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Commentary on On the Nature of Repressed

Contents
Linda A. W. Brakel M.D.

University of Michigan, Department of Psychiatry, Ann Arbor, Mich.; Michigan

Psychoanalytic Institute, Farmington Hills, Mich., U.S.A.
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Linda A. W. Brakel M.D. (2003) Commentary on On the Nature of Repressed Contents,
Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 5:2, 142-146, DOI:
10.1080/15294145.2003.10773418
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2003.10773418

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142

Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 2003, 5 (2)

Commentary on On the Nature of Repressed Contents

Linda A. W. Brakel (Ann Arbor, Michigan)

I am very glad to have the opportunity to provide a

commentary of Vesa Talvitie and Juhani Ihanuss
[T & Is] target paper, On the Nature of Repressed
ContentsA Working-through of John Searles
Critique. Although, as will be made evident, I
disagree with T & I and with Searle, T & I have
brought to the fore the vital issue of unconscious
(representational) contents. This commentary is divided into three parts. First, I discuss T & Is attempt to reconcile Searles critique of unconscious
content with psychoanalysis. Second, I address
problems with Searles account of the ontology of
the mental and his consequent critique of the psychoanalytic view of unconscious mental contents.
Third, I attempt a positive argument in favor of
unconscious (representational) contents.
Linda A. W. Brakel, M.D.: University of Michigan, Department of
Psychiatry, Ann Arbor, Mich.; Michigan Psychoanalytic Institute,
Farmington Hills, Mich., U.S.A.

Disagreement with T & I

T & I quote Searle (1992) in The Rediscovery of the
Mind 1 claiming that the psychoanalytic idea of
repressed contents . . . [is] incoherent (p. 151),
factually empty (p. 167), and implying dualism
(p. 170). Yet T & I hold that because the debate on
this issue has but minor relevance for clinical data
and psychoanalytic practice, a working-through
could be facilitated by substituting T & Is terms
meaning preservation and meaning manipulation for repressed unconscious contents. I disagree
with the authors here. Even if they were correct that
the immediate clinical-practice implications of a
psychoanalytic theory without the concepts of unconscious representational content were minor
1
All Searle quotes are from The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992)
unless otherwise specified.

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On the Nature of Repressed Contents Commentaries

(which in my judgment they are not), the consequences for psychoanalytic theory are major and
profound. Searles critique of psychoanalysis is not
just terminological, and therefore cannot be properly dealt with by making terminological adjustments. Searles claim is that what is mental is
essentially and primarily conscious. With this view,
no wonder Searle is disturbed that Freud thinks
that our unconscious mental states exist both as
unconscious and as occurrent intrinsic intentional
states even when unconscious. Their ontology [for
Freud] is that of the mental even when they are
unconscious (p. 168). Searle has Freud (and psychoanalysis) exactly right. The foundational claim
of psychoanalysis is that there are subjective, firstperson, intentional, meaningful, representational
mental states that are unconscious and exert great
influence on the subjective, first-personal, intentional, meaningful, representational conscious mental states that we experience.

Disagreement with Searle

Searle makes two types of ontological statements
about what is mental. First, about mental phenomena in general, he says, Mental phenomena are
caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain
and are themselves features of the brain (p. 1).
Second, about conscious mental phenomena, he
holds (pp. 9394, 155159) that unlike other natural
phenomena (including unconscious phenomena),
conscious mental states are necessarily about something (have intrinsic intentionality and aspectual
shape), and they are necessarily first-personal and
subjective (p. 94). Furthermore, Searle makes it
clear that he considers these properties of conscious
mental phenomena to be ontological, stating that
the ontology of the mental [conscious] is an irreducibly first-person ontology (p. 95).
So where does that leave unconscious states?
Searle regards true ascriptions of unconscious
mental life as corresponding to an objective neurophysiological ontology, but described in terms of its
capacity to cause conscious subjective mental phenomena . . . (p. 168). In other words, mental
unconscious phenomena are mental not because of
the specifics of the neurophysiological processes of
which they, like conscious phenomena, are entirely
composed, but only because and insofar as these
specific neurophysiological processes are capable
of causing particular conscious experiences. Unconscious mental phenomenal are only dispositionally
mental. Says Searle: the ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology
capable of generating the conscious (p. 172). In
making these assertions, Searle has made two im-

