Warranting Sci Belief

Warranting Scientific Belief
Author(s): G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay

Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 1982), pp. 383-408
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284666
Accessed: 23-01-2016 01:49 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/284666?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Studies of Science.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 128.111.121.42 on Sat, 23 Jan 2016 01:49:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
* ABSTRACT
The ways in whichscientistsaccount forand justifytheirown scientificviewsare
analyzedby examiningin detailtranscripts
of interviewswithbiochemists
workingon oxidativephosphorylation.
It is shown thatscientistsuse two
repertoires,
the 'empiricist'and the 'contingent',to account fortheirbeliefs. The
empiricist
repertoire
derivesfromand reinforcesthe traditional
conceptionof
scientificrationality
accordingto whichdata obtainedfromimpersonal,
standardizedroutinesare used to establishthe validityof hypothesesand to
decide between competingtheories.However,when the contingentrepertoire
is
adopted, 'facts' are seen as dependingon fallibleinterpretative
work.Both
repertoires
are used in informal
scientistsmovingflexibly
interaction,
between the
two as theyconstructaccounts of theory-choice.
In view of thisvariability
of
accounts, it is concluded thatit is impossibleto obtaindefinitive
evidenceof how
theoriesare actuallychosen and thata new formof sociologicalanalysisis
required.An attemptis made to illustratesuch an analysis.
WarrantingScientificBelief
G. Nigel Gilbertand Michael Mulkay
Scientists,like other social actors, constructthe nature of their

actions and beliefsthroughthe (largelyverbal) discoursewhich
theyuse to expressand to describetheseactions and beliefs.The
characterand meaningof scientists'actions and beliefsare continuallyin flux- notonlyin thesensethatnewactionsare regularlyundertakenand newbeliefsformed,butalso in thesensethatthe
meaning of past actions and beliefs is constantlyrevised and
reconstitutedby the actors themselvesas theyreformulatetheir
interpretative
accountsin accordancewiththerequirements
of new
Social Studiesof Science (SAGE, Londonand BeverlyHills),Vol. 12 (1982),383-408
384
SocialStudiesofScience
social situations.As analystsof the social world of science,it is

use language,
essentialforus to understandhow scientists
therefore
or moregenerally,how theyorganizetheirdiscourse,to construct
theiraccounts of scientificaction and belief. For in one way or
anotherwe are dependentforour knowledgeabout scienceon the
I
of actionand beliefcarriedout by participants.
interpretations
In this paper we will describeand illustratesome of the procedures used by scientistsin constructingaccounts of theorychoice. We showedin a previouspaper that,at least in our collection of interviewtranscripts,scientists'attemptsto account for
in contentfrom
different
falsebeliefare almostalwayssignificantly
theirattemptsto accountforcorrectbelief.2 Whereascorrectbelief
is almost withoutexceptionportrayedas exclusivelya cognitive
out of rationalassessphenomenon,as arisingunproblematically
is systematically
belief
incorrect
evidence,
of
experimental
ments
presentedas being due to the intrusionof distortingsocial and
psychologicalfactorsintothecognitivedomain.3 This kindof interconsistentwithtraditionalviewsof
pretationis, of course,entirely
and muchworkin thesociology,historyand
scientificrationXality,
pattern
philosophyof sciencehas incorporatedthis asymmetrical
of accountingforerrorand forcorrectbeliefintoitsanalyses.4By
adoptingthis formof accounting,both participantsand analysts
come to presentcorrectscientificbeliefas 'objective' - thatis, as
'social' factors.
independentof non-cognitive,
However,by meansof close analysisof a completecollectionof
we wereable
transcripts,
such accounts,takenfromour interview
accountsof correct
to show clearlythatparticipants'asymmetrical
and incorrectbeliefcannotbe acceptedat facevalue. Theycannot
be takenas accurateversionsof how beliefswereproduced. This
conclusionwas based on thefollowingkindsof considerations:difaccountsof thereasonsforacferentscientistsgave contradictory
ceptanceof a specifictheory,dependingon whetheror nottheyacceptedit; individualscientistsaccountedforacceptanceof a given
dependingon whetheror not theywere
theoryquite differently,
aligningthemselveswiththat theoryin any particularstatement;
accounts of error
and scientistsoftenhad a varietyof different
preparedin advance,to be broughtintoplay or abandoneddepenjudgmentof who had been rightall
dingon theireventualscientific
along.
The generalconclusionof our previouspaper was thatscientists
themselvesmake use of a traditionalconception of scientific
Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

