20160222-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council - APPEAL-15-2502-ADDRESS To The COURT-Supplement 3

Page 1 AP 2502 ADDRESS TO THE COURT Suppl 3, Hearing date 22-2-2016 (or alternative date if allocated)
ADDRESS TO THE COURT (Written submissions) Supplement 3

County Court of Victoria
Ballarat venue (and/or alternative venue)
Cc:
Elliott Stafford and Associated

lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au
County Court of Victoria crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Melinda Hampshire Melinda.Hampshire@courts.vic.gov.au , registry.ballarat@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Reference AP 2502 Buloke Shire Council for State of Victoria (s114 of the constitution) v Schorel-Hlavka
Sir/Madam,
I have made clear that I rely upon HCA 27 of 1999 Wakim where the court held that
a constitutional matter that was litigated between the same parties cannot be re-litigated again.
In regard of the 2001 purported federal election I opposed to vote, and did so also in the
purported 2004 federal election which in both cases resulted to being charges and after various
hearings convicted by the Magistrates court of Victoria despite my Section 78B NOTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS (Reproduced below- including the typo errors!). I appealed
to the County Court of Victoria (invoking federal jurisdiction) which on 19 July 2006 upheld
both appeals and Mr Robert Hulls for the State of Victoria having stated that the State of Victoria
would abide by the courts ruling.
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22-2-2016
Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue
Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502
Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. 107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria admin@inspector-rikati.com
(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers
Again below the Section 78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS (section 78B of
the judiciary Act 1903) has been reproduced to indicate that the issues of citizenship, State
citizenship Australian citizenship was considerably canvassed by me and that Australian
Citizenship can only be obtained by obtaining State citizenship. None of the AttorneyGenerals challenged this.
As I succeeded in both appeals I am entitled to have the benefits of those successful appeals.
In current matters before the County Court of Victoria I am the Objector as well as the
Appellant, making known that I object to the jurisdiction of the court. The prosecutor has not
filed one of iota evidence to overcome this objection. And so to say time to do so has long
since passed. In fact despite the 30 October 29015 orders of His Honour Mullaly J the Prosecutor
(it should be purported Prosecutor) failed to comply with the orders to post on or before 9
November 2015 the full brief. As such no material is before the Court to consider in support of
either the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION or to justify the Summons charge. Hence the
objection is and remains to be unchallenged. The Prosecutor neither filed within the provisions of
the rules of the court and legislative provisions any Notice of Appearance and neither applied for
leave to file/serve out of time. As such the appeal for this is also unchallenged.
I opposed the litigation even before it was instituted but to no avail. Well, then the purported
prosecutor cannot complain about might be perceived as an avalanche of writings because after
all it is trying to deny me the benefits of past court orders.
As Buloke Shire Council is acting by delegated powers of the State of Victoria then the litigation
is one where effectively the name Buloke Shire Council can be substituted for the State of
Victoria. As such Buloke Shire Council cannot re-litigate constitutional issues that were resolved
by my successful appeal on 19 July 2006 as time for the State of Victoria to litigate was on 19
July 2006 and not about 10 years later.
Melinda Hampshire Registrar has indicated that the written submissions ADDRESS TO THE
COURT is placed in the correspondence file rather than the court file and I have written to
the Registrar that this is inappropriate.
QUOTE 20-2-2016 CORRESPONDENCE
Melinda Hampshire Registrar
20-2-2016
Melinda.Hampshire@courts.vic.gov.au & registry.ballarat@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Cc:
Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria, feedback@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J. judgemullaly.chambers@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Re: 20160220-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Melinda Hampshire Registrar-Re APPEAL-15-2502--Re COMPLAINT
Melinda,
considering that a judge on circuit requires to know what hearing time allocation is needed
and the basic issues of the case to conceal from the judge the written submissions (ADDRESS
TO THE COURT) from the court file means from onset that the judge from onset will be
misled by court staff about what the case is about, as I stated in my 18-2-2016 correspondence:
QUOTE 18-2-2018 correspondence
As the written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) supplement 2 (17-2-2016) on the last page sis
submit that orders and judgment be reserved then clearly a judge could consider it all and then if desiring to
do so hand down a reason of judgment and orders upon the content of the written submissions (ADDRESS
TO THE COURT) with its supplement 1 & 2, considering also no (valid) material was filed and/or served
by Buloke Shire Council.
END QUOTE 18-2-2018 correspondence
Technically this matter is too comprehensive & complicated to be heard by way of circuit
hearing, and should be transferred to William Street, Melbourne venue at the very least!
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For example as stated in

20160214-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council -APPEAL-15-2502ADDRESS TO THE COURT-Supplement 1
QUOTE
Some of the issues but not in any of priority

OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
Fire Prevention Notice in violation to the provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958
Fire Prevention Notice contains demands exceeding delegated powers.
Fire prevention Notice in valid in law
Infringement Notice invalid in law based on invalid Fire prevention Notice.
Summons invalid in law based on Invalid Infringement Notice.
Summons invalidly issues as Infringement Noticed failed to have been withdrawn.
Summons hearing in the wrong court venue
Failure to serve full brief
No evidence to prove jurisdiction.
No evidence whatsoever to justify 20 August 2015 orders at St Arnaud venue
No evidence to legally justify 17 September 2015 orders at St Arnaud venue
Failing to file and serve Notice of Appearance regarding appeal
Failing to file and serve for Leave to file and serve out of time Notice of Appearance
Failure to provide 27 October 2015 requested brief
Failing to comply with 30/10/2015 order to serve via Australia Post by 9/11/2015 full brief
Failing to request leave to serve out of time full brief.
Providing misleading Form 11 statement dated 25/11/2015 re 18/3/2013 alleged hearing
Provide different Form 11 for 22/2/2016 hearing without full brief
Failure by State Government to provide relevant FOI material requested 9/12/2015
END QUOTE
It should be clear that I am not the kind of person who will let these issues go and I view that no
competent legal practitioner would ignore such issues. A trail judge cannot ignore those issues
either and it may take considerable time, if not days, to hear and determine these issues. And
possibly orders that the court may deem appropriate and numerous further hearings. Hearing
times on circuit are very precious as people residing in the country need to be heard without
having to travel to Melbourne for this, albeit major complicated cases generally have to be heard
at Melbourne. The judge on circuit cannot allocate numerous days to deal with one case and so
repeated returns to the Ballarat venue in itself would be a gross denial of justice, this besides my
health problems. As I reside in Viewbank, a suburb of Melbourne and Buloke Shire Council
lawyers are based in Clifton Hill, a suburb of Melbourne then it simply doesnt make sense in
that regard to have a hearing in Ballarat. Moreover,
QUOTE 2 20151029-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council -APPEAL-15-2502
The fact that Buloke Shire Council as well as its legal representatives were made aware even before they instituted
litigation in the magistrates Court of Victoria at Collingwood but for a very strange reason chose a difficult venue at St
Arnaud to have it heard they were made aware of the 19 July 2006 judgment of the County Court of Victoria setting aside
the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg orders which I had challenged in an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
and as such its persistence to nevertheless institute litigation was and still remains of great concern to me. In particular
where I had notified both Buloke Shire Council as well as its legal representatives that I was in ill health. (My mobile can
show the numerous medical appointment that were confirmed to have been made, also on the days of the hearings). While
the Heidelberg venue was closed due to water damage the advice was that the magistrates Court of Victoria at Melbourne
(city), Broadmeadows and Ringwood would be the alternatives. In any circumstances as I reside in Viewbank St Arnaud
was not the correct venue. It should be of concern to any judge that this tactic to elect a venue that is most difficult to attend
to is as to obstruct access to the courts, in particular where a person is suffering of ill health. See also [2011] UKPC 31
Privy Council Appeal No 0101 of 2010 Electra Daniel Administrator for the estate of George Daniel (deceased) (Appellant)
v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (Respondent) while this was a wheelchair access issue, nevertheless the
judgment itself refers to access to the courts. As a senior citizen I view the Age Discrimination Act 2004 applies also,
considering also that a Magistrates Court of Victoria court facility at Heidelberg is about 4 KM away from my residence
(the City, Broadmeadows and Ringowood venues are each about 20 kilomtres away. The distance of Melbourne to St
Arnaud is 244 KM.
END QUOTE 20151029-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council -APPEAL-15-2502
The same applies to the Ballarat venue where despite my health problems I am forced to attend
to some distant circuit court hearing. Obviously the court do video hearing for me to attend to
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Melbourne, William Street venue, but that surely would be silly to use court facilities at 2 court
venues where William Street can be used on its own.
I understand now that you have placed the written submission on the correspondence file
instead of the court file. Hence, I will set out the following:
A trail judge (decades ago) refused to read the written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE
COURT) but on appeal the Full Court set aside the orders stating His Honour made an error in
law, as His Honour was obligated to consider the content of the (ADDRESS TO THE
COURT)! When His Honour Mullaly J on 30 October 2015 initially refused to consider the
(ADDRESS TO THE COURT) I alerted His Honour Mullaly J to this and His Honour Mullaly
J then adjourned the hearing to consider its content. When I had my 19-7-2006 successful
appeals my written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) was follows:
Part 1 contained 150 pages + Part 2 contained 135pages + Part 3 contained 127 pages = TOTAL: 412 pages
When I had another successful appeal in 1994 it was 11 parts of about 800 pages. The Full Court
in fact complimented me for this and recommended lawyers should follow my example!
When I had a matter before the High Court of Australia the written submissions (ADDRESS
TO THE COURT) was a mere about 100 pages but during the hearing one of the judges was
able to recite of head page number and statement I had made, indicating His Honour had read
the written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT).
When for example I represented Mr Frank Colosimo in both an appeal as well as a CONTEMPT
case against Mr Colosimo I had provided again more than 700 pages written submissions
(ADDRESS TO THE COURT) hence the success in both cases, whereas the opponent barrister
filed at the hearing a pile of printed out authorities only for me to immediately expose that one of
the authorities actually was proving Mr Colosimos case and not has counsel had claimed was
supporting her clients case. Counsel then sought to excuse herself that she had not reads the case
herself and relied upon her instructing solicitor. What was unfair and in fact denied a FAIR AND
PROPER HEARING was that counsel filed the Authorities at the time she presented her clients
case and obviously there was no way I could read a pile of authorities then. However just flicking
through the pile of Authorities I happen (within seconds) to notice the contradiction in one
authority. Regretfully I understand that lawyers have a habit of presenting piles of Authorities
when they open their address to the court well aware their opponent wouldnt have the time
and/or the ability to read and consider it all.
A judge rather reads the written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) then having to sit
for days listening to me having to read it all out at the bar table.
With my written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) I provide the material in
advance of a hearing giving opponents an opportunity to read and consider it all. This as well as
the court itself has the opportunity to read it all and knowing what the case is about rather than to
get involved in time wasting by a judge who doesnt understand/comprehend the case.
I see absolutely no legal justification why the court would for example place on court file the
disputed purported Notice of Appearance of Buloke Shire Council but conceal from the court file
my objections. The same can be stated regarding any purported (disputed) full brief.
As I indicated I am well aware that legal practitioners have so to say their private communication
line with the court and court staff and as I exposed with a judge she had issued orders without
any formal application and hearing but merely upon a phone call by opponent lawyers. Her
Honour had no choice but to disqualify herself, upon my written submission!
So, now it appears to me that Buloke Shire Council lawyers seems to have some private
communication channelled I am not privy to where perhaps arrangements are made that my
material is concealed from the court file and placed on correspondence file so a judge will be
unaware of my written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) while then dealing with
matters as if Buloke Shire Council has a legitimate case.
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When I was a constitutional consultant to a law firm I understood from a lawyer that the court
somehow had gone against his client but unknown why. I suggested it might be that the opponent
may have filed documents without ever serving them and so the judge was dealing (without any
hearing) on documentation unknown to him. The lawyer didnt hold that the court would engage
in such conduct but nevertheless was willing to have it checked out. I was authorised to search
the court file and copied an Affidavit of more than 100 pages which never was served upon the
other party. The opponent barrister turned out to have been a long time friend of the judge, and in
fact the mentor of the judge before he even was a lawyer.
Hansard 1-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention),
QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
I have over the decades at the bar table exposed how often court staff (allegedly in error) had
placed critical documents in the correspondence file instead of the court file and so when I
checked with a trail judge if His Honour/Her Honour had all relevant documents then often it
was discovered that certain documents such as filed Affidavits were not on court file.
So to say a legal practitioner merely has to be friends or sleep with court staff and then the court
file with be tampered with that so to say accidentally documents goes missing from court the
court file. Even if the trail judge himself/herself may be unaware of what is going on it still
cannot be excused because the trail judge should not tolerate this kind of conduct. Judges should
be given a check list they have to follow at commencement of a trail as to what documents
should be before the court and if not why not. Too often I had to provide the judge with a (spare)
sealed copies because various documents were missing from court file and couldnt be locate,
even after a short adjournment. No wonder unrepresented parties at time lose a case regardless of
the overwhelming evidence in their favour because unbeknown to them Affidavits are removed
from the court file so the trail judge will not be aware of the content of the Affidavit. And now it
seems you indicate to me as I understand from your writings that you are involved in keeping my
written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) from the court file. And also my
objections against the purported Notice of Appearance, etc. But I am not aware you are doing
this with the material allegedly filed by Buloke Shire Council (so it lawyers)!
I ordinary publish my writings so others will be aware of the rot that goes on in the court system.
With my special life line service since 1982 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL I
encountered many a person contemplating suicide because they held their case was railroaded.
This is why also I am so critical upon what is going on and the misuse and abuse of court rules
by lawyers and the court itself (including court staff). As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I much
agree with the Late His Honour Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the USA
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4n8gOUzZ8I&feature=player_embedded#t=1058) (Antonin Scalia and
Stephen Breyer Re constitution) that the constitution can only be amended by the People, and not
by judges.
Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states
on terms that are just to both. END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the
point. All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must
be heard. Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard. END QUOTE
Clearly, both sides are not heard when past of the documentation is concealed from the court by
being either removed inappropriately from the court file, being unlawfully amended and/or is not
placed at all on court file and by this causing a judge to deal with a matter that may not at all
represent what the case really is about. Obviously one has to ask how often this is done as some
modus operandi by the court and/or court staff.
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My written submissions (ADDRESS TO THE COURT) are formal written documents that
should be on court file and any purported Noticed of appearance and/or full brief and or other
documents that are subject to objections cannot be placed on court file as if there are no
objections but should be placed in a sealed envelope on court file for a judge first to determine if
considering the objection(s) the document(s) should or shouldnt be accepted to form part of the
court file. What now appears to me is that the County Court of Victoria still hasnt managed to
have a proper system in place, and is subject to any abuse/misuse/corrupt conduct by court staff.
It is clear that matters need to be fully investigated because no judge can rely upon the court file
to be in a proper state of affairs to hear and determine matters. It is not for me to do the job of the
Chief Justice to manage the court system appropriately. Stop the private communication with
lawyers and ensure my complaint is independently and appropriately dealt with.
I look forwards to your reply and confirming appropriate resolve to the issues raised in this
correspondence.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
Awaiting your response,
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

(Our name is our motto!)
END QUOTE 20-2-2016 CORRESPONDENCE
I have further notified Buloke Shire Council as follows:

QUOTE 21-2-2016
Cc:
21-2-2016

Ref; 20160221-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to ES&a Your ref LA-05-06-Re APPEAL-15-2502 -Re List of documents-etc
Alison,
I remind you that since the 17 September 2015 hearing before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at
St Arnaud you still have failed to provide me with a list as to the about 200 pages that were used to claim
cost against me. Neither did you clarify if copies were left with the court. I urge you to clarify each and
every document that allegedly was relied upon.
I trust you will ensure that the list of documents will be provided by return email, after all I expect that
such a list would have been existing at the time of 17 September 2015 hearing and not some bunch of
papers were on the bar table that could have been for all I know part of some other case and/or cases. I
can assure you that this is an issue to me and the court may have to deal with this as to legal technicalities
relevant to the proceedings. For example each and every document could be challenged as to the content
being justified or not and relevant to the issues and as such no order of cost was appropriate in that regard
also. And I may seek you to be cross-examined regarding this also. And you may be called as a hostile
witness! It is not the first time I cross-examined an opponent lawyer, and so far each time an opponent
ought to object the judge made clear I was well entitled to do so!
In my view any competent judge will hold it abhorrent that without a shred of evidence a
magistrate/judicial registrar would make orders for more than $3,200 including more than $1,600
regarding paperwork that is totally unknown to what it relates to. And an appeal is not so the lawyers
having misused/abuse court processes can have a second bite to try to justify a claim for cost on basis of
documentation of which not a shred of evidence exist on court file what those documents related to, if
they were not just blank papers grabbed from a ream of paper. In my view it is this kind of judicial
misuse/abuse that undermines the credibility of the judiciary. Magistrates/Judicial Registrars are
seemingly handing out orders like candies to members of the legal profession and place the court at
ridicule by doing so without a shred of any proper legal process being followed. In my view there should
be an independent inquiry as to this incident! It is the modus operandi of the courts to so to say to
undermine the very democratic legal processes embedded as legal principles in our constitution!
http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2014/margaretmcmurdo160414.pdf The Self-Represented Litigant in the Court of
Appeal Supreme Court of Queensland AIJA Assisting Unrepresented Litigants: a Challenge for Courts and
Tribunals Conference, Coogee Beach, Sydney, 16 April 2014. The Hon Justice Margaret McMurdo AC sets
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out how the Queensland court and members of the legal profession are seeking to assist. Well in
Victoria it appears to me we have so to say a corrupt court system. The fact that the Registrar of
County Court of Victoria has seemingly placed my written submissions ADDRESS TO THE
COURT on correspondence may underline this also, this this should have been placed on court
file as a proper document, as accepted in other courts, including the High Court of Australia.
I can assure you that apart of the outcome of litigation now before the courts there will be effort to stamp
out this kind of misuse and abuse of the legal processes.
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues.

