Lati vs. Valmores, G.R. No. L-6877, 30 March 1954.

Material averments in a complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, are deemed admitted when not specifically denied. The court may render judgment upon the
pleadings if material averments in the complaint are admitted.
G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Vicente Yu filed a suit against Emilio Mapayo to recover the sum of P 2,800 representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff to
the defendant in the City Court of Davao.
The answer admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended that by reason of hidden defects of the article sold, the defendant had been forced to spend P2, 800 for
repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine, and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees.
The City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs.
Defendant Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao. When, after several continuances, the case was called for hearing on 13 March 1968, the defendant, as well
as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence. However, the attorney
for the plaintiff refuses to present evidence, either oral or documentary, when required by the Court. The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs counsel is correct when it refused to comply the order of the trial court to present evidence and demanded that he would
introduce evidence only in rebuttal.
RULING:
Yes. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant
to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports appellant:
Sec. 2. Judicial admissions. Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.
Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to law. The court below is directed to enter judgment in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P2, 800.00.
G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez
left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Beatriz filed an action for breach of promise to marry with damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as
commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 000.00 as actual damages; P25, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But
the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition
for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable settlement. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time, however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo
defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable
settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
valid defense. Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure
to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or
opinions instead of facts is not valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants consent need to be obtained to the procedure of adducing evidence before the clerk of court.
RULING:
No. Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside
was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court.
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975
ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO LEONARDO NG SUA and CO OYO, petitioners, vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Cebu and TAN PUT, respondents.
FACTS:
A complaint for accounting of the real and personal properties of the Glory Commercial Company located in the Philippines and in Hong Kong was filed on February 9, 1971 by
respondent Tan Put against the spouses-petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay as well as Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo.
Tan alleged that she "is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner in the commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company with the petitioners, through fraud
and machination, took actual and active management of the partnership and although her husband was the manager of Glory Commercial Company, defendants managed to use
the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and building's in the cities of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue, and the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla.

On February 3, 1973, however, the date set for the pre-trial, both of the two defendants-spouses, did not appear, for which reason, upon motion of plaintiff, in an order, they were
all "declared in DEFAULT when they failed to appear at the pre-trial."
The hearing of the plaintiff's evidence ex-parte was set before the Branch Clerk of Court who is deputized for the purpose.
But the scheduled ex-parte reception of evidence did not take place on November 20, 1974, for on October 28, 1974, upon verbal motion of plaintiff, the court issued the following
self-explanatory order: .
Acting favorably on the motion of the plaintiff dated October 18, 1974, the Court deputized the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of the plaintiff ex-parte to be made
on November 20, 1974. However, on October 28, 1974, the plaintiff, together with her witnesses, appeared in court and asked, thru counsel that she be allowed to present her
evidence.
Considering the time and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in bringing her witnesses to the court, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby authorized to receive immediately the
evidence of the plaintiff ex-parte.
Upon learning of these orders on October 23, 1973, the defendant Lim Teck Cheng, thru counsel, Atty. Sitoy, filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, and on November 1, 1974,
defendant Eng Chong Leonardo, thru counsel Atty. Alcudia, filed also his own motion for reconsideration and clarification of the same orders. These motions were denied in an
order dated December 6, 1974 but received by the movants only on December 23, 1974. Meanwhile, respondent court rendered the impugned decision on December 20, 1974. It
does not appear when the parties were served copies of this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ex-parte reception of the evidence of the plaintiff by the clerk of court can be the basis for the court rendition of a judgment.
RULING:
No. The delegation to the clerk of court of the function of receiving plaintiff's evidence is irregular. And as regards the ex-parte reception of plaintiff's evidence and subsequent
rendition of the judgment by default based thereon, it was violative of the right of the petitioners, under the applicable rules and principles on default, to a common and single
fate with their non-defaulted co-defendants.
OLD RULE: Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete - prohibits the delegation of the power to receive evidence on Clerks of Court.
NEW RULE: Section 9, Rule 30 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure - Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. The judge of the court where the case is pending
shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the court may
delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission
of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.
G.R. No. L-64250

September 30, 1983

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and ERLITO LORCA, Petitioners, vs. HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, Judge Presiding over Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, TIMOTEA T. MORALDE, CAYETANO T. MORALDE, JR., ALEXANDER T. MORALDE, EMMANUEL T. MORALDE, and JOCELYN MORALDE ABELLANA,
Respondents.

