DE OCAMPO vs.

ARLOS
FACTS
Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for
registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340,
wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to]
three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by
SGS 4140 [PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2)
a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with
an area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land
identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN] with an area of 63,811
square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan,
and having a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159
hectares.
Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and
spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the
application for registration, alleging that they are the coowners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at
Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T44205, and that they became owners of said lots by
purchase from the government through sales patents.
The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application,
contending that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding
the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land
applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation. Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez
and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed
the application for registration.
Applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and
applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil
Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of
defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez,
that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan,
covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772
square meters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an area of
43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square
meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title of
defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT
No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area
of 72,065 square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the
sales patent title of defendants-spouses Geminiano de
Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses
Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of
225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333
hectares
CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply with the Public
Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the
actual occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the
testimonies of petitioners, which were incongruous with
reality, bolstered the finding that [they had] never occupied,
cultivated or made improvements on the property
And because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their
part, the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are null
and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114
SCRA 946) that the alleged misrepresentation of the
applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the
land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title
under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.
WON the registration of respondents title under the Public
Land Act and
WON the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
HELD:
Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title
Respondents application for registration of title to the three
parcels of land that were once part of the public domain is
governed by the Public Land Act
SEC. 48.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or

ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding

the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a
part of a US military reservation that had been turned over
to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared
disposable and alienable only in 1971.
It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation
in Bataan, of which the land in question forms part, was
turned over to the Philippine government, the same
automatically became a disposable land of the public
domain. The ownership and control over said reservation
was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature
as a military reservation remained unchanged.
This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred
to continued to be a military reservation land while in the
custody of the Philippine government until it was certified
alienable in 1971
Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could
not have occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971
when the land was declared alienable and disposable,
because it was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it
was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement.
We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in
1971; hence, respondents have not satisfied the thirty-year
requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could
not have occupied the property for thirty years, because it
formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then, their
application for the registration of their titles was erroneously
granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners Titles
Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be
challenged, because it is a rule that the Torrens Title issued
on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one
which was judicially secured upon registration upon
expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent
We are not persuaded by respondents argument. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better
right. That is what reconveyance is all about.[18]
Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents,
because they have not shown a title better than that of
petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven
any title that may be judicially confirmed.
The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of
these factual averments would be improper in this Decision.
If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently
obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be
filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Since petitioners titles originated from a grant by the
government, their cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.[20] At the risk of being repetitive,
we stress that respondents have no personality to recover
the property, because they have not shown that they are the
rightful owners thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL
ESTATE CORPORATION
Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), which was approved on
June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands
by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law,
reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means,
of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

invoking the aforecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City

Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of
Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay
City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into
reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions
therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959
by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real
Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of
Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a Complaint
grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is
outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions
are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was
executed without any public bidding.
Answers[5] of RREC and Pasay City
Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase
foreshore lands within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a
broader meaning than the cited definition of the term
trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction[7] which
enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents,
and all persons claiming under them from further reclaiming
or committing acts of dispossession.
defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss[10]
the Complaint of the Republic, placing reliance on Section 3
of Republic Act No. 5187
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts
shall be respected, movants contended that the issues
raised by the pleadings have become moot, academic and of
no further validity or effect.
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed
therefrom to the Court of Appeals. However, on January 11,
1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential
Decree No. 3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or
inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any
person authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be
forfeited to the State without need of judicial action.
Court of Appeals came out with a Decision[14] dismissing
the appeal of the Republic
regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated
April 21, 1959 and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959
between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in the negative
Section 1 of RA 1899, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means,
of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications
submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that
there are no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay
City[15]; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore
areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a
proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City
and RREC in question as the area affected is within the
National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort,
established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954,
pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession since time
immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding
what may be considered foreshore land
Websters definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and low-water
marks usually fixed at the line to which the ordinary means
tide flows: also, by extension, the beach, the shore near the
waters edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or
foreshore lands should be confined to but a portion of the
shore, in itself a very limited area.
Bearing in mind the (Websters and Law of Waters) definitions
of shore and of foreshore lands, one is struck with the

