: 5 3 = RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION aot EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA ene BLUMBERG LAW CORPORATION JOHN P. BLUMBERG, ESQ. (SBN 70200) 444 W. OCEAN BLVD., SUITE 1500 LONG BEACH, CA 90802 TELEPHONE: (562) 437-0403 TELECOPIER: (562) 432-0107 METZGER LAW GROUP A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION RAPHAEL METZGER, ESQ. (SBN 116020) KATHRYN SALDANA, ESQ. (SBN 251364) 401 E. OCEAN BLVD., SUITE 800 LONG BEACH, CA 90802-4966 TELEPHONE: (562) 437-4499 TELECOPIER: (562) 436-1561 Attorneys for Plaintiff LAURA ANN DECRESCENZO SUPERIOR COURT OF THE MD osrsss202:e1 one np Supe A LLED on tib FEB 22 2018 Shem ey By, UtCer Clerk Deputy STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO, aka LAURA A. DIECKMAN, Plaintiffs, vs. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a corporate entity, AND DOES 1 - 20, Defendants. CASE NO. BC411018 Reassigned to the Honorable John P. Doyle, Dept. 58 PLAINTIFF’S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION [Supporting | documents originally filed October. 8, 2015) DATE: March 7, 2016 TIME 8:30 a.m. DEPT: 58 PUATNTIFF’S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION* Cw aa u 12 13 14 RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 15 16 7 18 bs 19 20 e (ABscromssexeonen mitt ntoninnt TABLE OF CONTI 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........-- I, STATEMENT OF FACTS ........ Defendants’ Status as a “Religion” Does Not Exempt Them From Liability ... . Defendants Fraudulently Induced Plaintiff to Join the Sea Org at Age 12 ......- Defendants’ Control on Plaintiff's Communications With Her Family ......... Schedule in the Sea Org . . Schooling ........6.scee eee e cece eens eects eee ee Plaintiff's Ability to Leave the Sea Org.........-- A B. @ D. _Life History Questionnaires . E. F. G. H. Plaintiff's Forced Abortion . Plaintiff Was Physically Prevented From Leaving and Mentally Wom Down . . J. Rehabilitation Project Force . K. __ Plaintiff Unknowingly Subjected Herself to Coercive Persuasion . Mm. — PLAINTIFF DID NOT. QUALIFY AS A MINISTER FOR PURPOSES OF THE, MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION . A. Plaintiff Lacked the Capacity to Consent to Being a Minister at Age Twelve . .. B, __ Plaintiff Was Incapable of Consenting.to Being a Minister Even as an Adult . . . C. Defendants’ Attempts to Clasty All Employees ofthe Church of Scientology as Ministers is Subterfuge tee ‘ IV. THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” DOES NOT BAR ALL CLAIMS ARISING DURING THE CHURCH-MINISTER RELATIONSHIP ......-... ++ Vv. THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” IS CONFINED TO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DOES NOT PROVIDE, RELIGIONS A SHIELD FROM ALL LIABILITY ......... A. Religious Freedom Under the Free Exercise Clause Is Not Absolute and Religious Conduct May be Subject to Regulation for the Protection of Society . . B, The Establishment Clause Does Not Bar the he Imp tion of Tort Liability Against Religions sppnenoosadeedn0000000 VI. THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION" DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CLAIMS © OF MINORS ......---.+ - 12 12 14 14 15 - 16 7 7 18 ‘PEAINTIFE’S REVISED NEMORANDUN OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONe (Weecunacso nr retensspnt VII. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR SOLICITATION OF EMPLOYMENT BY MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT BARRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ADDRESS THIS CLAIM IN THEIR MOTION ... 19 VII. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL, LAW OFFICES OF DISTRESS CLAIM . . 24 A. The Ministerial Exception and Free Exercise/Establishment Clauses Do ‘Not Bar Plaintif's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim .. on B. There are Triable Issues of Fact as to Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim ..... Bususuadee 25 IX. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S FALSE IMPRISONMENT/DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY CLAIMS .... 27 10 A. The Ministerial Exception and Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 288 Do Not Bar Plaintiff's False Imprisonment or Deprivation of Liberty Claims ... 27 gu§ Ul a $53/ B. There are Triable Issues of Fact With Respect to Plaintiff's Claim for False wee 12 Imprisonment °.... wees 28 Nef GEsz 13 1. Specific Instances of False Imprisonment by Threat of Force and 2235 Physical Barriers Exist in This Case veces : dada 4 Pert 2. False Imprisonment by Physical Barriers and Fraud/Deceit and Eeaz 15 Unreasonable Duress Also Exist in this Case .. . . 30 Soe KSEE 16 C. _Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to Plaintiff's Deprivation of Liberty fag Caine fobs ecoonucsbabooncdeD 32 <38 17 ‘ X. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 18 LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS sees 33 19 A. The First Amendment Does Not Trump Plaintiff's Basic and Fundamental Right to Privacy in Choosing Whether to Continue Her Pregnancy ........... 34 20 B, __Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to Plaintiff's Common Law Invasion of Ia ay ela eee eee eee 37 C. _Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to Plaintiffs Constitutional Invasion of Privacy Claim . ae SeseeceEoEEEE 139) XI. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES DO NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S WAGE AND HOUR CLAIMS. 40 XI CONCLUSION ..... ee PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONe MB scrosesosonenn rites ona 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 PAGE 3 CASES 4 || Agostini, Felton 5 (1997) 521 U.S. 208 ... 18 Alcazar» Corp. ofthe Catholic Archbishop of Seattle 6 (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288 . ls |5 7 |) Alcorn y, Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal 3d 493... . 26 8 Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club 9 (1950) 97 Cal. App.2d 735, 29 10 || Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren 288 (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307 2... e eee ec cece eects eset eee eee eee eeeeeeeeenees 3S gue 1 «ess Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. BE%3 12 (2007) 149 Cal. Appth 860 2.20.0... cece cveeeseeeee rene oe ee 02 SNOB goss 13 || Barbee v, Household Automotive Finance Corp. S2ea8 (2003) 113 Cal. Apptth $25.2... eee veceteteeeeereee 3B Eu5gs 14 3 ee25 Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church SEgSE 15 (Pa, 1975) 341 A.2d 105 34 ease BEBE 16 || Bollard y.Cal Province ofthe Soe'y of Jesus Eig (9 Cir, 1999) 196 F.3d 940.2... eee cece eee feceeeees 19618, 22 <38 17 v Braunfield v, Brown 18 (1961) 366 US. 599... ceeeeveeeeeceveceseeeeeeeeeerseeetertestteesesses 22 19 |] Brock v, Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc. . (4th Cir, 1989) 867 F.24 196.0... e cece ceeeeeeeeeteeeteeeeteseeeeeenes 18 20 Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, Inc. 21 (MD. Ala. 1983) 563 F.Supp. 505 2 32 22 || Cantwell v. State of Conn 33 (1940) 310 US, 296... .eeeeee - 17,21 Se8h, 23 EEE Carrieri v. Bush 2252? 24 (1966) 419 P.2d 132........ 34 £424) 25 || Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v Superior Court Seek) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527 fevectnneterenss . 16 38zi 26 hate Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co. Hep 27 (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579 bo cbeeeeeevcttrtteteeettrtreeeenee 26 EfS5, 28 iii PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONe ee g Christensen v. Superior Court i (1991) SA CalSd C60 ee 25 : Collins v. County of Los Angeles 5 (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 ..... 29 y Comm, to Defend Reproductive Rights v. . Myers 3 (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 0 ev ceceeeee sees ee eee ween seen eeneees 34 : Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. (1993) 509 US. 579... 12 Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197... . 28 Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485. . . 28 10 || EEOC v, Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n 382 (9* Cir, 1982) 676 F.2d 1272....... sees eo gag 1 Pret Eisenstadt v. Baird He83 12 (1972) 405 US. 438 35 SNEES ghee 13 || Blvigv. Calvin Presbyterian Church g225 (Sth Cir. 2004) 375 F.3d 951.0... eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 15, 16, 18 dasa 4 3aez0 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church SRoaz 15 (Sth Cir. 2003) 397 F.3d 790 . - 13,15 gies es5e 16 Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co. fag (1955) 138 Cal. App.2d 82 2.00.00. .ceccec eevee eee ences veteteeeeeeeeeees 38 «38 17 : Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. 18 (1994) 7 Cal.4th 29 19 || Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist, No, 354 (Sth Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 1528 .17 20 Guinn v. The Church of Christ of Collinsville a (Okla, 1989) 775 P.2d 766... 28,34 bE 22 || Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ge (2004) 116 Cal-App.4th 497 ........ 19 z Hanna v. Raphael Weill & Co. e: (1949) 90 Cal. App.2d 461 . 29 fe Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l Gg (Sth Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d 1173 sees 16,37 8: Heard v. Johnson s (D.C. App. Ct. 2002) 810 A.2d 871 iv PLAINTIFF’ S REVISED MEVORANDOM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER e MW cr. corona raion ssa Henry v ed Hil Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin (2011) 201 Cal.App-tth 1041.22... eG Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47Caldt272 ee ee ee ed Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 1168 fect ceteeetteteettetetteesesssees 16,27 Hill v, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7/CalAth Pete ee 33, 35, 37, 39 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012) 1328. Ct. 694 fetevretteteeserenes 15 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries». Bd. of Equal. of Cal. (1990) 493 US. 378... veceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 18 Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329 2.0... eee eee a2) KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court . (1995) 31 Cal. Appetth 1023 2.0.0.0. cceecccseeeeeeeeeceseeeeeeeeseeeeees . 26 Lemon v. Kurtzman (9714030 S C02 ee ely Little v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance Co. (1977) 6) CA App sd slate ee 26 Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exchange (2008) 161 Cal. App.4th 880 28 Malik v, Brown (Sth Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 330 ..... .17 McCullen v. Coakley (2014) _US._, 1348.Ct. 2518.......... ee 30 Miller v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463 38 Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092 . . - 2, 14, 20-24, 26, 28, 35-37 ‘Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 965.222.0000 eeeccceeeeeeeeeeecteseeeeseteeseeeees 20 O'Moore v. Driscoll (1933) 135 Cal. App. 770 .....eeccseeeceeeesseeeteeeeeeeteseeeseesseeeees 28 Patton v. Jones (Texas App. Ct. 2006) 212 $.W.3d 541 16, 24, 28 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER 6s z0 5 Hi ag 3o Roe ee pen es) W 12 1B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 e MBbssrorisco2 0 etn ent People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.24 954 ...... . 34 People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351 ............ 29 People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241 oo... cove cece eee eeeeeeeeeeteeeeeeteee 34, 35, 38 Pettus v. Cole (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 402 .....00ccceeeecssseeeeeeeeteeeseeeteeseeeeenes 40 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) 505 US. 833 ....... 39 Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965 ...... Prince v. Mass. (1944) 321 US. 158 0.00. e cece cece ceeeeesseeeeeeeseeetseeeeeeesseeeees 13,18 Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. Of Seventh-Day Adventists (4tin Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 1164... 18 Reynolds v. US. (1878) 98 U.S. 145... 17,22 Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal. App-th 257.0... 26 Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 US. 113 ... 35 Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharm. (2001) 86 Cal.App-4th 365. «2.2.0... beetetcttetterectereees 38 Schanafelt v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1951) 108 Cal.App. 420 ........ ee 9 Scofield v, Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990. 29 Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 US. 398 2, 16, 21, 24, 28 Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church (1989) 216 Cal App.3d oe... 000ceeeeeecesseeeeeeeeeereees » 24,28 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria (7th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1036.0... eee ec ccseeeeee eee eetteeeet eters 4 Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (Richards) (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 148 . - 20 vi PLAINTIFFS REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION3 2 3 LAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER ‘A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 600 we eae iL 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 a) 24 25 26 e Ce US. v, Lee (1982) 455 U.S, 252... 17 Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology (1982) $35 F.Supp. 1125 ..... 2... 2. 24 Vandiveer v. Charters (1930) 110 Cal.App. 347 2.20.00. cece cece eceeeeeeneneneuene veceeeeeenes 29 Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 820 6... cece ceeeeeeeetttseeeeeeeetesreeesssses 32 Walz v. Tax Comm'n (1979) 397 U.S. 664 Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home (1996) 42 CalAthi124eee ere eee ee 29 Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S, 205 STATUTES Business & Professions Code § 22706(b)(3) .... Civil Code § 1556 Civil Code § 52.1 Civil Code § 52.1 (a) and (b) 33 Education Code § 48200 ......0.ceeeeeenee peonGos0n Er ugdoda6ox0000 12 Evidence Code § 801(1) ........200cseceeeeccssseeeeeeestneeeeeesenneee 12 Family Code §302.........0.0 Family Code § 6910 . Family Code § 6911 12 Family Code § 6922 12 Sunes do need EERE ONOEE ROR DEUMRLecaceecaasecaaeentssaasisaas 12 Labor Code § 1194 Labor Code § 1391(a)(1), (3)... 12 Labor Code § 970. 19,20 Penal Code § 652 .. 