101 PHIL.

115
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No.
1180, petitioner, vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO,
City Treasurer of Manila, respondent
FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail
business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed
the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned
for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties
concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the
business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally

accepted principles.

RULING: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In

this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle
and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

9 SCRA 230
G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive
Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO
GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR
MARIO, as Secretary of Justice, respondents

FACTS: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic
Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then
Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons
of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive
agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn
by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered
into by Macapagal.

RULING: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance
of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between
a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines
has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter
to an act of Congress.

462 SCRA 622

G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REP. ETTA ROSALES, PHILIPPINE
COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAMILIES OF VICTIMS
OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES, BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE,
HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, AHMED PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO, LEAVIDES
G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO CARLO VISTAN, NOEL VILLAROMAN, CELESTE
CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL LLASOS, CRISTINA
ATENDIDO, ISRAEL FAGELA, and ROMEL BAGARES, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, represented by HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and
the DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE,
respondents
FACTS: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Philippines
signed the Statute on December 28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Hence this petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate and it is the duty of the executive
department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow
it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Respondents,
however argue that it has no duty to transmit the copy of Rome Statute to Senate
for concurrence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty
to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute.
RULING: Petition is dismissed.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of the state, is regarded
as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole
representative with foreign nations. As chief architect of foreign policy, the President
acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the
President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties,
and otherwise transact business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides for a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 votes of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. The participation of the legislative branch in the treatymaking process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the
field of foreign relations.
Petitioners equate signing of the treaty with ratification, which are two different and
distinct steps in the treaty-making process. Signature is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good faith of the
parties. Ratification, the other hand, is a formal act, executive by nature,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. Under our Constitution, the
power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence to the ratification. Such power of the President cannot be encroached
by the courts via mandamus and the courts has no jurisdiction over actions seeking
to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. Therefore, the Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the
signed text of Rome Statute to Senate.

151 SCRA 279

G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS
MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD, RAMSID ASALI, BANDING
USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN
TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA
ALIH, and
NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners, vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C.
GASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL
UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO
CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL
FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IDC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT
DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL
DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
FACTS: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense
forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the
intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally
seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights.

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but
reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the
assassination of the city mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints
and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are
violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.
RULING: The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents
had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty
provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The
petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary
actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that
the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals
or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court.
The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held
inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation
by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said
operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence
should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the
prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling a
man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material.

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, petitioners, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M.
SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the
Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO), respondents.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their
withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she
resign as President of the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an
Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time
that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They
question the jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that
their act was not service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles
of War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.
ISSUE: Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore
cognizable by court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup dtat cognizable by
regular courts
RULING: The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving
the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military
efficiency. Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war,
but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but
also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there
is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has been
universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries
of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has
become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the
most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.
The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such
violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In
short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the
penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by
the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently
intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent
standard of military discipline.