[G.R. No. 139465.

January 18, 2000]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,respondents. Esmso
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of
government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the
Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a
citizens basic due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and
this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The
Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the
suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive
department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as
the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)
(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon
certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting
State). Kycalr
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United
States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based
on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of
the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition
request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of
some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a
letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from
the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given
ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private
respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the
request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of
time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but
received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following
reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents
submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law
are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department
will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose
certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of
extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United
States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Departments
denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of
a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that
"[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein
petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to
afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate
the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioners letter dated July
13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104105, Rollo). Scslx
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25
of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own
behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives
to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act
directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the
counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. The respondents

are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said date. SO ORDERED.
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER BECAUSE: Slxs c
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED

OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;

II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND

IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for,
was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: slx mis
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your
place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August
9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th
day of August 1999.
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their
respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a
review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal
point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private
respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are
substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate
lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the
process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the
event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result
would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and
the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive
merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the
TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court. Missdaa
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was
executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as
"the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant
case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority
of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent
legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and
identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of,
and the time and place of the commission of these acts; Sda adsc
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements
of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related
documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his
office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is
the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority
must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location
of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; Rtc spped
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said
Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his
arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents
received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy
Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary
of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with
the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition
request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). Korte
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as
practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on
the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph
[1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a
special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the
extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides
that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the
latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the
reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section
10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and
immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day
period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on
the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself:
What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings? Sclaw
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file
the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to
assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition
Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide
by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was
delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours
later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs
discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of
an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely
acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice,
indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of
the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down
in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that
although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following: (1)
the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in
having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the
opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private
respondent's opposition to the request. Kyle
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its
powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through
the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly
conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign
Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a wellfounded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The
Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his
undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process
may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in
the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power. Ex sm
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by
the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of
the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64). The power of
investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agencys performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is
indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of
an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its
power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the
test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence
submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment. Mse sm
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The bodys power is limited
to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be
effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of
the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may
request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1],
Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which
the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on
this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the
prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5],
Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the
purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary
arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation
stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Sc lex
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for

criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a
respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August
31, 1999, p. 135;Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against selfincrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect,
such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which
could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case
of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of ones license as a medical
practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent
which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the
investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or
penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case ofAlmeda, Sr. vs.
Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to
determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in
nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature. x law
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property right.
No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself
and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time
spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a
foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the
evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, Petitioners Memorandum)
that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not
well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a
preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of
the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with
due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens. Sc
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly
identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme
Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in
their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every
modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies
of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United
States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward
this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the
meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers
to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due
process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights
will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their
interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute
the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the
respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. Scmis
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy
restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such
as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a
temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government. Mis sc
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the
Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In
interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to
the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction
to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to
the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve
extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as
the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was
committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407).
The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such
papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging
the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate.
Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said
papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the
extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment,
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his
attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right
mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex
parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). Mis spped
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive
authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the
designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am
Jur 2d 815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September
13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition
procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special
reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for
the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the
U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request
has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide
reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable
offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the
federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee
(18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered
in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) Spped
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a
"complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any
of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this
regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition
proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather
than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the persons extraditability. The court
then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary
of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18
U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one
entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on
the courts determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs
which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier
mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and
filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of
evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition
for extradition. Jo spped
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to
be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that
petitioners primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. (Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of
liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as
well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will
not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or
the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To
be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed
expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are,
however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean
precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty." Miso
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition,
the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act
favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal
and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).
Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny
the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law
and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition
petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with
jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring
compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of
certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official
English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those
from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be
completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private
respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to
him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is
yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse
to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the
filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069
calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during
the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and
shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of
Article III which reads: Nex old
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely:
(1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official
records and documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on
matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred.
These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987
Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an
informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not
fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction
between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes
material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to

information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to
information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public
officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing".Mani kx
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on
matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from
the U. S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have
some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party
invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since
they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the
evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence
the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would
already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an
official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private
respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a
breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the
answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the
same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private
respondent on foreign relations. Maniks
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our
country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to
make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p.
12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of
the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the abovecited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984
[1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law
in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution (Ibid.). Manikan

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RPUS Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures
earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the
propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee.
However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation
procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the
supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly,
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the
same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of
Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation
that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department
of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury
information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the
extradition proceedings. Not even during trial. Oldmis o
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence
and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process
rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to
consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition
Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which
states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not available
during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court
since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees
in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto? Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions
or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997];Aquinas School
vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting State
may have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments under the
Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we

ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of
the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and
Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and
Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be
effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that
an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which
the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic
procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in
support of his defenses. Ncmmis
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights
of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private
respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by
treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if
we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government
authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be
laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.
Facts:
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United
States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In
compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the
Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the
established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America, the department proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to
conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and
papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is
confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary
investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet
available.
Issue:
1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request
and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its

supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine
Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its
citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a
prospective extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty,
but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in
the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation
is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state.
Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and
a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and
the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective
citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a
prospective extradite.

