Concepts and 'Isms' in Psychology

Author(s): Joseph Jastrow

Source: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 39, No. 1/4 (Dec., 1927), pp. 1-6
Published by: University of Illinois Press
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THE AMERICAN

JOURNAL

OF

PSYCHOLOGY

Founded in I887 by G. STANLEYHALL

VOL.XXXIX

DECEMBER,

1927

Nos. 1-4

CONCEPTSAND 'ISMS' IN PSYCHOLOGY

By JOSEPH JASTROW, University of Wisconsin

The attention now given to the history of scienceis in every way

commendable. The broadeningvalue for every professionalscientist
of an acquaintancewith the intellectual steps by which his science
has come to its present status and recognition,is part of the liberal
education of the specialist. It is perhapsparticularlyimportantin
such a disciplineas medicine in which the relation between theory
and practice is so variable. Such a history is concrete and full of
incidents by reason of that relation. The more abstract disciplines
lack this realistic touch, and their history consequentlyfollows the
line of doctrine. Still further,doctrinearisesfrom the creative contribution of distinctive minds and is likely unduly to carry the impressof personalattitude ratherthan the objectivestamp of inquiry.
In the case of psychology,its late emancipationfromthe tutelage
of philosophygives its history an irregularperspective. The earlier
attempts to projecta history of psychologyconsisted in little more
than selecting the psychologicalportions of the doctrines of representative philosophies;it is on the whole definitelycreditableto the
importanceof psychology that so many of the important philosophical problemsfollowed what we now recognize as psychological
clues. As is usual in such affiliationsthe dominantparty claimsthe
credit. Much of what passes as the history of philosophicdoctrine
is far moredirectlya chapterin the antecedentsof modernpsychology.
Oncepsychologywas establishedin the modernsense,the perspective
of its problemsappearedclearly; we find that the later histories of
psychologytake their clue frommoderninterest, and recordthe stepby-step contributions,often anticipations,of thinkers primarilyinI

JASTROW

terestedin philosophy. The interestand profitin such an undertaking appearsadmirablyin the masterlystudy of Stratton on "Physiological Psychology among the Greeks."
As an instance of presentingthe distinctive forces that are responsible for the development of psychology, one may cite the
division of Dessoir who recognizesthe practical interest as "psycosophy" (later applied psychology) parallelwith the technical interest in doctrine,whichis 'psychology'in its usualacceptedmeaning.
With doctrineonce made prominent,the historicalpath was inevitably that set by the doctrinalsurvey. We have then such sectional
contributionsas Warren'sof the "History of the AssociationPsychology;"and we have as equally importantthe historicalpresentation of selected problems. Roback's recent book on "Character"
containsso largea historicalmaterialthat it may stand as the model
of this procedure. We have there presentedthe successivestages in
our knowledge of this important problem. Similarly Wilm has
given us a history of the "Theoriesof Instinct." I mention this in
order to make clear that the history of psychologyis not a barren
subject-that indeedunderthe impetus of the modernperspectiveit
has grownin significance.
By way of contrast it is rather noteworthy that the study of
philosophy,especiallyas introducedinto the collegecurriculum,has
proceededso generallyin terms of an historicaloutlook. It was true
of many coursesin philosophythat they werefar more coursesin the
history of philosophy than in philosophy itself. It would almost
appearthat philosopherswere hard put to definethe matter of their
considerations,and went eagerly to the history to supply their
deficiencies. To centerthe study of philosophyaroundits history is
hardlya warrantedpedagogicaldevice. It is certainlyin markedcontrast to the procedurein physicsand chemistryor biology. Thus with
neglecton one side and over-emphasison the other,the properplacing
of the historicalaspect is itself an interestingproblem.
I find it necessaryto presentthis backgroundfor the special considerationthat I here have in mind, for I wish to raise the question
as to the significantand profitablesteps in the evolution of psychology. Owingto the patternswhichwerefollowed,that whichwas
made the center of discussionwas a certain system of thought, and
this frequentlytook the nameof an 'ism.' So markedis the influence
of personality that most of the original'isms'seem to have been
personalones. We have almostforgotten that Platonismwas origin-

