VILLEGAS v HIU CHONG, G.R. No.

L-29646

November 10, 1978

FACTS:
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio
J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY
OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE
MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or
to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated
therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective
households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more
than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in
Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila to stop the
enforcement of the ordinance. According to him: 1) as a revenue measure
imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, the ordinance discriminatory
and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation; 2) as a police power
measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations,
imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the
cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or
limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers; 3) it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty
and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
Respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner: the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or
revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure

but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a

regulatory measure in nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance violated the due process clause and equal
protection clause
HELD: Yes, the ordinance violates the due process and equal protection clause.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure
because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true
that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment
permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the
processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits
and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure.
There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to
raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it
fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens
who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification
should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation
to the subject of the particular legislation.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct
1920]
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has
general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The
Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city
of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English
and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by
laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction
was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532
savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It

unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it

constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that
the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police
power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the
scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that
infringes property rights.
Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are
permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to
enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal
board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid
disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of
laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded.
(Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with
Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance
invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise
of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights.
The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to
Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and
each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444
(ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed
on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the
appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic
numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are
subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the
enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold
the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
7 June 1926
Facts
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept,
and to establish penalties for its violation), also known as the Chinese
Bookkeeping Act, was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in
1921. It provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or
corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose
of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its
account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment
for not more than two years, or both.
Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber
business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand English, Spanish,
or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his books
were seized.
Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam (on
behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed a petition against
the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding judge.
Arguments
By the petitioner
Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his books in English or
Spanish, he would have no means of verifying the correctness of the books. If he
would employ a translator or interpreter, he might be at the mercy of his
employees if they might cheat and defraud him. According to the Act, he is
prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set of accounts in his own language
and he will be compelled to remain in total ignorance of the status of his
business.
The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese merchants out of
business (They do 60% of the business in the country).
The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese merchants of their liberty
and property without due process of law, and deny them the equal protection of
the laws.

Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners are entitled to the
same rights, privileges, and immunities as the citizens and subjects of Great
Britain and Spain.
By the respondent
The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of proper legislative
power. Due to the inability of internal revenue officials to check the books of the
Chinese merchants, the treasury loses large sums of money corresponding to
taxes.
Pronouncements of the Philippine Court
A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to
keep his account books in languages other than those listed
Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may keep his
account books in Chinese, but he has to keep another set of books in the
prescribed languages
A third construction is that the law only intended to require the keeping of such
books to facilitate governmental inspection of the same for tax purposes.
However, the law does not specify what kinds of books shall be kept.
The Act is not unconstitutional under the Courts construction of the law. A literal
interpretation would render it unconstitutional, so the Court made a reasonable
construction to preserve the law.
A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the
Philippine Supreme Courts decision denying an original petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972, on the ground
of its invalidity.
Issues
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES
Issue # 1
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO
It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental
law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from
conflict with constitutional limitation.
What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory law of
great indefiniteness to conform to what the court assumes was, or ought to have
been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change would avoid a

conflict with constitutional restriction. Such strained construction, in order to

make a law conform to a constitutional limitation, cannot be sustained.
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government.
(US v. Reese)
Issue # 2
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES
The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and
property without due process of law, and denies them the equal protection of the
laws.
Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the
14thAmendment were extended to the PH; hence, said guarantees are to be
interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when Congress
made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)
PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep
records of their transactions. However, it is NOT within the police power of the
legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in
Chinese.
To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the
interestsof the public require such interference and 2) the means are necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressiveupon individuals. The
determination as to what is a proper exercise of the legislatures police power is
subject to the courts supervision. (Lawton v. Steel)
We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the
accused is entitled to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the doing of an act
so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning violates due
process of law.
Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the
carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended to affect them (as
distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal protection
of the laws.
JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACT NO. 2972 IS INVALID.
Vinta Maritime Company vs. NLRC [ G.R. No. 113911 January 23, 1998]
Facts: Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal
against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners

alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent
performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay. The POEA ruled that private
respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA.
Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.
Held: The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For
an employees dismissal to be valid, 1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause
and 2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that
private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating
incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondents
seamans book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave.
Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners
in the same book that private respondents services were highly recommended
and that his conduct and ability were rated very good . Petitioners allegation
that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an
accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot
consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a
blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such
misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have
known its possible repercussions.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and
hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code
requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of
termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the
employees dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker
with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally
effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which
informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul
of the constitutional guaranty. Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the
payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their
employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the
administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the
period of the effectivity of his contract.
VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION
G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.
Facts:
Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of
Elizalde Rope Factory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union.

Membership with the Union was mandatory as provided for under a collective
bargaining agreement: "Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition
of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement."
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment
by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization".
Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor
organizations, the Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from
the Union as a member.
The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company from dismissing
him.
In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the
ground that 1) prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining
any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and,
consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join
lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution; 2) Impairs the obligation of contracts;
3) discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to
labor unions; 4) violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of a civil right; 5) violates the equal protection clause;
and 6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of
social justice.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the
rights of workers and to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it
allows some workers, by virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union
security agreements. Held:
HELD: NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out
that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not
spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular
purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by
averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest
means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.
More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where it is mandated
that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.
In enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of
the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It
was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial
Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable,
could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with
scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling
state interest" intervenes. In the instant case, Wesee no such compelling state
interest to withhold exemption. The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting
laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a
wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be based on
scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions,
59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they
may appear.

JAVIER v COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

Due Process impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two
came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and
killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed
were attempts to railroadthe private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner
went to theCommission on Elections to question the canvass of the election
returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body.
On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before
the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made.
Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved
before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should
inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the
proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that
it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The
SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should
be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.
They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with
what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already

committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated
plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the
ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and
all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law.