Chapter Two

CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY

Section Two. Trespass to dwelling
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. Any private person who shall
enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall be punished by
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who
shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious
harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall
it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose
of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall
enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are
open.
Elements of trespass to dwelling.
1. That the offender is a private person.
2. That he enters the dwelling of another.
3. That such entrance is against the latters will.
Circumstance qualifying the offense.
If the offense is committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty
is higher.
Offender is private person.
If the offender is a public officer or employee, the entrance into the dwelling
against the will of the occupant is violation of domicile. (Art. 128)
Dwelling place, defined.
Dwelling place, as used in this article, means any building or structure
exclusively devoted for rest and comfort, as distinguished from places devoted to
business, offices, etc.
In the case of People v. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703, a store of cheap goods,
which was also the dwelling place of the owner thereof, was considered a dwelling.
The accused was found guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling.

Whether a building is a dwelling house or not depends upon the use to which
it is put. A barn may be converted into a dwelling house or a dwelling house into a
barn, by a change of use.
Dwelling includes a room when occupied by another person.
Neither the nature of the crime nor the responsibility of its perpetrator is
altered by the fact that the accused was living, as a boarder, in the same house of
which the room of the offended occupant he entered was a part. (U.S. v Silvano, 31
Phil. 510)
Entrance into dwelling must be against the will of owner or occupant.
Note the word against used in the law, to distinguish the case from a mere
lack of consent of the dweller, because the mere absence of his consent is not
enough to constitute of the crime of trespass to dwelling.
To commit trespass, the entrance by the accused should be against the
presumed or express prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission should
not be confused with prohibition. (People v. De Peralta, 42 Phil 169)
Lack of permission does not amount to prohibition.
It is not necessary in the ordinary life of men, in order to call at the door of a
house or to enter it, to obtain the previous permission from the owner who lives in
it. With the utmost good faith, a person, to whom entrance has not been denied
beforehand, may suppose that the owner of the house has no objection to receiving
him in it. (Groizard, cited in People v. Peralta, 42 Phil. 69)
In general, all members of a household must be presumed to have authority to
extend an invitation to enter the house.
Thus, an invitation to enter a dwelling, extended by a girl 12 years old, an
inmate thereof, was held sufficient to justify the claim of the entry was not made
against the occupants will, in the absence of express prohibition of his part. (U.S. v.
Dulfo, 11 Phil. 75)
There must be opposition on the part of the owner of the house to the entry of the
accused.
Thus, where the owner of the house, upon meeting the accused at the door,
took the accused by the hand and requested him to be seated, it is clear that there
was no trespass to dwelling, because there was no opposition on the part of the
owner of the house to the entry of the accused. (U.S. v. Flemister, 1 Phil. 335; U.S. v.
Dionisio, et al., 12 Phil. 283)
Implied prohibition.

Thus, early in the morning, defendant went up to the house of the offended
party and entered the room of the latters daughter who was then sleeping. There
was no lock to the door to prevent the entrance of any person.
Held: There is trespass to dwelling. Express prohibition is not necessary,
because prohibition in this case is presumed, considering the time, the fact that the
door was closed and the fact that daughter was sleeping and the offended party
was in the market. (People v. Clemente, C.A.- G.R. No. 43907, November, 1936)
It is well-settled rule that whoever enters the dwelling of another at late hour
of the night after the inmates have retired and closed their doors does so against
their will. Under these circumstances and express prohibition is not necessary, as it
is presumed. (U.S. v. Mesina, 21 Phil. 615; U.S. v. Panes, 25 Phil. 292)
The fact that the door of the room was only fastened by a string too weak
and inadequate to hold it fast, does not alter the fact that the offended party wished
it to be understood that she did not desire anyone to enter without her express
consent. (U.S. v. Silvano, 31 Phil. 509_
There was implied prohibition to enter the dwelling in a case where the owner
thereof had told the defendants to wait in the open porch and then closed the door
behind him as he entered the drawing room. (Gabriel v. People, 96 Phil 10)
Prohibition is implied in entrance through the window.
While it is true that the window was open when the defendants passed
through it in order to gain entrance into the house, there is an implied prohibition
when entrance is made through means not intended for ingress. (People v. Marcia,
C.A., 50 O.G. 3122)
Prohibition must be in existence prior to or at the time of entrance.
The facts or circumstances from which the objection of the occupant may be
inferred should be in existence prior to or at the time of the entry.
In no event can facts arising after entry has been effected with the express or
implied consent of the occupant change the character of the entry from one with
consent to one contrary thereto. In this case, the accused entered a house by the
principal door, which they found half-open. There was no opposition of any kind
from the occupant at the time of entrance by the accused. (U.S. v. Dionisio, et al.,
12 Phil. 283)
Distinguish this ruling from that of U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381.
In the case of U.S. v. Arceo, there was violence used by the accused
immediately after entrance without the consent of the owner of the house.