Scientific
Belief
385
rationalitywhentheytryto explainwhysome scientistsadhereto

incorrectbeliefs about the phenomenathey are studying.Each
scientistinterprets
the actions and beliefsof those withwhom he
interactson the assumptionthatthosewithwhomhe agreesscientificallyhave been guided by the experimentalevidence,whilst
thosewithwhomhe disagreeshave unfortunately
been influenced
by scientifically
irrelevantfactors. Thus each scientistcreatesa
worldwhichappearsto conformto thetraditionalversionof scientificrationality.Yet this does not mean thatthe worldof science
literallyis likethat.Indeed,to theanalystwho examinescarefullya
numberof suchinterpretations,
theonlyconsistent
liesin
regularity
the patternof interpretation
used by scientists.Thus asymmetrical
accountingforerrorand correctbeliefcomesto be seenas an interpretativeprocedure wherebyscientistsconstructa community
which,insofaras itis takento be revealedin participants'discourse
about correctand incorrectbelief,appearsto embodytheconventionalviewof scientificrationality.5
In the previous paper, then, we concentratedon scientists'
attemptsto explaintheexistenceof theoreticalerror.In thispaper
we shallbe mainlyconcernedwiththeothersideof thecoin: thatis,
how scientistsaccount for and justifytheirown scientificviews,
which,of course,theynormallytaketo be corrector as nearlycorrectas is currently
possible. We will show that scientistsuse two
well-developedrepertoires
in orderto accountfortheirbeliefs.One
of theserepertoires
both derivesfromand reinforces
the standard
conceptionof scientificrationality.We will also show, however,
thatscientiststhemselvesregularlyunderminethisconceptionand
replaceit witha significantly
different
versionof scientificrationality. In this way, we will tryto extendour previousanalysisby
beginningto show how accountsof correctbeliefare contingently
accomplishedby participantsas they select fromtwo different
interpretative
repertoires.
The data we shall be examiningwereobtainedfroma studyof
researchon one topicin biochemistry.
Thirty-four
scientistsworkingon 'OxidativePhosphorylation'or in closelyrelatedareas were
interviewed
in Britainand theUnitedStatesin 1979. Both authors
participated in all the interviewswhich were recorded and
transcribedin full.6
386
Social Studiesof Science
A BriefHistoryof the ResearchArea

issueswithwhich
This sectionbrieflyoutlinessome of thescientific
samplewereconcerned.It is intended
themembersof our interview
onlyto providethe lay readerwithsome backgroundinformation
thecommentsmade bythe
about the fieldto helpin understanding
interviewees
about theirresearch.7
The scientistsin thisarea are concernedwiththe formationof a
complex molecule called ATP (adenosine triphosphate),a major
sourceof energyforanimals,plantsand bacteria.The mainprocess
wherebythismoleculeis createdin animals and bacteriais called
ATP is formedby the combinationof
oxidativephosphorylation.
ADP (adenosinediphosphate)and inorganicphosphate.Since the
early1950s,it has been acceptedthat,in animals,theprocesstakes
place in smallmembraneousparticlescalled 'mitochondria',which
are composedof proteins,enzymesand lipidand containmanyinorganicsubstancessuchas calcium,potassiumand sodium,as well
as phosphate.Mitochondriahave twomembranes,an outerand an
innermembrane.In recentyearsit has come to be widelyaccepted
thatthe innermembraneis essentialforthe formationof ATP by
oxidativephosphorylation.
The synthesisof ATP requiresenergy,which is stored in the
moleculeuntilitis neededforotherphysiologicalprocesses.During
the early 1950s,it was recognizedthata seriesof chemicaloxidation and reductionreactionslinked togethersome of the components of mitochondriainto a chain. The operation of this
chain seemedto be coupled to the formationof ATP.
respiratory
chain createdan as
In 1953 Fennellproposed thatthe respiratory
yet unknown'high energychemicalintermediate'whichprovided
theenergynecessaryto bringADP and phosphatetogetherto form
ATP. The chemical intermediateturnedout to be much more
elusive than anybody imagined and, although claims to have
observedit have occurredeven withinthe last fewyears,less and
less efforthas beenexpandedon the'chemicalhypothesis'sincethe
late 1960s.
In contrast,the 'chemiosmotichypothesis'proposedby Spencer
in 1961 has become widelyacceptedand in various ways Spencer
has become the dominantfigurein the field.He was awardedthe
of
Nobel Prize in 1978 for his contributionto the understanding
of
the
chemiosmotic
The
central
ideas
transfer.
biological energy
hypothesisare that the creation of ATP takes place in the

