G.R. No.

L-2474

May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA
DUEAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.

father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and
treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence
of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a
boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child be considered as
the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.

Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the
celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or
the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.

This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of
the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas;
that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel
of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a
donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been
in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the
abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the
legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring
Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano
Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his
marriage to Maria Dueas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to
inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as
the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined
hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned.
The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between
Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in
connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in
January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his
house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10,
1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10,
1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's

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Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to
prove that it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano
was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed
sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial
period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3)
imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt
violation of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in
his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of
conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10,
1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano
Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano
Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the
same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not
preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering
from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from
bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent
carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal

act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an
author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is
probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An
Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show that
Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence
that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child
has not, therefore, been overcome.
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the
Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code.
Said section provides:
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably
presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately
succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its
dissolution.
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to
the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three (300) days following
the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the
issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof
that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here
there is no such proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not also overcome
this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err in declaring
Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

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G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

The Facts

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a
certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's
birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her
inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the
proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special
Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant,
TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto.4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court,
judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and
void "ab initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the
registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry
No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City
Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in
the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only surviving child of
the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996
and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by
"hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the
knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts
of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65
years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as
the mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her
own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their
house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio,
as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false
entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The
family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her
mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate
child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista
Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it
is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956
because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's
last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was
already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would
affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and
declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing,
judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil
registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in a newspaper,
the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and
TEOFISTA.

TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of
action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to
file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the
instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family
Code." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an
answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on
substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera
and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff
Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood.
Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of
Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant
petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the
biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the
time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed
birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant
medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different
from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only
the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral
attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs
asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of
the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to
either the father or the mother.
Hence, this appeal.6

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Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file
the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this
review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is
barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the
ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of
respondent.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of
the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 1718 of the Family
Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."9 The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition
which the latter filed against the former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by
respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of
this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena,
but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not
impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no
blood relation to impugn in the first place.

In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:

Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
xxx

xxx

xxx

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation,
like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological
child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or
his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband
who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible
for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband
or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless
then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to
claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a]
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased. 12(Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena
Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the
prescriptive period for such action:

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Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one
year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband
or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if
they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child
has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall
be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth
Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of
the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that
petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already
irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. 14 More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the
former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical
records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was
presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time
of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to
have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when
her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which
states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband
Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:

q Who are your children?

a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband
Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx

xxx

xxx

q Do you recall where she was born?

a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your
residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with
your husband?
a No, sir. 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no
other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really Hermogena's child; Neither
has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the
former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate
courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November
13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private
respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial
Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor
of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants
or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite
claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly
establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel
Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled
extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and
that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the
deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged
reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.

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The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the
deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her
Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and
Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter
(Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses
reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private
respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a
child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred
to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary
witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically
declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to
physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private
respondents petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court
relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th
Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court
states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another
one entered declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological
daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O.
Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an administrator
of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED;
said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and
the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding
No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of
the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and

misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions, more
particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in
adopting and upholding private respondent's theory that the instant case does
not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn
directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still the respondent
appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more
weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose
credibility and demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and
sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the now
petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in
accord with law or with applicable decisions of the supreme Court, more
particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to
the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm
of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the
husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together
with the birth certificate of the child.

b) the fact that the husband and wife were living

separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child
could not have been that of the husband except in the instance provided in the
second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of
birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to
the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within
the period prescribed in the preceding Article only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for
bringing his action;

Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;

8 | Page

2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own
a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said

child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that
for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170
and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or
any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child
by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our
ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Article 170 of
the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to
claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child
or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court
exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is
utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship with the
aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that
she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of
having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere
while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated,
cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her
the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she was really
their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never
became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only
brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already
been married for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she
has not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her

9 | Page

to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetriciangynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a
number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a
teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the children of
their widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his wife
highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and
his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter
and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that
Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a
boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought
home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby
as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and
too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of
her testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her
residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak
physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's
testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by
her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in material things
anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a
witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule,
Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this case and
declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had
drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have
been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly
born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it
is also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel
Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her
(Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever
become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that
when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's
house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the
baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez
and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well
as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public
eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not
have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen
mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather
late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez
was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that
baby.

Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez
appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if
Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years old at the time of the child's
supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in
her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under
the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist
Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel
would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How
come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was
supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
with no physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in
recent times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a
judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil
registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could
avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through
court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the
child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the
child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so either
because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which
is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the
late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and
Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on
April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the
deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or
ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness stand by appellants,
testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared
said document and that he signed the same only because the latter told him to
do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such a
statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his
and his wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his deceased
wife's legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed
said document without understanding completely the meaning of the words
"descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot
believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to
the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously,

10 | P a g e

Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the fosterdaughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as against those of the
latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, that the latter, before her death, would write a note to her
husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband
and my child or only daughter will inherit what is legally
my own property, in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband
that any inheritance due him from my property when
he die to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do
[sic] not mean what he legally owns or his inherited
property. I leave him to decide for himself regarding
those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the
spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been
necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her
husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law.
Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her husband to
give appellee although without any legal papers her properties when she dies,
and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties that he would
inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their
daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband
makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio
even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is
the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a
coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to
have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was
only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her
the birth date of Vicente's mother.

We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The weight of
these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most
notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents were
the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears
to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code,
however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated." As
related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently
rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence,
the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that "(they) are the
sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or
ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live
Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made
twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

11 | P a g e

G.R. No. L-49162

July 28, 1987

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S.
SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29
August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition and support against private
respondent, and from the respondent Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying
petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and
guardian-ad-litemArlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so
the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test,
held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V.
Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff"s (herein
petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice
was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to appreciate the result of
the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or
mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been
conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s decision. In its
decision, the Court of Appeals held:
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO was
introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After
this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first
sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife. ...
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE to the
Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her confinement was with JAO"s
consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries of the maids, and other
household expenses. ...

12 | P a g e

The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968, after
completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have conceived
JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved
in this appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse
and were already living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the third or
fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after
several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long beach,
Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to
live with her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise
to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967 because the day
following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua
went to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He
remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968,
because that was a week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the paternity of
JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which resulted in
the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of
JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a position to
determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,
considering the rulings of this Court ... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were
admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted
the test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the
findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court
had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been
recognized as early as the 1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples
of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of the child. But group blood testing
cannot show that a man is the father of a particular child, but at least can
show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in
others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of

the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity

where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the
judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is
allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of
many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
But the Uniform Act recognizes that the tests may have some probative value
to establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is
shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in (I
Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is now in
accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation between the trait
of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood
composition of a child may be some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But
thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as generally
accepted) can be used onlynegatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man F
is not the father of a particular child C. (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp.
610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test, JANICE
claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases where they tended to
establish paternity; and that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to
establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only when
the result is a possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention is
fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would be
recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself for
if the result were negative, the test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As
an admitted test, it is admissible in subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be
in the negative or in the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner"s contention that JAO"s
actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to recognition. Said the respondent
appellate court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his own. In fact,
he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latter"s certificate of live birth
be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in
cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy and the
financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping

13 | P a g e

test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his
own as the possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge
JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of Article 283 in
relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article which
states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from
November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first sexual
intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week
after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must
have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since
ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967,
then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation.
Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4
as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of conception,
ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin
Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is
not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of
plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and candid
manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have been
overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether she was
lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered
dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and conclusiveness of the
result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt
with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In
said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and types,
the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant
contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he
can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is
the father of the child Manuel."3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity,
rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of
blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to
non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when
the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
child cannotpossibly be that of the alleged father.4
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity
has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the positive results of blood
tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn
around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v.
Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted
despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of
gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the
plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was
stated, should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result was to deny progress.7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v.
Rysedorph,8 a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence,
excluding paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests
is also in force in several states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of nonpaternity, thus
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are
of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus,
when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they

14 | P a g e

cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood
test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12
Moreover,
The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of
the child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of
the period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the
child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself
cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant case by
impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the
tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic
chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area
for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically
recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under witness and
supervision.15
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject for
accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she, represented by
her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as
Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.161avvphi1
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result of the
blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the nonpaternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing
any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the
proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted, which are
binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the issue of recognition
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by her mother,
LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill the earth. Others
did not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is
now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and
support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less that a year's time,
she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met
petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Since
then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years.
Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua,
Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came
home to her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone
Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water
bills. 1 Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the
name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at
the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by petitioner. 2 Thereafter, while they were

15 | P a g e

living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30,
1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,
child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. 3 Leoncia submitted receipts
issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until
January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. 4
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) 5 or thru Merceditas
herself; 6 and sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No.
81532, 7 the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner
because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. 8 Both
petitioner and his daughter admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. 9
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as
the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he
signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods 10 as her parent. Those signatures
were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their
presence and of Elynia. 11 Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one
whom she recognized as her Daddy. 12 He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring
home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants,
and even cuddle her to sleep. 13
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture
with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong." 14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She
accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963.
Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the
child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information.
Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the
following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to
Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with petitioner
in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his
instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he
cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. 15 They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz,
Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up
to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and
Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column 16 of the death
certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in column 13 thereof opposite father's name

the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also denied the following: all the notes alleged
to have been received from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in
Merceditas' Report Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication.
He admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including the signature is his. He
was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. 16 He does not
understand why this case was filed against him. 17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his
name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and
shared the same bed. They later transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54,
Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get married with
another which he eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by Melencio which
were received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she been brought to
their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her father was at their home because
he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was
hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on
December 30, 1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium
because he was at their home at that time; and that her father lived with a certain woman in 1963
up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and
reporting to the office everyday and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or
brother goes with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about petitioner's
sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that
her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de
los Santos because her husband never slept out of their house and that in his capacity as
President and Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to
Guagua even once a year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully
satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of the following:
1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas' conception;
2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living, took care of
all the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;

16 | P a g e

4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner to Merceditas.
Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the same view as
the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced adduced by private
respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to
support. The dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is
hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of defendant ARTEMIO G.
ILANO with all the right appurtenant to such status.
Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of
EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date of the filing of
the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August
16, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she reached the age
of majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED. 19
The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26, 1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent court:
1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a judgment declaring
petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of this Court.

Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court,
therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas. It would have been
only from the date of the judgment of the trial court that support should have commenced, if so
granted. Under the law in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain
an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary
recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the caption
"parent" in the report card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family home of
petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as
his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was part of his
family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119,
old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified
to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. 21 Since petitioner had a subsisting
marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, 22 she is a spurious child. In this regard,
Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with
Article 26923 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them
because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. 24 However, before Article 287
can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity 25 either voluntarily or by court
action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child
has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or
blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an
illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under
the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. 26 The relevant law on the
matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

17 | P a g e

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father.
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize the child as
his naturalchild, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas
as his spurious child. This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code
which provides:
Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate)
children . . . under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our finding, that
private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too
overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony
of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:
Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and defendant
carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is
the father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her mother and
defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took
into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the
apartment where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified
that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiffs
mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was
rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee
and godson of the defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere
subaltern of the latter, and only frequented the place upon instruction of the
defendant to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at
the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio
was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officerin-Charge in the absence of Artemio whose residence and main office was in
Cavite. There, for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74).
The apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As Leoncia
does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio gave
Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs
(TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the

supplies and services needed in the apartment for which procurement

Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for
liquidation of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or
Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73;
TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).

Exh. "F-3"

At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of four times a
week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an
allowance of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73).

"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang

dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.

Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute between Cavite
and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred Leoncia to Calle San
Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known as
husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City,
Leoncia was fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11,
Appellant's Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places
heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of
Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-3") and money from
Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among the notes identified by Leoncia as
having come from defendant were the following:
Exh. "F-1"

"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan

(11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na, sigurado yon.SgExh. "F4"

Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong

makarating dian sa Jueves.Sgn."
The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose
nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens to "Ne". Miling is the
nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in Exh. "F-1" refers to Gracia
delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio when Leoncia
was removed from the hospital during the birth of Merceditas. (pp. 17-19,
Appellant's Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together
ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that it was with
Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with during her period of
conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia
being in the apartment and sharing the same bedroom and the same bed
hardly inspires belief.

"Dear Ne,
xxx xxx xxx
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa
paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.
Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si
Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.Sgn."
"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati.
Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.
Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.Sgn."
Exh. "F-2"
"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.Sgn."

18 | P a g e

Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship

between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although
appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and unwittingly required him to
submit to Leoncia an accounting of his expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or
Guagua Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it were
true that there was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff's mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio
foisted on the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour
of Leoncia but since there was really no such relationship, he could not state
the place in San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long
they stayed there belying his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with
plaintiffs mother. 27

Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then applied
paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as sufficient to
establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in view
of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient
evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated
denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is
not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already
been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that
he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot
be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability
of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest.
Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of
such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983
Ed.).
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his
own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing
Coquia vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own,
by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at
the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent
prenatal examination by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection
on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her
discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN,
pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would
play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father

19 | P a g e

should do for his child bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever
he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic)
(TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the
child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called
to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to
know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by
Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and
sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check
No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing therein which was identified
by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and
Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN,
p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature
were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When
Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio
signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth
grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic).
Those signatures of Artemio were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of
Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio
gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best
regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20, Appellant's Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs
to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was
falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's
daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had
long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that

defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the

father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting. 28
Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof of continuos
possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:
. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too replete with
details that are coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as
mere fabrications of an inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los
Santos was not shown to possess.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as
circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may
not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as lacking in
credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that defendant is the father
since the Certificate of Live Birth was not signed by appellee and since the
monthly report card is not sufficient to establish recognition, considering the
denial of the defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth,
the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30,
1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived
at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id. p.
26) who made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries were
directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the answers of
Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The
inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the
interview the nurse told them that the information has to be recorded in the
formal form and has to be signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is
no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning
for Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the
biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the following
morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33).
Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26).
As pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958] andBerciles

20 | P a g e

v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53

[1984] that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate,
the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, register, or
other person is incompetent evidence of paternity does
not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself
who went to the municipal building and gave all the data
about his daughter's birth. . . .
. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff
Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she
has nevertheless established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that
an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed affiliation by "any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil
Code, . . . Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. 29
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other
cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is
broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first
three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. 30 This paragraph permits
hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation. 31
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of
petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into account
the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not

be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203,
Family Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been
born on December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and was
already of school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her
school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a
month. She attained the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article
234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of
twelve (12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby
fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and considering the
declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a
graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next three (3) years;
P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a month
for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she
attained the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is
appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court
deems it just and equitable under the given facts and circumstances that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. 32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years after the
decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any consideration because it appears
that it is being raised for the first time in this petition. 33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

21 | P a g e

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder

reproduced;

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.

. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me

alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save
my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our
sake and for the child sake.

REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge,
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on
May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision,
now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of
the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action,
ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.

. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him
and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle
him to all what I am and what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .

In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for
Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan,
by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the
defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left
by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City
on September 28, 1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several
years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit
amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they
begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the
ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in
Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional
affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as
can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty.

22 | P a g e

. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly

against the whole world. After all we love each other and
CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled
to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the
owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and
in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of
pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the
defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said
Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are
his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,
Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant
complaint is filed;

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of
friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is
urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support
from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to
grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed
and refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the
claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3

the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied
the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938,
in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to
determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give
him support pendente lite.

No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of
the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a wrong"
(Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the
complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the
material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that
the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by
prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that
the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder
of causes of action. 4

No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It
is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the
step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after
another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of
action.

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial
court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:

No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is
(her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is instituting
the action.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further
proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to
hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the
nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime
held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set
for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner
filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent
court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for

23 | P a g e

No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file
an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of majority (New
Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty.
Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done
in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special
jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint such
as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the
body of the complaint.

From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form
and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until
after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the
complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.

alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed
and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of
such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no
basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30,
1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be
annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to
the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals
involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this
Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the
Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate
minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par.
2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation;
and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with
respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial
Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in
behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action,
she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the

24 | P a g e

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as
plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give
her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia,
that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the
deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed
to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants
therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her
complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is
barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing
of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority,
whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate
child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must
prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the
putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of
such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought
after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of
a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint,
but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint
filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate
child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same
may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in
our jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and
at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which,
in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided
always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of
action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute

necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have

been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in
which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment
as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally
applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered
well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of
his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private
respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be
proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor
child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar,
considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has
prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article
175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the
supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are
created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;

25 | P a g e

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the
child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or
in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the
status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,
the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should
have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed
on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for
filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an
action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor
child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case
of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.15 where we held that the fact of filing of
the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural
in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive
that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises

especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds
no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private
respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested
with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions
of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court
below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition
for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at
bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

26 | P a g e

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for
support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was
dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano, 1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in
the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or
acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another action for
recognition and support against the private respondent before another branch of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of
the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis
enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father
served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit
sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner
Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married
until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In
March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of
live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro
which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
Violeta Esguerra.

27 | P a g e

Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3 Dr. Milagros Villanueva, 4 Ruby
Chua Cu, 5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. 6 The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta
Esguerra had, at different times, 7introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr.
Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the
father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He
averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was
corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also
stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent also presented
as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation
that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated
he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private
respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners
as their father after he was sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs
minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the relief's prayed for in the
complaint. The defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby ordered to
recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul
Fernandez, now aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he
has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in the
amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra,
the children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears reckoned as of the
filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed by the respondent
Court of Appeals 8 in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied
upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of
(petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine of res judicataapplied because of the dismissal of the
petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied
on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving full faith and
credit to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the testimony of
Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent
Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta
Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much

credence to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6)
holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.

administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the

declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized,
or of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.

We find no merit in the petition.

The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court
only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate
court clash with those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise
our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private
respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the respondent
court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on
the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro
(Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante
Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering
affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2",
"B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held inTan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,
another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel,
like playing with him and giving him paternity. The same must be said of . . .
(the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their physical
likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and
much less would prove violation of complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its
preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the
baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the record the
decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a
voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical
records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and
117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is
simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by reason of his
personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like the

28 | P a g e

In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying private
respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again,
the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates.
In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our
pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child
born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed
or made by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances
by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate no signed by the
alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners and we are
satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize
on the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when
you called for the father and the mother of the child, that
both father and mother were present?
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the
mother who were present at that time?
A Yes.

Q Please point to the court?

A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was
you want to get a baptismal certificate and then the
second time was I asked you for what is this? And you
said it is for the court.

A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito

Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what
question do you remember having asked him?

Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to

your place, you were already informed that you will testify
here before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his

works?

A Yes.

Q What was the answer of Fernandez?

Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra

that this man wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?

A Yes, I do.
A Yes, sir.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at
the defendant again. I want to be sure if he is the person
who appeared before you on that occasion?

Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .

A Yes.

A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of
the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were first
shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q What month in 1986.

29 | P a g e

Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the
private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent
during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that
Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can
remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of Violeta Esguerra.
Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity
of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate court applying the
doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and
support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate
their cause of action.

A It is difficult. . .

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent court in CAG.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Q When was the first time you know you are going to
testify here?

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124814

October 21, 2004

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.
DECISION

While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was
pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioners house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she was
re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the
father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of
her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.

CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as
his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She
was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the
alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to
Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with
her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive.
Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid
that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the
Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based
on the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the
plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia
Regodos.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on
suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead
brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982,
assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private
respondent Camelo Regodos.

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the
plaintiff in support of the claim to "be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual
intercourse with the plaintiffs mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the
child. The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case,
based on the personal appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that the
plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia
Regodos."2

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to
work the following morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for
another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years
Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited
her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to
lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse.

