Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SO ORDERED.2
SECTION 4
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 13 December 1967, the spouses Mateo Camitan and
Lorenza Alcazar (spouses Camitan) sold to Fidelity
Investment Corporation (respondent) a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T(11982)T-3188 located in Barangay Maunong, Calamba,
Laguna. Upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the spouses Camitan delivered to respondent corporation
(respondent) the owners duplicate certificate of title
(Owners Copy). From then on, respondent has been
paying the real estate taxes due on the property and has
remained in actual physical possession thereof. 1
On 29 December 1993, after the death of the spouses
Camitan, without the knowledge of respondent, the heirs of
the spouses-petitioners herein - filed a petition for the
issuance of a new Owners Copy,2 However, it appears that
respondent was not given notice of such proceedings. The
trial court issued an order of general default. 3 After an ex
parte presentation of evidence by the petitioners, the trial
court granted the petition and directed the Register of
Deeds of Laguna to issue a new Owners Copy, while at the
same time declaring void the first Owners Copy, per its
Order dated 08 March 1995.4
When respondent learned of the petition and order for the
first time in March 1995, it caused the annotation of a notice
of sale on the title of the property. Thereafter, on 26 April
1995, it filed a Notice of Adverse Claim with the Register of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.5
In a Petition6 for annulment of judgment and cancellation of
title before the Court of Appeals, respondent argued that
the Order dated 08 March 1995 is null and void, having
been issued by the trial court without jurisdiction since the
Owners Copy of TCT No. T-(11982)T-3188 exists and has
been in its possession, and not lost as petitioners alleged.
Moreover, it claimed that petitioners have no standing to file
the petition, not being the registered owners of the property,
nor persons in interest, since all the rights and interest of
the spouses Camitan had already been transferred to
respondent upon the sale of the property. Respondent
further accused petitioners of perjury; intentionally
suppressing from the trial court the fact that they were not
in possession of the property; and not serving notice on
respondent despite knowledge that it was in actual
possession of the property.7
xxxx
2.
Private
respondents
deny
specifically
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said petition for lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of falsity of the allegations
contained
therein
and
as
heretofore
substantiated.23
The relevant provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections
10 and 11, Rule 8, which read:
SEC. 10. Specific denial. A defendant must
specify each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial.
Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of
an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the
effect of a denial. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC.11. Allegation not specifically denied deemed
admitted. Material averment in the complaint,
other than those as to the amount of unliquidated
damages, shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed
admitted if not denied under oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
Although petitioners put their unmistakably sparse denial of
respondents allegations relative to the execution of the
deed of sale in its favor and its possession of the Owners
Copy under the heading "SPECIFIC DENIALS" and
anteceding it with the adverb "specifically, the same cannot
function as an operative denial within the purview of the
Rules. A denial is not specific simply because it is so
qualified by the defendant. A general denial does not
become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When
the matters of whether the defendant alleges having no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are
plainly and necessarily within the defendants knowledge,
his alleged ignorance or lack of information
will not be considered as a specific denial. 24 In one case, it
was held that when a respondent makes a "specific denial"
of a material allegation of the petition without setting forth
the substance of the matters relied upon to support its
general denial, when such matters were plainly within its
knowledge and the defendant could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, said defendant fails to properly
tender an issue.25 Petitioners "specific denial" in this case is
ineffective and amounts to an admission pursuant to Rule 8,
Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners make an issue of the lack of material evidence
to support the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Owners
for
appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
The plaintiff-appellee filed against the defendantsappellants an action for foreclosure of mortgage on August
20, 1954. The deed of mortgage sued upon was attached to
the complaint as Annex "A". After having been granted an
extension, the appellants filed an answer on September 30,
1954, alleging:
1. That they admit paragraph 1 of the complaint;
2. That the defendants are without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the material averments of the remainder of the
complaint; and
3. That they hereby reserve the right to present an
amended answer with special defenses and
counterclaim.
As the appellants did not file any amended answer, the
appellee moved on November 15, 1954 for judgment on the
pleadings on the ground that the answer failed to tender an
issue. The lower court granted appellee's motion in the
order dated December 28, 1954 and thereafter (on
December 29, 1954) rendered judgment in favor of the
appellee. In granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the lower court held "that the denial by the
defendants of the material allegations of the complaint
under the guise of lack of knowledge is a general denial so
as to entitle the plaintiff to judgment on the pleadings."
In the present appeal taken by the defendants, the question
raised is whether the allegation of want of knowledge or
information as to the truth of the material averments of the
complaint amounts to a mere general denial warranting
judgment on the pleadings or is sufficient to tender a triable
issue.