Scientific
Belief
387
chain is located in
mitochondrialmembrane;that the respiratory
the membraneand operatesto dividehydrogeninto electronsand
protons; that specifiable numbers of protons are effectively
transportedacross the membrane,therebycreatinga gradientof
protonsand an electricalpotentialacross the membrane;and that
thisprotongradientand difference
in electricalpotential,funnelled
back acrossthemembranethrougha particularstructure,
provides
the energynecessaryto bind togetherADP and phosphate.
AlthoughSpencer'schemiosmotic
mechanismforthecatalysisof
ATP has been widelyadopted as basicallycorrect,it has not been
acceptedwithoutopposition.Moreover,a thirdmajor hypothesis
was proposed by Watson in 1964. Watson's idea was that the
energynecessaryfor the formationof ATP was not storedas a
chemical intermediateor as an electro-chemical
gradient,but as
or shape of themoleculesin thememchangesin theconformation
brane.
The divisionof ideas into these threemain hypothesesis frequentlyused by participantsin constructing
historicalaccountsof
the developmentof the field. It is in some respectsmisleading,
however, because each of the hypotheseshas undergoneconsiderableelaborationand revision.In addition,therehave been
numerousversionsof each hypothesisand manyattemptsto combine aspectsof two or moreof thesetheoreticalpositions.Even today thereare manyvariantsof thedominantchemiosmotic
theory;
manyscientistsacceptonlypartof whattheytakethattheoryto be
and othersappear to rejectit entirely.
One of the major areas of controversy
amongstthose who do
accept some version of the chemiosmotictheory is that of
This debatecentreson preciselyhow manyprotons
'stoichiometry'.
are transportedacross the membraneas one electronpasses down
the respiratory
chain.
In thenextsectionof thepaper we willexaminetheaccountsthe
scientistswe interviewed
gave us whentheyexplainedwhytheyhad
adopted certainknowledge-claims
ratherthan otherswhich had
beenproposedin theirresearcharea. An 'account' isan (attemptat
an) explanationof whya particularbeliefis heldby thespeakeror
by anotherscientist.For instance,a speakermayprovideaccounts
of whyhe acceptsa particulartheoryand whyotherscientists
are in
errorwhentheythinkthatthe theoryis false. In the nextsection,
we will focusprincipallyon accountsofferedto show thatcertain
ideas or theoriesare correct.
388
When scientistsaccount fortheirown beliefs,theyoftencompare and contrasttheirviewswithotherincorrectviews.As long as

