Professional Documents
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RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831; 155840; 158700/ February 18, 2008/ Nachura, J./ Administrative
procedure /JBMORETO
asked to be transferred, after which she filed the complaint on the basis
of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. 7877 in the DOLE.
Since Rayala was a presidential appointee, Laguesma referred the
complaint to the OP. Laguesma was later ordered by Secretary Zamora to
create a committee to investigate the allegations. Accordingly, Laguesma
created the Committee on Decorum and Investigation. The Committee
heard the parties and received their respective evidence. In March 2000
the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Laguesma,
finding Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommending the
minimum penalty provided under the AO. Laguesma forwarded the report
to Zamora, who issued A.O. 119 concurring with the Committees
findings but ruling that the penalty was too light, considering Rayalas
elevated rank. Considering his disgraceful and immoral conduct, Zamora
dismissed Rayala.
On petition for certiorari before the CA, the CA upheld the validity of the
order of Rayalas dismissal for violation of R.A. 6713, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Rayala
filed an MR and CA Justice Reyes dissented from the decision to affirm
because under AO 250 the imposable penalty was suspension for a
minimum of 6 months and 1 day. A Special Division had to be constituted
to settle the disagreement and the CA modified its earlier decision so
that Rayala was only suspended for one year.
Domingo and Rayala filed Petitions for Review before the SC. Domingo
wanted Sec. Zamoras original order to be upheld, Rayala wanted to be
cleared of all charges of sexual harassment, i.e. no punishment at all.
The Republic did not like the CAs resolution and filed its own Petition for
Review
because
it
wanted
Rayala
dismissed
ISSUES & RATIO.
1.
Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? YES.
It must be pointed out that despite Rayalas protests and allegations of
conspiracy, he was found guilty by THREE independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP, and the CA. They differed only as to the appropriate
penalty. The assessments of the Committee and OP were found by the CA
and SC to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of
the complainant and respondent. When supported by substantial evidence,
factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are
accorded great respect by the courts.
2.
Was AO 250 an unlawful expansion of sexual harassment
under R.A. 7877? NO
Issue was raised by Rayala. he argued that in Aquino v. Acosta the SC laid
down what truly constitutes sexual harassment, and such is what is
applicable not AO 250. Under R.A. 7877 there needs to be a demand of a
sexual favor which is a pre-condition to hiring or continued employment,
the denial of which results in discrimination against the employee. He
argued that the acts imputed to him were without malice, and contrary to
the CAs findings sexual harassment is not malum prohibitum, hence
a.
SC: Rayala admitted to doing what Lourdes said he did, but insisted that
such was not sexual harassment within the purview of the law. However,
the SC pointed out that basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold
liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public
officer may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liability which can
proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to
sexual harassment.
While Rayala correctly pointed out that under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7877 certain
elements were required in order for the crime to be committed, this is with
respect to CRIMINAL LIABILITY only.
b.
Under Sec. 4 of the Act, which governs administrative cases, the employer
or head of the institution shall provide a procedure for the resolution,
settlement, and prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. The rules and
regulations promulgated in this respect shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace.
Hence, the CA correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability was not determined
solely under Sec. 3, since he was charged with the administrative offense.
Under AO 250, in relation to Sec. 4 of R.A. 7877, he could be charged for
sexual harassment for violating the guidelines on proper decorum set down
in the AO.
However, EVEN IF Sec. 3 were the only standard, Rayala would still be
administratively liable. The demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor need not be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Ms.
Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the demand be a precondition
to employment it is enough that the acts result in creating and
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee
3.
c.
d.
The records show that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due
process safeguards. He appeared personally and with counsel and
participated in the proceedings.
As to the designation of the offense (disgraceful and immoral conduct)
even in criminal cases such is not controlling. What is controlling is the
description of the offense charged and the particular facts therein recited.
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to
disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is punished by the RAC. Hence, it
can be concluded that any finding of liability for sexual harassment may
also be the basis of culpability for a charge for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
4.
Did the CA err in modifying the penalty imposed by the OP?
NO.
The only limitations to the Presidents power to remove the NLRC
Chairman are the requirements under the law and the due process
clause.
Issue raised by Lourdes and the Republic. They argued that the President
had the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
erring presidential appointee, since the President has control of the entire
Executive Department. The limitation of AO 250 referred only to instances
where the DOLE Secretary was the disciplining authority.
Rayala argued that in the OPs decision he was dismissed for disgraceful
and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code. Considering
that he was tried for a violation of R.A. 7877 and not for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, he argued that he was denied the right to procedural
due process.
The SC disagreed. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following
SC: It was error for the OP to dismiss Rayala. Under AO 250 the penalty for
the first offense is suspension is 6 months and one day to 1 year, while the
penalty for the second offense is dismissal. This is the same penalty
prescribed by Sec. 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 52 A(15) of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Under
the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good
behaviour until he or she reaches the age of 65, unless sooner removed for
cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties
of the office.
In the order issued by Sec. Zamora, he cited these provisions but failed to
apply the appropriate penalty. It was proper that the President, as the
proper disciplining authority, determined whether there was valid cause for
Rayalas removal. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for
cause as provided by law. In short, when the OP found that Rayala was
guilty the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. Whether
the OP found him guilty under AO 250 or the RAC, the penalty was the
same: suspension, not dismissal. The high office occupied by Rayala [rank
equivalent of a CA Justice] and his abuse of it would only constitute an
aggravating circumstance meriting the maximum penalty one year
suspension, as correctly found by the CA.
DECISION.
CA affirmed, all petitions denied