12 Penal Code § 653 . beeen eee ee vii PLAINTIFF'S REVISED NEMORANDUN OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONgaa I lo. | 5 i Bd ae i e i ws 5 a8 5 : ER 3 : BY i : Be e e fe : : g le : Zz aE : Re Og: a |e : og: P : — : as Ba gees a He Be 3 g : 24 Be e 5 ae eo BE Be es g Be @ sf: els ca ae zs Ae °° Bg es 333 S28 Ee & 8 8 33 ie gag £5 i 3 3 aa ges: 65 2 St ee 9967-20806 VINUOSIIV> "Hovaa ONOT 008 31Ins “aNVAEINOG NVADO 4S¥3 1Oy NOLWHOdNOD MV TNOISSS40ud ¥ MB9ZL3W T3VHaVel 30 $3914 MV3 3 3 See aay RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 fee e AD coven scents st tit MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIE! L PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendants claim that Plaintiff is not entitled to pursue any of her claims because Plaintiff “assumed the risk” in joining Defendants’ Sea Organization (“Sea Org”), and “churches have a right to accept and rely upon such a commitment.” (Defendants’ Brief, p. 28). What Defendants ignore, is that Plaintiff was fraudulently induced to join the Sea Org and move away from her family at the young age of twelve, and thereafter was subjected to years of coercive persuasion at the hands of Defendants, such that she lost her ability to freely make choices about whether she should remain in the Sea Org, whether she should submit to Defendants’ disciplinary procedures, and whether she should have a child, among other important decisions. Churches who fraudulently induce children to join their organizations and engage in coercive persuasion are not entitled to claim judicial immunity from claims made by such individuals. Given that Plaintiff was only a child when she joined the Sea Org, she did not have the capacity to consent, let alone the ability to fully understand the ramifications of joining a “religious order,” such that she was not a “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception. Once Plaintiff was of consenting age, she had been under Defendants’ coercive persuasion for six years and was so indoctrinated by Defendants that she lost her ability to freely consent to being a member of the Sea Org, such that she was not a “minister” even during her time as an adult. Further, the ministerial exception is limited to what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment, Each of Plaintiff's claims is permissible under the First Amendment and courts have specifically permitted claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy against religious institutions in cases involving unusual and egregious facts such as the facts presented in this case. Triable issues of fact also exist with respect to each and every one of Plaintiff's claims, including Plaintiff's claim for solicitation by misrepresentation, which Defendants did not address in their moving papers. * This Revised Memorandum is submitted pursuant to the Court's order of December 15, 2015. 1 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER 5 3 e AB ecrom sso sini estes ipainet I, STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Defendants’ Status as a “Religion” Does Not Exempt Them From Liability Most of Defendants’ facts submitted in support of their motion concern Defendants’ claimed status as a “religion.” Plaintiff does not dispute that Scientology is a “religion” for purposes of this motion or that Scientologists believe in certain principles. [Plaintiff's Response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“RDSF”), Nos. 1-7, 9-11, 15, 22-23] However, Plaintiff's claims are permissible because most of Defendants’ conduct underlying Plaintiff's claims was not religiously motivated, and even if Defendants’ conduct was religiously motivated, the compelling state interests underlying Plaintiff's claims warrant tort liability. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1114- 1120; Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 403. B. Defendants Fraudulently Induced Plaintiff to Join the Sea Org at Age 12 Plaintiff was raised in the Church of Scientology Intemational (“CSI”), and attended Scientology schools for most of her young childhood. [RDSF, No. 22, 26-27; Plaintiff's Additional ‘Statement of Facts (“PSF”) Nos. 1-4] She began volunteering with CSI at age 6 or 7. (PSF, No. 1] Atage 12, Defendants recruited her to move away from her family in New Mexico and join CSI’'s Sea Organization (Sea Org) in Los Angeles. [RDSF Nos. 24-25, 28-29; PSF Nos. 2-4] Three important promises were made to Plaintiff when she was recruited: (1) She would be able to have kids when she ‘was older; (2) she would be able to go home every couple of months to see her parents, and; (3) she ‘would continue to go to school. [RDSF No. 29; PSF No. 5] Plaintiff also was told that she would only work hours consistent with being a minor, and she would be able to regularly communicate with her parents, [/d] Without these promises, Plaintiff would not have agreed to uproot her life and join the Sea Org, [Jd.] With respect to having children, Plaintiff testified adamantly: “1 would never have joined the Sea Organization if had been told that I couldn't have kids... I've always from the beginning of my life wanted children ... I told my family and everybody when I was 12 years old, okay, I will be back after I’m married.” [RDSF No. 29] Defendants also made promises to Plaintiff's mother regarding Plaintiff's membership in the Sea Org. [RDSF No. 29; PSF Nos. 6-16] Specifically, she was assured that Plaintiff would continue to receive a traditional, non-Scientology education until she was at least sixteen, would work hours 2 PEAINTIFF’S REVISED MEORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONBern RAPHAEL METZGER 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 e Mccovnsroreanes nenmnsteten appropriate fora minor, would be able to come and visit her and her husband once a month if they paid for her travel, and would be able to speak with her parents regularly. [/d.] Plaintiff's mother was also told her daughter’s physical and emotional well-being would be looked after including regular medical care and emotional support from the person who recruited her, Shane Whitmore. (/d.] Plaintiff's ‘mother was also told that her daughter would be allowed to get married and have children in the future, and that when this occurred, Plaintiff would work at a different organization within CSI. [/d.] Similar promises were made to other young Sea Org recruits. [RDSF No. 29; PSF No. 17] ‘The promises made to Plaintiff and her mother were willful lies to induce Plaintiff to join the Sea Org and unknowingly subject herself to Scientology's coercive persuasion. Additionally, while Plaintiff signed an application for membership in the Sea Org when she was 12, she did not understand many of the terms used in this application and both she and her mother relied on the foregoing representations. [RDSF Nos. 28-28; PSF Nos. 5-19] C. Defendants’ Control on Plaintiffs Communications With Her Family Upon joining the Sea Org, Defendants controlled Plaintiff's communications with her family [RDSF Nos. 30-31; PSF Nos. 20-30] They read and approved all incoming and outgoing mail, and listened in on all telephone calls. [RDSF Nos. 30-31; PSF Nos. 21-22] Plaintiff was repeatedly ‘questioned by Defendants about her communications with family, to the point that Plaintiff became fearful she would be subjected to punishment if she told her family members anything negative about the Sea Org or Scientology, because she was trained from the time that she entered the Sea Org that if she said anything negative, she would be found in treason and assigned demeaning tasks outside her normal long working hours. [RDSF Nos. 30-31; PSF Nos. 23-30] She also was required to report anything that her family did that was negative or antagonistic to Scientology, including questions by her family about Plaintiff not being able to visit them. [/d.] Plaintiff was prevented from regularly seeing her family. [RDSF Nos. 30, 39; PSF Nos. 23-30] ‘As young as 12, she was physically stopped from leaving to see her family. [RDSF.No. 30; PSF No. 26] Further, during her entire time in the Sea Org, she was required to undergo a “sec check” before leaving to see her family. [RDSF No. 30; PSF No. 27] A “sec check” is an interrogation tool used by Defendants. [/d.] When someone is taking time off, they are required to undergo a sec check, and are 3 PLAINTIFFS REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONe Mosse sisesonton stot 43% 1. || asked if they intend to not return, if they intend to reveal confidential information, or if they will be in i 5 # 2 || contact with anyone antagonistic of Scientology, ete. [/d.] Only when the examiner determines the i 3 3. |! person is being truthful and does not intend to leave permanently or for an “improper” purpose will the £222 4 || person be allowed to leave, {/d.] As.a direct result of Defendants’ coercive practices, Plaintiff went if * 5 |) toras long as 2-3 years without retuming home or seeing her parents primarily because she was not = 6 given “authorization” by Defendants to see her own family. [RDSF No. 30; PSF No. 29] When she was 7 able to communicate with her parents, the conversations were limited and controlled by what 8 Defendants demanded from her. [RDSF No. 31; PSF Nos. 23-24, 30] On the few occasions Plaintiff 9 was permitted to visit her family, she was convinced that Church officials would learn if she said «10 |] anything negative or expressed a desire to leave based on their extensive interrogation, {/d] 8 Hs u D. Life History Questionnaires 7 5 # 12 Both before and during Plaintiff's time in the Sea Org, she was required to fill out invasive “Life t 5 : 5 z 13 History Questionnaires,” that sought detailed information about her and her family including: E 4 : 3 : 14 “Have you ever been connected to anyone who has threatened or attacked Scientology?” 3388s 1s “Note any instances of homosexual activity from earliest time up to PT. Give whom? 4 £ : i G ‘What done? And how often?” Ey “Please give exact details concerning your current life: whom you live with, whom you “3317 spend your free time with or run around with, etc. What is your daily routine?” 18 Plaintiff knew Defendants used these Questionnaires to keep information about her, and that 19 if she attacked Scientology or tried to leave, they would be used against her. [PSF Nos. 31-32] 20 E. Schedule in the Sea Org 21 For about her first year in the Sea Org, Plaintiff worked from 8:30 a.m. until 10:30 p.m. - e £22 || Monday through Sunday. PSF No. 33] After Plaintiff's frst year, and until approximately 2001, she 3542) 23. || worked from 8:30 am. to 12:30 am. Monday through Sunday. She would return to her quarters on a : 2 P 24 || bus between 12:30 a.m, and 1:30 a.m. [PSF No. 34] Plaintiff's only time not working was on Sunday : i i ia 25 mornings, but she was not allowed to leave CSI facilities unaccompanied during this time. [PSF Nos. # : P 26 33-34] In 2001, Plaintiff was sent to the Rehabilitation Project Force (“RPF”), a punishment/rehab ti i &) 27 |) program for Sea Org members. [RDSF No. 59; PSF No. 35] During this time, she worked doing mostly 8 3 28 heavy labor from about 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. seven days a week with 15 minute meal 4 SRINTEFF'S-HEVISED WENORANDON OF POINTS BAD AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS" MOTION FOR SUM@IARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 0802: fy Ce anu eon i 12 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 e (lB erassomet intrest breaks. [RDSF No. 82, PSF No. 35] “Lights out” was usually at 10:30 p.m. A “quartermaster” would patrol the hallways, making sure each person was in their room, and would remain in hallway all night Jong so that no one could leave. {/d.] Plaintiff was regularly being deprived of sleep during her time in the Sea Org to work longer hours. [PSF No. 36] When plaintiff was 14, she forced to work for 3 days straight without even being allowed to take a shower or change her clothes. When she received ashort shower break after 3 days, she had to immediately return and worked and additional 2 more days without any sleep. [Jd] Under these brutal, inhumane working conditions, Plaintiff's compensation ‘was as low as $10.00 per week, and was never more than $50 per week. [PSF No. 37] F. Schooling Plaintiff never received any formal schooling in traditional subjects such as math, science, or history in the Sea Org. [RDSF No. 33; PSF Nos. 38-40] She took her high school proficiency exam at age fifteen or sixteen, and received no further “schooling” in non-Scientology subjects. [/d ] G. Plaintiff's Ability to Leave the Sea Org Plaintiff's ability to leave the Sea Org was severely restricted from the time she entered the Sea Orgat age 12 until she left at age 25. [RDSF Nos. 30, 39, 40, 52, 80-81, 84-85; PSF Nos. 42-44, 68-93] As a general rule, she was not allowed to leave CSI facilities without an escort or without receiving a leave of absence after undergoing a sec check as discussed above. [RDSF No. 30; PSF Nos. 27, 43] Ona few occasions, Plaintiff was able to get away without approval or an escort. [RDSF Nos. 40, 80- 81; PSF Nos. 23-30, 44] However, on these occasions, she returned to the Sea Org because she had no money, no experience, no car or driver’s license, no understanding of the non-Scientology world, and because CSI officials threatened her by telling if she left Sea Org she would be subject toa “Freeloader bill” (an inflated “bill” for “services” she received in the Sea Org). [Jd] Plaintiff also was told that by leaving, she was hiding crimes or bad acts she had committed and that she would lose all contact with her family and friends. Plaintiff also witnessed Defendants hunting down and following anyone who left the Sea Org without permission; this was referred to as a “blow drill.” [4] Defendants would go so far as to tracking the individual’s personal bank accounts, staking out airports, harassing family ‘members, and similar coercive conduct. [RSDF No. 52; PSF 44,93] Asa result, Plaintiff believed that, even if she tried to leave, she would be tracked down and retuned to the Sea Org. [/d.] 5 BOAINTIFF’S REVISED MENORANDOM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90802: Car auneon WW 12 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 e ey H. Plaintiff's Forced Abortion Former female Sea Org members testified that Defendants regularly engaged in coercive practices effectively forcing pregnant Sea Org members to have abortions. [RDSF No. 52; PSF Nos. 45-49] According to former Sea Org member Astra Woodcraft: “Ifa woman got pregnant or wanted to have a baby, the way they convinced her to have an abortion would be to kind of pit husband and, wife against each either, handle the husband and then handle the wife. Because it would be much more likely that she would not want to leave by herself and have a baby by herself if her husband wasn’t on board.” [RDSF Nos. 52, 55; PSF No. 46] The policy really was “if you got pregnant, you would need to have an abortion.” [RDSF Nos. 52, 55; PSF No. 47] Woodcraft also testified that “it was my job 10 handle someone who wanted to have a child and convince them to have an abortion.” (PSF No. 48] Former Sea Org member, Claire Headley, testified that she was coerced to have two abortions against her wishes while in the Sea Org and that she observed countless other women who were subjected to forced abortions. [RDSF No. 52; PSF No. 49] At 16, Plaintiff married Jesse DeCrescenzo, another member of the Sea Org. [RDSF No. 41] 73] In 