Midterm Civil Procedure Cases

WMSU LLB2A 2015
Civil Procedure
Atty. Floriza Sales
MIDTERM CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Russell vs Vestil; GR. No. 119347 .................................................................................................................. 2
Heirs of Ceferina Ungria vs CA; GR No. 165777 ............................................................................................ 9
Heirs of Juanita Padilla vs Magdua; GR No. 176858 ................................................................................... 23
Sps. De Leon vs CA; GR No. 104796 ............................................................................................................ 32
Copioso vs Copioso, et. al.; GR No. 149243 ................................................................................................ 38
Heirs of Valeriano Concha vs Sps. Lumocso; GR No. 158121 ..................................................................... 42
Fortune Motors Inc. vs CA; GR No. 76431 .................................................................................................. 55
Relucio vs Lopez; GR No. 138497 ................................................................................................................ 60
Phil. Crop Insurance Corp. vs CA; GR No. 169558 ....................................................................................... 67
Municipality of Kapalong vs Moya; GR No. L-41322 ................................................................................... 75
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RUSSELL VS VESTIL; GR. NO. 119347

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999

EULALIA RUSSELL, PUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO
TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA,
AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTlL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA
MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order dated January 12, 1995 issued by
respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56,
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on ground of lack of jurisdiction, as well as his
Order dated February 13, 1995 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents,
denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The complaint, in substance,
alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu
and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land was previously
owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses,
the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents.
Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document
denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private
respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are
also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho.
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Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents
were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made
between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an
order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. 1
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 2 the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691, 4 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Curt of
Liloan, Compostela. 5
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 6 saying that the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
within the contemplation of Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended. 7
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. 8 A
Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging
that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one for recovery of title to or
possession of the land but an action to annul a document or declare it null and void, 9 hence,
one incapable of pecuniary estimation falling within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for
reconsideration. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the
annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition and since
the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are reproduced
hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
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3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long time ago;
4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of
land, which is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land containing 56,97740 square meters, more or less,
located at Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu.
designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification issued by the
Office of the Land Management copy of which are hereto attached as Annexes
"A" and "A-1" and are made part hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;
5. That the passed to the children of the spouses (who are all deceased except
for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely: Zacarias, Epifania, Vicenta, Felecisimo,
Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and which in turn passed to the plaintiffs and
defendants upon their death they being their descendants and legal heirs;
6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by and among the
legal heirs of said previous owners;
7. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public document, which is a
declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement of
partition, affecting the land executed by and among the defendants whereby
defendants divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs
who are entitled thereto; attached hereto as Annex "B" and is made part hereof
is xerox copy of said document;
8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a complete
nullity because the defendants are not the only heirs of Casimero Tautho;
plaintiffs are also heirs and descendants of said deceased; moreover, there has
been no oral partition of the property;
9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had procured tax
declarations of the land for their supposed "shares" to the great damage and
prejudice of plaintiffs;
10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven (7) equal parts
since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had seven children;
11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at the barangay
level; attached hereto as Annex "C" is Certification to file Action;
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12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act of defendants, plaintiffs
were forced to bring instant action and contract the services of the undersigned
counsel with whom they bind themselves to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to declare
null and void the document (Annex "B") of declaration of heirs and confirmation
and to order the partition of the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall
respectively go to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho and considering six
(6) of them died already the same shall go to their children or descendants, and
to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of
P30,000.00.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable
under the premises. 11
We agree with petitioners.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; 14 also actions questioning the
validity of a mortgage, 15 annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price
paid 16 and for rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance. 17
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). 18 However, the subject matter of
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the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF

HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document
in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses
Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the
complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action,
which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dismissing Civil
Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order,
is SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in
resolving Civil Case No. MAN-2275. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 13-17.
2 Id., at 21.
3 Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or in civil action
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
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the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
4 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuits Trial Courts Amending for the purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
5 Id., at 21.
6 Id., at 22-23.
7 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
8 Id., at 24.
9 Id., at 26-28.
10 Id., at 29.
11 Id., at 14-16.
12 88 SCRA 623 (1979).
13 See also: Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457 (1992).
14 Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457 (1992).
15 Bunayog v. Tunos, 106 Phil. 715.
16 Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. v. Llanos, 14 SCRA 949; Arroz v. Alojada, 19 SCRA
711.
17 Lapitan v. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479.
18 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
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(2) In all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx

19 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 239; Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640.
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HEIRS OF CEFERINA UNGRIA VS CA; GR NO. 165777

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165777
July 25, 2011
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her HEIRS, represented by LOLITA UNGRIA

SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA as their Attorney-in-fact, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL
SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS,
FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, and ROSALIE
CASTOR BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated May 26, 2004 and the
Resolution2 dated September 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60764.
On August 26, 1999, respondents Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor (Rosario), Nepthalie Castor
Itucas, Ferolyn Castor Facurib (Ferolyn), Rachel De Castor, Lea Castor Dollolosa and Rosalie
Castor Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a
Complaint3 for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to
declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with
damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria, defendants
Avelino Gumban, Dolores Cagaitan, Zacasio Poutan, PO1 Jonas Montales, Ignacio Olarte and
alias Dory. Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the rest
of the respondents are their legitimate children. The documents they sought to annul are (1)
the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3,
1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2)
the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of
petitioner.
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to Dismiss4 (Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam) on the following
grounds: (1) the claim or demand has been extinguished by virtue of the valid sale of Lot No.
1615 to Eugenio; (2) the action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription; (3) the action
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is barred by laches; and (4) plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, or filed the case
prematurely for failure to resort to prior barangay conciliation proceedings.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss5 raising the following additional
grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over
the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Respondents filed their Opposition
thereto.
On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 denying the motion to dismiss, to wit:
After the motion to dismiss and its addendum have been received, it is now ripe for resolution.
One of the grounds alleged in the complaint is for the recovery of conjugal share on Lot No.
1615, of Pls-209 D with damages.
It is alleged that the late Fernando Castor and Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor were married on
September 15, 1952, and the application to the land was dated January 17, 1952 and the patent
was issued by the President on November 19, 1954.
The said land was sold to the defendant on October 3, 1960 (Annex C) and an Affidavit of
Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 which was made a part thereof as Annex "D."
Considering the marriage of September 15, 1992, the said land became conjugal as of the date
of the marriage and, therefore, thereof belongs to the wife, Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor.
Thus, considering the above, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.7
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,8 which the RTC denied in an
Order9 dated February 4, 2000.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion10 asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1) whether or not
the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme Court
(SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4,
2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint.
Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow11 them to continue
prosecuting this case as indigent litigants.
On March 8, 2000, the RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion in an Order12 that read in this wise:
On the omnibus motion regarding filing fees, the plaintiffs asserted in its motion that they are
charging defendant actual and compensatory damages such as are proved during the hearing of
this case. So also are attorneys fees and moral damages, all to be proved during the hearing of
this case.
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Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic) to determine how much is to
be charged.
At any rate, if after hearing the Clerk of Court determine that the filing fees is still insufficient,
considering the total amount of the claim, the Clerk of Court should determine and, thereafter,
if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same x x x.
As to the second issue, the same has already been decided in its order dated February 4, 2000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the omnibus motion is DENIED.
The defendant shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order. 13
From this Order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification on whether
plaintiffs should be allowed to continue prosecuting the case as indigent litigants.
On March 30, 2000, the RTC issued a Clarificatory Order14 reading as follows:
As has been said, the plaintiff asserted in its motion that they are charging defendants actual
and compensatory damages as has been proved during the hearing of this case. So also are
attorney's fees and moral damages all to be proved during the hearing of this case.
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic) to determine how much is to
be charged.
At any rate, after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still insufficient,
the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered.
As to the motion seeking from the Honorable Court allowance to allow plaintiff to continue
prosecuting this case as indigent litigants, suffice it to say that the same is already provided for
in this order.
WHEREFORE, the defendants shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Order.15
In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the
nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the
RTC thereto for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.
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In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that SC Circular
No. 7 would not apply where the amount of damages or value of the property was immaterial;
that the Circular could be applied only in cases where the amount claimed or the value of the
personal property was determinative of the court's jurisdiction citing the case of Tacay v. RTC of
Tagum, Davao del Norte.16 The CA found that respondents had paid the corresponding docket
fees upon the filing of the complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case
despite the failure to state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the complaint or in
the prayer thereof. The CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. It noted that the
RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March 30, 2000, which stated that "if after hearing the Clerk of
Court determines that the filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on
the judgment that may be entered" was in accordance with the rule laid down in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion.17 The CA proceeded to state that a judicious examination of the
complaint pointed to a determination of the respective rights and interests of the parties over
the property based on the issues presented therein which could only be determined in a fullblown trial on the merits of the case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription
and laches were likewise unavailing. It found that the subject property is covered by a Torrens
title (OCT No. V-19556); thus, it is axiomatic that adverse, notorious and continuous possession
under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title; that
unless there are intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a
decision directing the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of laches will not
apply as against the registered owner.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following assignment of
errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IS BARRED BY LACHES AND EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION.18
We find the petition without merit.
Preliminarily, although not raised as an issue in this petition, we find it necessary to discuss the
issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in
1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was
already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
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Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending
for the purpose BP Blg. 129.19 Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the
RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx
Section 3 of RA No. 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts,
thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law (BP Blg. 129) is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, we would first determine whether the
RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the above-quoted provisions.
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The Complaint filed by respondents in the RTC was for ownership, possession and damages,
and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities and/or for
recovery of conjugal share on the subject land with damages or redemption of the subject land.
In their Complaint, respondents claimed that Rosario and Fernando are the registered owners
of the subject land with an assessed value of P12,780.00; that the couple left the cultivation
and enjoyment of the usufruct of the subject land to Fernando's mother and her second family
to augment their means of livelihood; that respondent Rosario and Fernando thought that
when the latter's mother died in 1980, the subject land was in the enjoyment of the second
family of his mother, but later learned that the subject land was leased by petitioner Ceferina;
that sometime in August 1999, respondents learned of the existence of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960, where Fernando
had allegedly transferred his rights and interests on the subject land in favor of Eugenio,
petitioner Ceferina's father, as well as an Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960
executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner Ceferina; that Fernando's signature in the Deed of
Transfer was not his but a forgery; and the Affidavit of Relinquishment was also void as it was a
direct result of a simulated Deed of Transfer.
Respondents prayed that they be declared as absolute and lawful owners of the subject land
and to order petitioner and the other defendants to vacate the premises and restore
respondents to its possession and enjoyment therefore. On their second cause of action, they
prayed that the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest Including Improvements Thereon be
declared as a forgery, purely simulated and without any consideration; hence, inexistent, void
ab initio and/or a patent nullity, as well as the Affidavit of Relinquishment which was the direct
result of the Deed of Transfer. Respondents also prayed in the alternative that if the Deed be
finally upheld as valid, to order petitioner to reconvey to respondent Rosario the undivided
one-half portion of the subject land as conjugal owner thereof and to account and reimburse
her of its usufruct; and/or to allow them to redeem the subject land.
It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession and
interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the
assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus,
since it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under
the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as
amended.
Notably, however, respondents in the same Complaint filed alternative causes of action
assailing the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest executed by Fernando in
favor of petitioner's father. Respondents also sought for the reconveyance to respondent
Rosario of the undivided one-half portion of the subject land as conjugal owner thereof in case
the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest will be upheld as valid; and/or for redemption of the
subject land. Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than
the issue of possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention, but includes an
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action to annul contracts and reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
thus, properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.20
In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,21 we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).22
Thus, respondents correctly filed their Complaint with the RTC.
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be
accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.23 It is not simply the filing
of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.24
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a thirdparty, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in
the same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in
litigation, is:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated ........ P400.00
2. x x x
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees.25
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Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not
be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their
memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in
the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid
to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus,
upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the
case is terminated. 26
Notably, petitioners claim that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction in this case is premised on
her contention that respondents violated SC Circular No. 7 issued on March 24, 1998 requiring
that all complaints must specify the amount of damages sought not only in the body of the
pleadings but also in the prayer to be accepted and admitted for filing. Petitioner argues that
respondents alleged in paragraph 13 of their Complaint that:
(T)he reasonable rental for the use of the [subject] land is P2,000.00 per hectare, every crop
time, once every four months, or P6,000.00 a year per hectare; that defendants in proportion
and length of time of their respective occupancy is and/or are jointly and severally liable to
plaintiffs of the produce thereby in the following proportions, viz: (a) for defendant Ceferina de
Ungria for a period of time claimed by her as such; (b) for defendants Dolores Cagautan, a
certain alias "Dory," and PO1 Jonas Montales, of an undetermined area, the latter having
entered the area sometime in 1998 and defendant alias "Dory," only just few months ago; that
defendant Ignacio Olarte and Zacasio Puutan of occupying about one-half hectare each.27
and in their prayer asked:
x x x Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, in proportion to the length and area of their
respective occupancy, to pay reasonable rentals to the plaintiffs in the proportion and amount
assessed in paragraph 13 of the First Cause of Action.
xxxx
(a) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs actual and
compensatory damages such as are proved during the hearing of this case;
(b) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs attorneys' fees and
moral damages, all to be proved during the hearing of this case.28
Thus, the RTC should have dismissed the case, since respondents did not specify the amount of
damages in their prayer.
We are not persuaded.
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SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,29where we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the
amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee.
However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,30 we laid down the following guidelines in
the payment of docket fees, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Subsequently, in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,31 we said:
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of damages "in amounts
justified by the evidence" does not call for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC
Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which required that all complaints must specify the
amount of damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order
to be accepted and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by
providing that filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on
the awards finally granted by the trial court.
x x x judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven
during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his dulyauthorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees. 32
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A reading of the allegations in the complaint would show that the amount of the rental due can
only be determined after a final judgment, since there is a need to show supporting evidence
when the petitioner and the other defendants started to possess the subject land. Thus, we find
no reversible error committed by the CA when it ruled that there was no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in issuing its Order dated March 30, 2000, where the RTC
stated that "since there was no hearing yet, respondents are not in a position to determine how
much is to be charged and that after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is
still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered."
Petitioner claims that the action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription and laches.
Petitioner contends that she took possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
exclusive, notorious and continuous since 1952 through her predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio,
and by herself up to the present; that the late Fernando and private respondents had never
taken possession of the land at any single moment; and that, granting without admitting that
the transfer of rights between Fernando and Eugenio was null and void for any reason
whatsoever, petitioner's possession of the land had already ripened into ownership after the
lapse of 30 years from August 1952 by virtue of the extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
We are not persuaded.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of
the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.33 Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against
his hereditary successors.34 In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled
property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.
Petitioner claims that respondent had impliedly admitted the fact of sale by Fernando to
Eugenio in August 1952, but only according to respondents, the sale was null and void because
it violated the provisions of the Public Land Act. Petitioner argues that the application of
Fernando, dated January 17, 1952, was not the homestead application referred to in Sections
118 and 124 of the Public Land Act; and that Fernando's application was only as settler, or for
the allocation of the subject land to him vice the original settler Cadiente.
Such argument does not persuade.
The trial in this case has not yet started as in fact no answer has yet been filed. We find that
these issues are factual which must be resolved at the trial of this case on the merits wherein
both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
Anent petitioner's defense of laches, the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot
be a valid ground to dismiss respondents' complaint.35 Notably, the allegations of respondents
in their petition filed before the RTC which alleged among others:
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7. That sometime between the years 1965 to 1970, defendant Ceferina de Ungria,
accompanied by Miss Angela Jagna-an, appeared in the residence of plaintiff Rosario
Dideles Vda. de Castor in Bo.1, Banga, South Cotabato, and requested her to sign a
folded document with her name only appearing thereon, telling her that it has
something to do with the land above-described, of which she refused telling her that
she better return it to the person who requested her to do so (referring to her motherin-law), more so that her husband was out at that time;
8. That when the matter was brought home to Fernando Castor, the latter just
commented that [his] mother desires the land above-described to be sold to defendant
Ceferina de Ungria which however he was opposed to do so even as they occasionally
come into heated arguments everytime this insistence on the same subject propped up;
9. That even after the death of the mother of the late Fernando Castor in Bo. Bula, City
of General Santos, sometime in 1980, the latter and his surviving wife thought all the
while that the land above-described was in the enjoyment of his late mother's family
with his 2nd husband; that it was only after sometime when plaintiff Rosario Dideles
Vda. de Castor heard that the land above-described had even been leased by defendant
Ceferina de Ungria with the Stanfilco and Checkered farm;
10. That sometime in 1997, defendant Ceferina de Ungria sent overtures to plaintiffs
through Ester Orejana, who is the half sister-in-law of plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de
Castor that she desires to settle with them relating to the land above-described; that
the overtures developed into defendant Ceferina de Ungria meeting for the purpose
plaintiff Ferolyn Castor Facurib where the negotiation continued with Lolita Javier as
attorney-in-fact after defendant Ceferina de Ungria left to reside in Manila and which
resulted later to the attorney-in-fact offering the plaintiffs P100,000.00 to quitclaim on
their rights over the said land, which offer, however, was refused by plaintiffs as so
[insignificant] as compared to the actual value of the same land; that in that negotiation,
defendant Ceferina de Ungria was challenged to show any pertinent document to
support her claim on the land in question and where she meekly answered by saying at
the time that she does not have any of such document;
x x x x36
would not conclusively establish laches.1avvphil Thus, it is necessary for petitioners to proceed
to trial and present controverting evidence to prove the elements of laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
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WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1042 dated July 6, 2011.
Penned by Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco

Flores and Edgardo A. Camello, concurring; rollo, pp. 126-132.
2
Id. at 175-179.
Id. at 34-46. Docketed as Civil Case No. 6636 and raffled off to Branch 35.
Id. at 55-66.
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5
Id. at 87-90.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 94-104.
Id. at 105-106
10
Id. at 107-115.
11
Id. at 117-121.
12
Id. at 122.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 123.
15
Id.
16
G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 433.
17
252 Phil. 280 (1989).
18
Rollo, pp. 18-19.
19
Took effect April 15, 1994.
20
Copioso v. Copioso, 439 Phil. 936, 942 (2002).
21
177 Phil. 575 (1979).
22
Id. at 588-589.
23
Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, supra note 16; Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, supra note 17, at 291. See also Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562, 568-569.
24
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224
SCRA 477, 478.
25
Underscoring supplied.
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26
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April

18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 350.
27
Rollo, p. 39.
28
Id. at 43-44.
29
Supra note 23.
30
Supra note 17, at 291-292.
31
495 Phil. 422 (2005).
32
Id. at 437.
33
D.B.T.-Mar Bay Construction, Inc. v. Panes, G.R. No. 167232, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA
578; Abadiano v. Martir, G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 676, 693; Ragudo v.
Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil. 751, 764 (2005); Alcantara-Daus v. Sps.
De Leon, 452 Phil. 92, 102 (2003); Velez, Sr. v. Rev. Demetrio, 436 Phil. 1, 9 (2002);
Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 791, 801 (2001); Bishop v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641; and Barcelona, et. al. v. Barcelona and
Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 251, 256-257 (1956).
34
Id.
35
Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009, 576 SCRA 70, 87.
36
Rollo, pp. 37-38.
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HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA VS MAGDUA; GR NO. 176858

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176858
September 15, 2010
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA, Petitioners,

vs.
DOMINADOR MAGDUA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Orders dated 8 September
20062 and 13 February 20073 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in
Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
The Facts
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San Roque,
Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita,
sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia
(Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998
written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had
declared the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that
Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property 4 (Affidavit) in
favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The records do not
show that the land was registered under the Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for
recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void
the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of
Ricardo.
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Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his
name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to
1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo and his wife
Zosima separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third
parties.
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable
because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be
leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited from her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed
value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte.
In an Order dated 20 February 2006,5 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than the
amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not
merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for
annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary
estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took
cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the
Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his
inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his
own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since
prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem
logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardos
daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is reconsidered in so far as the
pronouncement of the Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. The
dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack of jurisdiction but by
reason of prescription.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order dated 13
February 2007 since petitioners raised no new issue.
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Hence, this petition.

The Issue
The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners insist that the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not conform with the requirement of
sufficient repudiation of co-ownership by Ricardo against his co-heirs in accordance with Article
494 of the Civil Code. Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part of public records only
because it was kept by the Provincial Assessors office for real property tax declaration
purposes. However, such cannot be contemplated by law as a record or registration affecting
real properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not an act of appropriation sufficient to be
deemed as constructive notice to an adverse claim of ownership absent a clear showing that
petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the Affidavit issued by their mother
in Ricardos favor.
Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that Juanita, during her lifetime, never
renounced her signature on the Affidavit or interposed objections to Ricardos possession of
the land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an owner. Dominador contends that
the alleged written instrument dated 15 May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died
was only made known lately and conveys the possibility of being fabricated. Dominador adds
that the alleged highly questionable signature of Juanita on the Affidavit was only made an
issue after 35 years from the date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in 2001. As a
buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the defense of acquisitive prescription against
petitioners.
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.8
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription
based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the
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property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a review of the
case is necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court which states:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
case. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed on 31
May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than
30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor of Dominador
without assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in
order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners evidence. The facts show that the
land was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia BahiaAbas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as
evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters had any authority from Ricardo to
dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to,
acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006
Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality to sell the
property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had
no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no moment in this case. It should
be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his] daughters and not the herein plaintiffs.
After all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or ratified the alleged deed of sale. 9
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that Ricardos
possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in
order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.10 Dominador merely assumed that
Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to the
RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of
ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he
separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not
mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether
Ricardos family ever lived there.
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Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for taxation
purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed.
Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of
the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners
cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which
states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owners possession
may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites
must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing.11
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanitas death in 1989,
petitioners sought for the partition of their mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were
notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his
co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos interest in the
land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of
entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera,12 we held that in order that title may
prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the
claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the
date petitioners received notice of Ricardos repudiation of their claims to the land. Since
petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages
with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period
falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to
be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive
prescription.
Further, Dominadors argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the
Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the
RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not
submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession since 1966.
In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that the evidence relative to the
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possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any other
competent evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over
the land. Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the land at his own risk,
being aware as buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador
is not afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to his claim.
With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC did not err in taking
cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),14 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which
involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where the
assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
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where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00
according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the
value alone, being way belowP20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. However,
petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession,
partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of contracts are
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 151avvphi1
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,16 we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover ownership and
possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit
executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land
to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2)
the validity of the deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since
the principal action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is
the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.17
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss
the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominadors rightful claim of
ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who
among the parties are legally entitled to the land.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Orders dated 8
September 2006 and 13 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 34 in
Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
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SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 883 dated 1 September 2010.
**
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886 dated 1 September 2010.
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

