27. Manuel Barredo vs Court of Appeals, GR No.

L-17863, November 28,

1962, digested
(Special Proceedings Claims against estate; Rule 86, Sec. 2: Statute of Non-Claims)
Facts: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them
their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the
date of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the
administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough.
On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the
face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneys fees against
the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto
Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDnough The original lease, the extension of its
term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the
land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs
and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.
The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section
2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6
month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator
argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the
expiration of the regular 6-month period.
Section 2, Rule 87 provides:
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in section 1,
the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not
be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of
the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such
claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month.
Issue: WON the tardy claim will be allowed.
Held: No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient
cause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of
cause for failure to present said claim on time.
The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the
same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean
that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed
by the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20,
1958)
However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for
filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for
apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim.

Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers
of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This
ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the
annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant
claim, (as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military
authorities.)
The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under
Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated
claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.

28. Sikat vs. Villanueva

Facts:
Petitioner Sikat, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano
P. Villanueva,filed a complaint against QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva, as judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the
decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the intestate proceedings
of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano P.
Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial
administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with
legal interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.
In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every
allegation thereof, and set up a special defense of prescription, and a
counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment
absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said
amount with interest and costs.
The lower court ruled against petitioner. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in holding that the aforesaid claim of Mariano P.
Villanueva's estate against Pedro Villanueva estate has already prescribed.
Held:
No. the SC ruled that taking into account the spirit of the law upon the
settlement and partition of estates, and the fact that the administration of
Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death, and
instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate in
the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim
against it, which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings
void for lack of jurisdiction, the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of
laches in not instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the Court
of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and applying the
provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare
the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would
be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the
latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either testate or
intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs

and legatees. Even in the case of the summary settlement of an estate under
section 598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure limits the
time within which a creditor may file his claim to two years after the settlement
and distribution of the estate.
29. IN RE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL VILLANUEVA.
MAURICIA G. DE VILLANUEVA,petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
This is a case certified by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the issues
involved are purely of law.
The widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the
Court of First Instance of Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc.
No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof was published
on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily Bulletin.
At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under
administration, opposed the appointment the widow. The name of Atty.
Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties agreed.
After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the
performance of his duties. Under date of November 9, 1950 the Clerk of
the Agusan CFI, issued the Notice to Creditors through Morning times of
City on November 16, 23 and 30, 1950 which expired on November 16,
1961.
On July 20, 1953 Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed in the administration
proceedings, Creditors Claim in the amount of P 1,347.45 (including
interest) which such obligation was due and demandable since December
20, 1940.
On October 12, 1954, the PNB filed a Motion for Admission of Claim.
On November 5, 1954, Atty. Ricaforte opposed the alleging that he had no
knowledge or information insufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations therein.
The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after
the opposition of the claim presented by the administrator, filed a
pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within which to File
the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec.
2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated
in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as
equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in
the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings, for
while said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not
come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the
Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.

 Appellant Bank moved to reconsider the above Order, arguing that the
statute of limitations had been suspended by the Moratorium Law, and
that the courts can extend the period limited in the notice, under special
circumstances, and on grounds of equity.
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive
period for filing the claim under consideration.
HELD:
The important issue presented is whether or not the in question is already
barred. Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for
in the Order of the lower court, within which to present claims against the
estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and
the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late.
The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for
one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.
WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant Philippine National Bank, in both instances.
30. BELAMALA VS POLINAR
Facts:
This is an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance allowing a money
claim of appellee Belamala against the estate of the deceased Mauricio Polinar,
for damages caused to the claimant. The claimant Buenaventura Belamala is
the same offended party in Criminal Case against the same Mauricio Polinar for
Frustrated Murder; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision
thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical
injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura
Belamala.
The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed, however, while the appeal of
said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and no
Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of
Appeals. The CA then affirmed the decision of the CFI. The appellant contended
that the claim should have been prosecuted by separate action against the
administrator, and not to be enforced by filing a claim against the estate.
Issue:
W/N the appellant Polinars contention is correct.
Held:
Yes. The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should
have been prosecuted by separate action against the administrator,
as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87, since the claim is patently
one "to recover damages for an injury to person or property" (Rule87, sec. 1).
Belamala's action cannot be enforced by filing a claim against the estate under
Rule 86,because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for