30 | P a g e

xxx

xxx

xxx

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:

The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should
not prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where
a witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is
not required that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA
585). It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574,
575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse with

appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September 9,
1982, she gave birth to appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial
court and there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we
find no cogent reason to disturb the trial courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.3
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE
CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 4
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a
different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is convinced that
this case falls within one of the exceptions.5
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the childs mother and "the personal appearance of the child."
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation.6An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.7
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:

31 | P a g e

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. 8
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.9 Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same.10
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a
widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We
disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.11 The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but

is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.12
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective
test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity
and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is reversed and set aside. Private respondents petition
for recognition and support is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

32 | P a g e

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS
SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO
CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:

CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves
to the exclusion of all others.

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364),
the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

SO ORDERED.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson,
who claim to be their children.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent
court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the
pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional
rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision
is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of
Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to
wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by
right of representation.

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the
same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by

33 | P a g e

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate
daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the
petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia

and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of
adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such
birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before
the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the
court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission
of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by
law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the
considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO
SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having
been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot
be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents
were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists,
whether erroneous or not,cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for
a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd
Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary
facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it;
it cannot be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a
judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order
of adoption, this does not make it essential to the

34 | P a g e

jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be

determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until
reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and
the adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have been of
no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by
the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such
evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier
statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that
it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate
must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary
nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely
evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care
even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter
by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of

35 | P a g e

representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs
and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of
Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the
inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the
adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 138961

March 7, 2002

William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered
under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO,respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 453941 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and
to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil
Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory
recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina
Liyao.2 The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner
having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten
(10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They
lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City
and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita
Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon
and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her
husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature
and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of

36 | P a g e

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and
the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing
were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary,
Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon
to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company4 and gave weekly
amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his
good looking son and had their pictures taken together.6
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William
Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and
their wives while on vacation in Baguio.7 Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that
she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings.8 During the occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975
held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the
presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can
still make a good looking son."9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters
direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other
material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to
Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal
belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White
Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and
William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao
from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely,
Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William
Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would
sleep in the couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually
see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant
with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and
later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon,
she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited
them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave
support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the
two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November 22,
1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present,
including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and
healthy."10He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to
make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not

happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos
funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue
and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime green14 as
belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora,
Love From William."15 Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mothers birthday
where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another.
Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled
nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of
William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the
house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the
son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers.
Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965.
Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the
couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was
conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that
she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play
mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of
the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is
married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo
with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that
the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when
William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr.
Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was
corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr.
Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the
possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were
legally married.16 Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro
Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there
was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of
town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his
clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble
sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a

37 | P a g e

businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily.
He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He
suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co.
He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture
treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her
sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister
referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed.
He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke
during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days
and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long
hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not
legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate
that the couple obtained any annulment17 of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon
Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the death of
Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments with
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda
added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents,
clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance
when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again."18 Linda then
instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to
let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father
after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters,
shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated.
They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her
fathers death on December 2, 1975.19 Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests
(CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his
speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under
strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap,
for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control.20 Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr.
Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her
family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an
illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the
company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing payment
to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased
which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of
William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo

Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the
evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime
between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to
report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in
September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver
and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid andaldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr.
Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast
and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs.
Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic
Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would
sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as
if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself
as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely
relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973
and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr.
Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao,
Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with
the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving
for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence
that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time
when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner
had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by
direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his
son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the
legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted
only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically
impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The
appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon
Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were
seen in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased
William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish
proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The
Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With
regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either
petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as
follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the
minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as
such; and
(d) Costs of suit.21

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It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues
which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of
filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real
crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate
of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate.22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.23
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code24 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it
was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was
conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of
Separation,"25 executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all
claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned
in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs
under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27Impugning the legitimacy of the
child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in
view of the moral and economic interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of
the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao,
Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.30We cannot allow petitioner to
maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in

39 | P a g e

exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and
the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.31
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with
Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that
Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the
initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his
mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.1wphi1
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented
by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event,
there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged
father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142877

October 2, 2001

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their

mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS
MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful
wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.

On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions,
respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being
the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an
ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It was
contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the
question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or
proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the
complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.1 It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were
seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born,
the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.

Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not
require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo.2

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie
de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.

In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is
inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation
in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on
the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in direct
action frontally addressing the issue.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless
call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February
1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.

The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this
matter draws to a close.

On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting
assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of
illegitimacy.1wphi1.nt

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The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.4 The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of
the child, and no further court action is required.5 In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgement.7

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03
August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and
the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable,12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners,
in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, 13 or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said
case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition
filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of
a private document. Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a
case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally
ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare
that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their
respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been
first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.17

41 | P a g e

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion
as Jose Gerardos surname.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION

Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and
made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something
they should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.

CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care,
including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.1 In case of assault on his rights
by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with
the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte,
and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29,
1989.2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City. 3 Almost
a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19,
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy.5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that
Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred
that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above
decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner socalled visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any
Sunday."10 She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child."11 She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname
should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.

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The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as
he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot
give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy
would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall
be the paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED. 12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial
court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos
surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate
and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the "best interest of the child"
policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
hours once a week."14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers surname motu
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate
court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate
the issues involved in the controversy.

After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court
resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo
was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma.
Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with
the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called "marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was
[Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately
married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore,
the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the
void and non-existent marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be
the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art.
164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither
custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his
name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his
illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the
married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was
born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the
appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We
cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father.
In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for
ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of
the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says
it is.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same
was denied.18Hence, this appeal.

43 | P a g e

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.19 Article 164 of the Family Code is clear.
A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.22 We explained
the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals23:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the
policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, 25 his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs.27 Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he
never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.28 To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the
Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enabled the husband to father the child.29 Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of conception.33 Or, the husband was in
prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon
City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights
are only a scant four kilometers apart.

Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all
was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make
it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should
be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer35 to the petition for annulment of
marriage36 that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never
any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with
Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her
child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an
instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely
no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed
that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their
proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical
access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.37 A mother has no right to disavow
a child because maternity is never uncertain.38 Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to
question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.39 The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the
law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.40

44 | P a g e

Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and
in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted
and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement
that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be
tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and
consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the
very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.41 Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value
in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court
shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.43 Although a
record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,44 as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be established.45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.46 As prima facieevidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more
preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties.47Between the certificate of birth which is prima
facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law
(rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not
only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in
consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law,
the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of
both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance.48 On the other hand, an illegitimate
child is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can
claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
counterpart.49 Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the

eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless
to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very
persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was
made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an
innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He
is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now
comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of
tender years.52 Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own
parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society
shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant
where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
SO ORDERED.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. 50 A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from
parent to child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes
of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such
parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose
Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.

45 | P a g e

G.R. No. 125901

March 8, 2001

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who
was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta.
Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait
until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as
she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida
forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's
maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later.
She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to
another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who
seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react
to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate
would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their
missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover
their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes
Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery
of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her
testimony with her clinical records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his
brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter
was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge
of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin
further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and
that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age
42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima
Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real
husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law
husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband
could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial court
also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child
of petitioners. The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING
the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to
immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and
Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the
decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their
minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.6

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,
allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy,
Bulacan.

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff
implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff
stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child
to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8

Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by
Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.1 She
avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court.
The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the
evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the

46 | P a g e

minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person,9 and disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No.
94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to
respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said
respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the
instant petition alleging:
I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS
MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS
HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
"HABEAS CORPUS" AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN
THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R.
TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. 11
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.13 It must be stressed
too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it
must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the
same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first
determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must
necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate
from each other, are indeed one and the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have
rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the
writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence
presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or
order.15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this
Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred
as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted
that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970,
before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that
ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child
between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child
was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were
ever submitted.

We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even
be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child.
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person and is the son of petitioners?

47 | P a g e

birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even
private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect,
it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners.
The writ ofhabeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 162571

June 15, 2005

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY
HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in
exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision2 and
resolution3 upholding the resolution and order of the trial court,4 which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss private respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.5
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into
an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out
of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This
incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since
then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.6
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe
had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one
other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in
love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because
she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy
on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually
turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point

49 | P a g e

of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and
means to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife
and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring
potential customers to the car aircon repair shop"7 where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out
that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the
United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling
people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their
"last intimacy was sometime in 1998."8 Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On
January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to
demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe
and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without
bumping or hitting any part of her body."9 Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate
were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually
married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.10
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but
expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.11
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.12
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.13 He also
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the
birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if
not recognized by the putative father.14 In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal
charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for
cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-0246669). He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his
signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to
a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.15

The petition is without merit.

First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the
prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.16
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner, as
a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he
had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the
relationship long before the childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the
parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question
is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have
alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are
strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give
support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and
authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also claims
that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively
converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by
law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and
must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 28317 in relation to Article 26518 of the
Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but
merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been
denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the
assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action
for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. InTayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we
allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights
from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is
necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel

50 | P a g e

recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to
allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint
filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate
child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same
may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not
new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922])
wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief
in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the
affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of
action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and
prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is
undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous
cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right
to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may
maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x;
and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his
deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason
is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
(Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or
rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.

On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive
means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions
have no merit.

A year later, in People v. Janson,25 we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence
because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or
other scientific evidence to still our doubts!"

Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining
paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past
decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.

In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC26 where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of
filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:

21

In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee where the appellant was convicted of murder on the
testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that "while eyewitness identification
is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied)."
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v.
Court of Appeals,22 promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA,
being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts.
Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of
a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo24 where the rape and
murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in
evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were)
subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile."