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2
Id. at 19-20.
Rollo, pp. 17-18. Penned by Presiding Judge Frisco T. Lilagan.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 42.
See Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000, id. at 28-29.
Id. at 20.
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation, G.R. No.
161539, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 194.
9
Rollo, p. 20.
10
See Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
11
Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 36 (1995).
12
G.R. No. 166521, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 620, citing Pangan v. Court of Appeals,
248 Phil. 601 (1988); Jardin v. Hallasgo, 202 Phil. 858 (1982); Cortes v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480
(1916).
13
342 Phil. 567 (1997).
14
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Approved on
25 March 1994.
15
Spouses de Leon v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 535 (1998).
16
177 Phil. 575 (1979), reiterated in Russell v. Vestil, 364 Phil. 392 (1999) and Social
Security System v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 175952, 30
April 2008, 553 SCRA 677.
17
Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 62 (2002).
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SPS. DE LEON VS CA; GR NO. 104796

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104796 March 6, 1998

SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO
ELAYDA,respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an
action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, subject
matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be considered as
one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat
rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, 7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court. The trial court held the
fees should be based on the value of the property, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the flat rate should be charged. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The facts are as follows:
On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land against
petitioners, praying for the following reliefs:
1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale
(Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private
respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of
the terms and conditions of the said contract.
2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; and
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3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney's

fees in the amount of P100,000.00.
Other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable in the premises are also prayed
for. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private respondents to pay docket
and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00, broken down as follows:
P450.00 Docket fee for the Judicial Development Fund under
Official Receipt No. 1877773
150.00 Docket fee for the General Fund under Official Receipt
No. 6834215
10.00 for the Legal Research Fund under Official Receipt No.
6834450. 2
On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents'
nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to
the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for attorney's fees, private
respondents should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the alleged
value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale sought to be
annulled. 3
On September 30, 1991, private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing
that outright dismissal of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the alleged
nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees, considering that the amount paid by them
was that assessed by the clerk of court. 4 On October 9, 1991, petitioners filed a reply to which
private respondents filed, on October 17, 1991, a rejoinder.
On October 21, 1991, the trial court 5 denied petitioners' motion to dismiss but required
private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the
parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the trial
court. They therefore, brought the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1992,
rendered a decision 6annulling the orders of the trial court. The appellate court held that an
action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter
of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but
their motion was denied in a resolution dated March 25, 1992 of the appellate court. Hence,
the petition for review on certiorari.
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Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. (a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of
court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for
all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the
stated value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P120.00
2. More than P20,000.00 but less than P40,000.00 150.00
3. P40,000.00 or more but less than P60,000.00 200.00
7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 5.00
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated P400.00
2. Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure of
mortgage which shall be governed by paragraph (a)
above 400.00
3. All other actions not involving property 400.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees. (emphasis added)
Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real
property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by private
respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of the
action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of
7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the Resolution of the Court dated September 12, 1990. Since
private respondents alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been
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sold for P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated value of
the land for the purpose of determining the docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees
should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, 7(b)(1). In support of their argument, they
cite the cases of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. 7 and Bautista v. Lim. 8 In Lapitan this Court, in an
opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that
the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into
other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of
first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic
laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine
Commission of June 11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816,
February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29,
1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an
action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a "rescission" being
counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would
certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the
other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first
conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in
the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and
law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court,
arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967
(legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity
of the money deposit made); De Ursua v.Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a
judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of mortgage); Baito
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v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to support
created by the relation, etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159,
September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of documents upon which claims are
predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action
for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to
see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for
concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer which must
be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have
suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded
from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging
multiplicity of suits.
Conformably with this discussion of actions "where the value of the case cannot be estimated,"
the Court inBautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be
estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as
then fixed in the former Rule 141, 141, 5(10). Said this Court:
We hold that Judge Dalisay did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 as basically
one for rescission or annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation (1 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 55; Lapitan vs.
Scandia, Inc., L-24668, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 781-483).
Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by plaintiff, now
respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal research fund fee, if
she has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the
U.P. Law Center).
Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action
as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly applied
these cases to the present one. As it said:
We would like to add the observations that since the action of petitioners [private
respondents] against private respondents [petitioners] is solely for annulment or
rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be
confused and equated with the "value of the property" subject of the transaction; that
by the very nature of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint, sans
any prayer for recovery of money and/or value of the transaction, or for actual or
compensatory damages, the assessment and collection of the legal fees should not be
intertwined with the merits of the case and/or what may be its end result; and that to
sustain private respondents' [petitioners'] position on what the respondent court may
decide after all, then the assessment should be deferred and finally assessed only after
the court had finally decided the case, which cannot be done because the rules require
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that filing fees should be based on what is alleged and prayed for in the face of the
complaint and paid upon the filing of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex C, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
2 Rollo, p. 27.
3 Petition, Annex D, Rollo, p. 47.
4 Petition, Annex E, Rollo, p. 51-52.
5 Per Judge Teodoro P. Regino.
6 Per Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Justices Serafin E. Camilon
and Celso L. Magsino.
7 24 SCRA 479 (1968).
8 88 SCRA 479 (1979).
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COPIOSO VS COPIOSO, ET. AL.; GR NO. 149243

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149243
October 28, 2002
LOLITA B. COPIOSO, petitioner,

vs.
LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62090
which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.
On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso,
filed a complaint2 for reconveyance of two (2) parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate
of deceased Antonio Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario
Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso were coowners of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents, and that through
fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses
Bernabe and Imelda Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. They thus prayed
for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being co-owners thereof.
When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill of particulars that the
assessed value of the subject property was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses
Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over
the case considering that the assessed value of the property was lower than P20,000.00.
The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss
holding that since the subject matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was
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properly within its jurisdiction.3 Lolita Copioso's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied,4 hence, she filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari and prohibition
praying for the annulment of the twin orders of the trial court which denied the motions to
dismiss and at the same time maintaining her position that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case because the assessed value of the property was below P20,000.00.
The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
complaint for reconveyance. Motion for reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the
appellate court, hence this petition.
Petitioner Lolita Copioso anchors her argument on Sec. 33, par. (3), of B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise
known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 7691 which
provides Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court
delves upon the issues of "title, possession and interests" of each of the stakeholders over the
subject parcels of land. She asserts that the allegations and relief prayed for in the complaint
coupled with the assessed value of the disputed property place the action within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.
In turn, private respondents anchor their position on Sec. 19, par. (1), of the same law which
provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation: x x x
Simply, they claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of
action which include the annulment of sale and other instruments of false conveyance
incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC.
The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec.
33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil
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cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec.
19, par. (1), applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides
that in civil cases involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real
property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed
value of the real property involved, such that where the sum of money or the assessed value of
the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies
with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the
contending parties over the contested property the assessed value of which falls within the
jurisdictional range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set
forth, and the reliefs prayed for, forestall its cognizance by the MTC.
As can be readily gleaned from the records, the complaint was for "Reconveyance and/or
Recovery of Common Properties Illegally Disposed, with Annulment of Sales and other
Instruments of False Conveyance, with Damages, and Restraining Order." Private respondents
alleged therein that they were co-owners of the property along with their deceased brother
Antonio Copioso; and that in or about 1998, with fraud and machination, Antonio together with
the spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria made it appear in a public document entitled
Pagpapatunay ng Kusang Loob na Pagbabahagi that they were the co-owners of the subject
property and had divided the same equally between themselves to the exclusion of private
respondents. Subsequently, they sold the subdivided lots to the other defendants namely
Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Private respondents also sought payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation
expenses, attorney's fees plus appearance fees amounting to more or less P286,500.00. They
likewise applied for a TRO pending the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the defendants from further alienating the common properties. They also prayed of the trial
court to order the cancellation, annulment and/or rescission of the four (4) deeds of absolute
sale made in favor of the buyers, and to order Lolita B. Copioso and the estate of Antonio
Copioso to return the price that the buyer-defendants had paid to them for the land sold.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of
title to, possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention but includes an
action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages,
which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession
or bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the
instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property,
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falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title,
ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of annulment of sale and
reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the
parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when
necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 May 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 62090 as well as its 30 July 2001 Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Callejo, Sr., J., no part in deliberation.
Footnotes
Decision penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Elvi
John S. Asuncion and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring.
2
Rollo, pp. 21-26.
Id., pp. 48-50.
Id., pp. 51-53.
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HEIRS OF VALERIANO CONCHA VS SPS. LUMOCS O; GR NO. 158121

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158121
December 12, 2007
HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P.

CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL
GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and
GLORIA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE
DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2 respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision3 and resolution4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions5 and order6 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434
which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
respondents.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners
of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No.
5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No.
141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case
No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case
No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.7 and his children, petitioners Valeriano
Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha,
filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses
Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of
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"Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City,
Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners prayed
that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued
to defendants as null and void ab initio;
2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property of the plaintiffs under
Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA
1942;
3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties (sic) in question Lot No.
6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of
the decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable
Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by
the defendant[s] themselves;
4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21 forest trees illegally
cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings;
5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area of the plaintiffs at
Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the
plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed, preserved, and
owned by the plaintiffs;
6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable
Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.8
On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by
petitioners,9 this time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot
No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of
Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of
Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433,
petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527) 4888 equivalent to one
hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs
under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA
No. 1942;
2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested
portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the
finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888,
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located at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this
Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if
executed by the defenda[n]t herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00
for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses;
and to pay the cost of the proceedings.10
In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT
(P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare located as (sic) the western portion of said
lots as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise
know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested
portion of their properties in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the
finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870
and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they
refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest trees illegally
cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.11
The three complaints12 commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents
(spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved"
the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land"
located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which
consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of
Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good
faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and
occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and
Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees
standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons
from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case
Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered
the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22
trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land
or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired
imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
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1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case
No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold
to a timber dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously"
filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned
the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the lots never
informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications;
j) that respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud,
deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against
them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the
complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d)
waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents
contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed
values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of
which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also
contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the
value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered
which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.15 The respondents filed
a Joint Motion for Reconsideration,16 to no avail.17
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining Order Ex Parte18 with the CA, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19 the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court.
It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been
barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on
fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they
involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The
CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.
Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following issues, viz:
FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION)
ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND
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TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY

MATTERS.
SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST
DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION.
THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST
DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON
RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE
PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED
WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES
OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).20
In their memorandum,21 respondents reiterated their arguments in the courts below that: a)
the complaints of the petitioners in the trial court do not state causes of action for
reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of action for reconveyance, the same
have already been barred by prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the complaints are barred by
waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and estoppel; and e) there is no
special reason warranting a review by this Court.
Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA
skirted the question, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental
Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22
In their Supplemental Memorandum,23 petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints,
as denominated therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or
annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the
issue of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the
reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction
under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions
in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited:
a) Raymundo v. CA24 which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation; b)Swan v. CA25 where it was held that an action for annulment
of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c)Santos v. CA26 where it was similarly held that an
action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and
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d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA27 where it was held that "[w]here the
action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located."
Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject
properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have
included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown
trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by
their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount
prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that
the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong.28 It is conferred by law and an objection
based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.29 To determine whether a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the
cause of action and of the relief sought.30
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.31 An
action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the
transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons'
names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right. 32 There is
no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a
legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner 33 and that the property has
not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 34
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The
following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to
constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have
painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare
homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern
portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired
this property by occupation or possession;35
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the
forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants
Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No.
5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by
force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut,
collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two
(22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various
sizes;36
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(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it
was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto
under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as
amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they]
surreptitiously filed38 [their respective patent applications and were issued their
respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged
to the petitioners];39
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles
were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation; 40 and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.41
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are
intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners'
alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title. 42
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the
applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and
their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case
No. Lot No.
Assessed Value
5188
6195
P1,030.00
5433
6196-A
4,500.00
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5434
6196-B
4,340.00
7529-A
1,880.00.43
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of
title45 to or to quiet title46 over real property are actions that fall under the classification of
cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A.
296,47 as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original
jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs],
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296,
as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether
a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section
19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between
the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148 in 1994
which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest thereinwhere the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over
cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts,
with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was
introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier
administration of justice."49
The cases of Raymundo v. CA50 and Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v.
CA,51 relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a
complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone
of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering
petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees
of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining
whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of
whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of
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the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees
was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the
court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any
comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not
jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period
which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue
of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be
instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly
laid."
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA52 and Santos v. CA53 cited by the petitioners, contradict their
own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The
complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the
Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for
cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of
real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had
jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title,
reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any
interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the
respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It
is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be
included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining
which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be
computed.54 In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties
as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant
cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of
Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, JJ., concur.
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Footnotes
1
Also referred to as "Lomocso" or "Lumucso" in the records.
The Court of Appeals was removed as public respondent pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court and our ruling in Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc., G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499, 504.
3
Promulgated on November 29, 2002; Rollo, pp. 7-14.
Promulgated on April 10, 2003; id. at 16.
Annexes "M," "N" and "O" of the Petition; id. at 281-295.
Annex "R" of the Petition; id. at 305-306.
Died on May 12, 1999.
Rollo, pp. 98-99.
Id. at 119-125, 143-149.
10
Id. at 124.
11
Id. at 148-149.
12
Id. at 93-106 (Civil Case No. 5188), 119-132 (Civil Case No. 5433), 143-158 (Civil Case
No. 5434).
13
Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses for the Dismissal of the
Complaint and the Instant Case (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 169-189; Motion to Dismiss
(Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 191-210; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 212231.
14
Opposition to Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at
233-248; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 249-264;
Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 265-280.
15
In its separate Resolutions all dated December 9, 1999; id. at 281-285, 286-290, 291295.
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16
Id. at 296-301.
17
Order dated May 10, 2000; id. at 305-306.
18
Id. at 307-334.
19
Dated November 29, 2002; id. at 7-14.
20
Id. at 36-37.
21
Id. at 568-641.
22
Id. at 703-710.
23
Id. at 722-733.
24
G.R. No. 97805, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 457.
25
G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114.
26
G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162.
27
G.R. No. 125008, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 439.
28
Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA
667, 672, citingReyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941).
29
Republic v. Sangalang, L-58822, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 515.
30
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla, et al., 106 Phil. 591
(1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941).
31
Rollo, pp. 283, 288, 293.
32
Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No. 149992, August 20, 2004, 437
SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA
431, 442.
33
Ponce, D.R. Florencio, The Philippine Torrens System (1965), p. 213.
34
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, June 6, 2001, 358
SCRA 489, 499, citing Lucena v. CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47.
35
Rollo, pp. 94, 120, 144.