funeral expenses, expenses for last sickness, judgments for money and "claims
against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied;" and this last
category (the other three being inapposite) includes only "all purely personal
obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort" (Leung
Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil.182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages manifestly have
a tortious origin.Hajan/Saldon
31. Stronghold Insurance Company Inc. vs. Republic Asahi Corp.
GR No. 147561 22 June 2006
Facts:
Republic Asahi Glass Corp. (RAG) contracts with Jose D. Santos Jr. Construction
(JDS) for the construction of roadways and drainage systems in RAG's
compound. JDS does so and files the required compliance bond with Stronghold
Insurance Inc. (SII) acting as surety. The contract is 5.3 million pesos while the
bond is 795 thousand pesos.
However, JDS falls woefully behind schedule, prompting RAG to rescind the
contract and demand the compliance bond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS
Construction disappears. SII refuses to pay the bond claiming that the death of
JDS owner extinguishes the obligation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the debtor extinguishes the compliance bond or
money claims of RAG from SII
Held:
No. Sec. 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of
money claims arising from the contract against the estate of a deceased debtor.
Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished.
What is extinguish is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court which
is not then acting as a probate court. Whatever monetary liabilities or
obligations JDS had under his contracts with respondent were not
intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, the liability of petitioner is contractial in nature, because it excuted
a performance bond, as a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in
accordance with the Civil Code.

32. Gabriel v. Bilon GR 146989, june 2006

Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay are jeepney drivers driving jeepneys owned by
Melencio Gabriel. They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the
drivers were required to pay an additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car
wash, deposit fee, and garage fees.

The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when
the drivers reported to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive.
Eventually, they were dismissed. The three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal
dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the
drivers their backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of
P1.03M.
On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a
copy thereof to Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the
copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April 4, 1997. The copy was resent via
registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5, 1997.
The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because
the promulgation was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5,
1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for appeal.
The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there
was no employee-employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The
Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but it ruled that the separation pay should
not be awarded but rather, the employees should be reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal before the LA was made on time. Whether or
not there was an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and
Gabriel. Whether or not there was a strained relation between Gabriel and the
drivers.
HELD: The appeal was made on time because when the promulgation was
made Gabriel is already dead. The ten day requirement to make an appeal is not
applicable in this situation because Gabriel was not yet properly substituted by
the wife. The counting of the period should be made starting from the date
when the copy was sent via registered mail. Therefore, the appeal filed on June
5 was made on time.
There exists an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and
Gabriel. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in
excess of the so-called boundary [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not
sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and
employee.
The award of the separation pay is not proper. It was not shown that there was a
strained relationship between Gabriel and the drivers so as to cause animosity if
they are reinstated. The Strained Relations Principle is only applied if it is shown
that reinstatement would only cause antagonism between the employer and the

employee; and that the only solution is separation and the payment of
separation pay.

33. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibaez

G.R. No. 149926
Feb. 23, 2005
Facts:
The First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
(Efraim), father of herein respondents, entered into a loan agreement in the
amount of P128,000.00 on May 31, 1980. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note
in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in 5 equal amortizations of
P43,745.95 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31,
1985.
On Dec. 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement of P123,156.00, this time, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note plus a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for this loan. The
amount was now intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and
one unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
Sometime in February1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of
Iloilo. On April 9,1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the
special administrator of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, who are
the respondents in this case, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the 3
tractors; that is, 2 tractors for Edmund and 1 for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.
On Aug. 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities
was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank,
wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Uinion Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by herein
petitioner bank to Edmund but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to
pay. Thereafter, on Feb. 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money against the heirs of Efraim, the respondents herein, before the RTC of
Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the US and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Thus, the complaint was
narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola (Florence).

On Dec. 7, 1988, Florence filed her answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her as she was not a party thereto. Considering that the
joint agreement signed by her and her brother was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable under the same. RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit saying that the claim should have
been filed with the probate court before which the estate of the late Efraim was
pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred but the
said decedent. The trial court also found that the joint agreement was in effect a
partition of the estate of the decedent; however, it was void because it had not
been approved by the probate court and there can be no valid partition until
after the will has been probated. It was further declared that petitioner failed to
prove that it is now the defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities.
The petitioner appealed before the CA asserting that the obligation of the
deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement, it was no longer necessary to present the same
before the probate court for approval. On the other hand, respondent Florence
maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should have been presented
before the probate court.
The appellate court found the appeal was not meritorious holding that it
should have been filed before the probate court as provided under Sec. 1, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition was null and void, since
no valid partition may be had after the will has been probated. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim should have been filed before the probate court
in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
Held:
SC held in the affirmative citing the vintage case of PyEng Chong vs.
Herrera, ..This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of
the property to the distributes, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedents estate
in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off it debts
and distribute the residue.
The Court further held that the petitioner failed to prove that it is now the
defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, thus, the petitioners personality to
file the complaint is wanting, it failed to establish its cause of action, quoting the
case Republic vs. CA, 107 SCRA 504. Petition was denied and CA decision was
affirmed.

