Garcia v Recio

Held
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types.
The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in
the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:"1. A party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence
as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned
in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence,

VAN DORN v ROMULLO

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The
Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this Certiorari
proceeding.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds; and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
WON Alice Van Dorn can claim for the property (galleon shop)
Held: The court ruled pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
The divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community xxx xxx xxx"You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, subject to the
following:"1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility."2. That there is no community of property to
be adjudicated by the Court."3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage."
That, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.

May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Villanueva at the Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed 2 children.
Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same.
OSG Held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. he is likewise capacitated by operation of
law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
RULE 63DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder... .The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Held
The Court ruled that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
They also stated the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and2
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
It is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.

Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license. the marriage contract itself states that marriage license was issued in
the name of the contracting parties in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
When Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted
only for four (4) months. The couple parted ways. Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the
consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage.
The lawyer discovered that there was no marriage license issued. Castro showed the certificate from the civil register
certifying that their marriage license cannot be located because it does not appear in their records. She admitted that she
did not go to the Civil Registrar to apply neither did she sign. She only signed in the marriage contract.
RTC ruled that its inability to certify that the marriage license could not be found is not conclusive to show that there was
no marriage license issued. But the appellate court reversed and declared it null and void.
Issue: WON the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that
no marriage license was issued.
Held: YES. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was
the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the
LCR, being an essential requirement and absence of which will render the marriage void ab initio. Based on Sec 29 of 132
Rules of Court:
Sec 29: A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his contain no such record or entry."
a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties. The marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of marriage
license even though there was a spurious marriage license presented to the solemnizing office . The documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.

Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union,
the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. On 28 May 1992,

Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.

When Robert died he was single without legitimate descendants or ascendants. The Petitioner seeks to claim that
Roberto and Rudyard shall succeed the entire estate of the deceased amounting to 5 Million Pesos. She attached the
birth certificate of the 2 children. She is requesting that she be granted the guardianship of the 2 children considering they
are both minors. She states that she is competent and possess all the qualifications and non of the disqualifications.
The RTC issued an order setting the hearing and the notice be published in the newspaper of general circulation in
Cotabato City or Davao City. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence,
hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. RTC denied. Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file
the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. the court found that the actual residence of
the deceased was Cotabato City. Petitioner presents a Xerox copy of the marriage contract between her and Robert but
the court does not accept it because the best evidence would be the original and not a photocopy and that there was no
real marriage because even the solemnizing officer denied that he solemnized a wedding between the 2 parties. The
counsels of the petitioner brought to evidence the TCT, Income Tax Returns, passports all stating that he was married to
Antionietta Garcia.
WON the following documents can act as supporting evidence that she was infact married to Robert Chua?
The court DENIED the petition of Garcia on the ground that the best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the
movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents
cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the
marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man
and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together
with other worthless pieces of evidence.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the
deceased, as special administrator of the estate.

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.

Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. Pepito and Norma executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
WON The parties are exempt from the marriage license?
WON the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Issue 1: The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage
to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code.
The applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration A
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)7 in relation to Article 58.8. The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution. Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"12 and
case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
There are some exemptions of the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided
in Article 76. In this case, they consider to fall in this case. That they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained
the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. It should be considered that they shall have no legal impediment
At the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about 1 year and 8months. So that would mean that they were cohabiting while Pepito
was still married to his formal wife which is against the law. The 5 year period should be from the time that Pepito and the
wife got separated and not during a valid marriage.
Issue 2: A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid
under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can
be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the

bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the
law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator.
She was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in a church wedding in Caloocan City and
having 4 children. Her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Judge claims that in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. Had he known he would not have
advised Payao to marry again otherwise they can be charged with bigamy.
The Judge asked both parties to file a resolution. Both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been
marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
WON they fall under Article 34?
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.For
this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without
legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. Payao and Manzano stated that they both indicated that they
were separated. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from
their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Clearly, respondent Judge
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of
the law excuses no one" has special application to judges

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages.

