Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COLLEGE OF LAW
_________________________________
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
FOR THE REQUIREMENTS IN
LLB 242N (LABOR STANDARDS LAW)
_________________________________
SUBMITTED BY:
MIKKO GABRIEL L. VALENDEZ
JD 2 (EH306)
SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. JEFFERSON M. MARQUEZ
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
AND PLACEMENT
115. ISS Indochina Corp., vs. Ferrer, G.R. No.
156381, Oct. 14, 2005
116. People vs. Capt. Gasacao, G.R. No. 168449,
Nov. 11, 2005
117. Acuna vs. CA, G.R. No. 159832, May 5,
2006
118. Asian International Manpower Services vs.
CA, G.R. No. 169652, October 9, 2006
1.
2.
Facts:
Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) is
a religious corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine law. Austria was a Pastor of the
SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated.
Austria worked with the SDA for 28 years from 1963
to 1991. He began his work with the SDA as a
literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA
6
Issue:
Do the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction
to try and decide the complaint filed by Austria
against the SDA?
Ruling:
Yes, they have jurisdiction.
The principle of separation of church and state finds
no application here. The case at bar does not concern
an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar
the State from taking cognizance of the same. An
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between
the church and its members and relate to matters of
faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of
the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this
so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State
cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication,
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of
sacraments and other activities with attached
religious significance.
10
FACTS:
Johnny
Pastorin
(Respondent)
was
employed by Metromedia Times Corporation
(Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field
Representative/Collector. His task entailed the
periodic collection of receivables from dealers of
petitioner's newspapers.
11
YUSEN
AIR
AND
SEA
SERVICE
PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED,petitioner
vs.
ISAGANI A. VILLAMOR,respondent
Facts:
-Petitioner,is engaged in the business of freight
forwarding. As such, it is contracted by clients to
pick-up, unpack, consolidate, deliver, transport and
distribute all kinds of cargoes, acts as cargo or freight
accommodation and enters into charter parties for the
carriage of all kinds of cargoes or freight.
-On 1993, petitioner hired respondent as branch
manager in its Cebu Office. Later, petitioner
reclassified respondents position to that of Division
Manager, which position respondent held until his
resignation on February 1, 2002.
- Immediately after his resignation, respondent
started working for Aspac International, a
corporation engaged in the same line of business as
that of petitioner.
- On February 11, 2002,petitioner filed against
respondent a complaint[3] for injunction and damages
with prayer for a temporary restraining order, the
complaint alleged,inter alia, as follows:
7.
That
duly
[respondent]
signed
an
12
undertaking to abide by
the policies of the
[Petitioner]
which
includes the provision on
the
employees
responsibility
and
obligation in cases of
conflict of interest, which
reads:
2nd issue:
No employee may engage in any business or
undertaking that is directly or indirectly in
competition with that of the company and its
affiliates or engage directly or indirectly in any
undertaking or activity prejudicial to the interests of
the company or to the performance of his/her job or
work assignments. The same provision will be
implemented for a period of two (2) years from
the date of an employees resignation, termination
or separation from the company.
-Petitioner thus prayed for a judgment enjoining
respondent from further pursuing his work at Aspac
International, and awarding it P2,000,000 as actual
damages; P300,000 as exemplary damages;
- respondent filed against petitioner a case for illegal
dismissal before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
- Meanwhile, instead of filing his answer,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,arguing that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
said case because an employer-employee relationship
is involved.
1st issue:
With regards to the 2 yr prohibition
HELD:
HELD:
13
exempla
ry and
other
forms of
damages
arising
from the
employe
remploye
e
relations
;"
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
4.
xxx
Clai
ms for
actual,
moral,
Issue
-With the reality that the stipulation refers to the postemployment relations of the parties.
1.
2.
3.
Held
1.
1 19 August 2014.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
2.
2.
Ruling:
SC ruled first with jurisdiction as it is decisive. If
NLRC has no jurisdiction, then it would be
unnecessary to talk about the validity of dismissal.
Petitioner contends that it is SEC, and not the NLRC,
who has jurisdiction since respondent was a
corporate officer. Is respondent a corporate officer?
Here, petitioner failed to prove that respondent was a
corporate officer.
Corporate officers are those officers who
are given that character under the
Corporation Code. Under Section 25
thereof, the corporate officers are the
president, secretary, treasurer and such other
officers as may be provided by the by-laws.
Since petitioner failed to satisfy burden of proof that
was required of it, we cannot sanction its claim that
respondent was a corporate officer whose removal
was cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A and not
by NLRC.
An office is created by the charter of the
corporation and the officer is elected by the
directors and stockholders. On the other
hand, employee occupies no office and
generally is employed not by the action of
the directors or stockholders but by the
managing officer of the corporation who
also determines compensation of employee.
Respondent was appointed VP by Malonzo,
petitioners manager, not by the board of directors. It
was also Malozo who determined respondents
compensation package. Thus, respondent was an
employee, not a corporate officer. The CA was
correct in ruling that jurisdiction over the case was
properly with NLRC, not with SEC.
Validity of the Dismissal
While loss of confidence is a valid ground for
dismissing the employee, it should not be simulated.
It must not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the
employer against a claim that the dismissal was
arbitrary.
Loss of trust and confidence must be based
on a willful breach and founded on cleary
established facts. A breach is willful if it is
done
intentionally,
knowingly
and
16
2.
19
21
Facts:
Petitioners were employed as female flight
attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL)
on different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They
are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor
organization certified as the sole and exclusive
certified bargaining representative of the flight
attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent.
On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement[3]
incorporating the terms and conditions of their
agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter
referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.
The controversy of this petition is the the
constitutionality of Section 144, Part A of their
PAL-FASAP CBA, it provides that:
A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22
November 1996:
3.
Compulsory Retirement
Issue:
Subject to the grooming standards
provisions of this Agreement, compulsory
retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for
females and sixty (60) for males. Xxxx
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of
the material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief prayed for irrespective of
whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.
22
24
Issue:
Ruling:
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have
jurisdiction over LRTA. Petitioners themselves
admitted in their complaint that LRTA "is a
government agency organized and existing pursuant
to anoriginal charter (Executive Order No. 603)," and
that they are employees of METRO.
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Venus, Jr., which has
a similar factual backdrop, holds that LRTA, being a
government-owned or controlled corporation created
by an original charter, is beyond the reach of the
Department of Labor and Employment which has
jurisdiction over workers in the private sector, viz:
. . . [E]mployees of petitioner METRO
cannot be considered as employees of
petitioner LRTA. The employees hired by
METRO are covered by the Labor Code and
are under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Labor and Employment, whereas the
employees of petitioner LRTA, a
government-owned
and
controlled
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
25
for
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Coros was a
corporate officer of Matling
Whether or not the Labort Arbiter has
jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
First Issue
As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or
other employee of a private employer is properly
cognizable by the LA. This is provided for in Article
217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code.
Where the complaint for illegal dismissal
concerns a corporate officer, however, the
controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), because
the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or
partnership
relations
between
and
among
stockholders, members, or associates, or between any
or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or
association of which they are stockholders, members,
or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership, or association and the State
insofar as the controversy concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
WHEREFORE, the
on certiorari is denied.
petition
for
review
Issue:
Whether or not, writ of habeas data is applicable in
the case at bar.