Awaiting your response,
(Our name is our motto!)

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
END QUOTE 21-2-2016
In my experiences over about 4 decades appearing at the Bar table, etc, the courts are
considerably disorganised and judges fail to be properly educated as to their judicial powers, and
fraud and corruption in my view is rife by members of the legal profession. If anything for the
magistrates court of Victoria at St Arnaud on 17 September 2015 to issue orders without a shred
of evidence may underline this also.
Because Her Honour Justice Margaret McMurdo in her statement (2014) seems to rely upon the
Victorian system I have written to Justice Margaret McMurdo to expose reality. Victorian judges
and even the High Court of Australia seems to hold that the judiciary is the 3rd part of the
government, and to me this is of concern because it means the judiciary is bias in favour of the
government, and perhaps this is why Her Honour Mullaly J claimed that the court doesnt need
any evidence in ex parte (criminal) proceedings. This in my view makes His honour Mullaly J
and any other judicial officer holding this view not competent to adjudicate within the legal
principles embedded in the constitution. As I seem to have to be so to say ganged up by the
courts and its staff to railroad my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and my written
submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT I find it appropriate to include my views in
regard of the courts as expressed to Her Honour Justice Margaret McMurdo. This also as to
show that I pursue the true meaning and application of the constitution and a legal system in
accordance to this within those provisions and not despite of it.
QUOTE 21-2-2016 correspondence
The Hon Justice Margaret McMurdo AC
21-2-2016
reference@sclqld.org.au, librarian@sclqld.org.au
Re: 20160221-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to The Hon Justice Margaret McMurdo AC -etc
Margaret,
As a self-educated CONSTITUTIONALIST and (now retired) Professional Advocate
I have spent about 4 decades at the bar table, including representing/assisting lawyers.
I have suddenly various people sending me links to your speeches/statements and like to
comment upon this.
.
http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2012/mcmurdop061012.pdf
A COMMENT ON JUSTICE MALCOLM WALLIS'S PAPER, "JUDGES AS
EMPLOYEES", JCA COLLOQUIUM, FREMANTLE, SATURDAY, 6
OCTOBER 2012, 10.30 AM 12 NOON
This document deals with independents of the judiciary.

http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/court-of-appeal-president-justice-margaret-mcmurdo-defendssystem-amid-infighting-over-chief-justice-tim-carmody/news-story/38a7fbac33d18236ab2789d48c061874?=
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Court of Appeal President Justice Margaret McMurdo defends system amid infighting over Chief Justice Tim
Carmody
June 1, 2015 12:56pm
In this you refer to self -represented litigants, etc.

QUOTE
As lawyers you may be called on to defend the independence of the third arm of
government, the judiciary, Justice McMurdo told the court.
END QUOTE
The truth is that the courts never were to be the third arm of government1
HANSARD 12-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE Mr. BARTON:
It is provided that instead of, as before, the Parliament having power to constitute a judiciary, there
shall be a Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, as a part of the Constitution-that I
believe to be an improvement-and other courts which the Parliament may from time to time create or
invest with federal jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
END QUOTE
Being part of the constitution means that the court is not and cannot be part of the government.
This is also important to understand that as shown below the constitution is between the
government and the people and so if the courts were part of the government then it would be
implied bias.
When the Bronwyn choppergate was going on it was then argued that the then Prime Minister
Tony Abbott should deal with her. However as the Speaker she is totally independent from the
government and rules the House of Representatives as the President does the senate. Likewise
the chief Justice of the Supreme Court is totally independent from the government.
Basically the Chief Justice should submit his estimated projective cost of running the judiciary to
the parliament and it then should debate if the monies so requested should be provided. The
government could only place before the parliament its recommendations.
Court neither should be associated with the Department of Justice ABN number as this
undermines the separation of powers.
.
HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
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parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
What should be understood is that colonial Parliaments were sovereign Parliaments which
could legislate whatever but since Federation all colonial sovereign Parliaments became State
constitutional Parliaments and the State government cannot even refer within the provisions of
ss51(xxxvii) any legislative powers unless this is first approve by way of State referendum, as
any reference of legislative powers would entail also that the judicial associated powers are
referred to the Commonwealth. Section 123 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
1900 (UK) is the vehicle to provide for this.
Constitutionally the judiciary are employed with the State but not with the State government, as
the federal judiciary is employed with the Commonwealth of Australia but not with the federal
government.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
The corporatising of our courts
Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
QUOTE
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms
what they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with
politicians, but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of
this court's independence.
END QUOTE
Clearly, the wording As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our
constitutional system indicates that this justice held there was a separation of powers within
state level.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
QUOTE
The corporatising of our courts
Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
In his parting words from the Supreme Court bench, John D. Phillips warns of a dangerous erosion of the
court's independence.
For more than 14 years I have been sitting here, and it has been hard and unremitting, but exciting and
rewarding - emotionally, I hasten to add, before I am misunderstood. But for much of that time I have had
to bite my tongue.
p9
I refer to policy matters rather than the debate within a particular case. For, during my time on the bench,
and especially as I grew more senior, I have watched with some concern a change emerge in the
22-2-2016 Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
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perception of this court by others and some blurring of essential distinctions. I want to speak briefly of
that now because I have been unable to say much about it until now and when my resignation becomes
effective, I fear that nobody will listen.
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms what
they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with politicians,
but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of this court's
independence.
One of the most public examples recently was the refusal of the executive to accept the decision on
remuneration handed down by the tribunal established by the Parliament for the very purpose of freeing
both Parliament and the executive from the invidiousness of the decision-making process over judicial
salaries and so ensuring the independence of which I am speaking.
Less well known was the refusal of earlier governments to allow that the court's own chief executive
officer be appointed by the Governor-in-Council and its insistence that that officer be appointed by and be
ultimately answerable to the Department of Justice, which is what happened.
That appears now, if I may say so, to have been but part of a movement towards this court's becoming
absorbed into that department, and it is that to which I want to draw attention in particular; for such a
movement must be reversed if this court is to have, and to keep, its proper role under the constitution.
This court is not some part of the public service and it must never be seen as such. Established as a court
of plenary jurisdiction and with supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and tribunals, this court is
the third arm of government, co-equal in concept with Parliament and the executive. Its role, inter alia, is
to control and to limit those other arms according to law and to that end to stand between those other arms
and the citizen. Hence the emphasis on the court's independence, especially from the executive.
Yet within the Department of Justice this court is now identified and dealt with - would you believe
- as "Business Unit 19" within a section labelled "courts and tribunals", a section which
indiscriminately includes all three tiers of the court structure and VCAT.
This court is subject to direction on the raising of taxes in the form of court fees - in that these are
prescribed by departmental regulation, even if a part of those fees is redirected to the court by the
department at its discretion. The other day the department used a regulation to prescribe a procedure in
this court, apparently in disregard, if not in defiance, of the convention that such matters are for rules of
court.
And perhaps most troubling of all: the judges' computers, which were provided by and through the
department, are but part of the departmental network. I do not say that departmental officers ordinarily
avail themselves of the access that that affords; one hopes the department has some controls in place. But
access is possible, and that seems to me altogether inappropriate when the state, in one form or another, is
the major litigant in this court, and sometimes on matters of critical import to the wider community.
Nobody is suggesting that the executive would ever seek to influence a judge's decision directly,
otherwise than by argument in open court, but what has been happening is more insidious. What is
evolving is a perception of the court as some sort of unit or functionary within the Department of Justice,
a perception which is inconsistent with this court's fundamental role and underlying independence.
Indeed I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, despite its dominant role within the court structure
and its constitutional role vis-a-vis the other arms of government, is now seen by some in authority as no
different from a tribunal, nowadays the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in particular. That is
simply not the case; yet the distinction between a court and a tribunal has been steadily undermined over
the years, and it must be restored if the proper constitutional position is not 2to be subverted.
The basic distinction is easy enough. A court exercises judicial power and must be, and be seen to be,
impartial and so must be independent of all else. Accordingly, its judges are appointed once and for all,
and ideally, without hope of additional gain or reward from anyone, including any other arm of
government. Hence Parliament's creation of the specialist remuneration tribunal. In contrast to a court, a
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tribunal, properly so called, exercises administrative functions but not judicial power, and many things
flow from that. Such a tribunal may be an arm of the executive; its members may be appointed for fixed
terms, with the possibility of renewal at the discretion of the executive; and the need is not so great, to see
that their remuneration is fixed independently of the executive.
You will see, now, how far the distinction between court and tribunal has become blurred. While the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal is staffed by a few judges, it consists mainly of members
appointed for fixed terms, capable of renewal at the discretion of the executive - and hence my alarm
when, in addition to its administrative work, that tribunal was given some judicial power to exercise, for
the latter is altogether inconsistent with such a form of tenure.
There is talk now of acting judges for this court, and again, because this is a court which is exercising
judicial power, such would be anathema. It is one thing to tolerate the occasional acting appointment to
this court for a limited time or purpose; it is altogether different to institutionalise such temporary
appointments at the discretion of the executive. Judges of a court properly so called must have security of
tenure or, in a relatively small community like this in Victoria, the whole system is put at risk. Our courts
have been remarkably free from any taint of bias or corruption; let it remain that way. A judge must be,
and be seen to be, impartial and so must eschew all other interests which might one day give rise to
conflict or the appearance of bias.
In my book, the judge must forgo the current cult of the individual: to adapt Edmund Burke, "individuals
pass like shadows, but the (institution) is fixed and stable". The judge is sometimes accused of remoteness
but in one sense that is no more than the reverse side of the commitment, the total commitment, which is
demanded of the appointee.
John D. Phillips is retiring as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This is part of his farewell
address to the court.
END QUOTE
Constitutionally there is a division between the Judiciary and the legislators and executives.
.
It should be noted that the wording and for the due and impartial administration of
justice which Oaths the said Chief Justice or Judge is hereby required to administer
leaves it beyond doubt that the Chief Justice or Judge must for the due and impartial
administration of justice make an oath. As such the separation of powers in the State of
Victoria is enshrined in this Proclamation as the Governor cannot act otherwise nor so any
judge.
FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
VICTORIA
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
OF FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1900.
Published by Authority
No. 2.] WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2. [1901.
QUOTE
follows :
IV. Every person appointed to fill the Office of Governor shall with, all due solemnity, before entering
on any of the duties of his Office, cause the Commission appointing to be Governor to be read and
published at, the seat of Government, in the presence of the Chief .Justice, or some other Judge of the
Supreme Court of the State, and of she Members of the Executive Council thereof, which being done, he
shall then and there take before them the Oath of Allegiance, in the form provided by an Act passed in the
Session holden in tile Thirty-first and Thirty-second years of Our Reign, intituled an Act to amend the
Law relating to Promissory Oaths ; ,and likewise the usual Oath for the due execution of the Office of
Governor, and for the due and impartial administration of justice which Oaths the said Chief Justice or
Judge is hereby required to administer.
END QUOTE
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The Office of the Governor (Victoria) as per 2-1-1901 PROCLAMATION, that was Gazetted
requires that the Governor appoints independent judges! As such, any notion that there being
no separation of powers in the states utter and sheer nonsense.
I understand that you referred to the Queensland 2001 constitution.
In the Colosimo case, where he was represented by a barrister then Victoria Legal Aid advised
Mr Colosimo to purge his contempt. Mr Colosimo was charged with CONTEMPT OF COURT
and had already endured 6 hearings as well as was placed under guardianship.
I was requested by Mr Colosimo to take over the case (that already had involved about 20
lawyers) and did so. I succeeded in having the administration orders wet aside as well as when I
appeared before Her Honour Harbison J the contempt proceedings were stopped in its tracks. I
opposed the contempt application to be withdrawn as I held it was beyond the powers of the
party filing this to do so as once filed it became the property of the court/tribunal and Her
Honour Harbison J in her Reason of Judgment agreed with my submission.
I discovered that the Office of the Public Advocate had misled the (medical) expert witnesses
that Mr Colosimo refused to accept he was convicted for CONTEMPT OF COURT and the
expert witnesses on that basis held Mr Colosimo should be under administration. However I
exposed and Her Honour Harbison J made this clear Mr Colosimo was never convicted. As a
matter of fact I discovered that despite 6 previous hearings for contempt Mr Colosimo was never
even formally charged with contempt. And as I exposed to Her Honour Harbison J Mr Colosimo
never could have committed contempt.
As such while judges tend to blame Self Represented Litigants and that perhaps in Queensland a
mere ab out 11% succeed in appeals reality is (in Victoria) that parties represented by members
of the legal profession are often having their case conducted far worse than a Self Represented
Litigant may ever do.
As I exposed over the years there is a private communication channel between members in the
legal profession and the courts, even that judges issue orders merely on a phone call by a lawyer,
without any formal application let alone a hearing.
The following is the conduct of a firm of lawyers representing a client, besides having telephone
communications with the court without the knowledge of the other party!
Some of the issues but not in any of priority
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
Fire Prevention Notice in violation to the provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958
Fire Prevention Notice contains demands exceeding delegated powers.
Fire prevention Notice in valid in law
Infringement Notice invalid in law based on invalid Fire prevention Notice.
Summons invalid in law based on Invalid Infringement Notice.
Summons invalidly issues as Infringement Noticed failed to have been withdrawn.
Summons hearing in the wrong court venue
Failure to serve full brief
No evidence to prove jurisdiction.
No evidence whatsoever to justify 20 August 2015 orders at St Arnaud venue
No evidence to legally justify 17 September 2015 orders at St Arnaud venue
Failing to file and serve Notice of Appearance regarding appeal
Failing to file and serve for Leave to file and serve out of time Notice of Appearance
Failure to provide 27 October 2015 requested brief
Failing to comply with 30/10/2015 order to serve via Australia Post by 9/11/2015 full brief
Failing to request leave to serve out of time full brief.
Providing misleading Form 11 statement dated 25/11/2015 re 18/3/2013 alleged hearing
Provide different Form 11 for 22/2/2016 hearing without full brief
Failure by State Government to provide relevant FOI material requested 9/12/2015
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While you referred to the Queensland Constitution Act 2001 I did in 2009 file an written
submission ADDRESS TO THE COURT in which I canvassed extensively the issue about the
purported Queensland constitution and that it is a worthless constitution. I will not now delve
into all the details but safe to say it is utter and sheer nonsense to hold there is a Queensland
constitution Act 2001 as much as there is no valid Victorian constitution act 1975.
On 19 July 2006 in the County Court of Victoria I successfully appealed 2 convictions of
FAILING TO VOTE that compulsory voting was unconstitutional and that the Victorian
Constitution Act 1975 was unconstitutional.
At the time I also challenged the validity of Australian citizenship as the Commonwealth was
specifically denied this by the Framers of the Constitution. Not even the Queensland Attorney-General
challenged me on this either! (Having been served with a s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MATTER)
I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU DO MEAN WELL WITH YOUR WRITINGS BUT DO
UNDERSTAND THAT THE JUDICIARY IS NOT PART OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT ON
THE SAME LEVEL AS THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT AS PART OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
As for the spat with the chief Justice about this contact with a person not being a party to the proceedings,
it appears to me (without knowing the finer details) that you are correct in that this is a violation because a
judge must decide matters upon the evidence before the court and not seek to obtain the views of some
person without the parties of the dispute being aware what is communicated and what effect, if any, this
may have on the decision of the court. It could be seen equally as fraternizing with one of the parties
where the person spoken to might present views to support a particular party before the court. By this
placing the legal validity of any subsequent order in jeopardy/doubt.
.
Ambard v Att Gen for Trinidad and Tabaco (1939) AC 322 at 335
QUOTE
The basic of the right to fair comment is the Right of Freedom of speech and the inalienable right of
everyone to comment fairly upon matters of public importance.
END QUOTE
No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:
LORD ATKIN in AMBARD v ATTORNEY-GENERAL for TRINIDAD and TABAGO (1936) A.C. 332, at 335
QUOTE
But whether the authority and position or an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned,
no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good
faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way, the
wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper
motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism,
and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a
cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of
ordinary man
END QUOTE
.
The right for the public to be informed about the judicial process being properly applied or acts:
THE COMMENTS OF SIR JAMES MARTIN C.J., IN THE MATTER THE EVENING NEWS (1880) N.S.W.
LR 211 AT 239.:
QUOTE
The right of the public to canvass fairly and honestly what takes place here cannot be disputed. Our practice of
sitting here with open doors and transacting our judicial functions as we do, always in the broad light of day,
would be shown of some of its value if the public opinion respecting our proceedings were at all times to be
rigidly suppressed. We claim no immunity from fair, even though it be mistaken criticism.
END QUOTE
.
As to value of criticism, keeping judge subject to rules and principles of honour and justice;
(a) R v FOSTER (1937) St. E Qd 368
(b) Re WASEMAN (1969) N.Z.L.R. 55, 58-59
(c) Re BOROVSKI (1971) 19 D.L.R. (34) 537
(d) SOLICITOR-GENERAL v RADIO AVON LTD (1978) 1 N.Z.L.R. 225, at 230-31
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It is my view that no matter how serious the allegations may be against a person we cannot afford to
ignore the rules of the court to administer justice to all in equal manner. Many a person convicted by
hindsight proved to be innocent of wrongdoing and that indicates that there remains a failure in the system
to allow for this.
I will now refer to:
http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2014/margaretmcmurdo160414.pdf
The Self-Represented Litigant in the court of appeal supreme court of Queensland AIJA Assisting Unrepresented
Litigants: a Challenge for Courts and Tribunals Conference, Coogee Beach, Sydney, 16 April 2014.
I referred to the Colosimo case as an example where it not for me taking over the case and expose all the
misconceptions and that Mr Colosimo was totally innocent of any wrongdoing, he could have ended up in
prison, and for what? While I understand you referred to the low percentage of successes and SRLs
dropping issues and raising issues that are so to say a waste of courts time, reality is that too often judges
have a pre-determined opinion and by this deny a SRL proper consideration. After all you and many other
judges would have held that compulsory voting is lawful, but I nevertheless succeeded on the basis it was
unconstitutional!

QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the
liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of
liberty is enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good
government for the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the
people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta
for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole
history of the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of
Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This new
charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
END QUOTE
Clearly, judges should not introduce their own personal views based often on misconceptions, but rely
only upon the evidence that is placed before the court and base their considerations accordingly, and
perhaps more SRLs may succeed then in their cases!
Let me add some examples:
I was representing a party and before we attended court orders were issued albeit no known application
had been served or for that filed.
At the hearing I made clear that I wanted to place on record my objection to such kind of orders being
made. A month later the same judge again issued orders with any known application being files let alone
served and no hearing. I filed then a complaint against this judge who then was disqualified from the
case. Months later I discovered that the opponent lawyers had 9 phone calls to the judge of which 2
resulted with orders.
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In another case I was the constitutional consultant to a law firm when orders were issued without any
known application or Affidavit. I suggested to the lawyer to authorise me to check the court files. He did.
I discovered that an Affidavit in excess of 100 pages was on court file but never served.
While I was at the Registry searching the files I noticed how one person was taking the Affidavits apart of
another case. And lawyers simply removing files from the court file.
In another case a person asked my assistance in responding to his wifes affidavit. I urged him to get a
copy of the wifes Affidavit on court file. He wondered why but nevertheless did and it proved to be
identical. He subsequently responded to the wifes affidavit and filed it. Weeks later I asked him to get
another copy of his wifes affidavit, and again after some talking he did. This time the wifes affidavit had
been tampered with and numerous changes made but the Affidavit was not re-sworn. I will give an
explanation how an alteration can change the meaning;
Say the wife stated in Paragraph 3 My husband was never violent. The Husband replied; As to
paragraph 3 I agree with this. Now the wifes lawyer goes to the Registry and crosses of the word never
by this it becomes Paragraph 3 My husband was never violent. Usually I ask a trail judge if I can
inspect the court file and often find up to 8 alterations per page which are not initialled by the deponent.
In one case the entire content was different and the trail judge, not the opponent lawyers, then argued that
obviously they must in error have served the draft Affidavit and commented Now you know it and so
continue. Refusing to hold the purported affidavit to be inadmissible.
In another case the DVD was created a day after the Affidavit was sworn. The judicial officer argued that
this is normal when making copies but the other party couldnt provide any DVD that was dated on or
before the day the affidavit was sworn, nor did the DVD contain the details claimed in the affidavit. At
one stage the opposing barrister complained; Mr Schorel0-Hlavka is surgically taking apart my witness
affidavit.
Often judges couldnt locate certain documents on court file where I insist at commencement of the
hearing the judge checks each and every document to be on court file. And then I often provide sealed
copies. I understand lawyers at times remove documents from court file and then after the trail replace
them so for an appeal court it appears the files are in act but the judge at the time never realised that
documents were missing.
When Mr Jeff Kennett was Premier of Victoria I urged him to install metal detectors because I was
conducting since 1982 a special lifeline service under the motto MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS
PREVAIL but understood that some persons contemplating suicide desired to take some judges with
them on their final journey eve n so innocent people would also be involved. And while metal detectors
were installed no one actually bothers to check any person leaving the Registry (having had access to the
court files) if he/she has documents that belong in the court files. On one occasion there was this gigantic
bundle of court documents left on the counter but no registrar in sight. Anyone could have walked off
with the files.
One judge issued a court order sentencing a party to 21 days in imprisonment 2 days before the trail was
completed. After the trail was completed another set of orders were issued for the same! As such the
judge had predetermine the case before the case was completed.
Judges going to have an evening out with the first defendant without the plaintiff being made aware of it.
A judge giving evidence from the bench, but refused to be cross-examined by me in the witness box
when I exposed he was totally wrong in facts.
Judges fabricating reason of judgment to suit their predetermined orders, in blatant disregard of the
evidence presented to the court.
QUOTE In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780

As no grounds for appeal are required to be specified in the notice of Appeal, which, on
filing institutes the appeal (reg 122), there is no limitations of the scope of the appeal and all
findings of fact and law made in the lower court in relation to the decree appealed are in
challenge and cannot be relied on by the appellant or the respondent. All the issues (unless
by consent) must be reheard. This of course brings me to the point of the absence of reason
for the magistrates decision in this case. Perhaps reasons were given orally but not recorded
for the record. Apart from the requirement of such reason for the purpose of the appeal
process, there is the basic ground of criticism that litigants who go to court, put their
witnesses up, argue their case and attempt to controvert the opposing case are entitled to
know, if they lose, why they lost. If they are given no reason they may be entitled to feel
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the decision against them was conceived in prejudice, bias, or caprice. In such a case not
only the litigant, but justice itself, is the loser.
Magistrates should realise, even more than they seem to do, that this class of business is not
mere ordinary trivial work, and they should deal with these cases with a due sense of
responsibility which administrations of the summary jurisdiction Act and the far reaching
consequences of the orders that they make thereafter entail. [Baker v Baker (1906) 95 LT
549; In Robinson v Robinson (1898) p135; and again in Cobb v Cobb (1900) p145] it was
stated that when making orders of this kind, from which lies an appeal to other courts, it is
the duty of the magistrate not only to cause a note to be made of the evidence, and of his
decision, but to give the reasons for his decision and to cause a note to be made of his
reasons... Elaborate judgements are not required, but the reasons which lead the magistrate
to make his order must be explicitly stated.
END QUOTE
Well in Victoria a court issued orders in a criminal matter without any evidence having been before the
court and ignoring the written OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION. An appeal judge made known that
the Magistrates Court of Victoria doesnt need any evidence in (criminal) ex parte hearing to convict.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the
point. All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be
heard.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything
the state thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person
accused will have an opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a
first principle in criminal law now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
END QUOTE
Again the above states is merely so to say the tip of the iceberg and let no one tell me we have a proper
judicial system within constitutional context. Blaming SRL is the easy way out, and that they may persist
in an appeal despite being warned they have no justified case may be because the SRL knows the case and
not that the others are aware that the court file might have been tampered with.
Transcripts are neither trustworthy as for expel in a custody case the husband in evidence stated told Mr
Allen that Scott is the Husbands, while the transcript later showed told Mr Allen that Scottish
Bastard. Upon a complaint this was corrected. How many transcript however are left uncorrected that an
appellated court misconceive what really transpired? Often I found numerous in correct statement on one
page alone of transcripts, this because I read often from a pre-typed document (WITTEN SUBMISSIONS
titled ADDRESS TO THE COURT) and then later compare it with the transcript!
The above is merely so to say the tip of the iceberg of the corrupt/fraudulent conduct going on! Hence on
appeal, if a SRL can afford this, the appeal court may never even realise what really went on with the
court file, etc.
Did you realise the Letters Patent for the Governor-General doesnt provide for a pardon as is provided
for with Governors? This is because criminal cases against a person are not to be dealt with in a Federal
court but a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction, by their peers!
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

Our name is our motto!)
END QUOTE 21-2-2016 correspondence

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QUOTE S78 NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

FORM 69
NOTICE OF A CONSTITUTION MATTER
O 73 r 1 High Court Rules
UNDER SECTION 78B of the JUDICIARY ACT 1903

MAGISTRATES COURT AT HEIDELBERG
No.
GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL-HLAVKA
of 2002
Defendant
and
AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Plaintiff
NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER

1.
The Defendant GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL-HLAVKA gives notice that the proceedings involves a
matter arising under the constitution or involving its interpretation within the meaning of section 78B of the
judiciary Act 1903.
2.
That the Defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Heidelberg to hear the matters
arising of the proceedings instituted by the applicant in regard of matters relating to the PURPORTED
Federal general election on 10 November 2001.
3.
The said Magistrates Court adjourned matter, on 16 September 2002, for hearing of the question of legal
jurisdiction to be heard on 4 December 2002.
4.
The outline of the case at hand and is as follows;

(a)
The Defendant was born on 7 June 1947 in Rotterdam, The Netherlands of parents being
Dutch nationals and as such, the Defendant by birth was a Dutch national.
(b)
The Defendant became lawfully married to his (then) wife Ingrid Maria Edith Schorel on 2
February 1969 and subsequently the had a child born 13 December 1969 named Guido
Alexander Silvester Sebastien Viggo Schorel.
(c)
The Defendant was at that time in the Dutch (conscripted) army serving within NATO at the
(then) Iron curtain in West Germany, and later joined the regular Dutch army, from which he
resigned to migrate to Australia, upon the invitation of the Australian government to do so.
This affidavit was filed by the applicant GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL-HLAVKA

Of: 107 Graham Road, Rosanna East (Viewbank), In the State of Victoria, 3584
Phone number: 03 9457 7209
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
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The Defendant, his (then) wife and child entered Australia on 7 April 1971 as
aliens/immigrant all of Dutch nationality, having been provided with a visa with
Permanent residence to enter Australia
The Defendant applied naturalization to become an naturalized Australian.
The Defendant naturalized under the Commonwealth of Australia Australian Citizenship
Act 1948 on 28 March 1994, to take on the Australian nationality. The ceremony was
conducted at 55 King Street, Melbourne at the Department of Immigration office.
Unbeknown to the Defendant at the time of the naturalization, on 28 January 1898 the framers
of the Commonwealth Constitution Bill debated at the Constitutional convention, as
recorded in the Hansard, the issue of alien.
Unbeknown at the time of nominating as a candidate for the Federal election, the Hansard
indicates that the framers required a person to have State citizenship to obtain Australian
Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502
citizenship, and so by the time of the 30-11-2002 election the Defendant discovered he did not
appear to be a qualified elector for not having State citizenship.
Hansard 2-3-1898
Dr. QUICK (Victoria).-I beg to moveThat the following new sub-section be inserted after sub-section (21):XXIA. Commonwealth citizenship.
I propose to confer upon the Federal Parliament the power to deal with the question of
Commonwealth citizenship. I have looked through the Bill very carefully, and I do not
see the slightest allusion in it to a federal citizenship.
And;
Dr. QUICK.-If we are to have a citizenship of the Commonwealth higher, more
comprehensive, and nobler than that of the states, I would ask why is it not implanted in the
Constitution? Mr. Barton was not present when I made my remarks in proposing the clause. I
then-anticipated the point he has raised as to the position we occupy as subjects of the British
Empire. I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship, and in defining
the qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way interfering with
our position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the scope of the
Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a city, citizens of a colony, or citizens of
a Commonwealth, but we would still be, subjects of the Queen. I see therefore nothing
unconstitutional, nothing contrary to our instincts as British subjects, in proposing to place
power in this Constitution to enable the Federal Parliament to deal with the question of
federal citizenship. An objection has been raised in various quarters-as by the honorable and
learned members (Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Wise)-to the effect that we ought to define federal
citizenship in the Constitution itself. I have considered this matter very carefully, and it has
seemed to me that it would be most difficult and invidious, if not almost impossible, to frame
a satisfactory definition. There is in the Constitution of the United States of America a
cast-iron definition of citizenship, which has been found to be absolutely unworkable,
because, among other things, it says that a citizen of the United States shall be a naturalborn or naturalized citizen within the jurisdiction of the United States, and it has been
found that that excludes the children of citizens born outside the limits of this
jurisdiction. That shows the danger of attempting definitions, and although I have
placed a proposed clause defining federal citizenship upon the notice-paper, the subject,
seems to me surrounded with the greatest difficulty, and no doubt the honorable and
learned members (Mr. Wise, Mr. O'Connor, and Mr. Symon) would be the first to
attack any definition, and would be able to perforate it. In my opinion, it would be
undesirable to implant a cast-iron definition of citizenship in the Constitution, because it
would be better to leave the question more elastic, more open to consideration, and
more yielding to the advancing changes and requirements of the times.
And
Mr. SYMON.-In clause 52 we have given to the Federal Parliament the power of
dealing absolutely with immigration. If we have given that power, then incidental to that
power they will have an exclusive jurisdiction as to the status and citizenship of people
who come into this country. If, therefore, the Federal Parliament are to have this entire
control of the citizenship of the nation, then they have a right to say who shall be
admitted to that citizenship and who shall be excluded, and they must also have the
power to define the terms of that citizenship.
(Note; Subsequently on 2-3-1898 the convention defeated a bill to inset into the
Commonwealth Constitution legislative powers for the Commonwealth to define and declare
citizenship.)
p18
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Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).The Federal Parliament could do nothing in the way of defining the qualification of
citizenship or the rights of citizenship beyond the limits of the Constitution.
Appeal 15-2502
Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).There is no territorial entity coincident with the Commonwealth. Every part of the
Commonwealth territory is part of the state, and it is only by virtue of his citizenship of
a state that any person within the bounds of the Commonwealth will have any political
rights under the Constitution. Of course, when I speak of a state, I include also any
territory occupying the position of quasi-state, which, of course, stands in exactly the
same position.
And;
Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. DOBSON.-Does not that create them citizens?
[start page 1751]
Dr. QUICK.-No, it does not in any way define citizenship. It refers to the people without in
any way defining or stating the mode of ascertaining who are the people. If the word "people"
in this earlier section is to be considered as giving the test of citizenship, then all the people
within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of all races, black or white, or aliens, will be
considered members of this new political community. What I want to see inserted in the Bill
is a constitutional definition of citizenship.
And;
Dr. QUICK.-I want to see either a constitutional definition in the Bill or the power
conferred on the Federal Parliament to define what constitutes citizenship. If that be
done, then of course there will be two citizenships within this United Australia. There will be
the citizenship of the state in which a person resides, the rights and duties of which will
be determined by the laws of the state, and there will be the wider federal citizenship,
the rights and duties and incidence of which will be defined by the Federal Parliament.
Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-We have provided in this Constitution for the exercise
of the rights of citizenship, so far as the choice of representatives is concerned, and we have
given various safe-guards to individual liberty in the Constitution. We have, therefore, given
each resident in the Commonwealth his political rights, so far as the powers of legislation and
administration intrusted to the Commonwealth are concerned. Let us consider the position.
Before the establishment of the Commonwealth, each subject is the subject of a state. After
the Commonwealth is established, every one who acquires political rights-in fact, every one
who is a subject in a state, having certain political rights, has like political rights in the
Commonwealth. The only difference between the position before the institution of the
Commonwealth and afterwards is that, so far as there are additional political powers given to
any subject or citizen, be has the right to exercise these, and the method of exercising them is
defined. So far the right of citizenship, if there is a right of citizenship under the empire,
is defined in the Constitution. Now, each citizen of a state is, without definition, a citizen
of the Commonwealth if there is such a term as citizenship to be applied to a subject of
the empire. I must admit, after looking at a standard authority-Stroud's Judicial Dictionarythat I cannot find any definition of citizenship as applied to a British subject. No such term
as citizen or citizenship is to be found in the long roll of enactments, so far as I can
recollect, that deal with the position of subjects of the United Kingdom, and I do not
think we have been in the habit of using that term under our own enactments in any of
our colonies.
Mr. HIGGINS.-You had it in the Draft Bill.
Mr. BARTON.-Yes; but the term has since disappeared, and it disappeared owing to
objections from members of the Convention. I am inclined to think that the Convention is
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right in not applying [start page 1765] the term "citizens" to subjects residing in the
Commonwealth or in the states, but in leaving them to their ordinary definition as subjects of
the Crown. If, however, we make an amendment of this character, inasmuch as citizens of the
state must be citizens of the Commonwealth by the very terms of the Constitution, we shall
simply be enabling the Commonwealth to deal with the political rights of the citizens of
the states. The one thing follows from the other. If you once admit that a citizen or
subject of the state is a citizen or subject of the Commonwealth, the power conferred in
these wide terms would enable the Federal Parliament to deal with the political rights of
subjects of the states. I do not think the honorable member intends to go so far as that,
but his amendment is open to that misconception.
Mr. HOWE.-Trust to the Federal Parliament.
And
Mr. BARTON.-When we confer a right of legislation on the Federal Parliament we trust
them to exercise it with wisdom, but we still keep as the subject of debate the question of
whether a particular legislative right should be conferred on the Federal Parliament. When
you give them the right then you may trust them to exercise it fully.
Mr. HOWE.-And wisely.
Mr. BARTON.-But inasmuch as we have given to the Commonwealth the power of

