ABENES v.

CA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Few days prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, the (PNP) of Pagadian City, created a
team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a
checkpoint in a brgy at said city for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was
then being implemented by the COMELEC. The team had put up a road block with
the marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were
required by the team to stop and their occupants were then politely requested to
alight in order to allow routine inspection and checking of their vehicles. Motorists
who refused the request were not forced to do so.
Abenes was found guilty of At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red
Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team and
directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could
not be seen through its tinted windows, a member of the team knocked on the
vehicles window and requested the occupants to step down for a routine
inspection. The occupants of said vehicle including Abenes alighted and the two
policemen noticed the firearm tucked at the right waist of Abenes. However, he
failed to show any license or any other document to justify his lawful possession of
the firearm. He now questions the legality of the checkpoint and alleges that it
violated his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure
ISSUES
1. was the check-point validly established? Yes.
2. was the petitioners constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure
violated? No.
HELD:
1. CHECKPOINT IS VALID. The petitioner insists that the prosecution should
have produced the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and that
firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are inadmissible
because there was no indication that would trigger any suspicion from the
policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
In the present case, the production of the mission order is not necessary in
view of the fact that the checkpoint was established three days before the
May 11, 1998 elections; and, the circumstances under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine

checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right

against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced
by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its
deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also
defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to
bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be
able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
2. NO VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SEARCH AND
SEIZURE. Notwithstanding the absence of a search warrant, the policemen
may validly seize a firearm and the same is admissible in evidence pursuant
to the "plain view doctrine". In the instant case, the firearm was seized from
the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist
uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.19
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the
policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain
view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the
vehicle.
GAANAN v. IAC
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an
extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such
that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
FACTS:
Atty. Laconico (client) and Atty. Gaanan (counsel) are client and counsel
respectively. Laconico called the complainant in the direct assault charged against
him in order to discuss proposed conditions for the settlement of the case. While

Laconico was talking to complainant through the phone, he asked his lawyer to
secretly listen through an extension telephone. A consideration for the settlement
was set and during the pay-off, Gaanan and Laconico made it appear that it was
extortion, with the presence of the NBI agents. The evidence for extortion was the
statements of Gaanan and Laconico as well as the affidavits regarding the phone
conversation. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act and both were found to be guilty.
IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between
the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore,
covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication
without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension
telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation
between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in
Rep. Act No. 4200.
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement"
under Rep. Act No. 4200; No
HELD:
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
AN EXTENSION TELEPHONE CANNOT BE PLACED IN THE SAME
CATEGORY AS A DICTAPHONE, DICTAGRAPH OR THE OTHER DEVICES
ENUMERATED IN SECTION 1 OF RA NO. 4200 as the use thereof cannot
be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200,
although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments
the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very
nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially
now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the
main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling
at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs

the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone
unit which shares its line with another.
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may
cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party
to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation.
When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which
the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception,
has not occurred.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a
prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more
concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation. It can be readily seen that our
lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing
devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail
or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.The petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Remedies in case of violation
A. Exclusionary Rule
Art. III sec. 3(2)
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Facts: Upon application of respondent prosecutors, several judges issued, on
different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the
persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences
to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as
the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on
the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers,
money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation
proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted
the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
ISSUES:
1. With respect to those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, W/N
petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested
warrants? No cause of action
2. With respect to those found and seized in the residences of petitioners, W/N
the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under
the authority thereof are valid? Not Valid
HELD:
1. Petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. It is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity
2. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of CB
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and RPC." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.
SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED WERE VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE RULES, THUS, ILLEGAL OR BEING GENERAL WARRANTS.

There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things
to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity
of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. This ruling
relied upon which was held in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal
should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of
an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach
and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures
the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing
the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
Hence," Document seized from an illegal search warrant is NOT admissible in
court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned,
except if warranted by the circumstances.
Important Points
1. Illegally obtained evidences are excluded
2. Objection to the admissibility must be expressed, otherwise it will be deemed
waived
3. Constitutional mandate
4. Civil action for damages is allowed under Art. 32, of NCC as to violation of
any of civil liberties
5. Criminal violations under RPC
a. 128 (Violation of domicile)
b. 129 (Search warrant maliciously obtained)
c. 130 (Searching a domicile w/o witness)
PASTRANO v. CA
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
On February 13, 1989, a group of students went to see Capt. Maoza, then
intelligence operations officer of PC. They reported having seen Clyde beaten up by
his father, petitioner Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but expressed
fear of the Pastrano who, according to them, had firearms. Clyde had died and it
was suspected he had been the victim of foul play.
2 sons of Pastrano by his estranged wife - James and Clinton - also saw Capt. Maoza,
seeking his assistance in connection with the death of their brother Clyde. The
brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping
unlicensed firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit in which they
stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pastrano was
keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom of his house.
On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza applied for a
search warrant on the same day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a search warrant which Capt. Maoza and his men
later served at the residence of Pastrano. Seized from petitioners dwelling was a
sack containing ammunitions Without having the necessary license, authority
and/or permit duly issued to or granted them by the proper government
agency/official as determined by law.
ISSUE
1. W/N the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is invalid for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the evidence
obtained is inadmissible in court.
HELD:
The second ground for the present petition is that the evidence against
petitioner was obtained through illegal search. Petitioner cites the
constitutional provision that
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner contends that Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, who applied for the search
warrant, did not have personal knowledge of the facts on which the warrant
was based. But the trial court actually examined the two brothers, James and
Clinton. These two were the ones who reported the matter to Capt. Maoza.
They gave information of the illegal possession of firearms by their father,
petitioner herein, on the basis of personal knowledge. Their testimonies, not
that of Capt. Maoza, formed the basis of the trial courts finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. As Capt. Maoza testified:[2]

Petitioner finally assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the
judge had examined the complainant and his witnesses by means of
searching questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, 4 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
4. Examination of complainant, record. - The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Rule 126, 4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and his witnesses
to be put in writing and under oath. But although this is a ground for quashing a
search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to this end. He did not move to
quash the information before the trial court.[3] Nor did he object to the presentation
of the evidence obtained as being the product of an illegal search. In the case of
Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,[4] we held:
At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility
of the evidence obtained thereby were deemed waived when no objection to the
legality of the search warrant was raised during the trial of the case nor to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained through said warrant.
Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search. As held in
People v. Omaweng,[5] the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly.
We find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the crime charged
and that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition.
We hold, however, that the penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified by
reducing it, in view of R.A. No. 8294,[6] which took effect on July 6, 1997. Penal
statutes are to be retroactively applied insofar as they are favorable to the accused.
Under the new statute, the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearm has been
reduced to prision correccional maximum and a fine of not less than P15,000.00
with respect to the possession of the .32 cal. revolver and to prision mayor
minimum and a fine of P30,000.00 with respect to the possession of the .22 cal.
Magnum revolver. Additional benefit would redound to petitioner because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will have to be applied.
B. Civil Action for Damages
ABERCA v. VER
YAP, J.:
whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil
action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action

for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of
the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of AFP, known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs
allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number
of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without
proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they
were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate
plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and
to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.
ISSUE: W/N Ver, et. Al may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid search and
seizures, or violation of Constitutional Rights or Liberties of another in general? Yes
HELD:
It may be that the Ver, et.al as members of the AFP, were merely responding to
their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President
Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress
upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by
the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their
assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their
duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or
from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and
imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out

this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed,
otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel.
May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to
the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
YES
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer
may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in
February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or
indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons
who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention
and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right
of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners,
their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755
which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasidelict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one
(1) year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it
does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of
their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.