
opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the
re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of
admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the
circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should
have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme
Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent
Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of
the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to
fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so

circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so
declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved
or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection
with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With
respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they
increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of
the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received
60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few
points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I
did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see
also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular
examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and
that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to
at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe
I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to
be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I
readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to
re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and
tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct
although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of
68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the
changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations
made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were
deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo.
Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence
of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V,
p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17,
1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh.
A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according
to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was
just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty.
Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved
a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial
Law,
if
I
recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent
Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted
to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them
was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity,
honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased
grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the
records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations
in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5)
subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action.
WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to
remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission
of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of

public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to

exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November
14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this
unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar
Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the
records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and
integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October
18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this
charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and
deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also
against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case
shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of
respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see
and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help
in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar
results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should
exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules
of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination
of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations
was committed for valuable consideration.
A

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately

after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972,
which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less,
for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but
was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and
lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of
inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No.
90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%,
more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining
the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000)
[Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan
from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under
Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of
P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not
realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to
1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount
of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did
not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in
Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her
own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give

to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo

was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument;August 23, 1972 date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently,
or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913
was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch
20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of
GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According
to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is
P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same.
In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection
with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however,
as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate
loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956
VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between
January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971
or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in
his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding
the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to
link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers
or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of
the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed
respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or
resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court.
His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but
after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness
of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the
1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave
from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in
lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and
lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under
Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft
Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal
of a public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned
Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during
the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of
this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights
educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school
days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans
Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm.
Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo

had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954,
retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the
time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when
he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution
from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and
from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat
in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the
notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang
from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12,
Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the
Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and
claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does
not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester
to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that
he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he
never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94,
rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS
building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not
remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E.
Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st
Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly
before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla
movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while
working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's
father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in

Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He
is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51,
rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of
respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46,
rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal
Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and
was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into
the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army
stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies,
from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected
notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this
Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT
VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS
NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.