[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997] WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as
members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO
as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKASKAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT,
DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT
INSTITUTE,
in
representation
of
various
taxpayers
and
as
non-governmental
organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOSSHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES,
ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE,
JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and
FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who
concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO
NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the
membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and
economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and
economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium
buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics
the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market
niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario
are replacing age-old beggar-thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic
producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru,
Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and
prosperity. Brief Historical Background To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by
the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that
grand political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of
war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was
to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its nonratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only
GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to
the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or
dependable system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the
Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World
Trade Organization -- with the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal,
as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of
new opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with
exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments into the country. Although the Chief Executive did
not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession
- - will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent
WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal.Heretofore, trade
disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis
of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a
disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or
impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this
Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the
nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement,
for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and
utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.

The Facts
On
April
15,
1994,
Respondent
Rizalino
Navarro,
then
Secretary
of
the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994
from the President of the Philippines, [3] stating among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President
of the Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round
Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. [6] The text of the WTO Agreement
is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volumeUruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for
brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed [7] the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after
having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby
ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3)
of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement
(and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2)
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, [8] the
Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of

WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on
dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or
limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and
new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents
comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to
the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the
Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper, [9] for brevity, (1) providing a
historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the
transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to
the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2)
copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as
possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments
involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance
dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.

The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting
leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the
provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit,
restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2,
Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the
exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the
constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included
the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the several issues
raised by petitioners into the following:[10]
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that

agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor
General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is
otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna
Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the
Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO
Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the
very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will
thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have
effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents favor, will not cause the petitions dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two
senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up
as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus
standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably
realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international
commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the
substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC.
19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. [12] Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case),
it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters [14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution,[15] as follows:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an
innovation in our political law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, [17] the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, [18] it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be
given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we
have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule
on the propriety of the governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies,
quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty
to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum:[19]
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable
under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to
the volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it
exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by
restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume
or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local
production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round Legal Documents, p.22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the
application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic
operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as
amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable
than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property... (par. 1,

Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out
therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than
it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different
treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it
modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610 emphasis
supplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional
limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment
accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions
are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the
Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant
provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do
not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution[21] is called the basic political creed of the nation by
Dean Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines
for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them, thus:
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of
Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and
policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available
remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles
are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the

uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring
opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons.One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is
not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to
health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and executive departments -- must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced
Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles
relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other
sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of
the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony [27] and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive;
[28]
and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.[29] In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside
world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; [30] and speaks of industries which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et
al.,[31] this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the
rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the
issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. [32] In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to
protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the
UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of
any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments
would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision
will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of
six months from the date of notice of withdrawals.[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form
powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not
merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles
underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. These
basic principles are found in the preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development,

Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
theelimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral
trading system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in
general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff
reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an
average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6)
years while developing countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to effect an average tariff
reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to
agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be
effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their
budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a
period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that
prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such
reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of
these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries
and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the
contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account;
thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion.True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of
economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier
stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of
trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining
whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy [35] does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities. [36]
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all
WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, [37] the fundamental
law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,

Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy
of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor
does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make
available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the
most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the
general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will -- as promised by its
promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto
are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified
in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers
might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United
Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean
that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty
when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its
foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to
the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the
same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent
political law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in
a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it
will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine,
the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to restructure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to
the heartbeat of the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. [39] Petitioners
maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the
Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means
that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if
such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods x x
x but also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on sociocultural matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority
is subject to specified limits and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide, [42] as in
fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their
arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." [43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound
by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws.[44] One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. [45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States
concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the
regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international organizations. [46] The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot
in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of selfsufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.[47]

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. 47-A Under Article 2 of the
UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which
the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping
operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice
held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were
expenses of the United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members
must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted
in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping
expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within
their own territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members
are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under
Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail, thus
unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign power to make a choice as to
which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both
bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the
Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines
agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others,
the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention,
wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt
from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation
with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.

(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all
customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular
equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs
duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils,
spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the
same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service
agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines
exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in
the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special
Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without
consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs
duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning
the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of international obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes
the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of
the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external
obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we
accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss
of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined
substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries
exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of
legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential
new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller
countrys market.[48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation
and amity with all nations.