Section 7 of Rule 9 of the Rules of court, in allowing the
defendant to controvert material averments not within his
knowledge or information, provides that "where the
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of material averment, he shall
so state and this shall have the effect of a denial. This form
of denial was explained in one case as follows:
Just as the explicit denials of an answer should be
either general or specific, so all denials of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
should refer either generally to all the averments of
the complain" thus intended to be denied, or
specifically to such as are to be denied by that
particular form of plea. The would be so definite
an answer that
or information
the truth of an
is not the effect
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52753, which reversed the trial courts judgment on the
pleadings and remanded the case thereto for trial on the
merits, and the Resolution2 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant petition originated from a complaint for
rescission and damages filed on February 14, 1995 by
petitioners, Spouses Pesane Animas Mongao (hereafter
referred to as petitioner Mongao) and Benhur Mongao,
against respondent Pryce Properties Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City.3 The
complaint alleged that petitioner Mongao and respondent
corporation executed a Memorandum of Agreement4 on
December 20, 1993, wherein the former agreed to sell to
the latter for the total price of Five Million Twenty-Eight
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P5,028,800.00) a parcel
of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-221865 registered in the
name of petitioner Mongao only. In accordance with the
terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Agreement,
respondent corporation allegedly paid petitioners the sum of
Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P550,000.00) as
earnest money considered as part of the purchase price.
The complaint further alleged that after considerable delay,
respondent corporation offered to pay the balance of the
purchase price by issuing a check payable to petitioner
Mongao and her mother, Nellie Animas, which the former
rejected. Allegedly, respondent corporation continuously
refused to heed petitioners written and oral demands to pay
the balance solely to petitioner Mongao.
The complaint also denied that petitioner Mongao executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 15, 1994 in favor
of respondent corporation, the registration of which caused
the cancellation of TCT No. T-22186 in the name of
petitioner Mongao and the issuance of TCT No. T-62944. In
addition to petitioners prayer for the rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the forfeiture of the earnest money paid by respondent
corporation, the complaint also asked for the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Respondent corporation filed an answer and refuted
petitioners allegations with a narration of the factual
antecedents leading to the perfection of the contract of
sale.6 It claimed that sometime in 1993, a certain Pedro
Animas IV approached Sonito N. Mole, an officer of
respondent corporation, and negotiated the sale of
properties belonging to the Animas family which were on
the verge of being foreclosed by the bank. Respondent
10
11
. . . .20
12
13
14
DECISION
"(b) to pay the plaintiff litigation expenses in the
amount of P2,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P10,000.00; and
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The Facts
Respondent Rosalina B. Rojas was the co-owner of a twostory building located in Calasiao, Pangasinan.4
The Regional Trial Court denied the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in toto.
Civil Case No. 16890
xxx
"5. That after the filling of said complaint, defendantsspouses conspiring together as husband and wife caused
the removal of the sign board infront (sic) of the clinic of
plaintiffs and dumped gravel and sand infront (sic) of their
stall and fenced off the same preventing the patients and
customers of plaintiffs from coming in;
xxx
xxx
15
"SO ORDERED."20
On June 27, 1996, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration.21
On September 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.22
Hence, this appeal.23
The Issue
The sole issue raised is whether the causes of action
complained of in the Regional Trial Court 24 were in the
nature of compulsory counterclaims that must be pleaded in
Civil Case No. 658 of the Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioners argue that the acts complained of in Civil Case
No. 16890 arose after the filing of the complaint and the
answer in Civil Case No. 658. Thus, damages arising from
such acts could not be raised therein as compulsory
counterclaims.25
The Courts Ruling
We find the appeal meritorious.
We agree with petitioners that the causes of action pleaded
in Civil Case No. 16890 are different from those in Civil
Case No. 658, and that such causes could not have been
raised as compulsory counterclaims therein.
Nonetheless, we find that the trial court erred in Civil Case
No. 16890 for touching on the propriety of the ejectment
case which was settled in Civil Case No. 658 and affirmed
on appeal in Civil Case No. D-9996.
"SO ORDERED."17
16
17
18
19
that Section 4719 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)
provides that the certificate of title covering registered land
shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines
and shall be conclusive as to all matters stated therein.
The Court of Appeals stated that the Torrens title has three
attributes: (1) a Torrens title is the best evidence of
ownership over registered land and, unless annulled in an
appropriate proceeding, the title is conclusive on the issue
of ownership; (2) a Torrens title is incontrovertible and
indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date
of the entry of the decree of registration; 20 and (3) a Torrens
title is not subject to collateral attack.21
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners counterclaim
filed on October 15, 1984 for cancellation of respondents
original certificate of title issued on May 22, 1981 was filed
beyond the statutory one-year period; hence, petitioners
title had become indefeasible, and cannot be affected by
the decision made by Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan
Abato and his councilmen. Moreover, the appellate court
held that petitioners prayer for the cancellation of
respondents title, OCT No. P-658, through a counterclaim
included in his Answer is a collateral attack, which the law
does not allow, citing Cimafranca v. Court of Appeals22 and
Natalia Realty Corporation v. Valdez.23
The allegation of fraud in securing OCT No. P-658 on the
ground that the property in dispute is a residential lot and
not subject of a free patent was not given weight by the
appellate court as it was supported only by testimonial
evidence that did not show how (by metes and bounds) and
why the property in dispute could not have been the subject
of a free patent. The appellate court stated that a mere
preponderance of evidence is not adequate to prove
fraud;24 it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioner claimed that
the subject property is only part of his larger property.