FACTS:
A bus owned by Pantranco South Express, Inc., driven by Rogelio Dillomas, collided with a bus owned by Superlines Transportation Co., Inc., then driven by Erlito Lorca along the
highway at Lumilang, Calauag, Quezon, resulting in the instantaneous death of Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., a passenger in the Pantranco bus.
Superlines instituted an action for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, against Pantranco and Rogelio Dillomas, driver of said Pantranco
Bus. In its complaint, Superlines alleged that the recklessness and negligence of the Pantranco bus driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that there was want of
diligence on the part of Pantranco in the selection and supervision of its driver.
Timotea T. Moralde, widow of the deceased Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., and her children, filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, against
Superlines and its driver, Erlito Lorca, as well as Pantranco and its driver, Rogelio Dillomas. The cause of action pleaded against Superlines was based on quasi-delict, while that
against Pantranco, on culpa-contractual.
Petitioners Superlines and its driver Erlito Lorca filed a motion to dismiss in the civil case filed in RTC-Cavite City on the ground of pendency of another civil case pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca Branch. They suggested that private respondent Moraldes should pursue their claim for damages by intervening in the Gumaca action.
It is contended that since the right of private respondents to claim damages is founded on the same facts involved in the Gumaca action, any judgment rendered therein will
amount to res judicata in the Cavite case, for whatever adjudication is made in the former case between Pantranco and Superlines as regards either of the parties culpability
would set said issue at rest. Furthermore, such intervention would prevent multiplicity of suits and avoid confusion that may arise should the trial courts render conflicting
decisions.
Finding that the two cases involved different parties as well as different causes of action, respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss.

Dissatisfied, Superlines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, which petition, however, was denied due
course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent RTC-Cavite City Judge Luis Victor erred in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground that the two civil cases involved different
parties as well as different causes of action.
RULING:
No. There is, however, a more pragmatic solution to the controversy at bar; and that is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case. Considerations of judicial economy
and administration, as well as the convenience of the parties for which the rules on procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather than the
Gumaca court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties concerned.
As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to require private respondents who are all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would
unnecessarily expose them to considerable expenses. On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the defendants transportation companies if they were required to plead
their causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not expose them to expenses which they are not already liable to incur in connection with the Gumaca case. The objection
interposed by Superlines that it has its offices in Atimonan, Quezon, should not detract from the overall convenience afforded by the consolidation of cases in the Cavite Court. For
apart from the fact that petitioner and its driver are represented by the same counsel with offices located in Manila, defendants transportation companies can readily avail of their
facilities for conveying their witnesses to the place of trial.
The civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon is consolidated with the civil case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca
Branch, is directed to transfer, without unnecessary delay, the records to the Regional Court of Cavite.

G.R. No. L-10884

March 31, 1959

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE LEATHER CO. INC., ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Philippine National Bank filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Philippine Leather Co. Inc. PNB alleged that Philippine Leather applied for a commercial
letter of credit in favor of the Turner Tanning Machinery Co. of Peabody, Massachusetts, U.S.A. to cover the value of certain machineries and their accessories as well as in favor of
Bay State Chemical Co., of Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., to pay for the importation of color dye. The defendant failed and refused to pay the amount of the draft and the charges
due thereon.
In its answer, Philippine Leather admitted PNBs averments except as to the correctness of the amounts due on the two drafts, the correctness of which they were still checking.
PNB filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since the defendants had admitted the material averments of its complaint except as to the correctness of the
amounts due, the defendant's answer did not tender a genuine issue.
The Court granted the plaintiff's motion and rendered judgment ordering Philippine Leather to pay PNB.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter certified the case to this Court for the reason that only questions of law are raised.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court is correct in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by PNB.
RULING:
Yes. The defendant's answer to the cause of action does not tender a genuine issue. In fact they admit that they are indebted to the plaintiff. As the affidavit subscribed and sworn
to by the Manager of the Special Assets Department of the plaintiff, in charge of all outstanding accounts of its debtors, attached to the motion for summary judgment, furnishes
the Court with the payments made by the defendants on their account and the amount due from them, which they failed to oppose by counter affidavits, the plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment.
G.R. No. L-17721