143

portant moves. First, he has made consciousness a

definitional requirement for being intrinsically mental. Second, he has made neurophysiological processes objective, not subjective, processes (cf. the
previous quote from p. 168).
Regarding the first move, although it is a bydefinition assertion and thereby difficult to counter
with argument, there is a possible avenue of refutation entailing an argument against Searles second
move. Suppose it could be shown that the mental
does not require consciousness. What requirements
would still be necessary for something to count as a
mental state? For something to qualify as a mental
state, (1) it would need to consist of a neurophysiological process in the brain, and (2) it would need
to be first-personal, subjective, and intrinsically intentional. Clearly, to get this refutation going, I will
have to give some positive evidence that some unconscious states are neurophysiological and subjective, not only objective, as Searle claims. But before
I do this, I must take issue with the grounds of
Searles claim that what is neurophysiological is
only objective. True, our neurophysiological states
cannot be described in first-personal, subjective
terms. As we have no conscious experiences of
these neurophysiological states, they can only be
described objectively. But description is an epistemological not an ontological tool. Thus, the fact that
ones neurophysiological states cannot be described
as and known as subjective first-personal experiences need not rule out that these states are subjective states.
To demonstrate that some unconscious states at
the neurophysiological level can be subjective, let
me start with a matter that Searle introduces as
unproblematic to his view:
The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. . . . But the existence of
these causal features is consistent with the fact that
in any given case their powers may be blocked by
some other interfering causes, such as psychological repression. . . . [p. 160]

Searle means here the same type of psychological

repression with which psychoanalysts are familiar.
This type of psychological repression operates entirely unconsciously. Not only is the repressive operation itself never to become consciousthat is,
how whatever contents are repressed become repressedmore tellingly, the selection process by
which it is decided which specific contents need
to get repressed is likewise unconscious, and so to
remain. Moreover, this selection process is entirely
subjective, and necessarily so. Take Patients A and
B, each with the same sort of neurosis and the same
basic conflict: each will repress totally idiosyncratic, subjective, mental contents.

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144

Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, & Williams

(1996; see also Shevrin, Williams, Marshall, Hertel,
Bond, & Brakel, 1992) have in fact conducted an
empirical study that bears directly on this point.
Eleven social phobics were the participants. For
each participant, a team of psychoanalysts conducted several interview sessions. From transcripts
of these sessions, the analytic team chose a series of
words representing that participants conscious
symptom and another series of words representing
that participants unconscious conflicts. Both of
these word-sets were highly relevant in first-personal, subjective terms, but only to the particular
participant for whom they were chosen. Thus, the
word-sets chosen were different for each participant, despite the fact that all the participants had the
same diagnosis (social phobia) and a number of
them even shared core unconscious conflicts. In the
next stage of the experiment, each participant was
presented with both of his/her personal word-sets in
a tachistoscope, subliminally and supraliminally,
with event-related brain potentials (ERPs) recorded.
The ERPs of the participants as a group showed that
their brains responded with significantly different
patterns to unconscious conflict words and to
conscious symptom words, in the subliminal and
supraliminal conditions. These findings, across participants, showed a statistically significant neurophysiological effect, which the researchers
described objectively. But it was an effect that took
place within each participant unconsciously, on
contents rendered outside consciousnessthat is,
presented subliminallyand on content, from both
conscious and unconscious word-sets, that could
only be meaningful subjectively.
In addition to repression, Searle discusses another sort of familiar psychological mechanism as
though it were unproblematic for his view. Yet this
one too can be used against Searles objective-only
account of unconscious neurophysiological states.
Searle (pp. 172173) recognizes cases of unconscious desires, beliefs, etc. and says, It is best to
think of these as cases of repressed consciousness,
because they are always bubbling to the surface,
though often in disguised form. How can Searle
account for the disguising? As I (Brakel, 1994, p.
791) asked in a review of Searles (1992) book,
Wouldnt some truly mental, intentional, subjective assessment be required, even though unconscious, to recognize that some sort of repression or
disguise or defense is warranted? And what about
those transforming processes, not accessible to consciousness, yet effecting the repression or disguise;
wouldnt these too best be considered mental, intentional, and subjective?
For psychoanalysts, the transformative processes
disguising contents are the primary processes.