Although petitioner introduced proof of payment of the real
estate taxes of the said property, as well as a previous
mortgage of the property, petitioner did not show that the
disputed property is part of his larger property. Hence, the
appellate court stated that under such circumstances, it
cannot rule that petitioner owned the land under litigation,
since petitioner failed to show that it is part of his larger
property.
The Court of Appeals did not award actual and moral
damages, because respondent failed to prove the amount
of any actual damages sustained, and the instances
enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code warranting
the award of moral damages were not present.
20
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS
TITLE INVOLVED HEREIN WAS ISSUED
PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT WHICH COULD
NOT BE VALIDLY ISSUED OVER A PRIVATE
LAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED
TO BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS ITSELF NO
SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT
LAND WAS ISSUED BY IT; HENCE, SAID FREE
PATENT IS SPURIOUS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE SUBJECT LOT HAD LONG
BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED
BY THE DEFENDANT (PETITIONER HEREIN) OR
HIS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT OF AN
OWNER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM FOR
CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENTS TITLE IS
BARRED.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT
CASE IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFFS TITLE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION.25
21
22
xxxx
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree,
provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or
canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an
attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the
title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
x x x A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on
the title. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court
Appeals, we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title
despite the fact that the nullity thereof was raised only as a
counterclaim. It was held that a counterclaim is considered
a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff.1avvphi1 It stands on the same
footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an
independent action. x x x43
The above ruling of the court on the definition of collateral
attack under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 was reiterated in
Leyson v. Bontuyan,44 Heirs of Enrique Diaz v. Virata, 45
Arangote v. Maglunob,46 and Catores v. Afidchao.47
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioners
counterclaim for cancellation of respondents title is not a
collateral attack, but a direct attack on the Torrens title of
petitioner. However, the counterclaim seeking for the
cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject
property has prescribed as petitioner has not proven actual
possession and ownership of the property due to his failure
to prove the identity of his larger property that would show
that the disputed property is a part thereof, and his claim of
title to the subject property by virtue of open, public and
continuous possession in the concept of owner is nebulous
in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a
Torrens title to the subject property.
23
JESUS
C.
GARCIA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of
Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their
wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse
and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners,
i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child.5 The law provides for
protection orders from the barangay and the courts to
prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials,
law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests
for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
24
25
26
2)
Prohibited
from
harassing,
annoying,
telephoning,
contacting
or
otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party,
either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children,
Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother
Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver
Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the
gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of
the three children; Furthermore, that respondent
shall not contact the schools of the children directly
or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to
pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise
he will have access to the children through the
schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .
9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the
Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for
rental for the period from August 6 to September 6,
2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to
August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for
2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan
Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van
with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent
fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered
27
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first
tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court
of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698)
filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.40
The Issues
I.
We disagree.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS
COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF
THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
28
29
30
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally
why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that
in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be
victimized and that children are almost always the helpless
victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be
enough protection extended to other family members
particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic
Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the
special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in
said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
31
32
33
and
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
927
659
837
811
770
46
26
22
28
27
148
185
147
204
167
536
382
358
445
485
2,335
1,892
1,505
1,307
1,498
37
38
46
18
54
924
1,269
2,387
3,599
5,285
223
199
182
220
208
19
29
30
19
19
102
93
109
109
99
34
11
16
24
34
152
34
23
28
18
25
50
59
59
83
703
5,374
4,881
5,729
6,905
9,485
35
36
R.A.
9262
is
not
violative
due process clause of the Constitution.
of
the
37
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from
private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership,
only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter.
Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where
no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The
non-referral
to a mediator is justified.
of
VAWC
case
delegation
of
38
39
GRI;O-AQUINO, J.:
The issue raised in this case is the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial court, in an ejectment case, over the
lessee's counterclaim for the value of improvements
exceeding the court's jurisdictional limit of P20,000. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the counterclaim for lack of
jurisdiction, hence, this petition for review by the lessee,
Adelfo Maceda.
The leased property originally belonged to the spouses
Arturo Victoria and Maxima Monserrat, a maternal aunt of
the petitioner. After the spouses emigrated to the U.S. in
1970, they leased their house and lot in San Juan, Metro
Manila, to the petitioner for P200 per month in 1970. As the
house was old and run down, petitioner proposed to have it
repaired and renovated subject to reimbursement of his
expenses. The lessors allowed him to do so (Exh. 3) and
requested him to send them pictures of the work
accomplished (Exh. 3-a). He made extensive repairs,
tearing down rotten parts of the house, rebuilding and
extending it up to the garage which he converted into a
dining room. He also moved the bathrooms around. The
remodelling job cost P40,000. His aunt and uncle were
pleased with the pictures of the remodelled house and
made plans to reimburse him for his expenditures. But
Maceda did not stop there. In what appears to be an orgy of
building, he introduced more improvements. He constructed
a new driveway, a basketball court and raised the ground
level near the creek, elevated the fence, remodelled the
gate, and landscaped the lawn.