51 | P a g e

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult
to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the conviction of the accused
for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy
discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of
our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the
root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as
an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has
developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and
reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would
allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one
such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the
results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed
that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself,
violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of
the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the
person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs,28 hair,29 and
other bodily substances.30 We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed
on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine
from ones mouth32 and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody
footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia,
in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her
orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive
and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our
ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,36 where we
struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:

52 | P a g e

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures,37 and the
infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way
being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to
submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face
such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official
results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general
acceptance.39 Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation
of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some
instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St.
Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to
subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law,
specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty,
upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:41
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of
and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be
reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b
of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in
which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings
are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k
of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law may be rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the court to
vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the
acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a
proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a
party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition.
After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator

may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the
voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the
determination of the childs paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if
appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither signators legal obligations,
including the obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may be
suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the
court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court
determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that
an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall
immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the childs
birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department
of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services
law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in
receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social
services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support
enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such
services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through
the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial
process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment
meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:42
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs of
tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or
DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the
mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA
tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated
by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed
by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of
health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged
father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon
a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the
basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a
child born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic

53 | P a g e

marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred
eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to
subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules
where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely
objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the
court. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test
or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the
admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of
paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the
support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a
report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence
pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered
by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the
first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay
such cost, the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if
practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate
local social services district. In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that
the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their
respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the
issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to prove that
H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was
actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an
adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,44 the 4th
Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years,
once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case,
G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had
been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a
provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the
difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements
were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased
significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement(current testing

methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time
the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant
obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of
modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in
1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course,
while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a
child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus,
when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing
paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time
were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity action,
obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's
biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only
sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into
private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable
meet her burden of proof.

(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person
accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization,
including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks.

It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have included the use of DNA
testing:46

(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5),
either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does
not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if
applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)

722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and
alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of
person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof;
summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by
or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother,
child, and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which
may include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell
isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification
profiling, to determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the
father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification
profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA
identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court may
do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless
good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.

54 | P a g e

xxx xxx xxx

(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in
subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification
profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report
are admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results
of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a
probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct
additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is
eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have
identical DNA.

In Rafferty v. Perkins,47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing
paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating
Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we
find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic
testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such
order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and
support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal
from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing,
which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,49 decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, demonstrated
that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through
DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of
Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have the default judgment against him
vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld
from his wages for child support. The Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against

the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child.
Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently
vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from
his wages."
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,50 another case decided by the Supreme Court of
Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of
filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established
someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court
reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.51
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available "when any tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."52 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals53 where we
dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of
such a petition and just what was meant by "grave abuse of discretion":

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and
resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed,
however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was
correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed
equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA
testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a
valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals
decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction,
an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of
justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the
recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer
or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.
(emphasis supplied)

55 | P a g e

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF
ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as
JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought
to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to
Julian Lin Wang.

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. [2] The trial court found
that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may
be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within
the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot
be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor.
The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution
dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a
middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who
intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling.
That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent
purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not
reasonable.[5]

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) [6] arguing that the
trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is:
whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 [7] of the Family
Code. Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the
Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new
environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best
interest of the child.[8] It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the
name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle
name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it
will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community.
Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of
name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to
previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name. [10]

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they
will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in
Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried
in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against
because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might
also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan
sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is,
they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is
requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.[1]

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The
OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of
name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere
expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping
of the middle name Carulasan is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not
sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. [12] The OSG also
adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the
dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:

56 | P a g e

middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG
reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name
could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while
petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the
surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle
name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by
Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a
privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.[14]
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable
cause for which the change is sought.[15] To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held
valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory
to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety
of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of
its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. [17]
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek
to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle
name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually
deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for
change of the given name[18] and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in
the negative.

57 | P a g e

A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote,
thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of
persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing
and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be
without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man,
and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.[19]
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that
middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. [20] The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, [21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname
of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers
surname.[22]
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child
is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle
name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that
the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated
and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this
would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support,
he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome,
and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to
Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also
elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to
bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World
War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or
that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor
child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to
Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her
mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted
where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the
opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would
carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that
justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of
other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code
gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not
mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother.
In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon,
sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered
in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in
her school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court
overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate
child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose
to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there
was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is
amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.

58 | P a g e

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases
of Oshita andAlfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for
change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and
judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be
unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these
two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita,
recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a
result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship.
In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a
name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school
records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in
behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does
not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest
in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name
is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it
from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. [26] As he is of tender age, he may not
yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156343

October 18, 2004

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
DECISION

"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as
evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody,
absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August 28, 2002
Decision2 and the December 11, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
69400.4 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel shall
have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10) years of age.
Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose
which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help support the
child, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week, and may take the child out upon
the written consent of the mother.
"Acting on the petitioners Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, and finding it to be
without merit, the same is DENIED."5
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of
his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel,
the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.

59 | P a g e

"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be
brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In
the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed
Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly
pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the
house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor
child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM
Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to
which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as
promised by them.
"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao
City but he was informed that the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights,
Santiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that
Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate
his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the said case
was withdrawn ex-parte.
"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him
as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and
educate him.
"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with the May 2,
2002 Resolution of this Court.

"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the
petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that
she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioners allegation that respondents
Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from the
petitioner or the latters parents. She averred that she was the one who took Michael
Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter
readily agreed and consented.

In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x [w]hether or not
[he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the
absence of the mother who is away."7
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in regard to its
erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue

"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was
deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found
to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that
since the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully
employed. The custody of the child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was
entrusted to petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that
even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents, she has
already been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was
allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the
purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work
so she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further
stated that she has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she has been
returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she could.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her
and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael
Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that
petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and expense he had spent
in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate
the minor from his mother. Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issue

60 | P a g e

Who Should Have Custody of the Child?

Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists,
however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the
period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the
biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take
care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,8 granting to her sister temporary
custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus
rendering petitioners argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before
the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," 10 alleging
therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his
mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.11
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines 12 explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of
whether the father admits paternity.13
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally classified into
two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous,
adulterous or illicit.14 A natural child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time
of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.15 On the
other hand, a spurious child is one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified
to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.16

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested
in the father or the mother recognizing them.17 If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be
exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as
to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in
the father and the mother.18
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code.19Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. 20
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment
of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory
shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, without any distinction between natural and spurious.21 The concept of "natural child" is
important only for purposes of legitimation.22 Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child
remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in
the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of
his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article
176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
fathers recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals23 held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a
ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father
may adopt his own illegitimate child;24 in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate
child of the adoptive parent.25
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.26 She has the right to keep him in her
company.27 She cannot be deprived of that right,28 and she may not even renounce or transfer it
"except in the cases authorized by law."29
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise.

61 | P a g e

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.30 In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment,31 unemployment,
immorality,32 habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,33 we hold
that the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta.
There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of
Appeals,34 the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children in view of
the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children.35 Even when
the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling
for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer,
absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are
separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de
facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were
never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to
live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to
choose which parent to live with isDELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY,
BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS, respondents.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the
court a quopassed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's order dated
January 9, 1992.

ROMERO, J.:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
There being no explicit provision of law in point, the Court is called upon to cast illumination in a
gray area even as it fills up unintentional interstices in the fabric of Civil Law with overlays of
philosophical, historical and sociological strands. For an understanding of how the issue arose, we
now proceed to unravel the pertinent factual background.
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as
now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private
respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This
union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month
later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City
celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with
an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus,
in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that private respondent's
children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted
during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.

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Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.
This argument is tenable.
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time
of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does
not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time.
Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage
solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware
of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily
contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and
Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a provision subsumed under the
general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on
the effects of said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children,
those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because
there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged natural children"
and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case
at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous,
contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of

such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their
parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting
marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper (those "born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other")? A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device
contrived by law to simulate a fact or condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what
it purports to be. In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving
rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as
defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and,
consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. Does this cluster of rights
include the right to be legitimated?
Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of rights granted
by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing the substantive provisions of the law in
force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new provisions of the
Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on the classification of children vis-a-vis their
parents, and the corresponding rights they are entitled to under the law. Thus, the title on "Paternity
and Filiation" devotes two whole chapters to legitimate children alone, and one chapter on those
deemed by law to be possessed of the rights of the former, such as legitimated children, because
of their compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other chapters deal with
illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children, and those other than natural, or
spurious, whether recognized or not. The well-ordered delineation of such distinctions among these
groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize
and separate one from the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights
accruing to the different categories of children.
It must be noted that before said Code was enacted, other classes of illegitimate children were
recognized, such as, "manceres" or the offspring of prostitutes and the "sacrilegious" or children of
those who had received Holy Orders. Subsequently, the Civil Code, in an effort to keep in step with
modern times, limited illegitimate filiation to those which are incestuous, adulterous and illicit.
At the core of the institution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish tradition and culture, lies the
"inviolable social institution" known as marriage. This union, absent any formal or substantial defect
or of any vice of consent, is virtually adamantine. On the whole, the status of a marriage
determines in large part the filiation of its resultant issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage
is legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were,
at the time of the child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently
do so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child eventually
enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy. Without such marriage, the natural

63 | P a g e

child's rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or recognized by his parents, but he does not
rise to the level of a legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child does.
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is declared a nullity is
illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law which accords him the rights of
an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively denominated
as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There is no marriage valid or otherwise which
would give any semblance of legality to the child's existence. Nothing links child to parent aside
from the information appearing in the birth certificate. When such child is recognized by one or both
parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching those of his legitimate counterparts.
The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending
on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and support.
Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus, they "shall principally
use the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants
and descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both
parents, 5 and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as
effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced." 6
Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally
use the surname of the father. 7 If a natural child is recognized by only one parent, the child shall
follow the surname of such recognizing parent. 8 Both types of children are entitled to receive
support from the parent recognizing them. 9 They also cannot be deprived of their legitime
equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the
recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate. 10
Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their minority, under
the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the latter's surname. 11 The only support
which they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, 12 and their legitime, also to be taken from
the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-fifths
that of each legitimate child. 13
It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured by law, 14 the
legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free portion of the hereditary
estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said
portion. 15
Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned. 16

These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated child may
enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction
cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary
rights are concerned.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's half siblings
can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the
most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of
Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply
because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children.
It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural children and,
therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction. This conclusion is arrived at
through a syllogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs as follows:
The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction.
Therefore, they have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children.
Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated.
Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be
legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed legitimated" by
the subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the
Philippines in 1967).
The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that things equal to the
same thing are equal to each other. This may hold true in the realm of instructional, as opposed to
descriptive science, where the former calls for the application of absolute, mathematical rules with
precision but not to the latter, particularly those which deal with the social sciences where human
relationships are central to a study whose main concern is not to leave out anything of significance.
The former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as the "dead aspect
of nature," excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining absolute results and nothing
more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole truth as with those aspects or parts only
through which the inexorable result can be obtained. To apply the strict rules of syllogism, where
the basic premise is defective, to the arena of paternity and filiation, especially in the determination
of the status and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate children vis-a-vis the legitimate ones, is
bound to spawn mischief and results never intended by the framers of the provisions of the law
under review.