regulating the entry of that class of persons, and the power of regulating them when they have
entered, is it not desirable that in that process there shall be left to the Commonwealth power
of repressing any such practices in the name of religion as I have indicated? If it be necessary
that there should be some regulative power left to the Commonwealth, then the argument that
we should leave the matter to the states does not apply, because we give such a power to the
Commonwealth.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Then all crimes should be left to the Commonwealth?
Mr. BARTON.-No; because you do not give any power with regard to punishing crime
to the Commonwealth, but you do give power to the Commonwealth to make special laws
as to alien races; and the moment you do that the power of making such laws does not remain
in the hands of the states; and if you place in the hands of the Commonwealth the power to
prevent such practices as I have described you should not defeat that regulative power of the
Commonwealth. I do not think that that applies at all, however, to any power of
regulating the lives and proceedings of citizens, because we do not give any such power
to the Commonwealth, whilst we do give the Commonwealth power with regard to alien
races; and having given that power, we should take care not to take away an incident of
it which it may be necessary for the Commonwealth to use by way of regulation.
And;
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Mr. BARTON.-If the honorable member's exclamation means more than I have explained,
then the best thing to do is to confide to the Commonwealth the right of dealing with the
lives, liberty, and property of all the persons residing in the Commonwealth, independently of
any law of any state. That is not intended, but that is what the expression "Trust the Federal
Parliament" would mean unless it was limited by the consideration I have laid down. I am
sure Dr. Quick will see that he is using a word that has not a definition in English
constitutional law, and which is not otherwise defined in this Constitution. He will be giving
to the Commonwealth Parliament a power, not only of dealing with the rights of
citizenship, but of defining those rights even within the very narrowest limits, so that the
citizenship of a state might be worth nothing; or of extending them in one direction, and
narrowing them in another, so that a subject living in one of the states would scarcely
know whether he was on his head or his heels. Under the Constitution we give subjects
political rights to enable the Parliament to legislate with regard to the suffrage, and pending
that legislation we give the qualification of electors. It is that qualification of electors which
Appeal 15-2502
is really the sum and substance of political liberty, and we have defined that. If we are going
to give the Federal Parliament power to legislate as it pleases with regard to
Commonwealth citizenship, not having defined it, we may be enabling the Parliament to
pass legislation that would really defeat all the principles inserted elsewhere in the
Constitution, and, in fact, to play ducks and drakes with it. That is not what is meant by
the term "Trust the Federal Parliament."
Mr. HIGGINS.-You give the Federal Parliament power to naturalize.
Mr. BARTON.-Yes; and in doing that we give them power to make persons subjects of the
British Empire. Have we not done enough? We allow them to naturalize aliens. That is a
power which, with the consent of the Imperial authority, has been carried into
legislation by the various colonies, and, of course, we cannot do less for the
Commonwealth than we have done for the colonies.
(i)
That the framers of the Commonwealth Constitution specifically stated in regard of

citizenship and political rights;
Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. SYMON.The political Union is the Commonwealth, the name of our country is Australia.
And
Every part of the Commonwealth territory is part of the state, and it is only by virtue of his
citizenship of a state that any person within the bounds of the Commonwealth will have any
political rights under the Constitution.
And
You will find in dealing with this question of the definition of citizenship, that you will
have to be very careful in your definition, because it would be rather too limited a
definition to confine it only to persons who are natural-born or naturalized subjects,
unless you are dealing simply with the political aspect.
And
Mr. OCONNOR.-If they are political rights, they are conferred already by virtue of a
person being an inhabitant of a state entitled to certain political rights, in such state. The
honorable member cannot intend to give a different right to a citizen politically under
the government of the Commonwealth from the right of a citizen of any state. The rights
are coterminous-coincident-and the political rights of every citizen of the
Commonwealth who is within the Commonwealth arise by virtue of his being a citizen
of a state.
And
(j)
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Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).Let us consider the position. Before the establishment of the Commonwealth, each subject is
the subject of a state. After the Commonwealth is established, every one who acquires
political rights-in fact, every one who is a subject in a state, having certain political rights, has
like political rights in the Commonwealth. The only difference between the position before
the institution of the Commonwealth and afterwards is that, so far as there are additional
political powers given to any subject or citizen, be has the right to exercise these, and the
method of exercising them is defined. So far the right of citizenship, if there is a right of
citizenship under the empire, is defined in the Constitution. Now, each citizen of a state
is, without definition, a citizen of the Commonwealth if there is such a term as
citizenship to be applied to a subject of the empire.
That for the Commonwealth to define citizenship as to whom can obtain it, and in what
circumstances, defeats other sections of the Commonwealth Constitution including
117 Rights of residents in States
Appeal 15-2502
A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject
in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would
not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen
resident in such other State.
As the Commonwealth then had the power, as example, to define a citizen not being a
subject of the Queen, by this not being entitled to the privileges, rights and duties of this or
other sections of the Commonwealth Constitution.
If a particular alien would or would not upon naturalization obtain the right to vote in State
elections, etc.
(k)
The framers placed beyond doubt that the only way a person obtains Australian citizenship is
AUTOMATICALLY upon obtaining State citizenship!
(l)
The State of Victoria appears to have had at no time any Statute to declare what is State
citizenship
(m)
The Defendant was to his knowledge never provided with State citizenship, as such neither
could have obtained Australian citizenship.
(n)
The Defendant was at the time of naturalization residing at 10 Anderson Berriwillock,
Victoria, and was since naturalization enrolled on the State electoral roll.
(o)
The Defendant within the provisions of Section 41 of the Commonwealth Constitution was
granted to be an elector in Federal elections.
(p)
The Defendant stood as a candidate for the Legislative Council, North Western electorate, in
1996 as an INDEPENDENT.
(q)
The Defendant stood as a candidate for the Legislative Assembly, Swan Hill electorate, in
1999 as an INDEPENDENT.
(r)
The Defendant married on 28 March 2001 and by marriage changed his name to GERRIT
HENDRIK SCHOREL-HLAVKA, by this annexing his wife late husbands surname, while his
wife annexed his name to become Mrs O. A. M. HLAVKA-SCHOREL.
(s)
The Defendant moved to his current residential address on 28 March 2001.
(t)
Upon the issue of the writs on 8 October 2001, the Defendant notified in person the Australian
Electoral Commission of the change of details, which were then used to amend the electoral
roll.
(u)
The Defendant became an INDEPENDENT candidate for the seat of JAGAJAGA.
(v)
The Defendant then became aware that the writs had not been issued according to law and
on 20 October 2001 notified the then Care Taking Prime Minister of Australia Mr John
Winston Howard, the Leader of the opposition Mr Kim Beazley, the Australian Electoral
Commission and various others by e-mail that the writs were defective.
(w)
Unbeknown to the Defendant at that time, the Gazette S421 containing the Proclamation of
the Prorogue of the Parliament and the Dissolution of the House of Representative had not
been published in on 8 October 2001, but had been published first in Canberra on 9 October
2001, and in Victoria not until 10 October 2001, Western Australia not until 15 October 2001,
New South Wales not until 18 October 2001, Tasmania not until 22 October 2001 and in no
State or Territory was ever any Proclamation published on 8 October 2001.
(x)
The Defendant sought under protracted FOI Act request information details as to any delivery
details, but other then computer records showing that the Special Gazette s421 was till at the
(private) printers company on 9 October 2001, the Commonwealth claimed to be unable to
provide any further details/information upon the basis they didnt exist! As such, there is no
evidence to prove what date and time the printers allegedly delivered S421 for publication and
as such, the computer records showing 9 October 2001 are the only records that can be relied
upon as being reliable that at that time the Special Gazette S421 was still at the printers.
(y)
That the Defendant holds that for the failure to publish the Proclamation on 8 October 2001,
all writs for the general election were ULTRA VIRES, in that they were issue before any
vacant seats existed and in breach of the Commonwealth Constitution, which requires that the
proclamation be published prior to any writs being issued. As well as that each and every writ
issued was defective for failing to comply with the relevant legislation concerning the time
table set out in each legislation that was applicable for each particular writ.
(z)
That albeit the Act Interpretation Act 1901 does refer to that the Court shall take notice of the
date of the Gazette of the Government Printers, in this case the Gazette was not printed by
the Government Printers, and neither had any such reference on it, as such the Act
Interpretation act 1901 didnt apply.
(aa)
The Defendant instituted legal proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia as to seek an
injunction, however matters were not heard upon the merits of the case, as Marshall J held
that the matters was one to challenge the election which fell within Section 353(1) using the
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wording and not otherwise of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, not within Section
383 of the said Act and as such dismissed the matter with cost.
(bb)
The Defendant appealed that decision on 22 November 2001 as M114 of 2001 and this matter
is still outstanding. The Defendant argues that and not otherwise was incorrectly
interpreted, an error of law, in that the High Court of Australia in Sue v Hill set out the true
meaning of the wording, and also that as the Defendant contested the validity of all writs then
the Court of Disputed Returns lacks any legal jurisdiction to hear such matter. Further, that the
issue of injunction against the Australian Electoral Commission was within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia where the case was that the AEC was publishing
ongoing false and misleading information and by this caused to misled the public, the
Government and the Commonwealth. Also, that the AEC could not excuse itself to rely upon
writs that were issued upon their own incorrect advice. The writs for the House of
Representatives had been actually prepared by the AEC for the Governor-General.
(cc)
The Defendant refused to exercise his (purported) rights to vote in the Federal election, nor
appears there be any legal requirement within the Australian Electoral Act 1918 that a person
must attend to a polling booth. An elector is given an opportunity to elect to vote by way of
absentee vote, or otherwise but no distinct requirement appears to exist that one must do either
one or the other.
(dd)
The Federal General election existed of two different elections, being one for the half-Senate
and one for the House of Representatives.
(ee)
The Act requires that the Commission, or the person acting on its behalf shall show that the
ballot box is empty. The Act doesnt state that this must only occur at the commence of the
polling day or at the commencement of each day the AEC allows people to vote in the
preceding days. As such, the defendant takes the view that failure any specific set out the
officer in charge must show the ballot box to be empty prior to each voter depositing a vote.
This, as the Statute is silent otherwise.
(ff)
That the Defendant and his wife attended to the nearest polling booth on Saturday 10
November 2001 and his wife Mrs O. A. M. HLAVKA-SCHOREL then attended into the
polling booth and upon her return made known that the presiding officer (so his staff) had
only once marked of her name and then issued both the ballot paper for the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
(gg)
The Defendant holds that this conduct is unconstitutional, this as this forces a person to vote
for both polls at the same time, and denied the elector his/her right to vote for different polls
at different polling booths. The AEC by this unduly obstruct the right of the elector to vote at
his/her choice at whatever polling booth within the state of Victoria for the Senate at any day
the elector wishes to do so.
(hh)
That the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 doesnt stipulate that an elector has no right to
vote for the Senate at a different day and polling booth then for the house of Representatives,
and as such , the AEC unlawfully requires a person to cast a vote, not within the powers of the
AEC.
(ii)
The AEC also prevented electors (in various States to become Nominated candidates, by
closing the nominations as per writs that were incorrectly issued and as such, in Victoria
denied Mrs Heidi Holz to become a nominated candidate, even so by State of Victoria
legislative provisions Mrs Heidi Holz had another 48 House to nominate.
(jj)
The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 provides for an electoral roll for the
Commonwealth, this even so by S41 of the Commonwealth Constitution it is the State
electoral roll that holds a person to be an elector within S41.
(kk)
The ACE had caused to print and distribute to Candidates Candidate booklets which
showed incorrect election timetables as to State legislative provisions in regard of Senate
elections.
(ll)
The ACE had caused to print and distribute to Candidates Candidate booklets which
showed incorrect election timetables as to Commonwealth legislative provisions in regard of
House of Representatives elections.
(mm) The AEC had published the Pocket handbook, which included the results of the 1998 federal
election, which listed the various State legislations in regard to State elections of its Houses of
Parliament, however the AEC purported this to be the Senate legislation of the State
governing Federal elections.
(nn)
That for all purposes, the Proclamation signed by the Governor-General on 5 October 2001
didnt become effective in Canberra until 9 October 2001 when it become first published.
(oo)
That the issue of writs for the States are issued by the Governors of each State and as such, as
a State legislative issue. The writs for the States, as such, could not be issued, unless first the
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Proclamation of the Governor-General was published in that State. And, this never occurred
until 10 October 2001 in the State of Victoria!
(pp)
Section 41 of the Commonwealth Constitution requires that a person to be eligible to be an
elector in a Federal election must be entitled to be an elector for the numerous Houses of
the State Parliament. The right of being an elector for the Commonwealth, is upon the
condition that such right of being an elector for the numerous Houses is maintained.
(qq)
Queensland abolished its Upper House, as such no elector of the State of Queensland can be
deemed to be qualified to be an elector, as such neither have any candidates or become a
member of parliament in the Federal Parliament.
(rr)
The framers of the Constitution also made clear that the Territories could have representatives
in the Senate but could not vote. They were deemed States in transit (Quasi States) but
specifically failed the right to vote in the Senate. While the High Court of Australia in the
1975 case ruled otherwise, this is an error in interpretation of the intention of the framers!
This, as the framers specifically stated that the Senators of a Territory were representatives
who had no right to vote.
(ss)
That the framers of the Commonwealth Constitution rejected Dr Quick (of Quick & Garran)
submission to give the Federal Parliament constitutional powers to define or otherwise
determine Australian citizenship.
(tt)
That the Victorian constitution requires that a person to be eligible to be an elector, candidate
or Member of Parliament must be an Australian citizen as defined in the Australian
Citizenship Act 1948. As such, referring to an Act that is ULTRA VIRES in regard to any
definition of citizenship!
(uu)
That neither the Defendant or other person who had not obtained State citizenship could
obtain Australian citizenship and for this disqualified from being an elector, candidate or
member of Parliament for State elections.
(vv)
That where the Defendants and others failing to be qualified to be an elector then the incorrect
listing as an elector is ULTRA VIRES in regard of any person listed on the elector rolls
without actually having obtained State citizenship.
(ww)
That the Defendant and any person is disqualified from being an elector for State elections,
then also is disqualified by Section 41 to be an elector in Federal elections.
(xx)
That the Defendant understand that the same lack of qualifications has occurred in most other
states.
(yy)
That as such, most electors who voted in the Federal general election appears not to have been
duly qualified for failure to be legitimate entitled State voters.
(zz)
That by way of 19 November 2002 the Attorney General, through the Department of Justice,
provided that; As explained in my previous letter, citizenship is a matter for the
commonwealth, not the States. And You believe that you must be made a citizen of the
State of Victoria. That is incorrect. And You believe that you must be made a citizen of
the State of Victoria. That is not correct.
(aaa)
That it is clear that Victoria has no Statute to define and declare State citizenship and neither
that any person is granted State citizenship and for this no person, including myself, obtained
either Australian citizenship.
(bbb) That albeit it is within the powers Section 51 (xxxvii) of the Commonwealth Constitution of a
State to adapt any Federal law, and upon this adaptation the Federal law become the law
governing this adoption and the State lacks any legislative powers then to alter or amend it or
otherwise dispose of it, the fact that the Commonwealth provided for the definition of
citizen in an unconstitutional manner, the States in effect adapted a Commonwealth law
that was ULTRA VIRES for so far it dealt with citizenship as it was beyond the legislative
powers of the Commonwealth to define this.
(ccc)
That, where the State of Victoria provides in its constitution that a person must have
Australian citizenship but didnt provide the very mechanism of Statute to provide State
citizenship, then no person can obtain Australian citizenship.
(ddd) That where the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 for so far it purports to deal with
citizenship is declared ULTRA VIRES, then this releases the States to this Federal law.
(eee)
That by the State of Victoria, and other States having made the legal requirements that an
elector must be an Australian citizen, then this condition must be complied with, irrespective
if due to the nature of omitting State citizenship legislation this cant be obtained.
(fff)
The Constitution of Victoria, albeit it adopting the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 in regard
of Australian citizenship, in itself is not granting any State citizenship to any person, even if
the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 were to be held constitutional valid (this is not conceded
by the Defendant) for the fact that the political rights of a State citizen is within the borders of
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the State and cant be made dependent of some Commonwealth law that was not part of State
law.
(ggg) That there appear to be no Section 128 Commonwealth Constitution referendum that has
approved for the Commonwealth to exercise further and/or additional legislative powers as to
define citizenship and/or otherwise grant this to any person, for this, as the time of the
enactment of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 in for so far it was referring to citizenship
it is and remained ULTRA VIRES, and any adaptation of this ULTRA VIRES section doesnt
make the Act constitutional valid.
(hhh) Commonwealth Constitution 41 Right of electors of States
No adult person who has or acquires a right to vote at elections for
the more numerous House of the Parliament of a State shall, while
the right continues, be prevented by any law of the Commonwealth
from voting at elections for either House of the Parliament of the
Commonwealth.
As such, a person who is enrolled for State elections as an elector, upon that basis, irrespective
if or if not enrolled on any electoral roll of the commonwealth, cant be prevented from
voting for any Federal election. There is no need to have Commonwealth enrolment as the
State enrolment is what qualifies an State elector to vote for Commonwealth elections.
The legal requirements by the Commonwealth that unless one enroll with the Commonwealth
one cannot vote in a federal election is therefore unconstitutional. The Commonwealth has no
constitutional powers to legislate such disability, as such any legislation to impose any
disability is ULTRA VIRES!
(iii)
That the Commonwealth refusing Australians to vote in Commonwealth elections for being
abroad, without registering, albeit still being entitled to vote in State elections, is
unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES.
(jjj)
That within the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution, there is no duty for any
elector having to vote, it is rather an elective rights to become an elector, however, the way
the system is implemented is that a person who only enrols for State elections is then by the
VEC passed on to the AEC, without any consent of an elector, and by this forced to vote for a
Federal election.
(kkk) That the Commonwealth makes it compulsory for electors to vote, which appears to be for no
other reason but because of the payment per vote to candidates. This causes an unfair
election campaign of major political parties versus independents who do not have such form
of payment.
(lll)
That I object to having my vote used as payment per vote, for that also refuse to vote.
(mmm) That the various unconstitutional issues resulted to a product of purported 10 November 2001
elections which were not FAIR AND PROPER ELECTIONS.
(nnn) The proceedings before the High Court of Australia as M114 of 2001 has not been disposed
of.
5.
The Magistrates Court only can INTERPRETE, and ENFORCE LAWS of the COMMONWEALTH
OF AUSTRALIA, as governed by the Commonwealth Constitution and by this interpreting matters as set
out by the recorded intentions of the Constitutional Conventions held in 1891, 1897 and 1898 for so far
this is within its legal jurisdiction and power, and otherwise refer the matter for a CASE STATED to the
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA for its determination of the true interpretation of the Commonwealth
Constitution, in particularly where the Commonwealth Constitution is silent of any term of citizenship
and as such the Commonwealth appears to have no legislative powers if it is not stated in the
Commonwealth Constitution!
6.
That a Form 69 under Section 78 of the Judiciary Act was forwarded to all Attorney Generals of each State
and Territory and of the Commonwealth about this.
7.
The Defendant relies upon HCA 27 of 1999 the HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA (at 79) stated,
The orders made in Gould v Brown have no constitutional affect. For constitutional purposes,
they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail against the constitution.
No Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in Gould v Brown.
As such, the Defendant applies the same to any enrolment with the commonwealth being
unconstitutional, as well as the manner in which the purported 10 November 2001 elections were held and
the Defendant was under no constitutional requirement to comply with some unconstitutional conducted
election making a farce of the democratic processes and no more but support a tyrannical conduct.
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8.
That likewise I have found the same NEGLICENCE of the Australian electoral commission to deal with
the matter appropriately and having engaged Mr Peter Hanks QC to deceive the Federal Court of Australia
and to make false and misleading statements as well as to conceal from the Court relevant details and by
this perveting the course of justice and causing a miscarriage of justice, underlines that this matter is one
that could not proceed unless the true constitutional provisions are appropriately determined.
9.
That the Defendant in October 2002 published his book on CD titled;

