Why does religious extremism produce terror?

What role does religion have in producing terrorism? According to Martin (2003),
religion can be identified as cause for terrorism in two distinct cases, as primary
motive and secondary motive. In some cases, religion is the secondary motive for
ethno- nationalist, revolutionary and pro- independence groups as for example in
Northern Ireland, Catholic and Protestant fighters. Their religion is a key element of
their identity but not the main motive for terror. When religion is the primary motive,
it is at the core of the political, social and revolutionary agenda of the groups. Usually
these groups are mostly fundamentalist as for example Hamas.

Religious extremists or fundamentalists are easily linked to acts of terror because they
are ready to ‘murder because they embrace theologies that sanction violence in the
service of God’. (Iannacone and Berman, 2006). They feel no sympathy or emotion as
they view their victims as enemies of God (infidels) and are ready to sacrifice their
life for the promised rewards in afterlife. According to Sam Harris, most people in the
world believe that the creator/s of the world have written a book. There are many of
these books and all of them make exclusive claims to infallibility. People sometimes
organise around what they claim to believe. Thus, religion besides producing strong
communities, ethical behaviour, spirtual experiences and so on can also be used for
‘terrible things done in the name of God’ (Harris, 2004).

According to Mazzar (2004), it is universal in this day and age to talk about the
human effects of modernization and globalisation and the ‘ways in which frustration,
rage, and ultimately terrorism spring up from the collision of the new and the
traditional’. Mazzar continues to state that radical extremist Islam’s reaction to
modernity, which has been also noted in other fundamentalist religions, has been
around for a long time. When adhering to the philosophical tradition of existentialism,
one may start to be concerned about the effect of modern life as they believe that
‘mass technology life tranquilizes people, drains us of our authenticity, of our will and
strength to live a fully realised life’ (Mazzar, 2004). All of this produces alienation,
frustration and anger. Al Qaeda’s leaders can be seen as engaging to reclaim the
aforementioned lost elements of humanity. Here we can note the intertwining of the

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roots of fundamentalist terrorism with many anti- modern strains of thought that we
have seen in the past three centuries. For instance the Romantics like Blake,
Wordsworth and Coleridge, who saw ‘ belching factories and impersonal cities …
Progress and technology the beginning of the end of mankind a worthwhile project’
(Mazzar, 2004).

Eric Hoffer (1951) (as cited in Mazzar, 2004) wrote that all mass movements ‘draw
their adherents from the same types of humanity; they all appeal to the same types of
mind’. These are frustrated people that according to Hoffer ‘feel their lives are spoiled
or wasted’. He continues to say that radical movements flourish when they depict the
present situation as ‘despoiled and ruined’ and point to an idealized past and
anticipation of a purified and restored future, thus creating a ‘fantasy’ in the mind of
their followers.

Mazzar (2004), states that scapegoating ‘ is an essential component in a fanatic’s

toolbox’. They generate hatred against enemies they hold responsible for the horrid
present and the destruction of the magnificent past. The members of the group start to
objectify themselves and everyone else, and their horrendous acts become logical as
they surrender completely to the group, body and soul. In a frantic search for identity
the terrorist becomes alienated and sees the ultimate response in violence towards the
‘modernity’ that opposes and upsets the group’s values and goals. According to
Anthony Giddens (as cited in Mazzar’s journal, 2004) tradition defines the truth and
for someone following tradition, questions are not asked about alternatives. Berman,
(2003) (as cited in Mazzar, 2004) sees versions of radical Islam as closely resembling
the enemies of liberalism such as Nazism, Bolshevism and Fascism. They have
common features among which that include hatred of a dishonest desecrated
cosmopolitan present, their worship of a magnificent and righteous past, longing for
an utopian future, acceptance of a dictatorship for the ultimate cause, the designation
of enemies both foreign and domestic ones who are responsible for all the present
evil.