In 1972, Arturo Victoria passed away in the United States.
In 1973, his aunt's attorney-in-fact, Atty. Rustico Zapata, Sr.,
promised to sell the property to him for P125,000 after the
title should have been transferred to his widowed aunt. On
February 12, 1974, Atty. Zapata and a Mr. Gomez visited
the place and informed him that his aunt had sold the
property to Mrs. Gomez so he should vacate it. He refused
to leave. As a result, Atty. Zapata filed an ejectment case
40
41
42
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May defendants in civil cases implead in their counterclaims
persons who were not parties to the original complaints?
This is the main question to be answered in this
controversy.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the May 22, 2002 2 and the
September 3, 2002 Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 80) in Civil Case No. Q-0041103. The decretal portion of the first assailed Order
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing as
earlier stated, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss
claims is granted. Accordingly, the defendants'
claims against Mr. Lim and Mr. Mariano captioned
as their counterclaims are dismissed."4
The second challenged Order denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
Briefly, the origins of the present controversy can be traced
to the Letter of Intent (LOI) executed by both parties on
August 11, 1998, whereby Petitioner Lafarge Cement
Philippines, Inc. (Lafarge) -- on behalf of its affiliates and
other qualified entities, including Petitioner Luzon
Continental Land Corporation (LCLC) -- agreed to purchase
the cement business of Respondent Continental Cement
Corporation (CCC). On October 21, 1998, both parties
entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA). At the
time of the foregoing transactions, petitioners were well
43
44
xxx
xxx
45
46
of
Causes
47
48
49
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila, Branch VI, the judgment was affirmed
on February 21, 1972. The matter was elevated to the Court
of Appeals which likewise affirmed the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Manila on November 27, 1980.
On October 15, 1984, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch VII, granted the motion of the petitioners for
a writ of execution since the said decision had already
become final and executory.
SARMIENTO, J.:p
In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners assail
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
06586 in so far as it reversed and set aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IV, dismissing
the complaint for indemnity of improvements with injunction
filed by the private respondent and docketed as Civil Case
No. 8427921. The dispositive portion of this challenged
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, subject to the findings and
conclusions contained herein, the order
appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE insofar as it granted private
defendants motion to dismiss and Affirmed
insofar as it denies the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. Let the records of
the case be remanded to the court below
for further proceedings. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1968, the petitioners, Marita and Rodolfo
Cabangis, together with Oscar Cabangis and the deceased
Arturo Cabangis, filed an ejectment 2 case against Gaspar
Devis, the deceased father of the private respondent Elvira
Devis Nicandro, in the then City Court of Manila (now
Metropolitan Trial Court) for non-payment of rents of a
parcel of land situated in Tondo, Manila, owned by the
Cabangises and leased to Devis.
On May 31, 1969, the said court rendered a decision
dispositive portion of which states:
the
50
51
52
53
54
counterclaim
is
55
Summary Judgment
56
57
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Both parties in this case have moved for the
reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated on
February 29, 1972. Plaintiffs maintain that the decision
appealed from should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in
turn, prays that the decision of this Court be "set aside ...
with or without a new trial, ... and that the complaint be
dismissed, with costs; or, in the alternative, that the amount
of the award embodied therein be considerably reduced." .
Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration,
the defendant filed a "petition to annul proceedings and/or
to order the dismissal of plaintiffs-appellees' complaint"
upon the ground that "appellees' complaint actually seeks
the recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual damages,
because, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of
the lower court, the unspecified sums representing items of
alleged damages, may not be considered, under the settled
doctrines of this Honorable Court," and "the jurisdiction of
courts of first instance when the complaint in the present
case was filed on Sept. 30, 1965" was limited to cases "in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the
property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand
pesos" and "the mere fact that the complaint also prays for
unspecified moral damages and attorney's fees, does not
bring the action within the jurisdiction of the lower court."
We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not
true that "the unspecified sums representing items or other
alleged damages, may not be considered" for the
purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the court
"under the settled doctrines of this Honorable Court." In
fact, not a single case has been cited in support of this
allegation.
58
59
60
by
for
for
is
manager refused to do, thereby impliedly ratifying the offloading of Mr. Zulueta at Wake Island.
It is next urged that, under the contract of carriage with the
defendant, Mr. Zulueta was bound to be present at the time
scheduled for the departure of defendant's plane and that
he had, consequently, violated said contract when he did
not show up at such time. This argument might have had
some weight had defendant's plane taken off before Mr.