theyare seekingto explainand justifytheirown (correct)beliefs,
scientistswill almost always restrictthemselvesto an explicitly
scientific,technicalor cognitiveaccount. In particular,correct
supportedand incorrectbelief
beliefis presentedas experimentally
This overtlytechnicalassesssupport.
as lackingin experimental
correctand
mentof prosand cons is carriedout in orderto identify
incorrectbeliefsas well as to justifythe speaker'sadoptionof the
of incorrectbeliefwhichis
former.The technicalcharacterization
part of thisproceduremustnot be confusedwith'accountingfor
of incorrectbeliefin opposition
error'.Rather,thecharacterization
unjustified,
to correctbelief,as thatbeliefwhichis experimentally
problemforthespeaker- namely,how to
setsup an interpretative
explainwhysome scientistscome to accept a beliefwhichis scientificallyunjustified.This problemis normallyresolvedby referring
factors.It is thislatterprocedure
to theinfluenceof non-cognitive
of explainingotherscientists'acceptanceof false ideas whichwe
call 'accountingfor error'. The technicalcharacterizationof the
scientificinadequacy of others' ideas is usuallya preludeto, but
notidenticalwith,an accountof error.Much of thematerialbelow
of incorrectas wellas of corwillconsistof suchcharacterizations
rectbelief.
AccountingforTheoryChoice by Appeal
to the ExperimentalFacts
All the biochemistswe interviewedwere asked to describe the
developmentof their own scientificideas. These biographical
detailsusuallyculminatedin a descriptionof theircurrentopinions
about what was known about oxidativephosphorylation.Often,
theyalso providedone or a rangeof reasons for those opinions.
The most frequentkindof justificationtheyused was to pointto
evidencewhichtheysaid supportedtheirposition.
theexperimental
The followingexamplecomes froma researcherwho changedhis
beliefsradicallyin the course of his career. In orderto assertthe
correctnessof his presentideas and to explainwhyhis beliefshad
changed,he made an exceptionallystrongstatementof justification:
Gilbert
& Mulkay:Warranting
Scientific
Belief
389
1. I can tellyou in myown case whyI changed.I changedstrictly

because of experiments.I changedbecause theSpencerhypothesispredictscertainthingsthat
my hypothesisdidn't. And on the other hand, my hypothesismade certain
predictionsthatthe Spencerhypothesisdidn't. And it turnedout thatwhenyou
took both of themand testedthem,Spencerturnedout to be a whole lot more
rightthan I was. (Cookson, 36)
This biochemist
himselfas beingswayedfromhis own
presents
to Spencer'sbecause of the forceof experimental
hypothesis
evidence,evidencewhichsupportedSpencer'sbut not his own
hypothesis.
In thesecondquotation,we finda verysimilaraccount. The
thattheprimefactorleadinghimto adopt
speakeragainsuggests
thechemiosmotic
theorywas thattheresultsof his experiments
fromthattheory:
werein accordwithhispredictions
2. The situationwas this... . I was just one of a numberof peopleworkingwith
these new ideas. It just seemed that everything
we did could be explained
satisfactorily
by Spencer'stheory,and we were quite happyjust to adopt this
theoryand use thisas a framework
forfurther
tests. So we said right,ifthisidea
is rightthenwe oughtto be able to showsuchand sucha thing,and we wouldgo
ahead and do it and it would work. That gave us a lot of confidencethatthe
hypothesiswas right.(Crosskey,4)
Not onlyone's ownresults,

butalso others'experimental
work
forone'sbeliefs:
mayprovidejustification
3. They showed that when lactose was transported,..therewas simultaneous
uptake of protons, protons and lactose, simple protons and lactose, and
thereforetherewas a mechanismforlactose accumulation.Now as faras I am
aware thatis totallynoveland verysupportiveforthechemiosmotic
hypothesis.
(Burridge, :111)
Some interviewees
hintedthatthereasonsfortheadoptionof a
werenotalwaysquiteso straightforward,
theory
although
therole
of experimental
evidence
remains
paramount
injustifying
thecoroftheirchoiceintheseaccounts.Forexample,
rectness
thespeaker
inquotationfoursuggests
first
thatthechemiosmotic
hypothesis
is
'wonderful'
becauseitis a 'terrific
generalization'.
Thehypothesis,
he says,is good forthisreasonalone,whether
itis in factrightor
wrong.Nevertheless,
he is thenquickto pointoutthatin addition
to beinga terrific
generalization,
itis also correct,
as shownbyan
accumulating
bodyof experimental
evidence.'One byone,things
390
have been shownto operateacross a membrane'.