Religious extremists make huge sacrifices in the name of their faith. Their costly
strictures (dietary and sexual prohibitions, distinctive dress and grooming and so on)
bring on high levels of commitment and participation. This is most likely to benefit

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people with limited worldly opportunities due to restricted education, low wages,
unpleasant job or unemployment and low social status. (Iannacone and Bergman,
2006). The high cost groups of any religious tradition tend to be exclusive, devoting
immense time to their group’s activities and goals. As a result they maintain tight
social ties as shown in extreme Christian sects in the USA (Iannacone, 2006). These
movements prosper because they supply their members with hope for the future,
benefits for the present and assurance against trouble. They assist people in their
problems, creating a tight knit unit. This situation is much the same in Judaism and
Islam as it is in Christian sects in the USA, ultra Orthodox Jews in Israel and through
out the whole world who have an extensive support network (Berman). In the case of
radical Islamic groups they enjoy massive support from Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Indonesia. This is especially true when it comes to the poorer
segments of society, as this tight knit units offer mutual aid and social services
(Iannacone and Bergman, 2006).

The Fundamentalism Project (FP) was a multi-year study of world fundamentalisms,

which incorporated hundreds of experts on religion and culture from around the
globe, conducted under the patronage of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
The FP’s (1995) detailed definition of fundamentalism has nine sections, five
dedicated to fundamentalist ideology and four to the groups’ organization. The first
five are titled, Reactivity to the marginalization of religion, Selectivity, Moral
manicheism, Absolutism and inerrancy and Millennialism and messianism. These first
five points are mainly concerned with ‘ … the erosion of religion and its role in
society…’ and thus try to protect ‘… religious content… traditional cosmological
beliefs and associated norms of conduct.’ They see fundamentalism as not simply
defensive of the tradition, but ‘ selects and reshapes aspects’ of it. Fundamentalists
accept some forms of modernity but refuse others, which are mainly concerned with
ideology such as relativism, secularism and pluralism. In the context of Moral
manicheism, fundamentalists view the world as divided into light and darkness.
Outside their group, the world is seen as ‘contaminated, sinful doomed’ while the
world they belong to is ‘ pure and redeemed’. As in many religions, extremists also
see and share the belief that their sacred texts are infallible. When concerned with the
Millennialism and messianism, ‘the good will triumph over evil’ and ‘ the end of
days, preceded by trials and tribulations will be ushered in by the Messiah, the

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Saviour, the Hidden Imam.’ The next four points are divided into the Elect and chosen
membership, sharp boundaries, authoritarian organization and behavioral
requirements. The militants in fundamentalist groups see themselves as ‘elect’,
‘chosen’ and ‘ divinely called’. The idea of separation between the faithful and the
sinful is widespread and essential to fundamentalists and although membership is
voluntary, ‘the typical form of fundamentalism organization is charismatic, a leader-
follower relationship’. Sacrifice and maximum commitment is a key factor in
belonging. ‘ The member’s time, space and activity are a group resource, not an
individual one’. Groups have ‘distinctive music… rules for dress…drinking…
sexuality, appropriate speech, and the discipline of children’ often accompanied with
censorship of reading and audio- visual material.

These definitions reveal a great deal about what drives individuals and groups towards
violence but not all fundamentalists are terrorists or potential ones. Ozzano (2007)
inquires what then makes a terrorist out of a religious fundamentalist. The most
emphasized by scholars according to Ozzano is the millennialism and messianism
point. According to James Reinhart (2007) (as cited in Ozzano), a community that is
made up of profoundly ethnocentric people, disrupted by a noticeably depraved, evil
and alienating power of apparently demonic dimension that upsets their conventional
way of life will react. In the presence of this pressing peril they persuade themselves
that ‘God’s chosen elect’ must defend them to death. This is God’s plan. Stern, 2005
as cited in Tilly (2005), sees Jewish, Christian and Muslim ‘holy warriors as
humiliated people’ who blame others specifically for their suffering. This humiliation
can be either individual or stigma for a whole group for instance Muslims or Jews.
Through their ‘heroic acts’, they try to ‘simplify and purify the world’. This path leads
to memberships in groups that support lives ‘ organized around fundamental
distinctions between good and bad, pure and impure and us and them.’ (Tilly, 2005).
According to Ranstrop, 1996 a survey of the major religious terrorist groups in
existence worldwide in the 1990’s showed that nearly all had experienced a serious
crisis or feeling in their environment. This most probably led to the increase in the
number of groups and members and intensification in their activities.