Zulueta had shown up. But the fact is that he was ready,
willing and able to board the plane about two hours before it
actually took off, and that he was deliberately and
maliciously off-loaded on account of his altercation with
Capt. Zentner. It should, also, be noted that, although Mr.
Zulueta was delayed some 20 to 30 minutes, the arrival or
departure of planes is often delayed for much longer
periods of time. Followed to its logical conclusion, the
argument adduced by the defense suggests that airlines
should be held liable for damages due to the inconvenience
and anxiety, aside from actual damages, suffered by many
passengers either in their haste to arrive at the airport on
scheduled time just to find that their plane will not take off
until later, or by reason of the late arrival of the aircraft at its
destination.
PANAM impugns the award of attorney's fees upon the
ground that no penalty should be imposed upon the right to
litigate; that, by law, it may be awarded only in exceptional
cases; that the claim for attorney's fees has not been
proven; and that said defendant was justified in resisting
plaintiff's claim "because it was patently exorbitant."
Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed
apart from plaintiff's claim for actual damages, the amount
of which is not contested, plaintiffs did not ask any specific
sum by way of exemplary and moral damages, as well as
attorney's fees, and left the amount thereof to the "sound
discretion" of the lower court. This, precisely, is the reason
why PANAM, now, alleges without justification that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
present case.
61
62
63
64
a) P10,000.00 as moral
damages;
b)
P5,000.00
exemplary damages;
as
c)
P1,000.00
attorney's fees; and
as
as
moral
65
P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages
P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees
66
67
68
EDGARDO
PINGA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF GERMAN, SANTIAGO represented by
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure1 necessarily carries the power to
overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law
through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the
notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is
dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is
"without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action." 2 The
innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence
holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was
sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of the compulsory
counterclaim.3
In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the
former jurisprudential rule can no longer stand in light of
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The relevant facts are simple enough. Petitioner Eduardo
Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a complaint
for injunction4 filed with Branch 29 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC)5 of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, by
respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by
Fernando Santiago. The Complaint6 dated 28 May 1998
alleged in essence that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente
Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of
the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting
the fruits of the coconut trees therein. Respondents prayed
that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined from committing
"acts of depredation" on their properties, and ordered to pay
damages.
In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, 7 petitioner and
his co-defendant disputed respondents ownership of the
properties in question, asserting that petitioners father,
Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived their
interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof
since the 1930s.8 They alleged that as far back as 1968,
respondents had already been ordered ejected from the
properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by
the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. It was further claimed that
respondents application for free patent over the properties
was rejected by the Office of the President in 1971.
Defendants in turn prayed that owing to respondents
By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been
completed. Moreover, respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed
to present their evidence. It appears that on 25 October
2004, the RTC already ordered the dismissal of the
complaint after respondents counsel had sought the
postponement of the hearing scheduled then. 10 However,
the order of dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by
the RTC in an Order dated 9 June 2005, which took into
account the assurance of respondents counsel that he
would give priority to that case.11
At the hearing of 27 July 2005, plaintiffs counsel on record
failed to appear, sending in his stead a representative who
sought the postponement of the hearing. Counsel for
defendants (who include herein petitioner) opposed the
move for postponement and moved instead for the
dismissal of the case. The RTC noted that it was obvious
that respondents had failed to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time, in fact not having presented
their evidence yet. On that ground, the complaint was
dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants
"to present their evidence ex-parte."12
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the
order issued in open court on 27 July 2005, opting however
not to seek that their complaint be reinstated, but praying
instead that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be
disallowed
from
presenting
evidence
ex-parte.
Respondents claimed that the order of the RTC allowing
petitioner to present evidence ex-parte was not in accord
with established jurisprudence. They cited cases,
particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann14 and Domingo v.
Santos,15 which noted those instances in which a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent
adjudication.
On 9 August 2005, the RTC promulgated an order granting
respondents Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing the
counterclaim, citing as the only ground therefor that "there
is no opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of the
[respondents]."16
Petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in
an Order dated 10 October 2005. 17 Notably, respondents
filed an Opposition to Defendants Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, wherein they argued that the prevailing
jurisprudential rule18 is that "compulsory counterclaims
cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of
action," and "a conversu, the dismissal of the complaint
carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaims."19
The matter was elevated to this Court directly by way of a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 on a pure question of
law, the most relevant being whether the dismissal of the
complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim.
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
REGALADO, J.:p
Impugned in this petition for review on certiorari is the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated August 9,
1990, 1 dismissing the special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed therein by petitioner corporation.
The appeal herein arose from Civil Case No. 55560 filed by
petitioner corporation against private respondent Plaridel
Jose, for the annulment of an agreement to buy and sell
executed between the parties, before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 160, the complaint 2 alleging, inter
alia, that:
79
80
81
having
been
denied,
82
83
ESTHERLITA
CRUZ-AGANA,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AURORA SANTIAGO-LAGMAN (In her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
77, Malolos, Bulacan) and B. SERRANO ENTERPRISES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan ("trial
court"), dated 4 June 1999, recalling its previous Order
dated 25 May 1999 dismissing B. Serrano Enterprises,
Inc.'s ("respondent") counterclaim upon a motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner Estherlita Cruz-Agana ("petitioner").