What is intended to be protected and preserved by the law in punishing trespass is

the privacy of ones dwelling.
People v. Almeda, et al.
(75 Phil. 477-478)
Facrs: The appellant, in company with other persons, arrived at the house of
Honorata Limpo. The latter was thereupon informed by appellants companion,
Potencio Villano, that they were going to demolish and repair her house, to which
Honorata Limpo objected. Unheeding this opposition, and upon express orders by
the appellant, his companions Potenciano Villano and Antonio Dysionglo proceeded
to gain entry into the house by means of two ladders which they placed against the
front wall.
Held: The defense pressed in the appeal is that the opposition registered by
Honorata Limpo was directed against the demolition or repair of her house and not
against the original entry of the appellant and his companions into her dwelling.
But Honorata Limpo could not have consented to appeallants intrusion into
the house, which made him a trespasser, for the very purpose already objected to
by her. Moreover, the method employed by appellants men in effecting entry
suggests prior refusal on the part of Honorata Limpo to admit them through its
stairs.
What is intended to be protected and preserved by the law is the privacy of
ones dwelling, and , except in those cases enumerated in the third paragraph of
Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent inheres in the unwelcome visit
of a trespasser.
Trespass under the second paragraph, of Article 280.
When the crime of trespass is committed by means of violence or
intimidation, it is qualified in the sense that a higher penalty is imposed.
Must violence refer to person only?
There is no question that intimidation refers to person. But there is a conflict
of opinion as to whether violence refers also to person or to things only.
In the case of People v. Tayag, 59 Phil. 606, the Supreme Court considered
the act of the accused in loosening one of the bars of the door by means of bol and
screw driver as trespass committed by violence.
The Court of Appeals in the case of People v. Coronel, CA-G.R. No. 5322, did
not hold the same view. In the case of People v. Abling, CA- G.R. No. 4640, March 12,
1940, the Court of Appeals also held that violence does not refer to force upon
things.

Trespass by means of violence:

1. Pushing the door violently and maltreating the occupants after entering. (U.S.
v. Paray, 17 Phil. 378)
2. Cutting of a ribbon or string with which the door latch of a closed room was
fastened. The cutting of the fastenings of the door was an act of violence.
(U.S. v. Lindio, 10 Phil. 192)
3. Wounding by means of a bolo the owner of the house immediately after
entrance. (U.S. v. Arceo, et al., 3 Phil. 192)
Trespass by means of intimidation:
1. Firing a revolver in the air by persons attempting to force their way in to a
house. (U.S. v. Ostrea, 2 Phil. 93)
2. The flourishing of a bolo against inmates of the house upon gaining entrance.
(U.S. v. Lindio, 10 Phil. 192)
The violence or intimidation may take place immediately after the entrance
The law which forbids entry (with violence) into the dwelling of another
relates not only to the method which one may pass the threshold of the dwelling
of another, but also to conduct immediately after the entrance of one who so
enters. In this case, although the couple already retired at that time, as it was
between 8 and 9 oclock at night, the wifes sister was still awake and sitting up
sewing. But the accused entered the house without first obtaining the permission
of any person. One inside, the accused wounded the husband.
Held: Qualified trespass was committed. (U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381)
Prohibition, not necessary when violence or intimidation is employed by the
offender.
There is qualified trespass as long as there is violence or intimidation
employed, notwithstanding the fact that the door of the house was already open
and there was no express prohibition to the entry. (U.S. v. Abanto, 15 Phil. 223)
In this case, the owner of the house was awakened by the accused on the
outside calling him by name; that when the owner of the house opened the door
and sought to recognize the accused, another man, who was already upstairs
alongside the staircase, struck the owner of the house on the forehead with a
woodenstick; and that the latter fell backward over a bench inside the house, the
accused passed through the door, threw himself upon the owner of the house,
and seized him by the throat.
Trespass may be committed by the owner of a dwelling.
Thus, even supposing that the house belonged to the accused, that fact alone
did not authorize him to do anything with or enter the house against the will of