October 16, 1961

GREGORIO APELARIO, doing business under the style "GREGORIO TRADING," plaintiff-appellee, vs. INES CHAVEZ & COMPANY, LTD., doing business under the
style "FIDELITY MOTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, LTD., and INES CHAVEZ, Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
Gregorio Apelario filed a complaint against Ines Chavez & Company, Ltd., a limited partnership, and its general partner, Ines Chavez. The defendant partnership had purchased on
credit from plaintiff ten sets of axle assemblies for the sum of P2, 400.00
Defendant delivered in payment to the plaintiff two postdated cash checks for P1, 200.00 each, drawn against the Philippine Bank of Commerce; that when the checks were
presented for payment, they were dishonored for lack of funds.

Plaintiff demanded payment in cash, but defendant refused to pay.

Defendant filed an answer admitting the allegations of the complaint; admitting that plaintiff had demanded payment of P2,400, but pleaded that defendants could not pay the
plaintiff, because they have so many accounts receivables which have not yet been paid to them, of which fact the defendant, was duly informed by the plaintiff and thereby
requested to wait a while.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, and over the objection of defendants, the trial court rendered judgment on the pleadings, sentencing defendants to pay P2, 400.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in rendering judgement on the pleadings.
RULING:
No. The defendants-appellants had admitted all the material allegations of the complaint concerning the existence of the debt and its non-payment. The pleaded excuse, that they
had requested plaintiff to, wait because appellants many accounts receivable had not yet been collected, is clearly no defense, for a debtor cannot delay payment due just to suit
its convenience.
G.R. No. L-49668 November 14, 1989
POLICARPIO, LUCIO, JULIAN, CATALINO, BONIFACIO, CONRADA, DOMINGO, PAQUITA, AND LILIA, ALL SURNAMED GALICIA, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, CFI, Branch V, Samar (Calbayog City), ZOSIMA PALAJOS, TITING LISTOJAS, ALFREDO
PALAJOS, MANUELITO ROSIALDA, respondents.
FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the Municipal Court of Almagro, Samar, alleging that Amancio Palajos is the owner and in actual possession of a parcel of land located at
Bacjao, Almagro, Samar which he acquired by way of donation from his father, Juan Palajos. It is further alleged that defendants (petitioners herein) forcibly entered the
northeastern portion of the said property.
The trial of the case was set several times but was postponed at the instance of defendants (petitioners herein). For the fifth time, neither the defendants nor counsel appeared.
Accordingly, the court granted a trial ex parte on motion of plaintiffs counsel.
The municipal trial court rendered judgment ordering defendants Policarpio Galicia, Perfecto Galicia, Victorio Galicia, Julian Galicia and Eduarda Galicia to restore to plaintiff
Amancio Palajos the portion of land and ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff a monthly rental in the amount of FIFTY PESOS (P 50.00) on the premises in question for its
use and occupation.
For failure of the defendants to pay the rentals adjudged in the forcible entry case, a writ of execution was issued and after levy, the deputy sheriff of Calbayog City, on August 4,
1976, sold at public auction the real property owned by petitioners' deceased father adjoining the land subject of the forcible entry case
Over 14 months after the execution sale, petitioners filed a complaint for Ownership and Damages against herein respondents in the Court of First Instance of Samar
alleging that they are co-owners of a certain parcel of agricultural land (subject of the auction sale) which they inherited from their deceased father, Pedro Galicia.

