1.

SANTOS vs JUDGE HOW

Both the prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in the case of the prosecution,
that evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong; and, in the case of the defense, that such evidence of guilt is not
strong. The accused has the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and to introduce his
evidence in rebuttal to establish his right to bail.
It is not accurate to contend that hearing the prosecution overcome its burden of proof would suffice. Dictates of
fair play should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first the nature of the evidence proposed to be
presented, determine whether or not they will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before
discarding any evidence outright. This is in keeping with procedural due process, given established rules and
jurisprudence on bail.
Respondent, in effect, deprived the accused with their right to present rebuttal evidence which to our mind is a clear
violation of their right to due process and equal protection of the law. As aptly observed by the OCA, dictates of fair
play should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first of the nature of the evidence proposed to be presented,
determine whether or not it will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before discarding any
evidence outright. This is in keeping with procedural due process, given established rules and jurisprudence on
bail.16
2.

SANTOS vs RASALAN

The authority of the Ombudsman to act on respondents administrative complaint is anchored on Section
13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

(1)

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission

of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. x x x

(Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989,[7] likewise provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are
supplied)

otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid

of

justification.

(Underscoring

The Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found that the acts committed by petitioner as a
public employee are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular, immoral and devoid of justification, thus falling
within the purview of the above-quoted constitutional and statutory provisions. We find no cogent reason to deviate
from their findings.
Pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure of
office, thus:
SEC. 16. Applicability. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee
as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

Moreover, in Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio,[8] we held that even if the act or omission complained of is not
service-connected, still it falls within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, thus:

The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee
that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.

3.

PHILIPPINE WOMENS CREDIT CORP vs BAYBAY

It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused
should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public
prosecutors.26 The courts duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed
executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, 27 albeit in extreme cases,
exceptional circumstances have been recognized.28 The rule is also consistent with this Courts policy of noninterference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.29
While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, their findings are
subject to review by the Secretary of Justice.30
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, any disposition of the case, e.g., its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the Court.31
In thus resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his
own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence or for lack
of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the

Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is
insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused.32 It is its bounden duty to independently assess the
merits of the motion. For while the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. 33
The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied
upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law
involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused.
The trial judges grant of the motion after his independent finding that there was indeed lack of probable cause to
indict respondents should not then be brushed aside absent any evidence showing that he overlooked relevant and
material facts which, if considered, would glaringly point to the presence of probable cause.
4.

DECIN vs TAYCO

[T]he Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers
or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over,
at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001
for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigationsx x x x
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the information against the respondent, or direct
another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the
parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
To confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal complaints filed
with them for offenses cognizable by the proper court within their respective territorial jurisdictions, including those
offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit
the records and their resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. x x x x
[T]he Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against
public officers and employees.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any
public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their
assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are
in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. x x x x Thus, there

is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to
do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation.
It is undeniable that both the City Prosecutor and the DOJ, on their own initiative, duly referred petitioners case to
the Ombudsman for the latters resolution in the exercise of his concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ in accordance
with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995 (Joint Circular). Noteworthy is the fact that the
referral made by the City Prosecutor on September 16, 1997 came earlier than the referral of the DOJ, which is
dated May 19, 1998, likewise pursuant to the Joint Circular. When the Ombudsman approved the City Prosecutors
Resolution on October 31, 1997 which affirmed the prosecutors dismissal of the charges against the respondents, it
then and there took cognizance of the case in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, and, by doing so, such exercise
of jurisdiction barred the DOJ from intervening in the preliminary investigation proceedings. In other words, the
DOJ was effectively deprived of its power to assert its jurisdiction when the Ombudsman took cognizance of the
case pursuant to the Joint Circular.
Concededly, murder which is the felony under scrutiny can be "committed in relation to the public office". In the
case at bar, the complaint was indorsed by the DOJ to the Ombudsman who found a probable cause for the crime of
murder to exist against dela Rama only excluding the petitioners herein, and additionally that the crime was
committed in relation to his office. To repeat, the Ombudsman ruling became final, as it was never elevated to the
Court of Appeals for judicial review. It ought not to be disturbed now.
And, as stated, since the City Prosecutor had already implemented the Resolution of the Ombudsman by filing the
Information with the trial court charging dela Rama alone and after the latter had been arraigned, it has been held
that any disposition of the case thereafter as to the dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it.11
5.