With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he has four (4) children. Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second
wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely:
Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa (3 rd wife) died
in 1941. At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried.
Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinlupa. December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second
marriages (Mariategui) executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of
the Muntinglupa Estate. Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicates under
Act No. 496. the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties. Lupo's children (Paulina, Julian and Jacinto) by
his third marriage with Felipa Velasco filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together
with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 164 were owned by their common father. Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the
third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. The Mariategui filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription.
The plaintiffs are assailing the proof that Felipa Velasco was infact married to Lupo Mariategui
WON
Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married despite the failure to produce a marriage certificate. The fact
is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to Jacinto that they he ( Lupo) and his mom (Felipa) got married
before the Justice of Peace of Taguig in or about 1930s.. Based on the Civil Code it provides for a manner of proving
filiation there are only 2 types of filiation legitimate and illegitimate. Filiation of legitimate children may be established by
records of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Chi Min Tsoi and his wife got married in Intramurous Manila after the ceremony and reception they proceeded in the
house of Chi Min Tsoi During the first few days of their marriage they slept together in one room but they did not engage
to sexual intercourse. On the first day Chi Min Tsoi was tired and just fell asleep which happened for the next few days.
They went up to Baguio for their honeymoon but they were together with the wifes family which were invited by Tsoi.
During that time there was also no attempt of sexual intercourse he even avoided her by taking long walks during siesta or
just falls asleep in the rocking chair. The wife claims that she has never seen the private parts of her husband and vice
versa. Because of this they submitted to a medical examinations The results of their physical examinations were that she
is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. The wife claims that
her husband was impotent because he does not show his penis and that sometimes he uses the facial cream and
eyebrow pencils. according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with
her husband. The wife wants an annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity. The husband refused because he
said that he loves her and that he has no defect and he is not psychologically incapacitated. Since the relationship is still
very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is still a chance to fix them. The marriage was from May 1988 till March
1989 and there was no sexual intercourse between them. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out
that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch
and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
RTC rendered the marriage VOID.
WON the marriage is voif?
WON He is psychologically incapacitated?
Held: Marriage is VOID.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial. While the law provides that the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order"
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came
home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and
had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand,
Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis
for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for
the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married
marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for
separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. Based on Art 43 and 44 of the Family Code , private respondent's ultimate prayer
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of their marriage. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is
the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower
court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the
expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations
of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial
court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound.
Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a
number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she
called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did.
Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure
of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was
denied.

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987.
Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan
and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after
that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from
her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in
1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and
the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio
15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to
refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita
had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not
physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993,
Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso
presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological
incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish
outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than
just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be
treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the
City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967 They
have 4 children. During the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had
extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist from the AFP, a lieutenant from PSC and a Jordanian National. Sharon
was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa
Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon
returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the
two illegitimate children as his own. Sharon went to Jordan to with her 2 children by Ibrahim and would only go back to the
Philippines on special occasions. Petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity;
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
After the RTC ruled that the church and civil marriages are declared null and void in the ground of psychological
incapactity to perform essential marital obligations.
whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated
Held:
The court ruled with reference to the Santos v CA when they defined that psychological incapacity should be no less than
a mental and not physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants expressed in
Article 68 (36) of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. Psychological incapacity must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of
petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic
Church.

Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del
Norte. They lived in Dapaon Zamboanga and have 2 children. On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that Natividad
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Rodolfo testified that he first met
Natividad when they were in HS and was forced to marry her 3 months because he got pregnant. They were only 21 and
18 during the marriage so they were both unstable. When Rodolfo decided to join the army natividad left their conjugal
home and sold their house without his consent. She also lived with Eng. Terez and had a child. After cohabiting with Terez,
she contracted a second marriage on Jan 11 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and lived with him in CDO.
Since 1972 Natividad abandoned Rodolfo and her 2 kids. He tried his best to save their marriage but it seemed that
Natividads physiological incapacity was incurable. She even failed to file her answer during trial but she informed the
court that she took the psychiatric exam in response to Rodolfo. Whichheunderwentaswell.Aspertheresultsitshowedthat
both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to complywith the essential marital obligations, finding that
both parties suffered from utter emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant
from persons who abide by established norms of conduct. As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the
willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a
husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both
parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the couples union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of
marriage
OSG filed a case stating that the acts committed by Natividad can not fall under psychological incapacity but rather mere
grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.
WON the marriage can be declared void?
No. Tho the RTC ruled that it is considered void the SC ruled otherwise.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833
of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of the
Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved).
Respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity. On the incurability of Natividad's
condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare
conclusion and even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of
her report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated.
To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be
reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family the instant petition is granted.

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically
the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant
Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and
were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including
their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo,
that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged
entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate
children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in
1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate
wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after
her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband
as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the
partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail
trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put
and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latters share.
HELD:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and
wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing
the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While
a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily
explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such
marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to
the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat
allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of
his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they
terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her
relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No.
12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the exparte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to
enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners
Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently
enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private
respondent.