1996, when Plaintiff was 17 years old, she wanted to have a child, stopped taking birth control, and became pregnant, [RDSF No. 45; PSF No. 50] Plaintiff informed her husband that she was pregnant and that she intended to keep the baby. [RDSF Nos. 49, 55-56; PSF No. 51] Plaintiff and her husband spoke with their Commanding Officers to inform them Plaintiff was pregnant and they were going to have the baby. [RDSF No. 49; PSF No. 52] ‘When Plaintiff told her Commanding Officer, Gabriella Saccomano, that she was pregnant, she asked what Plaintiff wanted to do. [RDSF Nos. 49, 55-56; PSF No. 53] Plaintiff said: “There is no question in my mind. I'm going to have the baby.” {Jd.] Plaintiff had only gone to her Commanding Officer to find out what she needed to do in order to leave and have the baby. [Jd] Ms. Saccomano told Plaintiff that she herself had been pregnant a few months earlier and had an abortion because she believed this was the “greatest good for the greatest number of dynamics.” [RDSF Nos. 49, 55-56; PSF No. 54] She then asked Plaintiff what her husband wanted to do, to which Plaintiff responded: “We're going to have the baby. There is no question about it.” [/d.] Plaintiff was told that if she had the baby, she would have to leave the Sea Org and would not be allowed to go to a Class V org. [/d.] Ms. 6 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 e MD orcrsn scons actin sont Saccomano then got Plaintiff's husband and his Commanding Officer (a woman named Chris Cole) on thetelephone. [RDSF Nos. 49, 55-56; PSF No. 55] Ms. Cole became angry, berating Plaintiff, calling her selfish, and accusing her of “not looking out for the greatest good.” [RDSF Nos. 48-49; PSFNo.55] ‘The conversation was so upsetting to Plaintiff that she hung up the phone. [/d.] After the phone call, Ms. Saccomano continued to pressure Plaintiff into having an abortion, telling her to “chill,” there is “no Thetan there yet,” and the “baby is just tissue.” [RDSF Nos. 49, 55-56; PSF No. 56] That night, Plaintiff spoke with her husband and they had “come to the conclusion that we were going to keep the baby.” [RDSF No. 46; PSF No. 57] The next day, Plaintiff told another friend in the Sea Org that she was pregnant and that “I’m going to have it.” [PSF No. 58] After this, Plaintiff spoke with her husband again on the phone. His tone had changed. [RDSF No. 46; PSF No. 59] After speaking with Chris Cole, Plaintiff's husband wanted to stay in Sea Org, and maybe it would be best to have an abortion. [RDSF No. 50; PSF No. 59] Either Plaintiff's husband or Ms. Saccomano then started questioning Plaintiff about how she would be able to leave without her husband. [RDSF Nos. 55-56; PSF No. 60] Ms. Saccomano continued to ambush Plaintiff, telling her that the baby was not “formed enough to matter.” [RDSF Nos. 55-56; PSF No. 61] Plaintiff was also told that she would be subjected to a large Freeloader bill if she left and had the baby. [RDSF Nos. 55-56; PSF No. 62] Plaintiff's husband followed up again telling Plaintiff “[lJet’s just do the abortion,” and reiterated the same things that Plaintiff's Commanding Officer had told her, including “there's no Thetan there yet” and “it’s just tissue.” [RDSF Nos. 55-56; PSF No. 63] Ms. Saccomano then again spoke with Plaintiff, and after two to three days of coercing Plaintiff with the same things, Plaintiff’ stated that she would have an abortion. [RDSF Nos. 55-56; PSF No. 64] While Plaintiff stated that she would have an abortion, this was not what she wanted to do: “I said I would have an abortion because of everything that had happened, And I even when I was there I still did not want to do it, but I did it because of the - - everything that was going on.” [RDSF No. 56; PSF No. 65] Plaintiff also testified: “What happened killed me because I was made to abort a child that I wanted.” (Jd.] When asked if she was “physically” forced to have an abortion, Plaintiff testified: ‘No one physically forced me to have an abortion. I was so ~~ you have to realize I grew up in Scientology, okay? I knew no other way of life other than Scientology. [had been programmed a certain way. I joined the Sea Organization at 12 when most kids should 7 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONgts EEE ates RAPHAEL METZGER Ce rane one Re BS ae oy et tom e XW cco: res spn be living with their parents and going to school, And here I was at 17 thinking, okay, I'm going to have a kid and I'm told, well, here’s - - here’s the dynamics. You know, look at this. Look at how much this is going to affect your dynamics if you have a kid and... .- - everything I said earlier .... But - - so I'm basically being told - - and because I'm so programmed to think that way there was no other option for me at that point. I'm now so convinced by these people that that’s the only option I have. [RDSF No. 56; PSF No. 66] L Plaintiff Was Physically Prevented From Leaving and Mentally Worn Down On the few occasions when Plaintiff asked to leave Sea Org, Defendants prevented her from doing so by “handling” her to stay. [RDSF Nos. 52, 68-71, 77-81; PSF Nos. 68-93, 96] This included physical barriers, physical force, and threats of physical force to prevent Plaintiff from leaving, [RDSF Nos, 52, 68-71, 77-81; PSF Nos. 26, 68-93, 96] Several of these instances occurred in 2001. In April 2001, Plaintiff was given a short amount of time to visit her dying grandfather. [RDSF No. 67; PSF No. 69] She was required to retum to the Sea Org within a few hours of his death and missed his funeral because her Commanding Officer found that there was “big problem” because Plaintiff had somehow “betray[ed] their trust” by leaving to be with her grandfather. (/d.] Plaintiff was later accused in a subsequent interview in May 2001 that she “must have some crime” that she committed because she had found so many reasons not to be “on post,” including having pink eye, having left to be with her dying grandfather, and attending a wedding that she was in. [RDSF No. 68; PSF No. 70] ‘After this sequence of events, Plaintiff testified: “I stood back and I said, ‘What am I doing here? This is insane.” I was like why am I. And I said -- you know, Iwas like I can’t do that anymore. 1 don’t have the drive. I’m not - - I'm miserable, I was completely and utterly miserable...” [RDSF Nos. 68, 70; PSFNo. 71] Plaintiffalso said to herself, “I’m done.” [Jd] Plaintiff then wrote a detailed letter in an effort to make herself look as bad as possible, with the hope that she would be kicked out of the Sea Org: “I basically made myself look like scum of the earth because I wanted out and I was like Ineed to make myself look so bad that they just don’t want me anymore.” [RDSF Nos. 68-70; PSF ‘No. 72} This included making representations that she was pregnant and that she did not intend to have an abortion, because Plaintiff hoped that her husband would be allowed to leave with her. [/d.] Plaintiff also explained, “I was upset because I felt stuck,” and “didn’t know what to do,” so she wrote this letter in an attempt to be allowed to leave. [/d.] Plaintiff delivered the letter to the Master At Arms, Katie Johnston, and informed Ms, Johnston that she wanted to leave. [RDSF Nos. 68-70; PSF No. 73] 8 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED NEMORANDUN OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER : : : 8 Ce raneene BP eRRRESORERESSCRE TABESERBS e a Plaintiff was not allowed to leave, and instead, was told by Tracye Danilovich of the Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) that Plaintiff's husband was being moved out of her room, she was not allowed to speak with him or tell him that she was pregnant, and that she would only be allowed to speak with him when she was no longer pregnant. [RDSF Nos. 68, 70; PSF No. 74] Plaintiff returned to her room where she was placed on watch; Katie Johnston sleptin Plaintiff's bed with her and Matthias Gance had the door of her room open and was watching Plaintiff throughout the night. [RDSF Nos. 70-71; PSF No. 75] For approximately the next week, Plaintiff was assigned “mest work,” which included redoing roofing on the top of Scientology's Hollywood Inn and someone was assigned to be with Plaintiff and watching her at all times, including sleeping in her bed. [RDSF Nos. 70-71; PSF No. 75-76] Plaintiff understood that these individuals were present to physically stop her from leaving and that they would follow her if she was somehow able to get away. (Jd.] Eventually, Plaintiff became broken down to the point that she felt this was “pointless” and “not accomplishing anything.” [Jd] She said to herself, “I’m just being trapped here,” and told Katie Johnston that she ‘would get an abortion although she knew she was not pregnant. [RDSF Nos. 70-71; PSF No. 77] Plaintiff was escorted to the abortion clinic by another member of the Sea Org, and was put back on. doing “mest work” upon her return. [Jd] Shortly after this incident, Plaintiff escaped the Sea Org after learning that Defendants intended to send her to the Rehabilitation Project Force (“RPF”). [RDSF No. 72-73; PSF No. 78] The RPF is a punishment/rehab program for Sea Org members. [/d] However, Plaintiff was convinced by Defendants to retum so that she could “route out,” meaning that she could leave the Sea Org in good standing. [RDSF Nos. 74-76; PSF No. 79] Plaintiff made clear upon her return that it was her intent to “route out” and that she did not want to stay in the Sea Org. [Jd.] Rather than starting the routing ‘out process, Defendants began “handling” Plaintiff to stay, even when Plaintiff expressed suicidal feelings. [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF Nos. 80-87] Someone was assigned to sleep in Plaintiff's bed throughout this time period and Plaintiff understood that she was under watch to prevent her from leaving. [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 84] During this time, Plaintiff was pulled outside by Katie Johnston who directed her to sorub dumpsters with a toothbrush. [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 81] When Plaintiff refused to do the 9 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER ‘A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 e Moran nates assignment, Ms, Johnston grabbed Plaintiff and attempted to physically restrain her. [/d.] Ms, Johnston then followed Plaintiff around the block, back up to her bedroom, and followed her into her bedroom. [Jd] Plaintiff's friend, Hansa, then came to her room and Plaintiff explained that she did not want to go to the RPF. (RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 82] For the next two weeks, Plaintiff remained in her room and was “worn down” to agree to go to the RPF. [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 83-87] Plaintiff testified that during this time, “there was always somebody watching me whether it was Matthias or the Shube git] or Katie or I think David Lipchik was around at that time,” “Iwas never left alone, I was being - - someone slept in my bed with me.” [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 84] A variety of people came to Plaintiff's room to try to handle her to go to the RPF, including James Parselle. [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 85] Plaintiff testified that Mr. Parselle “was pushing these ideas back in my head, which honestly now that I’ve been out for as long as I have [realize how ingrained you are into something and you can use the term ‘brainwashed’ to be convinced you're doing something that is right.” [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 86] Plaintiff did not believe that she had the option of refusing to the go the RPF: “If you didn’t go to the RPF, the consequences of that ‘would ultimately be that you would be off-loaded or you would depart from the Sea Org? The Witness: ‘They would have continued trying to handle me until I went.” [Id] After these weeks of handling, Plaintiff was so beaten down, she agreed to go to the RPF. [RDSF Nos. 77-79; PSF No. 87] Once Plaintiff arrived at the RPF, she stated “I don’t want to do this” to Alex Meyer, the person in charge of the RPF. [RDSF Nos. 79-81; PSF No. 88] Plaintiff attempted to leave Mr. Meyer's office several times, but was escorted back to his office by other members of the Sea Org. [RDSF Nos. 79-81; PSF No. 89] Plaintiff testified that while she may have been able to physically overcome these individuals, it was “it’s 1:00 o’clock in the moming. I don’t have a car. I don’t know how to drive I don’t have any money. Where am I going?” [RDSF Nos. 79-81; PSF No. 90] Plaintiff was kept awake until 3:00 o’clock in the morning and was so worn down and tired that she said she would stay. [RDSF Nos. 79-81; PSF No. 91] When Plaintiff awoke the next morning, she did not know what to do, and remained in the RPF. [RDSF Nos 79-81; PSF No. 92] Plaintiff's experiences of being physically prevented from leaving the Sea Org and her inability to leave have been corroborated by others. Former Sea Org member, Astra Woodcraft, testified: 10 PUAINTIF’S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONe ey 1 Ifsomeone stated they wanted to leave, it was my job to put them under security watch so they weren't allowed to ever be left alone or move about freely. Sometimes I would 2 have to sleep outside the door of their room. One time I was required to tie my hand to the door to make sure I would wake up if they were trying to escape. And if they did escape under my watch, I got in further trouble. And it was my job to 4 interrogate them and assign them manual labor until they were convinced to stay. [PSF No. 93] 5 J. Rehabilitation Project Force 6 During her time in the RPF from 2001-2004, Plaintiff left Scientology's facilities less than 20 7. |] times, and did not have unfiltered access to her identification or money. [RDSF Nos. 84-85; PSF No. 94] She allowed to have $20 on her at any given time, and her passport was locked in a Scientology 9 || office. (Zd.] All trips out of Scientology’ facilities involved at least two escorts. [Jd.] Plaintiff spent 10 || _hertime performing manual labor, and attempting to complete required “programs,” and was regularly i i $11 ||. “punished” and forced to run around a basement or do push-ups. [RDSF Nos. 82-83; PSF No. 95] . ae a 12 During plaintiff's last year in the RPF, she became distraught and mentally unstable. [RDSF £ by i i 13. || Nos. 86-87; PSF No, 96] Every time she expressed wanting to leave, she was “handled” to stay and Sa 3 3 3 14 |) stayed out of fear about what would happen to her if she tried to leave. [RDSF Nos. 85-87; PSF No. 96] ar 5 $3 15 || im April 2004, ater nearly thre years, Plaintiff completed everything that was required of her, and was é 5 5 : 16 || awaiting approval to end the RPF. [RDSF Nos. 85-87; PSF No. 97] However, she was told that she < 34.17 || wasbeing removed from her job position, and being reassigned to perform hard labor for 10 hours each 18 |} day. (Jd.] Plaintiff was mentally unstable and physically