the actual occupant. He could have invoked the aid or the court for the exercise
or protection of his proprietary rights. (People v. Almeda, et. al., 75 Phil. 476)
All trespassers ordinarily have intention to commit another crime, but if there is
no overt act of the crime intended to be committed, the crime is only trespass to
dwelling.
Thus, even if the defendants desired to have carnal relation with a mother
and her two daughters when they broke in to the house in which the women
were living and maltreated them, but the defendants desisted from their original
intention and left the house, they were guilty of trespass to dwelling with
violence. (U.S. v. Barnedo, et al., 36 Phil. 851; U.S. v. Cabaraban, 36 Phil. 251)
The culprit who entered a dwelling through the window to steal personal
property, but was caught by the owner of the dwelling before he could take any
personal property, is guilty of trespass to dwelling, not attempted robbery.
Where an intruder was caught in the act of forcibly attempting to enter a
dwelling, the crime is not attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.
(People v. Tayag and Moralesm 59 Phil. 606, cited in the case of People v.
Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703)
Trespass to dwelling, when separate from other offense committed in the
dwelling.
The accused entered the dwelling of a captain by forcing his way through the
window. When found inside by the occupants who tried to arrest him, the
accused resisted arrest and stabbed the son of the captain, inflicting a mortal
wound. In his effort to escape, he also assaulted the captain, his wife and
daughter. The son did not die because of the timely and able medical attendance
given by a physician.
Held: The accused committed trespass to dwelling through violence,
frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries. (People v. Medina, 59 Phil.
134)
Note: Two crimes were committed, not complex under Article 48. If the
purpose of the accused was to kill the person injured, it would be frustrated
homicide only, but dwelling or that the crime was committed after an unlawful
entry would be an aggravating circumstance.
Since in the Medina case, it seems that when the accused entered the
dwelling through the window he had no intent to kill any person inside, but that
the intent to kill came to his mind when he was being arrested by the occupants
thereof, the crime of trespass to dwelling is a separate and distinct offense from
frustrated homicide.

Cases to which the provisions of his article are not applicable:

1. If the entrance to anothers dwelling is made for the purpose of preventing
some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third
person.
2. If the purpose is to render some service to humanity or justice.
3. If the place where entrance is made is a caf, tavern, inn and other public
houses, while the same are open. (Art. 280, last par.)
Entering a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to x x x justice.
The Meralco line inspectors, who were suspecting that the householfer was
hiding a transformer used by him in stealing electricity in his house, had no right
to enter the house against his will. It cannot be said that the inspector rendered
a service to justice. (Gabriel v. People, 96 Phil. 10)
_________________________________________________________________________________
Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter
the closed premises or the fenced estate of another, while either or them are
uninhabited, if the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser has not
secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof.
Elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.

That the offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of another.
That the entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited.
That the prohibition to enter be manifest.
That the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the
caretaker thereof.

Meaning of premises.
Premises signifies distinct and definite locality. It may mean a room, shop,
building, building or definite area, but in either case, locality is fixed. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 33)
Entering a warehouse may be trespass under this article.
This is so, because the warehouse is a closed premise; and if it is
uninhabited, prohibition is manifest and no permission is given, the entrance into
the same is other form of trespass.
Distinguished from trespass to dwelling.
1. In trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person; in other forms of
trespass, the offender is any person.

2. In the first, the offender enters a dwelling house; in the second, the offender
enters closed premises or fenced estate.
3. In the first, the place entered is inhabited; in the second, the place entered is
uninhabited.
4. In the first, the act constituting the crime is entering the dwelling against the
will of the owner; in the second, it is entering the closed premises or the
fenced state without securing the permission of the owner or caretaker
thereof.
5. In the first, the prohibition to enter is express or implied; in the second, the
prohibition to enter must be manifest.
Section Three. Threats and coercion
Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction
upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime be
threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money
or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall
have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the
penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat
shall not have been made subject to a condition.
Acts punishable as grave threats:
1. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property
or that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime and demanding
money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and the
offender attained his purpose.
2. By making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose.
3. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property
or that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the threat not being
a subject to a condition.
The threat must be to inflict a wrong amounting to a crime upon the
person, honor, or property of the offended party or that of his family.
Is it necessary that the wrong threatened to be inflicted must amount to any of
the crimes against persons, against honor or against property?

Suppose, A threatened B that unless the latter send to him P 1, 000, he would
kidnap his son, would it be grave threats, considering that the wrong threatened
to be inflicted would amount to a crime against liberty?
It is believed that the crime committed is grave threats. Such a threat affects
the person or a member of the family of the offended party.
Elements of grave threats where offender attained his purpose:
1. That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the
latters person, honor, or property, or upon that of the latters family, of any
wrong.
2. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
3. That there is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed,
even though not unlawful.
4. That the offender attains his purpose.
Examples:
Threats to commit a crime upon the person of the offended partyA sent a letter to B in which A said that unless B would send to him P 1, 000,
A would kill B. B sent P 1, 000 to A. The threat to kill B involves crime against person
of B, which is homicide.
Threats to commit a crime upon the property of the offended partyA sent C to B to tell, as in fact he told, the latter that if he would not send P 1,
000, A would burn Bs house. B sent the money to A. The threat to burn the house of
B involves a crime against his property, which is arson.
Threats to commit a crime upon the honor of the offended party
A told B that unless the latter would give him P 1, 000, he would place inside
his house a tin of opium and then he would report that matter to the police. B sent P
1, 000 to A. The threat involves the crime of incriminating an innocent person. (Art.
363)
Demand for money.
Note that in the examples above, there is a demand of money,
In a case, the accused sent a letter to an old woman, threatening her with death or
the burning of her house unless she gave him P 500, which she must deposit in the
place indicated to her in the letter. When arrested and searched, the accused had in
his pocketbook an envelope on which was written the name of the offended party. It
was held that the accused was guilty of grave threats. (U.S. v. De la Cruz, 28 Phil.
279)

Or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful.

A seduced Bs daughter. Because A refused to marry her, B threatened A with
death, unless A would marry his said daughter. Is B liable for grave threats?
Yes, B threatened A with the infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting
to a crime (homicide), imposing a condition (unless A would marry his daughter).
It will be noted that the condition imposed is not unlawful. Nevertheless,
since a threat to inflict a wrong amounting to a crime was made, B is criminally
liable of grave threats.
Penalty to be imposed.
If the offended attained his purpose, the penalty one degree lower of the
penalty for the crime threatened to be committed shall be imposed.
Thus, if, in the example above, A succeeded in having the daughter of B
marry him, because of the threat, the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed.
Prision mayor is the penalty one degree lower from reclusion temporal, the penalty
for homicide. Homicide is a crime, A threatened to commit against B.
If the offended does not attain his purpose, the penalty is two degrees lower
than that provided by law for the crime threated to be committed.
Thus, if B refused to give his daughter to A in marriage, and the latter is prosecuted
and convicted, the penalty is prision correccional.
If the threat is not subject to a condition, the penalty is fixed.
When the threat is not subject to a condition, the penalty does not depend on
the penalty does not depend on the penalty for the crime threatened to be
committed. The penalty is fixed at arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.
Circumstance qualifying the offense.
If the threat is made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty is to be
imposed in its maximum period.
Illustration of grave threats where the offender does not attain his purpose.
A was madly in love with B, a woman. B rejected A. Thereupon, A threatened
to kidnap or kill B if she would not treat him well. Because of fear, B moved to and
sought protection in the house of her cousin. A wrote a letter and asked C to deliver
it to B, threatening that if she would not leave her hiding place and go with him, he
would kill her and her relatives. When B received the letter, she immediately
showed it to her cousin and on the same day the matter was reported to the police.

Held: A is guilty of the crime of grave threats. A did not attain his purpose for
which he wrote the letter, because of the intervention of the police to whom the
matter was reported. The purpose not having been attained, the penalty to be
imposed upon A should be two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for
murder, the crime A threatened to commit. The threat having been made in writing,
the penalty should be imposed in the maximum period. (People v. Nerona, C.A., 46
O.G. 314)
Elements of grave threats not subject to a condition:
a. Theat the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the
latters person, honor, or property, or upo that of the latters family, of any
wrong.
b. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
c. That the threat is not subject to a condition.
Example:
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her
house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she
witnessed earlier at around 4:00 ocock in the afternoon. On her way there,
petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time
saying Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito? Considering what transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict a serious physical injury on her
person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding
circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict
serious injury evinced, by petitioners accompanying act.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under
Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to
a crime and (2) the treat to kill was not subject to a condition. (Caluag v. People,
G.R. No. 171511. March 4, 2009)
Third form of grave threats must be serious and deliberate.
The third form of grave threats must be serious in the sense that it is
deliberate and that the offender persists in the idea involved in his threats.
The threats of the third form are those made with the deliberate purpose of
creating in the mind of person threatened with the belief that the threats is
punished under Article 285, par. 2.
In the third form of grave threats, there is no condition imposed or there is no
demand for money.

