Eloisa Merchandising Inc. v.

BDO
672 SCRA 533
June 13, 2012

FACTS: Respondent BDO extended a credit accommodation to petitioner Eloisa Merchandising,

Inc. (EMI)and it was secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over its properties. BDO filed an
application for extrajudicial foreclosure before the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC. A notice
was issued setting the auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Hence, petitioners filed a
complaint for the annulment of REM. BDO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action but it was denied. BDO then filed its answer. The petitioners failed to appear
twice during the pre-trial conference despite notice. Hence, the case was also dismissed twice.
The case was once again dismissed due to inaction of petitioners for unreasonable length of
time. Petitioners appealed to the CA but it affirmed the trial courts dismissal. Hence, the petition
for review under Rule 45. Petitioners contend that the only reason for the trial courts dismissal of
the case was the failure of their counsel to move to set the case for pre-trial. However, Section 1,
Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, imposing upon the plaintiff the duty to
promptly move to set the case for pre-trial, had been repealed and amended by A.M. No. 03-109-SC which took effect on August 16, 2004. This amendment to the rule on pre-trial now
imposes on the clerk of court the duty to issue a notice of pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to file a
motion to set the case for pre-trial conference.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case against the petitioners is proper.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is the duty of
the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that
the case be set for pre-trial. On August 16, 2004, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on
Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial
and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that within 5 days from
date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pretrial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC
shall issue a notice of pre-trial. When the above guidelines took effect, the case was already at
the pre-trial stage and it was the failure of petitioners to set the case anew for pre-trial
conference which prompted the trial court to dismiss their complaint. While under the
present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff
fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years
and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us that
the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified.

The petition is dismissed.

Shimizu Phil Contractors v. Magsalin

674 SCRA 65
June 20, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner Shimizu filed a case against Magsalin along with FGU Insurance as surety due
to Magsalins breach of their subcontract agreement. FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss but
it was denied. FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint which
was admitted naming the other three respondents as third-party defendants. The RTC issued a
notice setting the case for hearing but the FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on
the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer and it was granted.
Only one of the third-party defendants filed an answer. Petitioner was, however, not served with
a copy of such answer. The RTC issued an order of dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioner to prosecute. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, it elevated
the case before the CA but it affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of petitioners complaint is proper.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
The dismissal order of the RTC is void. It simply states its conclusion that the case should
be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this
conclusion is based. Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized
under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the dismissal order shows
that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. As a
prejudicial dismissal, the dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that
the petitioners complaint can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally,
when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the
dismissal has the effect of adjudication on the merits. Hence, it is imperative that the dismissal
order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him,
and filed with the clerk of the court.

The dismissal of the complaint is likewise not warranted as the dismissal was not in
accordance with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu
proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is
whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing
to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff
to prosecute. In this case, the parties own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioners
willingness to prosecute its complaint. Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor the thirdparty defendant was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the
dismissal of their case.
The petition is granted.

Suico Industrial Corp v. Lagura-Yap

680 SCRA 105
September 5, 2012

FACTS: Respondent PDCP Bank, now Prime Media Hodlings, Inc. acquired the real estate
properties of petitioner due to the latters failure to redeem it when the properties were
foreclosed by the bank. The enforcement of a writ of possession obtained by PDCP Bank from the
RTC Mandaue City, Branch 28 was, however, enjoined by an injunctive writ obtained by the
petitioners from the RTC, Mandaue City, Branch 56, where they filed an action for specific
performance, injunction and damages. The bank elevated the case before the CA and it declared
the trial court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed writ, as it interfered with
the proceedings of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, the RTC Branch 28. During the cases
scheduled pre-trial conference, the petitioners counsel asked for a resetting to allow him more
time to prepare the required pre-trial brief. This was opposed by PDCP Bank and AADC, which
filed a motion for the cases dismissal and it was granted by respondent Judge Lagura-Yap on the
ground that although petitioner Elizabeth was in court, there was no pre-trial brief submitted by
petitioners and such failure has the same effect as failure to appear in the pre-trial under Section
6 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON the failure to file a pre-trial brief within the time prescribed by the Rules
of Court constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal of an action.
RULING: The Court ruled in affirmative.
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The effect of their failure to do so is provided in Section 5 of
Rule 18 the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding
section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. Under Section 6, Rule 18, the failure to file a pre-trial brief when
required by law produces the same effect as failure to attend the pre-trial. On the basis of the
foregoing, the trial court clearly had a valid basis when it ordered the dismissal of the petitioners
action. Consistent with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the
lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party
"fails to appear at a pre-trial conference, (he) may be non-suited or considered as in default." The
obligation "to appear" denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical
presentation by a party of ones self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the
different subjects assigned by law to a pre-trial.

The petition is dismissed.

PRE-TRIAL
Tolentino v, Laurel
666 SCRA 561
February 22, 2012
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against herein petitioners for the recovery
of the possession of the western portion of a parcel of land owned by the former. Petitioners

averred that the subject property was owned by the Republic and they were occupying the same
by virtue of a Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their
stay over the property is lawful. Petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at the
pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the pre-trial
conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which petitioners were
notified, petitioners failed to appear. Hence, the trial court issued an order allowing respondents
to present their evidence ex parte, instead of declaring petitioners in default. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondents. Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the CA
but it affirmed the RTC decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but it
was denied by the CA. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioners
maintain that they were denied their day in court, because they were not allowed to present
their evidence before the trial court which resulted in the denial of their right to due process.
ISSUE: WON petitioners right to due process is denied.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent
party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear,
then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment
on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without
objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. In
the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even
reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding, petitioners and their
counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the legal processes, by
continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause. Clearly,
when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte due to the continued
failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that they were denied due process. What the
fundamental law prohibits is total absence of opportunity to be heard. When a party has been
afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process.

The petition is dismissed.

Tanoco vs Sagun
674 SCRA 32
June 20, 2012
Facts
On 4 March 2010, complainant filed a verified Complaint against respondent judge for undue
delay in rendering judgment. Complainant alleged that on 6 May 2009, a case for ejectment was
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and raffled to respondents sala. On 13
October 2009, pretrial was concluded, and the parties were directed to file their position papers.
On 23 November 2009, the plaintiff in the ejectment case filed her position paper. As of the date
of the filing of the Complaint, no position paper had been filed by the defendant therein. Neither
had any decision been rendered by respondent on the case, in violation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which mandates that ejectment cases should be decided within thirty (30) days from
the submission of the position papers of the parties or upon the lapse of the period to do so.

Issue
WON there was undue delay by the respondent?

Ruling
Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the
judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary
period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order
as a less serious charge, which under Section 1(b) of the same Rule is punishable with
suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or a fine of more than P 10,000, but not exceeding P 20,000. Considering that
the instant administrative charge is only the third against respondent judge (the first has been
dismissed, while the second is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in the

judiciary starting in 1997, he may be reasonably meted out a penalty of P 5,000 for being
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.

Chinkoe vs Republic
702 SCRA 677
July 31, 2013

Facts
The case stems from two separate civil cases for a collection of sum of money by the Republic of
the Philippines represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) against Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc
and Filstar Textile Industrial Corporation. The case was heard and submitted for mediation but
during the hearings the counsels for the Republic were not present, both from BOC and from the
office of the Solicitor General (SG). Although there was one representative from the BOC that
appeared during the pre-trial hearing but he was not prepared and only suggested for the
postponement of the pre-trial and suggested that upon nonappearance of counsels of the
Republic the court may dismiss the case for ---. However, on the rescheduled pre-trial hearing
they still did not appear. Hence the court dismissed the case for failure to appear during the pretrial and upon motion of defendants..

Issues
WON the dismissal due to non-appearance of counsel during pre-trial was proper?

Ruling
The rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to appear at pre-trial is with
prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. The questioned Order of the trial court did not
specify that the dismissal is without prejudice. There should be no cause for confusion, and the
trial court is not required to explicitly state that the dismissal is with prejudice. The respondent is
not then left without a remedy, since the Rules itself construes the dismissal to be with prejudice.
It should be considered as adjudication on the merits of the case, where the proper remedy is an
appeal under Rule 41. Regrettably, the respondent chose the wrong mode of judicial review. In

not dismissing the petition for certiorari outright, and in not ruling that such remedy is the wrong
mode of judicial review, the CA committed grave and reversible error.

Benavidez vs Salvador
712 SCRA 238
December 11, 2003

Facts
The controversy arose from a complaint for sum of money with damages and prayer for issuance
of preliminary attachment by Salvador against Benavidez. However, Benavidez filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia stating that she had filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money against Salvador with the RTC in Rizal. The motion to dismiss was denied. A pretrial was scheduled but Benavidez and counsel failed to appear despite due notice. Salvador was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favour of Salvador.

Issue:

WON the RTC was correct in allowing the other party to present evidence ex parte due to nonappearance at pre-trail?

Ruling
It is clear that the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the
absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to
appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence
without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of
the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.

Serrano vs Ambassador Hotel, Inc

690 vs 226
February 11, 2013

Facts
The case stems from an intra-corporate dispute between Serrano and Ambassador Hotel when
Yolanda Chan brought to the Presidents attention the alleged acts of misappropriation. A case
was filed by Chan against Serrano with the RTC regarding Board Resolutions dismissing Serrano,
among others. The RTC sustained the legality of Board Resolutions.

Meanwhile, Serrano who did not receive her wages and other monetary benefits filed a complaint
before the labor arbiter. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Serrano. On appeal, NLRC modified
the award of retirement pay. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration but was dismissed.