The complaint further alleged that pursuant to forcible entry case, respondents were able to take possession of the land in question as said case was heard exparte; and that a decision was rendered in respondents' favor and said decision was executed.
In their Answer, respondents (defendants below) countered that they were able to take possession of the land described in the complaint by virtue of the decision and
later, execution of the decision in the forcible entry case, which, by petitioners' (plaintiffs below) averment in their complaint is an admission of an existing judgment that
would constitute res judicata; that they are the lawful owners of the disputed land the same having been subjected to levy and execution in 1975 thru a sale in favor of
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Juan Palajos.
At the pre-trial, counsel for private respondents file a motion for summary judgment which was granted by respondent judge.
Defendants' (private respondents herein) motion for summary judgment was filed alleging that no genuine issue exists in the case at bar after the pre-trial was
conducted and admission of facts were had while plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed their opposition to the motion for summary judgment alleging among others, that genuine
issues exist.
The court rendered the summary judgment dismissing petitioners' complaint, the pertinent portion of which reads:
As demonstrated by the parties, there is no question that the land in dispute is that parcel described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, a portion of which was a
subject in a forcible entry case before the Municipal Trial Court of Almagro Samar (Exhibit 1, 2 and 3) with the defendants now as successors-in-interest of the
plaintiff, and most of the herein plaintiffs as defendants.
The pleadings also show that upon the death of the primitive owner, Pedro Galicia, the plaintiffs as children and grandchildren possessed and owned this land proindiviso, until the possession of said portion was transferred to the defendants when the decision in that forcible entry case was executed in 1976 (Exhibit 7) such
being the case, therefore, with respect to this portion of the land in dispute, the possession is settled, which would constitute as a bar to this action.
With respect to the other portion of the land in dispute, the plaintiffs admit that possession was transferred to the defendant by virtue of a sale executed by the
sheriff; the one year period having elapsed without exercising their right of redemption, as a result a final deed of sale was issued. The legality of the sale not
having been assailed by them, for all intents and purposes, ownership on this land has been vested on the defendants as heirs of Juan Palajos.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it decided the civil case by summary judgment.
It is the contention of petitioners that the trial court erred in deciding their complaint by summary judgment when there are several genuine issues involved therein which require
a full trial on the merits.
1. The execution sale conducted by the Deputy Provincial Sheriff was null and void and would have merited a trial on the merits.
2. Between Civil Case No. 56 and Civil Case No. 758-CC, there can be no res judicata, considering that there is no identity of parties, cause of action and subject matter between
the two actions.
RULING:

No. There is no reason to disturb the summary judgment rendered by respondent judge.
The Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment "is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial. The very object is 'to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a
suitor to the burden of trial.' The test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is-whether the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits in support of the motion are
sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious".
In addition, summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in the present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions wherein there exists no serious controversy.
The procedure may be availed of not only by claimants, but also by defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims. A motion for summary judgment
assumes that scrutinizing the facts will disclose that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as not to be genuine
issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits.
The disputed property is the same parcel of land, which adjoins private respondents' lot which was the subject of the forcible entry case and from which
petitioners were ordered to vacate. When petitioners (then defendants), failed to satisfy the rentals adjudged in the forcible entry case, said adjoining parcel of
land was sold at public auction to Juan Palajos (respondents' predecessor-in-interest) as the higher bidder in the execution sale to satisfy the monetary
judgment rendered therein. The property so described in petitioners' complaint squarely fits what has been levied upon and sold at public auction (Rollo, p. 30),
the owners of which are now private respondents upon the demise of their predecessor-in-interest.
There is thus no question that issue of ownership of the disputed land subject of the present petition has long been foreclosed in the forcible entry case which culminated in the
public auction sale of the parcel of land now sought to be recovered. Having failed to redeem the property sold at the public auction sale within the reglementary period of twelve
(12) months, petitioners cannot now claim that they still own said property. Petitioners' complaint for Ownership and Damages is but a belated and disguised attempt to revive a
judgment debtors' right of redemption which has long expired. There being no issue as to any material fact raised in the pleadings, summary judgment may be rendered.
G. R. No. 93219

August 30, 1990

MARCELINO G. RIVERA, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. MARCELINO F. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Reg ional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio City, Respondents.
FACTS:
Marcelino, G. Rivera, Jr. was arrested and detained for he allegedly was about to transport marijuana to Manila. A case for violation of R. A. 6425 was filed against him with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The first witness for the prosecution, Cpl. Victorio Afalla, partially testified on direct examination and
reserved the right to identify the marijuana specimen allegedly confiscated from the petitioner.

