Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, pp.

243--249

Affirmative Action and the Search

for Educational Equity
Faye J. Crosby
University of California, Santa Cruz

Susan Clayton
The College of Wooster

We discuss the ideas presented by Renner and Moore. We agree that it is a mistake
to justify affirmative action solely in terms of diversity, and we think it is vital to
note the continuing disparities in the educational opportunities afforded to White
students and to other students. We believe that the views expressed by Renner and
Moore present an opportunity to think critically about a number of issues related
to affirmative action.
Renner and Moore (2004) have written a provocative and timely article. In
terms of both specific points of information and general conceptualizations, the article by Renner and Moore should help scholars and activists who wish to continue
the fight for social justice generally and for racial parity in particular. In clear and
succinct language, they describe a problem that confronts American society. They
show, furthermore, how important it isfor economic and demographic reasons
as well as for reasons of justiceto address this problem.
In work that we have done, together and separately, over the last 15 years or
so, we have presented theory and research that ally us to scholars like Renner and
Moore. We have conducted empirical research that documents the need for affirmative action (e.g., Crosby, 1982; Crosby, Clayton, Hemker, & Alksnis, 1986) and
that helps to explicate peoples reactions to affirmative action (e.g., Clayton, 1996;
Elizondo & Crosby, in press; Golden, Hinkle, & Crosby, 2001; Ozawa, Crosby, &
Crosby, 1996; Schmermund, Sellers, Mueller, & Crosby, 2001; Tougas, Crosby,
Joly, & Pelchat, 1995; Truax, Wood, Wright, Cordova, & Crosby, 1998). In efforts
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to F.J. Crosby, Psychology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 [email: fjcrosby@ucsc.edu].
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to promote a firm understanding of affirmative action, we have also synthesized

work done by other researchers (e.g., Clayton & Crosby, 1992; Crosby, 1994;
Crosby & Blanchard, 1989; Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003; Tomasson,
Crosby, & Herzberger, 1996).
From our perspective, Renner and Moores article is particularly valuable in
that it shows that ethnic minority students have made few gains since 1965 relative
to the gains made by White students. Especially impressive are the pictorial representations in the article (particularly Figure 2) that illustrate how minority students . . . have not participated in the huge expansion of access to higher education
at the same rate as whites over the period of affirmative action. In showing the
persistent gap between ethnic minority and majority students, Renner and Moore
join the ranks of other scholars (e.g., Bell, 2004; Ogletree, 2004) who, 50 years
on, are calling attention to the limited long-term success of the Brown v. Board of
Education.
Like others (e.g., Pincus, 2003) Renner and Moore make clear that reverse
discrimination is a red herring. White applicants for university are mostly in competition with other White applicants and are not really in competition with applicants of color. A similar observation has been made by Bowen and Bok (1998)
who demonstrated that racially sensitive admissions policies at 28 New England
colleges resulted in little change in a White applicants chance of success. Specifically, race-sensitive admissions policies meant that a White applicants chances
of being granted admission at the schools droppedfrom 26.5% to 25%!
What is the implication of the stark racial disparities described by Renner
and Moore for the policy of affirmative action? They argue that scholars and
activists need to justify affirmative action on grounds other than diversity. In
fact, the diversity argument, according to Renner and Moore, can undermine the
effectiveness of affirmative action.
Over the years, we too have called on scholars and activists to move beyond
the diversity argument. In an article published around the time that the Supreme
Court was hearing oral arguments in the cases of Gratz v Bollinger and Grutter v
Bollinger, for example, we state:
In the public debates about affirmative action, justification of the policy has rested on
two planks: diversity and fairness (Tierney, 1997). Most educators who have entered the
debates have stressed affirmative actions worth in terms of achieving diversity (Bowen
& Bok, 1998). By focusing on diversity and ignoring issues of merit, the educators who
advocate for affirmative action seem to talk past the public commentators who oppose the
policy (Wachtel, 1999). . . . Focusing exclusively on diversity, the educators have ignored
the issue of greatest relevance to critics: the issue of preference (Kendler, 2000).
Our article contributes to the debate over affirmative action by emphasizing merit. We
argue that affirmative action is a policy that is entirely consistent with the American meritocratic ideal (Crosby et al., 2003, p. 94).