Ruling:
No, the habeas data rule, in general, is designed to
protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
28
Facts:
Renato Real was the Manager of respondent
corporation Sangu Philippines. Heclaimed to have been
illegaly dismissed through Board Resolution 2001-
Issues:
Ruling:
No intra-corporate relationship between the parties.
To
determine
whether a case involves an
intra-corporate controversy,
and is to be heard and
decided by the branches of
the
RTC
specifically
designated by the Court to try
and decide such cases, two
elements must concur: (a) the
status or relationship of the
parties, and (2) the nature of
the question that is the
subject of their controversy.
30
RULING:
To determine whether a case involves an intracorporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided
by the branches of the RTC specifically designated
by the Court to try and decide such cases, two
elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of
the parties, and (2) the nature of the question that is
the subject of their controversy.
31
Facts
In a letter agreement dated 3 May 1991,
signed by individual respondent Rudolf Lietz
(Rudolf) and conformed to by Portillo, the latter was
hired by the former under the following terms and
conditions:
A copy of [Lietz Inc.s] work rules
and policies on personnel is enclosed and an
inherent part of the terms and conditions of
employment.
We acknowledge your proposal in
your application specifically to the effect
that you will not engage in any other gainful
employment by yourself or with any other
company either directly or indirectly without
written consent of [Lietz Inc.], and we
hereby accept and henceforth consider your
proposal an undertaking on your part, a
breach of which will render you liable to
[Lietz Inc.] for liquidated damages.
On her tenth year with Lietz Inc.,
specifically on 1 February 2002, Portillo was
promoted to Sales Representative and received a
corresponding increase in basic monthly salary and
sales quota. In this regard, Portillo signed another
letter agreement containing a "Goodwill Clause:"
Three years thereafter, on 6 June 2005,
Portillo resigned from Lietz Inc. During her exit
interview, Portillo declared that she intended to
engage in businessa rice dealership, selling rice in
wholesale. On 15 June 2005, Lietz Inc. accepted
Portillos resignation and reminded her of the
"Goodwill Clause" in the last letter agreement she
had signed. Upon receipt thereof, Portillo jotted a
note thereon that the latest contract she had signed in
February 2004 did not contain any "Goodwill
Clause" referred to by Lietz Inc. In response thereto,
Lietz Inc. categorically wrote
Please be informed that the standard
prescription of prohibiting employees from
engaging in business or seeking employment
with organizations that directly or indirectly
compete against [Lietz Inc.] for three (3)
years after resignation remains in effect.
Subsequently, Lietz Inc. learned that Portillo
had been hired by Ed Keller Philippines, Limited to
head its Pharma Raw Material Department. Ed Keller
Limited is purportedly a direct competitor of Lietz
Inc.
Issue
Whether Portillos money claimes for unpaid salaries
may be offset against Lietz Inc.s claim for liquidated
damages
Ruling
Paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Labor
32
33
Facts:
Issues:
On October 9, 2008, seaman Teodorico
Fernandez (Fernandez), assisted by his wife, Glenita
Fernandez, filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint for disability
benefits, with prayer for moral and exemplary
34
Ruling:
No appeal from an interlocutory order shall
be entertained. To discourage frivolous or dilatory
appeals, including those taken from interlocutory
orders, the Commission may censure or cite in
contempt the erring parties and their counsels, or
subject them to reasonable fine or penalty.
In Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm.
on Higher Educ.,ll the Court declared that "[a]n order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory"; the
proper remedy in this situation is to appeal after a
decision has been rendered. Clearly, the denial of the
petitioners motion to dismiss in the present case was
an interlocutory order and, therefore, not subject to
appeal.
Issues:
Who has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Fernandez disability claim the labor
arbiter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, or the
voluntary arbitration mechanism as prescribed in the
parties CBA and the POEA-SEC?(latter)
Ruling:
The answer lies in the States labor relations
policy laid down in the Constitution and fleshed out
in the enabling statute, the Labor Code. Section 3,
Article XIII (on Social Justice and Human Rights) of
the Constitution declares:
The State shall promote the principle of
shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall
enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
Article 260 of the Labor Code (Grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration) states:
35
ISSUE:
FACTS:
RULING:
Broadcom Asia Inc. (Broadcom) is engaged in the
business of selling b r o a d c a s t equipment needed
by television networks and production houses. One of
No.
36
Facts:
Issue:
Petitioner was a member of the United States Air
Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories of
Ruling:
Labor Arbiter acquired no jurisdiction over the case
and the person of petitioner.
Firstly, the "Agreement Between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America
Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
military bases in the country.
Article XIV is the governing procedure for service of
summons on persons inside U.S. military bases.
Summonses and other processes issued by Philippine
courts and administrative agencies for United States
Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
Philippines could be served therein only with the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
giving his permission, he should instead designate
another person to serve the process, and obtain the
server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said
procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt.
Col. Frankhauser and not the Base Commander.
Secondly, under Base Labor Agreement of May 27,
1968, any dispute or disagreement between the
United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees
should be settled under grievance or labor relations
procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the
arbitration process provided in the RomualdezBosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if
the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was
appealable by either party to a Joint Labor
Committee established in Article III of the Base
Labor Agreement.
Therefore, no jurisdiction was ever acquired by the
Labor Arbiter over the case and the person of
petitioner and the judgment rendered is null and void
(Filmerco Commercial Co. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,supra.; Sy v. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458 [1978]).
FACTS:
On 12 April 1988, Policy Instruction No. 54 was
issued by the SOLE, which reads:
38
Facts:
Petitioner LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION
(LUDO for brevity) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture of coconut oil, corn starch, glucose
and related products. It operates a manufacturing
plant located at Tupas Street, Cebu City and a wharf
where raw materials and finished products are
shipped out
40
AND SIXTY
(P5,707,261.61)
CENTAVOS
ONE
Ruling
Facts:
Hanjin is a construction company that had been
contracted by the Philippine Government for the
construction of various foreign-financed projects.
Hanjin and the Philippine Government entered into
contracts for the construction of the Malinao Dam at
Pilar, Bohol, with a projected completion period of
1,050 calendar days, including main canal and lateral
projects for 750 days. From August 1995 to August
1996, Hanjin contracted the services of 712
carpenters, masons, truck drivers, helpers, laborers,
heavy equipment operators, leadmen, engineers,
steelmen, mechanics, electricians and others.
42
Ruling:
While respondent alleged that "complainants all
signed a contract of employment at the time they
were hired indicating therein the particular project
they will be working on, the period and other
conditions provided in their contracts which
complainants fully knew and understood," nowhere
in the records can the said contracts be found.
Moreover, let it be stressed that under DO No. 19,
Series of 1993 on project employment, six (6)
indicators are enumerated therein and one of which is
that: "(T)he termination of his employment in the
particular project/undertaking is reported to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
workplace within 30 days following the date of his
separation from work x x x."
In this particular case, the records do not show that a
similar report was ever made by respondent to the
Department of Labor and Employment. Such failure
of respondent employer to report to the nearest
employment office of the Department of Labor, the
termination of the workers it claimed as project
employees at the time it completed the project, is
proof that complainants were not project employees.
The principal test for determining whether particular
employees are properly characterized as project
employees is: whether or not the project employees
were assigned to carry out a specific project or
undertaking, the duration of which were specified at
the time the employees were engaged for that project.
Predetermination of the duration or period of project
employment is essential in resolving whether one is a
project employee or not. In the instant case, the
completion of the project for which the complainants
were hired was not determined at the start of their
employment, there being no substantial proof thereof.