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Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be postulated that "adulterous
children shall enjoy the status, rights and obligations of legitimate children," a doctrine which no
moral philosophy under our social and cultural milieu can countenance.
This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural" can be
legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children (and, consequently,
natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when no such right exists. Legitimation is
not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children
proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as
acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore,
they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this
case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife
effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the second union affected
by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and
his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law on family
relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegal relations such that the
benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to
extend, to natural children by legal fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation
to natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to
exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural
children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been
pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of
other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be
placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and unmistakable
language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all point to the correctness of petitioner's
claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gray area of law that calls for interpretation,
or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud unintentionally created by the
letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this case one which decidedly favors
legitimacy over illegitimacy. The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the
corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children
by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to the level of natural children proper,
whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid
marriage.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of
the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate
and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a
quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent
Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the aforesaid
decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following assignment of errors:

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot
be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles;
and

REGALADO, J.:

2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision
which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro
Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7

Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20,
1990 1 which affirmedin toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner
seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review oncertiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6)
years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated
February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The order was duly
published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned
to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other
places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies
of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz
Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the
proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON
CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the
child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the
child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.

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The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,
when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them.
However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the
Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under
the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be
dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues
that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter
did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.
We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles
as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score.
It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware
that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. 8 We further
apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court.
Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of
errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign
to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right

reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 11

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply
retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the
adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner.
We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for
adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she
was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right
to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with
the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed
by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an
integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The
pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:

When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 12 We do not find in the present case such
facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is
remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the
sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions.
However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their
enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes are
generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun
after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment.14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive
that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises. 15
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in
nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time
it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To
repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17

67 | P a g e

xxx xxx xxx

2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to
adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6)
years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also
in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court,
now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my lawful
consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have
continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since
birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal
and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the care,
concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for
whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this minor
child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by
me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient
to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign
residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed
to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in

language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by
arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and,
for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as
matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold
that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain
the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical
construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate
proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to
bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a
reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to
approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial
compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts
relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it
should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give
the court jurisdiction. 21
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the
child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount
consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and
the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the
child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to
accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the
court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long
as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing
of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the
best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 25 The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended
the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for
several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting
parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children
of the adopters.

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The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find
no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and
circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We are of the
opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way
towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful
and happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998]

HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not one
of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but
also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, [2] in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at
all reasonable times and places to petitioner.[7]
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00
to P20,000.00 a month[8] a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his childrens
expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings
No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had evaded
his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to
the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and
would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited
his parental rights over the children for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract without the written
consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States and had been
transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and

During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was undisturbed. Not
long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.

3. Her husband had divorced her.

Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite[3] with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu[4] which rendered a decision[5] approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. They further agreed:

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager
compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority
over his beloved children.

(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall
constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the
parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody
of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the
children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed
the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person
or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husbands consent as the parties are by
this agreement legally separated;[6]
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that

69 | P a g e

On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and
Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These children shall henceforth be known

and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano
respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though they were
in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this Decree of Adoption for
registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was impelled by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties with the Clavano family,
especially their maternal uncle, petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press, real estate
business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead,
California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed Menchu, approved of the
adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that
she could not provide them a secure and happy future as she travels a lot.
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as they would go to
church together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos Keith had
testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger
ones were observed by the court to have snuggled close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on a very
shaky foundation because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was morally unfit to be the father of his children on account of his being an
improvident father of his family and an undisguised Lothario. This conclusion is based
on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of
Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife
in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.

70 | P a g e

(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of comparatively recent dates were
attempts at verisimilitude as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could
not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioners claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with Anna Marie was dim
if not nil because it was petitioner who devised, engineered and executed the divorce
proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court.
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner is now an alien from the standpoint of
Philippine laws and therefore, how his new attachments and loyalties would sit with
his (Filipino) children is an open question.
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And abandonment of a child
by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to
its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case,
adoption will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against his
opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Cal. 469, 63
P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert,
170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am.
St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4
Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.)[9]
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it
would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the
adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their
written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by
law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be
adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is
not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question
therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the children. In
adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental
duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The
issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in fact even
maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes from two judicial
pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the

children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A.
Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has
not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has
submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the childrens names totalling
$2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support
commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor
should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were
shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in
arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in default of the judgment in
JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a
father, contrary to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different banks, as
follows

Acct. No.
1) 118-606437-4
2) 73-166-8

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this
Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides -

Date Opened
July 23, 1985
Oct. 29, 1987

Balance
$5,018.50

Name of Bank
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall
Great Western Savings, Dalybe
City,
Cal., U.S.A.
necessary:

March 5, 1986
Oct. 26, 1987

3,129.00

Matewan National Bank of Williamson, West

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
Virginia, U.S.A.

December 31, 1986

Oct. 29, 1987

2,622.19

The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of Social
Security Pacific National Bank, Daly City, (2)
Cal.,
Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency under whose care the
U.S.A.
child may be;

3) 564-146883
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositors name as trustee for Charmaine
Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated and the
amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the
minors. The second is an `or account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is
a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the funds
withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence `the aim and
purpose of providing for a better future and security of his family.[10]
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the
decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a
manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and
his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that
prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioners parents. Moreover, he
alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the joint complaint for
divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took
exception to the appellate courts findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay claim
to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he is still a
father to his children. As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he had always

71 | P a g e

denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true
that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue
City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner
insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it was only during
the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her
and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for monetary
considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that
they could love the children much more than he could.[11]

(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall
be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling
and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social Services and
Development or from a duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed childplacement agency under whose care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. [12] As such,
when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law
was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code
provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting
parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living
with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Underscoring
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption
signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the childs spouse,
if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has
not abandoned the child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad
litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or
by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child [13] or that such parent
is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without
the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with
the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court
declared:

72 | P a g e

x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings,
and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its
parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially
complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.[14]
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioners consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as
follows:
3. That the childrens mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given her express
consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex `A. Likewise, the written consent
of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the
children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already divorced the former,
as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe,
State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex `B) which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he
abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant.[15]
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent
of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by
his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence[16] dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue
for determination.The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove
to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be
considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. [17] This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.[18] However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to
review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the
evidence on record.[19]
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, [20] this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the
following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion [21] on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is on
the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim ones rights or interests. [22] In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care
and support which parents owe their children.[23]
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment.Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.[24] While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to Dear Bert on a
C.Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been a long time
since the last time youve heard from me excluding that of the phone conversation weve had.
She discussed petitioners intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension
over risks that could be engendered by Keiths use of it. She said that in the last phone
conversation she had with petitioner on the birthday of Ma, she forgot to tell petitioner that
Keiths voice had changed; he had become a bagito or a teen-ager with many fans who sent
him Valentines cards. She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative
almost dalaga who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how pretty she was
in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had
prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried because Charmaine
was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony),
she told petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and quite spoiled being the youngest of
the children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would
sleep anytime. She admitted having said so much about the children because they might not
have informed petitioner of some happenings and spices of life about themselves. She said
that it was just very exciting to know how theyve grown up and very pleasant, too, that each
of them have (sic) different characters. She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was
at the best of health. After extending her regards to all, she signed her name after the word
Love. This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was
P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of a note from Menchu
on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that we wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and
that Keith and Joeton were very excited when petitioner called up last time. She told him
how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted
to order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioners call

73 | P a g e

because she also wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that
Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a
(k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their
needs. She told petitioner to be very fatherly about the childrens needs because those were
expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue
magazines and that whatever expenses he would incur, she would replace these. As a
postscript, she told petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored Sperry topsider shoes.
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. Its nice to be thought of at Xmas. Thanks
again.
Sincerely,
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to
Dear Dad. Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother to stay for a little while, just
a few weeks after classes start(s) on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in
Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and
well see what youre (sic) decision will be. He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and
shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He told
petitioner that they had been going to Lahug with their mother picking them up
after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go
for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 oclock in the evening. He wished his father luck
and the best of health and that they prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter was
ended with Love Keith.
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the Christmas card
with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00 and the card of Joeton with $5.00 inside. He told petitioner
the amounts following his fathers instructions and promise to send money through the mail.
He asked his father to address his letter directly to him because he wanted to open his own
letters. He informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season that they enjoyed
eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily schedule
and that their mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold their
blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become very smart
while Charmaine, who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their
mother was leaving for the United States on February 5, they would be missing her like they
were missing petitioner. He asked for his things and $200.00. He told petitioner more
anecdotes about Joeton like he would make the sign of the cross even when they would
pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead because he
had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become very maldita who

was not always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended
the letter with Love your son, Keith. The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).