Issue:
WON the the judgment rendered by the Court should have dismissed the separate petition of the
respondent from the decision of the CA?

Ruling
By the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points
and matters determined in the former suit." 40 To apply this doctrine in the form of a "bar by prior
judgment," there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action as between

the first case where the first judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred.

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering
it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise,
there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice
which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order
by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

Guzman v. Guzman
693 SCRA 318
March 13, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the MTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, a complaint for ejectment
against her children. The MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right
to its possession since the respondents had no vested right to the land because they are merely
the petitioners children to whom no ownership or possessory rights have passed. The
respondents appealed to the RTC arguing that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, to
which the RTC rejected the respondents arguments based on Section 33(2) of BP Blg. 129. RTC,
however, still ruled for the respondents and set aside the MTC ruling. It took into account the
petitioners transfer of rights in the respondents favor, which, it held, could not be unilaterally
revoked without a court action. It also noted that the petitioner failed to allege and prove that
earnest efforts at a compromise have been exerted prior to the filing of the complaint.
Later on, petitioner received a copy of RTC decision, then file her first motion for
reconsideration due to lack of required notice and hearing. Another motion for reconsideration as
filed by petitioner but the same was denied on the ground that it was filed out of time. The third
motion for reconsideration was file, which the trial court denied with finality. This prompts the
petitioner to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. However, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. It noted that a Rule 42 petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners
petition for certiorari.

RULING:
The petition lacks merit. The RTC decision became final and executory after
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. It is elementary
that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is immutable and unalterable, and can no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Thus, the
RTC decision, even if allegedly erroneous, can no longer be modified.

Heirs of Miranda vs. Miranda

700 SCRA 714
July 8, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioners, all surnamed Miranda, filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, a
Complaint for Annulment of Title and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro Miranda, the
heir of Tranquilino Miranda, and the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Sps. Pablo and Aida Miranda. Petitioners did not file
any appeal, hence the decision became final and executory. Later, the respondent filed an Exparte Motion praying that the RTC issue a Break-Open and Demolition Order to compel the
petitioners to vacate his property, which was denied. This prompted respondent to file with the
RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal. Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied
it. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA, but the CA denied it
otherwise on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for revival
judgement.

of

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. An action for revival of judgment may
be filed either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the
venue of actions in general. In this case, respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment in
the same court which rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999.

RCBC vs. Serra

701 SCRA 124
July 10, 2013

FACTS:
Serra and petitioner RCBC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy,
wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years and granted RCBC the option to buy
the land and improvement within 10 years. Later, RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise
its option to buy the property. However, Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling
it. RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra (in the RTC Makati
which initially dismissed the complaint, but later reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and
deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.
Serra appealed to the CA. On the meantime, Serra donated the property to his mother,
and was later on sold it to one Liok. A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed
a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and
Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra before the RTC of Masbate City.

ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred
from having its January 5, 1989 decision executed through motion, considering that
under the circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented by
respondent from enforcing said decision.

RULING:
The petition has merit. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory
judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action
after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows
exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These
exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing
judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights,
RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On the other
hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict
compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases
where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.

Smart Com. Inc., vs. Aldecoa

705 SCRA 392

September 11, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner entered into a contract of lease 4 with Florentino Sebastian in which the
latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot. Respondents filed before the RTC a
Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. In its Answer/Motion to Oppose Temporary
Restraining Order with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner raised special and affirmative
defenses. In the end, petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents Complaint, the denial of
respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction, the award of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages in the amounts
which the court deem just and reasonable; and the award of attorneys feesand litigation
expenses as may be proven at the trial. Respondents then contested petitioners allegations.
Respondents likewise filed their Opposition to petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment.
The RTC issued its Order granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing respondents Complaint. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of the
respondent, declaring the cellular based station a nuisance. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the summary judgment is proper.

RULING: In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary
judgment is proper: For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two
requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of
damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including
documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to
produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party
is entitled to a summary judgment. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious,
contrived or a false claim. The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis
of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by
the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there
is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called
for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The
evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who
must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.

COCOFED v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

663 scra 514
January 24, 2012
FACTS:

During the Martial Law regime, then President Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees and
the most relevant among these is which permitted the use of the Fund for the acquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the
stock of the bank it acquired free to the coconut farmers. The rest of the Fund was deposited to
the UCPB interest free. During the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order 1 which created the PCGG which was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the
Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB
registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The
Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the
Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were deprived of their rights when a summary judgement has
been issued.

HELD:
The court ruled that it cannot stressed enough that the Republic as well as herein petitioners
were well within their rights to move, as they in fact separately did, for a partial summary
judgment. Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is,
as shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue, as
distinguished from one that is fictitious, contrived and set up in bad faith, means an issue of fact
that calls for the presentation of evidence. [90] Summary or accelerated judgment, therefore, is a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation. Moreover, COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for Separate Summary
Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to be
determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary judgment
is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Viewed in this light, the Court has to reject petitioners self-serving allegations about being
deprived the right to adduce evidence.

Sps. VILLUGA and MERCEDITA VILLUGA, v. KELLY HARDWARE AND CONSTRUCTION

SUPPLY INC.,

677 SCRA 131

July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners made purchases of various construction materials from respondent corporation which
has not been paid up to the present time, both principal and stipulated interests due thereon.
Respondent made several demands, oral and written, for the defendants to pay all their
obligations but they fail and refuse to comply with, despite demands made upon them, to the
damage and prejudice of respondent. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the corporation
which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there should be a summary judgment against petitioners.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. The court ruled that Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted
to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. 25 Such judgment is generally
based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the
parties. In the present case, it bears to note that in its original Complaint, as well as in its
Amended Complaint, respondent did not allege as to how petitioners' partial payments of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were applied to the latter's obligations. In fact, there is no
allegation or admission whatsoever in the said Complaint and Amended Complaint that such
partial payments were made. Petitioners, on the other hand, were consistent in raising their
affirmative defense of partial payment in their Answer to the Complaint and Answer to Amended
Complaint. Having pleaded a valid defense, petitioners, at this point, were deemed to have
raised genuine issues of fact. On the basis of the foregoing, petitioners' defense of partial
payment in their Answer to Second Amended Complaint, in effect, no longer raised genuine
issues of fact that require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Hence, the summary
judgment of the RTC in favor of respondent is proper.

FIRST LEVERAGE AND SERVICES GROUP, INC v.

675 SCRA 407

SOLID BUILDERS, INC.,

July 2, 2012

FACTS:
The petition arose from a Complaint for Annulment of Promise to Sell, Mandamus and Prohibitory
Injunction filed with the RTC of Manila by herein petitioner First Leverage and Services Group, Inc.
(First Leverage) against PNB Republic Bank (PNB Republic). In its Amended Complaint, 3 wherein
it impleaded herein respondent Solid Builders, Inc. (Solid Builders) as additional defendant. Solid
Builders filed its Amended Answer asserting, in the same manner as PNB Republic. After Pre-Trial
Conference was concluded, First Leverage filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or
Resolution of Case Based on Admissions and Stipulations of Facts of the Parties. The RTC
rendered a decision granting said motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by petitioner is valid.
HELD:
The Court reiterates the ruling of the CA that what has been rendered by the RTC is not a
judgment on the pleadings. Rather, it is a summary judgment.
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there
are issues generated by the pleadings. 16 In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is
no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue.
In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e., facts are asserted in the
complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the issues thus arising
from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or
admissions.20In the present case, a perusal of the Amended Answer as well as the Pre-Trial Brief
filed by Solid Builders would readily show that it denied the material allegations in First
Leverage's Complaint and that defenses were raised to refute these allegations. Stated
differently, Solid Builders' pleadings tendered factual issues. Hence, the CA correctly held that
the RTC rendered a summary judgment and not a judgment on the pleadings.

SPOUSES JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANNETTE B. CRISOLOGO, v JUDGE GEORGE E.

OMELIO
682 SCRA 154
OCT 0 3 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners obtained a favorable judgment which had become final and executor. Accordingly, a
Writ of Execution was issued for the satisfaction of said final judgment. Subsequently, a Notice
of Sale was issued by Sheriff Robert M. Medialdea, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court on the subject
properties. However, the properties involved were already acquired by JEWM prior to the finality
of judgment. Aggrieved with the said decision, JEWM filed a complaint for Cancellation of Lien,
with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Omelio committed gross ignorance of the law for granting the contentious
Motion to Render Judgment Granting Plaintiff the Relief Prayed for.
HELD:
This case concerns the cancellation of liens on the transfer certificates of title, involving issues
which can be comprehended by the judge based on a cursory examination of the verified
application and its supporting documents. During the hearing, both counsels were given the
opportunity to argue their case before Judge
Omelio.27 Neither counsel raised the issue of authenticity of the titles, subject of the case. Both
counsels were in agreement with regard to the facts: (a) that there were several liens
over the properties;28 (b) that the property held by JEWM was a derivative title in
satisfaction of the first lien;29 and (c) that the Sps. Crisologo were executing JEWMs
property based on the second lien.30 With no factual issues or disputes, the issues raised by
counsels before Judge Omelio were purely legal in nature, which could be resolved from an
examination of the verified application and its supporting documents. A clear and unmistakable
right to the issuance of the writ of injunction in favor of JEWM could easily be gathered from
examining the submitted pleadings and their supporting documents. For this reason, we find
Judge Omelio not guilty of gross ignorance of the law in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
without requiring the parties to present testimonial evidences during the hearing.