On June 8, 1989, for the same reasons, the hearing was re-set to February 27, 1990. On February 27, 1990, Capt. Lina Sarmiento, the Forensic Chemist, who will present the
marijuana specimen, despite notice, failed to appear. Petitioner, through counsel, then moved for the dismissal of the case. This was denied by respondent Judge and the hearing
was re-set to March 28, 1990.
On March 28, 1990, when the case was called at about 8:30 a.m. Capt. Lina Sarmiento despite notice, was not around thereby necessitating a second call. When the case was
called for the second time at around 9:00 a.m. Capt. Sarmiento was still not around. Hence, Atty. Tomas Gorospe, in behalf of petitioner, orally moved for the dismissal of the case
invoking the right to speedy trial as the petitioner stands confined and that the Government failed to prosecute or adduce evidence due to the non-appearance of a vital
prosecution witness.
The respondent Judge verbally granted the motion and ordered the immediate release of the accused.
While the subsequent calendared cases set for that day was in progress, and in less than an hour after pronouncement of the verbal order of dismissal, Capt. Lina Sarmiento
arrived direct from Quezon City. Upon a satisfactory explanation, the respondent Judge issued his now assailed order setting aside his previous verbal order of dismissal and rescheduling Crim. Case No. 6201-R for continuation of trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the verbal order of dismissal made in open court amounted to the acquittal of petitioner and which order is immediately final and executory, the
respondent Judge could no longer set it aside without violating petitioner's constitutional right against double jeopardy.
RULING:
No. The earlier verbal order of dismissal was not final, in fact, was ineffective. The order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of
dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to
set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.
G.R. No. 83251

January 23, 1991

RENATO B. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZENAIDA BALTAZAR as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila, and ROSEMARIE MANESE,
respondents.
FACTS:
Rosemarie Manese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against petitioner Renato Suarez, his mother Paz Suarez and his sister Milagros Suarez.

Before she could finish the presentation of her evidence, respondent Manese filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to her right to file another action for custody and support
of minor Rafael Carlos Suarez, contending that the issue as to who between the parties has the rightful and legal custody of the minor child could be fully adjudicated in
another action and not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.
The trial court issued a resolution granting the motion with prejudice. Thereafter, respondent Manese filed another action for custody of minor and support before the trial court
against petitioner. The latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground of bar by prior judgment rendered in the petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissing the same with
prejudice. The motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied by the trial court.
Manese filed a motion for visitorial rights and a motion for custody of the minor during the Christmas season. The trial court issued an order granting t Manese's two motions.
Not satisfied with the orders of the trial court, petitioner filed with respondent appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining
order/preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the special civil action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of habeas corpus, is res judicata to the present action for custody of minor and
support.
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the petition for custody of minor cannot prosper due to the prior judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the principle of res
judicata applies even if the party changed the form of its cause of action in filing the present action for custody of minor.
Requisites to the Principle of Res Judicata:
(1) There must be a final judgment or order;
(2) The court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties;
(3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and
(4) There is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
However, the foregoing requisites should be subservient to the most significant requirement that the former judgment must be a valid one. The Court of Appeals was correct that
the former order issued by the trial court dismissing the habeas corpus case is null and void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Further, the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
the case show that the order of the trial court was issued whimsically and capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to nullity of the order.
The motion to dismiss of Manese was filed during the trial and hearing stage of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The general rule governing dismissal of actions by the
plaintiff after the answer has been served an action shall not be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff after the service of the answer except by order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. Hence, the trial court has the judicial discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss at the instance of the plaintiff, but this