Linda A. W. Brakel

Searle, without using the terms primary process or

secondary process, claims that only secondary
processes are mental. For Searle, rule-following
processes are mental and intentional, whereas associations (e.g., those via resemblance and other
associationist/primary-process principles such as
contiguity in time and space, part for whole, etc.) are
not. Drawing a distinction (p. 240) between process
with mental content and process by which mental
phenomena are related, he claims (p. 241) that
associations fall into the later category and need not
have any mental content at all in addition to that of
the relata. . . . For Searle, these associative patterns have only as-if intentionality, inferred and
posited. There are two matters raised here, but both
are beyond the scope of this commentary (for different reasons). First, there is the issue of primary
processes as mental and contentful. I have taken this
matter up at great length elsewhere (see Brakel,
2002) and have shown that they indeed can be fully
representational and contentful. Second, there is the
implication that resemblance (and other associative
principles) for Searle are primitives in the world
processes by which the world relates our mental
phenomena for us, rather than mind-dependent ways
that we use to put things together. This is clearly
such a serious and radical metaphysical claim (one
with which I do not agree) that many papers, not a
few sentences, are needed.

Positive argument for unconscious

representations
Following Dretske (1986, pp. 103107), T & I very
usefully claim that, Three aspects of representations can be distinguished: (1) what they are about
(reference), (2) their nature (what they look like,
what they are made of), and (3) what part they play
in information processing of an organism (efficacy). Regarding the third aspect, T & I hold that
a content does not have to be conscious in order to
affect behavior, and they continue that on thisthe
matter of practical relevanceneither Searle nor
analysts would disagree. I think T & I are correct
here. While some in cognitive science (see, e.g.,
Perruchet & Vinter in a 2002 Behavioral and Brain
Science target article) argue that unconscious contents have no functional role and should therefore be
dispensed with as a concept, Searle (e.g., see the
passages cited above) would seem to accept that
some unconscious states can have a functional role.
In fact, whenever such a state affects conscious
behavior by becoming conscious itself, it has fulfilled one of its rather unique functional rolesits
disposition to become conscious. (Recall that, for
Searle, the unconscious state prior to becoming

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On the Nature of Repressed Contents Commentaries

conscious has contentful/representational standing

only in virtue of this disposition to become conscious.)
Turning now to a representations second aspectits substantial natureit seems clear that
most analysts (following Freud, 1900) are substance
monists. For substance monists (even those who are
also property dualists, holding that the mental and
the physical have different properties), the underlying stuff of mind and body is one and the same
stuffphysical. All of this suggests that Searles
naturalistic materialist account of all mental representations as neurophysiological entities would be
uncontestable to most psychoanalysts.
Only the first aspect of representationswhat
unconscious representations are about, their referenceproves problematic between psychoanalytic
theory and Searles critique thereof. In the previous
section, I provided some empirical evidence supporting a view of unconscious representations as
subjective and quite capable of specific reference.
In what follows, I try to fill out this positive account.
The view I shall give is highly speculative, and,
although it rests heavily on the work of Edelman
(1987, 1988, 1989) and especially of Edelman and
Tononi (2000), I am well aware that my view is at
odds with their own interpretation of their work.
In order to get to my positive account for unconscious representation, I first need to introduce
Edelman and Tononi (2000) [E & T] on the neurophysiological underpinnings of memory, with special attention to their concept of degeneracy. E & T
define memory as the capacity specifically to repeat or suppress a mental or physical act (p. 105)
. . . after some time despite a changing context . . .
(p. 95). They explain further:
[T]he triggering of any set of [neural] circuits that
results in a set of output responses sufficiently
similar to those that were previously adaptive provides the basis for a repeated mental or physical
performance. In this view memory is dynamically
generated for the activity of certain selected subsets
of circuits. These subsets are degeneratea given
memory cannot be identified uniquely with any
single specific set of synaptic changes. Memory in a
degenerate selectional system is recategorical, not
strictly replicative. [p. 98]

They continue with a simple examplethe memory

involved in reaching for a glass of water when
thirsty againthat will make clearer how degeneracy in the brain operates:
[T]he satisfaction of thirst will . . . lead to the
selection of a number of circuits appropriate for
performing that action. By these means structurally
different circuits are each able to produce a similar
output, leading to repetition or variation of the act
of reaching . . . [with] each different member of the

145
degenerate set of circuits used at different time
[having] alternative network connections. [p. 98]