4. So Spencercomes along withthisterrificgeneralization,I mean thatthat's
what was wonderfulabout it, and it doesn't matterwhetherhe was rightor
wrong.He was clearlyrighton thedetailsin his workingout buthe came along
with this chemiosmotichypothesis.The result of that was everythingmust
operate across a membrane,that was the initialdogma. Indeed, one by one,
7)
thingshave been shownto operateacross a membrane.(Jeffrey,
In the followingpassage, the speakerdescribeshow a colleague

could be seen choosingbetweencompetingtheoriesand gradually,
as the experimentalevidenceaccumulated,comingto a decision
about whichis correct:
5. If you actuallylook at theacceptanceof itbyPerryyou see himnotbothering
hypothesisand thenyou willsee papersin whichhe
at all about thechemiosmotic
theresultsin thelightof one theoryor the
will,in thediscussion,tryto interpret
otherand thenyouwillfindhimcomparingthetwo,puttingthetwoin a table,in
Reviews - you say that the chemical hypothesisaccounts for this and the
chemiosmotichypothesisaccountsforthis,and I rememberin one paper he acdoes thisbetterand the
tuallyputscoresin - you know,thechemicalhypothesis
tottingthemup. (Burridge,
chemiosmoticdoes that,and actuallyarithmetically
1:24)
evidenceis used as an inIn all thesepassages, the experimental

dependentand unproblematicstandardagainstwhichtheoriescan
be assessed. It is assumed thatdata stand apart fromand are inarbitratebetdependentof anyparticulartheory,and can therefore
ween competingtheories.Because experimentalevidencecan be
used unequivocallyto justifyor rejecta theory,it is not surprising
thatscientistssuch as the speakerin the followingpassage suggest
suchevidenceis an importantactivityin convincing
thatgenerating
oneselfand othersof its truth:
6. Therewas quitea lot to do to reallyconvinceourselvesthatwe wereabsolutelyright,and therewas evenmoreto do to convinceour colleagues.Harold came
over... . He said 'Yes, verynice, verynice, but I won't be convinceduntilyou
inflowof protonswithlactose.' We setto, to do theexshowme a stoichiometric
... and we got a beautifulanswer,whichalthoughit's had manybufperiments
fetsin the last fewyears,just in thelast monthor two it has been confirmedas
beingcorrectovertheentirepH range.I onlydid it at one pH, but it seemscorrect,withone protonper lactose. (Roberts,12-13)
A problemcan ariseforspeakersin accountingforthefactthatit

Scientific
Belief
391
took some years before they publicly admittedthat they had

accepteda newlyproposedtheorywhichnow theybelieveto be correct.Othersmay suggestthatthe delaymighthave been due to the
speaker's inabilityto adapt to change, his prejudice againstthe
theory'ssupporters,or to otheropprobriousreasons. One way to
forestallsuch suggestionsis to explainthatthe delay in adopting
the theorywas to allow timeforconfirmatory
evidenceto appear.
Thus thespeakerin thefollowingpassage accountsforthefactthat
he did notespousethechemiosmotic
theoryuntilsomeyearsafterit
was formulatedby notingthat at firstthe theorywas advanced
withoutthesupportof anyexperimental
evidence.Later,however,
he was convincedby Spencer's 'beautifulexperiments'.
7. I considermyselffairlysusceptibleto newideas. I completelyignoredSpencer
thefirstfewyears,whenhe came out withhisconcept,simplybecauseof myprejudice againstanyhypothesiswhichis notadvancedwithanyexperimental
data.
But thatI admitis prejudiceon mypartand I simplyignoredit. When Spencer
came to visitme... I was veryimpressedbynotonlyhisbrillianceas a personbut
also by the factthathe had settleddownto do experiments
and did beautifulexperimentswhichto me were convincingmainly.And that was reallythe key
discovery- thatthe respirationin mitochondriais associatedwiththe movement of protons, 1. And 2: the hydrolysisof ATP is associated with the
translocationof protonsand thatto me was enough,notto acceptit,butto take
it veryseriously,and we immediately
started,or veryshortlythereafter.
Publicly, I didn'tcome out and believeall of it, butexperimentally
we werestartingto
considerit... And to us his contributionwas veryimportantbecause it started
changingour thinking.We startedthinkingin termsof compartmentswith
somethingwhichis a structure
whichis closed ratherthansomethingI have been
used to as a biochemist,workingwithenzymesand solublesystems.That was the
key departure.We startedrightthereand then,thinkingin termsof compartments.(Perry,2-3)
The normalmode amongour scientistsforjustifying