discretion should be exercised within reasonable limits. In such case, the trial court has to decide whether the dismissal of the case should be allowed, and if so on what terms and
conditions.
In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states that it was without prejudice to the filing of an action for the custody of minor on the ground that the issue as
to the custody of the child would be properly determined in a second action to be filed. Clearly, the purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a writ of
habeas corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this
time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground upon which respondent Manese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the question as
to who shall have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of habeas corpus without the necessity of filing a separate action.
Nevertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action without stating the reasons or basis thereof. This should not
prevent the filing of the second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court
in the habeas corpus case. Hence, the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits which would serve
as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the prior judgment of dismissal with prejudice was validly rendered within the lawful discretion of the court and could be considered as
adjudication on the merits, nonetheless, the principle of res judicata should be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. The application of
the said principle, under the particular facts obtaining, would amount to denial of justice and/or bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance. It is worth stating here that the
controversy in the instant case is not just an ordinary suit between parties over a trivial matter but a litigation initiated by the natural mother over the welfare
and custody of her child, in which the State has a paramount interest. The fundamental policy of the State as embodied in the Constitution in promoting and protecting the
welfare of children shall not be disregarded by the courts by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA
and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
FACTS:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand
protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.
When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the
face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo,
Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila
were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide in another Information.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge.

Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D.
Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y
Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law."
Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be
imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction as the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal requirements
for the perfection of an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death
under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
RULING:
Yes. Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of
broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was
bound by its provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides that when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape
with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed to impose the penalty of
either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that
"[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the
trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament,
it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the
sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter
upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.

As long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the
laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as
citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department concerned, its amendment, modification, or
repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body.
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This
is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he
disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
G.R. No. L-27013 October 18, 1977
ANGEL MASCUANA and ANGELES M. VERDEFLOR, petitioners-appellants, vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, LEON T. TREYES ULPIANA INSON GONZALO
ORDANIEL and FLORENTINO GARGALLANO respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
Mascuana and his daughter, Angeles, in a letter informed the mayor of Talisay that portion of Burgos Street was occupied by squatters. Mascuana said that the constructions of
the squatters were prejudicial to the public particularly to the owner of a lot his daughter Angeles, who wanted to build a residential house on her lot. Mascuana asked the mayor
to take, the necessary steps to clear the area of squatters so that the public could use that part of Burgos Street.
The mayor took up Masacuana's request with a municipal council. It was found that the alleged portion or extension of Burgos Street mentioned in Mascuana's letter is the
property of the municipality of Talisay. Thus;
RESOLUTION No. 59 was passed by members of the municipal council of Talisay, Negros Occidental. The council declared the portion of land being a municipal property,
therefore, to declare the same as closed or not necessary for vehicular traffic.
RESOLUTION No. 1035 was passed by members of the provincial board of Negros Occidental. The provincial board approved Resolution No. 59 passed by the municipal council
of Talisay, Negros Occidental.
Mascuana and his daughter Angeles filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the provincial board of Negros Occidental, the municipal council of Talisay,
Negros Occidental and the four occupants of the area in question, namely, Councilor Leon T. Treyes, Ulpiana Inson, Gonzalo Ordaniel and Florentino Gargallano, a petition wherein
they prayed that Resolution No. 59 of the municipal council and Resolution No. 1035 of the provincial board be declared void.
The petitioners insinuated that the municipal council was influenced by Councilor Treyes, one of the occupants of the disputed area. They alleged that the
provincial board made itself a party to an illegal act in order to justify the stay of Councilor Treyes in that area.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss. In his motion respondent Treyes alleged that he had occupied a part of the disputed area since 1942 and that he had constructed
thereon a house worth not less than P47, 000 while his three correspondents had occupied the area for more than twenty years. For that reason, according to Treyes, the remedy

