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Commentary on On the Nature of Repressed

Contents
a

Joel Weinberger
a

Adelphi University, Garden City, New York, U.S.A.

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Joel Weinberger (2003) Commentary on On the Nature of Repressed Contents,
Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 5:2, 152-153, DOI:
10.1080/15294145.2003.10773420
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152

Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 2003, 5 (2)

Commentary on On the Nature of Repressed Contents

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 22:02 17 August 2014

Joel Weinberger (Garden City, New York)

This is a topic well worth exploring. Searle is one of

the preeminent philosophers wrestling with the
problem of consciousness in the world today. Searle
clearly believes in the power of unconscious processes (see Chapter 7 of The Rediscovery of the
Mind, 1992): The explanatory power of the notion
of the unconscious is so great that we cannot do
without it . . . (p. 151). He believes however that
the Freudian conception of the relation between
consciousness and the unconscious . . . is incoherent (p. 151). As Freud is the preeminent theorist of
the unconscious, this dispute is well worth exploring. If it could be resolved, this would be a major
contribution to the study of the mind. Talvitie and
Ihanuss notion that the conflict is more apparent
than reala consequence of choice of metaphors
is an intriguing one. Their solution involving the
creation of a third set of terms to solve the dilemma
(e.g., unconscious meaning preservation for repressed meanings) is worth exploring.
Before I go further, however, there seems to be
confusion in their article that makes it very difficult
for me to judge its points. The authors seem to
equate repression with unconscious. Thus they assert that: The basic logic behind the term repression is that to be conscious of a content is distinct
from its efficacya content does not have to be
conscious to affect behavior. And again: According to the terminology introduced above, repressed
contents involve representations that have no direct
consequences for the contents of consciousness.
This definition can hold for any unconscious process or content. It does not capture the unique
properties of a repressed content. A cognitive scientist and/or a social psychologist would be perfectly
comfortable with it as a description of what they
would term implicit processes. It could describe an
automatic process, perceptual fluency, implicit
memory, or a multitude of other processes studied
by cognitive theorists and researchers. For a content
to be repressed, it must arouse anxiety that then
motivates the person to keep it from reaching consciousness. It then must continually strive for expression. This then leads to all of the vicissitudes of
the unconscious that are so unique to psychoanalytic
theory. Searle has no problem with repression defined in this way. And no doubt there are many
Joel Weinberger: Adelphi University, Garden City, New York,
U.S.A.

[mental states] that could not be brought to consciousness for one reason or anotherthey may be
too painful and hence too deeply repressed for us to
think about them, for example (p. 154). So what are
the authors interested in reconciling? It is certainly
not the conception of repression. Furthermore, what
is repression? These conceptual and terminological
confusions need to be cleared up before I can feel
comfortable in offering a sensible critique of their
article.
By the way, I think that what Searle calls the
connection principlethat is, that anything unconscious could be or could have been in consciousnessis wrong. It may be a flaw in this otherwise
absolutely brilliant work. Things like implicit
memory and learning that go on in animals with
limited if any consciousness and in brain-damaged
individuals are not simply of the same aspectual
shape as consciousness, nor do I believe that they
are neurophysiological events that can give rise to
consciousness. Similarly, primary process, one of
the hallmarks of unconscious mental states in the
Freudian view, follows different rules from secondary process, and the two kinds of mental processes
are organized differently. They do not have the
same aspectual shape, and one is not a latent neurophysiological precondition of the other. But that is
my view and not that of Searle.
Having made my main point (i.e., that there is
conceptual and terminological confusion in the
article as it is currently constituted), I shall address
some more minor points. The authors refer to
Holender as a scientist who does not believe that a
representation must directly affect consciousness in
order to affect behavior. In fact, Holender did not
believe in unconscious processes, and the paper
cited appeared in Behavioral and Brain Sciences as
a target article that disputed the causal efficacy of
unconscious and even the existence of unconscious
processes. Since then, no one says this. This was
perhaps the last gasp of this position. Later, the
authors refer to Searle as one of various researchers supporting Searles biological naturalism. I do
not think it a good idea to cite someone as supporting himself. Dennett is also cited as supportive. If
so, this is a rare instance of agreement between the
twothey are notoriously disputatious with one
another.
In summary, there are some interesting ideas
here, but terminological confusion and a need

On the Nature of Repressed Contents Commentaries

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for more care in laying out the ideas and scholarship makes this a difficult article to evaluate.
Nonetheless, I think this is an area worth pursuing.

153
REFERENCE

Searle, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press.