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D.

TYPES/ CLASSES OF JURISDICTION


i. Orginal concurrent jurisdiction vis--vis original exclusive
jurisdiction
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE
SHAREHOLDERS
OF
EUROCREDIT
COMMUNITY
BANK,
PETITIONER, vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: In January 2006, Vivas acquired the Rural Bank of Faire, Inc.
(RBFI). Upon acquisition, Vivas initiated an internal audit of RBFI. The
audit highlighted the dismal operation of RBFI.
On 8 Dec. 2006, BSP issued a Certificate of Authority extending
the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP also
approved the change of its name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Inc.
(ECBI)
R.A. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, required the general
examination of certain banks including ECBI. The following are the
serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general
examination:
1.
Negative capital of P14.674M and Capital Adequacy ratio of
Negative 18.42%;
2.
Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity composite rating
of 2 with a Management component rating of 1; and
3.
Serious supervisory concerns on activities deemed unsafe or
unsound.
Because of these findings, BSP cancelled the rediscounting line
of the ECBI. Moreover, BSP directed the bank to:
1.

Infuse fresh capital of P22.643M

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1

2.
Book the amount of P28.563M representing unbooked valuation
reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October
31, 2008; and
3.
Take
appropriate
action
necessary
violations/exceptions noted in the examination.

to

Vivas claimed that the Integrated Supervision


(ISD II) took the above courses of action due to the
exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former
Vivas moved for reconsideration of such resolution for
and violative of due process.

address

the

Department II
joint influence
BSP examiner.
being arbitrary

BSP on the contrary, said that there are several instances that
the BSP invited ECBI to discuss pertinent matters but Vivas kept on
postponing the meeting.
The Monetary Board of BSP posited that ECBI unjustly refused
to allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books
and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. In its
letter, 13 dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was already
due for another annual examination and that the pendency of its
appeal before the MB would not prevent the BSP from conducting
another one as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.
In view of ECBI's refusal to comply with the required
examination, MB issued a resolution imposing penalty on ECB. In a
Letter-Reply of ECBI, it asked for another deferment of the examination
due to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal
before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD
II denied ECBIs request and ordered the general examination to
proceed as previously scheduled.
A complaint was filed before DOJ for Estafa Through
Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and
employees of ECBI.
Eventually, the Monetary Board issued a resolution as follows:

1. To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the


Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership; and

shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.


[Emphases supplied]

2. To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as


Receiver of the bank.

That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and


reiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development
Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30

Vivas filed a petition for prohibition before SC, ascribing grave


abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its
banking business and for placing it under receivership.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the Monetary Board has jurisdiction over the case
(2) Whether Vivas was correct in filing a prohibition before the Supreme
Court
RULING: (1) The Monetary Board (MB) may forbid a bank from doing
business and place it under receivership without prior notice and
hearing.
(2) The Petition for PROHIBITION Should Have Been Filed in the
CA
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been
filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
2

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts


Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible
because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the
Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence
of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the
extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court
of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important
reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules
of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
questions of law.31 In the case at bench, there are certainly factual
issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where
the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of
the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ
must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy
of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy must be observed to
prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EJIEYANAGISAWA
G.R. No. 175303 (2012)

FACTS: Eiji, a Japanese, married Evelyn, Filipina, in 1989 at the City

equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction

Hall of Manila.

over each other. For this reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Paraaque

On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a townhouse in

RTCs decision to dismiss Eijis complaint.

Paranaque. The Registry of Deeds issued a title to Evelyn P. Castaneda,

ISSUE: Whether the RTC Paranaques decision was proper?

Filipino, married to EjieYanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of legal age.

RULING: No. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint before RTC Makati for the

ownership of the Paraaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the

declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of


bigamy. During the pendency of the case, he asked that Evelyn be
enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her

REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to
rely on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as
confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the

name. Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook to acede to the motion of

annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.

Eiji.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption


In 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000 from petitioner PAFIN. To

secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage (the property abovedescribed). At the time of the mortgage, Eijis's appeal was pending before the
CA.
Eiji filed an action before RTC Paranaque for annulment of the real
estate mortgage. PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the Order in the first case.
PAFIN admitted that it did not conduct any verification of the title because
Evelyn is good and friendly. Moreover, PAFIN averred that Eiji has no
personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national
cannot own real properties located within the Philippines.
The RTC Paranaque dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action. Eiji cannot possibly own the property because he is a foreigner.
Eiji appealed, arguing that his inability to own a real estate does
not automatically deprive him of all his interest in the mortgaged
property, because the same was purchased with his money.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. It ruled that the property
should be liquidated and divided between Eiji and Evelyn.
The appellate court determined that the Paraaque RTCs Decision
was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of
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3

by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to


the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on
the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs
resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.
Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who
between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled
that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and
should not have been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC. The CA only
clarified that it was improper for the Paraaque RTC to have reviewed the
ruling of a co-equal court.
G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F.
CEZAR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178845
ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR.
DANTE
G.
GUEV
ARRA
and
ATTY.
AUGUSTUS
F.
CEZAR, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the December 29, 2006 Decisionof
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95293, entitled "Dr. Dante
G. Guevarra and Atty. Augustus Cezar v. Civil Service Commission and
Atty. Honesto L. Cueva."
FACTS:
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar
(Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for
Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP
Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an
administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty,
grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously
undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and
Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied
the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases
In his Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of
the Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he answered
Question No. 11 in this wise:
11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so,
state briefly the nature thereof NO
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra
and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan
The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or
administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or
administrative casebecause their cases had not yet been decided by the
Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No.
11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith
March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution
No. 060521formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima
facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil
Service Law and Rules.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
4

the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to


Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case.
Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance
of
Preventive
Suspension12rll and
an
Omnibus
13
Motion rll seeking the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of the
following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.
CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents for
being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which
was a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission.15rll It also
denied Cuevas motion to include additional charges against the
respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as
the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence
possible witnesses against him.
Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the
administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva.
CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and
setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been
rendered without jurisdiction
the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by
Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all
administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the attention
of the PUP Board of Regents.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the
jurisdiction of heads of agencies.

The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed in
this case is whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases
filed directly with it against officials of a chartered state university.
HELD:
The petitions are meritorious.
CSC
has
jurisdiction
filed
directly
with
it,
who initiated the complaint

over
regardless

cases
of

Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of
the civil service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341 PUP became a chartered
state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the
Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.
The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter
7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it
may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials
to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to
be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case
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5

the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory
only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case
filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a
private citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially
in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or
on appeal" without any qualification.
It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is
immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case
by the CSC.
CSC
has
concurrent
with
the
Board
administrative cases

of

original
jurisdiction
Regents
over

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service(the


Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide
administrative cases directly brought before it:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil
Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil
Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the

civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees.

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS VS. THE

The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have
the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to mean
that the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority,
in this case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided
on the charges against the respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed to
take into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which
undeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and
belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases
on appeal:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY AND THE PEOPLE OF

Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments,


agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities
shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over
their respective officers and employees.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does
not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing
body in question, in this case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This means
that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint,
then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.Thus, not
all administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly,
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to
deputize some other department, agency or official to conduct an
investigation into the matter, thereby considerably easing the burden
placed upon the CSC.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006 and June
30,
2006,
respectively,
of
the
Civil
Service
Commission
are REINSTATED.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
6

HONORABLE

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

BRANCH

66

OF

THE

THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with the
crime of other forms of swindling for selling the mortgaged land. The
land was mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for review, however,
denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material dates.
Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
the judgment of conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19,
2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term.
The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas
because he was nowhere to be found.
Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant
of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the said
motion, petitioners instituted, the instant proceedings for the
annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition
in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on
motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.

In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that,


following the ruling in People v. Bitanga the remedy of annulment of
judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court likewise
rejected petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case.

excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the


case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.
Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized
that the petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one

ISSUES

for certiorari.

1. Whether the ruling on PEOPLE VS BITANGA would apply to this


case?
2. Whether the accused were guilty of other forms of swindling?

Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one


for certiorari, the doctrine in People v. Bitanga no longer finds
application in this case.
Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:

RULING

ART. 316. Other forms of swindling. The penalty of arresto

1. No.

mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not


Petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case,

from the time it was pending in the trial court until it reached
this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss
the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering
petitioners advanced age, the length of time this case has been
pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of
petitioners conviction, the Court resolves to grant pro hac
vice the motion for reconsideration.
This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application
of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has
allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always
be avoided. It is far better and more prudent for the court to
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
7

less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered,
shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not
recorded;
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime
charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.
For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling
under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution
had the burden to prove the confluence of the following essential
elements of the crime:
1. that the thing disposed of be real property;
2. that the offender knew that the real property was
encumbered,

whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;


3. that there must be express representation by the
offender that the real property is free from
encumbrance; and
4. that the act of disposing of the real property be made
to the damage of another.
One of the essential elements of swindling
under Article 316, paragraph 2, is that the act of
disposing the encumbered real property is made to
the damage of another. In this case, neither the trial
court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to
the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the
RTC or that of the CA is there any discussion that
there was damage suffered by complainant, or any
finding that his rights over the property were
prejudiced.
On the contrary, complainant had possession and
control of the land even as the cases were being
heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion
over the property was not disturbed. Admittedly,
there was delay in the delivery of the title. This,
however, was the subject of a separate case, which
was eventually decided in petitioners favor.
If no damage should result from the sale, no
crime of estafa would have been committed by the
vendor, as the element of damage would then be
lacking. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that
petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009
is SET ASIDE and
a
new
one
is
entered ACQUITTING petitioners of the crime charged
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
8

on the ground of the prosecutions failure to prove


their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR
PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR
GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER
REJANO, petitioners, vs. P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO,
respondent.
FACTS: The Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded
due process during the summary hearing. Hence, this motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for
the following reasons:
1. Proceedings were null and void because no hearing was conducted;
and
2. The evidence does not prove that respondent is guilty
ISSUES: 1. Whether the Summary Proceedings conducted were null
and void
2. Whether the evidence presented is insufficient to prove
respondents guilt
RULING: 1. NO. The fact that there was no full-blown trial before the
summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings. In
Samalio v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the time-honored
principle that: Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for
being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a

case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary


evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take
the place of their direct testimony.
2. To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court recalibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary hearing
officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's
guilt of the charges against him.
However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by
respondent before the RTC is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the ROC and as held in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where the issue
or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision
the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for
certiorari.
The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does
not toll the running of the period to appeal. However, Section 1, Rule
1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
In Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,6 the
Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to promote
substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
among other instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has
rendered years of service to the country.
In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately
resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for
reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision as an appeal before the
National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to
which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against
respondent could fall under both Sections 41 (where it shall be filed in
Peoples Law Enforcement Board) and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6975 (states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately
remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming
a police officer) or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
Act of 1990.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
9

It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in


2005 or after respondent had already filed the petition for
certiorari with the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of
jurisdiction. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and
regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative
cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal
from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or
regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case.
With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case,
respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate
his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may
file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No.
6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied.8 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court
stressed thus: After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in
themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient
dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be
construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial
justice.
Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB
should be deemed available to respondent in the higher interest of
substantial justice.
MR: Partly granted. Allowed to file an appeal.
GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 165835
FACTS:
Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Comptrollership of the AFP.
On 27 September 2004,
the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, filed a COMPLAINT before the Sandiganbayan against
Garcia
for
VIOLATION
of
the
following:
1. SECTION 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713 (Code of
Conduct of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

2.
3.

Sec52(A)(1),

Art
(3) &

(20)

of

183,
the Civil

Service

RPC
Law

His wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379


insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of
petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gotten
wealth.
Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his
wife and 3 sons. Ombudsman has determined a prima facie case exists
against Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier and
public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his
other lawful income. SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT
Garcia filed Motion to Dismiss and a Petition for Certiorari:
Garcia alleged that the Sandiganbayan has a LACK OF
JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA
1379. He claimed that RTC has the jurisdiction as provided under
Sec2(9) of the law.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in Civil Actions
pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired
property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.
SB was intended principally as a criminal court. This is
supported by Presidential issuances and laws, to wit:
(1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family
and cronies,
(2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No.
1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil
Code and other existing laws, and
(3) E.O. No. 14-A which further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D.
No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil
action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
10

independently of the criminal action.