SONY vs BRIGHT TECHNOLOGIES

The issue of whether a private complainant, like SCEI, has the right to participate in search warrant
proceedings was addressed in the affirmative in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip:[25]
. . . [A] private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a
government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD,
may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter
alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the
properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in
collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a
motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of
the court order granting such motion to quash.[26] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When SCEI then opposed BFTIs Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Suppress or Exclude Evidence and
Return Seized Articles (emphasis supplied), the RTC correctly recognized the participation of SCEI in the
proceedings.
As for the use of a bolt cutter to gain access to the premises of BFTI, it was, under the circumstances,
reasonable, contrary to the RTCs finding that it was unnecessary. For, as the RTC itself found, after the members of
the searching team introduced themselves to the security guards of BFTI and showed them the search warrants, the
guards refused to receive the warrants and to open the premises, they claiming that they are not in control of the
case.[27] The conditions required under Section 7 of Rule 126 were thus complied with:

The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of
his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (Underscoring supplied)
The RTCs finding that the two-witness rule governing the execution of search warrant was not complied
with, which rule is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant,[28] is in order.
The RTC did not thus err in ordering the quashal of the search warrants.
As the two-witness rule was not complied with, the objects seized during the April 1, 2005 search are
inadmissible in evidence. Their return, on motion of BFTI, was thus in order.[33]
6.

ABENES vs CA

Aft er a t horough revi e w of t he reco rds, t hi s C ourt i s of t he vi ew that the court s a quo ex cept
for a not abl e ex cept i on wi t h resp ect t o t he ne gat i v e al l e gat i on i n t he In fo rm at i on ar e cor re ct
i n t hei r fi ndi n gs of f act . In de ed, t he versi on of t he defens e, as found b y t he l ower court s, i s
i m pl ausi bl e and bel i es t he com m on ex peri en ce of m anki nd. Evi denc e t o be beli ev ed m ust not
onl y proce ed from the m out h of a cr edi bl e wit ness but i t m ust be c redi bl e i n i t sel f such as t he
com m on ex peri enc e and observat i on of m anki nd can app rove as probabl e under the
ci r cum st ances. [ 1 0 ] In addi t i on, t he quest i on of cr edi bi li t y of wit nesses i s prim a ri l y for t he
t ri al court t o det erm i ne. [ 1 1 ] Fo r thi s reason, i t s observ at i ons and concl usi ons are a ccord ed
gre at resp ect on app eal . [ 1 2 ]
In the present case, t he product i on of the mi ssi on order i s not ne cessa r y i n vi ew of
t he f act t hat t he ch eckpoi nt was est abl i shed t hre e da ys befor e t he Ma y 11, 1998 el e ct i ons;
and, the ci rcum st an ces unde r whi ch the pol i c em en found the gun war rant ed it s sei z ure
wi t hout a wa rrant .
In Peopl e v. Escao, [ 1 6 ] t he C ourt , t hrough t he ponenci a of Chi ef Just i ce Hi l ari o G.
Davi d e, J r., hel d:

Ac cused -appel l ant s ass ai l the m anner b y whi ch t he ch eckpoi nt i n

quest i on was conduct ed. The y cont end that t he checkpoi nt m anned b y el em ent s
of t he Makat i Pol i ce shoul d have be en announc ed. The y al so com pl ai n of it s
havi n g be en condu ct ed i n an a rbi t rar y and di scri m i nat or y m anner.

We tak e j udi ci al not i c e of t he exi st en ce of t he C OMEL EC resol ut i on

i mposi ng a gun ban duri ng t he el ect i on peri od i ssued pursuant t o Se ct i on 52 (c )
i n rel at i on t o Sect i on 26(q) of t he Omni bus El e ct i on Code (B at as Pambansa
Bl g. 881). T he nati onal and l ocal el ect i ons i n 1995 w ere hel d on 8 May, the
se cond Monday of the mont h. The inci d ent , whi ch happened on 5 April 1995,
w as w ell w i t hi n t he el ect i on peri od.