The problem with the diversity argument, say Renner and Moore, is that it
eliminates the criterion of racial equity. The legal position based on diversity is

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that race may be used to achieve diversity under limited circumstances, not that
race must be used whenever there are persistent effects of past and present discrimination (Renner & Moore, 2004). Paradoxically, diversity as a philosophy
is similar to colorblindness in that it ignores the historical experiences and sociocultural significance associated with specific ethnicities. A diversity criterion
directs attention away from the continuing reality of discrimination, and implies
that it is the multiplicity of ethnicities rather than the status of any particular ethnic
group that is of value. The success of diversity is evaluated not in terms of whether
minority groups disadvantage has been removed but in terms of whether (mostly
White) students are receiving an enhanced education.
By highlighting the shortcomings both of affirmative action as a policy and of
the legal arguments used to support it, Renner and Moores article should serve as
a springboard for discussions of some vexing issues. Four issues seem particularly
worth noting.
First, there is the question of whether affirmative action is a policy that tilts in
favor of ethnic minorities or is a genuinely neutral policy. We have conceptualized
affirmative action as a neutral policy whereby monitoring of outcomes allows us
to detect processes, including face-neutral processes, that (often unintentionally)
put people of color at a disadvantage. Like Jencks (1998), we have questioned
the reliance on gating mechanisms that do little to predict actual performance
on the job or in school but that serve to eliminate applicants of color. We have cited
the SATs, even the SAT IIs, as such a mechanism, noting that the 200-point gap
between majority and underrepresented students sounds quite dramatic but results
in only a half a grade difference in grade point averages of students at the University
of California (Crosby, Clayton, Downing, & Iyer, 2004). If traditional admissions
criteria truly assess merit objectively, then affirmative action policies that reduce
the impact of these criteria do privilege minority applicants over White applicants.
But if, as we argue, these criteria are themselves biased, then affirmative action
simply corrects for imperfections (that favor Whites) in the existing policies and
procedures.
Renner and Moore are less convinced. Since every single educational policy
and practice cannot be truly race neutral in terms of its outcomes, say Renner
and Moore, such as legacy admissions, it is the balance that is key to equity. Or,
a little later: the total set of admission standards, procedures, and policies that
govern overall access to higher education, still favor whites. Their effect more than
offsets the limited impact of admission procedures that supports minorities.
Where does the truth lie? With many different affirmative action plans in
place, affirmative action may sometimes accord privilege while at other times
it actually removes the hitherto invisible privilege of Whites. Discussions of affirmative action should be more conscious of the differences between programs
at specific institutions, and look for the best practices in terms of effectiveness,
fairness, and acceptability to those affected.

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The second issue provoked by the Renner and Moore analysis concerns the
possible pernicious effects of the Grutter v Bollinger and Gratz v Bollinger decisions. In both decisions, the Supreme Court declared that the state has a compelling interest in having diverse student bodies. Like Renner and Moore, we
think that much is lost if liberals seek to justify affirmative action solely in terms
of diversity. But we also believe that the defense of the University of Michigan was
more or less pre-determined by the importance of the Bakke decision and by the
judicial principle of stare decisis. In American jurisprudence, precedent trumps
innovation. Having read the 1954 decision in Brown v Board of Education of
Topeka, we do not know how the counsel for the University of Michigan
could have used the decision in Brown as precedence (Smith & Crosby,
in press). Thus, while agreeing with Renner and Moore that diversity should not
be the only, or even the major, justification for affirmative action, we believe
that diversity might be an effective argument alongside what we call the merit
argument.
Given what we know about system justification (Jost, 1995; Kay, Jimenez,
& Jost, 2002) there may be a strategic advantage in emphasizing diversity and
even more advantage in showing how diversity benefits White students. Research
suggests that some Whites react to affirmative action policies on the basis of how
the policies will affect Whites and are not concerned with the policies impact on
Blacks (Lowery, 2004). Diversity may, thus, provide the best argument to appeal
to Whites. Finally, we also consider diversity to be a valid argument (Gurin, 1999;
Gurin, Dey, Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002), a point that Renner and Moore do not
contest.
The third issue that is highlighted for us as we read Renner and Moores article
concerns the chasm between liberal and conservative interpretations of the sets of
statistics. Like Renner and Moore, we attribute Whites relative educational gains
to structural factors that facilitate White success and impede the success of others.
Renner and Moore produce a list of nine circumstances that confer advantage to
White students, starting with prepaid tax-exempt tuition plans that benefit affluent
families. We find the list totally persuasive. But we also wonder if scholars on the
political right would be as persuaded as we are. They might, instead, point to the
persistent gap between Whites and others and then proclaim, See! The problem
lies in the minorities; try as we might, we cannot make progress.
What explains these differences in perspective? Why are Whites so focused
on the (incorrect) perception that people of color (rather than other Whites) have
somehow robbed them of scarce resourcessuch as admission to selective colleges
and universities? Could it be that Whites reactivity to the presumed theft of places
by people of color derives from the persistent racist assumption that people of
color have no place at selective universities? Similarly, could it be that Whites
relative insensitivity to inter-White competition springs from the continuing racist

