DE LEON V.

NEPOMUCENO
FACTS:
Judgment for costs was rendered in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in an
election contest proceeding in the following terms: The costs and expenses of
the contest will be paid by the protestee and the intervener jointly and severally.
Petitioner, the protestee, alleges that the sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, with
the express approval of the respondent judge of the court of first instance of that
province, is proceeding to enforce the above-cited judgment against him as
though it were a joint and several judgment for the costs and expenses and not
merely a joint judgment.
Thus, petitioner prays that the respondent be restrained from all further attempts
to enforce the judgment for the costs as a joint and several judgment.
ISSUE: WON in the event that third persons intervene and take an active part in
the election contest, the court should tax the costs jointly and severally against
all the losing parties
RULING: No. Examining the language of the judgment for costs, which is set out
in the foregoing statement of facts, it is manifest that it is merely a joint judgment
against, and does not permit of construction or interpretation as a joint and
several judgment.
Solidary obligations must not be implied lightly because of provisions of Art.
1137 & Art. 1138 of Civil Code (now Art. 1207 & 1208).
PARROT V. GEMORA
FACTS:
There was a promissory note made by Asuncion Aguilar and Carlos Gemora
(defendant). But before payment of the PN, Asuncion Aguilar died.
Shortly thereafter, Tomasa Gemora sold and delivered the PN to Lizarraga
Hermanos who in turn sold and delivered it to Houston Parrot (petitioner).
The lower court after calculating the interest and allowing for the rate of
exchange between Mexican and Philippine currency, rendered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of 5,845.30 pesos,
Philippine currency, with costs.
The court ordered the defendant to pay the full amount.
ISSUE: WON the defendant is liable for the whole amount just like in solidary
obligation

RULING: Yes. The phrase juntos o separadamente, used in his promissory note,
is an express statement, making each of the persons who signed it individually
liable for the payment of the full amount of the obligation contained therein.
The phrase juntos o separadamente, used in a contract creates the same
obligation as the phrase "mancomun o insolidum." The words "separadamente"
and "insolidum" used in a contract in connection with the nature of the liability of
the parties are sufficient to create an individual liability.
ORIENTAL V. ABETO
Facts:
In civil case No. 35897 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the herein
petitioner sought to recover from Gregorio Bugayong, Vicente Rosario and the
herein respondent Alejo Mabanag a certain sum of money, interest, penalty and
costs. After trial, judgment was rendered ordering Bugayong alone to pay the
sum of P5,742.73 with legal interest thereon from August 15, 1929, plus the
costs, and absolving Mabanag and Rosario from the complaint. Appeal was
taken therefrom and the case was docketed in this court as case No. 37624.
After the same had been submitted for decision, judgment was rendered as
follows:
On the whole case we believe that P1,000 should be awarded appellant for
attorneys fees and that judgment should be entered against all the defendants
and appellees in the sum of P5,742.73, with legal interest from the 15th of
August, 1929, until paid, together with the sum of P1,000 as attorneys fees, and
the costs in both instances.
In the judgment of this court, notice of which was served by the clerk on the trial
court, notice of which was served by the clerk on the trial court and the parties, it
is simply stated that judgment be entered against all the defendants and
appellees in the sum of P5,742.73, with legal interest from the 15th of August,
1929, until paid, together with the sum of P1,000 as attorneys fees, and costs,
but it does not specify the kind of obligation imposed upon the defendants in
connection with the payment or the manner in which said payment should be
made by them. In other words, the judgment failed to state whether or not the
defendants should pay said sums jointly and severally.
ISSUE: WON the parties are solidarily liable?
RULING: No. It is already a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that,
when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to pay jointly
and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy
in full said judgment. And applying said doctrine to the case under consideration,
it follows that the respondent Mabanag is not in fact liable to satisfy in full the
amount of the judgment rendered against him and the other two co-defendants.
It is of no consequence that, under the written contract of suretyship executed by
the parties, the obligation contracted by the sureties was joint and several in

character. The final judgment, which superseded the action brought for the
enforcement of said contract, declared the obligation to be merely joint, and the
same cannot be executed otherwise.

negotiorum gestio with respect to the others. And if the power granted includes
various transactions some of which are common and others are not, only those
interested in each transaction shall be liable for it.

AMOR DE CASTRO V. CA

When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability
of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay
the entire obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any
one of the co-principals, as in this case.

FACTS:
The De Castros (appellants) were co-owners of 4 lots located at EDSA.
Francisco Artigo (respondent/appellee) was authorized by appellants to act as
real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the amount of P23Mfive
percent (5%) of which will begiven to the agent as commission.