INSPECTOR-RIKATI and the BANANA REPUBLIC AUSTRALIA
Dictatorship & deaths by stealth. Preliminary book edition on CD.
This book sets out in extensive details many issues regarding citizenship and the lack of legislative
powers by the commonwealth to define, declare and/or grant any citizenship!
It also contains references in extensive manner of E Barton (Australias first Prime Minister and later High
Court Judge) making clear, that if it is not stated in the Constitution then the Commonwealth has no
legislative powers.
10. That refer to the following statutes
CONSTITUTION ACT 1975

- SECT 48
Qualification of electors for the Council and the Assembly
48. Qualification of electors for the Council and the Assembly
(1) Subject to this Act, a person who(a) is(i) an Australian citizen; or

(ii) a person (other than an Australian citizen) who would, if the relevant citizenship law had continued in
force, be a British subject within the meaning of that relevant citizenship law and whose name was, at any
time within the three months immediately before 26 January 1984, enrolled on(A) an electoral roll for an electoral district of the Assembly; or
(B) an electoral roll maintained under any one of the Commonwealth Acts known as the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918, the Australian Capital Territory Representation (House of Representatives) Act 1973 and
the Northern Territory Representation Act 1922; and
(b) is of the full age of eighteen yearsshall be entitled to enrol as an elector for the Council and the Assembly.
(2) A person who(a) has been convicted of treason under the law of Victoria or treason or treachery under the law
of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory of the Commonwealth and has not been pardoned;
(b) has been convicted and is under sentence for an offence
punishable under the law of Victoria or of the Commonwealth or of a State
or Territory of the Commonwealth by imprisonment for five years or
longer;
(c) is(i) the holder of a temporary entry permit for the purposes of the Commonwealth Act known as the
Migration Act 1958; or
(ii) a prohibited immigrant under that Act; or
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(d) by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and significance
of enrolment and votingis not entitled to have the person's name placed on or retained on a roll of electors for the Council or
Assembly.
(2A) An elector who has changed his or her name under Part 4 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages
Registration Act 1996 is not by reason only of that change of name disqualified from voting under the name
appearing on the roll.
(3) Any entitlement to enrolment shall be subject to compliance with any law relating to enrolment for and
voting at elections for the Council or Assembly.
(4) Subject to this section, the Parliament may make such laws as it deems necessary or expedient for or
with respect to enrolment for and voting at elections for the Council or Assembly.
(5) In sub-section (1), "relevant citizenship law" means the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 of the
Commonwealth as amended and in force immediately before the day fixed by Proclamation for the purposes
of section 2(2) of the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984 of the Commonwealth and the regulations
in force immediately before that day under the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 as so amended and in force.
Electoral Act 2002
Act No. 23/2002
Division 1Entitlement to Vote
87. Voting at elections
(1) A person is entitled to vote in an election in accordance with this Act if the person
(a) is qualified to enrol as an elector under the Constitution Act 1975; and
(b) is enrolled as an elector under Part 3 of this Act; and
(c) in the case of an elector enrolled under section 22(1), is enrolled in respect of the address of
the person's principal place of residence or the address of the place that was the person's
principal place of residence during the period of 3 months immediately before election day.
(2) An elector
(a) whose name has been placed on the register under section 22(5); and
(b) who has not attained 18 years of age on election day
is not entitled to vote at the election.
(3) An elector must vote at every election for which the elector is entitled to vote.
(4) An elector may vote
(a) on election day at an election day voting centre; or
(b) in accordance with any other manner provided under this Part, if the elector is entitled to use
that manner of voting.
Division 1-Entitlement to enrolment
THE CONSTITUTION ACT AMENDMENT ACT 1958
- SECT 50
Entitlement to enrolment of electors for Assembly and Council
50. Entitlement to enrolment of electors for Assembly and Council
(1) A person who is qualified to enrol as an elector for the Assembly and Council and has resided at an
address in a district for at least one month immediately preceding the date of the person's claim for enrolment as an
elector is entitled in respect of residence at that address in that districtp27
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(a) to enrol as an elector for the Assembly and Council on the roll for that district and
corresponding province; and
(b) when enrolled and so long as the person continues to reside at that address in that district to
vote at an election for the district or the corresponding province.
(2) An elector who has changed residence to another address within the same district is not deemed by
reason only of the change of residence to be dispossessed of the qualification in respect of which the elector is
enrolled.
(3) A woman is not by reason only that her surname has been changed by marriage disqualified from
voting under the name appearing on the roll.
(4) A person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment or detention imposed by a court upon a conviction
for an offence is deemed to reside at the address at which he or she resided at the time of his or her conviction.
- SECT 51
Eligible overseas electors
51. Eligible overseas electors
(1) An elector(a) whose name appears on the roll for a district; and
(b) who intends to cease to reside in Australia and then, not later than 6 years after the day on
which the elector so ceases, to resume residing in Australia at the address in respect of which the elector is enrolled
or elsewhere; and
(c) whose name appears on the electoral roll maintained under the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 for a Commonwealth subdivision and that roll is annotated to indicate that the elector is an eligible overseas
elector under section 94 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918is entitled, whilst the elector's name continues to be included and annotated on the Commonwealth roll referred to in
paragraph (c) to(d) have the elector's name retained on the roll for the district and province corresponding with the
Commonwealth subdivision referred to in paragraph (c) with an annotation to indicate that the elector is an eligible
overseas elector; and
(e) vote as an elector for that district and corresponding province.
(2) A person(a) who is the spouse or child of an elector who is an eligible overseas elector by virtue of subsection (1) in relation to a district; and
(b) who is living at a place outside Australia so as to be with or near the eligible overseas elector;
and
(c) who had not attained the age of 18 years when the person last ceased to reside in Australia;
and
(d) whose name is not, and has not been, on a roll of electors for the Assembly and Council; and
(e) who is not entitled to be enrolled under section 50(1) but would be so entitled if the person
resided in a district; and
(f) who intends to resume residing in Australia not later than 6 years after the day on which the
person attained 18 years of age; and
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(g) whose name has been added to an electoral roll maintained under the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 for a Commonwealth subdivision and that roll is annotated to indicate that the elector is an
eligible overseas elector under section 95 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918is to be enrolled for the district and province corresponding with the Commonwealth subdivision referred to in
paragraph (g) for which the eligible overseas elector is enrolled with an annotation to indicate that the person is an
eligible overseas elector.
(3) Whilst the person's name continues to be included and annotated on the Commonwealth roll referred to
in sub-section (2)(g), the person is entitled to(a) have the person's name retained on the roll for the district and corresponding province; and
(b) vote as an elector for that district and corresponding province.
(4) A person may apply to the electoral registrar for enrolment as an elector for the Assembly and Council
for a district and corresponding province if, at the time of making the application(a) the person has ceased to reside in Australia for reasons relating to the person's career or
employment or for reasons relating to the career or employment of the person's spouse; and
(b) the person is not enrolled; and
(c) the person is not qualified for enrolment, but would be so qualified if he or she resided at an
address in a district and had done so for at least a month; and
(d) the person intends to resume residing in Australia not later than 6 years after he or she ceased
to reside in Australia.
(5) The application must be(a) in writing; and
(b) made within 2 years of the day on which the person ceased to reside in Australia.
(6) If the electoral registrar grants the application, the electoral registrar must cause the person's name to be
added to the roll(a) for the district and corresponding province for which the person last had an entitlement to be
enrolled; or
(b) if the person has never had such an entitlement, for a district and corresponding province for
which any of the person's next of kin is enrolled; or
(c) if neither paragraph (a) nor (b) applies, for the district and corresponding province in which
the person was born; or
(d) if none of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) applies, the district and corresponding province with
which the person has closest connection.
(7) If(a) the application was received by the electoral registrar after 6 p.m. on the day of the close of the
rolls of an election to be held in a district or province; and
(b) the application relates to that district and corresponding provincethe person's name must not be added to the roll for the district and corresponding province until after the close of the
poll for that election.
(8) The electoral registrar must notify the person in writing(a) of a decision to grant or refuse the application; or
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(b) of the electoral registrar's opinion that the application cannot be proceeded with because of
sub-section (7).
(9) If the application is granted, the elector is entitled to vote at an election for the district or corresponding
province for which the elector is enrolled under sub-section (6) while the elector continues to be so enrolled.
(10) In this section"child" includes an ex-nuptial child;
"spouse", in relation to a person (in this interpretation referred to as the relevant person) includes a person
who, although not legally married to the relevant person, lives with the relevant person as the spouse of the relevant
person on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis.
- SECT 52
Itinerant electors
52. Itinerant electors
(1) A person(a) who is in Australia but does not reside in any district; and
(b) who is not entitled to have the person's name placed or retained on the roll for any district by
reason only that the person does not reside at any address in any district; and
(c) whose name has been added to an electoral roll maintained under the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 for the Commonwealth subdivision with which the person has established a connection under
section 96 of that Act and the roll maintained under that Act is annotated to indicate that the elector is an itinerant
elector under section 96 of that Actis entitled to have the person's name added to the roll for the district and province corresponding with the
Commonwealth subdivision referred to in paragraph (c) with which the person has the connection with an annotation
to indicate that the elector is an itinerant elector.
(2) Whilst the person's name continues to be included and annotated on the Commonwealth roll referred to
in sub-section (1)(c), the person is entitled to(a) have the person's name retained on the roll for that district and corresponding province; and
(b) vote as an elector for that district and province.
- SECT 53
Entitlement of provisional electors
53. Entitlement of provisional electors
(1) An elector(a) whose name has been placed on the roll in pursuance of a claim under section 63; and
(b) who has not attained 18 years of age on the date fixed for the polling in an electionis not entitled to vote at that election.
(2) Notwithstanding section 63 or any enrolment made in pursuance of a claim made under that section, for
the purposes of an election under this Act, a person who has not attained 18 years of age on the date fixed for polling
in that election is not to bep30
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(a) entitled to be enrolled on a roll; or
(b) enrolled on a roll.
- SECT 54
Savings provision
54. Savings provision
Any person who is entitled to be enrolled as an elector in respect of residence in a subdivision under section 103
of the Act as in force immediately before the commencement of section 6 of The Constitution Act Amendment
(Amendment) Act 1999, continues to be entitled to be enrolled in respect of the relevant district and corresponding
province.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1989
11. Persons entitled to be enrolled
(1) A person who on the entitlement date would be an elector in respect of an address in a ward if a roll of
electors for the Legislative Assembly was prepared, is entitled without application to be enrolled on the voters' roll
in respect of that address.
(2) A person who on the entitlement date(a) is not a person referred to in sub-section (1); and
(b) is not less than 18 years of age; and
(c) is the owner of any rateable land in a ward whether solely or jointly with any other person or
persons; and
(d) is not a resident of the ward in which that rateable land is locatedis entitled without application to be enrolled on the voters' roll in respect of that rateable land.
(3) For the purposes of sub-section (2) only 2 joint owners are entitled to be enrolled in respect of any 1
property which is rateable land.
(4) A person who on the entitlement date(a) is not a person referred to in sub-section (1) or (2); and
(c) is the occupier of any rateable land, whether solely or jointly with any other person or
persons; and
(d) is not a resident of the ward in which that rateable land is locatedis entitled without application to be enrolled on the voters' roll in respect of that rateable land.
(5) For the purposes of sub-section (4)(a) in relation to rateable land any part of which is separately occupied, only 2 joint occupiers are
entitled to be enrolled in respect of each part of the rateable land assessed as a separate occupancy in accordance
with section 158A; and
(b) in relation to any other rateable land, only 2 joint occupiers are entitled to be enrolled in
respect of that rateable land.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1989
- SECT 12
Persons entitled to apply to be enrolled
12. Persons entitled to apply to be enrolled
A person who on the entitlement date(a) is not a person referred to in section 11; and
(c) is an owner or occupier of any rateable land in a wardis entitled to apply to be enrolled on the voters' roll in respect of that rateable land.
As for reference of legislative powers within Section 51(xxxvii) of the Commonwealth Constitution, only valid if
there is a successful referendum, to accept this reference of legislative powers of a State to the Commonwealth!
Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).Consequently, if it were proposed to add a legislative power of the kind suggested by Mr. Holder, I take
it that as Chapter VIII. provides first for the passage of the proposed law by an absolute majority,
and then for a referendum, the law would have no effect unless the majorities of the several states
agreed to it.
11. That any reference of legislative powers within the provisions of Section 51(xxxvii) of the commonwealth
constitution can only be valid provided this reference of legislative powers by any State has been carried by
way of Section 128 Commonwealth Constitution referendum. This, as the Hansard shows also
considerable debate by the framers that the people must approve of this! As a reference of legislative
powers causes cost to all Commonwealth taxpayers, it is obvious that for this reason such referendum is
required. Albeit various States have provided for purported reference of legislative powers non of them
were ever submitted and/or approved by way of referendum and as such remain beyond the legislative
powers of the Commonwealth.
12. That the legislative powers of the Commonwealth doesnt rely upon any or all States adopting the
legislation afterwards, but relies upon such Commonwealth legislation at the time of legislation being
enacted to be within the constitution powers of the Commonwealth Constitution. As not only was there no
reference of citizenship in the Commonwealth constitution, but the framers removed any reference from
the original DRAFT 1891 Commonwealth Constitution Bill and in particularly defeated the submission of
Dr Quick to inset a provision top give the Commonwealth legislative powers, then irrespective what the
High Court of Australia may have claimed in the past, the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is and remains
UNCONSTITUTION and ULTRA VIRES for so far it purports to deal with citizenship. Likewise so the
Migration Act references to non-citizen and/or non-citizens remains for that references
unconstitutional and those parts are for this ULTRA VIRES.
13. The Defendant also holds that PARENT PATRICIA doesnt lie with a Court of Statute, and as such the
High Court of Australia has no such position and neither can the Commonwealth upon its own provides
such position to any Minister of the Crown.
THE QUEEN v. DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE (VICT.); Ex parte HENRY (1975)
133 CLR 369
It is clear that the order nisi
for habeas corpus should be discharged unless s. 6 of the Immigration
(Guardianship of Children) Act 1946-1973 (Cth) ("the Act") is invalid as being
beyond the legislative power of the Parliament. (at p371)
Only the Supreme Courts of the Original States can grant PARENT PATRICIA to any person (Minister
or otherwise) and any attempt by the Commonwealth to do so in regard of any person not being a child of a
marriage (as the framers specifically limited this to a child of a marriage and only in relation thereto of an
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application for divorce, then the Commonwealth lacks any legislative powers to deal with the liberties
of any alien. The commonwealth parliament only could regulate that a child arriving as an alien is to be
placed in care of a State authority, but no further than that.
Hansard 2-3-1898
Mr. BARTON
The administration of [start page 1766] the laws regarding property and personal liberty is still
left with the states. We do not propose to interfere with them in this Constitution. We leave that
amongst the reserved powers of the states, and, therefore, having done nothing to make insecure
the rights of property and the rights of liberty which at present exist in the states,
For this I hold that THE QUEEN v. DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE (VICT.); Ex
parte HENRY (1975) 133 CLR 369 was wrongly decided.
14. The framers of the constitution made also clear that once a alien had entered Australia then the
Commonwealth, albeit able to regulate aliens could not interfere with their State rights. Albeit, the High
Court of Australia is on record, as I understand it, that once an alien always and alien. This is untrue.
Once a citizen obtains State citizenship or had paid his/her poll tax then the alien became a citizens, and
no longer was an alien for the purpose of the Commonwealth Constitution. However, Still was referred
to as China man, Afghan or else. As set out in my book, the framers made clear that other then certain
disabilities that the Commonwealth were to place upon an alien to enter Australia (such as, say, must be
in Australia for 5 years before being able to obtain naturalization, the Commonwealth had no power to oust
any alien in defiance of any State rights obtained.
15. In POCHI v. MACPHEE (1982) 151 CLR 101 the following was stated;
2. The plaintiff, who was born in Italy in 1939, came to Australia in 1959
with the intention of making Australia his permanent home, and has since that
time resided in Australia (apart from one short overseas trip), has
continuously had the intention to remain in Australia as his permanent home
and has been totally absorbed into the Australian community. On 11 September
1974 the plaintiff applied for a grant of a certificate of Australian
citizenship. On 25 February 1975 the application was approved by or on behalf
of the Minister for Immigration, but neither the Minister, nor his Department,
nor anyone on behalf of the Commonwealth notified the plaintiff that his
application had been successful. As a result of the absence of notification,
the plaintiff, as was reasonably foreseeable, did not take an oath or
affirmation as specified in s. 15 of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948
(Cth), as amended, and there was not issued to him a certificate of
citizenship. On 17 March 1977 the plaintiff was convicted before the District
Court of New South Wales at Griffith of supplying Indian hemp, contrary to s.
21 of the Poisons Act 1966 (N.S.W.) and was sentenced to imprisonment for two
years. On 7 August 1978 the Minister for Immigration, in purported exercise of