The fact that complainants had rendered more than
one year of service at the time of their dismissal and
there being no substantial evidence to support that
they were engaged to work on a specific project or
undertaking, overturns respondents allegation that
complainants were project employees hired for a
specific fixed project for a limited period of time.
43
44
46
Ruling:
1. No. Petitioners argue that there are certain
benefits and privileges expressly granted to
cooperative under the Cooperative Code. It
invoked the provision on Article 62
regarding the exemption from payment of an
appeal bond, to wit: (7)All cooperatives
shall be exempt from putting up a bond for
bringing an appeal against the decision of an
inferior court or for seeking to set aside any
third party claim: Provided, That a
certification of the Authority showing that
the net assets of the cooperative are in
excess of the amount of the bond required
by the court in similar cases shall be
accepted by the court as a sufficient bond.
2.
47
RULING:
APPLICATION:
2.
3.
48
activities
of
labor-only
contracting,
then
consequently, an employer-employee relationship is
deemed to exist between petitioner and respondents,
since CAMPCO shall be considered as a mere agent
or intermediary of petitioner.
50
ISSUE:
WON respondents claim for unpaid commissions
has already prescribed.
RULING:
Yes. Respondents claim had already prescribed as of
September 1991. In addition, the claims of private
respondent for reinstatement, backwages and benefits
in conjunction with his employment from 1986 to
1988 have prescribed.
The applicable law in this case is Article 291 of the
Labor Code which provides that all money claims
arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
The term money claims covers all money claims
arising from an employer-employee relation the
prescription of an action is interrupted by (a) the
filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand
by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of
the debt by the debtor.
On this point, the Court ruled that although the
commencement of a civil action stops the running of
the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal
or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the
parties in exactly the same position as though no
action had been commenced at all. Hence, while the
filing of Civil Case could have interrupted the
running of the three-year prescriptive period, its
consequent dismissal by the CA due to lack of
jurisdiction effectively canceled the tolling of the
prescriptive period within which to file his money
claim, leaving respondent in exactly the same
position as though no civil case had been filed at all.
The running of the three-year prescriptive period not
having been interrupted by the filing of Civil Case
respondents cause of action had already prescribed
on September 2, 1991, three years after his cessation
of employment on September 2, 1988. Consequently,
when respondent filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and
damages in July 24, 1996, his claim, clearly, had
already been barred by prescription.
FACTS:
The case originated from a complaint for illegal
dismissal and nonpayment of overtime pay filed by
Jimmy Lebatique,
a truck driver against his
employer, Far East Agricultural Supply Inc.
Lebatique was employed March 1996 and was tasked
to deliver animal feeds to the companys clients.
On January 24, 200o, Lebatique complained about
not being payed overtime pay. That same day when
he complained, he was suspended by Far Easts
General Manager Manuel Uy for his alleged illegal
use of company vehicle, and was prohibited from
entering the company premises when he reported to
work the next day.
Lebatique sought the assistance of the DOLE Public
Assistance and Complaints Unit for the issue on the
nonpayment of his Overtime pay.
Two days after seeking the assistance of the DOLE,
he received a telegram from Far East requiring him to
report to work. Upon his return, Alexander Uy
confronted him about his complaint and after talking
to Manuel, Alexander terminated Lebatique.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lebatique but this
decision was overturned by the NLRC who stated
that Lebatique was merely suspended and that he is a
field personnel not entitled to overtime pay, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. The Court of
Appeals reinstated the Arbiters ruling so petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court by way of review on
certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
The case revolves around two specific points on (1)
whether or not Lebatique was illegally dismissed and
on (2) whether or not he is a field personnel who is
not entitled to overtime pay.
51
52
RULING:
On the first issue
The Court finds no error in the ruling of the
CA that since nowhere in the petition is there any
acceptable demonstration that the LA or the NLRC
acted either with grave abuse of discretion or without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, the appellate court has
no reason to look into the correctness of the
evaluation of evidence which supports the labor
tribunals' findings of fact.
The findings of the Labor Arbiter, when
affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, are binding on
the Supreme Court unless patently erroneous. Thus,
in a petitioner for review on certiorari, this Courts
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in
the absence of any showing that the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support in the records or
are glaringly erroneous.
In petitions for review on certiorari like the
instant case, the Court invariably sustains the
unanimous factual findings of the LA, the NLRC and
the CA, specially when such findings are supported
by substantial evidence and there is no cogent basis
to reverse the same, as in this case.22
On the second issue
Settled is the doctrine that when an
administrative or executive agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means. Hence,
while the DOLE order may not be applicable, the
Court finds that overload pay should be excluded
from the computation of the 13th month pay of
petitioners members.
In the same manner that payment for
overtime work and work performed during special
holidays is considered as additional compensation
apart and distinct from an employee's regular wage or
basic salary, an overload pay, owing to its very nature
and definition, may not be considered as part of a
teacher's regular or basic salary, because it is being
paid for additional work performed in excess of the
regular teaching load.
35. Metro Transit Organization vs. Piglas NFWUKMU et al., G.R. No. 175460, April 14, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(MTO) is a government owned and controlled
corporation which entered into a Management and
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
Issue:
53
FACTS:
On December 3, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages
and Productivity Board, Region XI, issued Wage
Order No. RTWPB-XI-03, granting a Cost of Living
Allowance (COLA) to covered workers.
On January 28, 1994, petitioner filed an application
for exemption from the coverage of the aforesaid
wage order. Thus, however, was denied by the
regional wage board in an Order dated April 11,
1994.
Notwithstanding the said order, private respondents
were not given the benefits due them under Wage
Order No. RTWPB-XI-03.
On July 10, 1998, private respondents filed an Urgent
Motion for Writ of Execution, and Writ of
Garnishment seeking the enforcement of subject
wage order against several entities including herein
petitioner.
On October 7, 1998, the OIC-Regional Director,
Region XI, issued a Writ of Execution for the
54
RULING:
A. NO.
56
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by respondent
corporation ALCII as a supervisor in its purchasing
office. She was thereafter assigned to ALCII's
construction project in Davao City as business
manager and supervisor of the Administrative
Division. Her Davao assignment was from May 1997
to April 15, 1999.
Petitioner alleged that respondents refused
to pay her salary beginning August 1998 and
allowances beginning June 1998, despite her almost
weekly verbal follow-up. Petitioner filed a complaint
before the labor arbiter for unpaid salaries and
allowances. Despite several notices and warnings,
respondents did not file a position paper to controvert
petitioner's claims. The case was submitted for
resolution based solely on petitioner's allegations and
evidence.
In his June 30, 2000 decision, the labor
arbiter ordered ALCII and/or Dexter Ceriales to pay
petitioner P282,560 representing her unpaid salary
and allowance.
Respondents filed an appeal with motion for
reduction of bond in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) without posting any cash or
surety bond. In a resolution dated September 6, 2001,
the NLRC dismissed respondents' appeal. It ruled that
respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to
support their arguments of non-liability. Moreover, it
found no justifiable reason to grant a reduction in the
required bond.
Respondents were able to file a motion for
reconsideration on time, accompanied by a joint
undertaking/declaration in lieu of the cash or surety
57
Issue:
WON the CA was correct in dismissing the
case based on the aforementioned technical grounds.
Facts:
Sometime in 1994, respondent NUBE-
Ruling.
Reasoning.