SOFIO V. VALENZUELA
666 scra 55
February 15, 2012

FACTS:
RESPONDENTS ALBERTO, GLORIA, REMEDIOS, AND CESAR, ALL SURNAMED
VALENZUELA, ARE BROTHERS AND SISTERS. THEY ARE THE CO-OWNERS OF A PARCEL OF
AGRICULTURAL LAND DESIGNATED AS LOT NO. 970-B AND LOCATED IN BARANGAY AYUNGON,
VALLADOLID, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, CONTAINING AN AGGREGATE AREA OF 10.0959 HECTARES.
UNKNOWN TO THE RESPONDENTS, PETITIONER ROLANDO SOFIO AND HIS BROTHER, COPETITIONER RUFIO SOFIO, HAD OBTAINED PERMISSION TO FARM THE ABANDONED AREA FOR
FREE FROM SOCORRO VALENZUELA, THE RESPONDENTS MOTHER, ON CONDITION THAT
ROLANDO WOULD RETURN THE PORTION ONCE THE OWNERS NEEDED IT.
IN 1985, AFTER THE PETITIONERS REFUSED GLORIAS DEMAND FOR THE RETURN OF THE 1.8
HECTARES, SHE LODGED A COMPLAINT AGAINST ROLANDO WITH THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF
AYUNGON, VALLADOLID, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER (MARO). THE PARTIES DID NOT REACH AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT.
ON JULY 8, 1988, EMANCIPATION PATENTS (EPS) WERE ISSUED TO ROLANDO AND RUFIO
COVERING THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF TILLAGE.
ON OCTOBER 5, 1990, THE RESPONDENTS BROUGHT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PETITIONERS, [9] SEEKING
THE CANCELLATION OF THE EPS, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION, AND DAMAGES, ALLEGING THAT
THE PETITIONERS CULTIVATION OF THEIR LAND HAD BEEN ILLEGAL BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT
CONSENTED TO IT. HON. GIL A. ALEGARIO (PARAD) ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF
PETITIONERS. THE PETITIONERS APPEALED TO WIT THE DARAB GAVE A FAVORABLE RULING TO
THE PETITIONERS.
THE RESPONDENTS ELEVATED THE DARABS DECISION TO THE CA. THE CA DECREED THAT THE
PETITIONERS DID NOT ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM AND THE RESPONDENTS; AND THAT THE DARABS RELIANCE ON
THE RICE AND CORN LAND TENURE SURVEY WAS UNFOUNDED.
THE DECISION OF MAY 27, 1998 BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY ON OCTOBER 27, 1998 AFTER
THE PETITIONERS NEITHER MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION NOR APPEALED BY CERTIORARI TO
THE COURT.

ON FEBRUARY 6, 2002, THE PETITIONERS, REPRESENTED BY NEW COUNSEL, FILED IN THE PARAD
A MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED
NOVEMBER 27, 2001, AND MOTION TO RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED JANUARY 23, 2002
ALLEGING THEREIN THAT THEY HAD LEARNED OF THE MAY 27, 1998 DECISION OF THE CA ONLY
ON DECEMBER 11, 2001 THROUGH THEIR RECEIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 27, 2001 ORDER OF THE
PARAD GRANTING THE RESPONDENTS EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXECUTION.
WHEN PARAD DENIED THE MOTION, THE PETITIONERS THEN FILED IN THE CA A MOTION TO
RECALL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION TO WHICH THE CA DENIED. HENCE, PETITIONERS APPEAL BY PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
ISSUE: WON CAs DENIAL OF THEIR MOTION TO RECALL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT DENIED THEM FAIR
PLAY, JUSTICE, AND EQUITY.
HELD: THE COURT RULED THAT THERE IS NO CAUSE TO DISTURB THE DECISION OF THE CA
PROMULGATED ON MAY 27, 1998 AS THE DECISION HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
THE COURT WILL NOT OVERRIDE THE FINALITY AND IMMUTABILITY OF A JUDGMENT BASED ONLY
ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF A PARTYS COUNSEL IN TIMELY TAKING ALL THE PROPER RECOURSES
FROM THE JUDGMENT. TO JUSTIFY AN OVERRIDE, THE COUNSELS NEGLIGENCE MUST NOT ONLY
BE GROSS BUT MUST ALSO BE SHOWN TO HAVE DEPRIVED THE PARTY THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS. GIVEN THIS DOCTRINE, THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE ARE: (A) THE
CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS; (B) THE SO-CALLED NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRIES THAT CAUSE
NO PREJUDICE TO ANY PARTY; (C) VOID JUDGMENTS; AND (D) WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES
TRANSPIRE AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENTS RENDERING EXECUTION UNJUST AND
INEQUITABLE.
THE COURT STRESSED THAT THE OBJECT OF A JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC IS NOT THE
RENDERING OF A NEW JUDGMENT AND THE ASCERTAINMENT AND DETERMINATION OF NEW
RIGHTS, BUT IS ONE PLACING IN PROPER FORM ON THE RECORD, THE JUDGMENT THAT
HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RENDERED, TO MAKE IT SPEAK THE TRUTH, SO AS TO MAKE IT
SHOW WHAT THE JUDICIAL ACTION REALLY WAS, NOT TO CORRECT JUDICIAL ERRORS, SUCH
AS TO RENDER A JUDGMENT WHICH THE COURT OUGHT TO HAVE RENDERED, IN PLACE OF THE
ONE IT DID ERRONEOUSLY RENDER, NOR TO SUPPLY NONACTION BY THE COURT, HOWEVER
ERRONEOUS THE JUDGMENT MAY HAVE BEEN.
BASED ON SUCH DEFINITION AND CHARACTERIZATION, THE PETITIONERS SITUATION DID NOT
FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A NUNC PRO TUNC AMENDMENT, CONSIDERING THAT WHAT THEY
WERE SEEKING WAS NOT MERE CLARIFICATION, BUT THE COMPLETE REVERSAL IN THEIR
FAVOR OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE DARAB DECISION.

BIR VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

705 SCRA 430
September 30, 2013
FACTS: PETITIONER FTC IS THE MANUFACTURER/PRODUCER OF CIGARETTE BRANDS WITH TAX
RATE CLASSIFICATION BASED ON NET RETAIL PRICE PRESCRIBED BY ANNEX "D" OF R.A. NO.
4280. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1997, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CIGARETTE BRANDS
WERE SUBJECT TO AD VALOREM TAX PURSUANT TO THEN SECTION142 OF THE TAX CODE OF
1977, AS AMENDED. HOWEVER, ON JANUARY 1, 1997,R.A. NO. 8240 TOOK EFFECT WHEREBY A
SHIFT FROM THE AD VALOREM TAX (AVT)SYSTEM TO THE SPECIFIC TAX SYSTEM WAS MADE AND
SUBJECTING THE CIGARETTE BRANDS TO SPECIFIC TAX UNDER SECTION 142 THEREOF, NOW
RENUMBERED AS SEC. 145 OF THE TAX CODE OF 1997.
FOR THE PERIOD COVERING JANUARY 1-31, 2000, PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY PAID SPECIFIC TAXES
ON ALL BRANDS MANUFACTURED AND REMOVED IN THE TOTAL AMOUNTS OF P585,705,250.00.
ON FEBRUARY 7, 2000, PETITIONER FILED WITH RESPONDENTS APPELLATE DIVISION A CLAIM
FOR REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF ITS PURPORTEDLY OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE MONTH OF
JANUARY 2000 IN THE AMOUNT OF P35,651,410.00.
THE CTA RENDERED A DECISION IN CTA CASE NO. 6612 GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE REFUND
OF THE AMOUNT OF P355,385,920.00 REPRESENTING OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE PERIOD
COVERING JANUARY 1, 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2002. ON CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, TAX COURT RULED WITH A SEMBLANCE OF FINALITY THAT THE RESPONDENT
IS ENTITLED TO THE REFUND CLAIMED.
THE COMMISSIONER APPEALED THE AFORESAID DECISIONS OF THE CTA. THE PETITION
QUESTIONING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OF P680,387,025.00 WAS DOCKETED AS
CA-G.R. SP NO. 80675, WHEREAS THAT ASSAILING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT

OF P355,385,920.00 WAS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165. THE PETITIONS WERE

CONSOLIDATED AND EVENTUALLY DENIED BY THE CA. THE APPELLATE COURT ALSO DENIED
RECONSIDERATION IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED 1 MARCH 2005.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS A FLAW IN THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTION 145 OF THE TAX CODE AND
RR 17-99.
HELD: THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT RR NO. 17-99 IS INDEED INDEFENSIBLY FLAWED. THE
LEGALITY OF REVENUE REGULATION NO. 17-99 IS THE ONLY DETERMINATIVE ISSUE RESOLVED BY
THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION WHICH WAS THE VERY SAME ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE CA IN THE
CONSOLIDATED CA-G.R. SP NOS.80675 AND 83165 AND EXACTLY THE SAME ISSUE IN CTA NOS.
6365, 6383 AND 6612.
FROM THE FOREGOING COGENT REASONS, THE COURT RULED THAT CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION.1WPH IT HELD THAT
THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION IN G.R. NOS. 167274-75
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROPRIETY OF THE CA HOLDING IN CA-G.R. SP NO.83165 FORMED PART
OF THE CORE ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. CASE NOS. 167274-75, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WAS LEFT OUT
IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT DECRETAL PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT. THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008
DECISION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CORRESPONDINGLY CORRECTED.
TO REITERATE, THE CTA SIMPLY FOLLOWED THE ALL TOO FAMILIAR DOCTRINE THAT "WHEN
THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND THE BODY
THEREOF, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION CONTROLS IRRESPECTIVE WHAT APPEARS IN THE BODY OF
THE DECISION. VEERING AWAY FROM THE FALLO MIGHT EVEN BE VIEWED AS IRREGULAR AND
MAY GIVE RISE TO A CHARGE OF BREACH OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
THE CTA IS ORDERED TO ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT CIR TO PAY
PETITIONER
FORTUNE
TOBACCO
CORPORATION
THE
AMOUNT
OF
TAX
REFUND
OF P355,385,920.00 AS ADJUDGED IN CTA CASE NO. 6612.