of declaratory relief is not proper in this case since it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy. Treyes further alleged that if, as shown in Mascuana's letter to the
mayor, he had subdivided his lot and transferred it to his three children, he is not a real party in interest.
The petitioners in their opposition contended that their action might be treated as an action for prohibition wherein they seek to enjoin the enforcement of
Resolution No. 59.
The lower court issued a minute order finding the argument in support of the motion to dismiss to be well-founded, the petition was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court should make findings of fact and law in a minute order of dismissal.
RULING:
Yes. It is true that there is no rule requiring a trial court to make findings of fact and law in an order of dismissal. The constitutional requirement of making findings of fact and law
applies only to decisions. Nevertheless, it should be home in mind that a trial court's order dismissing a complaint or petition is appealable like a final judgment. Therefore, for the
satisfaction of the losing party and to assist the appellate court in resolving the appeal, the trial court should take some pains to reason out its order of dismissal and should not
merely incorporate therein, by reference, the motion to dismiss.
We should not be understood as having prejudged this case in favor of the petitioners-appellants. What is being underscored is that the ends of justice would be better served by
holding in this case a trial on the merits if no amicable settlement is arrived at during the pre-trial or if there is no agreed statement of facts, The legal points raised by the
petitioners should be resolved in a decision on the merits of the case.
G.R. No. L-44627

December 14, 1978

LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner, vs.

HON. ALBERTO V. SEERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON, and FELIPE AIZON, respondents.
FACTS:
Joselito Aizon being the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus owned and operated by FELIPE AIZON was involved in a vehicular accident. MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA
BARING, both passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger bus died. Thus, Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City with Double
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence.
Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In view of said plea, the court rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged and sentencing him "to
indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis the amount of P12, 000.00.
After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon for the indemnity of P12, 000.00, but the same was returned unsatisfied
because of his insolvency.

Whereupon, petitioner Lucia S. Pajarito, mother of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis, filed with the court a motion for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of
Execution and served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito Aizon as alleged in the Information.
Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to wit:
(1) That he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question having been sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of transfer has not been
executed because the full price has not yet been paid; and
(2) That in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity is concerned.
The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito, was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award
was made, or in a separate civil action.
RULING:
The subsidiary civil liability may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the
institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant.
Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when:
(1) The employer is engaged in any kind of industry;
(2) The employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and
(3) He is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.
The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case.
A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon
the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability.
The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the
employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence.

The decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but also with regard to its amount because
the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow
an employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.
Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of the bus but only claims now that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve
no important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil
liability. Under the circumstances, it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the
proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has
been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has
a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution.
The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the owner and operator of the in fated bus as he sold it already to Isaac Aizon, father of the accused Joselito Aizon, is
a matter that could be litigated and resolved in the same criminal case. In support of his opposition to the motion of the complainant, served upon him, for the purpose of the
enforcement of his subsidiary liability Felipe Aizon may adduce all the evidence necessary for that purpose. Indeed, the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may
be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. This would certainly facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties.
The trial court is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus.
G.R. No. 106436

December 3, 1994

VIRGILIO D. IMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOLIDAY HILLS STOCK AND BREEDING FARM CORPORATION, FNCB FINANCE CORPORATION,
respondents.
FACTS:
Virgilio Imsons Toyota Corolla and a Hino diesel truck registered under FNCB Finance Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation were involved in a
vehicular collision. The collision seriously injured Virgilio Imson and totally wrecked his car.
Imson filed a Complaint for Damages with the RTC Baguio City against the registered owners of the truck and truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corporation.
The truck owners failed to answer and were declared in default.
However, Virgilio Imson and the truck insurer entered into a compromise agreement which provided that Western Guaranty Corporation admits that its total liability and shall pay
P70, 000.00.
In consequence of the compromise agreement, the trial court dismissed the Complaint for Damages against Western Guaranty Corporation.