Even if SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally
defective for failing to comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA
1379,
Sec.
2:
i.
inquiry
similar
to
a
Preliminary
Investigation
ii. Certification to Solicitor General of prima facie case (In this
case: there is no
certification)
iii. action filed by Solicitor General. (In this case it is filed by
Ombudsman)
COMMENT
by
SB:
In Republic v. SB the Court ruled that there is no issue that
jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with
the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, under Constitution and prevailing statutes, SB is
vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture
under RA 1379.
SBs jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases
involving violations of RA 3019 IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES
ARE
CIVIL
OR
CRIMINAL
IN
NATURE
COMMENT
BY
OMBUDSMAN:
1.
Republic
vs.
SB
2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even
under the amendments of RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to be
limited
to
cases
involving
high-ranking
public
officials
3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs.
petitioner based on Constitution and RA 6770: The constitutional power
of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or
employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined
under
R.A.
No.
1379
4. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.
5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar
to PI + SOLGENs participation no longer required since Ombudsman
endowed
w/
authority
to
investigate
and
prosecute
6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB

REPLY
by
Garcia
1. SBs criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil
jurisdiction : SBs jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed
w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction
2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal
action against him, so not under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1. Whether SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA
1379
2. Whether Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and
prosecute such petitions for forfeiture
3.
Whether
petitioner
is
guilty
of
forum
shopping
HELD
Petition

without

MERIT,

dismissed

I. SB HAS JURISDICTION
Under RA 8249, jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and
1379 is lodged w Sandiganbayan.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, originally, the solicitor general
was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before CFI of the city or
province where the public officer/employee resides or holds office [RA
1379, SEC2]. However, upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD
1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was
vested in SB.
Eventually, PD 1606 repealed PD 1486 and modified jurisdiction
of SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in
connection w/ crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:
*
Restitution
or
reparation
for
damages;
* Recovery of instruments and effects of the crime;
* Civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code; and
* Forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379
BP 129 abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular
courts, and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of SB over
offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of PD 1606 to embrace all such offenses
irrespective of imposable penalty.
PD 1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD
1861 because of the proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not higher
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
11

than Prision Coreccional or its equivalent and even such cases not
serious
in
nature.
ON
CIVIL
Forfeiture actions
FORFEITURE OF
THE NATURE OF

NATURE
OF
FORFEITURE
ACTIONS
are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT
AN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES
A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]

SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379 [An


Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to
Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.]: the law provides a procedure
for forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and
income from legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the public
officer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as a
penalty
for
unlawfully
acquired
properties
2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)
RA 6770 and Article XI, Sec. 13 of 1987 Constitution provides
for the POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:
1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the
investigation
of
such
cases;

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of illgotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and
the
prosecution
of
the
parties
involved
therein.
It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture
under
RA
1379
BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-

gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the


recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed AFTER FEB
1986.
3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!
Garcia failed to inform the SC that he had filed a Motion to
Dismiss in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the SB.
A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised
substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as
it has in the instant petition. In fact, the petitioners argument that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted
from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that
in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition for
forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379,
and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayans
Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment
dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only
superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of
dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and
their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his
undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason
enough to dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.
G.R. No. 173121
April 3, 2013
FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACTFINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria
Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by Franklin
Alejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the February 21, 2006 decision2 and
the June 15, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the petitioner's appeal
on the August 20, 2004 decision 4 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0310-I finding him administratively liable
for grave misconduct.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
12

FACTS: On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water


Reduction Department of the Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI)
received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team that
the Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been
illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its carwash business in Binondo, Manila.5
On May 10, 2000, PNP-CIDG conducted an anti-water pilferage
operation against MICO.
During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered
that MICOs car-wash boys indeed had been illegally getting water from
an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys and
confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the
petitioner, Alfredos father and the Barangay Chairman or punong
barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with
the PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the
confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotion
and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to
escape.
Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after
conducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against the petitioner
for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and
for his unwarranted intervention.
In its decision9 dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled
that the petitioner cannot overextend his authority as Barangay
Chairman and induce other people to disrespect proper authorities. The
Deputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated the
illegal acts of MICOs car-wash boys.10
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. But the CA dismissed the petition for
premature filing.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling-DENIED.

Hence this petition.


The petitioner argues that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to order his dismissal from the service since under
Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991), an elective local official may be removed from office only
by the order of a proper court. Finally, he posits that the penalty of
dismissal from the service is not warranted under the available facts.

ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES REQUIRES A REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM
THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE OMBUDSMAN
FOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43 REVIEW.
II.
WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION
OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.
III.
WHETHER PETITIONERS ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT
TO WARRANT HIS DISMISSAL.

HELD:
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from
the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in
behalf of the Ombudsman
The petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he
filed his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case at the
administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on
the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
13

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative


cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the
Constitution.18 It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act 19 and the Local Government
Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the
seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases
decided by this Court.20
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and
underscore ours]
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.22
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is
to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of
jurisdiction is concurrent.
The Ombudsman
sanctions

has

the

power

to

impose

administrative

Section 15 of RA 677027 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to


give the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the

Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative sanctions; its


power is not merely recommendatory.

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides


that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to


provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure
that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people
against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The
Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with
the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only
of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also,
it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby DENY the petition for


lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 88544.

Substantive Issue

ii. Appellate jurisdiction vs Original jurisdiction (review)


DARMA MASLAG VS ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET
FACTS This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the resolution of
CA which dismissed petitioner Darma Maslag's ordinary appeal to it for
being an improper remedy. The Petition also assails the CAs September
22, 2006 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct


After the petitioner introduced himself and inquired about the
operation, the police officers immediately showed their identifications
and explained to him that they were conducting an anti-water pilferage
operation. However, instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually
ordered several bystanders to defy the PNP-CIDGs whole operation. The
petitioners act stirred further commotion that unfortunately led to the
escape of the apprehended car-wash boys.
Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher penalty
against the petitioner. His open interference in a legitimate police
activity. and defiance of the police's authority only show his clear
i1itent to violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as
the grassroot official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of the
law. The photographs, taken together with the investigation report of
the Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the witnesses, even
lead to conclusions beyond interference and defiance; the petitioner
himself could have been involved in corrupt activities, although we
cannot make this conclusive finding at this point. 43 We make this
observation though as his son owns MICO whose car-wash boys were
engaged in water pilferage. What we can conclusively confirm is that the
petitioner violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate police
activity where his own son appeared to be involved. This act qualifies
the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
14

The petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with


declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against the
respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in
obtaining an OCT over petitioners property.
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the
MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding
judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from
orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.
RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the
petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the
respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review
under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

xxxx

ISSUE:
1. Who has jurisdiction over the case?
2. Whether petioners appeal is the proper remedy?

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro

HELD:

Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand

1. Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real
property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the
RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property. Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
129,29 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30 provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the
assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
15

pesos (P50,000.00).
2. Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal
should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the
proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the
parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Neither
would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to
confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal
only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.
The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually
exercised by the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC
should have exercised.
Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case
is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the
court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was
improper to begin with.
Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court
affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

MARK
JEROME
S.
MAGLALANG,
Petitioner,
vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM
GENUINO, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City
Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). While he was
performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as
one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed
to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00
and P500.00 bills which in total amounts to P50,000.00. Following
casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board.
However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead
of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers
for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of
P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Convinced that she was tricked by the petitioner
in getting less than the amount she must received.
She filed a case against petitioner. And On January 8, 2009,
petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino informing him
that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer
and directing him to explain within 72 hours.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum
dated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the contents of its March
19, 2009 Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board of
Directors 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA,
averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to
support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to
the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to
observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in
imposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying his
recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
16

Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him


was only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellate
jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of
official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by
reprimand.ISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies?
RULING: Court of Appeals decision reversed.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation
that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal
standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only
when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from
reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters
when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or
when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or
incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances
and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the
CA for its judicious resolution is in order.
A. Errors of Jurisdiction vis-a-ivs errors of judgement
DIPAD V. OLIVAN
G.R. NO. 168771 (2012)

FACTS: The car of Dipad and passenger jeep of Olivan collided. Dipad

filed a civil action for damages. Dipad claimed that he is entitled of


damages because he was not able to use his car for his buy-and-sell
business. But when Dipad was being asked by the defense to produce

Whether the petition for certiorari is a proper remedy in this case?


Whether the ITR's sought to be produced are confidential in nature?

his Income Tax Return years 2001-2003, he refused to do so on ground


of confidentiality. He claimed that the demand for his ITR was
incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition. The MTC judge
ordered

the

petitioners

to

show

their

basis

for

invoking

the

RULING:
I

confidentiality of the ITR's. Dipad invoked the provisions of the National

No. A petition for certiorari is not a mode of appeal. This remedy

Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on the rule on confidentiality of Income

only corrects errors of jurisdiction. If the issue involves an error of

Tax return.1 Moreover, in a commentary of the NIRC by Gonzales, there

judgment, it is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition.

is a general rule that despite a court order, copies of the income tax
returns cannot be furnished in view of the prohibition contained in
Section 332 (now Section 286) of the Tax Code. Eventually, the court

Errors

Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the RTC alleging that

jurisdiction

occur

when

the

court

exercises

jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.


Errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the

required the production of the ITR's.


Dipad filed a MR, but was denied. He instituted a Petition for

of

exercise of its jurisdiction. They include errors of procedure or mistakes


in the court's findings20 based on a mistake of law or of fact.

the MTC issued the order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question

lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the case because the

whether the MTC has jurisdiction or authority to resolve the issue of

petition filed is an inappropriate remedy. The error alleged to be

confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC's very

committed is error of judgment. Errors of judgment is correctible by

judgment and appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically,

appeal, and not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

they claim that the ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the
alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

ISSUE:

1Natinoal Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 71: Disposition of


Income Tax Returns, Publication of Lists of Taxpayers and Filers
- After the assessment shall have been made, as provided in
this Title, the returns, together with any corrections thereof
which may have been made by the Commissioner, shall be
filed in the Office of the Commissioner and shall constitute
public records and be open to inspection as such upon the
order of the President of the Philippines, under rules and
regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
17

II
No. The commentary was explaining Sec. 270. This provision
prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from
divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers. The provision does not in any
way address the confidentiality of ITR's.Thus, petitioners cannot rely on
the inappropriate provision.
Section 71 is an excerption to the rule on unlawful divulgence of
trade secrets.
G.R. No. 162757

December 11, 2013

UNITED
COCONUT
PLANTERS
BANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO, Respondents.

the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884).-GRANTED and ISUUE the


writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place
UCPB in the actual possession of the property.

DECISION

The writ of possession was served with a demand for them to peacefully
vacate. Although the possession of the property was turned over to
UCPB on February 1, 2002, they were allowed to temporarily remain on
the property for humanitarian reasons.

BERSAMIN, J.:
The implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No.
3135 at the instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property in whose name the title has been meanwhile
consolidated cannot be prevented by the injunctive writ.
FACTS:
Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) appeals the decision of
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the order by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, 2 denying the motion of
respondents Christopher Lumbo and Milagros Lumbo for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the
writ of possession issued against them.
The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00
from UCPB. Tosecure the performance of their obligation, they
constituteda real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay,
Aklanand all the improvements thereon that they owned and operated
as abeach resort known as Titays South Beach Resort.
Upon theirfailure to settle the obligation, UCPB appliedon November 11,
1998 for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as
the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale held on January 12,
1999. Thecertificate of sale was issued on the same day, andUCPB
registered the sale in its name on February 18, 1999. The title over the
mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the
respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption
period.
On January 7, 2000, the respondents broughtagainst UCPB inthe RTC 3
an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting,
injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages(Civil Case No.
5920).
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
18

On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed inthe RTC handling


Special Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession
and to set aside the foreclosure sale.
Special Proceedings No. 5884 was consolidated with Civil Case No.
5920 on March 1, 2002.
On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition for
certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA which resolved C.A.-G.R. SP No.
70261 by granting the respondents petition, setting aside the assailed
orders,and enjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession
"pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the
annulment of the foreclosure sale.
UCPBsought thereconsiderationof the decision, butthe CA denied
itsmotion for reconsiderationon March 8, 2004.
Hence, UCPB appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
UCPB asserts that the CA did not rule in accordance with prevailing
laws and jurisprudence when it granted the respondents petition for
certiorariand enjoined the implementation of the writ of possession
issued by the RTC in favor of UCPB;
that the respondents were not entitled to the issuance of an injunctive
writ;
that the assailed decision and resolution were tantamount to a prejudgment of the respondents petition to cancel the writ of possession;
andthat the respondents were illegally attempting to wrest away its
possession of the property.

HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is necessary to explain the nature of the writ of possession and the
consequencesof its implementation.
A writ of possession commands the sheriff to place a person in
possession of real property. It may be issued inthe following instances,
namely:
(1) Land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2)
judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened;
(3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending
redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118; and
(4) Execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
The purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTC
of the province or place where the property or any part of itis situated,
to give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period,
furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the useof the property for a
period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor shouldit be shown
that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135.
The RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession be
issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is
situated, who shallthenexecute said order immediately. The relief is
granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person
against whom the relief is sought.
Its natureas an ex partepetition under Act No. 3135, as amended,
renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possessiona nonlitigious proceeding.17 Indeed, thegrant of the writ of possession is but a
ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance is
a matter of right on the part of the purchaser. 18 The judge issuing the
orderforthegranting of the writ of possession pursuant to the express
provisions of Act No. 3135cannot be charged with having acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
19

The property was sold at the public auction on January 12, 1999, with
UCPB as the highest bidder. The sheriff issuedthe certificate of saleto
UCPB on the same day of the sale. Considering that UCPB registered
the certificate of sale in its name on February 18, 1999,the period of
redemption was one year from said date. By virtue of the nonredemption by the respondents within said period, UCPB consolidated
the title over the property in its name.
It isclear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no grave abuse of
discretion but acted inaccordance withthe law and jurisprudence
indenying the respondents application for the injunctive writ filed on
February 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings No. 5884 to prevent the
implementation of the writ of possession issued on December 4, 2001.
Consequently, the CAgrossly erred in granting the respondents petition
for certiorariand/ormandamus, and in enjoining the RTC from
implementing thewrit of possession in favor of UCPB.
Otherweighty considerations justify resolvingthis appeal in favor of
UCPB.
The first is that the CA did not properly appreciate the nature of the
supposed error attributed to the RTC.
Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the
respondents applicationfor injunction to prevent the implementation of
the writ of possession, itserror related only to the correctapplication of
the law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As
such, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of
jurisdiction.An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and sucherror is reviewable only
throughan appealtaken in due course.In contrast, an error of
jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued by
the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and sucherror is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25
Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction
over bothCivil Case No. 5920 andSpecial Proceedings No. 5884, it
should follow that its consideration and resolution of the respondents
application for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884
were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain,
UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point
unquestionably entitled to thefull implementation of the writ of

possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing that


itcapriciouslyor whimsicallydenied the respondents application,its
denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The second concerns the CAs reversing and undoing the RTCs denial
of the respondents application for the injunctive writ, andenjoining the
RTC from implementing the writ of possession against the respondents
"pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the
annulment of the foreclosure sale."27 The CA effectively thereby granted
the respondents application for the injunctive writ. In so doing,
however, the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the
injunctive writ, and disregarded the patent fact that the respondents
held noright in essence that the injunctive writ they were seeking would
protect. Thus, the CA committed another serious error.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a
court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular
act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunctionmay be justified under any of the following
circumstances, namely:
(a)Theapplicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c)A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attemptingto do, or is procuring or suffering to bedone, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
In the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at
least be shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, the
applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. The Court has stressed
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
20

the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a right


in ease to be protected, stating:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the
instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protected
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ arc:
(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
The absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compelling
reason to undo the CA's reversal of the RTC's denial of their application
for injunction as well as to strike down the injunctive relief the CA
afforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no
"right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter
of law".
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES the decision promulgated on November 27, 2003 and the
resolution promulgated on March 8, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261;
DISMISSES the petition in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261 for lack of factual
and legal merits; DECLARES that there is now no obstacle to the
implementation of the writ of possession issued in favor of the
petitioner; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
LIGOT VS REPUBLIC
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari wherein Ligot et al claim that the
Court of Appeals (CA) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its resolution extending the
freeze order issued against the Ligots properties for an indefinite period
of time.
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extended
the freeze order issued against him and his family even though no
predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the
allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order

issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month


extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases. The CA, in extending the freeze order, not only unduly
deprived him and his family of their property, in violation of due
process, but also penalized them before they had been convicted of the
crimes they stand accused of.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in
assailing the said freeze order.
RULING: (Generally) NO. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze
order.
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the
remedy available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of
the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay
the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the
Supreme Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed
a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to
assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the
freeze order over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the
petitioners, a review of their petition shows that the issues they raise
(i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the
applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders
embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain
to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside
the Courts limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. As
held in People v. Court of Appeals:
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in
scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to
stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
21

as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be


resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a
petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is
not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one
in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or
a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.25 (citations
omitted; italics supplied)
EXCEPTION: However, considering the issue of due process squarely
brought before us in the face of an apparent conflict between Section 10
of RA No. 9160, as amended, and Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases, this Court finds it imperative to relax the application
of the rules of procedure and resolve this case on the merits in the
interest of justice
G.R. No. 193261

April 24, 2012

MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA,
Respondents.
FACTS: COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for
the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the
city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.

However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the
2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral
home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Respondent
Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification.
Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had
already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months
prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second
Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner
as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and
canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa
City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency
requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution
of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local
elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected
mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for
the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the
COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Hence, petitioner
filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely
Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the
Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26
January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in


holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


22

RULING: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However,
exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these
instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition;
generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held,
too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an
issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of
discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the
condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings
of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be
final and non-reviewable.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not
ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard
generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not
only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave
abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave
abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of whether
petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency
qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation.

Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused


its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that
he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the May 2010
elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the
COMELECs appreciation thereof.
Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are tantamount to
allege that the COMELEC, in denying his COC committed grave abuse
of discretion. The court here defined what grave abuse of discretion is;
and by that chose and ruled to review the acts of COMELEC under its
jurisdiction.
Eventually he was able to prove that he was a resident of Lipa and the
SC granted his petition.
AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid, Petitioners, vs. MELANIO B.
YUAG, Respondent
FACTS: Respondent Melanio Yuag worked for petitioner Alex Ang Gaeid
as a driver in his trucking business, delivering sacks of sugar from the
Busco Sugar Mill to the port of CDO City. He was hired on February 28,
2002 and earns on a commission basis of 9% of his gross delivery per
trip. During the course of his employment, petitioner received reports
that that the respondent was incurring substantial shortages in his
deliveries since September 30, 2004 (see notes), was illegally selling
bags of sugar at a lower price along the way, and was banned from
entry into the premises of Busco Sugar Mill. When confronted, the
respondent remained quiet. As a result of the reports, the petitioner
monitored the activities of all its drivers, instructing them to report
their location from time to time as well as deliver their assigned cargoes
by convoy to avoid the illegal sale o f cargo.
On December 4, 2004, the respondent was assigned to deliver bags of
sugar from CDO to the Coca-Cola Bottlers Plant, along with other
drivers. The respondent could not be reached through his cellphone
during the course of the trip. The Coca-Cola Plant later reported that
the delivery he made had an enormous amount of shortage. When the
goods were subsequently weighed on December 9, it was found out that
there was a shortage of 111 bags of sugar equivalent to P166, 000.00.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
23

When the respondent reported for work on December 6, the petitioner


confronted respondent who remained quiet. As a result, the petitioner
told the respondent to take a rest, which the respondent construed as
a dismissal.
The respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal on the very day of
confrontation with the Labor Arbiter.
The petitioner argued that he merely told the respondent to take a
rest, which was not a dismissal but a temporary break, since the
companys clients had lost their confidence in the respondents. He
alleged that as a response, the respondent demanded offered to resign
and demanded separation pay, which the former could not grant at the
time as it would entail computation by the cashier. He told the
respondent to come back the next day but he did not.
The respondent claimed on the other hand that his cellphone battery
was drained, the reason for his failure to answer the petitioners calls.
The petitioner was allegedly enraged and during their confrontation,
shouted at him to take a rest. When he asked for a clarification,
petitioner allegedly told him, No more talking! Take a rest! which he
construed to be a dismissal. When he asked for his separation pay, the
petitioner refused, hence the complaint.
The LA ruled in favor of the respondent, ruling that the respondent was
illegally dismissed and ordered payment of his separation pay and
proportionate 13th month pay. The LA stated that the petitioner failed
to prove the alleged shortages committed by the respondent and to
afford him due process before he was terminated.
The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, dismissing the complaint for
illegal dismissal. The NLRC stated that the respondent had the burden
of proving that he was dismissed from his job by the petitioner, which
he failed to do, as there was no proof showing any overt act
subsequently done by the petitioner that would suggest he carried out
the intention of dismissing the respondent when he said, Pahulay
naka! (You take a rest). Instead, the respondent was merely considered
on leave of absence without pay pending his new assignment. It also
held that the respondent was not entitled to the payment of 13th

month pay as he was paid on a commission basis, which was an


exception under PD 851 (the law requiring employers to pay their
employees 13th month pay.)
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 days after the
period to file had already elapsed. The NLRC denied the MR for being
filed out of time hence, the respondent filed a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA reversed the NLRC ruling, brushing aside the technicality
issues and proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, such as the
existence of an e-e relationship between the petitioner and respondent,
and the legality of the dismissal of the latter. It ordered the payment of
full backwages to the respondent, separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, temperate damages and exemplary damages. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its reversal of
the NLRC decision
RULING: YES. First, in its decision, the CA proceeded to review the
records of the case and to rule on issues that were no longer disputed
during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an employeremployee relationship. The issue before the NLRC, which was whether
the petitioners telling the respondent to take a break was an overt act
of dismissal was not discussed by the CA.
Second, there were patent errors in the decision of the CA, such as its
ruling that the NLRC refused to grant the award of separation pay
because the respondent had not been found to be a regular employee,
when the NLRC made no such ruling. The refusal by the NLRC to grant
separation pay was merely consistent with its ruling that there was no
dismissal.

Third, the CA entertained the Petition for Certiorari by the respondent


despite the prescribed Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC. Since
the respondent failed to file the MR within the reglementary period
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
24

provided by law, the Resolution of the NLRC has already become final
and could no longer be modified by the CA (see notes). An MR filed out
of time could not reopen a final and executory judgment by the NLRC.
Since the CA could no longer modify the NLRC Resolution, the
modification of the award cannot be done either (see notes). The NLRC
Resolution had become final and executoy 25 days before the
respondent filed his MR, thus, subsequent proceedings and
modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and void.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
23 June 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 20 December
2010 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. The 30 November 2006 and 30
March 2010 Resolutions of the NLRC are AFFIRMED and sustained.
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: On or about September 1,1991, the private respondents,
Abelardo Palanqui, the then Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga,
without being authorized by the Sanguniang Bayan, entered into a
Contract of Lease of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction,
represented by accused Wilfredo Cunanan, whereby the municipality
leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell and one (1)
unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a
period of thirty (30) days, which equipment items were to be
purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the Palto and
Pakulayo. The accused caused it to appear that the work had been
accomplished, but actually no work had been ever done, thus, payment
was made and received by Wilfredo Cunanan, for the supposed project.
The private respondents then charged for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, for they took advantage of their positions
as public officers, while performing their duties in relation to their
offices, did then and there with evident bad faith causes undue injury
to the government for granting unwarranted benefits to J.S Lim
Construction.
All private respondents pleaded not guilty as to the crime charged
against them, and since the prosecution failed to show evidences as to
prove the guilt of the private respondents, the court acquitted all

private respondents, unsatisfied with the courts decision, hence, this


present petition for certiorari.

However, the prosecution failed to established a clear evidence being not


all the elements of the crime charged are present.

ISSUE: (1.) Whether the court erred in relying to mere assumption


rather than on the evidence on records;

The foregoing is essentially an issue involving an alleged error of


judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. Respondent trial court clearly
stated in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its conclusion
that the project was actually undertaken, justifying payment to the
contractor. Clearly, petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial
resulting in denial of due process.

(2.) Whether the court committed an error of judgment or error of


jurisdiction.
HELD: The court finds the petition unmeritorious.
First. The court ruled as it reiterated the one cited in the case of People
vs Tria-Tirona:
After trial on merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where
double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial
resulting in a denial of due process.
Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
As it is also stated in another case of First Corporation v. Former Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence
is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
The present petition is to overturn the decision of the Sandiganbayan
that dredging were actually done along Palto and Pakulayo River.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
25

There being no mistrial in this case, the acquittal of private


respondents can no longer be reviewed by the Court as this would
constitute a violation of the constitutional right against double
jeopardy, and since this is an error of judgment petitioner is not entitled
to extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was dismissed and the earlier
decision is hereby affirmed.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS HON. REGINO
VERIDIANO II
FACTS: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, a banking entity
organized and doing business under the laws of the Philippines,
represented by LUCILA Y. UY, its Senior Manager.
Accused, Dominador Ong, under trust Receipts dated September 6,
1989 and September 15, 1989 executed by the said Dominador
Ong/Sun Ray Metal, Inc. in favor of the said Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, received in trust from the latter the trust receipt or all
valued at P413,133.00 for the purpose of holding the said merchandise
in trust under the express obligation on his part to dispose of the same
and turn over the proceeds of the sale to the said bank, if sold, or to the
account for or return the same, if unsold, on its due date or upon
demand, but the said accused, once in possession of the same, the
accused with intent to gain, misappropriate, misapply and convert the
same or the value thereof, to his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company.