apparent inconsistency between the areas thus described

and the purpose to which that area, when reclaimed under
the provision of Republic Act No. 1899, shall be devoted.
Section I (of said Law) authorizes the construction thereat of
adequate docking and harbor facilities. This purpose is
repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally
extend only from 10 to 20 meters along the coast. Not very
much more if at all. In fact, certain parts in Manila bordering
on Manila
not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind. Websters
limited concept of foreshore when it enacted Republic Act
No. 18
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and
construing the provisions of R.A. 1899, then Secretary of
Justice Mabanag opined:
It is clear that the Bacolod City pattern was the basis of the
enactment of the aforementioned bill of general application.
This so-called Bacolod City pattern appears to be composed
of 3 parts, namely: Republic Act No. 161, which grants
authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry out ... the
reclamation ... of any [sic] carry out the reclamation project
conformably with Republic Act No. 161; and Republic Act No.
1132 authorizing Bacolod City to contract indebtedness or to
issue bonds in the amount not exceeding six million pesos to
finance the reclamation of land in said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise
space therein referred to as foreshore lands, but it provided
that docking and harbor facilities should be erected on the
reclaimed portions thereof, while not conclusive would
indicate that Congress used the word foreshore in its
broadest sense. Significantly, the plan of reclamation of
foreshore drawn up by the Bureau of Public Works maps out
an area of approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the
boundaries of which clearly extend way beyond Websters
limited concept of the term foreshore. As a
contemporaneous construction by that branch of the
Government empowered to oversee at least, the conduct of
the work, such an interpretation deserves great weight.
Finally, Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 1132
(supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and approved the
Bureaus interpretation of the term foreshore when instead of
taking the occasion to correct the Bureau of over extending
its plan, it authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full
estimated cost of reclaiming the total area covered by the
plan.
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to
the strict literal meaning of foreshore lands which may be
reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress
would have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu,
Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as
suggested by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the
bill considering that these cities do not have foreshore lands
in the strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not
approve the proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco,
implying therefore, that Congress intended not to limit the
area that may be reclaimed to the strict definition of
foreshore lands.
our opinion that it is actually the intention of Congress in RA
1899 not to limit the authority granted to cities and
municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict
dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include
submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of
respondent court that under RA 1899, the term foreshore
lands includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its
disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent
court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of
foreshore lands, beyond the intentment of the law,
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which
can be interpreted to broaden the scope of foreshore lands.
The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an
Appropriations Act, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR PUBLIC WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH
PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City

Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and
the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside
the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra
vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the
glaring absence of a public bidding.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any
reclamation work done by RREC, and extent thereof, as of
April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor, sub-contractor,
engineer, surveyor, or any other witness involved in the
alleged reclamation work of RREC testified on the 55
hectares supposedly reclaimed by RREC.
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of
Appeals to order and declare that the requirement by the
trial court on public bidding and the submission of RRECs
plans and specification to the Department of Public Works
and Highways in order that RREC may continue the
implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being
moot and academic. Said requirement has never become
moot and academic. It has remained indispensable, as ever,
and non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully
resuming the reclamation work under controversy,
notwithstanding the rendition below of the decision in its
favor
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked.
The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently
issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to
impugn or annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 257 SCRA 174; Cimafranca vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 611.) Unmistakable, and cannot
be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D.
1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with
law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their
undertaking to reclaim any area within subject reclamation
project, it appearing that something compensable was
accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of
law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not
even the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at
the expense of another[20], we believe; and so hold, that
Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work
done and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as
verified by the former Ministry of Public Highways, and as
claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted letter dated June
25, 1981.
the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP for
brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of
fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands.[1] On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay[2]
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
then
issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract
with CDCP, so that [A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall
be funded and owned by PEA.
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one
million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety
four (1,915,894) square meters.
The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million
Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity)

with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding
these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation ProjectMCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding.[4] On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. [5] On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA
Senate President Ernesto Maceda
denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams
Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands
of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court
seeking to nullify the JVA
PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA, for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the
Office of the President under the administration of then
President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the
President, petitioner now prays that on constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null
and void
whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are
moot and academic because of subsequent events.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and
AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to
moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA
and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA.
whether the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of ongoing negotiations the right to information is limited to
definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the
right does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right
at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the
transaction.
We must first distinguish between information the law on
public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and
information the constitutional right to information requires
PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the
contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from
anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These include the size, location,
technical description and nature of the property being
disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the
parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose
them to the public at the start of the disposition process,
long before the consummation of the contract, because the
Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA
fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from
PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order.
[40] Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the
right to information in several legislations
whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain

title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also
vested in the government control and disposition of
foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed
by the government only if these lands were no longer
needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public
bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No.
1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that
unlike other public lands which the government could sell to
private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for
lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit
private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed
from the sea by private parties with government permission
remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious.
Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands
for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential
as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease,
of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved
these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into
other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands
falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for nonagricultural purposes the government could sell to private
parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not
sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to
private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing
their sale.
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming
parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private
parties with government permission remained private lands.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires
congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that
the government previously transferred to government units
or entities could be sold to private parties.
ispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987
Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by
the State, and except for alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain
only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
the general law governing the lease to private corporations
of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987

Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area
of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the
provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent
the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable
public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an evergrowing population. The most effective way to insure faithful
adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This,
it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated,
unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does
not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the
reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with
the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas
under water, whether directly or through private contractors.
DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the
approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked
to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of
foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public
domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.
Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that PEA shall
hold lands of the public domain as well as any and all kinds
of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and
private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the
public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to
PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs
name does not automatically make such lands private.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409[112]
of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of
men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court
must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab
initio.