Appeals. A
should
merits. Thus,
technicalities.
be
perusal
given
in
the
of
the
the
petition
opportunity
exercise
of
its
to
be
equity
58
Facts:
In this case, there are two actions. First, the one
initiated by the labor organization and the other
initiated by the employer. In the first case, the
Kasapiang Manggagawa sa Quezon City Sports Club
(union) claims that it is a registered independent
labor organization and the incumbent collective
bargaining agent of Quezon City Sports Club
(QCSC). They filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice against QCSC on 12 November 1997.
The Union averred that it was ordered to submit a
new information sheet. It immediately wrote a letter
addressed to the general manager, Angel Sadang, to
inquire about the information sheet, only to be
insulted by the latter. The members of the union were
not paid their salaries on 30 June 1997. A QCSC
board member, Antonio Chua allegedly harassed one
of the employees and told him not to join the strike
and even promised a promotion. On 4 July 1997, the
union wrote a letter to the management for the release
of the members salaries for the period 16-30 June
1997, implementation of Wage Order No. 5, and
granting of wage increases mandated by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). When its
letter went unanswered, the union filed a notice of
strike on 10 July 1997 for violation of Article 248
(a)(c)(e) of the Labor Code, nonpayment of overtime
pay, refusal to hear its grievances, and malicious
refusal to comply with the economic provisions of
the CBA. After conducting a strike vote, it staged a
strike on 12 August 1997. On 16 August 1997, the
QCSC placed some of its employees under temporary
lay-off status due to redundancy.
The second case: It appears that on 22 December
1997, QCSC also filed a petition for cancellation of
registration against the union and to declare the
unions strike on August 12, 1997 as illegal. This
action by QCSC is docketed as NLRC CASE NO.
00-09-0663-97. The Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol
declared the strike of the union illegal in its decision
dated October 9, 1998 (Dinopol decision). The
dispositive reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the Unions
having violated the no-strike-no-lockout
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
59
Facts:
Portillo was a Sales Representative of Rudolf Lietz,
Inc. pharmaceutical business. Portillo signed an
employment contract containing a Goodwill Clause
as follows:
61
62
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in liberally applying the rules
of procedure and ruling that respondent's appeal
should be allowed and resolved on the merits despite
having been filed out of time.
RULING:
The Court cannot sustain the CA's Decision. It should
be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application,
or suspension of the application of procedural rules,
must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the
orderly administration of justice. In Marohomsalic v.
Cole, the Court stated: While procedural rules may be
63
FACTS:
Neri and Cabelinapllied for and were hired
by respondent BCC, a corporation engaged in
providing technical, maintenance, engineering,
housekeeping, security and other specific services to
its clientele.They were assigned to work in the
Cagayan de Oro City Branch of respondent FEBTC
on 1 May 1979 and 1 August 1980, respectively, Neri
a radio/telex operator and Cabelin as janitor, before
being promoted to messenger on 1 April
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On 28 June 1989, petitioners instituted
complaints against FEBTC and BCC before Regional
Arbitration Branch No. 10 of the Department of
Labor and Employment to recognize them as its
regular employees and be paid the same wages which
its employees receive.
On 16 November 1989, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.Respondent
BCC was considered an independent contractor
because it proved it had substantial capital. Thus,
petitioners were held to be regular employees of
BCC, not FEBTC. The dismissal was appealed to
NLRC which on 28 September 1990 affirmed the
decision on appeal. On 22 October 1990, NLRC
denied reconsideration of its affirmance,prompting
petitioners to seek redress from this Court.
Nevertheless, petitioners insist before that
BCC is engaged in "labor-only" contracting hence,
they conclude, they are employees of respondent
FEBTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BCC is only a job
contracting company, hence petitioners are
not regular employees of FEBTC.
RULING:
We cannot sustain the petition.
Respondent BCC need not prove that it
made investments in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, because it
66
68
Held
1.
70
FACTS:
71
72
Builders
is
an
independent
Facts:
On September 17, 1996, respondent MASADA
Security Agency, Inc., entered into a one year
contract with NFA to provide security services to the
various offices, warehouses and installations of the
scope of the NFA Region I.
75
Ruling:
The test to determine the existence of independent
contractorship is whether one claiming to be an
independent contractor has contracted to do the work
according to his own methods and without being
subject to the control of the employer, except only as
to the results of the work.
In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an
employer-employee relationship for a limited
purpose, i.e., to ensure that the employees are paid
their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly
and severally liable with the job contractor, only for
the payment of the employees wages whenever the
contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the
principal employer is not responsible for any claim
made by the employees.
77
78
Facts:
employer-employee
Ruling:
Yes, there is employer-employee relationship.
The SC upheld the CAs ruling. CA found that the J.
Narag Construction assigned the respondents to
perform activities directly related to the main
business of the petitioner, all the documents that
proved the employment of the respondents were all
approved by the petitioner, such as the payrolls, the
using of equipment, materials and supplies of the J.
narag construction. The termination of the
respondents also proves that there is employeremployee relationship, since it was the petitioner who
terminated them and the J. Narag construction.
79
80
HELD:
ISSUES 1&2:
The pertinent provision of the Labor Code
on labor-only contracting is paragraph 4 of Article
106, which provides:
There is labor-only
contracting where the person
supplying workers to an employer
does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the
workers recruited and placed by
such persons are performing
activities which are directly related
to the principal business of such
employer. In such cases, the
person or intermediary shall be
considered merely as an agent of
the employer who shall be
responsible to the workers in the
same manner and extent as if the
latter were directly employed by
him.
In such case, the law creates an employeeemployer relationship so that labor laws may not be
circumvented. The principal employer becomes
solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all
the rightful claims of the employees. The labor-only
contractor is considered merely as an agent of the
employer, the employer having been made, by law,
responsible to the employees of the labor-only
contractor as if such employees had been directly
employed by it.
On the other hand, permissible job
contracting or subcontracting refers to an
arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or
farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the
performance or completion of a specific job, work or
service within a definite or predetermined period
regardless of whether such job, work or service is to
be performed or completed within or outside the
premises of the principal.
A person is considered engaging in
legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the
following conditions concur:
(a)
The contractor or
subcontractor carries on a distinct
81
82
ISSUE 3:
Ruling of NLRC and CA which the SC agrees with:
The only incident
from which complainant
drew the conclusion that
he was dismissed from
work is when he was
allegedly told to
disembark from the
vehicle. Nothing on
record shows that he was
terminated from work. On
the contrary, complainant
himself reveals that
previously (in July 1995)
he was also told to
disembark to be left on the
road by an angry
Jalapadan, the latter went
back to fetch him and told
him that we are just one
family. Evidently,
[these] incidents were
mere expressions of anger
on the part of Jalapadan
without intention of
terminating his
employment. Rather, it
was complainant as
admitted by him who,
this time, refused to return
to work
83
OZAMIS BRANCH
THRU:
MR.