UE VS. UEEA
657 SCRA 637
September 14, 2011

FACTS: PETITIONER UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST (UE) IS AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION DULY

ORGANIZED AND EXISTING UNDER PHILIPPINE LAWS. ON THE OTHER HAND, RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION(UEEA) IS A DULY REGISTERED LABOR UNION
OF THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF UE. PRIOR TO SCHOOL YEAR (SY) 1983-1984, THE
70% INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FROM TUITION FEE INCREASES AS MANDATED BY PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 451 (P.D. NO. 451), AS AMENDED, WAS DISTRIBUTED BY UE IN PROPORTION TO THE
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ACADEMIC AND NON-ACADEMIC PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THE 70%
INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FROM THE TUITION FEE INCREASE WAS DISTRIBUTED BY UE TO ITS
COVERED EMPLOYEES BASED ON A NEW FORMULA OF PERCENTAGE OF SALARY STARTING SY
1994-1995.

UEEA, OBJECTED THE MANNER OF DISTRIBUTION AND FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST UE FOR
NON-PAYMENT/UNDERPAYMENT OF THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES SHARE OF THE TUITION FEE
INCREASE. IN ITS CONTENTION, UE ASSERTED THAT THE CLAIM OF THE UEEA WAS ALREADY
BARRED SINCE IT WAS FILED THREE (3) YEARS FROM THE TIME ITS SUPPOSED CAUSE OF ACTION
ACCRUED.
LA RULED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS AND CONCLUDED THAT UE WAS LEGALLY BOUND TO KEEP
AND MAINTAIN THE ESTABLISHED PRACTICE OF DISTRIBUTING EQUALLY AMONG ITS EMPLOYEES
THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FROM THE TUITION FEE INCREASES PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF
THE AFORESAID TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT DATED OCTOBER 18, 1983 AND THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE XX, SECTION 5 OF THE UE-UEEA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.
UE INTERPOSED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE NLRC BUT WAS DISMISSED. A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WAS THEREAFTER FILED, NLRC DENIED THE MOTION WITH A WARNING THAT
NO FURTHER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHALL BE ENTERTAINED. NONETHELESS,
ON SEPTEMBER 20, 2004, UE FILED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND ADMIT A SECOND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, INCORPORATING THEREIN ITS SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. ALLEGING THAT THE NLRC RESOLUTION WAS NOT VALID FOR FAILURE TO
PASS UPON AND CONSIDER THE NEW AND VITAL ISSUES RAISED IN ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESCRIBED FORM FOR NLRC
RESOLUTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 13, RULE VII, NLRC NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE. NLRC
GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION, AND REVERSED ITS EARLIER RULING.
AGGRIEVED, UEEA FILED A PETITION BEFORE THE CA. THE CA DECLARED THAT SINCE THE
SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS A PROHIBITED PLEADING, IT DID NOT INTERRUPT
THE RUNNING OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
ACCORDINGLY, THE RESOLUTION
DATED AUGUST 24, 2004 HAD ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY
RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION WAS MEANT TO CORRECT WHAT WAS PERCEIVED TO BE
AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF FACT OR LAW. UE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE CA DECISION BUT IT WAS DENIED .HENCE, THIS APPEAL.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UEs SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (MR) BEFORE THE
NLRC IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING.

HELD:
THE COURT RULED THAT INDEED SECOND MR AS A RULE, IS GENERALLY A PROHIBITED
PLEADING. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT DISCOUNT INSTANCES WHEN IT MAY AUTHORIZE THE
SUSPENSION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE SO AS TO ALLOW THE RESOLUTION OF A SECOND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, IN CASES OF EXTRAORDINARILY PERSUASIVE REASONS SUCH
AS WHEN THE DECISION IS A PATENT NULLITY.
ON THE CONTENTION OF THE PETIOTIONER THAT THERE EXIST EXTRAORDINARY PERSUASIVE
REASONS WARRANTING THE ALLOWANCE OF THE SECOND MR ON THE GROUND THAT THE
COMPLAINT IS A MONEY CLAIM ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; HENCE, IT
PRESCRIBES IN THREE (3) YEARS., SC AGREES WITH UE AND HOLDS THAT UEEAS RIGHT TO

QUESTION THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FOR SY 1994-1995 HAS

ALREADY PRESCRIBED. ARTICLE 291 OF THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES THAT MONEY CLAIMS
ARISING FROM AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP MUST BE FILED WITHIN THREE (3) YEARS
FROM THE TIME THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED. IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE CAUSE OF ACTION
ACCRUED WHEN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS BASED ON PERCENTAGE
OF SALARY OF THE COVERED EMPLOYEES WAS DISCUSSED IN THE TRIPARTITE MEETING HELD
ON JUNE 19, 1995. UEEA DID NOT QUESTION THE MANNER OF ITS DISTRIBUTION AND ONLY
ON APRIL 27, 1999 DID IT FILE AN ACTION BASED THEREIN. HENCE, PRESCRIPTION HAD SET IN.

LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES VS. COMELEC

652 SCRA 798
February 15, 2011
FACTS: ON 18 NOVEMBER 2008, THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, BY A MAJORITY VOTE, STRUCK
DOWN THE SUBJECT 16 CITYHOOD LAWS FOR VIOLATING SECTION 10, ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. ON 31 MARCH 2009, THE SUPREME
COURT EN BANC, AGAIN BY A MAJORITY VOTE, DENIED THE RESPONDENTS FIRST MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION. ON 28 APRIL 2009, THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, BY A SPLIT VOTE,

DENIED THE RESPONDENTS SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE 18
NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND WAS RECORDED, IN DUE
COURSE, IN THE BOOK OF ENTRIES OF JUDGMENTS ON 21 MAY 2009.

HOWEVER, AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION AND WITHOUT ANY
EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING REASON, THE COURT EN BANC UNPRECEDENTEDLY REVERSED
THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION BY UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CITYHOOD
LAWS IN THE DECISION OF 21 DECEMBER 2009.
UPON REEXAMINATION, THE COURT FINDS THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION MERITORIOUS
AND ACCORDINGLY REINSTATES THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION DECLARING THE 16
CITYHOOD LAWS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ISSUE: WON THE TIE VOTE OF THE COURT EN BANC ON THE SECOND MR CONSTITUTES DENIAL.

HELD: THE COURT RULED THAT SINCE THE COURT WAS EVENLY DIVIDED, THERE COULD BE NO
REVERSAL OF THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION, FOR A TIE-VOTE CANNOT RESULT IN ANY
COURT ORDER OR DIRECTIVE. THE JUDGMENT STANDS IN FULL FORCE. UNDENIABLY, THE 6-6 TIEVOTE DID NOT OVERRULE THE PRIOR MAJORITY EN BANC DECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 2008, AS
WELL

AS

THE

PRIOR

MAJORITY EN

BANC RESOLUTION

OF

31

MARCH

2009

DENYING

RECONSIDERATION. THE TIE-VOTE ON THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NOT THE
SAME AS A TIE-VOTE ON THE MAIN DECISION WHERE THERE IS NO PRIOR DECISION. HERE, THE
TIE-VOTE PLAINLY SIGNIFIES THAT THERE IS NO MAJORITY TO OVERTURN THE PRIOR 18
NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION AND 31 MARCH 2009 RESOLUTION, AND THUS THE SECOND MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE DENIED.

SECTION 7, RULE 56 OF THE RULES OF COURT PROVIDES:

SEC. 7. PROCEDURE IF OPINION IS EQUALLY DIVIDED. WHERE THE COURT EN

BANC IS EQUALLY DIVIDED IN OPINION, OR THE NECESSARY MAJORITY CANNOT BE
HAD, THE CASE SHALL AGAIN BE DELIBERATED ON, AND IF AFTER SUCH
DELIBERATION NO DECISION IS REACHED, THE ORIGINAL ACTION COMMENCED IN
THE COURT SHALL BE DISMISSED; IN APPEALED CASES, THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER
APPEALED FROM SHALL STAND AFFIRMED; AND ON ALL INCIDENTAL MATTERS, THE
PETITION OR MOTION SHALL BE DENIED.
THE EN BANC RESOLUTION OF 26 JANUARY 1999 IN A.M. NO. 99-1-09-SC, READS:

A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE

COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO
ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED
DENIED.