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presumption that White people more or less automatically merit a place at selective
universities?
In making a public argument for affirmative action, we need to be aware of
the impact of ideology on perceptions of the policy. When the media highlight
a particular ideological interpretation, or when White frustration over job loss
finds a racist explanation appealing, it is not enough for us to argue that affirmative action is needed. People in structurally advantaged groups gain self-esteem
from ideologies that justify their groups advantage as a function of innate group
differences; thus the desire to retain social dominance may drive opposition to
affirmative action (e.g. Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Political conservatives are
more likely than liberals to make dispositional attributions for social disadvantage
(Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,
2003; Zucker & Wiener, 1993). Proponents of affirmative action need to provide
evidence that structural, not personological, explanations account for the WhiteBlack differences in achievement and to demonstrate that White losses are due to
economic factors and not to reverse discrimination.
The final issue we want to highlight concerns one statement made in the
middle of the Renner and Moore article: When the numerical effects outlined
at the start of this paper no longer exist, affirmative action will no longer be
needed. We disagree. Affirmative action is primarily a monitoring system. Even
after progress has been made, more progress will be necessary. We know from
social identity theory that people will break into groups on the slightest provocation, often using visible markers as a way of assorting themselves (e.g., Tajfel,
1982). The mechanism of in-group preference, furthermore, means that people
will always have a tendency to favor those in their own group and to undervalue
those in the out-group. People at the top of any hierarchy willoften quite out
of awarenessengage in behaviors that perpetuate structural imbalances. Whenever jobs are advertised by word of mouth, for example, people like the already
employed enjoy real, if hidden, advance. Discrimination is thus a constant fact of
social life, not the aberration of some usually underdeveloped or mean individuals. So monitoring will always be needed. Good intentions and pure motives
are not enough to ensure the successful operation of democracy. . . . Thomas Jefferson observed that the price of democracy is eternal vigilance (Crosby, 2004,
p. 239).
In closing, we would like to end where we began. Renner and Moores
article serves as an excellent reminder that those who support racial equality
in education cannot assume the goal has been achieved, or even that affirmative action programs can be relied upon to reach the goal. The statistics they
present in bold relief are statistics that everyone should know. Equally laudatory is
Renner and Moores insistence on moving beyond the diversity justification. We
are pleased that the article has appeared and are grateful to have had the chance to
comment.

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FAYE CROSBY is professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa

Cruz. She is a feminist social psychologist specializing in issues of social justice
and affirmative action. She is also a past president of SPSSI.
SUSAN CLAYTON is professor of social psychology at the College of Wooster,
in Wooster, Ohio. She has published a number of articles on affirmative action
and is coauthor (with Faye Crosby) of Justice, Gender, and Affirmative Action
(University of Michigan Press). Clayton also writes about other topics relevant to
social justice and identity, particularly environmental issues.