ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995

CIRILO
ROY
G.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MONTEJO, petitioner,

SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.

FACTS:
. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte,
pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the
COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged
inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his
district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol,
representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion ofTolosa in
his district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it
involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of
the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of
five (5) legislative districts. 1
The first district 2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang,
Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district 3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen,
Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur,
Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district 4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval,
San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district 5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of
Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district 6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay,
Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
TANYA PIMENTEL

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Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by
virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on
April 8, 1959. 7
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its
Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular province.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of
the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District composed the
new province of Biliran,
ISSUES:
WON COMELEC can transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another legislative

HELD:
the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the
Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made."
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3
of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The
power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the
number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
G.R. No. 157013

TANYA PIMENTEL

July 10, 2003

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

ATTY.
ROMULO
B.
MACALINTAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Budget
and
Management, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and
material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries
by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to
return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1
of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate
the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the VicePresident shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

HELD:
A. NO.

TANYA PIMENTEL

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Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter
permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine
citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her intentions to
return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to
register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign
service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the
country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the
elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee
voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting
that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country. The
provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of
overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained
his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his
domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become
an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not
necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be
given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by
Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what
happens to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not
able to return within three years as promised? What is the effect on the
votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the winning candidates?
The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within
three years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to
vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be
cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants or permanent
residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
B. YES

TANYA PIMENTEL

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18.On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
.........
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the
proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will
not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the
scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such
country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are
beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation
of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the provisions of paragraph 4,
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on
the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president
and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions
of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part
of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of
the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
G.R. No. 124521 January 29, 1998
MICHAEL
vs.

TANYA PIMENTEL

O.

MASTURA, petitioner,

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (Second Division), THE NEW MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF MATANOG, MAGUINDANAO, THE NEW
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF MAGUINDANAO and
DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen
were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during
the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to
the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on
the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection,
the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the
election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the
examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened
Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the
MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that,
indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been
tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division annulled the
Certificate of Canvass of Matanog
The following day, Mastura filed an Urgent Motion to Examine and Verify the
Canvassed MBC Copies of the Election Returns and the COMELEC Copy of the
Certificate of Canvass and Accompanying Statement of Votes. The COMELEC
Second Division merely noted the motion in view of the 29 February 1996
Order. 2
Thereafter Mastura filed an Urgent Motion to Defer Implementation of the 29
February 1996 Order. Mastura argued that the 29 February 1996 Order was
issued precipitately and prematurely considering that some other
documents. The COMELEC Second Division denied the motion
After the proceedings in the Municipal Board of Canvassers, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers convened and prepared the Certificate of Canvass and
Statement of Votes of the Municipality of Matanog. As a result, private
respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly elected member of the
House of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao.

ISSUES:
TANYA PIMENTEL

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

1. WON COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its
inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various
copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers
2. WON it is necessary to examine all the copies of election returns.
HELD:
1. NO.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It
is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes
pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various
copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once
the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the
COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if
it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners
itself. 4
This was exactly what happened in the in the instant petition. Dilangalen
objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of
Matanog and, acting on the objection, COMELEC ordered the production and
examination of the MTC Judge copy and the COMELEC copy of the election
returns. Based on the comparison, the COMELEC Second Division found and
concluded that indeed the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of
Matanog was tampered with. Consequently, it ordered its annulment and
created a new set of Municipal and Provincial Boards of Canvassers to
recanvass the votes. After the recanvassing, Dilangalen emerged as the
winner and was thereafter proclaimed the duly elected member of the House
of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao.
That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered
with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from
reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The
rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by
courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made

TANYA PIMENTEL

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

independent by the Constitution itself on a level higher than statutory
administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true
results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that
end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. 5
Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises
direct supervision and control over the proceedings before the
Board of Canvassers

2. NO
All the seven (7) copies of the election returns are all original copies,
although the copy for the Municipal Board of Canvassers is designated as
the first copy. This designation is only for the purpose of distribution and
does not in any way accord said copy the status of being the only original
copy. Consequently, it was properly within the exercise of its discretion when
COMELEC ordered the production and examination of the MTC Judge copy
and the COMELEC copy of the election returns. COMELEC is not required to
retrieve and examine all the seven (7) copies of the election returns.
Additionally, Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 7166 does not in any way specify that the
COMELEC should use the Municipal Board of Canvassers copy in correcting
manifest error.