exhausted by this point. On all previous 19 |] occasions when she asked to leave the Sea Org, CSI prevented her from doing so. [RDSF Nos. 86-87; 20 || PSF No. 98] Plaintiff had observed that Sea Org members who engaged in suicidal actions were 21 || generally allowed to leave within 24 hours. [/d.] Having observed this, Plaintiff swallowed two gulps of bleach and made sure that other Sea Org members observed her doing so. [/d] Upon doing this, Defendants agreed Plaintiff would be permitted to leave, but only after signing release and waiver documents while being videotaped; Plaintiff was made to “confess” many supposed crimes that were not true and relinquish Defendants of any liability or wrongdoing. [RDSF Nos. 88; PSF No. 99] K. Plaintiff Unknowingly Subjected Herself to Coercive Persuasion Dr. Robert Levine, an expert in the psychology of persuasion, has opined that Plaintiff was manipulated and socialized by Scientology to a point where she lost her ability to make clear, 3 ul PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER Cer nn ek ene RP RRR PRRNRREE REE ee See Re ee Set Seo ies oy et e Wscrssrosns0e21 rateentntnn independent decisions about her reality and was incapable of objectively evaluating anything she was threatened with or told.? [RDSF Nos. 8 13-14, 16-17, 24-25, 34-38, 41, 65, 78, 80-81, 83, 91-92; PSF Nos. 100-101]. In Plaintiff's own words, she believes she was “psychologically programmed” by Defendants and lost her “free will” after she joined the Sea Org: Starting when I was twelve, the Church of Scientology controlled literally all aspects of my life, including my movements, my contact with the outside world (which was extremely limited), my education, my relationships, my time, my food and sustenance, and even my thoughts, I feel that lost my ability to freely choose whether I wanted to stay in the Sea Org and whether I wanted to submit to the Sea Org’s disciplinary procedures. I also feel that I lost my ability to freely make other major life decisions, such as having a child. [PSF No, 102-104] Il. PLAINTIFF DID NOT QUALIFY AS A MINISTER FOR PURPOSES OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION ‘A. Plaintiff Lacked the Capacity to Consent to Being a Minister at Age Twelve Defendants cite absolutely no case law suggesting that a twelve year old child has the capacity to consent to or understand the consequences of entering into a church-minister relationship and subjecting herself to the limitations of the “ministerial exception.” Indeed, it is well-recognized that minors generally lack the ability to consent, and California specifically places numerous and substantial restrictions on a minor’s ability to do so. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1556 (minor may not enter into binding contract); Cal. Labor Code § 1391(a)(1), (3) (mandated limits on working hours of minors); Cal, Fam. Code § 302 (minor may not consent to marriage without parental consent); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (minor may not consent to sexual intercourse); Cal. Fam. Code §§ 6910, 6911, 6922 (minor may not consent to medical/dental treatment without parental consent); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123930 (same); Cal. Penal Code §§ 652, 653 (minor may not get a piercing/tattoo without parental consent); Cal. Prob. Code § 3500 (minor's compromise requires court approval); Cal. Veh. Code §§ 17700, 17701 (minor may not acquire driver’s license without parental consent); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22706(b\(3) (minor may not use tanning facility without parental consent); Cal. Educ. Code § 48200 (compulsory education for minors); U.S. Const., Amend. XXVI (minor cannot vote). * Defendants attempt to challenge Dr. Levine’s opinions because a different declaration submitted by him ina different case was excluded under a different standard that does not apply in California. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. (1993) 509 U.S. 579. ‘Their arguments lack merit as Dr. Levine is allowed to assume the trth of certain facts in formulating an opinion under Evid. Code § 801(1). Funher, Dr. Levine previously submitted his declaration inthis case and the coutt determined that it was admissible under the California law, 12 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER 3 3 8 é 5 e Pes ssoans20 min npn If a child is incapable of consenting to a binding contract or even entering into a settlement agreement without court approval, it reasonably follows that a minor, as young as twelve, is incapable of consenting to joining a religious order or consenting that any conduct that occurs during her time in areligious order is beyond judicial review. Indeed, as will be addressed in greater detail below, courts, have routinely held that the interests of protecting children are so great, that religions are not given carte blanche when it comes to minors, even in employment relationships. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 790, 792 (“Elvig IP”) (“First Amendment does not exempt religious institutions from laws that regulate . .. use of child labor, even though it may] involve employment relationships.”); Prince v. Mass. (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 168 (state may regulate child labor even when founded in religious belief); see also Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (declining to acknowledge existence of ministerial exception as to minors). Defendants’ only support for the notion that it is appropriate to consider Plaintiff, at the age of twelve, a “minister” for purposes of the “ministerial exception,” isthe Declaration of Dr. Hubbard. Yet, Dr. Hubbard himself admits that he did not enter the seminary until he was 18 years of age, meaning, that he was a legally consenting adult. (See Hubbard Decl., § 3). Further, Dr. Hubbard admits that Catholic religious orders “currently admit postulates only in their late teens.” (See Hubbard Decl., ¥ 10) (emphasis added), Moreover, the mere fact that some religious organizations choose to admit children into their religious orders at younger ages as noted by Dr. Hubbard, does not mean that these children have the capacity to consent to joining a reli jous order, understand the consequences of doing, So, or are that they should be considered “mit {ers” for purposes of the ministerial exception Notably missing from Defendants’ motion is the document Plaintiff was required to sign at age twelve when she joined the Sea Org, which Plaintiff attaches to her opposition. (See Laura Dieckman Decl., Exhibit “HH”). This document contains a litany of confusing legal jargon, including but not limited to, confidentiality provisions, arbitration provisions, indemnity and hold harmless provisions, breach covenant provisions, waivers of basic and legally mandated rights, and agreements that Plaintiff be subjected to “existing policy, which is subject to amendment, deletion, and/or addition with or without prior notice.” (Jd.). Plaintiff simply did not have the capacity to consent to such an agreement at age twelve or understand the ramifications of joining a “religious order,” such that she was not a 13 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONa3 8 $3 LAW oFFices oF RAPHAEL METZGER 1A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 TONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 80802-494 e Denson mnogo “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception. [RDSF No. 28] The fact that Plaintiff's mother signed such a document does not mean that Plaintiff understood what she was joining B. __ Plaintiff Was Incapable of Consenting to Being a Minister Even as an Adult By the time Plaintiff was an adult and was legally capable of entering into a binding contract, she had already been under Defendants’ totalistic control for six years and had been subjected to Defendants’ coercive persuasion throughout that time period. In Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1109-1112 (a case with remarkable similarities to this case, which Defendants intentionally ignore in their moving papers), the court acknowledged the concepts of “coercive persuasion” and “mind control” used by some religious groups to control their members and impair ‘members’ ability to think independently. As addressed in greater detail later, the Molko court also held that in light of plaintiffs’ evidence of coercive persuasion in that case, they were not barred from pursuing certain claims against their former church, even if religiously motivated. Jd. at 1118-1120. In this case, Defendants exercised totalistic control over Plaintiff's behavior, information, and thoughts, starting at age twelve and Plaintiff knew of no world beyond the world presented to her and regimented by Defendants. Plaintiff was manipulated and socialized by Scientology to a point where she lost her ability to make clear, independent decisions about her reality and was incapable of objectively evaluating anything she was threatened with or told. After enduring Scientology's extensive indoctrination from such a young age, Plaintiff was not capable of freely and independently consenting to being a member of Scientology’s Sea Org. Given her inability to consent to her membership in the Sea Org or understand and objectively evaluate the consequences of such membership, she should not be considered a “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception even during her time as an adult. C. Defendants’ Attempts to Classify All Employees of the Church of Scientology as Ministers is Subterfuge “ Case law makes clear that “if a church labels a person as a ‘religious official’ as mere ‘subterfuge’ to avoid statutory obligations, the ministerial exception does not apply.” Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288, 1290, citing Tomie v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria (7th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1036, 1039. The Tomic court noted that a church easily could “designate{] all its employees as ‘ministers’” regardless of the work that they perform “to avoid having to pay the minimum wage.” Tomic, supra, 442 F.3d at 1039. Such tactical maneuvers should 14 PLAINTIFFS REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER i 32 oS 33 . e SAB ccron snort tet not and cannot be tolerated, and it is for this very reason that the ministerial exception does “not place the internal affairs of religious organizations wholly beyond secular jurisdiction.” Id. Inthe Declaration of Allan Cartwright submitted by Defendants, Mr. Cartwright attempts to do ‘what courts have cautioned against, stating that, “fajll individuals on CSI’s staffare engaged in actions exclusively in furtherance of the purposes specified in paragraph 5,” which includes oversight and dissemination of the “Scientology religion.” (Cartwright Decl., J] 5, 9). Defendants do not provide the necessary factual evidence to support a conclusion that literally every person employed by CSI around the world qualifies as a minister and its conclusory labels are not adequate to establish that Plaintiff was a “minister” even if she was actually capable of consenting to such. IV. THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” DOES NOT BAR ALL CLAIMS ARISING DURING THE CHURCH-MINISTER RELATIONSHIP Even if Plaintiff qualified as a minister, Defendants overstate the “ministerial exception” by suggesting it applies to all claims touching upon the church-minister relationship. Contrary to Defendants” position, case law makes clear that “t]he First Amendment does not exempt religious institutions from all statutes that regulate employment.” Elvig Il, supra, 397 F.3d at 792 (emphasis added); see also Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle of Seattle (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1288, 1290. Rather, “the scope of the ministerial exception” is “limited to what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment.” Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus (9 Cir. 1999) 196 F 34940, 947; see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church (9th Cir. 2004) 375 F.3d 951, 964 (“Elvig I”) (churches not entitled to “blanket First Amendment protection” for actions occurring during church- minister relationship). In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012) 132 S. Ct. 694, 710, the only U.S. Supreme Court decision that addresses the ministerial exception, the Court declined to extend the ministerial exception to all claims arising out of the church-minister relationship: ‘The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf ofa minister, challenging her chureh’s decision to fire he. Today we hold only thatthe ministerial Soper of sults including actions by employees alleging breach of contrat or foros conduct by their religious employers. Other courts have made clear that the fact that a claim arises in the church-minister relationship is not an automatic bar: “Regardless of the church's motives or objectives, or the circumstances giving 15 FEAINTIFF’S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION: : 3 RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 e Oe rise, we would probably agree that torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion cannot be perpetrated upon its members with civil impunity.” Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal.App.34 1168, 1176; see also See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527 (stating ministerial exception did not apply because case did not involve Title VIN); see also Patton v. Jones (Texas App. Ct. 2006) 212 S.W.3d S41, 554 (“Torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion probably fall within the exception to church immunity set out in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 USS. 403 . . . because they pose a ‘substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”); Heard v. Johnson (D.C. App. Ct. 2002) 810 A.2d 871, 884-885 (same). In fact, in Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l (9th Cit, 2012) 687 F.3d 1173, 1181, the case on which Defendants rely heavily, the court was careful to note that it did not decide how plaintiffs might have fared under other legal theories that were not pursued, such as “claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or any of a number of other theories,” but acknowledged plaintiffs “marshaled evidence of [such] potentially tortious conduct.” The court also did not decide whether the ministerial exception actually barred a claim of forced labor under the Trafficking Victims and Protections Act, the only cause of action stated by the plaintiffs. Ia. ‘The claims of ministers must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, balancing the rights involved ‘under the First Amendment before applying the ministerial exception. See Bollard, supra, 196 F.34 at 946, 948; see also EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n (9® Cir. 1982) 676 F.2d 1272, 1279. This is to ensure that courts “avoid trenching on religious freedom without entirely eviscerating Congress’ ‘otherwise fully applicable command{]’ to protect employees. . . even employees of religious organizations.” Elvig I, 375 F.3d at 956, quoting Bollard, supra, 196 F.3d at 944. V. THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” IS CONFINED TO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE _FIRST AMENDMENT AND DOES NOT PROVIDE RELIGIONS A SHIELD FROM ALL LIABILITY Because the ministerial exception is “constitutionally compelled,” Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin (2011) 201 Cal.App-4th 1041, 1053, courts must examine whether a particular claim violates either the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause to the First ‘Amendment, If the claim does not actually interfere with either of these clauses, the ministerial exception does not apply. 