TETRA SECURITY

Brian Murgatroyd
UK Home Office

Agenda
Why security is important in TETRA systems
Overview of TETRA security features
Authentication
Air interface encryption
Key Management
Terminal Disabling
Using SIMs
End to End Encryption

Security Threats
What are the main threats to your system?
Confidentiality?
Availability?
Integrity?

Message Related Threats

interception
by hostile government agencies

eavesdropping

by hackers, criminals, terrorists

Confidentiality
masquerading

pretending to be legitimate user

manipulation of data
changing messages

Replay

Integrity

recording messages and replaying them later

User Related Threats

traffic analysis

Confidentiality
getting intelligence from patterns of the traffic-frequencymessage lengths-message types

observability of user behaviour

Confidentiality
examining where the traffic is observed - times of day-number
of users

System Related Threats

denial of service

Availability

preventing the system working by attempting to use up

capacity

jamming

Availability

Using RF energy to swamp receiver sites

unauthorized use of resources

Integrity

Illicit use of telephony, interrogation of secure databases

TETRA Security features

Authentication
Air Interface encryption
Temporary /permanent disabling
Aliasing/User logon
Ambience listening
Discrete Listening
Lawful Interception

Security Classes

Class Authentication

Encryption

1 Optional None 2 Optional Static ESI

3 Mandatory
Dynamic ESI

Other

Authentication
Used to ensure that terminal is genuine and
allowed on network.
Mutual authentication ensures that in
addition to verifying the terminal, the SwMI
can be trusted.
Authentication requires both SwMI and
terminal have proof of secret key.
Successful authentication permits further
security related functions to be
downloaded.

Authentication process
Mobile
Base station
Centre
K

Authentication

Random
Seed (RS)

TA11
KS

TA12

Result

RS
Rand

Rand
TA12

RS
TA11

Expected Result
Same?

KS
(Session key)

Deriving DCK from mutual authentication

RAND1

Result 1

KS
DCK1
DCK
RAND2

DCK2

KS
Result 2

Air Interface keys

Four traffic keys are used in class 3
systems:Derived cipher Key (DCK)

derived from authentication process used for protecting

uplink, one to one calls

Common Cipher Key(CCK)

protect downlink group calls and ITSI on initial

registration

Group Cipher Key(GCK)

Provides crypto separation, combined with CCK

Static Cipher Key(SCK)

Used for protecting DMO and TMO fallback mode

Over the Air Re-Keying (OTAR)

KSO
(GSKO)

DCK
GCK

CCK

SCK

BS
CCK

GCK

SCK

AI
MS

DCK

KSO
(GSKO)
CCK

MGCK

SCK

Encryption Process

Traffic
Key
Initialisation
Vector (IV)
Clear data in
A BC D E F G H I

Key Stream Generator

(TEA[x])
Key Stream

Encrypted data out

y 4M v# Qt q c
Modulo 2 addition (XOR)

Disabling of terminals
Vital to ensure the reduction of risk of
threats to system by stolen and lost
terminals
Relies on the integrity of the users to report
losses quickly and accurately.
May be achieved by removing subscription
and/or disabling terminal
Disabling may be either temporary or
permanent
Permanent disabling removes all keys
including (k)
Temporary disabling removes all traffic keys
but allows ambience listening

Security and SIMs

Many second generation terminals may use
SIMs
SIM contains all personalization information
Secret key(k) and ITSI must be on SIM if
complete SIM mobility required.
Design must be able to prevent the secret
key (k) and traffic keys being extracted
May be possible to only have talkgroup and
phonebook information on SIM (leave ITSI/K
in terminal)

End to End Encryption

End to end encryption features

No need to trust infrastructure- no
intermediate decoding.
Additional synchronization carried in stolen
half frames
Standard algorithms available or national
solutions
Local Key Management Centres managed
by User
Keys received from national COMSEC

End to end keys

Traffic encryption key(TEK). Three editions
used in terminal to give key overlap.
Group Key encryption key(GEK) used to
protection TEKs during OTAR.
Unique KEK(long life) used to protect GEKs
during OTAR.
Signalling Encryption Keys (SEK) used
optionally for control traffic

Conclusions
Security functions built in from the start!
User friendly and transparent key
management.
Air interface encryption protects control
traffic, IDs as well as voice and user traffic.
Key management comes without user
overhead because of OTAR.
Well developed end to end encryption for
users with very sensitive data to protect.