T hi s Court has rul ed t hat not al l chec kpoi nt s are i ll egal . Those whi ch
are w arrant ed by t he exi g enci es of publ i c order and are conduct ed in a w ay
l east i nt rusi v e t o mot ori st s are al l ow ed . For, adm it t edl y, rout i ne ch eckpoi nt s
do i nt rud e, to a cert ai n ext ent , on mot ori st s ri ght to "f re e passage wi t hout

i nt errupt i on, " but it c annot be deni ed t hat , as a rul e, i t invol ves onl y a bri ef
det ent i on of t ravel e rs duri n g whi ch the vehi cl es oc cupant s a re r equi red to
answ er a bri ef quest i on or t wo. Fo r as lon g as the vehi cl e is nei t her sear ched
nor i t s occup ant s subj e ct ed to a bod y sear ch, and t he i nspect i on of t he vehi cl e
i s li m i t ed t o a vi sual sea rch, sai d rout i ne che cks cannot be re ga rd ed as
vi ol at i ve of an i ndi vi dual s ri ght a gai nst unr easonabl e sea rch . In fact , thes e
rout i ne checks, when condu ct ed i n a fix ed ar ea, are even l ess int rusi ve.

T he che ckpoi nt herei n conduct ed w as i n pursuanc e of t he gun ban

enf orced by t he C OMEL EC . The C OMEL EC w oul d be hard put t o i mpl e ment t he
ban if it s deput i zed agent s w ere l i mit ed t o a vi sual search of pedest ri ans. It
w oul d al so def eat t he purpose for whi ch such ban w as inst it ut ed. T hose who
i nt end to bri ng a gun duri ng sai d peri od w oul d know that the y onl y ne ed a car
t o be abl e to easi l y perpet rat e t hei r mal i ci ous desi gns.

The f act s adduced do not const i t ut e a ground for a vi ol at i on of t he

const i t uti onal ri ght s of t he ac cused agai nst il l egal sea rch and seiz ur e. PO3
S uba adm it t ed t hat the y w ere m er el y st oppi n g cars t he y deem ed suspi ci ous,
such as t hose whose wi ndows a re heavi l y ti nt ed j ust t o se e i f t he passen ge rs
t her eof we re ca rr yi ng guns. At best t he y woul d m er el y di r ect thei r fl ashl i ght s
i nsi de t he c ars t he y woul d st op, wi t hout openi ng t he c ars doors or subj ect i ng
i t s passenger s t o a bod y se arch. Ther e i s not hi n g di scri m i nat or y i n thi s as t hi s
i s what t he si t uat i on dem ands. [ 1 7 ] (Em phasi s suppli ed )

Thus, t he C ourt agre es wit h t he Sol i ci t or G ener al that pet i ti one rs rel i anc e on Ani ag is
m i spl a ced.

In Ani ag, t he
poli c e
offi ce rs
m anni ng
t he
che ckpoi nt
near
t he Bat asang
Pambansa com pl ex st opped t he vehi cl e dri ven b y t he dri ver of C ongressm an Ani ag. Aft er
st oppi ng t he vehi cl e, t he poli c e opened a pack age i nsi de t he ca r whi ch cont ai ned a fi re arm
purport edl y bel ongi n g t o C ongressm an Ani ag. In decl ari n g t he sear ch il l e gal , t he Supr em e
C ourt st at ed t hat the l aw en forc ers who conduct ed t he sear ch had no prob abl e cause t o check
t he cont ent of t he pa cka ge bec ause the dri ver di d not behav e suspi ci ousl y nor was t here an y
pr evi ous info rm at i on t hat a vehi cl e hi di n g a fi re arm woul d pass b y the checkpoi nt .

In the i nst ant c ase, the fi rea rm was seiz ed from t he pet i t i oner when i n pl ai n vi ew, the
pol i cem en saw i t t ucked i nt o hi s wai st uncover ed b y hi s shi rt .