16 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONawn Caw rae : 5 a g 6 z 3 E ae we a: BS 23 dz <3 3 Ey ge at g 3 3 8 ; i e ADecronscanenssn necininaptn A. Religious Freedom Under the Free Exercise Clause Is Not Absolute and Religious Conduct May be Subject to Regulation for the Protection of Society To assert a defense under the Free Exercise Clause, a defendant is required to show that the claim at issue actually infringes on its free exercise of religion. See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354 (8th Cir. 1985) 753 F.2d 1528, 1533; see also Malik v, Brown (9th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 330, 333. “In determining whether the proposed application of a statute would violate the Free Exercise Clause, courts must weigh three factors: “(1) the magnitude of the statute’s impact upon the exercise ofareligious belief, (2) the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exer of the religious belief, and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state.” Bollard, supra, 196 F.3d at 946, quoting Pacific Press, supra, 676 F.2d at 1279. Notably, the first of these factors requires an assessment of whether or not the statute at issue actually impacts the exercise of one’s rel ‘The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “[n]otall burdens on religion are unconstitutional” and certain religious conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. See U.S. v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S. 252, 257. In the context of religious freedom, the First Amendment “embraces two concepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell v State of Conn, (1940) 310 US. 296, 303-304; see also Reynolds v. US. (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 164. B. The Establishment Clause Does Not Bar the Imposition of Tort Liability Against “[T}he Tectia evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection [are] ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm 'n(1979)397 US. 664, 668. A three-part test is used to determine if a statute violates the Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.”” Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at 612-613. Application of the Establishment Clause in the clergy-communicant context “has both substantive and procedural dimensions.” Bollard, supra, 196 F.3d at 948. “On a substantive level, applying the statute to the clergy-church employment relationship creates a constitutionally 7 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION8 wess bee stage ange eee £4385 seize Pes. 04 ngs eee abee £ay aos 8 are e lB: sommes mininnstia impermissible entanglement with religion if the church’s freedom to choose its ministers is at stake.” Id. at. 948-49. On a procedural level, “entanglement might also result from a protracted legal process pitting church and state as adversaries. ...’” Id. at 949, quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. Of Seventh-Day ‘Adventists (4th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 1164, 1171. “[T]he dangers of procedural entanglement are most acute where there is also a substantive entanglement at issue.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In the absence of substantive entanglement, “procedural entanglement considerations are reduced to the constitutional propriety of subjecting a church to the expense and indignity of the civil legal process.” Bollard, supra, 196 F.3d at 949. In such cases, a court must consider whether the plaintiff's claim is “sufficiently significant” to violate the Establishment Clause. Id Courts have the ability “to control discovery” and guard against “wide-ranging intrusion into sensitive religious matters,” such that many, if not all, entanglement concerns can be alleviated. Elvig /, supra, 375 F.3d at 967. In fact, “[e}xcessive entanglement involves ‘pervasive monitoring,’ or continuing governmental inspection of a religious organization's ‘day-to-day operations,” which are not at issue when “the inquiry is secular and limited to the diseovery process.” Id, citing Agostini v, Felton (1997) 521 U.S. 203, 234; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equal. of| Cal. (1990) 493 U.S. 378, 395. Plaintiff addresses below whether each of her indi issible. lual claims are constitutionally per VI. THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION” DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CLAIMS OF MINORS In Brock v. Wendell's Woodwork, Inc. (4th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 196, 198-199, the court held that application of child labor laws to members of a separatist religious sect and associated employers who sought to employ children as young as nine in commercial enterprises to inculcate in them scripturally mandated work ethic, did not violate their free exercise rights. Similarly in Prince, the U.S. Supreme Court held that application of child labor laws did not interfere with the First Amendment, even when the conduct at issue was religiously motivated. Prince, supra, 321 U.S. at 166-168. The defendant in Prince appealed her conviction for permitting a nine year old child to sell religious literature on the streets in violation of Massachusetts’ child labor law on the ground that Jehovah’s Witnesses believed it was her religious duty to perform this work. /d. at 159-162. The court made clear that the state's interest in protecting children outweighed the burden on religion: 18 PEAINTIFF’S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION5 3 2 GS Ve RS ene saz 335 5Ea ae "3 g 3 3 8 LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA. 8 Cor ane un e 5 The state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment. A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers, within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment. .. Id. at 168. Numerous of Plaintiff’ claims concem the time period when she was a minor, and Defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that the conduct that occurred when Plaintiff was a minor is shielded from review by the ministerial exception. Vil. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM __FOR__ SOLICITATION _OF __EMPLOYMENT _ BY MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT BARRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ADDRESS THIS CLAIM IN THEIR MOTION asserted two claims for Defendants’ violations of California's Labor Code - one Plainti concerning failure to pay minimum wage and overtime in violation of Labor Code § 1194 and one for solicitation of employment by misrepresentation pursuant to Labor Code § 970. Defendants’ motion is devoid of any mention of Plaintiff's claim for solicitation of employment by misrepresentation, and Defendants’ only argument regarding Plaintiff's Labor Code claims is that “[tJhe ministerial exception bars application of federal and state minimum wage/maximum hour laws to a church's relationship with those coming within the exception.” (Defendants? Brief, p. 40) In moving for summary judgment, it is a defendant’ burden to address all claims alleged by the plaintiff, and if a defendant fails to address or respond to a particular claim, summary judgment is not proper. See Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 509-510, 514. Labor Code § 970 states: No person or officer thereof, directly or indirectly, shall influence, persuade, or engage any person to change from one place to another in this State or from any place outside to any place within the State, or from any place within the State to any place outside, for the purpose of working in any branch of labor, through or by means of knowingly false representations, whether spoken, writen, of advertised i printed form, concerning (a) The kind, character, or existence of such work; (b) The length of time such work will last, or the compensation therefor; (©) The sanitary or housing conditions relating to or surrounding the work . . 19 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONe MM ccna tnce.0 1 ste tint While Labor Code § 970 was originally enacted to protect migrant workers from abuse, courts have applied this section to a variety of employment situations and have made clear that this statute is, not restricted in application to farm workers or other mass hiring situations. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (1984) 156 Cal.App.34 965, 980 (“[N]othing in the statute restricts application of the statutory language to any particular class or kind of employment... ..”);see also Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (Richards) (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 148, 156-157. Here, Plaintiffalleged that Defendants solicited her at the impressionable age of twelve to move away from her family and live and work permanently at Defendants’ facilities in California. (Saldana Decl., Exhibit “I”, SAC at $f 17(A), 33(A), 82-85, 95(A)). Plaintiff further alleged that as part of her 10 |] solicitation to move and join Defendants’ workforce, Defendants knowingly and falsely represented to a 11 |} her that she would be allowed to visit her parents on a regular basis, that she would work hours ae 3 12 |} consistent with being a minor, that she would continue to get a formal education while working at 2b? HP 13 || Defendants’ facilities, and that she would be able to have children when she was older. (Id; see also E 4 3 £14 |] RDSENos. 22-29; PSF Nos. 1-19). Plaintiff further alleged that she reasonably relied on Defendants? EB2ie 15 |) intentional and fraudulent misrepresentations, and that she was harmed by Defendants’ z : 3 16 || misrepresentations, including suffering lost income and education and emotional distress, (Saldana < Fa 17 |] Dect., Exhibit “1”, SAC at $¥ 86-89). Plaintiff further alleged that upon joining the Sea Org, she was 18 || placed in a confidential relationship with Defendants and subjected to brainwashing. (Jd. at { 17). 19 Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim under Labor Code § 970 is similar to the claims of fraud 20 || asserted against the Unification Church by two of its former members in Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. 21 || (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1114-1120, which the California Supreme Court held were permissible claims 22 || even though they concerned religiously motivated conduct and would burden the free exercise of 23. |) religion. In that case, members of the Unification Church engaged in “Heavenly Deception,” a doctrine that holds “that it is acceptable to lie to someone in order to give him the opportunity to hear Reverend a Moon’s teachings.” /d. at 1114-1115. The plaintiffs in Molko were initially told by Church members y Rg 26 || who recruited them that they were not affiliated with any religious organization. Id. at 1102-1103, 27 || 1105-1106. The plaintiffs were invited to a “rural getaway” where people “went for relaxation and 28 || pleasure” and were not told that this “getaway” was an indoctrination facility for the Church. Jd. at @ 20 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONi we fi 38s abe ae Ba baa 258 3a as 40} EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, UT LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA s0n02-40ee e a 1102-1107. Plaintiffs asserted that they “justifiably relied on [the Church's] misrepresentations in unknowingly agreeing to participate in Church activities, and suffered psychological and financial damages as a result of their involvement with and membership in the Church.” Id. at 1108. Among, the psychological damage that they suffered was “brainwashing,” also known as “coercive persuasion.” Id, at 1110-1111. In permitting plaintiffs to pursue their claims of fraud, the Molko court stressed that “religious groups are not immune from all tort liability,” and that “in appropriate cases courts will recognize tort liability even for acts that are religiously motivated.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1114, The court then analyzed what is required to determine if tort claim is constitutionally-barred. First, the court assessed whether “plaintiffs? actions for fraud implicate religious belief or religiously motivated conduct.” Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original). The court held that the practice of| misrepresenting its identity to solicit members “is not itself belief- it is conduct ‘subject to regulation for the protection of society.”” Jd. at 1117, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 304. Second, the court asked whether the “state’s interest in allowing tort liability for the Church's deceptive practices is important enough to outweigh any burden such liability would impose on the Church’s religious conduct.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3¢ at 1117, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 221. The court held that while tort liability “does not impair the Church’s right to believe in recruiting through deception,” it does impose a burden on the Church “putting such belief into practice by subjecting the Church to possible monetary loss for doing so.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.34 at, 1117, However, the court found the burden imposed by tort liability was not “substantial” and “[a]t ‘most, it potentially closes one questionable avenue for bringing new members into the Church.” d. Third, the court considered “whether a compelling state interest justifies the marginal burden such liability imposes on the Church’s free exercise rights.” Jd, The court found that there was a compelling interest in the “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order’ the Church's allegedly fraudulent conduet poses,” Jd. at 1117-1118, quoting Sherbert v, Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 403. ‘The court specifically noted the state’s “compelling interest in preventing citizens from being deceived into submitting unknowingly to such a dangerous process” as “coercive persuasion.