TONY
JALAPADAN, SALESMAN
SIR:
(SGD.)________
HANDTHUMBMARK
ARNULFO ACEBEDO
84
Facts
Petitioner is a corporation engaged
principally in the production and processing of
pineapple for the export market. Respondents are
members of the Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(CAMPCO). CAMPCO was organized in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise
known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
Pursuant to the Service Contract, CAMPCO members
rendered services to petitioner. The number of
CAMPCO members that report for work and the type
of service they performed depended on the needs of
petitioner at any given time. Although the Service
Contract specifically stated that it shall only be for a
period of six months, i.e., from 1 July to 31
December 1993, the parties had apparently extended
or renewed the same for the succeeding years without
executing another written contract. It was under
these circumstances that respondents came to work
for petitioner. DOLE organized a Task Force that
conducted an investigation into the alleged labor-only
contracting activities of the cooperatives. The Task
Force identified six cooperatives that were engaged
in labor-only contracting, one of which was
CAMPCO. In this case, respondents alleged that they
started working for petitioner at various times in the
years 1993 and 1994, by virtue of the Service
Contract executed between CAMPCO and petitioner.
All of the respondents had already rendered more
than one year of service to petitioner. While some of
the respondents were still working for petitioner,
others were put on stay home status on varying
dates in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 and were no
longer furnished with work thereafter. Together,
respondents filed a Complaint with the NLRC for
illegal dismissal, regularization, wage differentials,
damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner denied that
respondents were its employees. It explained that it
found the need to engage external services to
augment its regular workforce, which was affected by
peaks in operation, work backlogs, absenteeism, and
excessive leaves. It used to engage the services of
individual workers for definite periods specified in
their employment contracts and never exceeding one
year. However, such an arrangement became the
subject of a labor case, in which petitioner was
accused of preventing the regularization of such
workers.
Issues
Ruling
The Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction
may look into the records of the case and re-examine
the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at
a just decision of the case. The same principles are
now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the
Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over
labor cases elevated through a petition for certiorari;
thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a
factual determination of the matters and on that basis
reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
On the second issue, CAMPCO was a mere laboronly contractor. First, although petitioner touts the
multi-million pesos assets of CAMPCO, it does well
to remember that such were amassed in the years
following its establishment. In 1993, when
CAMPCO was established and the Service Contract
between petitioner and CAMPCO was entered into,
CAMPCO only had P6,600.00 paid-up capital, which
could hardly be considered substantial. It only
managed to increase its capitalization and assets in
the succeeding years by continually and defiantly
engaging in what had been declared by authorized
DOLE officials as labor-only contracting. Second,
CAMPCO did not carry out an independent business
from petitioner. It was precisely established to render
services to petitioner to augment its workforce during
peak seasons. Petitioner was its only client. Even as
CAMPCO had its own office and office equipment,
these were mainly used for administrative purposes;
the tools, machineries, and equipment actually used
by CAMPCO members when rendering services to
the petitioner belonged to the latter. Third, petitioner
exercised control over the CAMPCO members,
including respondents. Petitioner attempts to refute
control by alleging the presence of a CAMPCO
supervisor in the work premises. Yet, the mere
presence within the premises of a supervisor from the
cooperative did not necessarily mean that CAMPCO
had control over its members. Section 8(1), Rule
VIII, Book III of the implementing rules of the Labor
Code, as amended, required for permissible job
contracting that the contractor undertakes the contract
work on his account, under his own responsibility,
according to his own manner and method, free from
the control and direction of his employer or principal
in all matters connected with the performance of the
work except as to the results thereof. As alleged by
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
87
FACTS:
Issue:
WHETHER
OR
NOT
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE
OF PETITIONER SMC DESPITE ITS
FINDINGS
THAT
PHILSSEC
IS
AN
INDEPENDENT
JOB
CONTRACTOR?
(affirmative)
Ruling:
88
administrative
employee of Skillpower
and that
he
and
clerical
work
that
was
was
Issue:
Ruling:
Ruling:
This joint and several liability of the
contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor
Code to assure compliance of theprovisions therein
including the statutory minimum wage. The
contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as
direct employer. The principal,on the other hand, is
made the indirect employer of the contractor's
employees for purposes of paying the employees
their wages should thecontractor be unable to pay
them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not
guarantees, payment of the workers' performance of
any work,task, job or project, thus giving the workers
ample protection as mandated by the 1987
Constitution. For the security guards, the actual
source of the payment of their wage differentials and
premium for holiday and rest day work does not
matter as long as they are paid. This is the import of
Eparwa and LDCU's solidary liability. Creditors,
such as the security guards, may collect from anyone
of the solidary debtors. Solidary liabilitydoes not
mean that, as between themselves, two solidary
debtors are liable for only half of the payment.
LDCU's ultimate liability comes intoplay because of
the expiration of the Contract for Security Services.
There is no privity of contract between the security
guards and LDCU, butLDCU's liability to the
security guards remains because of Articles 106, 107
and 109 of the Labor Code. Eparwa is already
precluded from askingLDCU for an adjustment in the
contract price because of the expiration of the
contract, but Eparwa's liability to the security guards
remainsbecause
of
their
employer-employee
relationship. In lieu of an adjustment in the contract
price, Eparwa may claim reimbursement from
LDCUfor any payment it may make to the security
guards. However, LDCU cannot claim any
reimbursement from Eparwa for any payment it
maymake to the security guards.
62. Lapanday Agri Development Corp., vs. Court of
Appeals, 324 SCRA 39
Issue:
Whether or not LDCU alone is ultimately liable to
the security guards for the wage differentials and
premium for holiday and rest daypay without any
right of reimbursement from Eparwa.
FACTS:
On June 1986 private respondent and plaintiff entered
into a Guard Service Contract. Respondent provided
security guards in defendant's banana plantation. The
contract called for the payment to a guard of P754.28
90
1. YES
The enforcement of the written contract does not fall
under the jurisdiction of the NLRC because the
money claims involved therein did not arise from
employer-employee relations between the parties and
is intrinsically a civil dispute. Thus, jurisdiction lies
with the regular courts. The RTC has jurisdiction
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
92
Facts:
the "Phenomenon." 12
94
95
i)
96
Facts:
Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed
of owners-members. Under its by-laws, ownersmembers are of two categories, to wit: (1) regular
member, who is entitled to all the rights and
98
supplied
.)
Ruling:
were
rendering
services
at
when
the
terms
and
surrounding
who
will
be
are
team
leaders who
assigned
at
defined
as
relationship
between
the
respondent
100
respondent
cooperative. Clearly
then,
the
101
103
B )NO.
104
106
107
2.
3.
RULING:
Specific authorization, the Court held, could only
come in the form of a board resolution issued by the
Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the
counsel to institute the petition and execute the
certification, to make his actions binding on his
principal, i.e.,the corporation.
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment.
The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the
oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement
of the employee or where the work or service to
be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual
if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That any employee
who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exists.
APPLICATION:
The procedural aspects placed aside, it may be seen
sustained by this court that MANRED is a laboronly contractor and that the real employer of
Oabel is Manaraw.
108
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Inteserve is a legitimate
job contractor;
2. Whether or not an employer-employee
relationship exists between petitioner
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. and
respondents.
RULING:
No. Inteserve is not a legitimate job
contractor
There is "labor-only" contracting where the
person supplying workers to an employee does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among
others, and the workers recruited and placed by such
persons are performing activities which are directly
related to the principal business of such employer. In
such cases, the person or intermediary shall be
considered merely as an agent of the employer who
shall be responsible to the workers in the same
manner and extent as if the latter were directly
employed by him.
The afore-quoted provision recognizes two
possible relations among the parties: (1) the permitted
legitimate job contract, or (2) the prohibited laboronly contracting.