Antecedent Facts
On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Complaint for
annulment of title with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction against respondent. Petitioner claims that as the
sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is the sole owner of a
lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3907.
Petitioner further claims that the lot was fraudulently sold to
Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who later on transferred the lot to
respondent. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan presided by Judge
Aurora Santiago-Lagman and docketed as Civil Case No.
210-M-96.
Respondent seasonably filed its Answer with compulsory
counterclaim. Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's
counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
In an Order dated 11 March 1999, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss respondent's counterclaim.
The trial court reasoned that respondent's counterclaim is
compulsory and therefore excluded from the coverage of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved
that the trial court reconsider its Order invoking the
mandatory nature of a certificate of non-forum shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. 2
On 25 May 1999, the trial court reversed its 11 March 1999
Order and dismissed respondent's counterclaim for lack of
a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
arguing that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not
84
85
NARVASA, J.:
The proceedings at bar had their origin in an agreement
denominated "Contract of Constitutional Purchase and Sale
of nterparation Goods" entered into between petitioner
Visayan baking Corporation (hereafter, simply VISPAC) and
the
Reparations
Commission
(hereafter,
simply
REPACOM). Subject of the contract were a cannery plant, a
tin manufacturing plant, and three (3) filing boats sold to
VISPAC, for which it bound itself to pay the total price of
P1,135,712.47 in ten (10) equal yearly installments with
interest. 2
Prior to the due date of the first installment, REPACOM sent
VISPAC a written reminder thereof. VISPAC's response was
to file in the Court of First Instance of Manila two (2) special
civil actions for declaratory relief, 3 alleging ambiguity in the
contract between it and REPACOM consisting in the
agreement's failure to clearly state the precise time when
the obligation to pay the first installment of the price would
arise. 4
On the other hand, when VISPAC subsequently failed,
despite several demands, to pay the first installment of the
price (P135,712.47) on what REPACOM deemed to be the
due date, the latter instituted an ordinary civil action for
collection thereof. 5 VISPAC moved to dismiss this
collection suit on the ground of the pendency of the
declaratory relief actions, arguing that until and unless the
latter were resolved, no cause of action could be deemed to
exist in favor of REPACOM for collection of said first
installment. The motion to dismiss was denied; and after
trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment dated
March 27, 1963 ordering VISPAC to pay REPACOM the
sum claimed, P135,712.47, with interest at the legal rate
from date of filing of the complaint until fully paid.
VISPAC appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming error on
the part of the Trial Court in not holding that the collection
suit was barred by the pendency of the declaratory relief
cases earlier instituted.
But the declaratory relief actions had been earlier dismissed
by Order of the Court of First Instance dated October 9,
1962, the Court holding that the issues raised would be
necessarily threshed out in the collection suit. VISPAC
86
87
88
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
89
90
91
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May the accused-petitioners who were charged with estafa,
file an answer with counterclaim for moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses
against the private complainant in the same criminal action?
This is the main issue raised in this petition 1 filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders dated
July 1, 1991, 2 and August 21, 1991, 3 of respondent Judge
"for being contrary to law and (for) having been issued by
the respondent judge in excess of his jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction."
4
92
as
(b)
P500,000.00
exemplary damages;
as
(c)
P100,000.00
attorney's fees; and
as
(d)
P20,000.00,
litigation expenses.
as
93
Propriety
of
94
in
95
96
to the best interest of the parties that the trial of the criminal
action should now proceed. The trial has waited too long; it
is time to continue and finish it with all reasonable dispatch.
In fairness to the accused, he may file separate
proceedings to litigate his counterclaim after the criminal
case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules
which may be promulgated as and when they become
effective.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned
Orders dated July 1, 1991 and August 21, 1991 are hereby
MODIFIED. The counter-claim of the accused is hereby set
aside without prejudice. The Respondent Regional Trial
Court of Manila is DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of
the criminal action and the civil action arising from the
criminal offense that is impliedly instituted therein, with all
judicious dispatch. No. costs.
SO ORDERED.
97
October 4, 2010
98
99
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the
bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of
CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the
counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive
the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when
petitioner became the owner of the subject property by
virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its
favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to
pay the prescribed docket fees.13 This, petitioner did not do,
because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental
payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner
failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment
rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is
considered null and void. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any
time, even on appeal before this Court.14
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim
is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and
decide the same, considering petitioner's exemption from all
kinds of fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees,15 the Court ruled that the provision in the
Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
8291, which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds," cannot operate to exempt it
from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the
Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from
Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter
or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this
Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal
fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the
GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing
another equally important institutional safeguard of the
Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy
recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy,
assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover,
legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
100
January 7, 2008
101
102
103
THE
THE
FOR
AND
OF
The Issues
104
105
both
parties
concerned.