his power under s. 12 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), as amended, ordered
that the plaintiff should be deported from Australia.
The High Court of Australia decided this case enormously in that albeit;
On 25 February 1975 the application was approved by or on behalf
of the Minister for Immigration, but neither the Minister, nor his Department,
nor anyone on behalf of the Commonwealth notified the plaintiff that his
application had been successful.
The Court centred its decision upon if the person had or had not made an oath of alience within the
Australian Citizenship Act 1948, rather then if the person was an approved citizen.
The issue is that the Minister by his approval of the application (regardless if this application was
constitutional valid or not) had recognised that Mr Pochi had been approved to be granted citizenship.
This implies that the Minister at the time of that approval held that Mr Pochi was a person worthy of
citizenship.
The issue then ought to be if the recognition by the Minister in itself was a demonstration that Mr Pochi
was accepted to be a citizen, this as the application within the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is
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ULTRA VIRES in regard of citizenship, and as such the application was to have been construed not being
one of Australian citizenship but rather one of Australian nationality within the powers of naturalization.
The same with Heather Hill, who by virtue of being a British born British subject upon arrival in Australia
AUTOMATICALLY obtained her political rights to be a State citizen and so Australian citizen without
needing to make any application at all. Her application for Australian citizenship was one that was really
only one to obtain Australian nationality. This, the High Court of Australia simply omitted to realise.
Heather Hill (Sue v Hill) by virtue of arrival in Australia obtained all political rights associated with any
citizen of the State she came to reside within, including the provisions then of S41 of the Commonwealth
Constitution. That was one of the basic principles of Federation as the framers made clear that to do
otherwise would mean the Federation bill would be rejected! The Commonwealth Constitution doesnt
therefore either provide for Australia to declare Brittain to be a foreign power, as the inherent provision is
that the commonwealth has no such constitutional powers! Only by way of Section 128 referendum could
this be achieved. The usage of Queen of Australia is also unconstitutional as again the framers made
clear that the Commonwealth had no constitutional powers to interfere with the standing or otherwise of the
Monarchy!
16. That I view that in POCHI v. MACPHEE (1982) 151 CLR 101 the High Court of Australia erred severely
in that it ought not be for the Commonwealth to dictate terms in Migration Act which are within the powers
of any State. In that case, the person was convicted of an offence under NSW law, which for the same in
another State may not have resulted to any conviction, if the laws of that State didnt hold it a criminal
offence. As such, the Commonwealth powers must be held to be confined to any offences that are
committed or allegedly committed under Commonwealth law and even then it is for the States to determine
the innocent or guilt of that person. (as set out in my book). Australian citizenship can only deal with laws
under the Commonwealth Constitution, not any particular State laws. As such, I view that by virtue of
State citizenship Mr Pochis criminal record not being an issue within his State ought to have been no issue
for Commonwealth purposes. It is here where the issue of State versus Australian citizenship is also very
relevant!
17. That there is a confusion by the various Courts about what Australian citizenship is really about and the
oath associated to it is shown also in the matter of Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners
[1999] VSCA 116 (30 July 1999) the Court there considers the oath/pledge made as an alien to become
naturalized and that of the Court. What it omitted to realize and address is that the oath/pledge to become
naturalized is one to the whole of Australia, all laws governing all citizens of Australia, where as an oath as
practitioner to the State of Victoria is in regard of laws of the State of Victoria, being often different to laws
of other States. Here is the problem that eminent lawyers even in the position of being judges fail to realise
that State citizenship is to protect a citizen of that State in regard of all rights and privileges provided
for within that State, which may be different then those rights and privileges of another State. That the
rights and privileges of being an Australian citizen only relates to rights governed by the Commonwealth
Constitution, and have nothing to do with State rights unless so specifically stated in the Commonwealth
Constitution. citizenship relates to political rights, not to naturalization!
18. That I am aware that the political party named Australian Greens are campaigning for Australian
citizenship above that of State citizenship, as least various of its campaigners made known to me. This,
even so State citizenship and Australian citizenship are complimenting each others, and do not in any
way conflict with each other. State legislation dictates State citizenship political rights Commonwealth
legislation dictates Commonwealth citizenship political rights for so far permissible within the provisions
of the Commonwealth Constitution. The right of trade without restrictions of any State borders is clearly a
political rights obtained as an Australian citizen.
19. That no person can become Australian citizen without being first a State citizen. Albeit the
Commonwealth has the legislative powers to determine who can enter Australia, it cant force any State to
accept any person into its State territory. As such, the Commonwealth may, for argument sake, grant visas
to a person of PURPLE NATIONALITY to enter Australia, but it cant force a State to accept this person
from PURPLE NATIONALITY as a resident and/or citizen, if that particular State doesnt want such
people to enter its State. The right to govern immigration and of aliens is one to determine if they are
suitable to Australia, but doesnt extend to override the Sovereignty of the States to determine who shall or
shall not be its residents and/or citizens. Indeed , as set out in my book, the framers made clear that no State
could be forced to accept people it didnt want as residents.
20. The framers of the Commonwealth Constitution themselves didnt even know the true meaning of
citizenship and as such could not be perceived to give the Commonwealth some legislative powers as to
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something they themselves questioned what it was meaning. Indeed, the framers made clear it was for
every State to determine for themselves what the true meaning of citizenship was within their own State.
Hansard 2-3-1898
The Federal Parliament could do nothing in the way of defining the qualification of citizenship
or the rights of citizenship beyond the limits of the Constitution.
I would point out to Dr. Quick that he is proposing to give a power to regulate or describe rights of
citizenship, when we really do not know at present what is meant by a citizen. I confess I do not
know what the honorable and learned member means by that term.
21. That the position is that the Commonwealth is the federation of the States as to limited powers only. The
States are the independent sovereign nations that came together for certain purposes but they refused to
hand over certain legislative powers. For example the imprisonment of people accused or convicted of any
breaches of Commonwealth Law must be in State prison facilities, where the alleged breach had occurred.
The Commonwealth however had the powers to determine which particular State prison system could be
used if an alleged breach of Commonwealth powers was occurring outside any particular State. As such,
the detention of any refugees outside any particular State territory (including its water (Sea) territories then
the Commonwealth was to determine which State prison the alleged offenders were to be placed. (The, so
called, Pacific solution as such was unconstitutional) the Migration Act determining that non-citizens are
to be placed in Commonwealth Detention Centres for this is also unconstitutional, bot for using the term
non-citizen and the provision for Commonwealth Detention Centres. This, as the framers didnt want
the Commonwealth to have any legislative powers to enforce its own laws! Indeed, the framers also made
clear that the State Courts were to enforce Commonwealth Law and only for so far it was not held by that
State to be tyrannical powers by the Commonwealth as otherwise the Court could use JURY
NULLIFICATION, refusing to convict a accused person.
22. The framers (again, as set out in my book) made clear that the Commonwealth would have no powers to
enter any state with its forces (being it ASIO, Australian Federal Police, Army, etc) as the local law
enforcement of a State were only so empowered, unless upon request of a State government it was to deal
with domestic violence (riots). As such, it is essential to the citizenship that this remains in the hands of
the States, as to prevent the Commonwealth to deny any citizen of its State laws. Otherwise,
extradition from one State to another could be circumvented by using the Australian Federal Police and
by this nullify State legislative provisions by a State to protect its citizens!
23. That the following case law reference (quoted below) shows the gross misconception by the Courts that it
relies upon Australian citizenship purportedly granted by the Commonwealth where none can be granted.
The truth is that the framers made clear that it would be beyond the legislative powers of the
Commonwealth to legislate against British subjects. The framers also made clear (as shown in my book)
that a British subject upon arrival obtains AUTOMATICALLY State citizenship and so
AUTOMATICALLY Australian Citizenship, and this without application. The High Court of Australia
misconceived that because Heather Hill applied for naturalization this related to her Australian citizenship
or her political rights. The Commonwealth had no constitutional powers to declare British government an
foreign power without first having a Section 128 Commonwealth Constitution referendum.
The purported Australian Act, despite what the high Court of Australia stated, is and remains
UNCONSTITUTIONAL as the States could only refer legislative powers that were within their own
legislative powers and only if within their legislative powers the relevant State could refer legislative
powers. This Dr Quick (during the Constitutional Conventions Debates) also questions being within the
State legislative powers. The State of Victoria has no legislative powers to refer its legislative powers to the
Commonwealth, and any purported reference of legislative powers is by this ULTRA VIRES. (As set out in
my book also!)
[210] (2001) 75 ALJR 1439 at 1458-1459 [110]; 182 ALR 657 at 682-683.
"A recent example of this process of the denotation of constitutional terms becoming
enlarged in the context of Australia's emergence as a sovereign state is Sue v Hill. In Sue v
Hill, the Court held that the term 'foreign power' in s 44(i) of the Constitution now includes the
United Kingdom although in 1901 and for long after the United Kingdom was not a 'foreign
power' within the meaning of that term. Consequently, the first respondent, Mrs Hill, who had
been born in England but had taken out Australian citizenship, was the subject of a foreign
power and incapable of being chosen as a member of the Senate. Three Justices of the
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Court said [(1999) 199 CLR 462 at 496 [78]]: 'Whilst the text of the Constitution has not
changed, its operation has. This reflects the changed identity of those upon whose advice
the sovereign accepts that he or she is bound to act in Australian matters by reason, among
other things, of the attitude taken since 1926 by the sovereign's advisers in the United
Kingdom. The Constitution speaks to the present and its interpretation takes account of and
moves with these developments.'"
24. The Defendant did request, in writing, the Governor-General to withdraw the defective writs issued on 8
October 2001 (setting out certain reasons), and issue valid writs, upon this the Governor-General never
responded. However, the issue is that the Defendant did pursue matters to be corrected but cant be held
accountable for any ignorance displayed or perceived to be displayed by the Governor-General.
25. The Defendant did request, in writing, the Governor of the State of Victoria, to withdraw the defective writs
issued on 5 November 2002 (setting out certain reasons), and issue valid writs, upon this the Governor
never responded, so far. However, the issue is that the Defendant did pursue matters to be corrected but
cant be held accountable for any ignorance displayed or perceived to be displayed by the Governor.
26. The Defendant therefore having made request to the then Acting Prime Minister Mr John Howard, the
Australian Electoral Commission, the Governor General and through the Federal Court of Australia made
many attempts to seek to avoid this unconstitutional debacle, but to no avail.
27. The usage of citizens in the following quotation appears to be more as if residents are referred to as
being citizens. After all, insurance companies would hardly restrict its insurance coverage only to those
declared citizens where the term citizen then was not even defined by law!
HANSARD 12-9-1897
Mr. BARTON:
After the sub-section giving power to the Federal Parliament to legislate with regard to banking, the
incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money, power is proposed to be given to it to legislate
upon insurance, including State insurance extending beyond the limits of the State concerned. Where a
State adopts a system of State insurance, for instance, on lives, and where that State takes proposals,
not only from citizens within its own bounds, but accepts those emanating from citizens of the
Commonwealth beyond its bounds, then it is proposed that that insurance shall be subject to the
general provisions of the Commonwealth law on the subject, but where the business is confined within
the limits of the State carrying it on it is not proposed to interfere with it. The sub-section following
that dealing with naturalisation and aliens originally read:
However, whereas the word citizen may or may not have been defined, and so its usage was open to all to
include or not include aliens, as their presence in a State would hardly denied them insurance cover on
the basis of lack of naturalization, and as such the issue of citizenship was not a legal issue per se, until
the Victorian Constitution actually provided for the legal requirement of Australian citizenship as it is by
this that whatever informal meaning was applied to citizenship the State then took upon it that it had to be
a person in certain ways. However, the doctrine of Australian citizenship as per Australian Citizenship
Act 1948, did not in any way alter and neither could alter the fact that the framers stipulated that one must
have State citizenship to be able to obtain Australian citizenship.
This means that even if the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 definition were to be accepted, it still would
not remove the fact that unless the State first grant State citizenship, there is no way any person can obtain
Australian Citizenship.
The framers made clear it was a DUAL CITIZENSHIP!
One cant simply not have a single citizenship within Australia as DUAL CITIZENSHIP is the basic
fabric upon which the political rights of any Australian citizen is built.
However, somehow most people (including lawyers and politicians, for so far they are not the same
identity) seem to have been misled that there was only the Australian citizenship! Even that the Parliament
legislated for DUAL CITIZENSHIP, where this all along was applicable.
A State citizen from Victoria may become a resident of New South Wales, but maintains State citizenship
by virtue of birth in Victoria. The persons Australian citizenship would not alter upon which State the
person resides in, neither his/her political rights, unless so dictated by the Commonwealth Constitution.
The lack of any Statute to provide for any person to apply for State Citizenship or otherwise to be granted
State citizenship in Victoria, albeit the Victorian Constitution demands Australian citizenship to be an
elector, means that not a single person could obtain Australian citizenship and so become an elector until
the Parliament of Victoria provides a Statute to obtain State citizenship of Victoria.
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Appeal 15-2502
However, as I contested the validity of the 30 November 2002 election for the State of Victoria also, and so
contested the validity of the electors since 5 August 2002, then the current PURPORTED Victorian
Government is no Parliament as all as its Members of parliament were elected by electors who failed to
have State citizenship and for this also Australian citizenship!
It prohibits this unconstitutional Government to amend any constitution of Victoria, and I see no other way
out but that once the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is declared to be ULTRA VIRES in regard of
citizenship, then the requirement of the Victorian Constitution also becomes ULTRA VIRES. However,
it remains the question, if this redress the problem that at the time of the election having been held the
purported electors were not electors at all, for failing to have first State citizenship!
In any event, the purported electors, not being electors, neither then could be deemed entitled within
Section 41 to be electors to be entitled to vote in the 10 November 2001 Federal election. This applies not
only to the purported Victorian electors but to all purported electors of the States who place the prerequisite
that a person is to be an Australian citizen in accordance of the definition in the Australian Citizenship Act
1948.
28. That Throughout the Constitutional Convention Debates in 1891, 1897 and 1898 there was an agreement
that there would be no uniform criminal law, but that breaches of Commonwealth law would be dealt
with according to the State criminal laws of the State where the alleged offence occurred. Albeit, The
Commonwealth did enact the Crimes Act, it remains ULTRA VIRES. In regard of claim against the
Defendant of not voting, there is clearly no constitutional powers for the Commonwealth to have the matter
heard within its own Criminal Act legislation, as it is ULTRA VIRES. Further, because of the division in
Writs being State for the Senate and Commonwealth for the House of Representatives, then any
Commonwealth claim against the Defendant must be limited to the issue of House of Representatives
election. Whereas the issue of alleged not voting for the Senate, is one that is within the legal provisions of
the State, being it a State writ and State Proclamation needed to have an election for the Senate.
Hansard 11-3-1891
Mr. CLARK:
My friend, Mr. Wrixon, said something about the desirableness of a uniform criminal law, and while
he was speaking I expressed the opinion that we should not have a uniform criminal law. The hon.
member invited me, I understood, to give some reasons why we should not have it. I have placed my
note upon criminal law under the head of state interests, because I believe it comes under that head. It
might be desirable in some colonies or in some states, to make certain things crimes which it would
not be desirable to make crimes in other states. We know that in the American union the eastern states
are highly civilised, refined communities, advanced in physical, intellectual, and artistic culture; while,
on the other hand, the western states, or the backwoods, as they are called, are in a very different
position, politically, socially, and intellectually. It might be necessary in some of the states to pass
stringent laws making certain things crimes which would not be so dealt with in other states. Besides,
we know that the law is often used as a means of effecting indirectly some ulterior purpose, also for
the purposes of class or special interests. The game laws of England occupied in former years, and
occupy now to a certain extent, a foremost place in the provisions of British criminal legislation. We
know what detestable and abominable laws they were, and we know that they were introduced not for
the protection of life and property and individual liberty in the ordinary sense-not for the same purpose
as that for which you make murder or forgery a crime-but for the conservation of certain class interests
and class privileges. In America, in the days of slavery, it was made a capital felony in some states to
teach a negro to read or write; and even at the present day, when slavery has been long abolished, the
marriage of black people with white people in some states is made criminal. Men who have chosen to
marry a mulatto or a quadroon have stood in the criminal's box and have been sentenced as common
criminals. Now, there was a time when the slave power was so strong in America that it appeared to be
about to transform the whole union into its own hideous form and likeness, and, if the attempt had
succeeded, it would have been [start page 253] a most lamentable state of things to have the laws
which would have been then enacted in force throughout the whole of the Union-in Massachusetts, in
the home of the pilgrims, as well as in Louisiana. We do not want to run that risk. Do not let us,
therefore, have a uniform criminal law, but let each state have its own law.
Again;
Mr. CLARK:
Do not let us, therefore, have a uniform criminal law, but let each state have its own law.
Hansard 2-3-1898
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Mr. HIGGINS.-Then all crimes should be left to the Commonwealth?