OUANO ARRASTRE V. ALENAR

FACTS:

It was appellee who first found Times Transit Corporation which bought the 2
lots. Appellee received from appellants P48K as commission. Apellee contended
that his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of
the agreed price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to
appellants for the two (2) lots. .On the other hand, appellants completely
traverse appellee's claims and essentially argue that appellee is selfishly asking
for more than what he truly deserved as commission. So appellee should not
have been heard to complain of getting only a pittance when he actually got the
biggest share of the commission out of the other agents and worse, he should
not have been allowed to get the entire commission. Furthermore, the purchase
price for the two lots was only P3.6 million as appearing in the deed of sale and
not P7.05 million as alleged by appellee.
"Private respondent Francisco Artigo sued petitioners the De Catros to collect
the unpaid balance of his broker's commission.
The Trial Court found the De Castros liable to pay jointly and solidarily to Artigo.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in totality the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WON the De Castros are solidarily liable?
RULING: Yes. The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates
against the De Castros theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as
indispensable parties. A noted commentator explained Article 1915 thus
The rule in this article applies even when the appointments were made by the
principals in separate acts, provided that they are for the same transaction. The
solidarity arises from the common interest of the principals, and not from the act
of constituting the agency. By virtue of this solidarity, the agent can recover from
any principal the whole compensation and indemnity owing to him by the others.
The parties, however, may, by express agreement, negate this solidary
responsibility. The solidarity does not disappear by the mere partition effected by
the principals after the accomplishment of the agency.
If the undertaking is one in which several are interested, but only some create
the agency, only the latter are solidarily liable, without prejudice to the effects of

Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed a complaint

before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance
Company, Inc. (Mercantile) and petitioner Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. for
replacement of certain equipment imported by IPI which were insured by
Mercantile but were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegedy because of mishandling
by petitioner.
Petitioners answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma Saludo & Associates
and signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office of LSA. Atty. Fidel
Manalo, a partner from the Makati office filed to postpone the hearing stating
that the case had just been endorsed to him by petitioner. After trial which Atty.
Manalo handled, the trial court rendered a decision holding Mercantile and
petitioner jointly and severally liable for the cost of replacement of the damaged
equipment plus damages totaling P435,000.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are solidarily liable
RULING: Yes. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a single
firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to pretend that its main office and
branch office in effect constitute separate law firms with separate and distinct
personalities.
BLOSSOM & CO. V. MANILA GAS CORPORATIONS
FACTS:
Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into
a contract. The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to
month of specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It
was agreed that the price would prevail only so long as the raw materials (coal
and crude oil) used by the defendants in the manufacture of gas should cost the
same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In the event of an
increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a
corresponding increase or decrease in the price of tar.
The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In
consideration of the modification, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the
defendant a certain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant. The defendant sold

and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage to
secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price.
Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action
against the defendant to obtain specific performance and recovery of damages.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract by ceasing to deliver
any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar products
and its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid.
CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for
damages but refused to order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with
its remedy for damages against the defendants for any subsequent breach of
contract.
Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the
defendant breached the contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation
under the same contract.

CUI V. SUN CHAN

FACTS:
The trial court found as a finding of fact that the defendant, without the
permission of the plaintiff, made some additions to the property on the rear end
consisting of two awnings. The defendant did not appeal from the judgment, and
we do not therefore have to discuss this aspect of the case.
As conclusion of law, the court decided that, while the defendant has made
constructions upon the property without the permission of the plaintiff, the latter,
nevertheless, has no right to rescind the lease, under clause (d) of the contract.
The plaintiff appealed from this judgment by filing the corresponding bill of
exceptions and the case has been transmitted to this court.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages

The clause of the contract which gave rise to this cases as follows:

RULING: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.

"(D)
Sun Chan (the lessee) also binds himself not to make any construction
upon the property without the permission of the lessor, and in case he should do
so, making any improvement thereon, it shall in all cases be for the benefit of the
property, without any right to ask for reimbursement for its costs."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Doctrine
Divisible contracts (as a general rule)
- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a
single breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent
breach.
Entire contract (case at bar)
- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is total, there can only be one
action in which the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a
judgement for damages by reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the
same contract and on account of the continuous breach.
-The contract between the parties is an entire contract.
-In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the continuing contract by absolute
refusal. The claim for damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final
judgement was rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may
thereafter sustain.

ISSUE: WON petitioner may be excused in performing obligation by electing

penalty
RULING: No. Without deciding whether the preceding clause of the contract of
lease constitutes or not an obligation with a penal clause, we believe that even
in this class of obligations the penalty, the object of which is to secure
compliance with the obligation, cannot, as a general rule, serve as a defense for
the purpose of leaving the principal obligation unfulfilled, for the reason that the
creditor may, at his option, exact the fulfillment of the obligation or the payment
of the penalty, according to article 1153 of the Civil Code.