Petitioner claims the RTC and the CA erred in ruling that the
arbitration clause is null and void.
Petitioner is correct.
Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the
place where the contract is made governs. Lex loci
contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here in
the Philippines. Therefore, our laws ought to govern.
Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the
validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality and
binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides, "Any
stipulation that the arbitrators award or decision shall be
final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and
2040." (Emphasis supplied.)
Arts. 2038,31 2039,32 and 204033 abovecited refer to
instances where a compromise or an arbitral award, as
applied to Art. 2044 pursuant to Art. 2043, 34 may be voided,
rescinded, or annulled, but these would not denigrate the
finality of the arbitral award.
The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties. It has not been shown to be contrary to
any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. There has been no showing that the parties
have not dealt with each other on equal footing. We find no
reason why the arbitration clause should not be respected
and complied with by both parties. In Gonzales v. Climax
Mining Ltd.,35 we held that submission to arbitration is a
contract and that a clause in a contract providing that all
matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
arbitration is a contract.36 Again in Del Monte CorporationUSA v. Court of Appeals, we likewise ruled that "[t]he
provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising
therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that
contract and is itself a contract."37
Arbitration clause not contrary to public policy
The arbitration clause which stipulates that the arbitration
must be done in Seoul, Korea in accordance with the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the KCAB, and that the
arbitral award is final and binding, is not contrary to public
policy. This Court has sanctioned the validity of arbitration
clauses in a catena of cases. In the 1957 case of
Eastboard Navigation Ltd. v. Juan Ysmael and Co., Inc.,38
this Court had occasion to rule that an arbitration clause to
resolve differences and breaches of mutually agreed
contractual terms is valid. In BF Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we held that "[i]n this jurisdiction, arbitration has
been held valid and constitutional. Even before the approval
on June 19, 1953 of Republic Act No. 876, this Court has
countenanced the settlement of disputes through
arbitration. Republic Act No. 876 was adopted to
supplement the New Civil Codes provisions on
arbitration."39 And in LM Power Engineering Corporation v.
Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., we declared
that:
UNCITRAL
Model
law
106
107
108
109
110
in consideration of the
international arbitration.
specific
features
of
preserve
the
subject
equipment
and
111
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117,
was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of
this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for
insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After
the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance
paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance
indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages
against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the
amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject
cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of
the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be
held legally liable for the loss."2
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
82822, entitled "R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel
Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs
Services, Inc.," which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs
Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel
Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of
P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity which
R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the
insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation
(Columbia).
THE FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy
No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the
shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes
against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were
shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela,
Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the
same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release
and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in
turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its
delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias
warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned
by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6)
truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to
Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were
destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in
six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in
Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route
to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the
against
defendant
Glodel
Brokerage
SO ORDERED.4
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision
to the CA.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision
which reads in part:
112
113
114
115
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioners fault the respondent court for reversing the
dismissal of a complaint by the trial court and remanding
the case for further proceedings. However, there is an
important antecedent question we must first resolve before
we can go to the merits of this case.
The facts relevant to this petition are briefly narrated.
On September 12, 1976, the Crisologo family donated an
island to the Sent of God Foundation on the condition inter
alia that it would "be used exclusively to provide a monastic
life and experience according to the Rule of St. Benedict
and for such other religious and charitable purposes as may
be determined by the donee." This was followed by a later
donation of other lands, under the same conditions. The
subject properties were later transferred by the Foundation
to the S of G Foundation Inc., which introduced
improvements thereon that, for reasons we do not need to
examine here, it later demolished. On July 29, 1988,
believing that the conditions of the donations had been
violated, the Crisologos filed a complaint for revocation of
the donations and the recovery of the properties donated. 1
Impleaded as defendants were the Sent of God Foundation,
the S of G Foundation, Inc., Raul G. Fores, Senen F.
Valero, and Father Odon de Castro, the last three as
officers of the foundations. Also included were Olegario
Orbeta and his wife, Susana Rosario Orbeta, for their role
in facilitating the donations.
116
117
118
11
THIRD/FOURTH,
ETC
PARTY
119
120
Finally, the MTC declared that the property is privateagricultural land. The RTC and the CA affirmed the finding
of the trial court. The findings of the MTC, affirmed by the
RTC and CA are conclusive on this Court, absent a
preponderance of evidence that the trial court ignored,
misconstrued or misapplied any cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would warrant a
modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.16
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
121
ISAAC
CAPAYAS,
ETC.,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, ET AL.,
respondents.
Ramon
C.