12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, Our Wish For You with the year 83 written on the upper
right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.

6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain,
pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of of her
birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore
size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes
would start on January 9 although Keiths classes had started on January 6. They would feel
sad again because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing
them. She signed, Love, Charmaine.

13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even when their Mom
was there where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00.
Because his mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that
would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with
friends but their grades were all good with Joeton receiving stars for excellence. Keith
wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner
would come and visit them someday.

7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had not been remiss
in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila they went to Malacaang, Tito
Doy Laurels house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three
days and Baguio for one week. He informed him that he got honors, Charmaine was 7th in
her class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon
and he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked for his reward from
petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he
could save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending them. He
said he missed petitioner and wished him the best. He added that petitioner should call them
on Sundays.

14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date January 1986. Keith
told his father that they had received the package that the latter sent them. The clothes he
sent, however, fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger.
Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for
low-heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make
her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was already
ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even though his mother had told him
not to be shy about it.

8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the latter. She asked
for money from petitioner to buy something for the school and something else. She promised
not to spend so much and to save some. She said she loved petitioner and missed him.
Joeton said hi! to petitioner. After ending the letter with Love, Joeton and Charmaine, she
asked for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been writing him; that he
would like to have some money but he would save them; that he learned that petitioner had
called them up but he was not around; that he would be going to Manila but would be back
home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the
official altar boy. He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner that he was
saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the only one in his group who
saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his own
the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to
Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that
he was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would drive for his group. He
asked him to call them often like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he would
call so that they could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and
heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to
write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him
perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy something
for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card For My Wonderful Father dated October 8, 1984 from Keith,
Charmaine and Joeton.

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Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the
benefit of his children.[25] Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children
from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards
the bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below attached a
high premium to the prospective adopters financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings
towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keiths
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would certainly have
engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he
had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their
presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones act of snuggling close to
private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their
father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their
succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his
hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals,[26] the Court awarded custody of a minor

illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if
the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able
to support her children according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir[27] where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son of the
beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent
and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child
even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may
be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts,
however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the
relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to
be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count
and appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a
dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and
their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever
treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing.
Flesh and blood count. x x x.
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, [28] the Court stated that (I)n ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more
intent on emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother separated from her children and the
humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound
to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater
than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. (Italics supplied) [29]
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. [30] The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had soemotionally abandoned them that his children would
not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received
from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him
and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also
because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.

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The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioners meager
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his
family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the
process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not
exactly the paramount consideration that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the country,
as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking
abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because Anna
Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. [31] In his testimony, private
respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and came
home twice or three times,[32] thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her
children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when he
went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The
Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of the
children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Maries brother Jose. However,
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private
respondents.[33]
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman,
private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. [34] Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could take care of the children while their parents are away, [35] thereby
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the childrens surname changed to
Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult for
them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. [36] To be sure, he also testified that he
wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to
keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was
allegedly the state of Anna Maries health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers
from a heart ailment.However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious
as she could still take care of the children. [37] An eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care
for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles [38]- she could not have
been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos attempt at
depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an
inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would never be at ease
with the wife of their father.[39]
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to
the sons of Wilma Soco.[40] As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine
society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it
does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the baneful effects
such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a premium on the inability of
a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that
petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion
that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.[41] Conventional wisdom and common human
experience show that a bad husband does not necessarily make a bad father. That a husband is
not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of
his inherent right to parental authority over the children. [42] Petitioner has demonstrated his love and

concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a telegram [43] to the lower court
expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled
back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire
to unite his family once more in the United States.[44]
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement
with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As
such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute
petitioners testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal home,
[45]
pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. Hence, it
can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of his family,
particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to
show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family
money, no matter how meager.
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out
the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts position
should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation
of law and jurisprudence.[46] The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored
solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents
over the child.[47]
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the basis
of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents counsel, [48] the authority given
to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was all
embracing[49] and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is
however, anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter
into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis
as private respondents apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with
petitioners consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing
the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal separation
of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. In awarding
custody, the court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the exercise of
parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to the
childs services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his
care and control, education, health and religion.[50]
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of
which is vested by the law upon the parents,[51] as

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x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental authority, `there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal,
the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company.[52] (Italics supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived
of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation
case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the
spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise,
there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an
irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds
under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the
court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to
petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Maries motion for reconsideration
thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner,
such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.[54]
[53]

The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for
adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects
of a decree of adoption.[55] But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely
because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of
petitioners abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to nonappreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escao[56] that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not
recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American
citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no
legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, [57] a case involving the
visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may
not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless
couples for a child, as on the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care of
parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the
discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry
Adoption[58] and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino
children.[59]
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and
be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and
harmonious development of his/her personality.[60]
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be
the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United
Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child.[61]
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s).[62]
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of
particularrelevance to instant case are the following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in
the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.[63]
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is
contrary to the childs best interests.[64]
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis,
save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both parents . . .[65]
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the child
in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.[66]
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes
with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests

77 | P a g e

of the child.This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent
or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--vis that of their
children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the
fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall
be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding
their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. [67] Said
petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and
under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE
ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ
returnable to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing of 12 October 1987
at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his report and recommendation
to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig submitted to the Court
his report and recommendation, also dated 3 December 1987.
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2)
weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also
executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by herein petitioners over the
child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20
August 1987, rendered a decision 2granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne
Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as
well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal
intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable
of inheriting their estate ." 3

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Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the
demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina
Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext
that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her
house in Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon
refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of
consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the
petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of
P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and
submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case, testified on 27
October 1987 before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in connection with the
present petition. She declared that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon on 24 June 1987
in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child. During the interview, said respondent
manifested to the social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of
age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that
desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married
man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a
minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father,
could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting
the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina
Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most
likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested
in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the

natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised
jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the
adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 9
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are
ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice
hereof This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan,
Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court
that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the
hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing both
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the
notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period ending 22 December 1987.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988,
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however,
was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc
are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not
petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition;
conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however,

80 | P a g e

1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed
before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and
Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not
having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which
did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is
mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of
hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for
appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the
policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of
procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice. if d
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be
defeated. 4

2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability,
or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or
logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine
of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following
terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether
of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our
Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to cases in which the person
upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to
the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence
of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-

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contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in

which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection
and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code
upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with
its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of
their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such
authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can
be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was
issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the
latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that
is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads
as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the
evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall
be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the
name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to
Article 39 of the same Code:

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx

child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put
a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the
time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised
trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody,
parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)

(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for
the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living
with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article
58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their companyand under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps
be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the

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Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case,
the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with
this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR.
MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.

14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more
frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the
care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly
indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

DECISION

15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces whenever
they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire
for some material benefits from petitioner.

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take
into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender
age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child
like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose
Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order
granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection
of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.

16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case
No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence,
hence this petition for revocation.[1]

VITUG, J.:

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred -

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change
his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the
latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents
adoption, but was prevented by petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxxxxxxxx
10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of
herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name
as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and
activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxxxxxxxx
13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps
to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

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SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of
the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of
the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the
proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 [2] of the Civil Code and
Article 192[3] of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369
confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint,
is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an
adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed
there is lack of cause of action.
Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family
Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind
the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within
the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years,
prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed.[4]
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner
raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In
ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family. [5] The continuity
of the adopters family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically
focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.
[6]
Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the
family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption. [7] It was only much later when adoption was given
an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.
[8]
Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman
law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans
came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made
the interests of the child an overriding consideration. [9] In the early part of the century just passed,
the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of

84 | P a g e

1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, [10] followed by the United Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child, [11] were written instruments that would also protect and
safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines [12] of 1950 on adoption,
later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code [13] and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the
United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to
the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552
secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate
status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the
sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to
annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being
vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process[15] that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.[17] Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
[18]
absolute, unconditional, and perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C.
Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No.
603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had
rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took
effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs.
Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D.
No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her
husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21] spouses Claude and
Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a
petition to formalize Michaels adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time
the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and
while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August
1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the
withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme
Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the
time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, [22] had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action
for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100 [23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would
lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right
within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges.[24] While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. [25] It is
a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child.[26] Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right
of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. [27] Concomitantly,
a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.[28]
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share
in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

85 | P a g e

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[4]
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig,
his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is
qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition
would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners
legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration [5] praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a
middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have
as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a
person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to
bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for
the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In

86 | P a g e

fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. [8] It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person
must have a name.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a
widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.

87 | P a g e

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use
such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above,
in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article
365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on
the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship
of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is
also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname
and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs,
for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if
he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will
his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should
be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty.
Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David
but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take
note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they
are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the
appropriate chapter.
xxx

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Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows,
as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. [15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish
a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when thePhilippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19]secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section
17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees

as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 [24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built
by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and
Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother
but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. [25] The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, [26] hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales
in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination
of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.

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Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995

3. to pay the costs of this suit.

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in
a habeas corpus case.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children,
all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed
into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to
them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June
9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal
wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with
his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar
said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the petitioner and against the respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to
the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a
month to the subject minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy
Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and

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Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may
be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the
parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under
the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their
legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to
determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an
adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a
relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by express provision
of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought in a
case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in
the case at bar because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant and,
therefore, cannot properly provide for their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich
businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and
parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and
her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J
that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant
until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW
ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in Special
Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the
custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other,

are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in
any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ
of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter
even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were
compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her
child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him
to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family
Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of
her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own
since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in
1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at
the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an
arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to
8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her
parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation,
compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close
family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if
the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able
to support her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the
amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private
respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of
P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes
love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because of

91 | P a g e

malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former
custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can
provide him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in
this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the
minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill
his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in
the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral
or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of
age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will
have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any
way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is
ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein
petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the
amount of support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs complaint is hereby reversed;
and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to
plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.