or explaining theorychoice was by referenceto a theory'sconsistencywith
experimentalevidence.It is not surprising
to find,therefore,
that
theyregularly
accountedfortheirrejectionof a theorybyreference
to its failureto rationalizeexistingevidenceor to generatesuccessfulexperiments.
8. You suggestedearlierthattherewerereasonswhyyou werebecomingdoubtful about the chemicalintermediate
hypothesis.
. . . I was doubtfulonlybecausenothinghas emergedfromall theseattacks.So
if I say I was doubtfulI would have said, well,it's a nicehypothesis,
butthere's
no evidenceforit. And thenthatis whatI latersaid about Spencer'shypothesis
392
fromexperiment,
for severalyearsbecause the evidencewas not forthcoming
untilhe came up withsome reallysolid data. (Perry,6)
Similarremarksweremade by manyscientists:
therewas wide
9. I thinkthatup to thetimehe actuallypublishedexperiments,
disbeliefand itwas just anotherpapertheory.So itwas widelydisregarded.But I
matter.(Milner,28)
thinkwhenhe startedpublishingdata, thatwas a different
In thesepassages, the speakersare makingseveralclaims about

and the connectionbetweentheoryproceduresof theory-choice
choiceand experimental
evidence.First,theymaintainthattheydo
not give seriousconsiderationto a theoryunlessit is supportedby
persuch evidence.Second, theystressthata theoryis particularly
suasive if it actually generatesnew findingsin the laboratory.
maintainthattheirown theoreticalchoices
Third,theyconsistently
are based directlyon evaluation of the fit betweencompeting
theoriesand experimentaldata. On the whole, in thesepassages,
speakers treat the experimentalevidence as providingan unproblematiccriterionagainstwhichthe specifichypothesiscan be
to findscientists
declarassessed. It is, of course,hardlysurprising
ing thattheyand otherssupporta theorybecause of theweightof
corroborativeexperimentalevidence lying behind it - this is,
debateovertheproblemof indespitephilosophers'long-standing
duction,the conventionalview of the relationshipbetweentheory
and experiment.But the materialabove becomesmoreinteresting
as soon as we note thatthesame scientistswho presentexperimental evidenceas unproblematicon some occasions also frequently
treatit as highlyunreliableand even as positivelymisleading,on
otheroccasions. It is to an examinationof accountswhichstress
this latterview of experimentalevidencethat we turnin the next
section.
ExperimentalFacts
Undermining
In quotation 1, Cookson justifiedhis conversionto Spencer's
theoryas being required by the experiments.He adopted this
gave the resultspredicted
theory'strictlybecause' his experiments
by Spencer's theory,but not by his own theory.Yet later in the
same interview,he defendssome of his earlierexperimentalfind-

Scientific
Belief
393
ings,whichnow seem to have been upsetby anotherbiochemist's

work,in the followingterms:
10. The thingis thatit is veryhardto getyourhandson thesethingsthatyouare
workingon. Membranesare extremely
complicatedand it's hard to know that
you've evergot the variablesall pinneddown, so thatwhenyou make an obserto thinkof
vation,thatthatobservationis reallywhatyou thinkitis. I am trying
a good example.All this'X' stuffis perfect.By any criteria,up to a yearago, I
don't thinkanybodyreadingthatstuffwouldhave had anyargumentthatthose
thingsbind to the membrane,but weren'ttransported.
Because you had been throughall thecontrols?
As muchas we could. I frequently
used to say to theguysand especiallywhen
Gamble firstchallengedthepaper,look he can't be right,we've done everything
we could thinkof. He did somethingwe didn'tthinkof, OK? (Cookson, 43)
In thiscontext,Cookson observesthat,despiteall theeffortsof