Mendoza, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 84843-44 January 22, 1990
NURHUSSEIN
A.
UTUTALUM, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARDEN S. ANNI, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received
35,581 votes out of the 39,801 voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded,
petitioner would have lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner filed written objections
to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they appear to be tampered

TANYA PIMENTEL

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

with or falsified owing to the great excess of votes appearing in the said
returns.
COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List of Voters on the ground of massive
irregularities committed in the preparation and being statistically
improbable, and ordering a new registration of voters for the local
elections.
Petitioner contends that the issue he raised referred to obvious
manufactured returns, a proper subject matter for a pre-proclamation
controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that election returns
from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its
original List of Voters had already been finally annulled.
ISSUES:
WON the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of
the results since the original List of Voters had been finally annulled.

HELD:
he Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the
old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could
have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted
out of the 39,801 voters.
Petitioners cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation
controversy. To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to
empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent
annulment of a questioned registry. The list must then be considered
conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a
particular election. The preparation of a voters list is not a proceeding before
the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to
challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of
Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to specified election
returns against which the petitioner should have made verbal elections.
G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999
JUAN
vs.
TANYA PIMENTEL

DOMINO, petitioner,

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B.
JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM,
SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani
indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the election. 3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java,
Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the
Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO,
contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident,
much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since
January 1997.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution
declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative
of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his COC.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental
Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be
counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning.
DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the
position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision
dated 29 May 1998.

TANYA PIMENTEL

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGEST: FIRST BATCH OF CASES

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not
of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole
world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject
congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.

HELD:

A. NO.
The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province
of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration
from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct
14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the
lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of
voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is
not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order
the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another
for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under
Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. 17 The only effect of the decision of the lower
court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election
Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's
registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of
exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file
B. NO

TANYA PIMENTEL

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It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. 21 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return. 22 "Domicile" is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be
borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must
be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence"
simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only
such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to
make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. 28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in
the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in
order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either
of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does
the fact of physical presence without intention. 29
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City
is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the
precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does
give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and
actual presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the
length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to do so
rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.

C. NO.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the
Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to

TANYA PIMENTEL

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or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after
election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered
before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes 38 and provided further that the winning
candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. 39
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 40
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate must
be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the
Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a
Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the
election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain
the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in
view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as
candidate for the position.
G.R. No. 180088

January 19, 2009

MANUEL
B.
JAPZON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY, Respondents

FACTS:
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty
(Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

TANYA PIMENTEL

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On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the
COMELEC a Petition5 to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur,
Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter
Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a
Filipino).
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a
citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.
When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a
permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship,
he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which
was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty
already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records.
He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his
Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for
public office and the cancellation of the latters Certificate of Candidacy.
The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material
misrepresentation.
ISSUES:

TANYA PIMENTEL

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Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement
for elective positions.
HELD:
YES.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which
a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain 17 his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and
liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the naturalborn Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born
Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships,
he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country
of which he is also a citizen
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year
period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be
considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled
that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence.24 The Court also notes, that even with his trips to
other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months
preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a
place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does
strongly support and is only consistent with Tys avowed intent in the instant
case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to
TANYA PIMENTEL

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comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC,25 the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing
residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to
prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence
for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already
found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and
in which he garnered the most number of votes.
26

To successfully challenge Tys disqualification, Japzon must clearly

demonstrate that Tys ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice
to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to
substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.
ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA
DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN
D.
NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship

under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage,
among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections,
petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter"
only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23,

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2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of
the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals
who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections
owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of
Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004,
the COMELEC filed a Comment, 6therein praying for the denial of the petition.
As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in
said elections.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained
and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
HELD:
YES.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225
- requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely nonresidents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized
that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote
the Court in Macalintal:

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It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section
2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided
for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be
allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the
residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 188920

February 16, 2010

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.

VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO,
SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.
MACUSI
and
ELEAZAR
P.
QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,Respondents
FACTS:
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president
of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L.
Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without
consulting his party.

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On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly
discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly
proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected
new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately
filed a petition1 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the
elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys electing
bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political
Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that
under the amended LP Constitution, 2 party officers were elected to a fixed
three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs
NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of
new officers on that occasion could be likened to "people power," wherein
the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action.
Atienza also said that the amendments3 to the original LP Constitution, or the
Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been
properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers
already ended on July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, 4 partially granting
respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and
ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held
that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid
since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga
Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not
been properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he
held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers
were elected.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over intra-political party dispute.
HELD:
YES.

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But the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does
not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving
political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities
without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already
been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections16 that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court
also declared in another case17 that the COMELECs power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act
on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership
issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution,
the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of
party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president
who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for
candidates to local elective posts.18 In simple terms, it is the LP president
who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges
that will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal
obligations upon registered political parties that have to be carried out
through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus
particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the
elections.