A legitimate job contract, wherein an
employer enters into a contract with a job contractor
for the performance of the former's work, is permitted
by law. Thus, the employer-employee relationship
between the job contractor and his employees is
maintained. In legitimate job contracting, the law
creates an employer-employee relationship between
the employer and the contractor's employees only for
a limited purpose, i.e., to ensure that the employees
are paid their wages. The employer becomes jointly
and severally liable with the job contractor only for
the payment of the employees' wages whenever the
contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the
employer is not responsible for any claim made by
the contractor's employees.
On the other hand, labor-only contracting is
an arrangement wherein the contractor merely acts as
an agent in recruiting and supplying the principal
employer with workers for the purpose of
circumventing labor law provisions setting down the
rights of employees. It is not condoned by law. A
finding by the appropriate authorities that a
109
110
Facts:
Petitioner South Davao Development Company
(petitioner or petitioner corporation) is the operator of
a coconut and mango farm in San Isidro, Davao
Oriental and Inawayan/Baracatan, Davao del Sur. On
August 1963 petitioner hired respondent Sergio L.
Gamo (Gamo) as a foreman. Sometime in 1987,
petitioner appointed Gamo as a copra maker
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
111
September 3, 2009
b. Respondents Defense
c. Petitioners Argument
ISSUE/S:
The case is anchored on the issue of whether or not
DFI (with which TACOR had been merged) and
Dole should be held solidarily liable with the
Cooperative for petitioners illegal dismissal and
money claims.
RULING:
114
ISSUE
Whether petitioners became employees of respondent
after the Agreement between SSCP and respondent
Facts
was terminated.
RULING
was terminated.
PLDT
terminated
the
Agreement
115
(ii)
the
contractor
does
not
exercise the right to
control
over
the
performance of the work
of
the
contractual
employee.
Thus,
the
Secretary
of
Labor
issued
Section 5. Prohibition
against labor-only contracting.
Labor-only contracting is hereby
declared prohibited. For this
116
Ruling:
Promm-Gem is an independent contractor however,
SAPS is a labor-only contractor.
The pertinent Labor Code provision on the matter
states:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever
an employer enters into a contract with another
person for the performance of the formers work, the
employees of the contractor and of the latters
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
117
118
FACTS:
AMPCO hired the services of Vicente
Semillano, Nelson Mondejar, Jovito Remada
and Alex Hawod, herein respondents. All of
them were assigned to work in SMC's
Bottling Plant situated at Brgy. Granada Sta.
Fe, Bacolod City, in order to perform the
following tasks: segregating bottles,
removing dirt therefrom, filing them in
designated places, loading and unloading the
bottles to and from the delivery trucks, and
performing other tasks as may be ordered by
SMC's officers. They were required to work
inside the premises of SMC using SMCs
equipment. They rendered service with SMC
for more than 6 months.
Subsequently, SMC entered into a Contract
of Services with AMPCO designating the
latter as the employer of Vicente, et al., As a
result, Vicente et al., failed to claim the
rights and benefits ordinarily accorded a
regular employee of SMC. In fact, they were
not paid their 13th month pay. They were
not allowed to enter the premises of SMC.
The project manager of AMPCO, Merlyn
Polidario, told them to wait for further
instructions from the SMC's supervisor.
Vicente et al., waited for one month,
unfortunately, they never heard a word from
SMC.
Consequently,
Vicente
et
al.,
as
complainants, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter against
AMPCO, Merlyn V. Polidario, SMC and
Rufino I. Yatar, SMC Plant Manager, as
respondents. Complainants assert that they
are regular employees of SMC. However,
SMC utilized AMPCO making it appear that
the latter was their employer, so that SMC
may evade the responsibility of paying the
benefits due them under the law.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment
declaring Vicente, et al. as regular
employees of San Miguel Corporation.
Initially, the NLRC Fourth Division
affirmed with modifications the findings of
the LA but in a Resolution, the NLRC
reversed its earlier ruling. It absolved
petitioner from liability and instead held
AMPCO, as employer of respondents, as an
independent contractor.
The Court of Appeals overturned the Commissions
finding that petitioner SMC wielded the power of
control over respondent and the power of dismissal
and that AMPCO was a labor-only contractor since
"a capital of nearly one million pesos" was
insufficient for it to qualify as an independent
contractor.
SMC filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner SMC argues that the CA wrongly assumed
that it exercised power of control over the
respondents just because they performed their work
within SMC's premises. In advocacy of its claim that
AMPCO is an independent contractor, petitioner
relies on the provisions of the service contract
between petitioner and AMPCO, wherein the latter
undertook to provide the materials, tools and
equipment to accomplish the services contracted out
by petitioner. The same contract provides that
AMPCO shall have exclusive discretion in the
selection, engagement and discharge of its
employees/personnel or otherwise in the direction
and control thereof. Petitioner also adds that AMPCO
determines the wages of its employees/personnel who
shall be within its full control.
In its Comment, respondent AMPCO essentially
advanced the same arguments in support of its claim
as a legitimate job contractor.
119
ISSUE:
WON AMPCO is a legitimate job contractor
RULING:
NO, AMPCO is a labor-only contractor.
The test to determine the existence of independent
contractorship is whether or not the one claiming to
be an independent contractor has contracted to do the
work according to his own methods and without
being subject to the control of the employer, except
only as to the results of the work.
Although there may be indications of an independent
contractor arrangement between petitioner and
AMPCO, the most determinant of factors exists
which indicate otherwise.
AMPCO's main business activity is trading,
maintaining a store catering to members and the
public. Its job contracting with SMC is only a minor
activity or sideline. The component of AMPCO's
substantial capital are in fact invested and used in the
trading business.
AMPCO does not have substantial equipment, tools,
machineries, and supplies actually and directly used
by it in the performance or completion of the
segregation and piling job. There is nothing in
AMPCO's list of fixed assets, machineries, tools, and
equipment which it could have used, actually and
directly, in the performance or completion of its
contracted job, work or service with petitioner. Thus,
there can be no other logical conclusion but that the
tools and equipment utilized by respondents are
owned by petitioner SMC. It is likewise noteworthy
that neither petitioner nor AMPCO has shown that
the latter had clients other than petitioner. Therefore,
AMPCO has no independent business.
In connection therewith, DOLE Department Order
No. 10 also states that an independent contractor
carries on an independent business and undertakes
the contract work on his own account, under his own
responsibility, according to his own manner and
method, and free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with
the performance of the work except as to the results
thereof. This embodies what has long been
jurisprudentially recognized as the control test to
determine the existence of employer-employee
relationship.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
120
121
Facts:
122
2.
Issues:
1. WON the VAs decision is not subject to a
motion for reconsideration.
2. WON an employer-employee relationship
existed between Teng and the respondent
workers.
Held:
The fact that there is no actual and direct employeremployee relationship between petitioner and
respondents does not absolve the former from
liability for the latters monetary claims. When
petitioner contracted DNL Securitys services,
petitioner became an indirect employer of
respondents, pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor
Code, which reads:
ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to
any person, partnership, association or corporation
which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any
work, task, job or project.
After DNL Security failed to pay respondents the
correct wages and other monetary benefits, petitioner,
as principal, became jointly and severally liable, as
provided in Articles 106 and 109 of the Labor Code,
which state:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever
an employer enters into a contract with another
person for the performance of the formers work, the
employees of the contractor and of the latters
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.
124
(consolidated
125
machineries,
work
126
Issues:
1. Whether or not Susan/Weesan is a labor-only
contracting agent acting as an agent of Fairland?
2. Whether or not the individual private respondents
(Sy, et al.) were illegal dismissed?