The prosecution showed that Sun Ray Metal, Inc. purchased brass
metals and aluminum wires separately through two (2) letters of
credit[3] issued by the petitioner bank in favor of the supplier of the raw
materials. To secure the obligation by Sun Ray Metal, Inc. to the
petitioner bank, the private respondent, in his capacity as treasurer of
Sun Ray Metal, Inc., executed two (2) trust receipts[4] in favor of the
petitioner bank. However, despite repeated demands, the private
respondent failed to pay the petitioner bank the proceeds of the sale of
the raw materials or to turn over the said materials in case of his
failure to sell the same.
The prosecution offered its documentary evidence. The defense
presented its evidence to show that herein private respondent signed
the trust receipts in blank and that he was acting only in his capacity
as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc. and the petitioner bank has been
novated when a representative of the bank verbally proposed to
restructure the obligation. Private respondent claimed that he paid
thrice under the restructuring agreement and showed as proof of the
said novation a receipt evidencing one of his payments to the petitioner
bank.
The prosecution presented Lucila Uy, as rebuttal witness to refute the
claim of the defense that there has been a novation of the obligation
under the trust receipts.
The public respondent promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused
Dominador Ong for failure to establish the guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, the petition.
HELD: Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter
acquitted the private respondent.
Conversely, there cannot be a grave abuse of discretion where the trial
court gave both parties the opportunity to present their case and even
required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based,
as in this case. In other words, if there is no denial of due process,
there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the
application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
26

the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its case
and that there is no indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a
review and consequent setting aside of the trial courts decision of
acquittal will put the private respondent in double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
If indeed public respondent has misappreciated certain evidence, as
argued by the petitioner in this petition, such are not jurisdictional
matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a certiorari
proceeding.
Indeed, the question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is
a factual question that cannot be reviewed not only because the
decision of the trial court is now final but also because a review of such
question at the instance of the prosecution would violate the right of
the accused against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for
the same act.
It bears stressing that whenever a criminal case is prosecuted and the
State is the offended party, the case must always be prosecuted under
the control and guidance of the State through its government
prosecutors. Accordingly, whenever there is an acquittal or dismissal of
a criminal case and the private complainant intends to question such
an acquittal or dismissal, the same must likewise be undertaken by the
State through the Solicitor General. This, petitioner failed to comply.
The present petition for certiorari before this Court was filed by
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. It was not initiated
by the Solicitor General. In fact, the Solicitor General intimated to this
Court in his comment that a reversal of the assailed judgment would
place the private respondent in double jeopardy.
Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may appeal the civil
aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In this case, petitioners action does not concern the civil aspect of the
case but the validity of the judgment itself. Indeed, petitioner does not
actually question the award of damages. What he contends is that the
trial court decided the case outside the issues made out by the
pleadings and thereby deprived the prosecution of due process.
The instant petition should be dismissed not only for lack of merit but
also for lack of legal personality on the part of the petitioner to appeal
the public respondents ruling on the criminal aspect of the case.
1. In Criminal Cases
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ASIS
On October 7, 2002, at 12:30 o'clock in the morning, respondent Jaime
Abordo was riding his motorcycle when he was met by private
complainants Kennard Majait , Joeniel Calvez and Jose Montes. An
altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped
unhurt. Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder
and one (1) count of frustrated murder. The trial court found no
treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005
Decision,[2] the RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries
for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to
Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in
favor of Abordo.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil
aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages.
Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor filed a notice
of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majait's motion for
reconsideration while Calvez's motion to withdraw was granted.
The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright.
According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition
for certiorari was the wrong remedy. Moreover, the petition
for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
27

Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact - a
mistake of judgment - appeal is the remedy. In view of the improper
action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It appears to us that the
Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private
complainant Calvez when it questioned the dismissal of the latter's
Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect
of the case.
In filing this petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in
double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the
petition for certiorari into an appeal. Hence, this petition is dismissible
not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to
question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action
places the accused in double jeopardy.
The OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of
acquittal is a petition for certiorari.
HELD: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy
to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the
appellate level. In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal
doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
However, in several cases, it may not be the proper remedy, as an
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion (People v. Louel Uy).
Appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused's demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil

action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse


of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in
jeopardy.
The OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious
error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of
that remedy.
However, it need not to remand the case to the Court of Appeals,
because the OSG's petition for certiorari, which forms part of the
records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due
course simply because it is bereft of merit.
While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
RATIO: The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment
rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued
without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is
no double jeopardy.
It further pointed out that the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This,
however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo's constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy.
The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the
evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public
respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties.
In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
28

Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in


her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
The CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before
it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is,
however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition
for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
PEOPLE VS TRIA-TIRONA
FACTS: Armed with two search warrants, members of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Organized Crime Division, together
with members of the NBI Special Investigation Division and the
Presidential Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Task Force Hammer
Head serving as security, conducted a search on the house of accusedprivate respondent located on Banawe, Quezon City.
The accused, Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot, have in his possession
Four Hundred Ninety-Eight point One Thousand Ninety-Four
(498.1094) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) a
regulated drug without any license, permit, prescription or authority
coming from any government office, bureau, agency, or department
authorized to issue such license, permit, prescription or authority in
blatant violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by
RA 7659.
During arraignment, the private respondent pleaded not guilty and
after trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a decision
acquitting private respondent on ground of reasonable doubt.
The acquittal of private respondent, is being assailed via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends
that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed
grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on
record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable conclusion
of the latters guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent


judge acquitting the accused . . . goes deeply into the trial courts
appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the
parties.

complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of


jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On 10 November 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

Private respondent Muyot filed his memorandum on 4 March 2005,


invoking the Rule of Double Jeopardy.

JOHNSON LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and


NEUGENE MARKETING, INC.,respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of respondent court for acquitting


private respondent may be reviewed by filing petition for certiorari.

DECISION

HELD: The fact that we gave due course to the petition means that the
issue on the sufficiency of the evidence in this case may be reviewed. It
added that a petition for certiorari should be an available remedy to
question the acquittal of the accused (People Vs. Velasco).

FACTS:

An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double


jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court
of Appeals.
Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double
jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the
prosecution, were denied due process.
The fact that the petition was given due course does not necessarily
mean we have to look into the sufficiency of the evidence since the
issue to be resolved is the appealability of an acquittal.
There being no mistrial in the case before us, we find no need to
reexamine the evidence, because if we do so, we will be allowing an
appeal to be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of
the accuseds right against double jeopardy.
An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
29

G.R. No. 159288. October 19, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI) was incorporated on January 27, 1978


with funds provided by the Uy Family. It had an authorized capital
stock of P3 million divided into 30,000 shares with a par value of P100
per share.
There were two stock dividend declarations, one on June 7, 1980 in the
amount of P60,000.00 and another on May 2, 1981 for P40,000.00. On
May 15, 1986 Eugenio Flores, Jr. assigned/divested himself of his
shares in favor of Sonny Moreno, 1,050 shares; Arsenio Yang, Jr., 700
shares and Charles O. Sy, 700 shares.
On June 11, 1987, the NMI sold and delivered to the Victorias Milling
Company, Inc. (VMCI), in Victorias, Negros Occidental, 77,500 pieces of
empty white bags for the price of P565,750.00. NMI issued Charge
Invoice No. 0809.
n June 18, 1987, VMCI purchased 100,000 pieces of empty white bags
from NMI for P730,000.00 for which NMI issued Charge Invoice No.
0810.
On June 25, 1987, VMCI again purchased 28,000 pieces of empty white
bags from NMI for the price of P204,400.00 and the latter issued
Charge Invoice No. 0811
In payment of said purchases from NMI, VMCI drew and issued two
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Checks: Check No. 068706 dated

August 3, 1987 in the amount of P565,750.00and Check No. 068993


dated August 19, 1987 in the amount of P934,400.00.
On October 13, 1987, 2/3 of NMI voted to call a stockholders meeting
and the agenda was the dissolution of the corporation.
October 24, 1987 in Bacolod City. The following stockholders, who were
also directors, were present and voted to dissolve the corporation
Name of Stockholders

Number of Shares

Arsenio Yang, Jr.

1,050

Charles Sy

2,800

Lok Chun Suen

1,400

Total

5,250

Notices were again sent to all stockholders of record, all of whom


properly acknowledged the said notices, that a meeting was to be held
on November 30, 1987 to consider the dissolution of the corporation
On March 22, 1988, Johnson Lee, Sonny Moreno, Leoncio Tan and
Nicanor Martin filed a petition with the Securities and Investigation
Clearing Department (SICD) of the Commission praying, among other
things, for the annulment or nullification of the Certification of Filing of
Resolution of Voluntary Dissolution of NMI for being contrary to law
and its by-laws.
In the meantime, the trustee wrote the petitioner, Johnson Lee, on
March 8, 1988 requesting him to turn over to it the P1,500,150.00 he
received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI. However,
he failed to do so.
A verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa was filed against the
petitioner and Sonny Moreno with the City Prosecutors Office.
During the requisite preliminary investigation, the petitioner and
Moreno submitted their counter-affidavits. After the investigation, two
(2) Amended Informations were filed against the petitioner and Moreno,
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores, who
testified that she saw the two checks in the office of the petitioner at
the Singson Building, Plaza Moraga, Sta. Cruz, Manila
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
30

Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, declared that


the records section of VMCI, which had custody of all checks and other
corporate records, was near her office. She testified that the checks,
including their other records, were lost during the flood in 1985.
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered in evidence the counteraffidavit of the petitioner during the preliminary investigation, as well
as the charge invoices and checks.
The accused objected to the admission of the photocopies of the checks
and charge invoices on the ground that the best evidence were the
original copies thereof.
The accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, claiming
that the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity and due execution
of the offered documents, a prerequisite to the admission thereof as
secondary evidence. They also filed a Motion for Leave to File a
Demurrer to Evidence.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed with
the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleged that Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in admitting in evidence the Peoples
documentary
evidence,
consisting
of
mere
unauthenticated
photocopies, in flagrant violation of the Best Evidence Rule (Sec. 3, 4, 5
and 6, Rule 130), despite the repeated vehement objections of the
petitioner, thereby wantonly refusing to exclude such clearly
inadmissible evidence, which actuation as embodied in his two (2)
assailed Orders, is capricious, whimsical and patently erroneous, as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, and the
remedy of ordinary appeal would not afford petitioner adequate and
expeditious relief, for while available eventually, such remedy is
cumbersome for it requires petitioner to undergo a useless and timeconsuming trial, and thus becomes an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority; hence, the imperative necessity for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring
respondent judge to refrain from further proceeding with Crim. Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011 until the Petition shall have been disposed of,
otherwise, failure of justice is sure to ensue.

On March 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment


dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the petition at bar is the proper remedy of the
petitioner
(b) whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in admitting in
evidence the photocopies of the checks and charge invoices in lieu of
the original copies thereof.
HELD:
We held that for a petition for certiorari or prohibition to be granted, it
must set out and demonstrate, plainly and distinctly, all the facts
essential to establish a right to a writ.
The trial court acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of
discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and
the acts of the tribunal or inferior court. 27 A petition for certiorari
cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The
existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to
the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two
remedies are mutually exclusive.28
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in
scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to
stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such
as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be
resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It
is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment.29 An error of judgment is
one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
31

and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is


one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.30 Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors made by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties, its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law thereon.31 As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal
issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if
only questions of law are involved.
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for estafa.
The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the charge invoices
and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu
of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the
conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a
factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.33 Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the
resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be
sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the
photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his
evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the
appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts
findings and conclusions
We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds
to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of
certiorari.
A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent court acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing

more than an error of judgment which can be reviewed or corrected on


appeal.
But it must be stressed that, even if petitioners did file motions to
quash, the denial thereof would not have automatically given rise to a
cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is
that, where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari
but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.
Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration was filed and denied, the
remedy under Rule 65 would still be unavailable absent any showing of
the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. The petition before the
Court of Appeals, subject of this appeal, did not allege any of such
grounds.
Furthermore, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure before this Court only allows questions of law.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
TAN Y CHUA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

On 13 July 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial court
and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in a decision, dated 18 August 2000, dismissed
petitioner's appeal on the ground that petitioner raised a pure question
of law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, on 18 May 2001,
was denied by the appellate court. The petition for review
on certiorari before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to an appeal after he has
applied for probation.
HELD: Petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice
of appeal with the trial court. Ordinarily, the Court should have the
case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Section 3(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
"Section 3. How appeal is taken.

On 23 December 1996, petitioner applied for probation.

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

On 8 January 1997, the application was granted by the trial court but
the release order was withheld in view of the filing by the prosecution.

The notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on 13 July 1998,


three days after the questioned decision was promulgated.

On 21 January 1997, of a motion for modification of the penalty.

The clear impingement upon petitioner's basic right against double


jeopardy, however, should here warrant the exercise of the prerogative
by this Court to relax the stringent application of the rules on the
matter. When the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his
crime of bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment and on
which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict
could only be deemed to have lapsed into finality.

FACTS: On 12 December 1996, petitioner Willy Tan was found guilty of


bigamy.

The trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having
been filed out of time since the decision sought to be modified had
already attained finality.

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


32

Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that states


"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon
motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final
or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right
to appeal, or has applied for probation"
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place
the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best: Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment or conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only, filed in the trial court and deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal.
Such a waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision
and writes finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The amendatory
judgment of the trial court is set aside and the decision dated
December 12, 1996, is reinstated.