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Medieval European just-war theory relied on religious justification and was
ideological, based on religious dogma. Western just-war ideas developed out of a
combination of Greco-Roman thought with Christian dogma and ethics and Teutonic
cultural traditions. The development of beliefs that resulted in the Western just-war
doctrine embraces holy war ideas and justifications as well. The European expressions
of holy war arose within historical and religio-cultural situations that were exclusive
and without doubt diverse from the similarly exceptional Arab situation out of which
arose the Islamic terminology of holy war (jihad). The two nonetheless share the
ideological character of rationalization for resorting to war. Both expressions thus
stand for a compartment of ideological war, which Johnson (1975) defines as "armed
struggle against threats to the highest values accepted in the culture and against the
values represented by the enemy (Firestone, 1999).

According to Tilly, 2005 these past few decades have seen religious and ethnic
activists being the most frequent nongovernmental strategists of terror. Sometimes
they have asked for autonomy at other times control over existing governments but
most of the time they have struck against their ethnic or religious rivals. According to
Williams, 2003 political terror disguised as religious terrorism is not specifically
Islamic. Christian fundamentalists have also political agendas most of the time. The
Army of God, a Christian group based in the US, directed their efforts towards the
elimination of abortion. While this is due to their morality, their frustration ultimately
lies with the US government. They see that America has failed as a Christian nation.
Similarly other Christian identity groups have been formed on anti-government and
anti- taxation.

In these cases religion is politicized to achieve political goals for example to stop the
murdering of unborn fetuses or to establish a Christian government in the United
States (Williams, 2003). Kach’s leader, Baruch Mazel said as cited in Ranstrop, 1996,
‘we feel God gave us in the six- day war1, with a miracle, this country. We are taking
this present from God and tossing it away. They are breaking every holy thing in this
country, the government, in a very brutal way.’ On the same note the late Palestinian

1
The six day war was an armed conflict in 1967 between Israel and the Arab States Eygypt, Jordan and
Syria. By the end of the war, Israel had conquered enough territory to more than triple the size of the
area it controlled, from 8,000 to 26,000 square miles. The victory enabled Israel to unify Jerusalem.
Israeli forces had also captured the Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and West Bank. (Bard, 2007)

5
Islamic Jihad leader Fathi al- Shaqaqi blamed Arafat (the Gaza Jericho agreement)
and accused Arafat of having sold his soul and was trying to sell the Palestinians’ soul
too.

Esposito, (2002) asks why is it that Islam is one of the foremost religions that time
and again produces large-scale terrorism and suicide bombers that kill and die
unequivocally in the name of faith. Esposito (2002), does not see it as appropriate to
label these people as evil as they believe that they are doing ‘ something justified and
righteous’.

‘Believers, make war on the infidels who dwell around you. Deal firmly with them.
Know that God is with the righteous.’ (Koran 9:123)

Esposito (2002) continues to explain that Muslims see the existence of Israel and most
Western polices as continuations of the crusades and colonialism. Osama Bin Laden
in fact exploits this nuance regularly. Muslim extremists are more often than not
extreme in their faith, their devotion to the literal word of the Koran and the hadith 2,
which in turn leads them to believe that the West and modernity is incompatible with
their moral and spiritual beliefs. ’Muslim extremists are certain that the exports of
Western culture are leading their wives and children away from God.’ (Harris, 2004)

‘Prophet, make war on the unbelievers and the hypocrites and deal rigorously with
them. Hell shall be their home: an evil fate.’ (Koran 9:73)

According to Esposito (2002), jihad has both offensive and defensive meaning in the
Koran. Moderate Muslims argue that jihad is not really aggressive and violent as
depicted in the media. On the other hand Islamic extremists use the defensive
understanding in order to justify their violent terrorist acts. They see Islam as being
under attack by the West and therefore use jihad to justify their violent responses.
According to Firestone (1999), the semantic meaning of the Arabic term jihad has no
relation to holy war or even war in general. Jihad is a verbal noun of the third Arabic
form of the root jahada, which is defined classically as "exerting one's utmost power,
efforts, endeavors, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation." (Lane,
2
Hadith is a saying of Muhammed or a report of something he did.( Godlas, 2003).