Unde r t he pl ai n vi ew doct ri ne, obj ect s fal l i ng i n the pl ai n vi e w of an offi ce r who has
a ri ght to be in t he posi t i on t o have t hat vi ew ar e subj ect to seiz ur e and m a y be pr esent ed as
evi den ce. [ 1 8 ] The pl ai n vi e w doct ri ne appl i es when the fol l owi ng requi si t es concu r: (a) t he
l aw enfor cem ent offi ce r i n sea rch of t he evi den ce has a pri or just i fi cat i on for an i nt rusi on or
i s i n a posi ti on from whi ch he can vi ew a part i cul ar a rea; (b) t he di scov er y of t he evi den ce i n
pl ai n vi e w is i nadvert ent ; and (c) i t i s im m edi at el y appa rent t o t he offi c er t hat t he i t em he
observ es m a y be evi den ce of a cri m e, cont rab and or ot he rwi se subj ect to sei z ure. [ 1 9 ]

Al l t he for egoi ng requi r em ent s ar e pr esent i n t he i nst ant case. The l aw enfor cem ent
offi ce rs l aw ful l y m ade an i ni ti al i nt rusi on bec ause of t he enfor cem ent of t he Gun B an and
we re properl y in a posit i on from whi ch t he y part i cul arl y vi ew ed t he a rea. In t he cou rse of
such l awful i nt rusi on, the poli c em en c am e i nadve rt ent l y ac ross a pi e ce of evi denc e
i ncri m i nat i ng t he pet i t i oner whe re the y saw the gun t ucked i nt o hi s wai st . The gun was i n
pl ai n vi ew and di scover ed i nadve rt ent l y when the pet i ti one r al i ght ed from the vehi cl e.
Nor c an the C ourt bel i eve pet i ti one rs cl ai m t hat he coul d not hav e fre el y refused t he
pol i ce orde rs issued b y t he pol i ce t eam who wer e arm ed t o t he t eet h and i n t he fac e of such
show of forc e. The cou rt s a quo consi st ent l y found t hat t he pol i ce t eam m anni n g the
ch eckpoi nt pol i t el y request ed t he passen ge rs t o al i ght from t hei r vehi cl es, and t he mot ori st s
who re fused t hi s requ est we re not fo rced t o do so. These fi ndi ngs of fa ct are ful l y support ed
b y t he evi denc e i n t he re cord.
How ever, t he C ourt m ust unde rscor e t hat t he prose cut i on fai l ed t o sat i sfa ct ori l y prove
t he ne ga t i ve al l e gat i on i n t he In f orm at i on t hat t he pet i t i oner possessed no li c ense or perm i t
t o bea r t he subj ect fi rea rm .

It i s a wel l -ent r ench ed rul e that i n c ri m es i nvol vi ng i ll e ga l possessi on of fi rea rm , the

prose cut i on has t he burden of provi ng the el em ent s t her eof, vi z: t he ex i st en ce of t he subj e ct
fi r earm , and t he fa ct t hat t he a ccused who owned or possessed the fi rea rm does not have t he
co rrespondi n g l i cens e or pe rm it t o possess t he sam e. [ 2 1 ]

Undoubt edl y, i t is t he const i t ut i onal presum pt i on of i nnocenc e t hat l a ys such burden

upon t he pros ecut i on. The abs ence of such li cens e and l egal aut hori t y const i t ut es an essent i al
i n gredi ent of t he offens e of il l egal possessi on of fi re arm , and eve r y in gr edi ent or ess ent i al
el em ent of an offens e m ust be shown b y t he pros ecut i on b y proof be yo nd r easonabl e doubt . [ 2 2 ]

Wit ness for t he prosecut i on SP O4 Gi l bert C. S enados admi t t ed t hat hi s r ecords w ere
out dat ed, i .e., t hat hi s Mast e r Li st of hol ders of fi rea rm s onl y cove red l i cens es up t o 1994;
t hat i t was possi bl e for the pet i ti one r t o acqui r e a li cens e aft er 1994; and that he i ssued t he
C ert i fi c at i on, dat ed Ma y 18, 1998, st at i ng t hat the pet i t i oner ca rri ed no li c ense or perm i t t o
possess t he guns be caus e he w as orde red to do so b y hi s superi ors. [ 2 3 ]