Mr. BARTON.-No; because you do not give any power with regard to punishing crime to the
Commonwealth
However, we find that people are even imprisoned, without charge, by the Commonwealth by a lack of the
States and/or the judiciary to appropriately apply the constitutional limitations of the Commonwealth
Constitution!
29. That in my view the conduct of the Plaintiff (and so also of those acting under his authority,) as some
referred to above, is jeopardising the security of our democratic society and a gross and utter and
blatant disregard for the various legal and constitutional provisions of the applicable Constitutions,
Statued law (State and/or Commonwealth) and Case Law and must neither be condoned or accepted
to be allowed to continue in any part thereof and for this the applicant urge the Court to make the
finding, declarations etc. as sought hereunder as to the conduct of the Plaintiff in general and each
item on its own or in combination is/are a breach of constitutional power etc.
30. That I also seek to rely upon the following quotations;
Hansard 27-1-1898
Mr. BARTON.-If a state Parliament wants to shirk its responsibility it can fall back upon the
referendum.
[start page 223]
Mr. ISAACS.-With regard to the other point that a state may repeal a law, I do not agree with that
argument. If a state refers a matter to the Federal Parliament, after the Federal Parliament has
exercised its power to deal with that matter the state ceases to be able to interfere in regard to it.
Moreover, when the Commonwealth has passed a law at the request of any Parliament or
Parliaments, and the Parliament of a third state adopts it, it adopts a Commonwealth law, and it
requires the consent of the Commonwealth to get rid of that law. In my opinion, there is no power
of repeal with the states, and I feel no doubt that I have read among the decisions of the United
States, one which is to the effect, although I cannot just now lay my hands upon it, that when a
state has, with the consent of Congress, made certain enactments the power of Congress is
required to repeal those enactments.
Mr. REID.-Otherwise the provision would be perfectly idle. A state would refer a matter to the
Commonwealth, and, not being pleased with the precise manner in which that matter was dealt with, it
would immediately repeal the law.
Mr. ISAACS.-Yes; the state might just as well pass the law for itself.
Mr. OCONNOR.-A law once passed under this provision becomes a federal law.
Mr. ISAACS.-Yes, and nothing less than the federal authority can get rid of it.
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales). With regard to the particular sub-section which we have now in
hand, I have not been brought to see that any dangerous power is given in it, or that there is any reason
for an alteration. Let us take first the suggestion of the honorable and learned member (Mr. Deakin).
The Federal Parliament can only deal with such matters as a state or states refer to it. A state may refer
to the Federal Legislature a certain subject without referring, or expressly excepting from the reference,
any financial dealing with that subject. In such a case the Commonwealth could only legislate upon the
subject so far as its financial aspects were not concerned. If the whole subject were referred, not
excepting finance, the Commonwealth could legislate to the whole extent of the reference. I think that
the words used in the sub-section are ample for either case. The difference with regard to subsection(3)is this: It is plain that that sub-section refers only to the raising of money by any mode of
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Appeal 15-2502
taxation for general Commonwealth purposes. Like all the rest of these sub-sections, with the exception
of one or two which contains special provisions, it concerns matters relating to the peace, order, and
good government of the Commonwealth," and the word Commonwealth" means prima facie the whole
Commonwealth. In this sub-section, however, there are special words which prevent the law applying to
the whole Commonwealth, and these are the words quoted by the honorable and learned member (Mr.
Deakin):But so that the law shall extend only to the state or states by whose Parliament or Parliaments the
matter was referred, and to such other states as may afterwards adopt the law.
It seems to me that if there is any raising of money intended by the states to be delegated to the
Commonwealth-and they can only delegate their legislative authority to a certain extent, provided for by
the Constitution-that will be expressed in the reference, or it can be excluded from any reference. In the
one case or the other the Commonwealth can only proceed as far as the extent of the reference. Then
there was the objection of the honorable and learned member (Dr. Quick), that this provision
affords an easy method of amending the state Constitution without the use of the referendum. But
at the present time the state Constitutions do not provide for the use of the referendum. The government
of the states is by a majority of the representatives of the people, and it must [start page 224] be
constitutionally assumed that when a majority of the two Houses of Parliament make a law the people
speak through that law. If the people choose to speak through a law made in this way, there is no
evasion of responsibility when an appeal was made to a superior authority for the settlement of a
difficulty incapable of settlement by the relations of two bodies at issue. This is not a restriction but an
enlargement of the legislative powers of the states, which I think is in the spirit of democracy, and one
that we should grant.
Mr. HOLDER (South Australia).-I want to ask the leader of the Convention a question, his
answer to which will influence my vote on the subject before us. The sub-section upon which we
are dealing and the following sub-section are the only ones which provide for an extension of the
powers of the Commonwealth. I have been looking up the clauses in Chapter VIII., and I do not
see that under them any extension of the powers of the Commonwealth can be dealt with. I want
to know whether I am right in supposing that under these clauses no extension of the powers or
scope of the Commonwealth would be possible, because I think that under that chapter, if any
alteration of the Constitution of the Commonwealth is desired, the states, to obtain it, must firsthave a law passed by the Commonwealth Parliament? Now, suppose it is proposed to enlarge the
power of the Commonwealth, by placing under its control the administration of Crown lands.
First of all, the Federal Parliament would have to pass a law upon this subject, and that law might
be held to be ultra vires. There would be no power to submit anything to the electors without
Parliament first of all passing a Bill, which, however, would be from the outset outside its power. I
should like to know from the leader of the Convention whether my view of this matter is correct?
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-What I understand my honorable friend (Mr. Holder) to ask is
this: Suppose it were desired that extra-legislative power than now exists should be granted to the
Commonwealth-as, for instance, to take under its control questions relating to Crown lands, and so onwhether an alteration in the Constitution in that direction would be ultra vires? Now, the Bill provides,
in Chapter VIII., that the provisions of the Constitution shall not be altered except in the following
manner;" which, to my mind, means that if the processes specified are adopted the provisions can be
altered in any way. I take the provision to mean that authority is given to the Commonwealth under the
processes here specified to alter this Constitution in any manner, so far as it deals with the affairs of
Federated Australia, and not with affairs outside the dominion of Australia. Consequently, if it were
proposed to add a legislative power of the kind suggested by Mr. Holder, I take it that as Chapter
VIII. provides first for the passage of the proposed law by an absolute majority, and then for a
referendum, the law would have no effect unless the majorities of the several states agreed to it. So
that not only the Commonwealth but the states would have to agree to the passage of the law.
Then any objection to that law becoming a new part of the Constitution of the Commonwealth would
vanish; because, I think, so much authority is conceded by Chapter VIII.
And;
p39
Mr. DEAKIN.-My point is that by the requests of different colonies at different times you may
arrive at a position in which all the colonies have adopted a particular law, and it is necessary for the
working of that law that certain fees, charges, or taxation should be imposed. That law now relates to
the whole of the Union, because every state has come under it. As I read clause 52, the Federal
Parliament will have no power, until the law has thus become absolutely federal, to impose taxation to
22-2-2016 Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502
provide the necessary revenue for carrying out that law. Another difficulty of the sub-section is the
question whether, even when a state has referred a matter to the federal authority, and federal
legislation takes place on it, it has any-and if any, what-power of amending or repealing the law
by which it referred the question? I should be inclined to think it had no such power, but the
question has been raised, and should be settled. I should say that, having appealed to Caesar, it
must be bound by the judgment of Caesar, and that it would not be possible for it afterwards to
revoke its reference.
What is very important are the wording;
referendum.
It relates to a state Parliament and referendum, as such a referendum is needed to accept a State to
have accepted it reference of Power.
Also;
I take it that as Chapter VIII. provides first for the passage of the proposed law by an absolute
majority, and then for a referendum, the law would have no effect unless the majorities of the
several states agreed to it. So that not only the Commonwealth but the states would have to
agree to the passage of the law.
Albeit, a State can adapt a Commonwealth law that is validly enacted within the Commonwealth
Constitution, the reference of power however is limited, where it is to create legislative powers that doesnt
exist previously So that not only the Commonwealth but the states would have to agree to the passage
of the law.. As such, it is not an issue for the Commonwealth to legislated on any matter referred to it
unless by way of referendum this was accepted. The Victorian purported reference of powers
Commonwealth Powers (Family Law- Children) Act 1993 No.92 of 1986 the Mutual Recognition
(Victoria) Act 1993 were never approved by way of referendum and are NOT AT ALL part of the
Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth albeit so claimed in prints of the Commonwealth
Constitution.
On 7 and subsequently on 21 October 1986 the Legislative Council passed the Commonwealth Powers
(Family Law - Children) Act 1986 No 92 which was Gazetted on 16 December 1986 and came into force
on 28 October 1987. Version 010 being:
s. 4
The Governor in Council may, at any time, by proclamation published in the Government Gazette,
fix a day as the day on which the reference under this Act shall terminate.
Mr. DEAKIN.Another difficulty of the sub-section is the question whether, even when a state has referred a
matter to the federal authority, and federal legislation takes place on it, it has any-and if any,
what-power of amending or repealing the law by which it referred the question? I should be
inclined to think it had no such power, but the question has been raised, and should be settled. I
should say that, having appealed to Caesar, it must be bound by the judgment of Caesar, and that
it would not be possible for it afterwards to revoke its reference.
Version No. 010
Commonwealth Powers (Family Law--Children) Act 1986
Act No. 92/1986
Version incorporating amendments as at 14 July 1997
This Version incorporates amendments made to the Commonwealth Powers (Family Law-Children) Act 1986 by Acts and subordinate instruments.
The Victorian Parliament has PURPORTEDLY amended this legislation of the Commonwealth Powers
(Family Law - Children) Act 1986 No 92 totally unaware what the true reference of legislated powers
possibly could mean! It purports to refer legislative powers and withdraw it as it please! It was however
never accepted by any referendum on the first place!
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Appeal 15-2502
GLEESON J as a judge in the corium in of the Full Court of the HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA in HCA 27 of
1999 under point 31 had this to say:
..I held that State Parliaments had no power to vest State Judicial power in federal courts created
by the Parliament of the commonwealth and that the parliament of the Commonwealth had no
power to consent to State Parliaments vesting State Judicial power in the federal courts.
I view, that likewise the States have no constitutional powers to vest the Commonwealth with legislative
powers or the commonwealth to consent to accept legislative powers within Section 51(xxxvii) of the
Commonwealth constitution unless the State constitution provides for such reference of legislative powers
and also such reference of legislative powers has been approved in accordance of the provisions of Section
128 of the Commonwealth Constitution by way of referendum, as well as that both the States (and so those
voting in the referendum) and the Commonwealth have been aware that this reference of legislative powers
is one of a permanent nature, after which the relevant State referring the legislative powers for ever has lost
future legislative powers either to rescind, amend or otherwise alter any legislation the Commonwealth may
provide upon a successful referendum.
The Victorian Constitution under s16 provides that The Parliament shall have power to make laws in
and for Victoria in all cases whatsoever. As such, this clearly exclude any reference of legislative
powers from the State of Victoria to the Commonwealth! After all, to refer legislative powers means the
State no longer has it, and that breaches the provisions of s16!
31. That albeit the Victorian Constitution refers to the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, no specific legislation
appears to be in place as to formally adopt this Commonwealth legislation.
32. That during the Constitution Convention Debates, the framers made it very clear that commonwealth law
was to be enforced within the States by State Courts and using State Crimes Act and outside the borders of
the States it would be the British criminal laws that were applicable on the ships of Great Brittain. Albeit
the British ships no longer are applicable and so a vacuum exist as to the lack of British criminal law,
without any amendment of the Commonwealth Constitution to include such powers, the Commonwealth
cant for itself take on certain legislative powers which specifically and deliberately were denied to the
Commonwealth!
33. That the Australian Act is and remains unconstitutional, as it was not within the legislative powers of each
of the States to legislate for the Australian Act for themselves, and as such cant purportedly refer powers
not within its own legislative powers. Further, any reference of legislative powers is conditional upon being
accepted by way of Section 128 Commonwealth Constitution referendum before being valid in law.
Hansard 27-1-1898
referendum.
34. That if the Proclamation signed by the Governor General on 5 October 2001 but firstly published on 9
October 2001 was defective and so ULTRA VIRES in regard of Prorogue the Parliament and dissolving the
House of Representatives, then all seats must be deemed vacant, by virtue of Section 20 & Section 38 of the
Commonwealth Constitution, as none of the members of either House attended for the remaining 3 months
of sitting days.
35. That I must set out that despite Constitutional limitations the Commonwealth has set up its own Minister
for Education and other matters and unconstitutionally uses that against the States. The point being, that no
matter what the Commonwealth may legislate, being it Australian Citizenship Act 1948, or other
Commonwealth legislation, if it aint within the constitutional powers it aint worth the paper written on it!
Hansard 1-3-1898
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time
being in each state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get 100,000 a year, or
so much a year, from the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink
p41
22-2-2016
Appeal 15-2502
at a violation of the Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should
we have these elaborate provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not
say that the Constitution may be amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies
may unanimously agree? Why have this provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at
all? Why not leave this matter to the Ministers of the day? But the proposal has a more serious
aspect, and for that reason only I will ask permission to occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
36. That likewise makes clear, that conduct of ASIO, and Australian Federal Police, are not justified and not
within the Commonwealth Constitution, albeit States tend to ignore this. It doesnt make it Constitutional
valid, as like the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 where it is beyond the constitutional powers of
Commonwealth then it is ULTRA VIRES. As such, each and every unconstitutional power exercised will
not by mere passing of time make it lawful, or constitutional valid. The only manner in which to have it
become valid is to have the Commonwealth Constitution amended by referendum, and then
Hansard
Mr. DIBBS:
We have no enemies within, and the only thing we have to fear is the possibility of any assault on the
mother country by her enemies from without, unless indeed the creation of a standing army proves a
menace to the people of Australia by the existence of an armed force for unlawful purposes.
And;
Our own police are quite sufficient for the preservation of order within.
37. That I seek this Court to adjourn these proceedings and to place before the HIGH COURT OF
AUSTRALIA a CASE STATED as to have the High Court of Australia to first determine the following
matters;
p42
(i)
Can a person obtain Australian citizenship without first obtaining State citizenship (Quasi
States being Territories included)? If so, then by which constitutional valid manner?
(ii)
Does the Commonwealth have constitutional powers to define citizenship? If so;