CONCEPTS AND "ISMS" IN PSYCHOLOGY

ally the body of doctrine set forth by Plato. It has come to mean a

certain attitude and interest in large human problems. We forget

that Epicurianismmeant originallya view on a particularproblem
held by Epicurus. When a movement took another name such as
Stoicism (somewhat accidentally from the place from which the
doctrinewas originated)we soon forgot its origin,and made it represent a distinctive moral quality, quite as much as a philosophical
position. The evolutionis completewhen we turn to such a wordas
skepticismwhich is a true name for a doctrine,or electicism,which
equallyclearlyindicatesa desireto take the best out of many systems
without over-adherenceto any one.
The thesis which I venture to maintain is that so far as the interests of modern science, including psychology, go, the whole
method of 'isms'is wronglyfocused. We sufferfrom it in the way of
confusionand irrelevanceand futility of discussion. As a mere label
for a particularbody of doctrine,it is useful enough. No one would
object to associationismas a convenientmethod of referringto that
doctrine; but it clearly representsonly a position in regard to the
solution of a specialproblem.It does not mean that an associationist
regardsevery problemin psychology as solved by that method or
attitude; if we do we are open to the confusionof the 'ism' fallacy.
We have so flagranta modernexampleof it that it is at once calledto
mind. Behaviorism,both as a term and as an 'ism'is an undesirable
citizen in the province of psychology. It carrieswith it just that
undesirableimplicationthat if one is a behaviorist,he solves his entire set of psychologicalproblemsby this attitude. It is again likely
to be 'unionized'and applied to the doctrinesof one school or one
man, thus concealingthe far more important factor that there are
all sorts of behaviorism,that in some sense every modern psychologist is a behaviorist,thoughmost of themprotestemphaticallyagainst
the appropriationof that term by one groupof thinkerswho have no
proprietaryright to it, and who have spoiledthe term for most of its
useful service.
If by way of contrastwe go back to the most momentousshift of
scientificinterest of moderntimes, that inauguratedby the doctrine
of evolution, one may see the relationsmore clearly. Perhapsit is a
subject for congratulationthat no one called it 'evolutionism,'so
deadly is the 'ism' implication. We called it Darwinismso far as it
indicated the position of Darwin;but 'evolution'is a concept;it is
not an 'ism.' My thesis is that science advances profitably and

JASTROW

significantlyin termsof conceptsand not in termsof 'isms.' A change

in concept,or the introductionof a new conceptadvancesknowledge.
Such concepts as evolution, conservationof energy, and such shifts
of concept as would be indicated if we should trace the changes in
meaning of the term 'instinct,' are the realities that mark the developmentof science.
Whenwe referto the theoreticalelementin a conceptwe may call
it a theory; but conceptis still the better name. Thus we have done
well to use the term Freudianism,or Freudism,as little as possible.
We presenthis doctrinein terms of the leadingconceptssuch as the
subconscious,suppression,conflict, transfer, regression,and so on.
Here,unfortunately,the majorapplicationof this groupof approaches
to psychologicalproblemshas introduceda false emphasis. Quitetoo
commonly'psychoanalysis'has usurpedthe place which belongs to
the total groupof conceptswhichhave done so much to quickenpsychologicalinterest. That they have done so from the study of the
abnormalis itself an example of the importanceof that concept,
which may be stated as the positionthat normalmental behavioris
to be illuminatedby many of the conceptsthat ariseout of the study
of the abnormal. It would be as unfortunateas misleadingif this
notion were called 'abnormalism.' So, similarly,the illuminationof
the entire mental domain from the genetic approachis one of the
fertile concepts of modern psychology. Though without sharp
boundariesthe introductionof the genetic view functions as a concept. It indicatesthe profitablelines of advance.
Equally characteristicare the shifts in the meaning of concept
with the change of name. Such is the concept of 'intelligence,'its
rich addition of connotationwhen it was brought in line with the
concept of arrest, thus combiningthe genetic concept of stages of
growth with the increasingcomplexity of logical processes;all this
establishesthe value of the concept.
I may pass with a brief mention the most unfortunatetendency
of the 'isms' in psychology or elsewhere, namely that when that
directionof adherenceis followed,it resultsnot in a science,but in a
cult. Herethe erroris flagrantand commonlyunderstood. Cults are
devotedto 'isms.' Too many representa peculiarityof an individual,
as when Fletcherismwas the exaggeratedadherenceof Mr. Fletcher
to excessive mastication in the maintenance of health. It was
equallyclearthat homeopathy,whichbeganwith the peculiarnotions
of Hahnemann, soon became a cult, deriving its name from its