The re i s no evi denc e that bet we en 1994 and Ma y 8, 1998, t he dat e the cri m e w as
al l e ge dl y com m it t ed, no li cens e was issued t o peti t i oner.
W hi l e t he prosecut i on was abl e t o est abl i sh the f act t hat t he subj ect fi rea rm was seiz ed b y the
pol i ce from t he possessi on of t he peti t i oner, wit hout t he l at t er bei ng abl e to pr esent an y
l i cense or pe rm it t o possess t he sam e, such fa ct al one is not concl usi ve proof t hat he was not
l aw ful l y aut horiz ed t o car r y such fi rea rm . In ot her words, such f act does not r el i eve the
prose cut i on from i t s dut y to est abl i sh t he l a ck of a li c ense or perm i t t o car r y t he fi r earm b y
cl e ar and convi nci n g evi den ce, li ke a ce rt i fi cat i on from the gov ernm ent a ge nc y conc erned. [ 2 4 ]
Thus, for fai l ure of t he prose cut i on t o prov e be yo nd reason abl e doubt t hat pet i t i oner was
c arr yi n g a fi re arm wi t hout pri or aut hori t y, l i cense or perm i t , t he l at t er must be ex cul pat ed
from cri m i nal li abi l i t y under P.D. No. 1866, as am ended.
Wit h respe ct t o the ch arge of vi ol at i ng S ect i on 261(q) of B.P. Bl g . 881, as am end ed,
ot her wi se known as t he Om ni bus El ect i on Code, t he C ourt i s const r ai ned t o affi rm the

convi ct i on of the pet i ti one r, si nce the prosecut i on suc cessful l y di scha rged it s burden of
proof.
S ect i on 261 of B.P. Bl g. 881 (Om ni bus El ect i on C ode), as ori gi nal l y worded, provi des:
S ec. 261. Prohi bi t ed Act s. The fol l owi ng shal l be gui l t y of an el e ct i on
offense:
(q) Carryi ng f i rearms out si de resi den ce or pl ac e of busi ness. An y
pe rs on who, al t hou gh possessi ng a pe rm it t o ca rr y fi re arm s, ca rri es an y
fi r earm s out si de hi s resi denc e or pl a ce of busi ness duri n g t he el ect i on
pe ri od, unl ess aut hori zed in w rit i ng by the Commi ssi on : Provi ded, That a m ot or
vehi cl e, wat e r or ai r cr aft shal l not be consi de red a resi den ce or pl ace of
busi ness or ex t ensi on hereo f.
x x x x (Em phasi s suppl i ed)
S ect i on 32 of R epubl i c Act No. 7166 (R .A. No. 7166), am endi ng S ect i on 261 of t he Om ni bus
El ect i on C ode, provi des:
S EC . 32. Who May Bear Fi rearms. Duri ng t he el e ct i on peri od, no
pe rs on shal l bear, c arr y or t ranspo rt fi r ea rm s or ot her deadl y we apons i n publ i c
pl ac es, incl udi n g an y buil di n g, st r eet , park, pri vat e vehi cl e or publ i c
conv e ya nc e, ev en i f li cens ed t o possess or carry the same, unl ess aut hori zed i n
w rit i ng by the Commi ssi on. The i ssuanc e of fi r ea rm li c enses shal l be suspend ed
duri n g t he el ect i on peri od. (Em phasi s suppli ed )
In vi e w of t he fore goi n g provi si ons, whi l e i t is w el l -set tl ed t hat under P.D. No. 1866, as
am end ed, t he burd en t o prove the negat i ve al l egat i on t hat t he ac cused has no li c ense or
pe rm it t o ca rr y a fi re arm li es wi t h the prose cut i on; under t he Om ni bus El ect i on Code,
howev er, t he burden t o addu ce evi den ce t hat a ccus ed is ex em pt from t he C OME LEC Gun B an,
l i es wi t h t he ac cused.
S ect i on 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is cl e ar and unequi voc al [ 2 5 ] t hat t he prohi bi t ed a ct t o
whi ch thi s provi si on ref ers is m ade up of t he fol l owi n g el em ent s: 1) the person is be ari ng,
c arr yi n g, or t ransport i n g fi r earm s or ot her de adl y we apons; 2) such possessi on oc curs duri n g
t he el ect i on peri od; and, 3) t he we apon i s ca rri ed in a publ i c pl a ce. Under sai d provi si on, it
i s ex pl i ci t t hat even i f the ac cused c an prove t hat he i s hol di n g a val i d li c ense t o possess
such fi rea rm , t hi s ci r cum st ance b y i t sel f cannot ex cul pat e him from cri m i nal li abi l i t y. The
burd en is on t he ac cused t o show t hat he has a wri t t en aut hori t y t o possess such fi re arm
i ssued b y no l ess t han the C OME LEC .
On t his poi nt , t he pet it i oner f ai l ed t o present an y form of such aut hori t y, and,
t her efor e, hi s convi ct i on m ust be affi rm ed.
S ect i on 264 of the Om ni bus El e ct i on Code provi des:
S ec. 264. Penal t i es . An y person found gui lt y of an y el e ct i on offense under t hi s
C ode shal l be puni shed wit h im pri sonm ent of not l ess th an on e yea r bu t not
more th an si x years and shal l not be subj e ct t o probat i on. In addi t i on, t he
gui l t y part y shal l be sent enced t o suffe r di squal i fi cat i on t o hol d publ i c offi c e
and depri v at i on of t he ri ght of suffr age. If he i s a fo rei gner, he shal l be
sent en ced to depo rt at i on whi ch shal l be en forc ed a ft er the pri son t erm has be en
serv ed.