(a)
under which provision? And
(b)
in regard of aliens and immigrants; or
(c)
in regard to any person within (b), as well as and including those born within Australia?
(iii)
Does the Commonwealth have constitutional powers to declare and/or grant citizenship? If so,
(d)
under which provision? And
(e)
in regard of aliens and immigrants; or
(f)
in regard to any person within (b), as well as and including those born within Australia?
(iv)
Does the Commonwealth have the constitutional powers to determine the rights of a resident in a
State to obtain citizenship of such State? If so, by which constitutional powers?
(v)
If the adaptation by the State of Victoria of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 were to be
deemed valid, then has the Commonwealth by this the legislative powers to determine the political
rights of the citizens of the State of Victoria, where purportedly they have no State citizenship. If
yes, would then the Commonwealth be able to dictate who shall be electors by what conditions
and override any Constitution provision that may exist within the Victorian Constitution?
(vi)
Where the Constitution of Victoria purports to adapt the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, is then
that part of the Victorian Constitution Federal law and can only be amended or otherwise altered
by Commonwealth legislation?
(vii)
If the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is ULTRA VIRES for so far it deals with granting
citizenship to any particular person, can then the adaptation of this part by State nevertheless be
held legally enforceable?
(viii)
If the purported granting of Australian citizenship within the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is
ULTRA VIRES, then is any State qualification based upon the Australian Citizenship Act 1948
definition of Australian citizenship also ULTRA VIRES?
22-2-2016
Appeal 15-2502
(ix)
Where the Defendant was not a State citizen at the time of election being held, then was the
Defendant nevertheless a qualified State elector, where the purported Australian citizenship
granted to the Defendant on 28 March 1994 was ULTRA VIRES.
(x)
Where the Defendant was not a State citizen at the time of election being held, then was the
Defendant nevertheless a qualified Commonwealth elector, where the purported Australian
citizenship granted to the Defendant on 28 March 1994 was ULTRA VIRES.
(xi)
Was the Proclamation signed on 5 October 2001 by the Governor General for the Prorogue of the
Parliament and the Dissolution of the House of Representatives legally applicable;
(a)
(b)
(c)
p43
On 9 October 2001, when the first Special Gazette S421 was first published in Canberra, but
only in Canberra, and/or
On 9 October 2001, in all States and Territories irrespective if Special Gazette S421 was not
published in any particular State/Territory, and/or
On 10 October 2001, when Special Gazette S421 first published in the State of Victoria?
(xii)
Was the Proclamation signed on 5 October 2001 by the Governor General for the Prorogue of the
Parliament and the Dissolution of the House of Representatives legally applicable at all, where the
date of the purported Prorogue and the dissolution had occurred on a previous day? If it was valid
from the time and day of actual publication then;
(a) If it was valid from the time and day of actual publication then, were both prorogue and
dissolution occurring instantly at the same time at commencement of the day, 00.01 AM on 9
October 2001 and/or
(b) Was the Prorogue of the Parliament valid, but not the Dissolution of the House, where the
latter one was to occur on 8 October 2001, AFTER the Prorogue of the Parliament, and for
this could not occur. And/or
(c) Was the proclamation valid, as to be a proclamation, but not for the date and time of the
events to occur, as a subsequent amendment Proclamation was required, to provide date and
times for the prorogue of the Parliament and the dissolution of the House of Representatives
to be applicable AFTER the date and time of actual publication of the subsequent amended
proclamation?
(xiii)
Where the writs were issued by the Governor-General using the wording according to law but
the Australian Electoral Commission had not drafted the writs according to law can it be held
that the writs therefore were defective and so null and void?
(xiv)
Can the Australian Electoral Commission lawfully act outside the provisions of Section 7 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to;
(a) act in breach of the Commonwealth Constitution and any legislative provisions in regard of
State legislative provisions regarding Senate timetables? And/or
(b) act in breach of the legislative provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to hold
elections in a manner of election timetable not being as legislated.
(xv)
Is the legal obligation of the Australian Electoral Commission to first act within the legal
provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, and must return any defective writ issued
by a Governor-General and/or Governor with a request to correct any offending parts and reissue
the Writ(s)?
(xvi)
Can the Australian Electoral Commission be excused from non-compliance with statutory legal
requirements, upon the basis of the writs being issued as to a certain timetable, irrespective that the
Australian Electoral Commission caused/created the writs be issued defective?
(xvii)
Where the Special Gazette doesnt contain the wording Government printers, or any simular
wording, is it then that the judicial notice required by the Act Interpretation Act 1901 is not
applicable?
(xviii)
Where the Court of disputed returns fails to have any judicial powers to deal with more then one
poll, and the Defendant sought to have the Federal Court of Australia to deal with numerous
matters of numerous polls, including injunctions against the Australian Electoral Commissions
conduct to hold a poll in breach of constitutional and legislative provisions, then was the Federal
Court of Australia the appropriate Court to deal with the matters?
22-2-2016
Appeal 15-2502
(xix)
Where the defendant is contesting the validity of the purported 10 November 2001, and has
pending proceedings outstanding prior to the purported 10 November 2001 elections being held,
then is the Defendant entitled then not to vote in such purported election in that it would
undermine his case outstanding at the time before the Courts?
(xx)
Does the Commonwealth have legislative powers in regard of (commonwealth) Crimes Act where
the framers of the Commonwealth Constitution specifically ruled that the Commonwealth would
not have constitutional powers for Criminal law legislation as in the States the State criminal laws
would be applicable, and beyond the States borders it would be the British crime laws that would
be applicable?
(xxi)
Can the issue of not voting be pursued within the (Commonwealth) Crimes Act, where the issue of
any elector voting is confidential?
(xxii)
When the relevant legislation to any election states shall not be less than, is then the number of
days referred to held to be clear days between the events referred to?
(xxiii)
Where the relevant Act stipulates a minimum days, such as using the wording shall not be less
than in relation to enrolment and/or nomination of candidates, must then the elector or a person
entitled to be an elector have access to enrol or to nominate for each of the shall not be less than
number of days provided? If not, could effectively the electoral commission close its doors for
most if not all of the days by this in effect nullifying the Statutory provision?
(xxiv)
Can the Commonwealth Electoral Commission exercise any powers within Section 7 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 in regard of holding any Senate election in breach of the
legislative provisions of the relevant State , upon writs that were issued defectively by a Governor
of a State having been the product of false and misleading details to advise the public, the
government and the Commonwealth about the true nature and its application of legislative
provisions?
(xxv)
Were the Candidate handbooks containing false and misleading details/information, where it
quoted the incorrect State legislation purporting to be Senate legislation of the States denying
electors/candidates for the Senate a FAIR AND PROPER election?
(xxvi)
Were the Candidate handbooks containing fair and misleading timetables as to the relevant
legislative provisions of each State in regard of Senate elections denying electors/candidates for
the Senate a FAIR AND PROPER election?
(xxvii) Was it lawfully within the powers of the Australian Electoral Commission to deny people to be
accepted as candidates for Senate election, despite that such person within its State legislative
powers still had up to 2 days of nominations left, because of the defective writs stating otherwise?
(xxviii) Were the Senate elections (its polls) held on 10 November 2001 FAIR AND PROPER?
(xxix)
Were the House of Representatives elections held on 10 November 2001 FAIR AND PROPER?
(xxx)
If the Proclamation signed by the Governor General on 5 October 2001 but firstly published on 9
October 2001 was defective and so ULTRA VIRES in regard of prorogue the Parliament and
dissolving the House of Representatives, then were all seats vacant by virtue of Section 20 &
Section 38 of the Commonwealth Constitution, where not a single member attended to the last 3
months of sitting days?
(xxxi)
Where the framers held that political rights are obtained arise by virtue his being a citizen of a
state there is dual citizenship being both State citizenship and Australian citizenship, then
can the Commonwealth, for so far this is deemed to be within its legislative powers grant any
person Australian citizenship and so political rights of voting (See section 41 Commonwealth
Constitution) in Commonwealth elections? If such voting rights in Commonwealth elections cant
be given is that then a bar to granting Australian citizenship?
(xxxii) Does a person upon obtaining State citizenship AUTOMATICALLY obtain Australian
citizenship? If not, why not?
p44
22-2-2016
Appeal 15-2502
(xxxiii) Can the Commonwealth constitutionally use its own electoral roll and by this deprive any person
entitled to be an elector to be denied the right to vote, for whatever reason by not being on the
Commonwealth electoral roll, even so the person is an elector on a State electoral roll?
(xxxiv) Can the lawfully Commonwealth Electoral Commission conduct State election or be involved with
State elections (other then Senate elections) where such is beyond the constitutional provisions of
the Commonwealth Constitution?
(xxxv)
Was any writ, issued by the Governor-General, in conflict to legislative provisions of the
Parliament, defective and so ULTRA VIRES?
(xxxvi) Was any writ, issued by a Governor of a State, in conflict to legislative provisions of that State,
defective and ULTRA VIRES?
(xxxvii) Is the Officer in Charge required to mark of each elector voting for having voted at each election
separately?
(xxxviii) Is it valid in law for the AEC to force a person to vote at the same time for both the Senate and
House of representatives, or is an elector entitled to vote at separate occasions for each House,
within legislated provisions?
Dated the 3rd of Day of December, 2002 (Signed, the Defendant)
END QUOTE S78 NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS
As I understood it His Honour Mullaly J on 30 October 29015 commented from the bench that I
was a person who holds that the law applies to everyone else but myself. This, even so not one
iota of evidence was before the court to justify this kind of remark. It is the kind of
workplace bullying that I view has no place in the legal system or for that anywhere else.
This Supplement 3 may indicate that I am a person who pursues the true meaning and application
of the constitution and any legislation to be within the legal principles embedded in the
constitution. That I view doesnt make me neither should brand me as some person not willing to
be subjected to valid legislation at all. A judge like His Honour Mullaly J is what causes to
undermine the confidence of society in the judicial system. It is what perverts the course of
justice. It is the reason why Self Represented Litigants often are losing their cases, because they
may not be able to handle the bullying from the bench and the denial of proper respect towards a
Self Represented Litigant.
His Honour Mullaly J instead of applying workplace bullying would in my view have done
better to learn how to properly conduct a pre-appeal hearing and case management. It may have
saved me the horrendous amount of work now involved to seek to overcome this workplace
bullying misconceptions, etc.
In my view this court can blunder on and its orders will be and remain without legal force or it
may just realise that it would be better for the Premier, the Attorney-General and myself to have
so to say a roundtable conference, to sort out what is going on and perhaps can present to the
court a resolution in MINUTES OF CONSENT ORDERS that the Court may rely upon within
the context of adjudicating about the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as a jurisdictional
issue. If the State government doesnt want so to say come to the table then the court is bound
by the rights I obtained by my successful appeals on 19 July 2006 and has to deal with the
issues I raised without the Prosecutor or pretended Prosecutor having filed any evidence to
challenge my sub missions.
On 3 December 2013 (long before the litigation commenced) I then wrote to the (then)_Premier
of Victoria Mr Denis Napthine about the issue of Fire prevention Notices, the abuse of it, etc. B
ut the Premier didnt bother to respond.
.
p45
22-2-2016
Appeal 15-2502
Let us be clear about this, we are talking about the fire danger in which firefighters are at the
peril of fire danger and Buloke Shire Council is misusing and abusing its delegated powers to
terrorist property holders to pay fines to itself (so to fraudulently take the monies rather than
place it in the consolidated Revenue Funds) rather than to use the delegated powers to ensure the
Country Fire Authority Act 1958 delegated powers are appropriately used to minimise the risk
of fires.
In my view workplace bullying by His Honour Mullaly J has no place in todays society and
certainly not to try to railroad a genuine concern to leave fire fighters at the peril of fire danger
that could be avoided if Buloke Shire Council acted within the delegated powers.
I do not get intimidated by judges who I view are incompetent to appropriately deal with matters
within the rules of the court and engage in workplace bullying and if anything I am resolute to
seek to protect the lives of fire fighters.
In my view the Chief Justice should have called for so to say a round table conference to deal
with the workplace bullying and failure to uphold the rules of the court by His Honour
Mullaly J.
.
I in my 21-2-2016 correspondence also stated

QUOTE 22-2-2016 CORRESPONDENCE
Cc:
21-2-2016
Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J. judgemullaly.chambers@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Mr Wayne Wall & Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Basil Stafford <basil.Stafford@elliottstafford.com.au>
Alison May <alison.may@elliottstafford.com.au>
Ref; 20160221-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to ES&a Your ref LA-05-06- -Re APPEAL-15-2502 Re self-incrimination
Sir/Madam,
I view it is essential that Mr Wayne Wall is appropriately warned by lawyers involved that
where he is to take the witness stand he can be cross examined also and he could self-incriminate by his
answers either during examination, cross-examination or any re-examination.
Infringement Act 2006
QUOTE
167Offence to give false information
A person must not intentionally provide false or misleading information in any written statement
required by or under this Act.
Penalty:
10 penalty units.
END QUOTE
In my view this also applies to Mr Wayne Wall!

As Mr Wayne Wall issued defective Fire Prevention Notices (in violation of the legal provisions of the
Country Fire Authority Act 1958) and nevertheless issued an Infringement Notice alleging failure to
comply and this resulted to the Magistrates Court of Victoria (albeit without any evidence to support this
charge) issuing orders adverse to me, then it is my view he could self-incriminate if under oath making
statements. As your correspondence of 10 June 2015 refer to him as Law Officer then clearly it is implied
he is aware of legal provisions and to issue defective notices and base an Infringement Notice upon this to
have it used to achieve a miscarriage of justice I view is a very serious matter. While the Premier still has
not responded to my long overdue FOI Act request as to the extent of Infringement Notices having been
issued in such manner defective, I do anticipate that in the end I will obtain the relevant details.
Mr Wayne Wall employed as a Legal Officer and as such being paid for the job surely can expected to
have a duty of care in his conduct dealing with legal issues. My 20160217-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to
County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council -APPEAL-15-2502-ADDRESS TO THE
COURT-Supplement 2 sets out certain issues and I view that if you have not already done so you ought
p46
22-2-2016
Appeal 15-2502
to give Mr Wayne Wall appropriate legal advice including that if he were to take the witness stand he
could self-incriminate as the transcript could be used in any charges that may be placed against him.
The High Court of Australia in various judgments on record also sets out what may constitute trespassing,
and as I indicated previously I pursue that Mr Wayne Wall committed trespassing upon my property.
Again, if he takes the witness stand than I can assure you I will pursue this issue also. Where the courts
did strike down police conduct to trespass then surely Mr Wayne Wall cannot be allowed to do so!
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL (Our name is our motto!)

END QUOTE 22-6-2016 CORRESPONDENCE
In my view Mr Wayne Wall can be charged within the provisions of s127of the Infringement Act
2006 as well as regarding trespassing if he were to end up giving evidence under oath. I view he
should be informed of the inherent dangers if he were to give evidence.
Re trespassing see also:
HALLIDAY v NEVILL [1984] HCA 80; (1984) 155 CLR 1 (6 December 1984)
GEORGE v ROCKETT [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104 (20 June 1990)
PLENTY v DILLON [1991] HCA 5; (1991) 171 CLR 635 F.C. 91/004
NSW v IBBETT [2006] HCA 57; (2006) 231 ALR 485; (2006) 81 ALJR 427
KURU v STATE OF NSW [2008] HCA 26 (12 June 2008)
The problem Mr Wayne Wall has is that he provided images that has the date and time of what
appears to be his trespassing upon my property and I am not aware any court order was obtained
by him to enter my property for the purpose he appeared to have done so. The court could hardly
entertain litigation based upon criminal conduct of the informer.
I didnt make the rules of the court, neither that I didnt make the constitution, and I didnt make
the judgments I am quoting. I am simply relying upon, legal and other provisions including
authorities that are within the legal principles of the constitution. And I am not a shame to pursue
this.
What I feel sorry about is those people who have had their person tarnished by judges like His
Honour Mullaly J abusing/misusing judicial powers for ulterior motives nothing to do with
enforcing the rule of law!
I view as a CONSTITUTIONALIST that constitutionally we do not have a valid state
constitution (that was also unchallenged in the 19 July 2006 successful appeals) and neither valid
elections or valid governments. It seems however that while I placed matters before the courts
willing to litigate it in every details it are the governments that fear to litigate the subject matters.
I can do no more but to place matters before the court and well expect a competent judge to
understand/comprehend what is constitutionally appropriate and adjudicate upon the evidence
before the court and not to be bias thinking to be part of the government.
This ADDRESS TO THE COURT supplement 3 should be considered together with the
ADDRESS TO THE COURT (incorrectly referring to a 22-2-2006 hearing which should be 222-2016) ADDRESS TO THE COURT supplement 1 and ADDRESS TO THE COURT
supplement 2.
This written submission is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all relevant
issues and oral supplement may be made. After all it is unknown to me what, if any, other matter
may arise before the hearing is held.
Appellant
p47
22-2-2016
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502

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Page 1 AP 2502 ADDRESS TO THE COURT Suppl 3, Hearing date 22-2-2016 (or alternative date if allocated)

ADDRESS TO THE COURT (Written submissions) Supplement 3

Elliott Stafford and Associated

Melinda Hampshire Melinda.Hampshire@courts.vic.gov.au , registry.ballarat@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Melinda Hampshire Registrar

Melinda.Hampshire@courts.vic.gov.au & registry.ballarat@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria, feedback@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

For example as stated in

Some of the issues but not in any of priority

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Awaiting your response,

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

I have further notified Buloke Shire Council as follows:

County Court of Victoria crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

(Our name is our motto!)

END QUOTE 21-2-2016

This document deals with independents of the judiciary.

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

In this you refer to self -represented litigants, etc.

Hansard 1-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

QUOTE In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

END QUOTE 21-2-2016 correspondence

Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

QUOTE S78 NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

O 73 r 1 High Court Rules

UNDER SECTION 78B of the JUDICIARY ACT 1903

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION

NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER

The outline of the case at hand and is as follows;