Ruling:
G.R. No. 182915 (Susan de Leon vs. Fairland,
Sy et al.)
127
129
Ruling:
Yes, the DOLE can.
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by
RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a
determination as to the existence of an employeremployee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial
and enforcement power.
The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of
the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered
nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple
expedient of disputing the employer-employee
relationship, force the referral of the matter to the
NLRC. At least a prima facie showing of the absence
of an employer-employee relationship be made to
oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the
DOLE that will be faced with that evidence, and it
is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same
does successfully refute the existence of an
employer- employee relationship.
Here, the DOLE finding Lancer was not an
independent contractor and that Superior and Lancer
were engaged in labor-only contracting is a finding
as to the existence of employer-employee
relationship. Hence, Superior was considered an
indirect employer of the workers and liable to the
latter for their unpaid money claims.
83. D I G I T A L
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHIL., INC. VS. DIGITEL
EMPLOYEES UNION (G.R.
NOS. 184903, 10OCT2012)
FACTS:
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
130
ISSUES:
1) Whether Digiserv is a legitimate contractor; and
131
132
133
ISSUES:
1) THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED
FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT MADE ITS OWN
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DISREGARDED THE
UNIFORM AND CONSISTENT FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE
NLRC, WHICH MUST BE ACCORDED GREAT
WEIGHT, RESPECT AND EVEN FINALITY. IN
SO DOING, THE COURT OF APPEALS
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY ON CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT
BECAUSE SUCH FACTUAL FINDINGS WERE
BASED ON SPECULATIONS AND NOT ON
OTHER EVIDENCES [SIC] ON RECORD.
4) THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DETERMINED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS WERE CONSTRUCTIVELY
DISMISSED CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE
NLRC AND WITHOUT SHOWING ANY
EVIDENCE TO OVERTURN SUCH FINDING OF
FACT.42
This Courts Ruling
The Court resolves to deny the petition.
134
135
RULING:
The companys defense is that
their act of hiring contractual employees is a
management prerogative and is a valid act
thereof.
Declaring that a particular act falls within
the concept of management prerogative is
significantly different from acknowledging that such
act is a valid exercise thereof. What the VA and the
CA correctly ruled was that the Companys act of
contracting out/outsourcing is within the purview of
management prerogative. Both did not say, however,
that such act is a valid exercise thereof. Obviously,
this is due to the recognition that the CBA provisions
agreed upon by the Company and the Union delimit
the free exercise of management prerogative
pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees.
Indeed, the VA opined that "the right of the
136
137
Ruling:
The petition fails.
The Releases, Waivers and Quitclaims are Valid
We noted that the individual quitclaims,
waivers and releases executed by the complainants
showing that they received their separation pay from
MBMSI were duly notarized by a Notary Public.
Such notarization gives prima facie evidence of their
due execution. Further, said releases, waivers, and
quitclaims were not refuted nor disputed by
complainants herein, thus, we have no recourse but to
uphold their due execution
138
Xxx
Under the general rule set out in the first and
second paragraphs of Article 106, an employer who
enters into a contract with a contractor for the
performance of work for the employer, does not
thereby create an employer-employees relationship
between himself and the employees of the contractor.
Thus, the employees of the contractor remain the
contractor's employees and his alone. Nonetheless
when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees in accordance with the Labor Code, the
employer who contracted out the job to the contractor
becomes jointly and severally liable with his
contractor to the employees of the latter "to the extent
Ruling:
ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. x x x Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement,
except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article,
gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such
agreement.
Clearly, only gross violations of the economic
provisions of the CBA are treated as ULP. Otherwise,
they are mere grievances.
In the present case, the alleged violation of the union
shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming it was
malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an
economic provision in the agreement. The provisions
relied upon by the Union were those articles referring
to the recognition of the union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-andfile employees, as well as the articles on union
security, specifically, the maintenance of membership
in good standing as a condition for continued
employment and the union shop clause.26 It failed to
take into consideration its recognition of the banks
exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided
in the CBA, which included the hiring of employees,
promotion, transfers, and dismissals for just cause
and the maintenance of order, discipline and
efficiency in its operations
The Union, however, insists that jobs being
outsourced to BOMC were included in the existing
bargaining unit, thus, resulting in a reduction of a
number of positions in such unit. The reduction
interfered with the employees right to selforganization because the power of a union primarily
depends on its strength in number.28
It is incomprehensible how the "reduction of
positions in the collective bargaining unit" interferes
with the employees right to self-organization
because the employees themselves were neither
transferred nor dismissed from the service. As the
NLRC clearly stated:
141
Issue:
Whether or not Art. 110 of the Labor Code,
as amended, which refers to worker preference in
case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's
business, is applicable to the present case
notwithstanding the absence of any formal
declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of
TPWII. In other words, is declaration of bankruptcy
or judicial liquidation required before the worker's
preference may be invoked under Art. 110 of the
Labor Code?
Ruling:
Article 110 is NOT applicable in the absence of any
formal declaration of bankruptcy or judicial
liquidation of TPWII.We hold that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. Art. 110 should not be treated
apart from other laws but applied in conjunction with
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the
Insolvency Law to the extent that piece-meal
distribution of the assets of the debtor is avoided. Art.
110, then prevailing, provides:
ARTICLE 110. Worker
preference in case of bankruptcy.
In the event of bankruptcy or
liquidation of an employer's
business, his workers shall enjoy
first preference as regards wages
due them for services rendered
during the period prior to the
bankruptcy or liquidation, any
provision to the contrary
notwithstanding. Unpaid wages
shall be paid in full before other
creditors may establish any claim
to a share in the assets of the
employer.
Complementing Art. 110, Sec. 10, Rule
VIII, Book III, of the Revised Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code provides:
SECTION 10. Payment of
wages in case of bankruptcy.
Unpaid wages earned by the
employees before the declaration of
bankruptcy or judicial liquidation
of the employer's business shall be
given first preference and shall be
paid in full before other creditors
may establish any claim to a share
in the assets of the employer.
We interpreted this provision in
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos to
mean that . . . a declaration of bankruptcy or a
judicial liquidation must be present before the
worker's preference may be enforced. Thus, Article
142
143
Issues:
Whether the Regional Director has jurisdiction over
the complaint filed by the employees of BBGMI
SC Ruling:
(1) YES. The Regional Director has
jurisdiction over the BBGMI employees who are the
complainants in Case Number NCR-LSED-CI-204787. The subject labor standards case of the petition
arose from the visitorial and enforcement powers by
the Regional Director of Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Labor standards cases are
governed by Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. As
can be gleaned from the records on hand, subject
labor standards case was filed on February 5, 1987 at
which time Article 128 (b) read as follows:
Art. 128 (b) Visitorial and enforcement
powers.
(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly
authorized representative shall have the
power to order and administer, after due
notice and hearing, compliance with the
labor standards provisions of this Code
based on the findings of labor regulation
officers or industrial safety engineers made
in the course of inspection, and to issue
writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their order,
except in cases where the employer contests
the findings of the labor regulations officers
and raises issues which cannot be resolved
without considering evidentiary matters that
are not verifiable in the ordinary course of
inspection.
145
146
FACTS:
Respondent Zamora had been in the employ of
petitioner PAL since 9 February 1981 when the
former was hired as a Cargo Representative at
petitioner PALs Import Operations Division.