CONCEPTS AND "ISMS

IN PSYCHOLOGY

or like cureslike. Science has remainedsciendoctrinehomeopathy,

it
the extreme danger of cults. The 'ism'
has
avoided
tific because
and
is the clearinvitation
temptation of the cultist.
In the present contributionI have set myself the simple task of
calling attention to what seems to me a very important distinction.
It is peculiarlyimportant in psychology that we should avoid the
emphasis on 'isms' and develop the importance of concepts. The
reasonwhy the history of philosophyis so full of futile controversies
is that it is dividedinto schools,which are institutionsfor the propaganda of a cult, in many cases a legitimate body of adherentsto a
doctrine. But the irrelevanceof 'schools'appearswhen we consider
that they do occupy the same field or sharethe sameinterests.There
is no alternativeor choicebetweenthem, for frequentlythey have no
prominentcommonelement. This bringsme to my concludingpoint;
namely, that the history of sciencemust take account of the shift of
interest, as well as of theory and fact and method. Many doctrines
formerly held have not been disproved, but just outgrown-discarded with the wane of interest. We have simply moved cultural
miles away from any interest in them. We all know the stock illustration of 'scholasticism'-the discussionof the problemof how many
angels can dance on the end of a needle. But there is no greater
incongruityof terms in this than in any other problem which has
passed the way of all knowledge,and ceased to interest when once
the newerconcepts have preparedthe way for a differentperspective
as well as a new enlightenment. There have been revolutionsand
reformationsin doctrines;and these have always followedthe reconstruction of values, reshapingof interests, so that the old problems
lost not what validity they may have had, but lost any hold on the
actual intellectualinterests of the day. 'Modernism,'if we must call
it such, representsa perspectiveof interest, a mode of approach,as
well as access to a substantialbody of doctrine.
My plea is accordinglythat in the pursuitof psychologywe drop
the outgrownand barreninterest in 'isms,' and substitute the living
and profitableinterestin concepts. We need this in psychologymore
than in the other sciencesfor many reasons. First, becauseits procedureis less well established,and secondlybecausethe laboratoryor
investigativemethodis new, and still presentsnot merelyan advance
in method, but a choice of problemsto which that method may be
profitably applied. Furthermore,we are under the temptation of
pushing a profitable idea to an unprofitableextent. There is no

JASTROW

questionthat the conceptof a 'glandularpsychology'is legitimatefor

the body of facts which show that glands exert a vital influenceon
behavior. We can secureits value by incorporatingit into the concept of behavior. But if we attempt to explainthe entire differences
of personalityfrom that approach,we may end in a glandularcult.
Once more, we still are under the influenceof 'schools.' We like to
classify and placepeoplein termsof their doctrinesand to the neglect
of their interests. The history of psychologythat is to be written,
would, as I see it, follow the suggestiveline of concepts,and indicate
how from age to age as interest changed, as knowledgeadvanced,
newerconceptswereneeded,wouldexpressand give point to the shift
of doctrines,to the growthof insight. The historicalapproachoffers
an interestingopportunityto set in orderthe right relation of concepts and 'isms.' But the distinction is equally important in the
guidance of the profitabledevelopmentsof the future. There are
many signsat handin sciencein generaland in psychologyin particular, that we are ready for this correctionof the fundamentalsof our
science.