The truck owners moved to dismiss the case. It argued that since they are all indispensable parties under a common cause of action, the dismissal of the case against defendant
insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them. The trial court denied the motion.
Private respondent Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation assailed the denial order through a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Restraining Order
filed with respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted on the ground that since the defendants are indispensable parties under a common cause of action, the dismissal of the case
against the insurer by virtue of a compromise agreement must result in the dismissal of the suit against the truck owners.
RULING:
No.
In sum, Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete states that where a complaint alleges a common cause of action against defendants who are all indispensable parties to the case, its dismissal
against any of them by virtue of a compromise agreement with the plaintiff necessarily results in the dismissal of the case against the other defendants, including those in default.
The ruling is rooted on the rationale that the court's power to act in a case involving a common cause of action against indispensable parties "is integral and cannot be split such
that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time render judgment against the rest.
For Lim Tanhu to apply to the case at bench, it must be established that:
(1) Petitioner has common cause of action against private respondents and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R; and
(2) All the defendants are indispensable parties to the case.
In the case at bench, it is clear that petitioner has different and separate causes of action against the defendants in the case. The allegations in the Complaint
show that petitioner seeks to recover from the truck driver for his wrong which caused injury to petitioner and his car. The cause of action against him is based
on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. Quasi-delict, too, is the basis of the cause of action against defendants beneficial and registered
owners. But in their case, it is Article 2180 of the same Code which governs the rights of the parties.
However, with respect to defendant Western Guaranty Corporation, petitioner's cause of action is based on contract. He seeks to recover from the insurer on the
basis of the third party liability clause of its insurance contract with the owners of the truck.
Lim Tanhu will not apply to the case at bench for there is no showing that petitioner has a common cause of action against the defendants in Civil Case No. 248R.
Defendants in the civil case are not all indispensable parties. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.

Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not
necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between
him and those already parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation.
It is true that all of petitioner's claims in the civil case is premised on the wrong committed by defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the
suit. The other defendants, however, cannot be categorized as indispensable parties. They are merely proper parties to the case. Proper parties have been described as parties
whose presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without
affecting them. It is easy to see that if any of them had not been impleaded as defendant, the case would still proceed without prejudicing the party not impleaded. Thus, if
petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty Corporation, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court
would not lose its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit. The insurer, clearly, is not an indispensable party in the civil case.
G.R. No. L-47448

May 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch VI, Province of Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and
DIOSDADO MARAPAO, respondents.
FACTS:
The provincial fiscal of Bukidnon filed Information in the court of respondent judge Ocaya, charging the three private respondents- accused (Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao
and Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries in Don Carlos, Bukidnon conspiring attack and assault Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th)
day from her child delivery, by then and there wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size stone at her face.
LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which relapse incapacitated her from performing
her customary labor for a period of more than thirty days.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held, much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued. Respondent judge motu
proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court". The trial court is of the opinion
that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of treatment, and not what the victim declares because the
same is self-serving.
ISSUE:
Whether the Judge Ocaya erred in dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the medical
certificate regarding the duration of treatment and "not what the victim declares because the same is self-serving."
RULING:
Yes. It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the evidence
presented at the trial,' much less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case without hearing the parties
and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper trial.

It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial, court's jurisdiction was committed does not
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject
matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will
not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached.
Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case had only resulted in duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of records when
respondent trial judge dismissed the instant case for want of jurisdiction, when it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the accused and try him. "
Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed with proper study and circumspection before summarily dismissing cases duly filed within their court's
cognizance and needlessly burdening the appellate courts with cases such as that at bar which should not have reached us at all in the first instance. Respondent judge's
disregard of the established rule that the information for serious physical injuries properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the case, and that if
from the evidence submitted a lesser offense was established, that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense, is difficult of
comprehension. Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably could corroborate the victim's testimony that her
injuries had taken longer to heal than had at first been estimated by him as well as clarify the location of the victim's facial scar.
Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the victim's declaration as to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to
whether the State and the offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since seemingly with his erroneous pre-conceptions
and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their case as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries. The case below should therefore be transferred to another court
presided by another judge.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null and void. The case below for serious physical injuries is remanded and ordered transferred to Branch V
of the court of first instance below, and the judge presiding the same is ordered to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest and to proceed with dispatch with the arraignment of
the respondents-accused and the trial and determination of the case on the merits.