Fernandez
Victorino P. Abrera for respondents.
for
petitioner.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
Court of First Instance of Albay to admit the so-called
amended third-party complaint filed by petitioner against
several persons named therein, on the ground that the
refusal of the respondent court to admit the same
constitutes an unlawful neglect of the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined upon it by law, pursuant to Rule 12 of
the Rules of Court, sections 1 and 2 of which read as
follows:
SECTION 1. Claim against one not a party to an
action.When a defendant claims to be entitled
against a person not a party to the action,
hereinafter called the third-party defendant, to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim, he may file,
with leave of court, against such person a pleading
which shall state the nature of his claim and shall
be called the third-party complaint.
SEC. 2. Motion for leave.Before the service of
his answer a defendant may move ex parte or,
after the service of his answer, on notice to the
plaintiff, for leave as third-party plaintiff to file a
complaint against a third-party defendant.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
First. Because from the said provisions it clearly appears
that it is not a court's duty especially enjoined by law to
admit a third-party complaint. Were it a ministerial duty, it
would not be necessary for the defendant to obtain leave of
court to file such complaint; because if the court has the
duty to admit, the defendant has the correlative right to file,
a third-party complaint without necessity of such leave. Of
course, when the law says that a third party complaint may
be filed with leave of court, it refers to a complaint that
alleges facts which prima facie show that the defendant is
In the case of General Taxicab Assn., Inc. vs. O' Shea, U.S.
Court of Appeals, Dist. Court of Columbia, January 15,
1940, the court said: "Against this background of statutes
and decisions, the Supreme Court, in framing Rule 14(a),
chose the language "a defendant may move . . . for leave
as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint
upon a person not a party to the action, . . .' and the
language 'if the motion is granted. . . .' We think there can
be no doubt that it was thus intended to make the
impleading of third parties in the Federal practice
discretionary with the trial court. See 1 Moore, op. cit.,
supra, 741: 'Whether a party to an action shall be allowed to
implead an additional party rests in the discretion of the
court. This is in accord with the English, New York and
Wisconsin practices.'" (2 Fed. Rules Service, 14a.15, Case
No. 1.)
Secondly. Because the respondent court would have
committed an error if it had admitted the so-called thirdparty complaint filed by the petitioner against Isidora
Lladoc, Fulgencio Lladoc and Gregorio Navera, since the
facts alleged therein do not show that the petitioner is
entitled to indemnify against them "in respect to plaintiff's
claim." The test to determine whether the claim is, whether
it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's
claim is based, or the third-party's claim, although arising
out of another or different contract or transaction, is
connected with the plaintiff's claim.
According to the decision in the case of Crim vs.
Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. (26 Fed. Supp., 715 [1
Fed. Rules Service, 14a11. Case No. 1]),the test to
determine when a third-party defendant may be impleaded
is whether he could have been joined originally as a
defendant by the plaintiff. But this could be applied only if
there could be asserted against the defendant as the thirdparty defendant, jointly and severally or in the alternatives,
any right to relief arising out of the same transaction. For
example in an action against the surety in a bond, the
surety may bring in as a third party defendant, the principle
who had agreed to indemnify the surety, because the
surety's claim arises out of the same transaction (United
States vs. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs.
Kolling, U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Minn., February 1, 1940, 2 Fed.
Rules Service 14a.222, Case No. 1). The above test does
not cover all cases in which impleading a third-party may be
and have been allowed, which are also covered by the test
we have laid down in the previous paragraph. Under Rule
14 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which corresponds
to our Rule 12, the bringing in of a third-party defendant is
proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the
original defendant, although the third-party defendant's
liability arises out of another transaction. So in the case of
Carbola Chemical Co., Inc. vs Trundle Engineering Co. (U.
S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., December 26, 1942), it was held
that in an action for breach of contract to render
engineering services and to survey a plant, the defendant
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FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch II, Cavite City, in Civil Case No. N-2411
entitled: "Emerita C. Jumanan, et al., plaintiffs, v. Felisa R.
Garcia, et al, defendants; Felisa R. Garcia, et al., third-party
plaintiffs, v. Purificacion Samala, et al., third-party
defendants; Purificacion Samala, fourth-party plaintiff, v.
The Imperial Insurance, Inc., fourth-party defendant",
absolving the defendants from any liability and ordering the
third party defendants and fourth party plaintiffs,
Purificacion Samala and Leonardo Esguerra (petitioners
herein) and the fourth party defendant Imperial Insurance,
Inc., jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs (respondent
herein) the damages mentioned in the decision. 1
The factual background of this case as found by the trial
court is as follows:
At approximately 6:30 o'clock in the
morning of February 7, 1976, plaintiff
Emerita C. Jumanan was riding a
passenger jeepney on her way from her
residence at Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite to
her place of work at the Department (now
Ministry) of Public Information in
Intramuros, Manila, where she was
employed. The said passenger jeepney,
which is owned by defendants Felisa and
Tomas Garcia, was then being driven by
defendant Virgilio Profeta and was bound
for Manila carrying
about twelve
passengers.
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