Note that in subdivision No. 2 or Article 282, the threat shall not have been
made subject to a condition.
If the condition is not proved, it is a grave threats under sub-paragraph 2 of Article
282.
If, as claimed by appellant, Lt. Santos had no right or power to place him
under arrest, or if the order to arrest him were unlawful, because he had not
committed any offense, then he could, as stated by him, rightfully resist the arrest
even to the extent of using such force as might be necessary to repel that employed
in carrying-out the lieutenants order. But the fact that Lt. Santos had ordered his
men to arrest appellant did not excuse or justify the latter in poking his gun into the
body of Lt. Santos with the threat to kill him. The Court does not agree with the
Solicitor General that the crime committed by appellant were subject to the
condition that Lt. Santos would not insist upon arresting appellant and the latter
attained his purpose, as he was not arrested till the following day. If appellant was
not taken into custody at that time, it was because he succeeded in making good
his escape by mixing with the crowd. (People v. Lustre, et al., 57 O.G)
Note: The accused was found guilty of grave threats under subparagraph 2 or
Article 282 and sentenced to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, and to pay a
fine of P 200.
Essence of the crime of threats is intimidation.
In the crime of threats, it is essential that there be intimidation.
In the intimidation, there is promise of some further harm or injury, either to
the person, honor or property of the offended party or of his family.
The act threatened to be committed must be wrong.
Note the phrase threaten another with the infliction x x x of any wrong in the first
paragraph of Article 282. So, the act threatened to be done must be WRONG. In
fact, any threat to commit a crime is a threat to inflict a wrong.
A, boarder in the house of B, seduced the latters daughter, 16 years old and
a virgin. As A was not willing to marry her, B threatened to file a criminal action
against him for qualified seduction, unless he would marry her. Is B liable for grave
threat? No. Filing a complaint against A is not wrong.
But if B threatened to kill A, unless he would marry his daughter, B would be
liable for grave threats, because what he threatened to do (to kill A) was wrong.
Grave threats may be committed by indirect challenge to a gunfight, even if the
complainant was absent when the challenge was made.

The accused went in front of the house of Rizal and shouted: You Rizal, you
fight in a gun duel. The accused fired two warning shots and thereafter threw
stones at the roof of the house of Rizal, but the latter was out having gone to
another town. A few moments later, after the accused had left, Rizal had alighted
from the a car, a neighbor reported to him the challenge made by the accused.
It was held that the indirect challenge to a gun fight amounted to
intimidation, especially when backed by two warning shots, withstanding the fact
that the complainant was not present at the time the challenge was made, the
Court of Appeals citing Viada, Vol. VI, pp 54-55, 4 th edition. (People v. Sayon, C.A., 64
O.G. 5089)
As the crime consists in threatening another with some future harm, it is not
necessary that the offended party was present at the time the threats were made. It
is sufficient that threats, after they had been made in his absence, came to the
knowledge of the offended party.
Art. 283. Light threats. Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime,
made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall
be punished by arresto mayor.
Art. 284. Bond for good behavior. In all cases falling within the two next
preceding articles, the person making the threats may also be required to give bail
not to molest the person threatened, or if he shall fail to give such bail, he shall be
sentenced to destierro.
Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding
article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel,
unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some
harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not
persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the
offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a
felony.
Art. 286. Grave coercions. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any
religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall
be imposed.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize
anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the
payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both.
Art. 288. Other similar coercions; (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and
payment of wages by means of tokens.) The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person, agent or
officer, of any association or corporation who shall force or compel, directly or
indirectly, or shall knowingly permit any laborer or employee employed by him or by
such firm or corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or
commodities of any kind.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall pay the wages due
a laborer or employee employed by him, by means of tokens or objects other than
the legal tender currency of the laborer or employee.
Art. 289. Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor
through violence or threats. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 300 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, for the purpose of
organizing, maintaining or preventing coalitions or capital or labor, strike of laborers
or lock-out of employees, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree as to
compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their
industry or work, if the act shall not constitute a more serious offense in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.
Chapter Three
DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS

Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. The penalty of

prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any private individual who in order to discover the
secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.
If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and
a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted

with the custody of minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or
minors placed under their care or study, nor to spouses with respect to the papers
or letters of either of them.
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee,
or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master
and shall reveal such secrets.
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial
establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of
the industry of the latter.