BIR VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

705 SCRA 430
FACTS: PETITIONER FTC IS THE MANUFACTURER/PRODUCER OF CIGARETTE BRANDS WITH
TAX RATE CLASSIFICATION BASED ON NET RETAIL PRICE PRESCRIBED BY ANNEX "D" OF
R.A. NO. 4280. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1997, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
CIGARETTE BRANDS WERE SUBJECT TO AD VALOREM TAX PURSUANT TO THEN
SECTION142 OF THE TAX CODE OF 1977, AS AMENDED. HOWEVER, ON JANUARY 1,
1997,R.A. NO. 8240 TOOK EFFECT WHEREBY A SHIFT FROM THE AD VALOREM TAX
(AVT)SYSTEM TO THE SPECIFIC TAX SYSTEM WAS MADE AND SUBJECTING THE CIGARETTE
BRANDS TO SPECIFIC TAX UNDER SECTION 142 THEREOF, NOW RENUMBERED AS SEC. 145
OF THE TAX CODE OF 1997.
FOR THE PERIOD COVERING JANUARY 1-31, 2000, PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY PAID SPECIFIC TAXES
ON ALL BRANDS MANUFACTURED AND REMOVED IN THE TOTAL AMOUNTS OF P585,705,250.00.
ON FEBRUARY 7, 2000, PETITIONER FILED WITH RESPONDENTS APPELLATE DIVISION A CLAIM
FOR REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF ITS PURPORTEDLY OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE MONTH OF
JANUARY 2000 IN THE AMOUNT OF P35,651,410.00.
THE CTA RENDERED A DECISION IN CTA CASE NO. 6612 GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE REFUND
OF THE AMOUNT OF P355,385,920.00 REPRESENTING OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE PERIOD
COVERING JANUARY 1, 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2002. ON CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, TAX COURT RULED WITH A SEMBLANCE OF FINALITY THAT THE RESPONDENT
IS ENTITLED TO THE REFUND CLAIMED.
THE COMMISSIONER APPEALED THE AFORESAID DECISIONS OF THE CTA. THE PETITION
QUESTIONING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OF P680,387,025.00 WAS DOCKETED AS
CA-G.R. SP NO. 80675, WHEREAS THAT ASSAILING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT
OF P355,385,920.00 WAS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165. THE PETITIONS WERE
CONSOLIDATED AND EVENTUALLY DENIED BY THE CA. THE APPELLATE COURT ALSO DENIED
RECONSIDERATION IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED 1 MARCH 2005.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS A FLAW IN THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTION 145 OF THE TAX CODE AND
RR 17-99.

HELD: THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT RR NO. 17-99 IS INDEED INDEFENSIBLY FLAWED. THE
LEGALITY OF REVENUE REGULATION NO. 17-99 IS THE ONLY DETERMINATIVE ISSUE RESOLVED BY
THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION WHICH WAS THE VERY SAME ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE CA IN THE

CONSOLIDATED CA-G.R. SP NOS.80675 AND 83165 AND EXACTLY THE SAME ISSUE IN CTA NOS.
6365, 6383 AND 6612.
FROM THE FOREGOING COGENT REASONS, THE COURT RULED THAT CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION.1WPH IT HELD THAT
THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION IN G.R. NOS. 167274-75
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROPRIETY OF THE CA HOLDING IN CA-G.R. SP NO.83165 FORMED PART
OF THE CORE ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. CASE NOS. 167274-75, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WAS LEFT OUT
IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT DECRETAL PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT. THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008
DECISION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CORRESPONDINGLY CORRECTED.
TO REITERATE, THE CTA SIMPLY FOLLOWED THE ALL TOO FAMILIAR DOCTRINE THAT "WHEN
THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND THE BODY
THEREOF, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION CONTROLS IRRESPECTIVE WHAT APPEARS IN THE BODY OF
THE DECISION. VEERING AWAY FROM THE FALLO MIGHT EVEN BE VIEWED AS IRREGULAR AND
MAY GIVE RISE TO A CHARGE OF BREACH OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
THE CTA IS ORDERED TO ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT CIR TO PAY
PETITIONER FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION THE AMOUNT OF TAX REFUND
OF P355,385,920.00 AS ADJUDGED IN CTA CASE NO. 6612.

Torres v. PAGCOR
661 SCRA 621
December 14, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner Torres was dismissed from service from allegedly committing padding of
anomalous SM jackpot receipts. Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its
Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the
period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Law. CSC Denied petitioners appeal for appeal had already prescribed. The CSC did not give
credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration
within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. Petitioner filed with the CA seeking to set aside the twin resolutions issued by the
CSC.The CA Dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: whether the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC's dismissal of the appeal for being filed
beyond the reglementary period.

Held: No. a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. Petitioner
received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for
reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before
August 19, 2007. Even

assuming

arguendo that

petitioner indeed

submitted

a letter

reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter
reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his
reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either
by mail or personal delivery.

Alivia v. PACTOR & GAMBLE

650 SCRA 400
June 6, 2011

FACTS: Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. Petitioners filed a complaintagainst P&G

for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint
was later amendedto include the matter of their subsequent dismissal. Petitioners filed a
complaint against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other benefits with
damages. The complaint was later amended to include the matter of their subsequent dismissal.
The NLRC likewise dismissed the same. The CA affirmed the decision of LA and NLRC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it did not find public respondents to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the judgement.
HELD:

Yes. As a rule, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and

agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is
constrained to wade into factual matters when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on
record to support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced
from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. In the present case, we find the need to
review the records to ascertain the facts.

Natividad v. Mariano
697 SCRA 63
June 3, 2013

FACTS: Ernesto filed with the PARAD a petition 6 for ejectment and collection of back lease
rentals against the respondent. The PARAD granted Ernestos petition and ordered the
respondents to vacate the subject property and to pay the lease rentals in arrears. The
respondents did not appeal the decision despite due notice.Thus, the PARADs decision became
final and executory espondents, , filed Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of
excusable negligence.T he respondents claimed that their inexperience and lack of knowledge of
agrarian reform laws and the DARAB Rules of Procedure prevented them from appearing before
the PARAD in due course. Parad Denied their first and second petition for none of the grounds for
the grant of a petition for relief exist and technical grounds. Respondents appealed to DARAB and
he DARAB granted the respondents appeal and reversed the PARADs decision. Ernesto
appealed the decision to the CA via a petition for review. The CA denied Ernestos petition for
review for lack of merit. Ernesto filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: whether Ernesto had sufficient cause to eject the respondents from the subject property.
HELD: The court denied the petition. A preliminary matter, the court reiterate the rule that a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of
law. A question that invites a review of the factual findings of the lower tribunals or bodies is
beyond the scope of this Courts power of review and generally justifies the dismissal of the
petition.

The Court, as a rule, observes this Rule 45 proscription as this Court is not a trier of facts. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower tribunals or bodies whose findings, when
duly supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA, bind this Court.

Bordomeo v. CA
691 SCRA 269
February 20, 2013

FACTS: The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12,
1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya, They further submit
that the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the first group of employees, including
themselves, had only been partially satisfied because no backwages or separation pay from
March 16, 1995 onwards had yet been paid to them; that the reduced award granted to the
second group of employees was in violation of the April 12, 1995 notice of
computation/execution; that no writ of execution had been issued in favor of the other groups of
employees; and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas thus committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to fully execute the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders. IPI counters that
the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for being an improper remedy, the more
appropriate remedy being a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the certiorari is proper.
HELD: Firstly, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order raising only
questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the
petition for certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CAs May 30, 2003 decision and October
30, 2003 resolution upon their allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was
improper. The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the
filing of the petition forcertiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course

under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary
remedy, certiorari cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, like an appeal in due course.43
We remind them that an appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of
discretion committed by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for that purpose.It is the
adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a special civil
action for certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.

Pia v. Gervacio, Jr.

697 SCRA 220
June 5, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Dr. Roman Dannug (Dannug), as Dean of the College of Economics, Finance
and Politics (CEFP) of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint against
Zenaida Pia (Pia) who was then a professor at PUP. He claimed that Pia was directly selling to her
students a book at a price of P120 per copy, in violation of Sec. 3, Art. X of the Code of Ethics for
Professional Teachers and several memoranda issued by PUP officials against the sale of books,
articles or any items by any faculty member directly to their students, and such books were overpriced as well. Pia argued that her students were not forced to buy such books and denied as
well the other claims of Dannug.
The case was deemed submitted for resolution after preliminary conference and the
parties submission of their respective memoranda. The Office of the Ombudsman declared Pia
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service with the penalty of suspension for
six (6) months without pay, approved by herein respondent Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. Pias motion
for reconsideration was denied so she filed a petition for review with the CA; even before she
could have filed the petition, respondents Dannug and Carague (former PUP President),
implemented the penalty of suspension imposed by the Ombudsman. Then the CA affirmed the
rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pias motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this
petition for review.

Issue: WON Dannug and Carague erred in implementing the Office of the Ombudsmans decision
during the time that Pias period to appeal had not yet expired?
Ruling:
No. The Court finds no irregularity in Dannug and Caragues implementation of the rulings
of the Office of the Ombudsman despite the fact that Pia then still had the remedy of an appeal
before the CA.
As stated in Administrative Order No. 14-A, amending Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
Decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal as clearly
held by the Court in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH. Pias complaint against Carague and Dannugs immediate
implementation of the penalty of suspension imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman deserves
no merit.

Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC

704 SCRA 24
August 28, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. lost to NLMS-Olalia to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of respondent company, Stayfast Phils., Inc. in the
certification election. Petitioner appealed the order of the Med-Arbiter certifying NLMS-Olalia as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of respondent company to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment which eventually restored the Med-Arbiters order.
Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the SC which was dismissed. Then
petitioner filed its own notice of strike after NLMS- Olalia went on strike. Such was opposed by
respondent company; conciliation-mediation stage in the NMCB followed which led petitioner to
withdraw its notice of strike. However, petitioners members staged a sit-down strike
demanding for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to
discriminate against them. Respondent company terminated petitioners members for not
explaining their violation of its rules. Then, petitioner staged another strike and filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice, union busting and illegal lockout against respondent company and its
General Manager in the NLRC which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. Petitioner appealed but NLRC
dismissed such as well as its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA which was also dismissed; hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue: WON the petitioners petition for certiorari is the correct remedy?
Ruling:
No. Petitioners petition for certiorari is a wrong remedy; the correct remedy was to
appeal.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution
is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse
of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of
the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal. Petitioner cannot mask
its failure to file an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the mere
expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. In this case, petitioner received the
Decision dated July 1, 2002 on August 2, 2002 and, under the rules, had until August 19, 2002 to
file an appeal by way of a petition for review in this Court. Petitioner let this period lapse without
filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on October 1, 2002.