B. Power of the reviewing court


V.C. PONCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE and SAMPAGUITA HILLS
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,Respondents.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
33

"It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party x x x when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a
mistaken mode of procedure."
FACTS: On October 5, 1987, respondent Municipality (now City) of
Paraaque (municipality) filed a complaint7 against petitioner VCP for
the expropriation of its property, which is located in the municipalitys
Barrio San Dionisio and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 116554.8 The municipality intended to develop the property for its
landless residents, in line with the Presidential Commission on Urban
Poors classification of the site as an area of priority development.
On August 23, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque,
Branch 274, sustained the municipalitys right to expropriate the said
property11 and to a writ of possession.12 The trial court also informed
the parties in the same Order of the reckoning period for the
determination of just compensation, thus:
The defenses having thus been ruled upon, the Court hereby declares
that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first
The parties did not file any objection to the above Order and proceeded
to submit the names of their respective nominees for commissioner. On
February 26, 2003, the trial court appointed three commissioners14 to
assist in ascertaining the just compensation
VCP did not participate in the meetings despite notification17 and that,
due to time constraints,18 the commissioners denied19 VCPs request for
an additional four months to submit its independent valuation of the
property
VCP moved for a reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its
Order dated August 15, 2005

Upon receipt, it filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time


(MOTEX) to File Petition for Cerrtiorari,32 which the CA granted.
CA ruled; observed that an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 was
available to petitioner and would have constituted a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to correct any perceived error in
the RTC Decision. VCP, for unknown reasons, failed to avail
itself of the said remedy within the reglementary period. Having
lost its right to appeal, VCP resorted to a Petition for Certiorari
in the hope that it could nevertheless, obtain a reversal of the
RTC Decision. The CA held that certiorari is unavailing as a
substitute for a lost appeal. The CA brushed aside as unfounded
VCPs excuse that an appeal would be slow and inadequate.
Such excuse, it noted, would allow any litigant to avail itself of
extraordinary remedies after they lose their right to appeal.
The CA then held that, even if it were to rule that certiorari is proper, it
would still dismiss the petition for certiorari. It held that grave
abuse of discretion was not attendant in the trial courts
rejection of the commissioners report. The CA explained that
the trial court has such authority as long as it finds just cause.
The reports contravention of the principle regarding the proper
reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is
such a cause. Hence this petition.
Upon receipt, it filed a MOTEX of time to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it has yet to engage the
services of a new counsel and requested another 15-day to file
its MR. Denied for the same cannot be extended.
Issues
1. Is petitioners lack of counsel a justifiable excuse for the late
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration?
2. Is a Petition for Certiorari the proper remedy to correct
alleged errors in the trial courts Decision?
Held:
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
34

Petition has no merit. Based on Rule 52 of the Rules of Court57 and


Rule 7 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA), VCP
had 15 days from its receipt of the Decision, or until April 25, 2007, to
file a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a motion for new trial.
Failure to file the necessary pleading within the reglementary period
would render the CA Decision final and executory.
The Court has pronounced strict adherence to the rule laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Judge Japson61that "no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals)."62 Since the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not
extendible, VCPs MOTEX did not toll the reglementary period.63 Thus,
there being no Motion for Reconsideration as of April 25, 2007, the
Decision of the CA dated March 23, 2007 became final and executory
by operation of law.64 The CA was correct in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration that VCP had belatedly filed on May 25, 2007 as its
lateness had rendered it moot.
There is no justification for the
application of equity and for the
relaxation of the rules.
The Court, in the interest of equity and justice, sometimes allows a
liberal reading of the rules, so long as the petitioner is able to prove the
existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance.65 The Court,
however, does not find a justification to warrant such relaxation in this
instance.
It is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the services
of new counsel.66 VCP knew since August 29, 2006, seven months
before the CA rendered its Decision, that it had no counsel. Despite its
knowledge, it did not immediately hire a lawyer to attend to its affairs.
Instead, it waited until the last minute, when it had already received
the adverse CA Decision on April 10, 2007, to search for a counsel; and
even then, VCP did not rush to meet the deadline. It asked for an

extension of 30 days to file a Motion for Reconsideration.67 It finally


retained the services of a new counsel on May 24, 2007,68 nine months
from the time that its former counsel withdrew her appearance. VCP
did not even attempt to explain its inaction. The Court cannot grant
equity where it is clearly undeserved by a grossly negligent party.69 As
the Court pronounced in another case:
x x x Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not
only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have the case
finally settled without delay.
Furthermore, the failure to file x x x on time was due primarily to
petitioners unwise choices x x x. They hired their subsequent lawyers
too late.
It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to
continue the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him go. x
x x They delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor
choices and lack of sufficient diligence x x x are the main culprits for
the situation they now find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass
on the bad consequences of their choices to respondents. Petitioners
low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements
x x x has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration
of justice, in the present case.70
This Court cannot ascribe good faith to
VCP as it had neglected reglementary
periods in the past.
Another reason that this Court is unable to accept VCPs plea for
indulgence is its observation that VCP has a penchant for disregarding
procedural rules and the periods allotted to it for its action
Appeal is a sufficient and adequate
remedy unless the party proves
otherwise.

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


35

A court with appellate jurisdiction can review both the facts and the
law, including questions of jurisdiction.72 It can set aside an erroneous
decision and even nullify the same, if warranted. Appeal is a speedy
remedy, as an adverse party can file its appeal from a final decision or
order immediately after receiving it. A party, who is alleging that an
appeal will not promptly relieve it of the injurious effects of the
judgment, should establish facts to show how the appeal is not speedy
or adequate.73 VCPs empty protestations, therefore, fail to impress.
There is no reason, and VCP cannot explain, why an appeal would not
be speedy and adequate to address its assigned errors.74 VCP cannot
complain of delay because it was guilty of delay itself, and it even waited
until the 58th day of its receipt of the CA Decision before taking action.
Clearly, petitioner resorted to certiorari as a substitute for its lost
appeal.75 The CA did not err in dismissing the same.
E. DOCTRINES INVOLVED AFFECTING JURISDICTION AND THE
EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
i. Doctrine of PRIMARY JURISDICTION in relation to
doctrine of EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
G.R. No. 196842

October 9, 2013

ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, Petitioner,


vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and ROSA S.
BUSUEGO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1)
Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation
of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman against her husband,

Alfredo, with designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital,


Apokon, Tagum City.

been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors


of DOJ,17 and affirmed in subsequent cases:

Sia and De Leon(mistresses) were subsequently impleaded. But the two


failed to submit their respective affidavits within a period of time. After
investigation, the same office found that Busuega and Sia are probably
guilty, hence ordered that the case be filed in appropriate court. Hence
this petition for certiorari.

The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and


Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by
public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent
with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city
and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may
take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.

Issue:
WON there was grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans finding
of probable cause to indict him and Sia for Concubinage
Held:
Petition denied. The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the
determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation.
This is the reason why judicial review of the resolution of the
Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and
prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered
to substitute their judgment for that of the Ombudsman.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. In this
regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much
less grave abuse, of discretion.
The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the
DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public
officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
36

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting


any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of
penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and
the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation, the respective heads of said offices.
In Honasan II, although Senator Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan was a
public officer who was charged with coup detat for the occupation of
Oakwood on 27 July 2003, the preliminary investigation therefor was
conducted by the DOJ. Honasan questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ
to do so, proferring that it was the Ombudsman which had jurisdiction
since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office.
We clarified that the DOJ and the Ombudsman have concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees. Nonetheless, we pointed out that the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. Plainly,
applying that ruling in this case, the Ombudsman has primary

jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, over Rosas complaint, and
after choosing to exercise such jurisdiction, need not defer to the
dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo. In other
words, the Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the DOJ.

G.R. No. 166330

September 11, 2013

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner,


vs.
ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. TORRE, CONRADO U. PUA,
GREGORIO V. MANSANO, JERRY CORPUZ and
ESTELITAACOSTA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications
business. On March 9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of
lease4 with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to
the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square meters,
located in Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property).Petitioner,
through its contractor, Allarilla Construction, immediately constructed
and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Inside the
cellular base station is a communications tower, rising as high as150
feet, with antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house open on
three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and
close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and
establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio
Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry
Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.
Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against
petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction because
SMARTs tower being constructed at Vira, Roxas, Isabela, is weak,
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
37

unstable, and infirm, susceptible to collapse like the Mobiline tower


which fell during a typhoon as earlier alleged, and its structural
integrity being doubtful, and not earthquake proof, this tower poses
great danger to life and limb of persons as well as their property,
particularly, the respondents whose houses a but, or are near or within
the periphery of the communications tower;
Further, the tower is powered by a standby generator that emits
noxious and deleterious fumes, not to mention the constant noise it
produces, hence, a hazard to the health, not only of the respondents,
but the residents in the area as well;
When in operation, the tower would also pose danger to the life and
health of respondents and residents of the barangay, especially
children, because of the ultra high frequency (UHF) radio wave
emissions it radiates. Only recently, Cable News Network (CNN) reported
that cell phones, with minimal radiated power, are dangerous to
children, so more it is for this communications tower, whose radiated
power is thousands of times more than that of a cellphone;
Worse, and in violation of law, petitioner constructed the tower without
the necessary public hearing, permit of the barangay, as well as that of
the municipality, the Environmental Compliance Certificate of the
[Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)],construction permit, and other requirements of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint. The respondents averred
that among others that it belies the petitioners claim that it sought the
consent of the majority of the respondents surrounding the tower site as
there where only a handful of residents signed the document prepared by
petitioner and the contents of which were misrepresented by a Sangguniang Bayan
Member in the person of Nick Sebastian who is an interested party being the owner
of the land where the tower is constructed.
The petitioner filed as well a Motion for Summary Judgment which was, later on
granted by RTC. The residents then filed a memorandum stating that the test was
conducted onNovember 14 and 15, 2000 and the result shows that the
petitioners power generator failed the noise emission test, day and night time.

RTC ruled in favor of Smart dismissing the complaint as the allegations therein
are purely speculative and hence no basis in fact to warrant further proceedings of
this case.
Appeal to CA which declared the cellular base station of petitioner a nuisance
that endangered the health and safety of the residents of Barangay Vira, Roxas,
Isabela because: (1) the locational clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity due to
the lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of the barangay and a
barangay resolution endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2)
the sound emission of the generator at the cellular base station exceeded the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) standards.
Issue:
WON CA erred when it encroached upon an executive function of determining the
validity of a locational clearance when it declared, contrary to the administrative
findings of the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board("HLURB"), that the
locational clearance of Petitioner was void
HELD:
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of
Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the validity or
nullity of petitionerslocational clearance for its cellular base station.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction were explained at length by the Court in
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals,25 as follows:
The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail
himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted
first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The
premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
38

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its


practical and legal reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies
entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition of
controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to
give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and
to dispose of the case.
xxxx
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.
In Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v.
Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., et al.,26 citing Republic v.
Lacap,27 to wit:
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court,
he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes.
The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not
be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving

such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact
In this case, there is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the
afore-mentioned administrative remedies prior to instituting the case before
the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Respondents
never asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the
Court to apply the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so
injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is
subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed
upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a
particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of
noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable
bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though
creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it.
PARTIALLY GRANTED
Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on
one hand, respondents' health, safety, and property, and on the other,
petitioner's business interest and the public's need for accessible and
better cellular mobile telephone services, the wise and prudent course
to take is to remand the case to the RTC for trial and give the parties
the opportunity to prove their respective factual claims.

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


39

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,


vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B.
ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N.
SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN,
ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in
1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then
represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly
authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a total area of 44,345
square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The
transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs
covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully
delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41
parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased
under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San
Miguel Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not
delivered to San Miguel Properties.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. It claimed
that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had
ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions
after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network
Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.
San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City (OCP Las Pias) charging respondent
directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256). At the same time, San Miguel

Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB


(HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes
to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel
Properties assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties
claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have
the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having
been replaced as BF Homes rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May
17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for
being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought
to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in
receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a
distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively
exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that
could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the
lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending
receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pias of
the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP
Las Pias,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in the
SEC. The OCP Las Pias then rendered its resolution,10 dismissing San
Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a
receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; and there
existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF
Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and
that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that
there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not
being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale. Likewise that, BF
officers cannot be held liable.
San Miguel appealed to DOJ. The latter did not disturb the decision of
OCP Las Pinas. Case was elevated to CA but it denied the same; the
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
40

conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question


generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio
cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative
case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil
case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until
after termination of the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court
relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial question.
Issue: WON Court of Appeals committed grave, serious and reversible
errors when it dismissed petitioners certiorari and mandamus petition
to order and direct respondent secretary to indict respondents for
violation of section 25, pd. 957
Held: The petition has no merit. Action for specific performance, even if
pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific
performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first
be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected
with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial
question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,

and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a
criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that
there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil
action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that
sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is
true simply because the action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.25
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill
it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of,
there must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots
in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal
ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either
case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment,
if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of
subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of
incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements
and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling
and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
41

subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to


deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances.
Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation
of the registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as
provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes
administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or noncompliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in
the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was
legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while
the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors
and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The
resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for
should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the
delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the
authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership
having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability
for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough
for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a
single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its
case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.30
______________________________________________________________________
__________________

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable


That the action for specific performance was an administrative case
pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no
consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific
performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the
HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly
regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to
the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise,
specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution.
The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable
only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into
play on matters demanding the special competence of administrative
agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the
expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative
board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate
questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts.
The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the
case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters
within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and
determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot
and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the
competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been
so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal
under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
42

the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a


question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body
prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes
of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the
action
*** San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum,
by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes directors and
officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered
the suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or
omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the
initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by
means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application
of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always
be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle
governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such
application would produce unjust and absurd results or
unreasonable consequences.
G.R. No. 175039

April 18, 2012

ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION,


INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDO I.
IMPERIAL, in his capacity as Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND
LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,Respondents.
FACTS:

[Private respondent] MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel


of land located along Lee Street, Barangay Addition Hills, Mandaluyong
City with an area of 6,148 square meters, more or less, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12768, issued by the Register of
Deeds for Mandaluyong City.
MEGAWORLD conceptualized the construction of a residential
condominium complex on the said parcel of land called the Wack-Wack
Heights Condominium consisting of a cluster of six (6) four-storey
buildings and one (1) seventeen (17) storey tower. Thereafter secured
the necessary clearances, licenses and permits for the condominium
project.
When construction begaun, the plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158,
docketed as Civil Case No. 65171, for yo (sic) annul the Building Permit,
CLV, ECC and Development Permit granted to MEGAWORLD; to
prohibit the issuance to MEGAWORLD of Certificate of Registration and
License to Sell Condominium Units; and to permanently enjoin local
and national building officials from issuing licenses and permits to
MEGAWORLD.
Megaworld filed a Motion to Dismiss but RTC denied. Subsequently,
Megaworld filed its Anwer and pre-trial commenced. RTC favored
AHMCSO declared licenses void. Megaworld appealed before CA. The
latter reversed RTCs decision. Herein petitioner moved for
reconsideration but then denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON CA erred when it found that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention from the
courts.
WON CA erred when it found that the case filed before and decided by
the regional trial court of pasig, branch 158, does not fall under any
one of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