34.AlanSheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker

GR. No. 155733, Jan 27, 2006
Topic: Statute of non-claims
Facts:
The will of Alice Sheker was admitted by the court and thereafter all
creditors were ordered to file their respective claims against the estate. On Oct.
7, 2002, a contingent claim for agent's commission in the total amount of
P481,250.00 was filed by petitioner.
However, the executrix of the estate moved for the dismissal of the
money claim on the ground that no docket fee was paid, no certification for nonforum shopping was attached, and no written explanation was made as to why
there was no personal service of the claim. The court thereon dismissed the
claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the money claim for failure to
pay the docket fee, attach a cert. of non-forum shoping, and make a personal
service.
Ruling:
The court erred in strictly applying Sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
because such calls also for practicabiliy for it to apply other than the absence of
special provisions.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints
and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money
claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,
that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees)
against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to
assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate
docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may
order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
On the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation
why service was not done personally might have been superfluous" because
the distance from the petitioner's residence and the respondent court is very far.
Petition granted.
35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
FATCS:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to
file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case
ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability
is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of
the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability.
HELD:
Yes.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in sensostrictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either

against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
36. HILADO v CA (2009)
FACTS:
Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his
wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (AdministratrixBenedicto), and
his only daughter, Francisco Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, two (2)
civil case were pending against Benedicto involving petitioner.
AdministratrixBenedicto, then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, List of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband, which included as among the liabilities. Thereafter, the Manila RTC
required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
On September 24, 2001, petitioner filed with the Manila RTC: (1)
Manifestation/Motion Ex AbundantiCautela, praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processs and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings; (2)
Omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission
by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate; and
(3) pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
37. Nacar v NistalGR L-3306, December 8, 1982
Facts:
Nacar filed a petition for certiorari etc to annulorder of respondent judge
Nistal.Theorderdirected attachment of seven carabaos& stop judge from
proceeding with case. Japitana filed aclaim against estate of Nacar with

preliminaryattachment. It was said that Nacar about todispose the property with
intent to defraud. Nicarfiled motion to dismiss to dissolve writ of thepreliminary
injunction & attachment, Judge deniedthe motion. The Supreme Court directed
issuanceof preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not Japitana can file claims againstestate of IsabeloNacar.
Held:
No filing of money claim, ex-contracts by actionagainst the admin is not
allowed. It should be filedin the administration proceeding of the estate of the
deceased in the case at bar, the claim of therespondent arising from a contract
may bepursued only in the same administrative proceeding that maybe taken to
settle the estateof the deceased.
38. ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ,
RUBY J. HENSON, and ANTONIO J. HENSON, respondents.
Topic: Statute of Non-Claims
FACTS:
Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for the
allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila.
Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceaseds daughters and also a respondent
in this petition, opposed Rubys petition. Lilia prayed that her mothers
holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate
Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special
Administrator of the estate of her late mother.
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as
Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment,
took his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate.
The following are among the significant highlights of his administration:
1. On February 16, 2000, Atty. Briones moved that the trial court approve
Special Administrators fees of P75,000.00 per month. These fees were
in addition to the commission referred to in Section 7, Rule 85 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The trial court granted the motion but reduced
the fees to P60,000.00 per month, retroactive to the date Atty. Briones
assumed office. [Briones vs. Henson-Cruz, 563 SCRA 69(2008)]
2. On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrators
Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a
commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the
value of the estate under his administration.
3. The trial court handed down an Order dated April 13, 2002, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:
2.Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator
except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of
the value of the estate.

The heirs of Luz Henzon filed on April 9, 2002 a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC assailing the Order dated April 3, 2003 insofar as it directed the payment of
Atty. Briones commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal.
On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the
appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence,
this case.
ISSUE: WON the trial court may order the payment of the Special
Administrators commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate
HELD:
Yes. To quote from the Order: the court hereby suspends the approval of
the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission,
which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. Under these terms, it
is immediately apparent that the special administrators commission is the
courts definite and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher
body may decide if an appeal is made from the courts ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators
commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that third parties
may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for
Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.
Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim
against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases. Hence, by the express
terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrators
commissioneffectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate
is the lower courts last word on the matter and one that is appealable.

39. Saligumba vs Palanog

SALIGUMBA VS. PALANOGGR. 143365, DECEMBER 4, 2008Facts:
Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against
defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses
Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court. In the complaint, spouses Palanog
alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous
possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land. The spouses
Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject
premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. At the trial,
only the counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. It appeared that Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba died. No motion for the substitution of the
spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased
spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed
the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. After a lapse of more
than two years, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanog
the lawful owners of the subject land. No motion for reconsideration or appeal
having been filed. After 10 years, Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to revive

and enforce the said decision. She further requested that the heirs and children
of spouses Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants. Petitioners thus question
the decision as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not
duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have
never taken part in the proceedings nor did they voluntarily appear or
participate in the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against
their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor
binding effect on petitioners. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON an action for quieting of title, which is an action involving real property, is
extinguished upon death of the party?
Ruling:
No. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an actionin
volving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87
as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies
in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to
appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and
on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.