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) [49]intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. [50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, [51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as
follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner
referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a
product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the
process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall
provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced
without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to
have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the
owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process
actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on
the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the
condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the
absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with
the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said
patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but
the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty
of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually
refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake)
product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that
the identical product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law
on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the
article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design
or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption
applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able
through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not
obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation
of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more
than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable
burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in
our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks
and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. [52]

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in
the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it

is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in
representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the
President to the Senate[53] which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject
of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of
the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference.[54] It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one page [55] in Vol. I of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They
were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of
the members can meet to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and
generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement. [56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply
to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which have indicated in their respective schedules
of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national
treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal
course of business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts,[58] as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among
its Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes
to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter
referred to as Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted
them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to
as GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October
1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified,
amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11,
1994,[59] the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of
this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the
Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay
Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that
basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding
that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat
the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the
submission could be clarified.

And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making a new submission
which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it
was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that
raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the
Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World
Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and
Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator
Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw
the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final
Act itself. The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement
which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the
governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO
Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of
the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or
acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization
Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and
the Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been
adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session and I dont see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance
of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further
comment to make.

Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ ofcertiorari grounded on grave
abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown
that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must begrave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [62] Failure on the part of
the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. [63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one
of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in
good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such
presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition
of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. [64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while
serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover,
there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the
pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged
impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of
the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal
hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members,
may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that isnot a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty.Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such
exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide
march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine
in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this
be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance[65] where the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and
culturally in the next century. He refers to the free market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming
Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia
negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on
national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation,
stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the
advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of
the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected
officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for
the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue :

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Ruling:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own
laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations
(UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.
What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial
or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a
member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade
law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
G.R. No. L-2662

March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI
KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO
TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS,
MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro
Serran,
Jose
G.
Lukban,
and
Liberato
B.
Cinco
for
petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General
of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now
charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines
with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them
to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to
establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case
before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of
petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory
nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues
"That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an
illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission
in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason
that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a
party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th
days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in
chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz.,
664) 1when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel
and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317
U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of
an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond
by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association
Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished
aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not
a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was
under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States
and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries.
These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency
as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed
crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in
the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert
Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in
Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is
violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law
and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive
Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional
law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission
must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts
it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is
only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her
government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of
those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government

but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The
least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of
attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people
have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before
the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should
submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody,
this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for Violation
of the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice
law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner has also
challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the
Philippines as accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It
appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law there
could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as with such
appearance they would be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved in the
challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several constitutional
ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole context of said order
which is reproduced as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATION
GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINAL.
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office charged with the
responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of war crimes committed in
the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and control of the Judge
Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available sources evidence of war crimes
committed in the Philippines from the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December 1941,
maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring
about the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said Office
information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

(a) General. person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be convened
by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority at the time of
the trial.
(b) Over Offenses. The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
offenses including but not limited to the following:
(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of
international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to murder
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on the seas or
elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage; plunder of public or private property wanton destruction
of cities towns or village; or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed against
civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or religion ground in
executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the local
laws.
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
(a) Appointment. The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the President
of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be appointed by the
convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission, and in case of illness or other
incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy
among the members or alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening
authority but the substance of all proceeding had evidence taken in that case shall be made known
to the said new member or alternate. This facts shall be announced by the president of the
commission in open court.
(b) Number of Members. Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) members.
(c) Qualifications. The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom he
determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by personal interest
or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in which he personally
investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required. One specially qualified member
whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an objection to the admissibility of
evidence offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the Commission
shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not
less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3)
of the member present.
(e) Presiding Member. In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the
member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission present
shall preside.
IV. PROSECUTORS
(a) Appointment. The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct the
prosecution before each commission.
(b) Duties. The duties of the prosecutor are:
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all cases
referred for trial.
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION

(a) Conduct of the Trial. A Commission shall:

(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the charges,
excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or interference.
(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment
therefor.
(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by the
convening authority.
(b) Rights of the Accused. The accused shall be entitled:
(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so as to
apprise the accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening authority or
counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in support
of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears before the
commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any documentary
evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(c) Witnesses. The Commission shall have power:
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or
affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties set
forth in (1) and (2) above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in proving or
disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the
mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of evidence and pleading set forth
herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without
limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be
admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have been
signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any
Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the International
Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any investigator or intelligence
officer, or by any other person whom commission considers as possessing knowledge of the
matters contained in the report.
(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the commission
to contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not
immediately available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official government
documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of
any of the United Nation.