1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

SYLLABUS

However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed." 1

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are
and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over
9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over
9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of
age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said
Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon
the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the
Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles
2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love.
A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of
their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to
award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this
disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest
resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the
parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court
promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal

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Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the
legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place
and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of
the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a
minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the
same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she
supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter
persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him,
Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and
Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with
the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi,
which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the
corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both
minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories
drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and
evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her
death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to
commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of
their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may
have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to
eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment
on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs
complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of
sufficient merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein
plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendantsappellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the
following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established
decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to
make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu,
submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot
wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed
by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry
of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken
into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an
explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the
body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty
interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna
himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral
parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent
in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
Wendells hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi
about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes
based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body
of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said
body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that
during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or
washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was
inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is
possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that
he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of
entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination,
Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black
residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call clean?

93 | P a g e

ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you
said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the
singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own
sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself,
Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and point of exit a little
above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned
and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim."
7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime,
each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the
sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that
there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The
necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2
cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind
and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left,
involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating
cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left,
and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left,
2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance,
gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the
gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please
indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself?

Will you please indicate the 24 inches?

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire
credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses observations, since the visual
perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the
house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on
rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie
Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was
going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds
later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police
station to report the incident. 15 Manolos direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the
fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the
gate of the Gotiong house.

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.

ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost
straight towards his head." 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
defendants witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment
across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the
Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong
house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas
station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the
Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a
man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but
the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she
saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs,
but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex
house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs house; and he further
gave the following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another
man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or
present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor
can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand
because of the overwhelming evidence testimonial, documentary and pictorial the confluence
of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of
his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence
they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the
evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a
gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag, all of which
facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16
We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell
could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently
left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely
remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendells death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was missing from the
safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous
work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation
given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,
18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of
that firearm.

Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

94 | P a g e

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at
the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of
petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this
dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in
supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could
have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children who live in their company.
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which
was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the
natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This
vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in
many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3
SCRA 361-367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article
2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted
with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101
of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage
is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold
of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever
knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a
picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart,
Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in
keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the
categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative
analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or
quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered
direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of
said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act
or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the
mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence
the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children
is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
x

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court
was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as preponderantly
shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father
of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of
defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly
checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil
liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We
take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential
dicta which we feel require clarification.

95 | P a g e

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites
Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended
quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages
caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with
pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.chanrobles law library

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a
person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or
control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.)
21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the
civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and
primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed
by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or
shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former.

Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the
minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex
delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the
aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated
by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24
Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the
aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by
their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of
minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised
Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be
resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well
expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil
liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would
result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not
where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate
variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of whether the
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is
primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held
jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family.
The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action
in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide,
but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but,
this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the
petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly
declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries committed by
their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were
adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent,
coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be
solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of
equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for

96 | P a g e

persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers,
teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and
accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is
not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A
careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in
the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case
which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically appear in
the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta
and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted
therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence
under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having
in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minors criminal
responsibility is of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be
held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that
the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That
primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect
to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the
liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33
For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a
quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for
damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that
said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

97 | P a g e

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.

MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The innocent
victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome
task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better
qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young
adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in
Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was
employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as
a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by
his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On
August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were
on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to
the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was
born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money
matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive
jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of
money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh
was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his
children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal
case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in
the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O.

98 | P a g e

Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222,Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to
the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now
reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's
parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental
authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved
by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and IbaySomera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation
rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the Court of
Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged
in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the children
should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children through an
automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated
from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission which drafted Article
213 that a child below seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can give
and which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of
the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the
Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a child below seven years
should still be awarded to her mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband.
This is on the theory that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such
action. (Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)

The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an
appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing
the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a
simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of
age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to
decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents", and in Medina
vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as
against the mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in
this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child,
Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling
reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother
(do). This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions,
the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of
life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a
chattel of his parents into a radically different institution, due to the influence
of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As
pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for
the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is
but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children
with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code
to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive.
It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but,
again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent
unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the
circumstances.

99 | P a g e

In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind
celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on
January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent
children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live.
Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the
choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court
simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common
situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not
a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more
intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and the
humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound
to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater
than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave
greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing
on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores
Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was
studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The
responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve
deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she
saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her
father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally
emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go
back to the United States to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with
feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to
compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist
show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be
best served by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the
travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada
Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with
her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did

everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her
mother's infidelity. The application for travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206209, Rollo).

position in litigation, because there was then not even an impending possibility of one. That they
were subsequently utilized in the case a quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor in
which they were first obtained.

Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to the
date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is
rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be
ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is
not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character
change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson
III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the
good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the
custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable
of making a fairly intelligent choice.

Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be construed to have been
presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the
determination of the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations were presented
in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective knowledge and
expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali vs. Abukakar, et al. (17
SCRA 988 [1966]).

According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in the trial court, with
the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from
her. We are more inclined to believe the father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in
court because such an emotional display as described by Teresita in her pleadings could not have
been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division, Judge
Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the children and their mother in the courtroom. What the
Judge found is diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this
to say on the matter.

The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain

contested documents, at the request, not of a public officer or agency of the
Government, but of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the
examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly
the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private individual
may examine the same, if there are facts within his knowledge which may
help, the court in the determination of said issue. Such examination, which
may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does not,
certainly become null and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an
officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)

And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light, or with
more understanding, especially as her conduct and demeanor in the
courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the presence
of the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent temper that
tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical punishment of the
children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional
instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show deference and respect to
the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the expert witnesses.
Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should have considered the fact that Reynaldo
and his sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was
taken into account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of bias and unfairness made
by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the expert witnesses and
the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that their
testimony remain uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made by the experts were
conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of the habeas corpus petition
in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to support petitioners'

100 | P a g e

In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may
place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with
the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability
and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight
and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a
paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the
matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which reserve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily
rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the
expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The
problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is
not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.

(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess the witnesses'
character and to observe their respective demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their
testimony, and we believe that the trial court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind and her
aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no required
clearance. They were referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and
interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the
interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons. The interview was for
purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation.
On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for
her mother was based on the disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable
that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of
her position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any
litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in Psychology and an M.A.
degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a
doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of
the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption College wanted an
examination of the child for school purposes and not because of any litigation. She may have been
paid to examine the child and to render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid
to fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In this instance it was not
even petitioner Reynaldo but the school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed
that a professional of her potential and stature would compromise her professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at the time
she had a subsisting marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one of the
Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and
conveniences commensurate to their social standing because she does not
even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.

It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons under the law
which would justify depriving her of custody over the children; worse, she claims, these findings are
non-existent and have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of age not
to be separated from the mother, without considering what the law itself denominates as
compelling reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier
mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding custody to the mother, it
being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . . might create
in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and most impressionable
stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They
understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their
best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a
certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an
"unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by the records. The
findings of the trial court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in
California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a
year later, she had already driven across the continental United States to commence living with
another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of
course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having contracted a bigamous
marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she
told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo.
Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this
story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about
Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist
about a prior marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to the
act. The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact, the
rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three nights from
California, who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed
and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if
not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various witnesses that while
married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there

101 | P a g e

in the house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the
National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his
co-employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered
emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a
boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and
the children, bound for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines,
Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and
taking breakfast together. More significant is that letters and written messages from Teresita to
Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under
"compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children
over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to
conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of
bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-222,Rollo).

In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 granting
custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father,
Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which should definitively settle the matter of the care,
custody and control of the boy.

Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole parent and
substitute mother because his job is in the United States while the children will be left behind with
their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a
temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various
equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are
completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995,
Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent
return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record.
From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said
article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption
should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years
mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant
custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and
have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in
its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to
their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-appellees.

ROMERO, J.:

Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and understanding heart," for
there is man's law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the
care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents,
the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as
the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner
alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States
proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been
sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. 2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. 3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. 4 In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 petitioner now brings the instant
petition for review for a reversal of the appellate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private respondents have failed to show
that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's
grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having custody over the
boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room for the
boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be
assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a single centavo for
the boy's support and maintenance. When the boy was about to be released from the hospital, they
were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter and petitioner had no money. Besides,
Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the boy to them before she left for the United
States. Furthermore, petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after
being hospitably treated by private respondents, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as
a parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody,
ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As
maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his
infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the child's welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.

The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental
authority orpatria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s
needs. 7 It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses. 8 As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor." 9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal,
the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a children's home or an orphan institution. 11 When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning
his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. 16 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may
substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18 The situation obtaining in
the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States
while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart but are also
emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to
obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has
failed. 19
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of
his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the
Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents
are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is
"depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so
considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of minor Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October 8, 1990, adopted as
its own the latter's observations, to wit:

103 | P a g e

From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic)
best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the care,
custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the petitioners herein. The
petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to their grandson
while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown little interest in his
welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Moreover the fact that
petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully considered in awarding
to them the custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his
maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual college education
and other material advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688).
Respondent had never given any previous financial support to his son, while,
upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal
grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully employed in the
United States. Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a military personnel who
has to shuttle from one assignment to another, and, in these troubled times,
may have pressing and compelling military duties which may prevent him from
attending to his son at times when the latter needs him most, militates strongly
against said respondent. Additionally, the child is sickly and asthmatic and
needs the loving and tender care of those who can provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and
the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has
not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof
that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable
to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the
boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his
permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and
merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance
the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his
son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform
who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over
their children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such
as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

104 | P a g e

Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three years
is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the
grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents should
not be seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a father. Moreover,
who is to say whether the petitioner's financial standing may improve in the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein
petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996]

NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Parties herein would have this Court duplicate the feat of King Solomon who was hailed in
Biblical times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodox, manner of resolving conflicts, the most
celebrated case being that when his authority was invoked to determine the identity of the real
mother as between two women claiming the same infant. Since there could only be one mother,
the daunting task that confronted the king/judge was to choose the true one.
In the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of deciding, as between father and
mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their genes.
While there is a provision of law squarely in point, the two courts whose authority have been
invoked to render a decision have arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions.
It has fallen upon us now to likewise act as judge between the trial court, on the one hand,
and the appellate, on the other.

that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick
mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer
on good terms. That their love for each other was fading became apparent from their serious
quarrels. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager
income of P5,000.00.1 She longed to be with her only child but he was being kept away from her by
her husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RJ (Ray Junior) with her husband and in-laws. She
wished for her son to grow up with his mother.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he
practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have
their own home and a car. They could live comfortably on his P 15,000.00 monthly income2 as they
were not burdened with having to pay any debts.
Petitioner was forced to move to her parents home on Guizo Street in Mandaue. Despite
mediation by the priest who solemnized their marriage, the couple failed to reconcile.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus 3 asking respondent
Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.