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36
Id. at 95, 121, 145.
37
Ibid.
38
Id. at 95-96, 121-122, 145-146.
39
Id. at 96, 122, 146.
40
Ibid.
41
Id. at 97, 123, 147.
42
See Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines Vol. II (1992), pp. 148-149.
43
Rollo, pp. 105, 132, 157, 158.
44
Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 421; Estate of
the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 120435, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 474.
45
Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162, 163; Swan v. CA,
G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon
v. CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219.
46
Mendoza v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646, March 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 764, 768; Heirs of
Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, supra.
47
Also known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended, which provides that:
SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction: x x x
(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or
any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except
actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts; x x x.
48
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on
March 25, 1994.
49
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Biazon, Record of the Senate dated October 6, 1993.
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50
Supra Note 24.
51
Supra Note 27.
52
Supra Note 25.
53
Supra Note 26.
54
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 826; See also
Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law, Doctrines Enunciated in Ponencias on Jurisdiction,
Procedure and Evidence Including Useful Outlines (2002), p. 218.
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FORTUNE MOTORS INC. VS CA; GR NO. 76431

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76431. October 16, 1989.]
FORTUNE MOTORS, (PHILS.), INC., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
Quirante & Associates Law Office for Petitioner.
Bautista, Cruz & Associates Law Offices for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; REAL ACTION; CONSTRUED. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. (Comments on the Rules of
Court by Moran, Vol. I, p. 122)
2. ID.; ID.; VENUE THEREOF. Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real
property, must be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province where the property or
any part thereof lies. (Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674, 1949; Garchitorena v. Register of
Deeds, 101 Phil. 1207, 1957)
3. ID.; PERSONAL ACTIONS; VENUE THEREOF. Personal actions upon the other hand, may be
instituted in the Court of First Instance where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court).
4. ID.; ACTION TO ANNUL REAL ESTATE FORECLOSURE OR SALE OF REAL PROPERTY; A REAL
ACTION. A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true
objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, Et Al., v. Quintan,
81 Phil. 97, 1948). An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real
action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760,
1954) An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action
to annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950.)
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5. ID.; ACTION TO ANNUL SALE OF REAL PROPERTY; RECOVERY THEREOF THE PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE. While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for
damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the
law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners primary objective.
The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real
property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the
case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did
not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was
timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 336, [1983]).
6. ID.; ACTION TO ANNUL FORECLOSURE SALE OF REALTY; AFFECTS TITLE OF THE PROPERTY;
PROVINCE WHERE PROPERTY OR PART THEREOF LIES, PROPER VENUE. "Since an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property sold to the
highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action
affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced
and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies."
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the July 30, 1986 decision of
the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 09255 entitled "Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, Et. Al." dismissing Civil Case No. 85-33218 entitled "Fortune Motors
(Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co." filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
IV for improper venue and (b) the resolution dated October 30, 1986 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On March 29, 1982 up to January 6, 1984, private respondent Metropolitan Bank extended
various loans to petitioner Fortune Motors in the total sum of P32,500,000.00 (according to the
borrower; or P34,150,000.00 according to the Bank) which loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage on the Fortune building and lot in Makati, Rizal. (Rollo, pp. 60-62)
Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic recession, the petitioner was not
able to pay the loan which became due. (Rollo, p. 62)
For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the respondent bank initiated extrajudicial
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foreclosure proceedings. After notices were served, posted, and published, the mortgaged
property was sold at public auction for the price of P47,899,264.91 to mortgagee Bank as the
highest bidder. (Rollo, p. 11)
The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on October 24, 1984 with the one-year
redemption period to expire on October 24, 1985. (Rollo, p. 12)
On October 21, 1985, three days before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioner
Fortune Motors filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging
that the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due, the
publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and the price for
which the property was sold was "shockingly low." (Rollo, pp. 60-68)
Before summons could be served private respondent Bank filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the
realty covered by the real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul
the foreclosure sale should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. (Rollo, pp. 67-71-A)
The motion was opposed by petitioner Fortune Motors alleging that its action "is a personal
action" and that "the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings" so that it
may have a new one year period to redeem. (Rollo, pp. 72-73)
On January 8, 1986 an order was issued by the lower court reserving the resolution of the
Banks motion to dismiss until after the trial on the merits as the grounds relied upon by the
defendant were not clear and indubitable. (Rollo, p. 81)
The Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated January 8, 1986 but it was
denied by the lower court in its order dated May 28, 1986. (Rollo, Annex "L" pp. 93-96; Annex
"N" p. 99)
On June 11, 1986 the respondent Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court
of Appeals. (Rollo, Annex "O" pp. 100-115)
And on July 30, 1986, a decision was issued by the Court of Appeals, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The complaint in the Civil
Case No. 85-33218 is dismissed without prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue. Costs
against the private Respondent."cralaw virtua1aw library
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15)
A motion for reconsideration was filed on August 11, 1986 on the said decision and on October
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30, 1986 a resolution was issued denying such motion for reconsideration. (Rollo, Annex "O"
pp. 121-123; Annex "S" p. 129)
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
On June 10, 1987 the Court gave due course to the petition, required the parties to file their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from the notice hereof, and pay deposit for
costs in the amount of P80.40.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Both parties have filed their respective memoranda, and the case was submitted for Courts
resolution in the resolution dated December 14, 1987. (Rollo, Metrobanks Memorandum pp.
45-59; petitioners memorandum pp. 130-136 Res. p. 138)
The only issue in this case is whether petitioners action for annulment of the real estate
mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of Fortune Building is a personal action or a real action
for venue purposes.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real
property. (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. I, p. 122)
Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the Court
of First Instance of the province where the property or any part thereof lies. (Enriquez v.
Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674, 1949; Garchitorena v. Register of Deeds, 101 Phil. 1207, 1957)
Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the Court of First Instance where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court).
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives
and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, Et Al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97,
1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime
objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to
annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950)
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
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intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners primary objective. The prevalent
doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not
operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in
dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised
(Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 336,
[1983]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, as aptly decided by the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by then Court of Appeals
Associate Justice now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the
pertinent portion reads: "Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a
conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul
the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is
therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or part thereof lies."cralaw virtua1aw library
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
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RELUCIO VS LOPEZ; GR NO. 138497

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138497
January 16, 2002
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party defendant therein.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff
below) filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and
petition Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec. Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968,
defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter
and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for
his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four
children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit
relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
"It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period
of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in
Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots,
houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and
jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner
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Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if
not solely through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of defendant
Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner Relucio.
"In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the
private respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal
properties and the income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not
place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or concealed
them from the private-respondent. He placed substantial portions of these conjugal
properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.1wphi1.nt
"It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopez abandoned
the private-respondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned,
canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and income belonging to the
conjugal partnership with the private-respondent and either spent the proceeds thereof
for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two illegitimate children or
permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach of the private-respondent
and their four children.
"On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner
on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.
"An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying
petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered
in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
"Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
Order of the respondent Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was likewise
denied in the Order dated May 31, 1994."3
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the
trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.4
On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition. 5 On June
26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 However, on April 6, 1996, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.7
Hence, this appeal.8
The Issues
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1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal

property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of
action against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a
complete adjudication of the controversy.9
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings below. "A
cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of
the other."10 The elements of a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.11
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts
were admitted or proved.12
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that
the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or
is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.13
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings M3630, we assays its allegations.
In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized
the causes of action alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's
causes of action were all against her husband.
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The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J.
Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code
refers only to spouses, to wit:
"If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership,
for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership property xxx"
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion
of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her
first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between
petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three
elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband." 14 The accounting of
conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no
cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.
Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the coowned property "acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with
[petitioner]"15 and for the "dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between him
[Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]."
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property coowned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership
between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit
Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of
Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor,
results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. 16 Such
cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' own words,
one by "an aggrieved wife against her husband."17 References to petitioner in the common and
specific allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and
circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.
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Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is against Alberto J.
Lopez, not petitioner.
To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an
action for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit."18 In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable.
Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting
of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children,
and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J.
Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly
valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as
one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be
accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.20 In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be
accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal
partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over
his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals.21 The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati,
Branch 141 as against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnote
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1
Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In CA-G. R. SP No. 34398, promulgated on May 31, 1996, Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp.
28-39. Ibay- Somera, J., ponente, Lipana Reyes+ and Agcaoili, JJ., concurring.
3
Rollo, pp. 28-39, at pp. 28-31.
Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 34398. Petition, Annex "A", CA Rollo, pp. 18-19.
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 28-39.
CA Rollo, pp. 114-119.
Petition, Annex "B". Rollo, p. 40.
Filed on June 18, 1999, posted by Registered Mail. Rollo, pp. 10-27. On September 15,
1999, the Court gave due course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 86-87).
9
Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 113-137, at p. 120.
10
Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 486, 490 [2000];
Centeno v. Centeno, 343 SCRA 153, 160 [2000].
11
Centeno v. Centeno, supra, Note 10.
12
Racoma v. Fortich, 148-A Phil. 454, 460 [1971], citing Amedo v. Rio, 92 Phil. 214
[1952].
13
Dulay y. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220 [1995].
14
Rollo, pp. 42-62, at p. 44.
15
Ibid., p. 44.
16
Kramer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 518 [1989].
17
Rollo, p. 43.
18
Rule 3, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court. Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88
Phil. 125 [1951]; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 203 SCRA 310 [1991].
19
Rule 3, Section 7, Revised Rules of Court.
20
Rule 3, Section 8, Revised Rules of Court.

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21
In CA-G. R. SP No. 34398.
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PHIL. CROP INSURANCE CORP. VS CA; GR NO. 169558

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE CROP INSURANCE
CORPORATION,Petitioner,
G.R. No. 169558

Present:
- versus Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ELMO N.
ALAMEDA, RENATO S. ALLAS, LYDIA H.
ALMERON, WILLIE U. ANTALAN, RAMON P.
AQUINO, NESTOR M. DE ROMA, ROBERTO T.
FERI, OSMUNDO M. GUMASING, ROSA P.
CALUBAQUIB, TELITA C. BARASI, PATROCINIA D.
HERRERO, CHARITO A. MALLILLIN, TERESITA A.
CARANGUIAN, DELFIN B. CRUZ, ROMEO P.
MAPAGU, ESTRELLA MAY K. MIGUEL, VICENTE T.
PADDAYUMAN, DELFRANDO T. SEVILLA, ELVIRA
SIMANGAN-INTERIOR, CELESTINO P. TABANIAG
and CIRILO B. TEGA, JR.,Respondents.
Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 29, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari before us, petitioner seeks the nullification of the
Decision1dated January 27, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated August 4, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77773, which had dismissed its earlier petition for certiorari assailing
the Order3 dated May 13, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan,
Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 6123.
The facts in this case are as follows.
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Petitioner Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is a government-owned and controlled

corporation engaged in the business of crop insurance. Private respondents Renato S. Allas,
Lydia H. Almeron, Willie U. Antalan, Ramon P. Aquino, Nestor M. de Roma, Roberto T. Feri,
Osmundo M. Gumasing, Rosa P. Calubaquib, Telita C. Barasi, Patrocinia D. Herrero, Charito A.
Mallillin, Teresita A. Caranguian, Delfin B. Cruz, Romeo P. Mapagu, Estrella May K. Miguel,
Vicente T. Paddayuman, Delfrando T. Sevilla, Elvira Simangan-Interior, Celestino P. Tabaniag
and Cirilo B. Tega, Jr. are all retired employees and officers of petitioner.
Prior to the effectivity on July 1, 1989 of Republic Act No. 6758, 4 or the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, private respondents were employed with PCIC and were
receiving cost of living allowance (COLA) equivalent to 40% of their basic salary, amelioration
allowance equivalent to 10% of their basic salary and additional COLA known as equity pay.
To implement the law, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate
Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 105 specifying that the COLA, amelioration allowance and
equity pay previously granted to government employees shall be deemed included in the basic
salary. It disallowed without qualification all allowances and fringe benefits granted to said
employees on top of their basic salary effective November 1, 1989. Pursuant to DBM-CCC No.
10, petitioner stopped paying the aforecited benefits to private respondents.
On August 12, 1998, the Supreme Court nullified DBM-CCC No. 10 in De Jesus v. Commission on
Audit6 due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the country.7
On February 4, 2003, private respondents instituted an action for specific performance against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5. They prayed
that petitioner be ordered to pay them the subject benefits from July 1, 1989 up to their
respective retirement dates or the publication of DBM-CCC No. 10, whichever is earlier. They
alleged that the nullification of DBM-CCC No. 10 rendered the integration of the subject
benefits into their salaries ineffective. They added that the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel8 and the Commission on Audit9 sustained their entitlement to the subject benefits. But
petitioner still refused to pay them.
On March 11, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss10 on the grounds that (1) the complaint
stated no cause of action since the parties have no contractual relationship; (2) the subject
benefits have already been integrated into the basic salaries of private respondents; and (3)
private respondents reliance on the De Jesus case was misplaced since said case involved the
payment of a different benefit which was not integrated into the basic salaries of the
employees concerned.
In their opposition,11 private respondents averred that the sufficiency of the complaint should
be tested based on the strength of its allegations and no other. They also argued that there was
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a contractual relationship between the parties since their claim for the subject benefits accrued
when they were still petitioners employees.
On May 13, 2003, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. It noted that
the allegations in the complaint for specific performance constituted a valid cause of action on
which the court could render a valid judgment. It held that where the allegations are sufficient
but the veracity of the facts is assailed, the motion to dismiss should be denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari12 with the Court of Appeals. It
argued that public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying its motion to dismiss despite the fact that (1) the complaint
stated no cause of action since the parties have no contractual relationship; (2) private
respondents failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; (3) the claim was barred by laches;
(4) the claim had already been paid in full since the subject benefits were already integrated
into the basic salaries of private respondents; and (5) the De Jesus case did not invalidate the
mandatory consolidation of allowances and compensation of government employees.
The appellate court dismissed the petition and thus affirmed that the complaint stated a cause
of action. First, it ruled that while the complaint is labeled as an action for specific performance
thereby giving the impression that it is based on contract, a close reading of its allegations
reveals that the action is based on law, particularly Section 1213 of Rep. Act No. 6758. In
determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint and no
other should be considered. Thus, it is the body of the complaint and not its title which defines
a cause of action. Second, it held that private respondents have sufficiently alleged in their
complaint facts constituting the elements of a cause of action: (1) that they are entitled to the
subject benefits under Rep. Act No. 6758; (2) that petitioner is bound by said law to pay the
subject benefits; and (3) that petitioner has refused to pay said benefits. Third, it declared that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since private
respondents claim to the subject benefits involves a purely legal issue. Fourth, it noted that
private respondents made several demands on petitioner to pay the subject benefits but they
were compelled to commence legal action only after petitioner refused to heed their demands.
Hence, they are not barred by laches since they have not slept on their rights.
In sum, the appellate court ruled that public respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly,
DISMISSED. The assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan (Tuguegarao, Branch 5)
dated May 13, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14
In the present petition, petitioner submits these issues for our consideration:
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I.
THERE WAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION, ABSENT A BINDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II.
THE ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION.
THERE WAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED AND
OMITTED TO QUANTIFY THE AMOUNTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS. ALSO, THE
COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF
DOCKET FEES.
III.
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EXPRESSLY ADMITTED THAT THEIR COLA, AMELIORATION
ALLOWANCE AND EQUITY PAY WERE ALREADY PAID THRU SALARY INTEGRATION BY
VIRTUE OF BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 89-055 AND 90-002.
IV.
THE INTEGRATION OR CONSOLIDATION OF THE COLA, AMELIORATION ALLOWANCE
AND EQUITY PAY IS MANDATED BY SECTION 12 OF R.A. [NO.] 6758, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE DE JESUS RULING DECLARING THE NULLITY OF DBM CIRCULAR NO. 10 DUE TO NONPUBLICATION.
V.
THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE CASE IS NOT PURELY LEGAL AND THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT.
VI.
THE CLAIM OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO [HAVE] BEEN ABANDONED
AND ARE NOW BARRED BY LACHES AFTER A PERIOD OF INACTION FOR MORE THAN 14
YEARS.15
Petitioner contends that a complaint for specific performance implies that the basis is a
contractual relationship between the parties. In this case, private respondents failed to make
any allegation, much less produce any evidence, to support the existence of any express
contract with petitioner. Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed outright for lack of or
failure to state a cause of action. Petitioner adds that private respondents failed to specify the
amounts they are claiming although the same were capable of pecuniary estimation. In that
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way, they were able to avoid the payment of the correct docket fees, which is also a ground to
dismiss their complaint. Petitioner also argues that private respondents themselves admitted
that their COLA, amelioration allowance and equity pay were already paid through salary
integration. Moreover, the validity of Rep. Act No. 6758 and the integration of the COLA,
amelioration allowance and equity pay in private respondents salaries remained valid
notwithstanding the De Jesus ruling. Petitioner further argues that the issues in this case are
not purely legal and private respondents have not exhausted all administrative remedies.
Finally, petitioner posits that private respondents claims are deemed to have been abandoned
and barred by laches after a period of inaction for more than 14 years.
Private respondents counter that the present petition is improper since it seeks to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals on questions of law which is not covered by Rule 65. Further,
the issues raised have already been passed upon by the appellate court, some of which are
defenses which should be threshed out during the trial proper. In any event, private
respondents insist that their complaint stated a cause of action since it sought to compel
petitioner to pay their COLA, amelioration allowance and equity pay.1avvphi1.net
Notwithstanding petitioners formulation of six issues, we only have to resolve one issue, i.e.,
whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion when it affirmed public
respondent judges order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The appellate court upheld
the public respondent judges ruling that the complaint stated a cause of action.
Section 1,16 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential
if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A
complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.17
These elements are present in the case at bar. Private respondents have sufficiently alleged in
their complaint that (1) they are entitled to the subject benefits under Rep. Act No. 6758; (2)
petitioner is bound by said law to pay the subject benefits; and (3) petitioner has refused to pay
said benefits.
Although the complaint is labeled as an action for specific performance thereby giving the
impression that it is based on contract, the allegations therein reveal that the action is based on
law, i.e., Rep. Act No. 6758. We have ruled that the cause of action is determined from the
allegations of a complaint, not from its caption.18 Moreover, the focus is on the sufficiency, not
the veracity, of the material allegations. The determination is confined to the four corners of
the complaint and nowhere else.19
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We need not pass upon the other issues raised by petitioner since the same are matters best
threshed out in a hearing on the merits. Reason dictates that the parties proceed with the trial
where they can present their respective evidence.
Everything considered, there was no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals when it
affirmed public respondent judges order denying petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 27, 2005 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77773 are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Regional Trial
Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 6123 and decide the said case with dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 26-33. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices
Mario L. Guaria III and Jose C. Mendoza concurring.
2
Id. at 34.
Records, pp. 57-57A.
An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the