G.R. No. 179271

April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
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ARTS
BUSINESS
AND
SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT
TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC
considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts,
while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners
at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners
more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule,
same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the
formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11
of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.

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BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it
is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances
when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the partylist elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory
or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list
representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
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representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for
party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) =
Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of
the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional
basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast
are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility
to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the
votes cast, then it isguaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows
those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

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1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats.
In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast
(called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second
round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the twopercenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?

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Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be
rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list
but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections
(15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining
seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2.
BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS
additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got
20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional
seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to
the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major
political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the
party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate
in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
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is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate
in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one
party shall dominate the party-list system.

G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan

Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent

FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54
with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013
party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October,
November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups
are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying some of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling
the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys
denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio
Carpio was tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.

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Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored
the status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of
the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory
injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of
official ballots.

ISSUES:
Whether or not themarginalized and underrepresented sector,s nominees
must come from the marginalized and underrepresented sector,

HELD:
NO.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to
the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
"marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees
of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have
a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or
her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
"marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income
group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties
of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
"marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
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limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized
and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
and will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and
underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have
the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative
district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor
represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national
or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those
that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically
reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 160869

May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR

SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR
GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as
the Secretary of Justice,Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship
of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending
for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual

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allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."

ISSUE:
Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional?

HELD:
YES.
That the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 5 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.
On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear
out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of
Rep. Act No. 9225.
G.R. No. 195649

April 16, 2013

CASAN
MACODE
MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General

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of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.5
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10To further bolster his claim of
Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computergenerated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado
has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order 13 requiring
the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three
(3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in
default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.

ISSUES:
A. WON an intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
B. WON The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones
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nationality and citizenship; WON it divests Filipino citizenship regained
by repatriation .
C. WON Maquiling is a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

HELD:
a. YES.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is
one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification,
the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646:
Sec. 6.Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the
Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for
the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be

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counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention
may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that
the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that
the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat
v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original
petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the
intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

b. Yes
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open
to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely
and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

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Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.

c. He is not a second placer.

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at
all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of
the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of
an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their
victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not
possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in
the rules to be eligible as candidates.

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CABALLERO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 209835
FACTS:
The Comelec cancelled Caballeros certificate of candidacy (COC) on May 3,
2013, or 10 days before the 2013 midterm elections.
While he renounced his Canadian citizenship and took the Oath of Allegiance
to the Philippines, the Comelec found that he was unable to "re-establish his
domicile [of origin] in Uyugan" a requirement to be eligible to run for
elective office.
He still won, however, against Jonathan Nanud and was the first proclaimed
mayor on May 14, 2013. He asked the Comelec to reconsider the
cancellation of his COC on May 16, 2013, but, on the next day, his opponent
Nanud filed a petition to annul his proclamation.
The Comelec denied Caballeros petition on November 6, 2013, after which
he brought the case to the SC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion is cancelling
petitioners COC.
HELD:
NO.
The court argued that the period from September 13, 2012 when Caballero
re-acquired his Filipino citizenship to May 12, 2013 "was even less than the
one-year residency required by law."
The court also did not agree with Caballero, who claimed that his 9-month
actual stay in Uyugan was substantially compliant with the residency
requirement.
He even claimed that the requirement is not strictly based on the period of
residence in the place where he is seeking an elective office, but based on
how familiar he is with the needs of his constituents.

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"The Comelec found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to
prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period
of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections," the SC said
in its decision.
G.R. No. 195229

October 9, 2012

EFREN
RACEL
ARA
TEA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and
Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
2009.4
On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny
due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground
that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for
the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was
eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code 6 both prohibit
a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution 7 on 18 February 2010
cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18
February 2010 Resolution read:

ISSUES:
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of
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the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful
occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD:
YES.
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed
Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In
short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were
stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible
or not qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy
is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only
one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who
therefore received the highest number of votes.
G.R. No. 149036

April 2, 2002

MA.
J.
ANGELINA
G.
MATIBAG, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his
capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the
Commission on Elections, respondents.
FACTS:
Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the
appointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission
on Elections), and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She
questions the legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as
Director IV of the Comelecs EID and reassigning her to the Law department.
ISSUES:

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WON Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason violated the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC
HELD:
NO.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments
because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The samead interim appointments and renewals of
appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008.63 Any delay in their
confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad
interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the
evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution.
The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three
respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008,
does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IXC of the Constitution.
the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no
reappointment of any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition on temporary
or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the
prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointees total term of
office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin
prohibitions are very specific - reappointment of any kind and exceeding
ones term in office beyond the maximum period of seven years.

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