Gagui v. Dejero
708 SCRA 533
October 23, 2013
Facts:
Respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo obtained a favorable decision in their
separate complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of
transportation expenses, and attorneys fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc. and Abdul Rahman
Al Mahwes. The issued Writ of Execution and subsequent Alias Writ of Execution were returned
unsatisfied. Respondents filed a Motion to Implead respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc.s
Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors, including petitioner as its VicePresident/Stockholder/Director, which was granted. Another two (2) Alias Writs of Execution were
issued which resulted to the garnishment of petitioners bank deposit and levying of her two (2)
parcels of land respectively. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the third Alias Writ of Execution
followed by a Supplemental Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution which were both denied.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which was likewise denied; the CA affirmed NLRCs ruling.
Petitioner filed two (2) Motions for Reconsideration which were both denied. Hence, this Petition
for Review.

Issue: WON the Petition for Review was filed on time?

Ruling:
Yes. The Petition for Review was filed on time.
The SC agree with petitioner that starting from the date she received the Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days within which to
appeal to the SC. The matter has already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, as follows:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for Reconsideration
only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within which to file her Petition, or until 31
March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March 2011, fell within the prescribed 15-day period.

Quiao v. Quiao
675 SCRA 642
July 4, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Rita Quiao (Rita) obtained a favorable judgment from the RTC in her complaint
for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido Quiao (Brigido) on October 26, 2000.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under
the pertinent provisions of the Rule on Legal Separation. The trial court granted respondents
motion for execution. The RTC issued a Writ of Execution which was partially executed on July 6,
2006. The next day, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification before the RTC asking it to define
the term Net Profits Earned which it did in its Order dated August 31, 2006. Aggrieved by the
Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Then, RTC issued
another Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted: the Order dated November 8,

2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006. Unsatisfied with the trial
courts Order, petitioner filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on
February 27, 2007.
Issue: WON the decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time
the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006?
Ruling:
Yes. The decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the SC clarified that to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, it held that it
would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. It explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs
to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make
the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. In other
words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt
of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner
neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or
after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for
execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of
execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7,
2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net
profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the
RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue
until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his
motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and executory. A judgment
becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is
perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto
itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.

Diaz v. People
691 SCRA 139
February 18, 2013

Facts:

The RTC found accused Victorio P. Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of twice violating Sec.
155, in relation to Sec. 170, of RA No. 8293 (COunterfeiting and imitation of Levi's Jeans).
Diaz appealed, but the CA dismissed the appeal on July 17, 2007 on the ground that Diaz had not
filed his appellants brief on time despite being granted his requested several extension periods.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred When in applied rigidly the rule on technicalitis and override
substantial justice by dismissing the appeal for late filing of appellant's brief.
Ruling:
The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the appeal
upon failure to file the appellants brief is not mandatory, but discretionary. Verily, the failure to
serve and file the required number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided by
the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of causing the outright dismissal of the
appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is lodged in the CA, by
virtue of which the CA may still allow the appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the
appellants brief, when the circumstances so warrant its liberality.

Escalante vs People
688 SCRA 362
January 9, 2013

Facts:
On May 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of violation of election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. The CA affirmed the decision.

Peitioner's motion for reconsideration was partly by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the appeal despite
the fact that one of the essential elements of the violation of election gun ban is present.

Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
The instant certiorari action is merely being used by the petitioner to make up for his failure to
promptly interpose an appeal from the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009 Resolution.
"However, a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure petitioners failure to timely file a
petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." It is settled that a special
civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, especially if
such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

Atilano vs Asaali
680 SCRA 345
2013

Facts:
THe RTC ordered petitioners to settle their obligations to ZACI. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari before the appellate court, imputing grave abuse of discretion upon the RTC for failing

to consider Section 43, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which substantially provides for the
proceedings that should be conducted when a third person allegedly indebted to a judgment
debtor denies the debt. However, the CA dismissed their petition outright on the following
grounds: (1) failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed RTC Decision and Order; (2) only
three out of four petitioners signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping; (3)
the IBP Official Receipt Number of the counsel for petitioners was outdated, violating Bar Matter
No. 287; and (4) deficiency in the docket and other fees in the sum of P 1,530.00.

Issue:
petitioners maintain that the CA's outright dismissal of their petition on procedural grounds,
despite substantial compliance, and the RTC Decision directing them to pay private respondent
the amount of their alleged unpaid stock subscriptions to ZACI, are tantamount to a denial of due
process of law.

Ruling:
Petitioners were total strangers to the civil case between ZACI and respondent, and to order
them to settle an obligation which they persistently denied would be tantamount to deprivation
of their property without due process of law.
Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not
against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates
that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties.

PNB v. Roque
665 SCRA 57
2013

Facts:

On January 23, 2006 or six (6) days after its receipt of the December 19, 2005 Resolution of the
RTC Malaybalay City, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court
in an Order dated May 3, 2006. PNB received the said order on June 19, 2006.

PNB then filed a Notice of Appeal[14] on June 27, 2006, alleging among other matters, that the
docket and other lawful fees therefore had been paid through PNB's Manager's Check, payable to
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC Malaybalay City in the amount of P3,330.00. The
respondents filed a motion to disallow the notice of appeal on the grounds of the late filing of the
same and of the petitioner's failure to pay the appeal fees.

The trial court in a Resolution dated November 7, 2006,disallowed the notice of appeal because
of the petitioner's failure to pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period,
resulting in the non-perfection of the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the perfection of appeal should be liberally construed.

Ruling:
The petitioner failed to advance any compelling, valid and justifiable reason for us to liberally
construe the rules on the perfection of appeal.
Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance
with the provision set by law. The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear. The
payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but an essential
requirement for the perfection of an appeal.Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus,
appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. The requirement of the
law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.

LIM, JR., vs. Sps.

LAZARO .

700 SCRA 547

July 3, 2013

FACTS:
Lim, Jr. filed a complaint5 for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from Sps. Lazaro the sum of
P2,160,000.00, which represented the amounts stated in several dishonored checks issued by
the latter to the former. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon
the posting of the required P2,160,000.00 bond. In this accord, three (3) parcels of land situated
in Bulacan which is registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro, were levied upon. In their Answer
with Counterclaim, Sps. Lazaro averred that Lim, Jr. had no cause of action against them since
Colim Merchandise and not Lim, Jr., was the payee of the fifteen (15) Metrobank check and the
PNB and Real Bank checks were not drawn by them. While they admit their indebtedness to
Colim, Sps. Lazaro alleged that the same had already been substantially reduced. They likewise
argued that no fraud should be imputed against them as the aforesaid checks issued to Colim
were merely intended as a form of collateral. Hinged on the same grounds, Sps. Lazaro equally
opposed the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80
on an installment basis under the following terms: (a) that should the financial condition of Sps.
Lazaro improve, the monthly installments shall be increased in order to hasten the full payment
of the entire obligation; and (b) that Sps. Lazaros failure to pay any installment due or the
dishonor of any of the postdated checks delivered in payment thereof shall make the whole
obligation immediately due and demandable. Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus
Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on the subject TCTs. It ruled
that a writ of preliminary attachment be cancelled as decision is good as final judgement.
Consequently, it ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the writs annotation on the
subject TCTs. Lim, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which wa sdenied prompting him to file a
petition for certiorari before the CA. ca affirmed rtc decision.
ISSUE: WON the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.

HELD:
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. Records indicate that while the
parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved by the RTC
in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations there under have yet to be fully
complied with particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80.
Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaros properties
should have continued to subsist since the decision is not yet final as the compromise agreement
has not been complied with.

GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON

699 SCRA 352
June 25, 2013

FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO
was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said
TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial
court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why
the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility. Petitioner filed
before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and
the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law. The CA issued
a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the
issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in dismissing the injunction and TRO against the enforcement of
TPO
HELD:
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining. Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief.
However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for
certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court.
Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner. As the
rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover,
if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with
more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined

SPOUSES DEMOCRITO and OLIVIA LAGO v. JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR

665 SCRA 247
February 8, 2012

FACTS:
Subject of this disposition is the motion for reconsideration of the Courts January 17, 2011
Decision, filed by respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., finding him guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of P25,000.00. Disciplinary action was
meted on him for (1) assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2009-905 without the mandated
raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party and issuing a temporary
restraining order (TRO); (2) setting the case for summary hearing beyond the 72-hour
required by the law in order to determine whether the TRO could be extended; and (3) issuing a
writ of preliminary injunction without prior notice to the complainants and without hearing.n
He explained that he issued the 72-hour TRO pursuant to the 2nd paragraph of Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules in order to avoid injustice and irreparable damage on the part of the plaintiff. He
pointed out, however, that the 72-hour TRO was issued only on July 7, 2009 because he was not
physically present nJudge Abul admits not conducting a summary hearing before the expiration
of the 72 hours from the issuance of the ex parte TRO to determine whether it could be extended
to twenty (20) days. He, however, explained that the holding of the summary hearing within 72
hours from the issuance of the TRO was simply not possible and was scheduled only on July 14,
2009 because the law office of the plaintiffs counsel was 144 kilometers away from Gingoog City
and under that situation, the service of the notice could only be made on the following day, July
8, 2009. Hence, it would be impractical to set the hearing on July 8, 2009. In addition, on July 9,
10 and 13, 2009, he was conducting hearings in his permanent station. As to the charge that he
failed to cause the service of summons on the complainants and that no hearing was conducted
prior to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Judge Abul belies the same by
submitting (1) a certified true copy of the Sheriffs Return of Service stating that he actually
served the summons on the complainants on July 8, 2009 together with the copy of the 72-hour
TRO; and (2) a certified machine copy of the summons3 bearing the signature of complainant
Democrito Lago that he personally received the same.

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge is correct despite delay in summary hearing for the issuance
of the TRO
HELD:
Court finds the reasons advanced by Judge Abul to be well-taken. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules
permits the executive judge to issue a TRO ex parte, effective for 72 hours, in case of extreme
urgency to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Then, after the lapse of the 72 hours, the
Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period. Under the circumstances, Judge

Abul should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours
from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a
summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not, however, be complied with
because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties addresses. The
importance of notice to all parties concerned is so basic that it could not be dispensed with. The
trial court cannot proceed with the summary hearing without giving all parties the opportunity to
be heard.

AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS v. MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA

BATANGAS PROVINCE,
668 SCRA 257
March 14, 2012

FACTS: In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Municipality of
Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government, invited petitioner Australian Professional
Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center.A Memorandum
of Agreement was executed between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor
Gutierrez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Under the MOA, APRI undertook to
construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the
exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years. In May 1995,
Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. On 6 February 2003, respondent,
through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of
Agreement with Damages. RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to file their
Answer to the Complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved, as petitioners were no
longer holding office in the given address. RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default
and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte. RTC rendered decision that memorandum
be declared null and void. Petitioners later filed before the CA Motion for the Issuance of Status
Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC from "further proceeding and
issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of Execution, and any other court processes"5 in the
case before it which was subsequently denied by CA.
ISSUE: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion for the
Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).
HELD: NO. The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the
sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation
of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not
be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic

manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive

duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his application that there is meritorious ground for
the issuance of a TRO in his favor.
No clear legal right. A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed
before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and faithful execution of
the MOA. However they have failed to establish in their Petition that they possess a clear legal
right that merits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Their rights under the MOA have
already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondent in the RTC case, under a
judgment that has become final and executory.
No irreparable injury. The injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary estimation. Any
loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully
compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.28 With respect to the
allegations of loss of employment and potential suits, these are speculative at best, with no proof
adduced to substantiate them.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ

700 SCRA 399
July 03, 2013
FACTS:
Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU BOR) received an order from the
Ombudsman directing them to enforce the dismissal of the respondents, finding them guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondents filed a petition for injunction before the RTC with
prayer for issuance of TRO against BSU BOR. BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal
and, therefore, are not yet final and executory. RTC denied the petition for injunction on the
ground of lack of cause of action. CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON respondents are entitled to the injunctive relief filed before the CA.
RULING:
No. The CA is not correct in reversing the decision of the RTC.
Since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution is
in danger of being impaired, the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its right to
have its judgment carried out. The CA patently erred in denying the Ombudsmans motion for
intervention.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in this case would necessarily touch on the very
merits of the case, i.e., whether the concerned government agencies and instrumentalities may
execute the Ombudsman's order to dismiss a government employee from service even if the
Ombudsman's decision is pending appeal. It would also be a great waste of time to remand the
case back to the CA, considering that the entire records of the proceedings have already been
elevated to this Court.

The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal
imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rulemaking powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, and R.A. 6770, which grants the
Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure.

PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA v. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

655 SCRA 640
April 17, 2011
FACTS:
The Board of Trustees appointed Barayuga as President of Adventist University. During his
tenure a group from North Philippine Union Mission conducted an external performance audit.
The audit revealed that petitioner committed serious violations of fundamental rules and
procedure in the disbursement and use of funds. The Board of Trustees denied the petitioners
request for reconsideration because his reasons were not meritorious.
The petitioner filed an injunction and damages in the RTC, with the issuance of a TRO,
impleading AUP and Board of Trustees alleging that they had no valid grounds and denied a
reasonable time to present his evidence that deprived him of his right to due process. RTC issued
the TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the resolution removing the petitioner as
President. CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff has an existing right to be protected by injunction or be dismissed for
lack of a cause of action.
RULING:
No. RTC acted in patently grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TRO and writ of
injunction.
A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence submitted by the
plaintiff. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave
abuse of discretion and will result to nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
It is clear, based on the foregoing principles guiding the issuance of the TRO and the writ
of injunction, that the issuance of the assailed order constituted patently grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC, and that the CA rightly set aside the order of the RTC.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SEVERINO LISTANA

649 SCRA 416
May 30, 2011
FACTS:
Severino Listana voluntarily sold the property to the government, through the Department
of Agrarian Reform under R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
DAR commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just
compensation for the property and ordered Land Bank of the Philippines to pay Listana of the
amount, of which the Land Bank refused to pay Listana. Land Bank filed with the RTC a petition
for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. The petition was
denied resulting to the filing of the Land Bank with the RTC a petition for injunction with the
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. RTC ruled in favor of the Land Bank.
Listana filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and reversed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in denying the petition for injunction of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. The petition is unmeritorious.
Rule 58 Section 4(b) states that an applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a
bond executed to the party or person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. In Republic v.
Caguioa, the Court held that, "The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the
plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly."

A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among
others, the applicant, unless exempted by the court, files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed
by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN

706 SCRA 174
September 30, 2013
FACTS:
The Philippine National Bank granted a loan in favor of Integrated Shoe Inc. for financing
its purchase of a complete line of machinery and equipment. The Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
found that the loans extended to ISI have not secured sufficient collaterals and obtained with
undue haste. As a result, Atty Salvador filed with the Ombudsman a complaint in violation of R.A.
3019. Violation of R.A. 3019 or the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his co accused.
Petitioner, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution
failed to adduce evidence of conspiracy to defraud the government because his co accused
from PNB had no power to approve the alleged loans. Sandiganbayan denies the Demurrer to
Evidence as the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the essential elements of
the offense charged.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on denying the Demurrer to Evidence of the petitioner.
RULING:
NO. The Court dismisses the Petition.
The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion. A lower courts order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will
not review the prosecutions evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has

established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established
that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice."
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence.

Oropesa vs. Oropesa,

671 SCRA 174
April 25, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner claimed that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and
has been sickly for over 10 years and was observed to have had lapses in memory and
judgement. Due to respondents condition, he cannot manage his property wisely without
the help of others and has become an easy prey for deceit from his girlfriend, Luisa
Agamata. On January 23, 2004, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
petition for him and his companion to be appointed as guardians over the respondents
property. RTC dismissed the petition due to lack of evidence, and later on the Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WON

the court erred in granting the demurer to evidence.

HELD:
NO. A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. [23] We have also held that a demurrer to
evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to
submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that
he is not entitled to the relief sought. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it
dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence
precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of

action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts
and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

GOLEZ VS NAVARRO
689 scra 589
2013
FACTS:
Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez (Petitioners), entered into a written agreement with
respondent Amelita Navarro (Amelita), a real estate dealer, appointing her as their exclusive
agent in the sale of their property, Amelita found an interested buyer (Mormons) No sale
between them transpired because they couldnt agree on the selling price, later petitioners
successfully sold their property to the Mormons, Amelita was neither notified of the sale nor was
she given any commission. Hence, upon discovery of the transaction, she asserted her right to
be paid her commission but the petitioners sternly refused. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents.
Ordering a writ of attachment to issue against the estate of the petitioners, CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC, Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court and denied the petition of Sps.
Golez thereafter, Acting on the motion, the RTC issued an order raising the award with 12%.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred when it ordered the payment of interest from the sale when none is
so decree by the Court of Appeals.

HELD:
The dispositive portion is clear. What was merely ordered by the CA was the payment of
P180,000.00, nothing more. The portion "in its other aspects, the appealed decision shall remain
undisturbed" pertains to those sections that were not disturbed or modified by the CA, that is,
payment of the costs of action and the issuance of a writ of attachment against the estate of the
petitioners. It cannot be construed to extend to the award. If the CA intended that there should
be a 12% per annum interest to be imposed on the principal sum of P180,000.00, "from the date
of sale until fully paid," it could have done so in plain and specific terms. But it did not. In
Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled: Petitioner was not ordered to pay interest on
the amount it was to hold and deliver to Valencia or to pay attorneys fees. The trial court cannot,
therefore, without committing grave abuse of discretion, direct the petitioner to pay interest and
attorneys fees. To do so would be to vary the tenor of the judgment against the latter and
increase its liability, thereby rendering nugatory the above proviso. Such imposition would mean,
as in this case, the delivery of money to Valencia in excess of that belonging to QRSI which the
petitioner has been retaining. It is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must
conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. Execution not in
harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform, more particularly, to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK ANDTRUST CORPORATION v. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS,

INC.,
465 scra 117
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in
order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust
corporation, alleges therein that it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount
ofP1,000,000.00 as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date.
During the trial on petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of
Exhibit could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate
original of the promissory note which was identified and marked. The trial court initially admitted
into evidence and granted respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective
answers to conform with this new evidence. Respondent claims that Exhibit should not have
been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence.
ISSUE: WON the courts erred in the demurrer to evidence.