Respondent Zamora was then dismissed from service
for having been found by petitioner PALs
management to be liable for insubordination, neglect
of customer, disrespect for authority and absence
without official leave.
147
RULING:
No. The relevant law dealing with the suspension of
actions for claims against corporations is Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, 52 as amended. The term "claim,"
as contemplated in Sec. 6 (c) of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, refers "to debts or demands of
a pecuniary nature. It means 'the assertion of a right
to have money paid.
It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that
"upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a
management committee or a rehabilitation receiver"
all actions for claims against the corporation pending
before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be
suspended.
The law is clear: upon the creation of a management
committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended
accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is
mentioned in the law. Since the law makes
no distinction or exemptions, neither should this
Court.
Otherwise stated, no other action may be taken in,
including the rendition of judgment during the state
of suspension what are automatically stayed or
suspended are the proceedings of an action or suit
and not just the payment of claims during the
execution stage after the case had become final and
executory.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Zamoras monetary claim should
be presented to the PAL rehabilitation receiver,
subject to the rules on preference of credits
148
1) Eligibility
92.)PAL vs. PALEA G.R. No. 142399
19, 2007
June
Facts:
This case arose from a labor Complaint, filed by
herein PALEA against herein PAL and one Mary
Anne del Rosario, Director of Personnel, PAL, on 1
March 1989, charging them with unfair labor practice
for the non-payment of 13th month pay of employees
who had not been regularized as of the 30th of April
1988, as allegedly stipulated in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into by herein
parties.
the facts are:
On 6 February 1987, herein parties, PAL and
PALEA, the collective bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of PAL, entered into a CBA that
was to cover the period of 1986 1989. Part of said
agreement required PAL to pay its rank and file
employees the following bonuses:
Section 4 13th Month Pay (Mid-year
Bonus)
A 13th month pay, equivalent to one
month's current basic pay, consistent with
the existing practice shall be paid in advance
in May.
Section 5 Christmas Bonus
The equivalent of one month's basic pay as
of November 30, shall be paid in December
as a Christmas bonus. Payment may be
staggered in two (2) stages. It is distinctly
understood that nothing herein contained
shall be construed to mean that the
Company may not at its sole discretion give
an additional amount or increase the
Christmas bonus.
Prior to the payment of the 13th month pay (mid
year bonus), PAL released an implementing
guideline on 22 April 1988. It stated that:
2) Amount
a) For category a) above, one
month basic salary as of April 30,
1988;
b) Employees covered under 1 b)
above shall be paid not less than
1/12 of their basic salary for every
month of service within the
calendar year.
3) Payment Date: May 9, 1988 for category
1 a) above.
PALEA assailed the implementation of the foregoing
guideline. In response to the above, PAL informed
PALEA that rank and file employees who were
regularized after 30 April 1988 were not entitled to
the 13th month pay as they were already given the
Christmas bonus in December of 1988, per the
Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 851.
PALEA, disagreeing with PAL, filed a Complaint for
unfair labor practice before the NLRC.
PAL answered that those rank and file employees
who were not regularized by 30 April of a particular
year are, in principle, not denied their 13 month pay,
considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the
form of the Christmas Bonus.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that PAL was not guilty of unfair labor practice
in withholding the grant of the 13th Month Pay or
Mid-Year Bonus, as set out in Section 4 of the CBA,
to the concerned employees. The giving of the
particular bonus was said to be merely an additional
practice made in the past, "such being the case, it
violated no agreement or existing practice or
committed unfair labor practice, as charged."
149
Issue:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
151
152
Ruling:
Yes. The Court reads the afore-cited provision as
prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees only when
it is effected through forced contributions from the
workers from their own funds as distinguished from
the union funds.
The purpose of the provision is to prevent imposition
on the workers of the duty to individually contribute
their respective shares in the fee to be paid the
attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its
negotiations with the management. The obligation to
pay the attorney's fees belongs to the union and
cannot be shunted to the workers as their direct
responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself
may require the individual workers to assume the
obligation to pay the attorney's fees from their own
pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law also
makes it clear that any agreement to the contrary
shall be null and void ab initio.
153
154
155
156
157
158
FACTS:
Reynaldo Aniban was employed by the Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (TRANSMARINE) as
radio operator (R/O) on board the vessel "Kassel" for
a contract period of nine (9) to eleven (11)
months. During the period of his employment, R/O
Aniban died due to myocardial infarction. He was
survived by a pregnant wife and three (3) minor
children who prayed for death benefits provided
under par. (1) of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract thus -
Article 11
Death caused by an
Occupational Injury or
Disease. - In the event
of death of an officer
due to an occupational
injury or disease while
serving on board, while
travelling to and from
the vessel on
Company's business or
due to marine peril,
the Company will pay
his beneficiaries a
compensation in
accordance with the
POEA's rules and
regulations x x x x It is
agreed that these
beneficiaries will be the
following next of kin:
The officer's spouse,
children or parents in
this preferential order.
ISSUES:
(a) WON the POEA has jurisdiction to determine the
claim of petitioners for death benefits---YES
(b) WON myocardial infarction is an occupational
disease as to entitle petitioners to the death benefits
provided under the CBA. ---YES
HELD:
(a)
It is not disputed that R/O Reynaldo Aniban was a
Filipino seaman and that he died on board the vessel
of his foreign employer during the existence of his
employment contract, hence, this claim for death
benefits by his widow and children.
(b)
The POEA ruled in the affirmative when it likened
the infirmity to a "heart attack" commonly
aggravated by pressure and strain. It was observed
that R/O Aniban, in addition to undergoing physical
exertion while performing his duties as radio
operator, was also exposed to undue pressure and
strain as he was required to be on call twenty-four
(24) hours a day to receive/transmit messages and to
keep track of weather conditions. Such pressure and
strain were aggravated by being away from his
family, a plight commonly suffered by all seamen.
In the case of R/O Aniban, the separation was
particularly distressful as his pregnant wife was due
to deliver their fourth child. Hence, the POEA ruled
that myocardial infarction was an occupational
disease.
160
Petitioner
filed
against
Undaloc
Respondent
161
th
month
Moreover, the
employees
P24,902.88.
and
audited
financial
statements,
awarded.
The total salary differential that petitioner is
Respondents appealed the award of salary
162
If
the
violation
is
committed by a corporation, trust
or firm, partnership, association or
any other entity, the penalty of
imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the entitys responsible
officers, including, but not limited
to, the president, vice president,
chief executive officer, general
manager, managing director or
partner. (Emphasis supplied)
The award of attorneys fees is warranted
under the circumstances of this case. Under Article
2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney's fees can be
recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of
laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's
liability laws but shall not exceed 10% of the amount
awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total
amount due the winning party.
FACTS
ISSUE
Whether he is entitled to the amount of
attorney's fees as adjudged by the NLRC in its
Decisions in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases or only
to the 10% of the amounts actually paid to his clients,
the complainants who signed the Deeds of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim.
RULING
This Court has consistently ruled that a
question of law exists when there is a doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the alleged
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question
to be one of law, it must involve no examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is a question of fact.
The aforesaid issue evidently involves a
question of law. What it needs to do is ascertain and
apply the relevant law and jurisprudence on the
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing parties in
labor cases
Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended,
specifically provides:
ART. 111. ATTORNEY'S FEES.
164
165
166
168
Ruling:
Clients
right
to
settle
by
compromise
agreement,
to terminate counsel; limitations
litigation
and
be
on
approved
the
171