an experimenter
to producevalid data, otherexperiments
maylater
reveal flaws which cast grave doubts on the interpretation
one
shouldput on thosedata, and mayindicatethatthedata shouldno
longerbe takenat face value. He stressesthatthe meaningof experimentaldata is remarkablydifficultto establishconclusively.
However, he did not mentionthis earlier,in the passage from
which quotation 1 is taken, in which he argued that it was experimentalevidencewhichpointedstrictly
to thesuperiority
of one
theoryover another. Furtheron in the interview,he provided
anotherradicallycontingent
accountof theory-choice,
maintaining
that 'truthis simplywhatmostpeople are willingto believetoday.
And that's truth.Tomorrowthe populationchanges,people are
notwillingto believethesame stuffthattheywerewillingto believe
theday beforeyesterday,
thentruthchanges' (Cookson, 49). Thus
a speakermay take 'experimentalevidence' as distinguishing
unequivocallybetweentwo theories,whilstobservinga fewminutes
later that in this field it is impossibleever to be sure that the
evidenceis 'reallywhatyou thinkit is'.
This variabilityof viewsabout the natureof experimental
data
withina singleinterview
transcription
is not unusual,buttypical.It
provides a major reason for not taking scientists'accounts of
theory-choice
literally.For we can hardlyconcludethata scientist
accepted that such evidenceis essentiallyinconclusiveor thatthe
cognitiveconsensusto whichhe claimsto belongis simplya result
of whatpeople happento be willingto believeat themoment.Consequently,insteadof tryingto distilfromthesedivergentversions
394
some compositeanalyst'saccountof how theoryof theory-choice

made, it seemsmoreappropriateto beginby
actually
were
choices
conor interpretative
circumstances
thedifferent
tryingto identify
evidenceas eitheran
textsin whichscientistspresentexperimental
or as an inconclusive
of theory-choice
unproblematicdeterminant
factorwhichmay or may not have discernibletheoreticalimplications.
In general,scientiststreattherelationshipbetweenexperimental
or as open-ended,dependingon the
data and theoryas determinate
out at anyparticularjuncture.
worktheyare carrying
interpretative
This can be seenclearlyin thetwoquotationsfromCookson (1 and
10). In the firstquotation, Cookson is justifyinghis supportfor
chemiosmosisas if the experimentalevidence was entirelyunproblematic.By treatingthe relationshipbetweentheoryand exhe is able in thispassage to presenthis
perimentas unproblematic,
previous act of theory-choiceand his currentscientificviews as
proper.Any suggestionthat the
both inevitableand scientifically
be heard as weakening
evidencewas not whollyconclusivenmight
his attemptto explainhis 'conversion'to chemiosmosisand require
explanatorywork.In thesecond quote, his conhimto do further
resultsin thisarea are inconclusiveis used
tentionthatexperimental
to justifyhis previousobservationalclaim,whichhe now viewsas
havingbeen successfullychallengedby Gamble. Gamble's results
are taken to provide the unequivocal standard against which
Cookson's previousobservationsare to be measured.Nevertheless,
statusforhispreviousclaims
Cookson retainsa genuinelyscientific
emphasizingexperimenby linkingthemto a generalizedstatement
tal uncertainty.Thus in this second passage Cookson makes his
previous experimentalmistake understandable,expectable, and
characterization
acceptableby linkingit to a different
scientifically
fromtheone he
of therelationshipbetweentheoryand experiment
reliedon earlier.
Let us give anotherillustrationof the variabilityof scientists'
and theory.In the
accountsof therelationshipbetweenexperiment
interviewfromwhichthefollowingis taken,theresearcherargued
data alone shouldbe used to determine
stronglythatexperimental
the truthof theories. He then maintainedthat this field was
characterizedby whatseemedto himto be an excessiveconcentrationon thedevelopmentof theoryas opposed to a focuson careful
At thispoint,he was asked:
experimentation.