HELD:
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action. Caution, however, must be exercised by the party seeking
the dismissal of a case upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for the dismissal
on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his
right to adduce evidence. If the defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is
granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the
adverse party because the movant loses his right to present evidence. The reviewing court
cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.

BERENGUER-LANDERS v. FLORIN
696 SCRA 589
April 17, 2013
FACTS:
The Berenguers are the registered owners of a 58-hectare land in Sorsogon. A notice of coverage
was issued by DAR regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion of their
land. The DAR Secretary, however, without acting on the application for exclusion, cancelled the
Berenguers' certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, the DAR Regional Director denied their application for exclusion from the CARP's
coverage. While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition for the implementation of
the Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD),

respondent Florin. The latter granted the petition and directed the issuance and implementation
of the Writ of Possession. The Berenguers opposed this saying that the execution would be
premature in view of their pending appeal before the DARAB.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order for execution made by Florin was proper.
HELD:
The Court points out that, as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment
or order has already become final and executory. However, under Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of
the DARAB, execution of the decision of the Adjudicator may be done pending appeal upon the
posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages which the
aggrieved party may suffer.
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director denying the
Berenguers' application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was
seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show
whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension of Respondent Florin
for ignorance of the law.

ABRIGO vs. FLORES

Florez 698 SCRA 559
June 17, 2013
FACTS:
This case emanated from the judicial partition involving a parcel of residential land (property in
litis) that siblings Francisco and Gaudencia Faylona inherited. Under the immutable and
unalterable judgment rendered on November 20, 1989, the heirs and successors-in-interest of
Francisco Faylona, respondents herein, would have the western portion of the property in litis,
while the heirs and successors-in-interest of Gaudencia Faylona its eastern half. However, the
heirs of Gaudencia, being in actual possession of the entire area, encroached and built
improvements on portions of the western half. Hence, in the same order, the court likewise
directed the petitioners to removeall their improvements which encroached on the western half.
However, this writ of execution was only partially satisfied and the court again issued a Motion
for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition.

The petitioners opposed this contesting that a sale was made to them by respondent Jimmy
Flores, one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, of his 1/4 share in the western
portion of the property in litis and asserts that this had made them co-owners of the western
portion which constituted a supervening event occurring after the finality of the November 20,
1989 decision that rendered the execution inequitable as to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged subsequent sale constituted a supervening event, which rendered the
execution of the final judgment against petitioners inequitable.
HELD:
A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or
substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution
unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the
judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment
attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party
may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move
the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the
supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should
necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy
to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.
Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the
property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the
partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners
had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores,
having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.

FLORENDO v. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP.

610 SCRA 377
January 20, 2010
FACTS:
The Florendos claimed that Rosario and her husband bought five agricultural lots in Dasmarias,
Cavite from Aguirre but did not cause the titles to be transferred in their names. Eighteen years
later, the Florendos discovered that respondent Paramount had earlier caused the attachment of
the lots and caused the sheriff's sale in its favor to be annotated on the titles. Petitioners then
filed for annulment of its liens over their lands against respondent.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Florendos and to which Paramount appealed to. The
Florendos, however, filed a motion with the RTC for execution pending appeal, citing the
following as "good and special reasons: (1) Rosario T. Florendo's advanced age and illness; (2)
Paramount's strong likelihood of becoming insolvent during the pendency of the appeal; and (3)
The Florendos' readiness and willingness to post a bond to answer for whatever damage
Paramount might suffer on account of such execution. On appeal, the CA found no special
reasons to warrant such execution, rendered judgment in respondent Paramount's favor and
ordered the issuance of titles over the subject properties in its name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's special order for lack of good reasons to
justify the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
HELD:
Execution pending appeal is the exception to the general rule. As such exception, the court's
discretion in allowing it must be strictly construed and firmly grounded on the existence of good
reasons. "Good reasons," it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify
immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior,
outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of
the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument
of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.
The Florendos point out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers from life threatening
ailments which the trial court applied to all the Florendos. But the trial court has allowed
execution pending appeal for all other of the Florendos who may not be old and ailing. As for the
Florendos' fear of Paramount's insolvency, such is wholly irrelevant since the judgment did not
require it to pay them any form of damages. Lastly, the Florendos' posting of a P4 million bond is
quite insufficient. The lands had a market value of P42 million in 2001. Hence, the CA decision is
affirmed.

MANACOP v. EQUITABLE PCIBANK

468 SCRA 286
August 25, 2005

Facts: Equitable Bank filed on April 24, 2002 a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
(with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction) before the Court of

Appeals. Meanwhile, Lavine, the insurer, also filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction after it withdrew its Notice
of Appeal. Both claimed that appeal was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the
circumstances.

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
OF EQUITABLE PCIBANK

Held:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal. It is
elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the requirement that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must likewise
be satisfied.

JP LATEX TECH v Ballons

581 SCRA 553
March 16, 2009

Facts:

This is a complaint for rescission with damages filed by Balloons Grangers Balloons (BGB) against
JP Latex. The trial court ruled in favor of BGB. Subsequently BGB filed a motion for execution
pending appeal which was granted by the trial court on the ground that the machinery is already
deteriorating and that JP Latex may not have any money to pay for damages. The sheriff
successfully dismantled the machinery. JPLatex filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate
court but it was dismissed for reason that JP Latex did not file an MR to the trial courts decision
Issue : WHETHER EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL MAYBE ISSUED AND IMPLEMENTED WHEN
THEDECISION SOUGHT TO BE EXECUTED IS NOTYET FINAL BECAUSE OF THE PENDING
ANDUNRESOLVED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONOF THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE
EXECUTEDPENDING APPEAL
Held:
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the issue raised is
purely of law; (2) when public interest is involved; or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth
exception, the Court has ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment
of the remedy of certiorari is not a
sine qua non,when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely
argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. In the instant case, the issue raised is
purely an issue of law. Moreover, following the fourth exception, a motion for reconsideration of
the RTC order allowing the immediate execution of its decision is no longer necessary in view of
the fact that the RTC had already passed upon the propriety of respondents motion for execution
"pending appeal" on two occasions. Execution pending appeal or immediate execution, which is
now called discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2(a), 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction,
the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. V. Almendras

706 SCRA 289
June 5, 2009
Facts:

Respondents purchased a residential lot from MRO Development Corporation. They later on filed
an application to construct a residential house with petitioner. Petitioner approved said
application subject to a deed of restriction. Conflict between the parties ensued when petitioner
discovered the non-compliance of respondents with the deed of restriction. Petitioner ordered
them to make the rectification of the structure. Respondents refused to heed to petitioners order
and filed a complaint for injunction, declaratory relief, annulment of provisions of Articles and Bylaws with prayer for issuance of a TRO/ Preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents petition for declaratory relief is proper?
RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative. SC indicated that it is apparent that although the complaint was
denominated as one for declaratory relief/ annulment of contracts, the allegations therein reveal
otherwise. SC highlighted that the respondents neither asked for the interpretation of the
questioned by-laws nor did they allege that the same is doubtful or ambiguous and require
judicial construction. The SC further added that what respondents really seek to accomplish is to
have a particular provision of the petitioners by-laws nullified and thereafter absolve them from
any violations of the same.

Malana vs. Tappa

588 SCRA 663
17 September 2009
Facts:

Petitioners filed an action to quiet title with the RTC. The RTC denied the same on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction given that the assessed value of the property involved is less than Php20,000.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that their principal cause of action
was for quieting of title. Petitioners supported their argument by citing the provision of Section 1
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC, however, sustained their position that it is the MTC that has
jurisdiction over petitioners action.
ISSUE/S:
1.
2.

How should Section 1 of Rule 63 relating to action for declaratory relief be construed with
respect to an action to quiet title?
What is the nature of an action for declaratory relief, its purpose and when is it applied?

RULING:
1.

The SC explained that an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights
are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of
the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder. According to SC, in construing Section 1 of Rule 63 it is important to note that
said provision does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the
RTC. The repeated use of may in said provision implies mere permissiveness, a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. As such, SC sustained that it is the MTC that has
jurisdiction over the petitioners action.

2.

SC explained that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no
actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another
relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights,
and a commission of wrongs. The SC also explained that where the law or contract has
already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more
jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Roque et. al.

600 SCRA 189

24 September 2013

Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of certain sections of RA 9372 also known as the Human Security Act of 2007.
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions raising the said
Acts constitutionality have been lodged before the Court. The said motion was granted. In 2010,
the court promulgated its decision in Southern Hemisphere cases thus causing the dismissal of
the certain petitions initially filed. As a result, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. The private
respondents, on the other hand, maintained their position that the said requisites were met.
ISSUE/S:
1. What are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief?
2. Whether or not the requisites of an action for declaratory relief were satisfied by the
private respondents?
RULING:
1. The requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
2. No, a perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they
have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to
sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA
9372. The private respondents only asserted general interests as citizens, and taxpayers
and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of
the said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government
officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how
these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards
the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real
or imminent threat to any of them. The court also explained that without any justiciable
controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. The possibility of abuse
in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions
out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar
to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

The court also held that it is also well to note that private respondents also lack the
required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the implementation
of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and
personal interest in the case. While it has been previously held that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that cases
involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus
of constitutional litigation. Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the
proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in
this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as
every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private respondents' petition, remain highly-speculative
and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This
private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.