On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the boys father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial courts decision to grant custody to Nerissa
Z. Perez, the childs mother.

On August 27, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old
child to his mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his
wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in Cebu onDecember 6,
1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth
to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued ordering the respondent to
turn over the custody of their child Ray Cortes Perez II, his passport and roundtrip ticket to herein
petitioner with a warning that if he will escape together with the child for the purpose of hiding the
minor child instead of complying with this Order, that warrant for his arrest will be issued.

Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of her
earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her
successive miscarriages in New York. She became a resident alien in February 1992.

SO ORDERED.4

Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became
pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and

105 | P a g e

Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals, on September 27, 1994, reversed the trial
courts order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.5
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 she filed the instant petition for
review where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now three years old.

Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial court and ruled that there were enough
reasons to deny Nerissa Perez custody over Ray II even if the child is under seven years old.It held
that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.7
Before us is the unedifying situation of a husband and wife in marital discord, struggling for
custody of their only child. It is sad that petitioner and private respondent have not found it in their
hearts to understand each other and live together once again as a family. Separated in fact, they
now seek the Courts assistance in the matter of custody or parental authority over the child.
The wisdom and necessity for the exercise of joint parental authority need not be
belabored. The father and the mother complement each other in giving nurture and providing that
holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and
spiritual needs of the child. By precept and example, they mold his character during his crucial
formative years.
However, the Courts intervention is sought in order that a decision may be made as to which
parent shall be given custody over the young boy. The Courts duty is to determine whether Ray
Perez II will be better off with petitioner or with private respondent. We are not called upon to
declare which party committed the greater fault in their domestic quarrel.
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable
law. It provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Italics supplied)
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered
within its terms.8
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption
and Custody of Minors) provides:
SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife
are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care,
custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will
be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over

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ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefor. (Italics supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. In the case of Lacson v. San JoseLacson,9 the Court declared:
The use of the word shall in Article 36310 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by
the Code Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It
prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless
such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.11
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of age to their
mother was explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her
child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have
any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 12)12
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven
years old should not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier
Article 17, paragraph three of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603)
which reduced the childs age to five years.13
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. 14 Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment,15 unemployment and immorality,16habitual
drunkenness,17 drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.18

It has long been settled that in custody cases, 19 the foremost consideration is always the
Welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.20
Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as
their material resources, social and moral situations.21
In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both
parties have demonstrated that they have ample means.
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of work in the U.S.A. and
has taken this point against her. The records, however, show that she is employed in a New
York hospital22 and was, at the time the petition was filed, still abroad. 23 She testified that she
intends to apply for a job elsewhere, presumably to improve her work environment and augment
her income, as well as for convenience. 24 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that a
registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in demand in the United States. Unlike
private respondent, a doctor who by his own admission could not find employment there, petitioner
immediately got a job in New York. Considering her skill and experience, petitioner should find no
difficulty in obtaining work elsewhere, should she desire to do so.
The decision under review casts doubt on petitioners capability to take care of the child,
particularly since she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at times, even at night. There
being no one to help her look after the child, it is alleged that she cannot properly attend to him.
This conclusion is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a number of working mothers who
are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time
management principles judiciously. Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has
invited her own mother or relative to join her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets and
liberal allowances, to look after the child until he is able to take care of himself. Others go on leave
from work until such time as the child can be entrusted to day-care centers. Delegating child care
temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good
mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often
brought up by housemaids or yayas under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third, private respondents
work schedule was not presented in evidence at the trial.Although he is a general practitioner, the
records merely show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and
teaches part-time.25 Hence, respondent courts conclusion that his work schedule is flexible (and
h)e can always find time for his son 26 is not well-founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent
lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitioners work schedule cited in
the respondent courts decision is not necessarily permanent. Hospitals work in shifts and, given a
mothers instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the utmost care, petitioner may be expected to
arrange her schedule in such a way as to allocate time for him. Finally, it does not follow that
petitioner values her career more than her family simply because she wants to work in the United

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States. There are any number of reasons for a persons seeking a job outside the country, e.g. to
augment her income for the familys benefit and welfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a
few. In the instant case, it has been shown that petitioner earned enough from her job to be able to
construct a house for the family in Mandaue City. The record describes sketchily the relations
between Ray and Nerissa Perez. The transcripts of the three hearings are inadequate to show that
petitioner did not exert earnest efforts and make sacrifices to save her marriage.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a
baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the infant
to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The mothers role in the life of
her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mothers
love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification, not in fantasy
but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner
Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132223

June 19, 2001

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,

vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing;
that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was
filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado,
U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr.
and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties
as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for
a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650,
"In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil,
Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and
its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said
Decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of October
12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.

The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:

The Court of Appeals held:

"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his
lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife, Helen G. Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie
was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that
the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of
proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits with a probable value of
P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.

"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in
the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental
authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of
the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the
Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may
another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any
reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal
rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen
would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil
law and the constitution on family solidarity."2
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the following
"legal points":

"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian
over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to
be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to
existing jurisprudence.

"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an
opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already
filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the
biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the
undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped
seven times by Oppositors live-in partner.

"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for
the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the
natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject

"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner
Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the

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disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998,
respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998
as shown by her Birth Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect
to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The said
"Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect to her.
Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent
should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the
minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support
in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and
legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent
one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:

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"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and
has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner
merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her
(respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is
no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify
as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of
Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of
a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian
by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who
may not also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines
since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction of
libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-16884 6 filed by
one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this
country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not
within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs.
Teran,7 this Court held:
"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that
her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators
or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements
upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates
of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with
this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to
their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who
are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that
Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of
respondent Helen Belmes.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006

EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner,
vs.
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother
and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa
Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardian ad-litem, Lea Daban Lacson, has come
to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal and
setting aside of the Decision1 dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
60203, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of October 18, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and other pleadings, the Court
gathers the following facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for
financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they
rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly
observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years,
shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976.
They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time
to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had received
from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 toP600,000.00.
In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs.
He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he
inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed
financial constraint for his inability to provide theP12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the
complaint.
As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa
support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other
conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996.4
Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as
represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set
forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented
216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The fallo of the trial courts decision 5 reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in arrears in the amount of TWO MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which amount shall be
deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that which they received from
defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support pendent lite;
2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and
3) Pay costs.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for
support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to
give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years
and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to
help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St.
Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed
a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,
Maowee was about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully

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SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No.
60203.
Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001,6 dismissed Edwards
appeal, disposing as follows;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court in its
equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.7

and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless,
what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his
obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by
way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of
support in arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision, thus:

Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred I. XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994.
II. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY RESPONDENTS UNCLE
NOEL DABAN.
III. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF PETITIONER IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME TO RESPONDENTS.
IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO XXX RESPONDENTS
EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN
COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE RESPONDENTS.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and
Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in
arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been
made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his
point:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has
a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil
Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for
support was made upon him.
Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over the
fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could
celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters
during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the
fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with
him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975.
It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms

112 | P a g e

From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their [paternal] grandmothers house by
their father and asked for support; this notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose
which the latter embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one years that they
needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligation for only two (2) years.
xxx xxx xxx
Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his children, the
[respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs mother asked extrajudicially for her childrens support
since 1976, when she went to her mothers house. .8 (Words in bracket and underscoring
added.)
The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the same in the
following wise:
We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture of trying to evade his responsibility
to give support to his daughters simply because their mother did not make a "formal" demand
therefor from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly
pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation
through a note in his own handwriting. Said note [stating that he will "sustain his two daughters
Maowee and Maonaa"] also stated "as requested by their mother" thus practically confirming the
fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. The trial court thus correctly
ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from 1976.9(Words in
bracket added).
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of
that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the
respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are
accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.10 Not one of the
well-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this
case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the CAs findings
bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand
for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note
adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is
generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the
Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below,11 except when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the
factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.

Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory holding that respondents
uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again, petitioners lament on the matter
is a veritable call for review of factual determinations of the two courts below. It need not,
accordingly, detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives, the
respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel Daban. Noteworthy also is the
fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for
schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance and education,12 or, in short, whatever is necessary to keep a person alive.
Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance
and education when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their preschooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it is not amiss to
deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that Noel Daban who, owing to consideration of kinship,
had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Lea money to support her children.

Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to consider a transaction
that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale by Lea of half of
what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the petitioner would have this
Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million proceeds of the sale for
themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received from the sale is more than
enough to fully satisfy thus release him from complying with- the underlying judgment for support,
assuming ex gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support in arrears.

Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from
the petitioner. The provision reads:

Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioners
suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off for
what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best gratuitous
and self-serving.

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently
needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the
petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract,13 an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly
enriching himself at the expense of another.
As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures
arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness
respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the
CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the varying
needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial
resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the
amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of
the recipient.14

113 | P a g e

Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it assumes
as a fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his exclusive property. But, as the CA aptly
observed, "there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction mentioned by [the
petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property," as in fact "[respondents] mother
asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold their respective shares on said property."15

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents
with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been
deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born.
This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein
respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and resolution are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.