The important conclusion for E & T is that the

property of degeneracy . . . gives rise to the remarkable stability of memorial performance (p. 99). And
I am in total agreement with themexcept that they
characterize this selectionist, recategorizing, memory system (a system based on a diverse and variable
but related group of neurophysiological circuits, i.e.,
a degenerate set) as nonrepresentational! Moreover
what does count for E & T as representational is
what is mental, and what is mental is conscious.
E & T line up with John Searle here.
And I disagree with E & T, no less than I do with
Searle, on this. Specifically, on E & Ts view that
their brain-based memory system cannot be both
selectionist and representational, I stated in a review
of their book for this journal:
I think they are wrong. E & T take too narrow a
view of the representationalas though something
can represent only if it is an encoded version of
some original, with the original to be reestablished
by reading out the code. If one instead held the view
that the entity that represents . . . [needs only to be
an entity consistently and specifically] about something, capable of referring, and having content . . .
the selectionist system of embodied memories . . .
could be considered selectionist and representational too. [Brakel, 2001, p. 247]

In other words, looked at in this way, what is mental

could certainly include neurophysiological selectionist memorial systems like the one E & T
described. The problem of unconscious representations would be resolved, and along with it much of
the mindbody dilemma.
Now, it seems clear to me that my reaching for a
glass of water is both subjective and about something (I am thirsty; I remember that, when thirsty,
reaching for a glass of water is a step toward slaking
thirst; I am doing the reaching now again). Furthermore, it seems clear that my reaching for a glass of
water is about something a little different, but much
the same, every particular time I do it. So why do
E & T and Searle take such a different position? I
think the problem concerns a major philosophical
issuethat of the determinancy of reference. For
philosophers, if a mental (representational) content
does not refer uniquely and fixedly, its singular
univocal meaning cannot be assured. Having therefore equivocal meanings, it cannot refer at all. (See
Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1981; Dretske, 1988;
Fodor & Lepore, 1992; Millikan, 1984, 1991;
Putnam, 1975; Quine, 1969; Stich, 1983.) Determinate fixed reference for representational content,
or no meaning at allthese have been the only
two choices. But E & Tby proposing a memory
system in which the systems degeneracy, its

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neurophysical variability and diversity, is that which

guarantees its stabilitycan actually solve the indeterminacy problem. Although E & T do not make
this claim (perhaps they would strongly oppose it), it
seems to me (Brakel, 2001, p. 247) that they have
shown that reference [representation] can be variable and yet stableand that the very variability
produces the stability both of the memory system in
general and the particular instances of memory performances. If representations can consist of a set of
related but diverse neural circuits, all subjective and
genuinely about something, these ontologically neurophysiological structures are clearly also mental,
and they are as mental when unconscious as when
they are conscious.

Conclusion
T & I want to work through aspects of John
Searles critique of psychoanalytic theory. They
present a terminological compromise between the
psychoanalytic view on unconscious (representational) content and that of John Searle. As the
authors ably demonstrate, reconciliation between
the two views at this rhetorical level can be effected.
But even so, I do not think it should be effected. The
price is too high. Clinically, with T & Is terms
memory preservation and memory manipulation in use, it may not seem vital whether a particular causally efficacious unconscious state is contentful (representational), subjective, and therefore
truly mental while it is unconscious, or if as an
unconscious state it has these mental characteristics
only dispositionally by virtue of its tendency to
become conscious. But this difference is vital, and I
am afraid that what T & Is rhetorical solution does
is mask the fact that Professor Searles critique of
psychoanalytic theory is not rhetorical, but conceptual. One of the central psychoanalytic concepts is
that of unconscious (representational) content
content that is subjective, about something, and
therefore mental even while unconscious. When we
change or amend or even ablate parts of psychoanalytic theory, we should do this consequent to empirical tests demonstrating those parts to be wrong, or
consequent to theoretical analyses showing that with
particular changes the theory is more coherent, corresponds better to facts, and/or is more generalizable. Serious theoretical analyses and empirical
tests of psychoanalytic theory are crucial for the
theory to survive and thrive. But to accommodate
views inimical to core concepts of psychoanalysis,
such as Professor Searles critique of unconscious
contents, merely because practically the clinical
situation seems to allow such an accommodation
threatens to separate the practice of clinical psycho-

Linda A. W. Brakel

analysis from its foundational theory. Such a separation would strike a serious blow both to practice and
to theory, because, to borrow in somewhat altered
form a famous statement of Kants: theory without
practice is empty; practice without theory is blind.

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