The C A a ffi rm ed the penal t y i m posed b y t he RTC . How ever, t he RTC fai l ed t o appl y S ect i on
1 of the Ind et e rm i nat e S ent enc e La w [ 2 6 ] whi ch provi des:
S EC T IO N 1. He re aft er, i n im posi ng a pri son sent enc e for an offens e punished
b y t he R evi sed P enal C ode, or i t s am endm ent s, t he court shal l sent en ce t he
a ccused t o an indet e rm i nat e s ent enc e the m axi m um t erm of whi ch shal l be t hat
whi ch, i n vi ew of t he at t endi ng ci r cum st anc es, coul d be prope rl y im posed
unde r the rul es of t he sai d C ode, and the m i nim um whi ch shal l be wi t hi n t he
r ange of t he penal t y nex t low er t o t hat pres cri bed b y t he C ode for the offense;
and i f t he offens e is puni shed b y an y ot her l aw, t he court shal l sent en ce t he
a ccused t o an i ndet erm i nat e sent enc e, t he m axi m um t erm of whi ch shal l not
ex ceed t he m axi m um fi x ed b y sai d l aw and t he mi ni m um shal l not be l ess t han
t he m i nim um t erm pr escri b ed b y t he sam e.
Thus, t he pen al t y t hat shoul d be m et ed out t o pet i t i oner shoul d have a m i nim um and a
m axi m um peri od. The Court deem s i t reason abl e t hat pet i t i oner shoul d suffer i m pri sonm ent
for a pe ri od of one (1) ye a r as t he m i ni m um and t wo (2) ye ar s, as the m ax im um .
Fu rt herm or e, under S ect i on 34 of R.A. No. 7166, t he subj ect fi re arm shal l be di sposed
of acco rdi ng t o ex i sti n g l aws, whi ch, i n t hi s c ase, m ust be re ad i n l i ght of Art i cl e 45 of t he
R evi sed P enal Code, to wi t :
Art . 45. C onfi scat i on and f orf ei t ure of t he proceeds or inst rument s of
t he cri me. Ever y pen al t y i m posed for t he com m i ssi on of a fel on y shal l c arr y
wi t h i t the fore fei t ure of t he pro ceeds of t he c ri m e and t he inst rum ent s or t ool s
wi t h whi ch i t was comm i t t ed.
S uch proce eds and inst rum ent s or tool s shal l be confi sc at ed and
for fei t ed i n f avor of t he Gov ernm ent , unl ess t he y be t he propert y of a t hi rd
pe rs on not li abl e for t he offense, but t hose art i cl es whi ch ar e not subj ect of
l aw ful com m erc e shal l be dest ro ye d.
7.

PEOPLE vs CA

Thus, before tackling the two-pronged issues raised by petitioner, we must address first the threshold
issue raised by private respondent: Would a review of the acquittal of Galicia constitute double jeopardy?
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7.Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration

thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a
plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor
and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
As we have previously held in People v. Serrano, Sr.:[36] A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. [37] In People v. Velasco,[38] we
stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the verdict of the Court of Appeals acquitting Ramon Galicia is now final
and irreviewable.[39]

This is not to say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is without exceptions. For there
are two recognized exceptions: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a
mistrial,[40] or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. [41] However, in
this case, we find that the exceptions do not exist.

Firstly, was there a deprivation of due process, or a mistrial? The records show that during the trial, both
parties had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the
appeal. The State represented by the prosecution had not been deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.