(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of proof
whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be considered in
mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's superior, or of his
Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if
the commission determines that justice so requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence without
any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or statement was
procured by mean which the commission believe to have been of such a character that may have
caused the accused to make a false statement the commission may strike out or disregard any such
portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as follows
unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this or any
other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the commission
and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the close
of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a finding of not
guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission may defer action on any such
motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available
evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding
member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to
submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of such
evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the
prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the commission may rule as
being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless otherwise
directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and sentence if any. The
commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.
( f ) Record of Proceedings. Each commission shall make a separate record of its proceeding in
the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the prosecutor under the
direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall be
responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the presiding member of the commission or
his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.
(g) Sentence. The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by hanging or
shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment as the
commission shall determine to be proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into effect until
approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be
carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the Philippines. For the purpose of his
review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review to be composed of not more than three
officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The
Chief of Staff shall have authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend,
reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the
case for rehearing before a new military commission; but he shall not have authority to increase the
severity of the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a
commission shall final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER

Supplementary Rule and Forms. Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern its
procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as may be
prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the Philippines.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the
appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in the
accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in accordance with
the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the President. The buildings,
fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other property herefore used by then
Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Power, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippines Government through
the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification
reserved for use off the National War Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and fortyseven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.

MANUEL
President of the Philippines

ROXAS

By the President:
EMILIO
Chief of the Executive Office

ABELLO

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of congressional
enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question, is
whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly vested in
Congress by the Constitution. .
The Constitution provides:
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by
agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as
to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject
only to the veto power of the President of the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which
allow the president of the Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place
any part of the Philippines under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in the
tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by Montequieu
and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of America, whose
Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power of government
legislative, executive, judicial to distinct and separate department of government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in the
nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may exercise any
power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express authority of the
Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish government
office is essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions. Whether
such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military
commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and allocate

jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in
Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the Philippines
cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with
more reason, delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established by the
said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the Philippines
usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive Order
No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the
President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power granted to him by
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671,
both of which are transcribed below:

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency
which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with extraordinary power in
order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by
suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all subversive to the people adequate shelter and clothing
and sufficient food supply, and by providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian
population the establishment of an air protective service and the organization of volunteer guard
units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public.
To carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall
have the force and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall
have the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First
Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of Philippines.
Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other
subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when not engaged in any lawful
occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such services as
may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage
of crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order to insure
adequate production, controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes
whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in
the interest of national security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and
salaried employees in industrial or business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even
distribution of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of
transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued transportation
facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by the
Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity,
both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally,
scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations, and private control affecting the supply,
distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material,
implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to
requisition these commodities subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com.
Act No. 620.)
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President may
designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this Act or of
this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the authority of
section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of

not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is committed by a firm or
corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with the management of the
business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the date of
the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under the authority
herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such amounts as
may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth Act Numbered four
hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be
unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.
Approved, August 19, 1940.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS
TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and Asia,
which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers
in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulation
as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof.
Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or
any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to
reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of
precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivision, branches,
departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those
already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriation which would lapse or otherwise
became inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an
administrative character; (e) to imposed new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize
the expensive of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal
governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension
of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce
its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by
him under the power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations. promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved December 16, 1941.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts
had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the
surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in
their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as chairman of
the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to
state that said measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the
emergency of impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. We approved said extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional

circumstances then prevailing legislative power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the following provisions of the Constitution:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI, section 26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the emergency
created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution.
We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still be any the same
should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the
fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender of
Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of Japan, or
since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that the contention
can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced
by the Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and
independence legislative organs, Congress and the President of the Philippines would have been and
would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature including those of emergency
character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency
powers. The situation would be pregnant with dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the
people and to Philippines democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a possibility that
no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long recess of Congress
(two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a
veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental
guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit the
admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it
is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation governing the
trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of the United State
Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General Yamashita and Homma.
What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945,
in the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23,
1946 in disposing the Homma case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in
Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can
expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to declare
Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.
Facts:
Petitioner, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial Forces, was charged before a military commission set by Executive Order No. 68 of the President
of the Philippines. Said executive order also established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules
and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Petitioner contended that E.O. No. 68 was
illegal and unconstitutional because he cannot be tried fro violation of international conventions, like the
Geneva and Hague Conventions. Furthermore, he alleged that the participation of two American lawyers in
the prosecution was violative of our national sovereignty.
Issue:
Whether the Philippine Government has the jurisdiction to try and convict Kuroda for violating prohibited
acts of the war.
Ruling:
Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional because Article II, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution
explicitly provides that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of nation.
In promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President of the Philippine exercised his power as
commander-in-chief of all armed forces. Moreover, it was in adherence with the generally accepted
principles and policies of international law which form part of our Constitution.
With regards to the contention about the participation of two American lawyers, the Philippines was under
the sovereignty of the United States and thus, we were equally bound together with the US and Japan, to
the rights and obligations contained in the treaties. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty.