Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21033 December 28, 1970

TESTATE ESTATE OF ALEJANDRO GONZALES y TOLENTINO, deceased, LORETO ESGUERRA (GONZALES)
MANGALIMAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL I. GONZALES, respondent-appellee.
Umali and Tagle for petitioner-appellant.
Recto Law Office for respondent-appellee.

action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against her former guardian for damages for the loss of her share in
the hacienda (Civil Case No. 25986). 1
Much later, or in April 1962, petitioner allegedly learned that before the sale to respondent of the Hacienda
Evangelista, including her one-eighth undivided share thereof, said respondent had actually been paid for his
services as administrator an amount more than the P11,000 00, claimed by him. Contending that respondent,
through fraud and misrepresentations had obtained the order of payment for his services and the subsequent writs of
execution which ultimately led to his acquistion of the property, thereby enriching himself at her expense, petitioner,
on April 21, 1962, filed a petition before the same probate court for the reconveyance to her of her one-eighth
undivided share in the Hacienda Evangelista by the respondent. After the filing by respondent of his opposition, and
the respective memorandum of the parties herein, the probate court, on November 12, 1962, issued an order, as
follows:
After considering the petition for reconveyance of Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman,
dated April 21, 1962, and the opposition thereto, dated May 14, 1962, of Manuel Gonzales in
support of which opposition said Manuel Gonzales filed his memorandum on September 12, of
this year, and in reply to which Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman filed hers on October
24, same year, the Court is of the opinion that inasmuch as the question of title or ownership is
involved, said Manuel Gonzales may not be divested of his title within these probate
proceedings but in an independent suit filed with a competent court.
Hence the present appeal by the petitioner.

ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal, on a question of law, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Special Proceedings No.
42412. This case is one of the many incidents in the testamentary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
late Alejandro Gonzales y Tolentino.
Petitioner-appellant Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman, an illegitimate daughter of Alejandro Gonzales y
Tolentino, was given a legacy of one-eighth (1/8) undivided portion of the Hacienda Evangelista located at Umingan,
Pangasinan, having an area of 137 hectares Because she was a minor when her father died, petitioner's share was
placed under the guardianship of her half-brother, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., a legitimate son of the testator.
Respondent-appellee Manuel I. Gonzales is a legitimate son of the testator, and was for some time the administrator
of the estate. For the payment of the services of said respondent as administrator, it was agreed on November 5,
1943 among the testator's widow and legitimate children that he would be paid the sum of P11,000 00. This
agreement was approved by the probate court on December 2, 1943. Alleging that he had not been paid his fee of
P11,000 00, as provided in the compromise agreement, respondent filed before the probate court a motion for
execution on July 28, 1948, which motion was granted in an order issued by the court on August 23, 1948.
Eventually, on July 27, 1950 the Hacienda Evangelista, which had previously been levied on execution, was sold by
the sheriff to respondent for the sum of P2,307 46. The one-year redemption period having elapsed without
petitioner's guardian having taken any step to redeem her undivided share of the hacienda, the sheriff executed, on
October 31, 1951, a final deed of sale in favor of respondent.
After coming of age, petitioner sought to recover her legacy by filing a motion in the probate court to set aside the
sale of the Hacienda Evangelista. Having found, however, that her guardian was duly notified of such sale, the
court a quo denied her motion on October 15, 1954. Petitioner did not appeal from this order, instead she filed an

The only question to be resolved in this appeal is, whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila, as a probate
court, has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's petition for reconveyance.
We hold that the probate court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for reconveyance, in question.
The remedy sought by petitioner for the reconveyance to her of her share in the Hacienda Evangelista upon the
ground that the same was acquired by respondent through fraud or misrepresentation cannot be obtained by a mere
petition in the probate proceedings. The court of first instance, acting as a probate court, has limited jurisdiction and
can take cognizance only of "matters of probate, both testate and intestate estates, ... and all such special cases and
proceedings as are not otherwise provided for " 2 The jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special, and this
should be understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers specified in the law, and can not extend to
the adjucation of collateral matters.
The petition filed by petitioner before the probate court which seemingly seeks merely the reconveyance to her of her
undivided share in a parcel of land which originally formed part of the estate of her father in fact calls for the
nullification, of the order of execution issued by the probate court which is already final, and of the subsequent sale
of a property to respondent, upon the alleged ground of fraud. The defense interposed by respondent is that
petitioner's action to recover the property is already barred by prescription, laches, and res judicata. The petition for
reconveyance has given rise to a controversy involving rights over a real property which would require the
presentation of evidence and the determination of legal questions that should be ventilated in a court of general
jurisdiction.
We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner-appellant's filing an action in the
proper court. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C J., Reyes,. J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987
PEDRO E. BAYBAYAN, CIPRIANO EVANGELISTA, and SPOUSES BARTOLOME and CONSUELO
BAYBAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge CFI Pangasinan Branch XIV; Deputy Sheriff CONSTANCIO
PAGADUAN; EULALIA EVANGELISTA, NORBERTO, PAULINA, FELIZA, all surnamed PADUA; DIONISIA,
LAUREANO, JOSEFINA, LEONARDO, ANASTACIA, VALENTINA, all surnamed ORPIANO; SERVILLANO,
GERTRUDES, PASTORA, LORENZO, FAUSTA, all surnamed DELFIN; and DIONISIO, FAUSTINA, AMADO
BENJAMIN, all surnamed ORIA, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the respondent Judge on 4 December
1975, which dismissed, without prejudice, the petitioners' complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24 December 1975, which denied petitioners' motion for
the reconsideration of said order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

adjudicated to said private respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof,
the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in contempt of court. 5
As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists, and the spouses Bartolome and
Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales Branch docketed therein as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and
the herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain said defendants from
enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, the question of the Identity of the
lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and
commissioned a geodetic engineer to undertake said survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the
Court a report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by the Deputy Sheriff to the heirs of
Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the probate court, are registered in the names of herein
petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No. 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the contempt charge against
Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelists. However, the same court ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to
determine whether or not the property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, inasmuch as it
is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269." 8
Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, to which was attached an
amended complaint wherein some defendants were dropped. 9 The respondent Judge, however, found that the
Amended Complaint did not comply with his order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case,
"without prejudice on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of ownership or possession of
the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 23684, now under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269." 10

On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa Padua, Dionisia Orpiano,
Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano, Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin,
Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin, Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all
claiming to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in 1945 in Balungao,
Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's estate, the value of which did not exceed
P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but the motion was denied on 24 December
1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court.
The Court treated the petition as a special civil action for certiorari. 13

After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the
decedent, who were ordered to submit a project of partition. 2 Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to the
Resales Branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.

The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to amend the complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who
are not parties in said special proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, wherein they
prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the order of the probate court of 30 October 1975.
They cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the
respondent trial Judge to whom they submitted their cause voluntarily. 14

On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and ordered Eulalia Evangelista
to deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to
deliver said produce to her co-heirs or pay its equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant
thereto. 3
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents were placed in possession of
their respective shares. 4 However, when a representative of the private respondents went to cultivate the portion

Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent Judge had no authority under the law, both
substantive and procedural, to issue the questioned orders because the order to amend the complaint was issued in,
and in connection with Spec. Proc. No. 24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.

We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged failure to amend their complaint to
exclude therefrom Lot E which the respondent Judge found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate

court, to be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the respondent
Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify the order to
amend the complaint since the determination of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over
a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right of an
interested party to raise the question of ownership in a proper action. 15
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long fine of decisions, that "when questions
arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other
person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings. The
Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance." 16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what the amendments should be
or how the complaint should be amended so that the petitioners should not be faulted if the amended complaint
subsequently filed by them in Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would
want to appear therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the Orders issued by the respondent Judge
on 7 December 1975 and 24 December 1975, in Civil Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18799

March 31, 1964

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein,
over their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of
petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent
antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of
that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased Digna
Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each
page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina
Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the
reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late wife, Digna
Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the
property subject of the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the
special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse
interest in the property subject of the Will, the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any
person other than the petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered,
for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the
surviving spouse of the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on each
page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.

On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for appointment of
Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the
will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at
which hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement, because respondent's principal counsel
(Salonga) had not been notified and was not present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of
the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from
the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the removal of
respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and
qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition,
respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special
administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was
filed.1wph1.t
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition February
29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2)
approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special administrator,
(4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as
special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special coadministratrix, on grounds that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959
estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to
respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the
administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special administrators would ruin the management of the
property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the
facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions
of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order dictated open court,
to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
(with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to
prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on
March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.

On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to
the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and
the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since
the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the
amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now
on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value
P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for
by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the
present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one
fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted
by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings
had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate
proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein
involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein
involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse,
but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v.
Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court
disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that
of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303,
June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No.
27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also
have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case,
which are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or value involved is
reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the entire
estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire administration of the
estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in
controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's

interest as appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole estate
amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced
to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in controversy, and such
amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is
therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the
whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much
more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the
amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is
inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the estate, nor to an order denying probate of a
will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In
an analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the
stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than
$5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts
decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been
decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other
hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680,
N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are
applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the
provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in
special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and not the
combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the instant
case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or value involved or in controversy
in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by
respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4
thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more than
P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable,
because unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of
Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in view of
Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos,

exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to
the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought
before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with respondent
that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the
reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a
regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for
the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in
this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of
petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the
proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy, it is suggested
that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the will (CAG.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one entered also
setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

This is a proceeding for mandamus commenced originally in this court by Florencio Manalo, as guardian of the
minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus addressed to the Honorable Isidro
Paredes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the Philippine Food Co., ordering the publication of the
petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Francisco Villegas, case No. 4217 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna; and injunction commanding the respondent judge, Honorable Isidro Paredes, to suspend the proceedings in
the registration case No. 954 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein the Philippine Food Co. is the
applicant and the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta opponents, until the termination of the proceeding for the
probate of the will of Francisco Villegas, in which said minors are named legatees of the land involved in said
registration case.
On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Laguna an application for letters of administration of the estate left by her deceased husband, who, according to
the application, died intestate (rec. No. 4031, file 1, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
In the course of said administration and on May 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta and
Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, filed a motion with the
court, praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his property was given as a
legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas (rec.
No. 4031, file 1. fol. 47).
On August 8, 1924, Messrs. E.M. Lopez and V.F. Reyes, attorneys, on behalf of the executor Melecio Fule, filed a
motion (Exhibit 3) wherein they stated that the attesting witnesses, Exequiel Evidente and Albino Villegas, had
assured them that the supposed will had not been executed by Francisco Villegas in accordance with law, and that
the executor Melecio Fule no longer took interest in the case (rec. No. 4031, fol. 116).
On June 5, 1924, having received an order of the court requiring her to produce the supposed will of Francisco
Villegas, Justina Mendieta filed a motion wherein, among other things, she said:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 24168

That having learned of the aforesaid order of this court, I hereby freely and spontaneously state that I know
not of any will executed by the deceased Francisco Villegas, except the one that I had had said deceased
Francisco Villegas sign on January 18, 1924, which he signed at my request and inducement in order that
my children begotten by him might have a share in his estate, as said deceased did in fact sign said will
only in my presence and compelled by the pressure exerted by me and for my aforesaid children. (Rec.
No. 4031, file 1, fol. 70.)

September 22, 1925

FLORENCIO MANALO, as guardian of the minors Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and PHILIPPINE FOOD
COMPANY,respondents.
Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez and Juan S. Rustia for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto, Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for respondents.
J.E. Blanco for the intervenor Hidalgo.

Notwithstanding the foregoing motions, the court, on September 3, 1924, ordered the publication in the
newspaper El Debate, of Manila, of the application of Melecio Fule and of Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, and
Daria Mendieta for the probate of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas, setting said application for
hearing on the 3rd day of October, 1924 (rec. No. 4031, file 1, fol. 192).
On September 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, together with her children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, filed
another application for the probate of the same will through their attorneys, Messrs. Azada and Veluz (rec. No. 4031,
file 1, fol. 199), and on October 13, 1924, the same attorneys and Attorney Marcelino Lontok, on behalf of Justina
Mendieta and her minor children, filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for said minors (rec. No.
4031, file 2, fol. 117).

VILLA-REAL, J.:
At the trial which was held October 16, 1924, the court below appointed Justina Mendieta, natural mother of said
minors, as their guardian ad litem. Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the probate of the will (rec. No. 4031,

file 2, fol. 136) and immediately the court proceeded to hear the evidence of the parties, each and everyone of the
attesting witnesses of the supposed will, named Tomas Dizon, Albino Villegas, and Exequiel Evidente having
testified, and the applicants having introduced Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, and N and the opponent
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4, the trial having been suspended thereafter, to be continued on October 24, 1924.
When the case was filed on October 24, 1924, for the continuation of the trial, Justina Mendieta, for herself and in
her capacity as guardian ad litem of her minor children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented by their
attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok and Marcial Azada, on the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, represented by her
attorney, Mr. J.E. Blanco, on the other, submitted to the court an agreement wherein Justina Mendieta stated that she
withdrew her application for the probate of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to justify the probate of said will, and consequently, she prayed that said will be held not
allowable to probate and that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs than his legitimate wife,
Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that the property of the
deceased be distributed in accordance with said agreement (rec. No. 4031, file 2, fol. 171).
By an order dated October 25, 1924, the court approved said stipulation and rendered judgment, holding that the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas could not be probated, and awarding to the heirs of the deceased the estate left
by Francisco Villegas in accordance with said agreement (rec. No. 4031, file 2, fol. 173). From this order no appeal
has been taken.
On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed
with the court a new application for the probate of the same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas (rec.
No. 4217).
As may be seen from the facts above stated, the will, the probate of which is applied for in the petition dated January
7, 1925, is the same one that was the subject of the application of May 5, 1924, and of September 5, 1924. The only
difference lies in that the first application was filed by Justina Mendieta and her minor children Lazaro Mendieta and
Daria Mendieta and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, all represented by the attorney, Mr. Eusebio M.
Lopez; the second by Justina Mendieta and her minor children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented by
the attorneys Messrs. Azada and Veluz; and the third and last by one Gelacio Malihan who claimed to be first cousin
of the deceased Francisco Villegas.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem (40 Cyc., p. 1265), and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the publication ordered by the

Court of First Instance of Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, filed by
Justina Mendieta and her minor children Lazaro and Daria Mendieta and Melecio Fule, testamentary executor,
through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in
the supposed will, including Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for probate, hearing all the
testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will, the applicant Justina Mendieta for herself and as
guardian ad litem of her minor children, represented by their attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok and Marcial Azada,
on the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney, Jesus. E. Blanco,
on the other, having submitted a stipulation wherein the former withdrew her application and the latter reserved
certain rights over the estate left by Francisco Villegas in favor of Justina Mendieta and her minor children; and the
court having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to said
agreement, all the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not
satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been
committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new
application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial
duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be
used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error (26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when the parties interested have
agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what
pertained to him (25 R.C.L., 359).
The first ground of the petition for mandamus is a consequence of the second and we need not deal with it.
As to the motion of the petitioner that the record of the proceeding be transmitted to the Attorney-General for
investigation, in order to discover any irregularity or fraud that may have been committed, and to institute the proper
proceeding against those who may be found guilty, this court will take no action unless specific charges are filed.
For all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.