Government and for Other Purposes, approved on August 21, 1989.
5
Official Gazette, Vol. 95, No. 9, March 1, 1999, pp. 1-40 (Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification System
Prescribed Under R.A. No. 6758 for Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations
[GOCCs] and Financial Institutions [GFIs], effective on July 1, 1989).
6
G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA 152.
Id. at 158.
Records, pp. 9-16.
Id. at 17-22 and 23-25.
10
Id. at 32-37.
11
Id. at 50-53.
12
Id. at 58-72.
13
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and
hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed
abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may
be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates
herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
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being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. Existing additional
compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of
a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or
employee and shall be paid by the National Government.
14
Rollo, p. 33.
15
Id. at 9.
16
Section 1. In general.-Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a

plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts.
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their
applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated.
17
Ceroferr Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139539, February 5, 2002,
376 SCRA 144, 148; See Malicdem v. Flores, G.R. No. 151001, September 8, 2006, 501
SCRA 248, 259.
18
Benito v. Saquitan-Ruiz, G.R. No. 149906, December 26, 2002, 394 SCRA 250, 251;
Gochan v. Gochan, G.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 256, 263-264.
19
Malicdem v. Flores, supra.
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MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG VS MOYA; GR NO. L-41322

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-41322 September 29, 1988
MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG, thru its Mayor, PORFIRIO F. ROYO Vice Mayor, TOMAS D.
MANZANO, Municipal Councilors VALERIANO CLARO, CARIDAD A. DORONIO FELICULO
ESTRADA, GEORGE PEDRO JAIN, LIDO E. MONOY SALVADOR PASPE and AGUEDO
ROTOL petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX L. MOYA, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX, and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STO. TOMAS, thru its Mayor, ANICETO SOLIS, Vice-Mayor LEOPOLDO
RECTO, Municipal Councilors DOMINGO CAGADAS, WENCESLAO CASTRO, WILDA ESPIRITU,
PASTOR FERNANDEZ, MACROSQUE PIMENTEL, DOMINADOR SOLIS, JOSE TAGHOY and
ALFONSO VALDEZ, and Municipal Treasurer JOSE AVENIDO, respondents.
Martin V. Delgra, Jr. for petitioners.
Simeon N. Millan Jr. for respondent Santo Tomas.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking: (a) the
reversal (annulment) of the February 17, 1975 Order of the then Court of First Instance of
Davao denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 475; and the March 17, 1975 and July 10,
1975 Orders of the same Court denying petitioner's motions for reconsideration; and (b) the
issuance of a writ of prohibition directing respondent Judge to desist from taking cognizance of
Civil Case No. 475.
From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created respondent
Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of
petitioner. For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the
two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private respondent, to the Provincial Board
of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, it appears that no action was taken on the
same. Private respondent then filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao,
presided over by herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of
Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected taxes and
damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475.
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On March 7, 1974, petitioner filed its Answer (Rollo, pp. 1417).

On November 22, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the lower court and lack of legal personality of the Municipality of Santo Tomas (Ibid., pp. 1822), which was opposed by private respondent (Ibid., pp. 23-26). On December 12, 1974,
petitioner filed its reply to the opposition (Ibid., pp. 27-30), after which respondent Judge, in an
Order dated February 17, 1975, denied the motion to dismiss (Ibid., pp. 34-36).
On March 3, 1975, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 37-40), but in an
Order dated March 17, 1975, the same was denied by respondent Judge and so was the Second
Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 42-43), in an Order dated July 10, 1975 (Ibid., p. 44).
Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 1-10).
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 1975, resolved to
require the respondents to answer and to issue a temporary restraining order (Ibid., p. 49). In
compliance therewith, private respondent filed its Answer on October 28, 1975 (Ibid., pp. 5357). In the Resolution dated November 3, 1975, the parties were required to file their
respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 65). Petitioner filed its Memorandum on December 10, 1975
(Ibid., pp. 68-76), and private respondent on January 5, 1975 (Ibid., pp. 77-85). Petitioner raised
four (4) issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MATTER OF SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE IS A POLITICAL
QUESTION;
3. WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 242 SUPERSEDED REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6128;
AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
The instant petition is impressed with merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.
Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
(15 SCRA 569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is
no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no
corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on
this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have dismissed the case.
On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is
administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the
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government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate
occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law
may be patties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has
no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not
be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case,
since further proceedings would be pointless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED; the Orders of
February 17, 1975, March 17, 1975 and July 10, 1975 of respondent Judge are SET ASIDE; and
Civil Case No. 475 is DISMISSED. The restraining order previously issued by this Court is made
permanent.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
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