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1118, It further noted the state’s “compelling interest in protecting the family institution,” and the dangers defendant’s conduct posed to families. Jd In light of this, the court held that the 21 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUIT Ce rane ‘ e AB erar scone atest burden of tort liabil ity was justified by compelling state interests. Id Fourth, the court analyzed whether any lesser burden on religion would satisfy the compelling state interests. Id at 1118-1119. The court held that allowing “injured parties to bring private actions for fraud is the least restrictive means available for advancing, the state’s interest in protecting individuals and families from harmful effects of fraudulent recruitment.” Id. at 1119. Lastly, the court stated that the burden can only be upheld if it “(1) has the purpose and effect of advancing the state’s secular goals and (2) does not discriminate between religions, or between religion or nonreligion.” Jd. at 1119, citing Braunfield v. Brown (1961) 366 U.S. 599, 607. The court found that both of these goals were satisfied as the purpose and effect of imposing tort liability was to “advance the legitimate secular goal of protecting persons from being harmed by fraud,” and it was non- discriminatory, as “all organizations, religious or otherwise, may be held liable for damages caused by their fraudulent acts.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1119. Plaintiff's claim in this case for solicitation by misrepresentation is on all fours with Molko. In order to get Plaintiff to move away from her family and begin working for the Sea Org at the young age of twelve, Defendants intentionally misrepresented the kind and character of her work (including ‘working hours, ability to leave and communicate with her family, education, and ability tohave children in the future). [RDSF Nos. 22-29; PSF Nos. 1-19] Defendants do not assert one way or another ‘whether such misrepresentations were religiously motivated in their motion. In the absence of any religious motivation for such misrepresentations, Plaintiff’ claim for solicitation by misrepresentation does not implicate any Constitutional issues and is not barred by the First Amendment. See Bollard ¥, Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 940, 946-947. However, even if these misrepresentations were religiously motivated, they are subject to regulation because they constitute actual conduct, as opposed to mere religious belief. See Reynolds v. U.S. (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 164. | Assuming Defendants’ deceptive conduct was religiously motivated, allowing Plaintifto pursue a claim for solicitation by misrepresentation may impose a burden on Defendants’ practices of misrepresentation, However, just as in Motko, this burden would not be substantial and the compelling state interests in preventing the solicitation of minors to move and work away from their families through misrepresentation far outweigh any burden imposed on Defendants. A twelve year old is, 2 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA e eee impressionable, and the state has a clear interest in protecting the safety and welfare of children, including ensuring that receive adequate education, adequate sleep, and are not subjected to unreasonable working hours or conditions, etc. Likewise, as noted in Molko, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the family institution. In this case, in relying on Defendants’ misrepresentations and moving away from her family to work for Defendants, Plaintiff unknowingly subjected herself to working conditions entirely inconsistent with Defendants’ representations, denied herself a formal education, and lost out on her ability to have children pursuant to the terms that had been represented to her. She also unknowingly subjected herself to coercive persuasion, such that she was unable to eave Defendants’ employment for a period of thirteen years and suffered extreme harms as a result of Defendants’ conduct, including losing the ability to openly and honestly communicate with her family. Notably, the state interests in this case are even greater than those that existed with respect to the plaintiffs in Molko, because Plaintiff was fraudulently induced to join the Sea Org.at the incredibly young age of twelve. By comparison, plaintiff, David Molko, was a 27-year old man who had graduated from law school at the time that he was recruited by the Unification Church. Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1102, The other plaintiff in Molko was a 19-year old woman who had finished a year of college by the time of her recruitment. Jd. at 1105. Ifthe state’s interests in protecting educated adults from being fraudulently induced into submitting to coercive persuasion are sufficient to outweigh the burden on religion in being subject to civil liability for such conduct, the state’s interests in protecting minors from such conduct is even greater. Given the state’s clear and legitimate concerns over a minor’s ability to consent and protecting the health and welfare of minors, there is no doubt that the sate interests outweigh the burden on religion in this case. Allowing tort claims for solicitation by mistepresentation is the least restrictive means of| satisfying the compelling state interests in this case. Plaintiff's claim does not prevent Defendants from engaging in deceptive recruitment practices or criminalize Defendants’ conduct. Defendants simply subject themselves to passive liability for soliciting employment through intentional misrepresentations. Finally, Plaintiff's solicitation by misrepresentation claim has the purpose and effect of advancing the state’s secular goals of protecting the safety and welfare of children. Nothing about permitting Plaintiff's claim discriminates between religions, or between religion or nonreligion. 23 PEAINTIFF’S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION3 : 3 En wes sa seks NE tsa e234 Bau8 aie 3585 72h a ae, <3 uN 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 an 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 e Wi ooosso0si01 rites Further, as emphasized in Molko, nothing about Plaintiff's claim requires this court to assess whether or not Defendants’ religious beliefs are genuine or make any other determinations regarding church doctrine, See Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1115. The point is that whether such conduct was religiously motivated or not, it cannot be tolerated, VIII. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM ‘A. The Ministerial Exception and Free Exercise/Establishment Clauses Do Not Bar Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Clait Defendants claim that “it is absurd to apply a tort of intentional infliction of em¢ nal distress toareligion,” and that “[iJt is the purpose and intended effect of many religions and religious doctrines, to inflict emotional distress on the flock of believers.” (Defendants’ Brief, p. 37) ‘Apparently the California Supreme Court disagrees, as it held that the Molko plaintiffs were not barred from pursuing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against their former church. ‘Molko, supra, 46 Cal.34 at 1120-1121. Rather, Molko makes clear that courts are to look at the conduct, supporting the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and determine whether the theory is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1120. In that case, the court held that to the extent the claims of emotional distress were based merely on threats of “divine retribution” if the plaintiffs left the church, they were not permissible. Jd, However, because plaintiffs presented evidence that their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress were also based on the church's misrepresentation and concealment of its identity for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs to submit unknowingly to coercive persuasion, they were not barred from pursuing that claim as a matter of law for the same reasons that their claims for fraud were not barred. Id. Indeed, other courts have also acknowledged that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a church are not barred as a matter of law, and that courts must look at the facts of each, case. See Patton v, Jones (Texas App. Ct. 2006) 212 S.W.3d S41, 554 (“intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy might be so unusual or egregious as to fall within the Sherbert exception . ...”); see also Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology (1982) 535 F.Supp. 1125, 1142 (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim “through the Fair Game doctrine” permissible), In Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church (1989) 216 Cal. App.3d 297, 309-310, the court held that with respect to the claims of emotional distress, the trial court was required to first assess whether 24 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION g é é 8 g re ro weer ePeeeeeer eee ee eee eee eee oy ot eo: e (eee ee or not the conduct at issue was religiously motivated. If it was not, then the claim could not be constitutionally barred. Id. at 310. Even if the conduct “qualifies as religious expression, the trial court must balance the importance to the state of the interest invaded against the burden which would result for imposing tort liability for such a claim.” Jd. The plaintifis* claims of emotional distress would “survive .. if the state’s interests are significant, and no less restrictive burden than the possibility of eventual tort liability is available.” Id. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not barred pursuant to the First Amendment or the “ministerial exception,” and Defendants’ argument that such a claim can never be asserted against a religion lacks any merit. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to Plaintiff's fraud claim, Plaintiff should be allowed to pursue her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim - the state’ interests in protecting children/families and protecting society from unknowingly consenting to coercive persuasion and the lack of free will associated therewith are paramount and the slight burden of tort liability in such cases is warranted. To the extent Defendants argue that certain evidence should not be considered with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, this should be addressed by a motion in limine. B. ThereareT! Distress Claim “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: ‘(1) extreme and Ie Issues of Fact as to Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) $4 Cal.3d 868, 903 (internal citation omitted); Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001. Conduct is “outrageous” ifit is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in acivilized community.” Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209. Additionally, “<[bJehavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position that gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interests; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through ‘mental distress; ot (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. ...” Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122 25 PLAINTIFFS REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONwow a Ss 12 1B 14 LAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 408 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 Lone BEACH, CALIFORNIA 80802-4966 15 16 7 18 19 20 e aM ererssomsnis masta tment (internal citation omitted). Among the relationships that have been recognized as significantly contributing to the conclusion that particular conduct was outrageous include religion, see id. at 1122- 1123, and employer-employee, see Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2.Cal.3d 493, 498, fn. 2 “(I]t is not essential to liability that a trier of fact find a malicious or evil purpose. It is enough that defendant ‘devoted little or no thought’ to probable consequences of his conduct.” KOVR-TV, Inc. ¥. Superior Court(1995)31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031-1032 (internal citation omitted). The requirement of reckless conduct is satisfied by a showing that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the probability that the plaintiff would suffer emotional distress. Little v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 451, 462; Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593. Just as in Molko, Plaintiff was induced to join the Sea Org at the age of twelve by false representations regarding working conditions and future options and thereafter was placed in a confidential relationship with Defendants and was unknowingly subjected to coercive persuasion that precluded her from exercising her free will. [RDSF Nos. 22-31, 39-41, 49, 55-56, 59-61, 68-70, 77-81, 84-87, 90-92; PSF Nos, 1-44, 68-104] Defendants’ conduct in making false promises for the purpose of inducing her to sign a billion year contract of employment, give up basic necessities (such as a living ‘wage and education), give up the ability to have children in the future, and unknowingly subject herself to coercive persuasion is “outrageous” and was perpetrated in reckless disregard of the probability that such conduct would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress. Indeed, as noted above, conduct can be considered outrageous when one “abuses a relation or position that gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interests.” Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1122. Here, Plaintiff undoubtedly was in a “confidential relationship” with Defendants that gave them a position of power over her. See Richelle Lv, Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257, 273 (“confidential relationship” means “an unequal relationship between parties in which one surrenders to the other some degree of control because of the trust and confidence which he reposes in the other.”) Further, Defendants’ conduct perpetrated against Plaintiff after she was under their complete control and persuasion is certainly outrageous. Defendants gathered personal and embarrassing, information about Plaintiff, purposefully alienated Plaintiff from her family and the outside world, and prevented Plaintiff from leaving when she expressed a desire to leave. [RDSF Nos. 30-31, 39-40, 52, 26 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION3 3 3 RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90802-4966 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 e AM accor scones mein 67-81, 84-85, 87; PSUF Nos, 20-32, 42-44, 68-96] Contrary to Defendants’ attempts to isolate Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to only Plaintiff's assignment to the RPF and her mandatory participation in sec checks, Plaintiff alleged this claim to cover her entire time in the Sea Org “from approximately 1991 to 2004,” and alleged that among Defendants’ conduct leading, to her severe emotional distress included Defendants’ repeated conduct of collecting information about Plaintiff and “threatening to disclose this embarrassing information when Defendants detected that Plaintiff wanted to leave, was failing to comply with Defendants’ policies, ot when Defendants felt that Plaintiff was a risk to Scientology. (Saldana Decl., Exhibit “I", SAC, at $f] 65-68). Plaintiff's Complaint must also be read as a whole and in light of her discovery responses, which make clear that Plaintiff's claim for emotional distress includes Defendants’ false promises and subsequent coercive persuasion of Plaintiff, including preventing her from leaving the Sea Org. (Saldana Decl., Exhibit “9"; PSF No. 107). Indeed, Plaintiff specifically alleged that Defendants “brainwashed” her and that she was in a “confidential relationship” with Defendants as a result of her age and immaturity when she entered the Sea Org. (Saldana Decl., Exhibit “1", SAC, at 17) Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress in their motion. Rather, they simply contend that none of their conduct can be considered “outrageous” because the things that they did to Plaintiff are integral to being ina religious group and that their conduct is beyond judicial review. Plaintiff has presented evidence of the severe emotional distress that she suffered, such as her desperation to escape Scientology's facilities and disciplinary procedures that led to her SUF Nos. 1-32, 42-44, 68-96] swallowing bleach. [RDSF Nos. 30-31, 39-40, 52, 67-81, 84-85, 87; There clearly are triable issues of fact as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and tort liability is appropriate under the unique and unusual facts of this case. IX. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S FALSE IMPRISONMENT/DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY CLAIMS A. The Ministerial Exception and Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses Do Not Bar Plaintiff's False Imprisonment or Deprivation of Liberty Claims “Regardless of the church’s motives or objectives, or the circumstances giving rise, we would probably agree that torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion cannot be perpetrated upon, its members with civil impunity.” Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1176 (emphasis added); see also Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, Inc. (M.D. Ala. 1983) 563 F.Supp. 505, 516-517 27 FEAINTIFF’S REVISED WEVORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION8 GS Oe SRE eho baz < 338 SE While this stautory section was originally enacted to “to tide a stem of hate crimes,” it has been widened and accepted as encompassing more than just hate crimes against members of specific classes, etc. See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal, 4th 820, 841-843 (holding claim under Civil Code § $2.1 does not require “discriminatory intent); see also Assembly Bill 2719 (Stats. 2000, ch, 98) (abrogated requirement plaintiff be member of specific class to state a claim under Civil Code § 52.1). 32 BEAINTIFF’S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION FE i ae 53 i woe wn eC we a Om e AB esr sxerine tite tne sufficient to cause Plaintiff to believe that Defendants would act on their threats if she attempted to leave. Indeed, Plaintiff was personally responsible for following and tracking other members and knew precisely what Defendants were capable of. [PSF No. 44] Defendants argue that Plaintiff's deprivation of liberty claim fails because the liberty provision of Article I, Section 1 ofthe California Constitution purportedly is directed at and intended to constrain only “state action,” not the conduct of private parties. This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution sets forth the “inalienable rights” of all persons in California: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. ‘Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” Courts interpreting this particular section | of the California Constitution have made clear that because this section inalienable rights, it “may not be violated by anyone” and state action is not required: “[A}rticle 1, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of action against private as well as government entities.” Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.Ath 525, quoting Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 15-20. Indeed, Defendants failed to cite to single case stating that this particular section of the California Constitution requires state action. Second, as noted above, Civil Code § 52.1 (a) and (b) expressly provide a private right of action for violations of Constitutional rights “whether or not” these violations were perpetrated by someone “acting under color of law.” Defendants also claim that only injunctive relief is available for violations of Constitutional rights. Yet, Civil Code § 52.1 expressly provides that an individual may bring “a civil action for damages” for violations of Constitutional rights. X. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS Defendants grossly distort Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claims to make it appear as if the privacy torts asserted by Plaintiff have no legal basis. Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claims are very simple - they concern intrusion into Plaintiff's basic and fundamental right of privacy in deciding whether or not to bear children, The harm that Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendants’ intrusion ‘was obtaining an abortion against her will and related emotional distress. As discussed below, these claims have legal merit and are not barred by the First Amendment. 33 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEVORANDOM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION a 54 8 8 e a A. The First Amendment Does Not Trump Plaintiff's Basic and Fundamental Right to Privacy in Choosing Whether to Continue Her Pregnancy In Carrieri v. Bush (1966) 419 P.2d 132, 137-138, the court held that a church's conduct in counseling a woman to disconnect from her spouse was not entitled to First Amendment protection. “{O]ne does not, under the guise of exercising religious beliefs, acquire a license to wrongfully interfere with familial relationships.” Id. at 137. The court also stressed that “[glood faith and reasonable conduct are the necessary touchstones to” a First Amendment privilege, and that “(ill will, intimidation, threats, or reckless recommendations of family separation directed toward alienating the spouses, where found to exist, nullify the privilege and project liability.” ia. Similarly, in Bear v, Reformed Mennonite Church (Pa, 1975) 341 A.2d 105, 106-108, the court ruled that the practice of shunning does not necessarily provide a complete defense to all civil claims because this practice may result in an “excessive interference” with paramount state concerns such as “the maintenance of marriage and family relationship,” for which the state may regulate, “even in light, of the ‘Establishment’ and ‘Free Exercise’ clauses of the First Amendment.” In Guinn, supra, 775 P.2d at 779, the court stated that “First Amendment protection does not extend to all religiously-motivated disciplinary practices in which ecclesiastical organizations might engage.” Defendants in Guinn disclosed plaintiff's private sexual transgressions to its entire congregation as part of a disciplinary proceeding, even though plaintiff had officially withdrawn her church membership and asked the church not to disclose this information. Id, at 768-769, 776. Defendants maintained that pursuant to their religious beliefs, members were prohibited from unilaterally withdrawing their allegiance to the church and that disclosure of the plaintiff's private sexual conduct was part of their religious disciplinary procedure. Jd at 769, 776. The court ruled defendants’ conduct was not protected by the First Amendment because it deprived plaintiff of her basic freedoms to choose religion and to refuse consent to a disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 778-780. Here, there is no doubt that a woman’s right to privacy in her decision whether to bear or beget a child is “among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights.” People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 244, quoting Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 263. “The California Supreme Court in People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, held that, it is a woman’s fundamental right to choose whether to bear children based upon her right of privacy 34 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER 1A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 5 Ak eK 10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 e APdecxcesconsnvan ttt ren in matters relating to marriage, family and sex. This right of privacy protecting a woman’s right to choose existed even prior to it being enumerated in the California Constitution.” People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 243. Over and over again, courts have recognized the individual and fundamental right of'a woman to privacy in deciding whether or not to obtain an abortion. See Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 153 (the “right to privacy” “encompass[es] a woman's decision whether ornotto terminate her pregnancy”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438, 453 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted . .. intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); see also Hill v, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 29. Courts have made this recognition because “personal decisions relating to ... procreation involv{es] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy ... [and] to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the of the mystery of human life.” Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 333. A t to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and ‘woman's right to privacy in choosing whether to continue a pregnancy is of “profound importance”: [T]he right to choose whether to continue or to terminate a pregnancy implicates a ‘woman's fundamental interest in the preservation of her personal health (and in some instances the preservation of her life), her interest in retaining personal control over the integrity of her own body, and her interest in deciding for herself whether to parent a Child. And our court also fas mae clear the profound importance of his consiutionl right: ‘This right of personal choice is central to a woman’s control not only of her own, body, but also to the control of her social role and personal destiny... Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 332-333 (emphasis added), quoting Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d at 275. Given Plaintiff's important and fundamental right to privacy in deciding whether to continue her pregnancy and the important state interests in preserving that right, Defendants’ religious freedom does not outweigh Plaintiff's right to privacy as a matter of law. Indeed, case law makes clear that the right of privacy, including the right to choose whether to have an abortion, is on equal footing with religious freedom and may notbe intruded upon absent a compelling state interest, the benefits of which ‘must “manifestly outweigh” the burden placed on privacy rights. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 831, 843. Based on the competing rights at issue, the Court should engage in the same analysis set forth in Molko with respect to Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claims. 35 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONA 33 3 we ae 5 SRE eae o22 bz 338 3Ee es e lM sro ene soso First, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff disputes that Defendants’ conduct in coercing and threatening her to have an abortion was religiously-motivated. Defendants” policy, as represented by them in their moving papers, was that Sea Org members who became pregnant had two choices: “having an abortion or freely leaving the Sea Org.” (Hubbard Decl., 23, 7:23-24). In fact, the President of Religious Technology Center has testified that the church “absolutely” does “not” allow forced or coerced abortions. [PSF No. 45] Thus, at the point that Plaintiff (a minor) stated that she was pregnant and did not want to have an abortion, which is documented in Defendants’ own files, Plaintiff should have been allowed to freely leave the Sea Org without any pressure or coercion that she obtain an abortion. [See RDSF Nos. 49-52, 55-56; PSF Nos. 50-54, 57-58] Even assuming that Defendants seek to justify their conduct as “religiously-motivated” on the ground that they were attempting to convince Plaintiff to stay in the Sea Org, this type of religious conduct is properly subject to regulation for the protection of society. Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1117. Second, the state’s interest in allowing tort liability for Defendants’ conduct in invading Plaintiff's fundamental right of privacy in her decision whether to continue her pregnancy is important enough to outweigh any burden such liability would impose on Defendants’ religious conduct. See Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1117. Imposing tort liability does not actually impair Defendants’ right to believe that members of the Sea Org should not have children, but it does impose a burden on putting such belief into practice by subjecting Defendants to possible monetary loss for doing so, or at least ‘monetary loss for doing so in a case of this nature. See Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1117. However, the burden imposed by tort liability would not “substantial” by allowing liability in a case of this nature because the facts and circumstances are so unusual. Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff that she ‘would be allowed to have children when they recruited her at the young age of twelve, Plaintiff then unknowingly subjected herself to years of coercive persuasion after joining the Sea Org such that she lost her ability to make clear, independent decisions about the reality she was confronted with, and Plaintiff was still a minor when she became pregnant. [RDSF Nos. 28-31; PSF Nos. 5, 12-13, 100-104] Third, the compelling state interest of preserving a woman’ s right to privacy in deciding whether tocontinue a pregnancy and the compelling state interests of non-interference with matters of marriage, family, sex, and the right to life justify the marginal burden such liability imposes on Defendants’ free 36 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER [A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OGEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA. 9 e eS exercise rights. See Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1117-1118. Indeed, the facts in this case particularly warrant application of tort liability given Plaintiff's age, Defendants’ false representations, and Defendants’ totalistic and powerful position over Plaintiff. Fourth, there is no lesser burden on religion that would satisfy the compelling state interests at issue in Plaintiff's privacy claims. See Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1118-1119. Lastly, tort liability under the circumstances of this case would advance the state’s interests in protecting a woman's right to privacy in choosing whether or not to have an abortion, and in preserving privacy in matters related to marriage, family, and sex. See Molko, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 1119. Additionally, nothing about imposing liability would discriminate between religions or religion and nonteligion. See id. This is one of the unique and unusual cases where a religious institution can and should be held liable for invasion of privacy and cannot claim religious immunity.