6
1865). The Hadith and the teachings of Muhammed prohibit suicide, and therefore
Jihad suicide bombers are not seen as true shahids3. The just war theory and the Quran
have similarities in the way they require force to be exerted only when certain criteria
is satisfied. In the lesser jihad, one must be defending himself or redressing injustice,
and if one party is inclined towards peace, the other must oblige as well (Williams,
2003).

Ranstrop, 1996 focuses beyond Islam when tackling terrorism in the name of religion.
In 1994 a Zionist4 settler went to a mosque and emptied three 30 shot magazines from
his automatic assault weapon into the congregation of 800 Muslim worshippers before
being beaten to death. His name was Baruch Goldstein, a member of a Jewish
fundamentalist group called the Kach movement. What where Goldstein’s motives?
He felt betrayed by the Israeli prime minister as he felt that ‘ the prime minister was
leading the Jewish state out of its god- given patrimony and into mortal danger.’
(Ranstrop, 1996). Goldstein’s attack occurred during the Jewish festival of Purim5,
and for a large segment of militant and orthodox Jews, he was seen as a martyr. Soon
enough, the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. Militant rabbis and their
halalic rules instigated the young student who assassinated Rabin. The killing of a Jew
by another Jew astonished most Jews, but this was the start of religiously motivated
terrorism worldwide. A surge of religious fanaticisms manifesting itself in terrorism,
away from the arena of the Middle East, which is typically violent and renowned for
this, has escalated. Examples of these are for example the Japanese religious cult Aum
Shinrikyuo, who tried to hasten the new millennium by releasing 6sarin nerve gas in
the Tokyo underground and two American white supremacists that carried out the
bombing of a US government building in Oklahoma city. These acts were all united ‘
in their justification for employing sacred violence either in efforts to defend, extend
or revenge their own communities or for millenarian or messianic reasons.’
(Ranstrop, 1996).

3
Shahid in Arabic means witness but is translated into English as martyr. (islamfrominside, 2007)
4
Zionism is the national movement for the return of Jewish people to their homeland.
(jewishvirtuallibrary, 2007)
5
Purim is the Jewish festival celebrating the survival of the Jews marked for death in Persia in the 5th
century. (Answers, 2007)
6
Sarin nerve gas is a human made chemical warfare. Following release of sarin into the air, people can
be exposed through skin contact or eye contact. Breathing air that contains sarin can also expose them.
(CDC, 2006)

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Most religious extremist groups were propelled into violence and terrorism in reaction
to key events that served either as a catalyst or inspirational mode. Their ideological
visions make them pursue uncompromisingly in a battle between evil and good. They
perceive their struggle as ‘ an all out war against their enemies’ (Ranstrop, 1996).
This struggle appeals greatly to the oppressed and alienated communities with
promises of change, hope and a greater change at vengeance against the source of
their historical grievances. Violent acts give these groups a sense of power, and are
used to strengthen their internal groups while inseminating fear in their targets. The
newly formed religious groups do not appear in ‘ a vacuum’ nor are born into
extremism (Ranstrop, 1996). Apart from religion, politics plays a key role in today’s
terrorism and work hand in hand.

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Company Inc. as cited in Mazzar, 2004.

• Dawood, N, J (2001). ‘Koran: English Translation’, UK: Penguin Classics

• Esposito, J, L (2002). ‘Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam.’ New York:
Oxford University Press.

• Firestone, R. (1999). ‘Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam.’ New York:
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• Giddens, A. (2000). ‘Runaway World: How Globalisation is reshaping our

World.’ New York: Routledge as cited in Mazzar, 2004.

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