Second, has there been a grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals? Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. [42] Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an
extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly
void.[43] Its aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [44]No grave abuse of discretion may be
attributed to the court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence.[45] While certiorari may be
used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that

the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
[46]

In its decision, the Court of Appeals, said that it overturned Galicias conviction because the trial court held
that Galicia was in no way involved in Thelmos death, and only Ureta and Banang conspired to kill Thelmo. The Court of
Appeals explained that the finding of the trial court, now final, should be upheld and applied to Galicia insofar as the death
of Ramon was concerned. The Court of Appeals went on to say that the deaths of Ramon and Thelmo happened on the
same occasion, in the same place and involved the same participants; that there was a continuous unbroken chain of events
which meant that the act and intention of each participant could not be split into segments/phases such that there was
conspiracy as to one aspect but none in the other aspect.[47] It also held that there is no such thing as partial conspiracy.

The Court of Appeals also observed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility and
were filled with inconsistencies.[48] Among them, (1) Dolores and Audie both claimed that Galicia was armed with a
gun and fired two consecutive shots, but surprisingly, the latter did not use his gun when he fought with Ramon. (2)
Ureta stabbed Ramon, yet, Galicia did not finish off Ramon by shooting him. (3) After Ramon was stabbed, Dolores
claimed that all the accused ganged up on her son, and yet, she could not specifically say who kicked, boxed or
strangled Ramon. (4) Dolores categorically testified that Ureta stabbed Ramon twice even pointing out that the first
stab was at the right shoulder and the second at the left chest, but, the medical certificate showed that Ramon
sustained only one wound. Lastly, (5) Dolores said that when Galicia fired his gun, he and his companions were
already inside their house, yet, Audie told the court he heard two shots before the group of Galicia arrived. [49] The
Court of Appeals observed that Ureta was seemingly on a rampage, stabbing Ramon first and then Thelmo. It noted
that Ureta did not even see what happened to Galicia who was still locked in a fight with Ramon.[50]

The Court of Appeals concluded that the RTC based its decision on the weakness of the defense evidence,
rather than on the strength of the prosecutions. It went on to say,
there is no evidence to show unity of purpose and design between appellant and accused
[U]reta. The fact that the fight between appellant and Ramon commenced prior to the actual
stabbing of the latter by [U]reta does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of
purpose and action, in the same manner that the fact that the assault on Ramon was carried out by
accused [U]reta while appellant was grappling with Ramon does not conclusively show that
appellant knew that [U]reta intended to stab, much less kill the victim. Simultaneity, it has been
held, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that
could be a basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals. Thus, contrary to the
findings of the trial court, appellant and accused [U]reta acted independently of, not in conspiracy
with each other. Appellant fought with Ramon in response to the latters challenge to a fight. And
while the two were fighting and grappling for the possession of a scythe, accused [U]reta stabbed
Ramon.[51]
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the trial courts finding that the conspiracy between Ureta and Galicia
was strengthened by the formers decision to jump bail and go into hiding, for being contrary to the doctrine
of res inter alios acta. According to the Court of Appeals, this conclusion of the court a quo partakes more of wild
conjectures and speculations which have no probative value whatsoever since there was no evidence that the escape
of Ureta was with the knowledge, much less consent of Galicia.[52]

In our considered view, the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Appeals cannot by any measure be
characterized as capricious, whimsical nor arbitrary, to constitute grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65. While it
may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts might have resulted from possible

lapses in evaluation of the evidence, nothing therein detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was
scrutinized, considered and evaluated.

We note that while the OSG alleges grave abuse of discretion as the core of its petition, the issues it raises concern
errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, which is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an
appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and prevailing jurisprudence.
[53]
Conformably then, we need not embark upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised by the OSG, as
these are not within the realm of the present petition.

8.

CABARLES vs JUDGE MACEDA

Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April 1, 2003 Order
reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both
parties had rested their case? Did the said order violate Cabarless right to due process and speedy disposition of his
case?

On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reopening
of the case before promulgation of judgment although both parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a case
may only be reopened after a judgment of conviction has been made but before its finality, as provided in Section 24, [23] Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case under Section 24 presupposes
that judgment has already been promulgated, which is not the case here. According to petitioner, the cases cited by the People
are not at all applicable in this case since they were tried and decided before the introduction of Section 24 under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that Section 24 is a new provision
which merely formalized the long accepted practice of judges of reopening a case to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. This being the case, jurisprudence providing that a judge has the discretion to reopen a case even before
promulgation of judgment still holds.