‘ B. Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to Plaintiff's Common Law Invs Claim Tort liability for invasion of privacy arises in four different instances: (1) intrusion into private ion of Privacy matters; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicly placing a person in a false light; and (4) misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35. This case concerns intrusion into Plaintiff's private matters, meaning intrusion into her basic and fundamental right of privacy in deciding whether or not to continue her pregnancy. The essential elements for a claim for intrusion into private matters are: 1) Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter intruded upon; 2) Defendant intentionally intruded in the Plaintiff's privacy in that matter; 3) Defendant’s intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; 4) Plaintiff was harmed; and 5) Defendants conduct was a substantial factor in harming Plaintiff. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 286-287. « Defendants attempt to rely onthe district court's decision in Claire Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l for the proposition that inquiry concerning pressure from the Church of Scientology to have an abortion “would require review of Scientology's doctrine prohibiting Sea Org members from raising children.” (Defendants’ Memo, at p. 30, citing 2010 WL 3184389), This reliance lacks merit for a number of reasons. First, the district court's decision was superseded by the decision ofthe Ninth Circuit. Second, and ‘more significantly, Claire Headley did not have an independent cause of ection for invasion of privacy forthe forced abortions she endured and was situated differently from Plain in that she did not jin the Sea Org atthe young age of vetve under false ‘promises that she would be allowed to have chren, 37 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION : 3 10 N 12 1B 14 1s 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 e Wesro.so025:204 metonnomnen ‘A claim for intrusion into private matters encompasses not only a physical intrusion, but also an intrusion into one’s sensory privacy. Miller v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.34 1463, 1482. Stated another way, “{tJhe definition of the intrusion tort consists of two elements: (1) the intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” see also Sanchez-Scott v, Alza Pharm. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 365, 372. In Miller, the court found that a camera crew’s intrusion into the plaintiff’s home to film paramedics performing work on the plaintiff's dying husband, without her consent, constituted an invasion of plaintiff's solitude and seclusion in her private affairs. Miller, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at 1484-1485, Damages flowing from such an invasion of privacy “logically would include an award for mental suffering and anguish.” Jd. at 1484, citing Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co. (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 89. Similarly, in Sanchez-Scott, the mere presence of a sales representative in a private examination room during a breast cancer patient’s examination, without proper identification, was a sufficient intrusion to warrant a claim for invasion of privacy. Here, pursuant to the many authorities detailed above, Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of | privacy in her decision as to whether she should continue her pregnancy or obtain an abortion. See Garziano, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at 243; see also Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 333. Plaintiff's solitude and seclusion in making that decision was of “profound importance” and Plaintiff had an individual and fundamental right to make that decision. See Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 333. Defendant intentionally intruded in Plaintiff's privacy by repeatedly and systematically zonvineing her to have an abortion and that an abortion was her only option. [RDSF Nos. 45-53, 55-56; PSF Nos. 45-67] Plaintiff testified unequivocally that she wanted to have her baby and that she made this representation to her Commanding Officer, to her husband, and to her husband's Commanding Officer. [/d.] Despite her affirmative statements, Defendants nonetheless interfered with her decision. Defendant’s intrusion into Plaintiff's private and personal decision regarding her pregnancy would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Courts have cautioned that a woman's right of “personal choice” in deciding whether to continue a pregnancy “‘s central to awoman’s control not only of her own body, but also to the control of her social role and personal destiny.” Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at 275. This decision “involv{es] the mast intimate and personal choices a person may make 38 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION8 i 6 : 8 as OE a Be de iy # i & 3 3 i 8 e A ina lifetime.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. 833, 851. Further, this situation is unlike the case cited by Defendants of individuals picketing outside an abortion clinic to attempt to persuade individuals not to have an abortion on religious grounds. (See Defendants’ Memo., p. 30, citing McCullen v. Coakley (2014) _U.S._, 134$.Ct. 2518). Defendants were in a confidential relationship with Plaintiff starting when she was only twelve, and exercised totalistic control over Plaintiff's life and communication with the outside world from that point forward. Defendants were not mere strangers to Plaintiff preaching from a reasonable distance outside an abortion clinic, rather, Defendants held significant power over Plaintiff and abused that power to convince Plaintiff that she must obtain an abortion, Plaintiff was not free to simply leave Defendants’ facilities and consider her decision in solitude. Defendants crafted numerous obstacles to prevent Plaintiff from simply leaving in order to ensure that they would be able to convince her to have an abortion, This included threatening Plaintiff with a large freeloader debt, telling Plaintiff she would lose her husband, telling Plaintiff that her baby was mere “tissue,” telling Plaintiff that she was not considering the “greater good,” telling Plaintiff that she was being “selfish,” and wearing Plaintiffdown to believe that she had no options, {RDSF Nos. 45-53, 55-56; PSF Nos. 20-32, 42-67] Plaintiff was “so programmed” by Defendants that she did not believe she had any other option. [PSF No. 65-66] Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ intrusion into her private decision because she had an abortion against her will. [PSF 65-67] Plaintiff also has suffered severe emotional distress as a result, ofher abortion, (PSF No. 67] Defendants’ actions were a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff harm because prior to Defendants’ coercive interference with Plaintiff's decision regarding her pregnancy, Plaintiff had decided that she would keep the baby. [RDSF Nos. 45-53, 55-56; PSF Nos. 45-67] It was not until their interference that Plaintiff, against her own wishes, obtained an abortion. [/d.] C. —Triable Issues of Fact Exist as to Plaintiff's Constitutional Invasion of Privacy “(The Srey Initiative in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of action against private as well as government entities.” Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 20. The elements for such a claim are: (I) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) a serious invasion of the plaintiff's privacy interest by the defendant. Id. at 32-37; In re Carmen M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 490-492. 39 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION e ee ‘Similar to Plaintiff's common law invasion of privacy claim, there is no doubt that Plaintiff had a Constitutional and legally protected right of privacy in her decision of whether or not to continue her pregnancy. Moreover, Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that issue given that this was one of the most important decisions of her life and concerned her control over her own body, but also her personal destiny. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at 275. Further, Defendants’ conduct constituted a serious invasion of Plaintiff's privacy interests. Rather than allowing Plaintiff to freely and independently decide whether she should continue her pregnancy, Defendants invaded Plaintiff's privacy, utilized all means available to convince her to have an abortion, and took advantage of their position of power over Plaintiff. Given this evidence, there are triable issues of fact. Defendants also suggest that there are no damages for a Constitutional invasion of privacy claim, and that the only remedy is injunctive relief. Yet, even in cases where damages are the only possible remedy that could cure the invasion of privacy at issue, courts have held that a claim for Constitutional invasion of privacy is permitted. See Pettus v. Cole (1996) 49 Cal. App.4th 402, 439-447 (doctors disclosed detailed medical and psychological information regarding plaintiff to his employers in violation of his Constitutional right to privacy, harming plaintiff). At the very least, Plaintiff's Consti ional right to privacy in deciding whether to continue her pregnancy establishes that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of her common law claim and demonstrates that Defendants’ right to freedom of religion does not trump the privacy interest at issue. XI. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES DO NOT BAR PLAINTIFF’S WAGE AND HOUR CLAIMS As explained in detail above, Plaintiff was not a minister because she lacked the capacity to consent to being a minister due to both her age and Defendants’ subsequent use of coercive persuasion over her. For this reason alone, her claims for unpaid minimum wage and overtime are not barred. At a minimum, Plaintiff should be allowed to pursue these claims for the period when she was a minor, given that the ministerial exception does not exempt Defendants from laws regulating child labor. Moreover, Defendants do not dispute that they did not pay Plaintiff minimum wage or overtime, only that they believe they are entitled to judgment on these claims pursuant to the ministerial exception. XII. CONCLUSION For each of the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendants’ motion in its entirety. 40 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONABs scons tin spt METZGER LAW GROUP A Professional Law Corporation ANA, ESQ. Attomeys for Plaintiff, LAURA ANN DECRESCENZO KATAR DATED: February 22, 2016 4 PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION le ee eS ol ee 2967-20806 VINOAIIVD "HOVAE ONOT 008 311s ‘GUYATINOG RYI90 SV IOP waigoasy3 NOLWYOMNOD MV TNOISSAsOUd ¥ Soveccee ian) amowastoL 4aOZLIW “TaVHaAVe 3 & a ageexseng A Sa SRA AR3 2 3 Law oFFicEs oF RAPHAEL METZGER A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 401 EAST OCEAN BOULEVARD, SUITE 800 LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 0802-4 oe ot) e MDrsrss200240 econ nent PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 401 East Ocean Blvd., #800, Long Beach, CA 90802. on February 22, 2016, 2015, I served the foregoing document, described as: PLAINTIFF’S REVISED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 10 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION on the parties to this action as follows: X_ (BY MAIL) I caused copies of such document, enclosed in sealed envelopes, to be deposited in the mail at Long Beach, California with postage thereon fully prepaid to the persons and addresses indicated on the attachee list. I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with U.S. Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of any party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing set forth in this affidavit. (BY FACSIMILE) I served the foregoing document by faxing true copies thereof from facsimile number (562) 436-1561, to the facsimile numbers indicated on the attached list. Said document was transmitted by facsimile transmission, which was reported complete and without error. (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused to be delivered such document by hand to the firms listed on the attached list where personal service is indicated. ___X_ (BY E-MAIL) I delivered such document by electronic mail to the firms listed on the attached list. (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I caused such document to be delivered to the firms indicated on the attached list by Express Mail or by another express service carrier, by placing the document in an envelope designated by the carrier and addressed as indicated on the attached list, with the delivery fees provided for, and depositing same in a box or facility regularly maintained by that carrier or by delivering same to an authorized courier or driver authorized by the carrier to receive documents. X_ (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the offices of a member of this court, at whose direction service was made. Executed on February 22, 2016, at Long Beach, California. PLAINTIFF'S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION2 3 4 5 6 7 8 “) ° 10 528 “ESS a <36 7 18 19 20 21 oa EP 2s eee SERVICE LIST (Decrescenzo v. Church of Scientology, Case No. BC411018) Bert H. Deixler, Esq. Richolas P. Daun, Esq. Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP 20100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725 Los Angeles, CA 90067 {Church of Scientology International) Bric M. Lieberman (pro hac vice) Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky Lieberman, P.C 45 Broadway, Suite 1700 ew York, NY 10006 (Church of Scientology International) Robert £. Mangels, Esq. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7 Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308 (Religious Technology Center) John P. Blumberg, Bsq. Blumberg Law Corporation 444 W. Ocean Blvd., Suite 1500 Hong Beach, CA 90802 (Plaintife) updates 10/68/25 nev) -000- 43 PEAINTIFF’S REVISED MENORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION