JOSEPH ESTRADA VS MACAPAGAL

&DESIERTO

353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional

Law De Jure vs De Facto President Arroyo a
de jure president

assume the presidency as soon as the disability

disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President; (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Estradas reference is to
a future challenge after occupying the office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity
could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.

Facts: Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is

the President on leave while Gloria MacapagalArroyo claims she is the President. From the
beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by
problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started
on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend
of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada,
his family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos
from jueteng lords.
The
expos
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20
p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps
surrender. On January 22, the Monday after
taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers and duties of the Presidency. After
his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de
jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of
Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacaang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO G.R. No. 146710-15;

Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable
controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings
involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada
were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when
11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in

suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result,

the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support
for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada
called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA
as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.

from it cannot be the subject

of judicial review
presented a political question;

involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation
of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b)
acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President
Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant issues
President Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not
be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In
the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as

ISSUE(S):

President;

1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of

peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to
prejudicial publicity.

that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he

was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity
to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past

RULING:

opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the

that may come in the same service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of
relinquishmentact or omission before, during and after

January 20, 2001.

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA
People Power II:
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly
EDSA I
EDSA II
stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
exercise of the people power
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
the Republic
of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
of revolution which
freedom of assemblyto petition the government
for redress
overthrew the whole
of grievances which only affected the office
of the the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As
178 confirms
government.
President.
Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
extra constitutional and the
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
Impeachment
legitimacy of the new
President that it caused and the succession
of the ViceCourts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated.
government that resulted
President as President are subject to judicial
review.It is clear is that both houses of Congress

recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that

recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no
longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his
claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this
is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he

did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a

President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character.

They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder

Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local

official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence.

which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged

mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite
any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1)

year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local
election. xxxx

are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the
free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system
does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and
legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated
by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the
trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable
to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against
Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on
the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned
with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories:

CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
G.R. 140560. May 4, 2000
FACTS
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of
Pasay City during the 11 May 1998 elections. He
assumed office on 1 July 1998.

On 19 May 1999, an ad hoc committee was

formed for the purpose of convening a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA).
On 29 May 1999, majority of the members of
the PRA adopted a Resolution to Initiate the
Recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio for Loss of
Confidence.
On 2 July 1999, the petition for recall was
formally submitted to the Office of the Election
Officer. Copies of the petition were posted in
public places in Pasay City and the authenticity
of the signatures therein was verified by the
election officer for Pasay City.
The petition was opposed on several grounds.
Principally, that the convening of the PRA took
place within the one-year prohibited period
under Sec. 74, LGC which provides:

The COMELEC granted the petition. It ruled that

the petition did not violate the one-year ban
because the petition was filed on 2 July 1999,
one day after Claudios assumption of office.

ISSUES
1. WoN the word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC covers a
process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the
recall resolution.
2. WoN the term "regular local election" in the last
clause of Sec. 74(b), LGC includes the election period
for that regular election or simply the date of such
election.
HELD/RATIO
1. The word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC refers to the to the
election itself by means of which voters decided
whether they shall retain their local official or elect
his replacement.
Recall is a process which involves the following steps:
(1) the convening of the preparatory
assembly or gathering of the

signatures of at least 25% registered

voters in the LGU;
(2) the filing of the recall resolution or
petition with the COMELEC;
(3) the verification of the resolution or
petition;
(4) fixing of the date of the recall election;
and
(5) holding of the election.
That the word recall used in Sec. 74(b), LGC, refers
to the recall election itself is due to the following
reasons:

(3) That the word recall refers to the recall

election is to uphold the constitutional
rights of speech and freedom of
assembly of PRA members.
To hold that limitation includes the
formation of opinion through public
discussions on the matter of recall of an
official is to curtail these constitutional
rights.

(1) Sec. 69, LGC provides that the power of

recall shall be exercised by the
registered voters of the LGU to which
the local elective official belongs. It is
clear that the power of recall referred
to in Sec. 69 is the power to
retain/replace officials and not the
power to initiate recall proceedings.
Thus, the limitations under Sec. 74
(Limitations on Recall) apply only to the
recall elections.

2. The term regular elections does not include the

election period.
To construe the word regular elections as including
the election period would emasculate the right of
the people to exercise the power of recall.

In Garcia v. COMELEC, the delegation

of the power to initiate recall
proceedings from the electorate to the
PRAs was questioned. The Supreme
Court held that what the Constitution
gave to the people is the power to
recall and not the power to initiate the
recall proceedings. The holding of the
PRA is not the recall itself.

If the regular elections mentioned in Sec. 74(b)

would include the election period, which commences
90 days from the date of the election and extends to
30 days thereafter, the period during which the
power of recall may be exercised will be reduced
even more. (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to midFebruary 2000)

(2) That the word recall refers to the recall

election is consistent with the
purposes1 of the limitations on recall.
The purpose of the first limitation is to
provide a reasonable basis for judging
the performance of the official
(Angobung v. COMELEC). This judgment
is not given during the preliminary
proceedings (such as the convening of

the PRA) but through the vote during

the recall election itself.

(1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of the official concerned; and (2)
that no recall shall take place within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that

the limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and Sec. 74 (b) would
mean that a local elective official may be subject
only to recall during the second year of his/her term
(in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-May 2000)

HELD/RATIO
Petition DISMISSED.