After a thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties, we find that the petition is meritorious.

A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a
recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage. [24] This lack of a
specific provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took
effect onDecember 1, 2000.

The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119
and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before
the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3)
the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5)
the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of
the order.

Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon
their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.
[25]
A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and
closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, [26] and even after promulgation but before finality of
judgment[27] and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.
[28]
This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[29]

However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section
24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and
hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This
failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution
which requires notice and opportunity to be heard. [30] The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing,
is contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.

Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the
case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarless objection to the April 1,
2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.[31] Here, Cabarles filed the present petition
seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa was cross-examined. Also, when asked to
comment on the prosecutions formal offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its
admission on the ground that the same was inadmissible having been received by the court after Judge Maceda
issued the questioned order.

On the second issue, Cabarles maintains that contrary to Judge Macedas observation, the prosecution was given
ample opportunity to present its case as seen by the issuance of several subpoenas to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues
that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty and should not be made to wait indefinitely for prosecution witnesses to
testify. To do so would violate his constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his case. According to
Cabarles, the reopening of the case is clearly detrimental to him since it meant another day in prison.

The OSG counters that the reopening of the case was made in accordance with Section 24 since the
prosecution is entitled to the reopening of the case to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Cabarless right
to a speedy trial had not been violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution witness are excluded
when computing the time within which trial should start under Section 3, [32] Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion
on
the
part
of
the
trial
court
judge,
this
judicial
action
must not,however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably.[33] In this particular case, the prosecution
was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take
full advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such opportunities. Contrary
to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not deprived of its day in court. While it
may be true that due to some confusion with the trial courts calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the
prosecution did not push through and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing
dates which were different from those assigned for reception of prosecutions evidence, still the prosecution had a
total of four hearing dates when it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1,
2001. The presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is
incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial. [34]

Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section
24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled
and set aside for having been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion. [35]

On Cabarless right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the Constitution, all persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful
than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake. [36]

Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the case is mooted by our nullification of
Judge Macedas April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to
reiterate that the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
[37]
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.[38]

With regard to the OSGs allegation in its Comment and Memorandum, that Cabarles failed to observe the
rule on hierarchy of courts since the petition for certiorari was filed directly with the Supreme Court, Cabarles insists
that he is a detention prisoner needing immediate resolution of his case. He also argues that this case not only
involves grave abuse of discretion but also a pure question of law involving the application of Section 24, which is a
new provision.[39]

It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the established
policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their respective
regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
this Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is the established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of its docket. [40]
Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of this case as an exception to
the principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy
justice since the information against him was filed way back in June 1999, [41] and almost eight years thereafter, no
judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to
Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. [42] Since Section 24 is a new provision, and
considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in
this petition.

As a final word, we find the Supreme Courts pronouncement in the case of People v. Monje instructive:

A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for further
proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the first
instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being
unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is
on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be
allowed to augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal
prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to
present additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the accused to due process,
and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the prosecution to fill the vital
gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, should not be
treated by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity
to refurbish its evidence.
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be
dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this
ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of
Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender
or political persuasion - whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor.
Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what
the prosecution has not proved.[43]

9.

PEOPLE vs LAGUIO

No. The Court ruled that there was no valid warrantless arrest . The court ruled that there were no any suspicious
behavior on the part of L that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the
apartment and was about to enter a car parked when the officers arrested him.
Absence of any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the officers,is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
In flagrante delicto arrest : when in the presence of the peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed,is
actually committing,or is attempting to commit an offense;

10. PEOPLE vs PANGILINAN

On the first assigned error, appellant assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was
arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is
prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the
time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.

Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.[19] In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of

the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court
jurisdiction over his person.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [20] The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the
accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at
the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. [21]

Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were
appellants rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings?

We do not think so. Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured
when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact,
his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels active participation in the hearings is a
clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and
informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The
parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and
sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too
late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.

In People v. Cabale[22] and People v. Atienza[23] where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants rights and interests were not
prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him was not violated.