43

WON CA erred when it found that petitioner failed to exhaust


administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention from the
courts.
WON CA erred when it concluded that the hlurb had jurisdiction over
actions to annul certificates of locational viability and development
permits.
HELD: Petition has no merit. It is long settled, by law and
jurisprudence, that the Court is not a trier of facts.10Therefore, the only
relevant issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the remedy
sought by the petitioner in the trial court is in violation of the legal
principle of the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.11
In the case of Republic v. Lacap,12 we expounded on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the related doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not

determine a controversy involving a question which is within the


jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.13
It is true that the foregoing doctrine admits of exceptions, such that in
Lacap, we also held:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on
sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in
quo warranto proceedings. x x x.14
Upon careful consideration of the parties contentions, we find that
none of the aforementioned exceptions exist in the case at bar.
In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention
via a petition for annulment. The power to act as appellate body over
decisions and actions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies
and deputized official of the board was retained by the HLURB and
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
44

remained unaffected by the devolution under the Local Government


Code.
Under the rules of the HLURB then prevailing at the time this case was
filed, a complaint to annul any permit issued by the HLURB may be
filed before the Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA). The decision
of the HLA may be brought to the Board of Commissioners by
Petition for Certiorari and the decision of the Board of
Commissioners [is] appealable to the Office of the
President.16(Citations omitted; emphases supplied.)
HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., ESTER SAAVEDRA, CESAR SAAVEDRA,
& ROEL BEJASA, petitioners,
vs.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GREGORIO RAMOS,
NAPOLEN RAMOS, CELSO TINGCUNGCO, ARMANDO DOMINGO &
CAROLINA SEBASTIAN, respondents
FACTS:
Private respondents in the above-mentioned case(Gregorio Ramos. et al.,
vs. Honorio Saavedra, et al.) with the SEC, alleging in then amended
complaint that, on or above 2 July 1981, private respondents sold all
their stocks, lights and interests in Philippine Inc. to petitioners for the
sum of P12 million payable in installments.
The parties agreed that the sale agreement would automatically be
rescinded upon failure on the part of petitioners to pay any amount
due; that petitioners failed to pay the last sum due on the scheduled
date, so that private respondents rescinded the sale under an
instrument, Rescission of Memorandum of Agreement. Private
respondents prayed, among others, that said instrument of rescission
be declared as having been made and executed -in accordance with law
and that a Temporary Restraining Order be issued to enjoin petitioners
from ... "committing acts of disposal of the Company assets,
merchandise stocks, equipment's, machineries and other company
paraphernalia."

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging lack of jurisdiction over


the case on the part of the SEC. SEC denied the same. Hence, the
present recourse by petitioners to this Court.
Issue:
WON SEC lack jurisdiction over the case
Held:
Petition dismissed. As aptly held by the SEC, the dispute at bar is an
intra-corporate dispute that has arisen between and among the
principal stockholders of the corporation due to the refusal of the
defendants (now petitioners) to fully comply with what has been
covenanted by the parties. Such dispute involves a controversy
"between and among stockholders,' specifically as to plaintiffs' right, as
stockholders, over unpaid assignment of shares and the validity of
defendants' acquisition of the same. 1 In other words, the present case
involves an intra-corporate dispute as to who has the right to remain
and act as owners-stockholders of the corporation.
Pursuant to PD No. 902-A, as amended, particularly Section 5(b)
thereof, the primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the present case
properly belongs to the SEC. The pertinent provision reads:
SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
function of the Securities and Exchange Commission
over corporations, partnership and other forms of
associations registered with it as expressly granted
under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving:
5(b) Controversies arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
45

and/or all of them and the corporation,


partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates,
respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association
and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as
such entity; ...
In Abejo vs. de la Cruz, 2 citing Philex Mining Corporation vs. Reyes, the
Court held that "an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises
between stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction,
qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and
covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and
corporations."
In the same case of Abejo vs. de la Cruz, the Court expounded on the
expanded jurisdiction of the SEC in line with the government's policy of
encouraging investments, and more active public participation in the
affairs of private corporations and enterprises through which desirable
activities may be pursued for the promotion of economic development,
and to promote a wider and more meaningful equitable distribution of
wealth. The expanded jurisdiction of SEC includes absolute
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships
or associations, who are the grantees of primary franchise and/or a
license or permit issued by the government to operate in the Philippines
(Sec. 3, PD 902-A as amended); ... and, in addition to its regulatory and
adjudicative functions over corporations, partnerships and other forms
of associations registered with it as expressly granted under laws and
decrees, original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the
board of directors, business associations, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of

associations or organizations registered with the


Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any and/or all of them
and the corporation, partnership or association of which
they are stockholders, members or associates,
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership
or association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist sa such entity;
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of
directors, trustees, officers or managers of such
corporations, partnerships or associations.

In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the
same to an administrative agency of special competence. As early as
1954, the Court in Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers vs. Samar Mining
Co. Inc.3 held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of
primary jurisdiction " ... the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee said:
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge. experience and capability to hear
and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
46

essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in


case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable.

BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILS V TANTUICO


FACTS: Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Audit initiated a special audit of coconut end-user
companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to their
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the
subsidies they had received.
As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office
with respect only to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman
directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and the Military Supervisor
of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund,
in various letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of petition) to
collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy
claims to the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to
remit the amount due.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard
the PCA rules and decisions has become moot.
RULING: In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that acts
were done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Case dismissed.
Petitioners contend that they are outside the ambit of
respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that
"The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a postaudit basis. ... (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or

equity directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are


required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity." (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution
formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who
handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or
audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors. n view
of the above considerations, we apply the principle of primary
jurisdiction:
In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has
been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence. As early as 1954, the Court in Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil.
932,941), held that under the sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the Purposes of the regulatory statute administered."
Recently, this Court specaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee said that "In this era of clogged court dockets, the
need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse
of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable." The court
reminds us that The legal presumption is that official duty has
been duly performed.
1. EXCEPTION: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY
JURISDICTION
PROVINCE OF AKLAN VS JODY KING CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


47

FACTS: The Province of Aklan and Jody King Construction entered into
a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Port and
terminal (phase 1). In the course of construction, Petitioner Aklan
issued a change orders for additional works and again entered into a
negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of Passenger
Terminal Building (Phase 2). After the construction of Phase 1 and
change orders were agreed, respondent allegedly failed to settle. Then,
respondent sued petitioner to RTC for collection a sum of money. The
trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment, Petitioner denied
any unpaid balance. RTC rendered decision in favour of respondent,
issued a writ execution and garnished petitioners funds deposited in
different banks. Petitioner filed petition in the CA, but it was denied for
its failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration and is stopped from
invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it stopped from making
the doctrine or primary jurisdiction as it only raised after its notice of
appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. COA has primary jurisdiction over money
claim and petitioner is not stopped from not raising the issue of
jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on
sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in
quo warranto proceedings. All the proceedings and decisions of the
court in violation of the doctrine rendered null and void.

2. DOCTRINE OF CONTINUING JURISDICTION


GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: The Provost Martial General of the AFP, Col Galarpe, issued a
restriction to quarters and a charge sheet was filed with the Special
General Court Martial against Gen Carlos Garcia allegedly for violation
of the Article of War (Section 96 Unbecoming an officer and Gentlemen;
Section 97 Prejudicial to good order and military discipline). Upon
arraignment, petitioner plead not guilty on all charges. After the
transfer of confinement to the ISAFP Detention Center, petitioner,
having reached the age of 56, compulsorily retired from service. After
the trial, petitioner was found guilty and dishonourably discharged
from service and to be confined at ward labor for a period of two (2)
years. The staff Judge Advocate recommended that the period of
confinement shall be credited in his favour and deducted from 2 years
of his sentence. And to effectuate the foregoing, thru Secretary of
National Defense, recommending approval of the attached prepared
Action of the President. Then, the office of the President confirmed the
sentence, further that the sentence shall not be remitted by any
previous confinement. Consequently, petitioner was again arrested and
detained.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner asserts that the General Court Martial
ceased jurisdiction ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement, thus,
the Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the
Confirmation of Sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction
over the petitioner despite his retirement during the pendency of the
proceeding.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. However, applying provisions of Article
29 or the Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was
under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence
confirmed by the President.
Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the
time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
48

jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continued until
the case is terminated. Therefore, petitioners retirement did not divest
the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction.
3. HIERARCHY OF COURTS (APPLICATION)
KULAYAN VS TAN
FACTS: Three members of the International Committee of the Red
Cross were kidnapped in the Province of Sulu by the members of the
Abu Sayaff Group (ASG). A task force was created joining PNP/AFP and
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) under the leadership of Governor
Abdusakur Tan. Governor Tan issued a proclamation declaring a state
of emergency citing kidnapping incident as a ground invoking Section
465 of LGC of 1991. In the same proclamation, Tan called upon the
PNP and CEF to set up checkpoints and conduct general search and
seizure including arrests. Several persons were arrested and detained.
Jamar Kukayan et al, filed petition for Certiorari claiming that the
proclamation was issued with grave abuse of discretion, as it
threatened fundamental freedoms, and only the President is vested with
calling-out powers, as the Commander-in-Chief.
Respondent contended that petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts when they filed the petition directly in the court of
last resort.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the petition even
if both CA and RTC possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the SC
under Rule 65.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Simply put, the doctrine provides that
where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the CA or RTC, it is in either of these courts and not the
SC, that the specific issuance of such writ must be sought UNLESS
special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the
petition. The reason for this is that this court is a court of last resort
and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and immortal tradition. It cannot be burdened with
deciding cases in the first instance. The principle of hierarchy of courts

applies generally to cases involving factual issues. The instant case,


however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to
the public. The Court resolve this case without determining any factual
issue related to the case.
1. EXCEPTIONS / RELAXATION OF THE RULE
UNITED CLAIMANTS OF NEA (UNICAN) VS NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION
FACTS: NEA is created in accordance with PD 269 where its Board is
empowered to reorganize NEAs staffing structure. RA 9136 Electric
Power Industry Reform Act was enacted to enhance the electrification
including the privatization of the NAPOCOR. To Implement RA 9136,
rules and regulations were issued, Section 3 (b) all NEAs employees
and officers are considered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions
of NEA vacant. NEA Board submitted a reorganization plan to the
president and the DBM approved NEAs termination plan.
The NEA implemented an early retirement program and giving
incentives to those who availed of it. Hence, this petitiom. UNICAN
asserts that the NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA
employee, but NEA Board asserts that the court has no jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of
courts when they filed the petition directly to SC
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. The termination of all the employees of
NEA was within the NEAs Board powers (Sec 5, PD 264).
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the
RTC. However, as an exception to the general rule, the principle of
hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important
reasons. Such reasons exist in the instant case involving as it does the
employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees,
who were effectively dismissed from employment in on swift stroke.
Thus, to the mind of the court entailed its attention.
TUNA PROCESSING INC VS PHILIPPINE KINGFORD INC
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
49

FACTS: Kamimitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of US patent, Philippine


patent, Indonesian Patent and five (5) tuna processors, one of which is
the respondent Kingford, entered into a MOA. The parties agree to the
establishment of the Tuna Processors Inc (TPI), a corporation
established in the State of California, in order to implement its
objectives which is the licensor, co-owner of patents, wishes to form an
alliance with sponsors (Tuna Processor) for purposes of enforcing his
three patents, granting licenses, and collecting royalties.
Due to a series of events, the licences including Kingsford,
withdrew from TPI and remerged on their obligations. Petitioner
submitted the dispute before the International Center of Dispute
Resolution in the State of California and won the case against the
respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a petition for
confirmation, recognition, and enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award
before the RTC. Kingsford filed a motion to dismiss which was granted
on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
Hence, this petition. Kingsford contends that the case should be
dismissed for failure to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquire jurisdiction over the case
RULING: Petition GRANTED. It is in the best interest of justice that the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing
party of the rule that bans foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts.
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should
be respected because RA 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law
in question.
Failure to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts warrants
the outright dismissal of the case. A strict application of this rule may
be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case,
where the issues are not factual but purely legal. The novelty and the
paramount importance of the issue herein should be seriously
considered.

CAPALLA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Commission on Elections posted and published an invitation to


apply for eligibility to bid for the 2010 poll Automation Project pursuant
to RA 9369 the Automation Law. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued
Resolution awarding the contract to smartmatic. The contract was one
of lease of the Automated Election System with option to purchase
(OTP) the goods. After 2010 election, the COMELEC issued resolution
resolving to accept Smartmatic TIMs offer to extend the period to
exercise the OTP and to authorize chairman Brillantes to sign in behalf
of the COMELEC. Then COMELEC issued a resolution to approve the
Deed of Sale to purchase the PCOS machine to be used in the May
2013 elections. Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.
Archbishop Capalla, et al filed a petition claiming that the
issuance of the COMELEC and the transactions entered as illegal and
unconstitutional. However, COMELEC assails the locus standi of
petitioners and the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquire jurisdiction over the case
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. As the CIMELEC is confronted with time
and budget constraints, and in view of the COMELECs mandate to
ensure free, honest and credible elections the acceptance of the
extension of the option period, and the execution of the Deed of Sale,
are the more prudent choices available to the COMELEC for a
successful 2013 automated elections.
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending
public importance of the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities
raised by respondent should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the
ends of justice would not be sub served by a rigid adherence to the
rules of procedure.
F. TYPES OF ACTION
i.

Accion reinvindicatoria and accion publiciana


distingusshed

SPOUSES ALDOVER VS COURT OF APPEALS


FACTS: Siblings Tomas and Sodra Reyes and their father Alfredo
obtained a loan from Antonio Aldover secured by real estate mortgage.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
50

When Reyes failed to pay, Aldover foreclosed the mortgage and she
emerged as the winning bidder. RTC issued a writ of possession over
the subject property. In compliance with the writ, Sheriff issued a
Notice to Vacate, but in the report, he cannot fully implement the writ
because there are several persons who occupy portion of subject lot
claiming to be the owners thereof. In view of Sheriffs partial report,
Aldover filed a motion for special order of Demolition which was granted
by the court. Respondents filed before the CA a petition for Certiorari
with prayer for TRO against petitioners and Reyes claiming that they
were neither impleaded nor notified in the proceedings conducted bin
LRC, and there are not bound by the order of the court for want of
jurisdiction. CA dismissed petition on procedural grounds, but after
Motion for Reconsideration, it was granted for substantial justice.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintain that respondents ancillary prayer for
injustice relief lacked basis as they have in clear right that must be
protected. And none of the respondent, alleged proofs of ownership were
over registered.
Respondents assert that the issue to resolve in this Petition for
Certiorari is whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion, not of
who have the better right over the property in question.
ISSUE: Whether the issue of who have a better right over the property
in question is an extraneous matter that is totally irrelevant in the
present controversy.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. A petition for Certiorari is not the proper
remedy to review the intrinsic correctness of the public respondents
ruling. Petitioners cannot resort to procedural shortcut in ousting
respondents by the simple expedient of filing a motion for Special Order
of Demolition for under Article 433, NCC, petitioners have failed to file
the appropriate judicial process to recover the property from the
respondents. The judicial process could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or a reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership
claims may be heard and adjudicated.
GAMBA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Violeta Herrera owner of Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey, that
shee inherited the house/lot to her parents and she only tolerated Rene
and others to construct residential houses without rentals. Private
respondent how demanded to the petitioner to vacate the lot and
remove their houses; but, petitioner refused. After reconciliation failed,
private respondent filed 2 ejectment complaints before the MTC. MTC
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. RTC affirmed the decision of
MTC. CA also denied the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners insist that private respondent
should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not a mere
complaint for ejectment, because they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith
for more than 30 years in the concept of owners and there was no
withholding of possession since private respondent was not in a prior
possession of the lot.
ISSUE: Whether MTC has jurisdiction over the complaints for unlawful
detainer, and that the only issue to be determined in a mere physical
possession (de facto) and not juridical possession (de jure).
RULING: Petition DENIED. Jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is
vested in MTC and in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint.
Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed
an action to recover possession de jure with the RTC is not supported
by law. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (accion publicana) and from a reinvidicatory action
(accion reinvidicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of
possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may
be filed to recover possession of real property.
Accion publiciana on the plenary action to recover the right to
possession, and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession.
JOSE V. ALBERTO

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


51

FACTS: Chua Sing owned a parcel of land, which he leased to Jose.


Jose demanded Rodolfo, et al., to vacate the property. Based on the
contract of lease, the lessor transfers all the rights and prerogatives to
evict said occupant in favor of the lease. But the respondents refused to
vacate the premises. Petitioner then file an ejectment case before the
MeTC claiming that as lessee of the subject property, he had the right
to eject the respondent who unlawfully occupy the land.
Respondents argued that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
case as the issue deals with ownership of the land. However, MeTC held
that respondents had no right to possess the land and their occupation
was merely by owners tolerance. RTC affirmed MeTC decision. But CA
reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions. It ruled that respondents
allegation that they had in possession of the land before Chua had
acquired it in 1991 supports that there is no tolerance, and having
been in possession of the land for more than a year, respondents now
cannot be evicted though an ejectment case which is summary
proceeding. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy in
this case.
RULING: Petitioner DENIED. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for
the recovery of possession of real property. Tolerance of possession
must have been present at the beginning of the possession; if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer
would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria. An ejectment suit is
bought before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession
only on possession de facto, NOT possession de jure. Unlawful detainer
and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to
property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is made
only to resolve the issue of possession.
VDA. DE BINAY V. SPOUSES UZI
636 SCRA 811

FACTS: Ellen Mendiola owned several parcels of land. A subdivision


plan for Lot 733 was divided into 6, Mendoza executed two deeds of
absolute sale transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Viray and Lot 733-A to
Avelino & Margarita. Purchasers annotated the blabla blabla of sale on
TCT 141, Fajardo Plan. Notwithstanding consequences, Mendoza,
spouses Usi, et al., as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed a
Subdivision Agreement which was approved the subdivision plan by the
Land Management Bureau. Based on the Agreement, they are the sale
and exclusive owner of the said land. The Lot 733 was subdivided into
those based on Galang Plan A, B, & C. Lot 733-C not further divided
into 13 smaller lots. The subdivision of the Lot 733, per Galang Plan,
virtually resulted in the loss of the identity of Lot 733-A & Lot 733-F of
Spouses Viray and Jesus Viray, from Mendoza.
As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions,
involving the same property, spawned several suits, and counter-suits
featuring, in particular, herein petitions, and respondents, (1)
Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, 733-A Fajardo Plan, Decision in
favor of Sps Viray, (2) Annulment of Absolute Sale (3) Forcible Entry (4)
Petition for Annulment of MCTC Decision or Forcible Entry (5)
Cancellation of Titles before RTC, (6) Petition for Accion Publiciana and
Reinvindicatoria before RTC.
RTC dismissed the petition of Spouses Uzi for Accion Publiciana /
Reinvindicatoria for failure to establish to support their claim of title,
possession and ownership over the lots. But the CA reversed the RTCs
decision despite the defense of res judicata. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the better right to possess and the right of ownwership
of Sps Viray over the parcel of land can be re-litigated three actions to
recover possession filed by Spouses Uzi
RULING: The court in Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale has in
effect determined that the conveyances and necessarily the transfer of
ownership made to Sps Viray were valid. This determination operates as
a bar to the reinvindicatory action to annul said conveyances and
precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the settles issue
of ownership and possession arising from ownership.
The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de
Viray (vice Jose Viray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of
land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
52

actions to recover possession and vindicate ownership filed by the Sps.


Usi. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose and
Amelita Usi v. Spouses Avelino Viray and Margarita Masangcay and
Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the
conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the
Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986 were
valid. This determination operates as a bar to the Usis reivindicatory
action to assail the April 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the
relitigation between the same parties of the settled issue of ownership
and possession arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses Usi
did not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property
in question in their action for annulment of the deed sale of sale. But it
cannot be gainsaid that said action is closely intertwined with the issue
of ownership, and affects the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The
prevalent doctrine, to borrow from Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,52 "is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a
sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and
prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real
property."
And lest it be overlooked, the Court, in G.R. No. 154538
(Spouses Jose and Amelita Usi v. Ruperta Cano Vda. de Viray), again in
effect ruled with finality that petitioner Vda. de Viray has a better
possessory right over Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan). Thus, the Courts
decision in G.R. No. 122287 juxtaposed with that in G.R. No. 154538
would suffice to bar the Sps. Usis accion publiciana, as the spouses
had invoked all along their ownership over the disputed Lot 733-F as
basis to defeat any claim of the right of possessiOn. While an accion
reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an ejectment case, such
judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana,
because the matter of possessioq between the same parties has become
res judicata and cannot be delved into in a new action.
ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and
EDITHA PE-TAN, vs. JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG,
FACTS: Respondent Jose Tong, thru his representative Jose Ong, filed
an action for ejectment case against Anita Monasterio-Pe et al before
the MTC. Petitioners are occupying the house without any contract of

lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation
thereof is simply by mere tolerance of Tong. Tong demanded to vacate
the house but respondents refused to vacate the same. Respodnents
alleged that Tons is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is
only a dummy. MTC rendered decision in favour of Tong. RTC also
affirmed the decision.
Hence, this petition. Respondents claiming that Jose Tong
should have filed an Accion Publiciana and not an unlawful detainer
case because one year period to file a case for unlawful detainer has
already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether the one year period should be counted from the date of
petitioners occupation in the land.
RULING: Petition DENIED. The person who occupies the land of
another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against them, Rule 70, Secton 1 of the Rules of
Court, the one year perios within which a complaint for unlawful
detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand,
because only upon the lapse of that perios does the possession become
unlawful.
ii.

Action in rem, quasi in rem and action in personam


distinguished.

MACASAET vs CO, Jr.


FACTS: Herein respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the
Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of
general circulation; its Publisher, its Managing, its Circulation Manager,
its Editors, and its Columnist/Reporter (petitioners), claiming damages
because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the
June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, docketed as Civil Case
No. 00-97907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due
course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including
Abante Tonite,
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
53

Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address in the summons to


effect the personal service of it on the defendants. But his efforts to
personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the
defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in
the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the
summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the
office. He then decided to resort to substituted service of the summons
and explained that per information, said defendants are always roving
outside and gathering information.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case alleging lack of
jurisdiction because of the invalid and ineffectual service of summons.
HELD: Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam the
power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the
parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action is an element of due process that is essential in
all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in
rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem
is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as
long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of
the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory
pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary
appearance in the action. The service of the summons fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the
opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. when
jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the
proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper
service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. Under the Rules of
Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. But if, for justifiable reasons,

the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the


service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a
copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his
office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted
service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made
through his substitute.

Herein petitioner prays for the dismissal of the Complaint on the


following grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of
summons. While the Motion to Dismiss is still pending, petitioner filed
two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to take the deposition of Mr. Paul
Murray (Director, Risk Management of petitioner) before the Philippine
Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on
respondent.

After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his
second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going
to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he
concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a
reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to
effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that
he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he
be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In
that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the
circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal
service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit
of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the Motion to


Dismiss. According to the trial court, there was a proper service of
summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account
of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do
business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney designating some person
on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served.

NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED vs LEPANTO


CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY
FACTS: Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a Complaint against
petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a
judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties
void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and for damages. Upon respondents (plaintiffs) motion, the
trial court authorized respondents counsel to personally bring the
summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in
Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on
petitioner (defendant).
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
54

HELD: When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem,


Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be
made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons
is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the
defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him
and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or
in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he
is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against
him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and
Hedging Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages.

It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to


the defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily
liable to the plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is therefore an
action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property
within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the
action will be converted to one quasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since
the defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case
against it because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its
person unless it voluntarily appears in court. However, respondent
points out that while petitioners Motion to Dismiss was still pending,
petitioner prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against
respondent, such as written interrogatories, requests for admission,
deposition, and motions for production of documents.
Therefore, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, petitioner
is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said
court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
JESSE U. LUCAS vs JESUS S. LUCAS
FACTS: On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to
Establish Illegitimate Filiation before RTC-Valenzuela City. Petitioner
narrated that his mother, Elsie Uy got pregnant and, on March 11,
1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of
petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth.
However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.
When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to
accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on
her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts
to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,
respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
55

On September 4, 2007 respondent filed a Special Appearance and


Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent;
(3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving
service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice
by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of
the confidentiality of the subject matter.
HELD: An action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem.
By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation
before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication,
all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.

If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not


for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in order to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he
so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court
of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party
had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We
find that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has
been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings
in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MERLYN MERCADERA
FACTS: Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970
at Dipolog City. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the
City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. In the
certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her
given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn.
On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized by the name Merlyn L.
Mercadera, according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines. In her elementary diploma, high school
diploma and college diploma uniformly show her name as Merlyn L.
Mercadera. Her certificate of membership issued by the Government
Service Insurance System also bears her complete name as Merlyn
Lacquiao Mercadera.
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth
from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name
as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name
might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material
correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights." What the
lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercaderas given name,
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
56

which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103
and proved any of the grounds therefor.
HELD: Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of
given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil
Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special
proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the
rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails
of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a
persons identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label
or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing
him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a
change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the
change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires
publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all
other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the
decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As
notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make
an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide it."
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the
correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to
Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also
as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil
registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors
affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond
the ambit of the rule.

The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under
Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from." To change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly
prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her
registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same
to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN."
SPS FERNANDO TORRES and IRMA TORRES vs AMPARO MEDINA
FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent Medina wrote a letter to the
Office of the Sheriff, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of the property of
petitioner spouses Fernando and Irma Torres (Spouses Torres) which
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-61056 (354973) and
which is subject of a Deed of Mortgage dated December 20, 1993.
On May 27, 1997, the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff issued a Notice of
Sheriffs Sale and, on June 30, 1997, sold at public auction the subject
property to Medina being the highest bidder thereof.
On September 21, 1999, the Spouses Torres filed a Complaint before
the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage conducted by the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
On July 20, 2000, Medina filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the grounds
of res judicata and forum shopping. Medina argued that the Spouses
Torres had filed an earlier Complaint praying for the annulment of the
real estate mortgage involving the same property and which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-18962 before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 216. Medina contended that said complaint was already
dismissed as evidenced by the RTCs Decision dated March 7, 1997.

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


57

On December 27, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting Medinas


motion to dismiss the complaint. The RTC ruled that res judicata was
present and that the Spouses Torres were guilty of forum shopping.
HELD: The Spouses Torres only filed their complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-99-38781 after more than two years had already lapsed from the
time the ex-officio sheriff sold the property in question at public
auction. The foreclosure proceeding was an action in rem, and
therefore, the Spouses Torres cannot feign knowledge thereof. More
importantly, the Spouses Torres were not completely left without any
remedy as they still had the right of redemption, which expired one year
from and after the date of the registration of the Certificate of Sale. In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court must assume that
no attempt to redeem the property was undertaken by the Spouses
Torres and that they simply allowed their right and remedy to lapse by
their inaction.
In addition, the Spouses Torres have already lost their right to question
the validity of the real estate mortgage, for most part due to the
negligence of their counsel. More importantly, the decision upholding
the validity of the real estate mortgage is already final; hence, the same
can no longer be questioned in another proceeding by simply varying
the form of the action, or adopting a different method of presenting
their case.
ACOSTA vs SALAZAR
FACTS: Herein respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the
entries annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta
Macaraeg, who died without issue. The Salazars claim that two of the
entries Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 annotated at the back of the
aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of rights appear in the
Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries; and that
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled
OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a certification issued by
the RD. On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to

grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102. No
respondent was impleaded in the said petition.
Petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the
disputed property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all filed their
formal written comment. In their comment, the oppositors contended,
among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for
value, and that the lower court, acting as a land registration court, had
no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. The appellees further argued
that the orders of RTC Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper
notice.
The CA struck down the arguments of the appellees and ratiocinated
that the proceeding is a land registration proceeding , which is an
action in rem. This being so, personal notice to the owners or claimants
of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the
court with jurisdiction over the parties.
HELD: It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system
is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem,
dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice
by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the
power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible
were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between
constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were
not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars can
hardly be classified as actions in rem. The petition for cancellation of
entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have been
directed against specific persons: namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as
appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their
successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of the
property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in
rem. Accordingly, the Salazars should have impleaded as party
defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
58

as those claiming ownership over the property under their names


because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this
case. Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars
in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the
RTC of Tarlac, herein petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of
the said court. Consequently, the judgment or order of the said court
never even acquired finality.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL vs GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION
SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.
FACTS: Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture
of assets against the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. On
July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General
[OSG]) received a copy of the sheriffs return dated June 30, 2004
stating that the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow
was no longer holding office at the given address since July 2002 and
left no forwarding address. On August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a
manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgows "Motion to
Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It
alleged, among others, that the court had no jurisdiction over its
person as summons had not yet been served on it. The Republic
opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was an
action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court.
HELD: As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself
instead of against the person.20 In actions in rem orquasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.21 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.22 For

this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of


service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.23
In this connection, paragraph (b), Section 8, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever
his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order.
xxx

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION vs


CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: These two petitions1 involve properties covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342
hectares of the Maysilo Estate.2 The vast tract of land stretches over
three (3) cities. Despite their prime location within Metropolitan Manila,
the properties included in OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy
and sullied by apparent fraud, cloudy titles and shady transfers.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present
acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and
the titles involved in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact
that the titles debunked in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases, which find
origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, seem to have been
derived from Cadastral Case No. 34 also covering the Maysilo Estate. It
is in fact the theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two
competing sources of title the OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917
arising from the issuance of Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration
Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 based on the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in Cadastral Case No. 34. It is
further opined that the registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
59

Case No. 34, even if the date of such registration is 3 May 1917, is void
since such registration could not supplant the earlier decision of the
land registration court.
HELD: The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over
lands already registered in ordinary land registration cases was
acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San Agustin.65 Such
jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair
the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title."66 It
was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz 67 that the limited jurisdiction of
the cadastral court over such lands even extends to the determination
of "which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as
such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of
the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and
must therefore be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court
in such proceedings."68
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land,
already issued in the name of a person, in the name of another,
divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor, or
the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial
rights.72 Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court
will not have jurisdiction over the action involving the previously
registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the
cadastral court may not issue a new title at all even if it would not
impair the rights of the previously registered owner, as emphasized in
Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that
because there was a cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from
which the titles emanated, such titles could not have been valid. It is
clear that there could be such titles issued, and they would be valid for
so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant to
whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued.
REPUBLIC OF
MANGOTARA

THE

PHILIPPINES

vs

HON.

MAMINDIARA

P.

FACTS: Essentially, in their Petitions for Review on Certiorari under


Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, LANDTRADE and Teofilo, and/or Atty.
Cabildo are calling upon this Court to determine whether the Court of
Appeals, in its Decision dated January 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No.
00456, erred in (1) upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 to
resolve the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case
No. 4452, the action for quieting of title; (2) not holding that Vidal and
AZIMUTH have neither cause of action nor legal or equitable title or
interest in the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 01201 (a.f.); (3) finding the evidence sufficient to establish Vidals status
as Doa Demetrias granddaughter and sole surviving heir; and (4) not
holding that Civil Case No. 4452 was already barred by prescription.

Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem.


Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi
in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in
rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.

HELD: An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being


cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

Instead, Civil Case No. 4452 is indisputably an action for quieting of


title, a special proceeding wherein the court is precisely tasked to
determine the rights of the parties as to a particular parcel of land, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him/her may be forever
free from any danger of hostile claim. Vidal asserted title to the two
parcels of land as Doa Demetrias sole heir. The cloud on Vidals title,
which she sought to have removed, was Teofilos adverse claim of title to
the same properties, also as Doa Demetrias only heir. For it to
determine the rights of the parties in Civil Case No. 4452, it was
therefore crucial for the RTC-Branch 3 to squarely make a finding as to
the status, filiation, and heirship of Vidal in relation to those of Teofilo.
A finding that one is Doa Demetrias sole and rightful heir would
consequently exclude and extinguish the claim of the other.

In Calacala v. Republic,95 the Court elucidated on the nature of an


action to quiet title:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting
of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating
in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure x x x an adjudication
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the
complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming
under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile
claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants,
x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other,
but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to
use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x . (Emphases
supplied.)
The Court expounded further in Spouses Portic v. Cristobal96 that:

Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to


bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy
may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner
because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily
refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual
certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to
quiet title. x x x (Emphases supplied.)

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL


BANK
FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves
Biaco. Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank. As
security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of the bank. When Ernesto failed to settle the
above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through
counsel sent him a written demand.
On February 22, 2000, respondent bank filed a complaint for
foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


60

before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Ernesto received the summons but
for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses
Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the respondent bank.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, 4 asserting that even if the
action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential in order
to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff
at her husbands office cannot be deemed proper service absent any
explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons
upon her but that such efforts failed.
HELD: An action in personam is an action against a person on the
basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the
thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one
wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property.14
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction
over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2)
as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.15
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.16 Significantly, in a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court
against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction
either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its
jurisdiction, is limited to the res.
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG vs SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA
HEDY VELAYO

Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries


61

FACTS: In their Complaint, respondents allege that petitioner, a


resident of 1860 Alamoana Boulevard, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and her
co-defendants, who are residents of the Philippines, made it appear
that their common father, Rodolfo Velayo, Sr. (Rodolfo Sr.) and petitioner
had filed a complaint against Raymond before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), accusing Raymond of the crimes of estafa and
kidnapping a minor; that petitioner and her co-defendants also
requested that respondents be included in the Hold Departure List of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) which was granted,
thereby preventing them from leaving the country and resulting in the
cancellation of respondents' trips abroad and caused all of respondents'
business transactions and operations to be paralyzed to their damage
and prejudice; that petitioner and her co-defendants also filed a petition
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as
Case No. 4422 entitled "Rodolfo Velayo Sr. et al. v. Raymond Velayo et
al." which caused respondents' funds to be frozen and paralyzed the
latters' business transactions and operations to their damage and
prejudice. Since petitioner was a non-resident and not found in the
Philippines, respondents prayed for a writ of preliminary attachment
against petitioner's properties located in the Philippines.
Before respondents' application for a writ of preliminary attachment
can be acted upon by the RTC, respondents filed on September 10,
1993 an Urgent Motion praying that the summons addressed to
petitioner be served to her at Suite 201, Sunset View Towers
Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and at No. 5040 P. Burgos
Street, T. Towers Condominium, Makati.4 In its Order dated September
13, 1993, the RTC granted the said motion.5
Upon ex-parte motions7 of respondents, the RTC in its Order dated
November 23, 1993 and January 5, 1994, declared petitioner and her
co-defendant in default for failure to file an answer and ordered the exparte presentation of respondents' evidence.8
On September 1, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of
Default claiming that she was prevented from filing a responsive
pleading and defending herself against respondents' complaint because
of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officer's Return, no
summons was served upon her; that she has valid and meritorious

defenses to refute respondents' material allegations. 10 Respondents


opposed said Motion.11
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA questioning the propriety and
validity of the service of summons made upon her. Petitioner argues
that summons should have been served through extraterritorial service
since she is a non-resident.
HELD: Under Section 17,28 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially. There are only four
instances when extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely:
(a) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (b) when
the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the
Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent; (c) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; and (d) when the defendant's property has
been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of
summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country,
with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any
other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action
is in rem, that is, an action against the thing itself instead of against the
person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. The rationale
for this is that in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.29
Where the action is in personam, that is, one brought against a person
on the basis of her personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person.30 Summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
62

tendering it to him.31 This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is


not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and
decide the case against him.32
The action instituted by respondents affect the parties alone, not the
whole world. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded.33 Thus, it is an action in personam. As such,
personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.34
G. CLASS SUIT

LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., LILIA MARQUINEZ PALANCA,


ROSANNA D. IMAI, GLORIA DOMINGO and RAY
VINCENT, Petitioners,
vs.
AMELIA P. MUER, SAMUEL M. TANCHOCO, ROMEO TANKIANG,
RUDEL PANGANIBAN, DOLORES AGBAYANI, ARLENEDAL A.
YASUMA, GODOFREDO M. CAGUIOA and EDGARDO M.
SALANDANAN, Respondents.
FACTS: Pursuant to the by-laws of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., petitioners
Lilia Marquinez Palanca, Rosanna D. Imai, Gloria Domingo and Ray
Vincent, the incumbent Board of Directors, set the annual meeting of
the members of the condominium corporation and the election of the
new Board of Directors at the lobby of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. The
Committee on Elections of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., however, found
most of the proxy votes, at its face value, irregular, thus, questionable;
and for lack of time to authenticate the same, petitioners adjourned the
meeting for lack of quorum.
However, the group of respondents challenged the adjournment of the
meeting. Despite petitioners' insistence that no quorum was obtained
during the annual meeting held on April 2, 2004, respondents pushed

through with the scheduled election and were elected as the new Board
of Directors and officers of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. and subsequently
submitted a General Information Sheet to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
On plaintiffs motion to admit amended complaint (to include Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc. as plaintiff), the RTC ruled denying the motion for
being improper. Then, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals and
held that Judge Antonio I. De Castro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Orders denying petitioners Motion to Admit Second Amended
Complaint and that petitioners the justified the inclusion of Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc. as plaintiff by invoking the doctrine of derivative
suit.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals thereafter. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Derivative Suit proper in this case.
RULING: The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Derivative Suit is not applicable.
Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in a
derivative suit, then the reliefs prayed for must be for the benefit
or interest of the corporation. When the reliefs prayed for do not
pertain to the corporation, then it is an improper derivative suit.
The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:
a) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time
of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his
shares not being material;
b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has
made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate
relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the
wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
63

corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the


suit.
As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners complaint seek to nullify
the said election, and to protect and enforce their individual right to
vote. The cause of action devolves on petitioners, not the condominium
corporation, which did not have the right to vote. Hence, the complaint
for nullification of the election is a direct action by petitioners, who were
the members of the Board of Directors of the corporation before the
election, against respondents, who are the newly-elected Board of
Directors. Under the circumstances, the derivative suit filed by
petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation in the
Second Amended Complaint is improper.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. vs
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., et al.
March 5, 2012
FACTS: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA),
together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et.
al.), instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and as a class
suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana
Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use
of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and
intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a
class suit. . They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not
necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al.
against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and
each may be affected differently than the others.
With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that
JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right
to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a

torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor
legal easement constituted over it.
ISSUES: A)Whether or not the complaint states a cause of
action;
B)Whether or not the complaint was properly filed as a
class suit
C)Whether or not a WPI is warranted
RULING: A) The question of whether the complaint states a cause of
action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by
the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint
sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments
in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are:
(1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation
that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and
(2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the
said roads
B) The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit
are:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently
numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and
motorists who use La Paz Road.
The individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties
and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.
Jurisdiction Compilation of Case Summaries
64

C) A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened


or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and
(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present
right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive. This means
that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of
violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use
of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein.
BANDA V. ERMITA
FACTS: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the
private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that
the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and
lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive
Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers
of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued
by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative

powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of
tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the


Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.

ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.

To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains


only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and
agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary,
the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the
power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance
with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.

HELD: YES
J. Leonardo-de Castro. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence
that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies
in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the
President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions
of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III
of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in
the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of
the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly

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65

J. Carpio: RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all


the procurement activities of the government including the acquisition
of items, supplies, materials, and general support services x x x which
may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in the
pursuit of any government x x x activity save for limited transactions.
By opening governments procurement of standard and accountable
forms to competitive bidding (except for documents crucial to the
conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely by
government), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184s principle of
promoting competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable
private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate
in public bidding.