ScientificBelief
395
11. If thefield is likethat,can you assumethatthe 'right'theoryis goingto win

out in theend?
In thelongrun,yes. It maynotbe verysoon. You see, thereis one thingabout
science,there'sno way to avoid the factsforever.Eventuallywhatevertheories
exist,theywillevolveto whateveris something
thatwillfit.So you see a situation
in whichtheymay swingcompletely.You mayhave one year,and you can say
90o of the people are in chemicalcoupling.That was not too long back. Now
you can say theyare 9OVochemiosmotic.Well,thatdoesn't meanthatone or the
otherwas right,or anythingof the sort. But timewill tell. Because eventually
data will be generated...
Whatyou're suggesting,then,is thatin thisfield thislong termdebateat the
theoreticallevel is in your viewstillinconclusive?
As faras I can see it is inconclusive.The data are certainlynotsuchas to draw
conclusions.And no matterhow closed some people say it is, it is stillopen.
Maybe it's chemiosmotic,
maybeit's not. We won't knowfora whileyet.I don't
knowwhatit willtake to be sure. But rightnow thedata aren'tclear. (Hawkins,
13)
Hawkins respondsto the suggestionthat he and his colleagues

mightend up withthe wrongtheoryby assertingthat a crucial
featureof scienceis thatthereis no wayto avoid thefactsand that
theorieswillevolveto fitthosefacts.Whatis requiredin thisfield,
he continues,is moredata, fromwhichone willeventuallybe able
to draw firmconclusionsabout thecorrecttheory.The theoretical
situationis stillunsettled,he suggests,because thedata are not yet
clear. However, compare this point of view with the passage
below, spokenonlyminutesbeforein the same conversation:
12. Don 't the varioustheorieshave somethingto say about how therespiratory
chain works?
Well thetheoriesdon't. The experiments
might.The theoriesdon't. There'sa
difference
betweenan experiment
and a theory.You can generatehundredsof
different
theoriesto fita particularsetof data and noneof those,in anyway,say
anythingabout the originalevent.(Hawkins, 9)
In the firstpassage, Hawkins manages to portrayscience as

achieving the truth, by assertingthat clear, theoreticallyunambiguousdata willeventuallyemerge.In quotation 12, however,
in seekingto denythecurrently
available theoriesany explanatory
power,he so weakenstheconnectionbetweentheoryand data that
it becomesdifficult
to see how anytheoreticalconclusionscan ever
be establishedbymeansof data alone. In each isolatedfragment
of
conversation,thespeakerproducesplausibleaccountsin which,in
one instance,the epistemologicalstatusof scientificknowledgeis
396
preservedand, in the othercase, the speaker'scurrentintellectual

views are sustained. But these specificinteractionalaccomplishmentsare achieved by treatingthe relationshipbetweenfact and
theoryin a highlyflexibleway. Like Cookson, Hawkinsappearsto
versionsof thisrelationship
choose betweentwo radicallydifferent
in accordancewithsubtlechangesoccurringin the conversational
context.
treat
it is noticeablethatscientistsfrequently
In our transcripts,
when
as
unproblematic
theory
and
data
between
the relationship
theyare directlyengagedin justifyingtheirown choice of theory
and treatthisrelationshipas equivocal whenengagedin undermining anotherperson'schoice. In all of thematerialin thepreceding
section, where scientistswere justifyingtheirtheories,the consistencyof data and theorywas treatedas obvious: for instance,
'thetheorywouldpredictsomethingand we wouldgo ahead and do
it and it would work'; 'it was a mechanismforlactose accumula... very supportive for the chemiosmotic
tion and therefore
hypothesis';'we set to, to do the experiments...and we got a
beautifulanswer'; and so on. Occasionally,passing referenceis
made in thesepassages to thepossibilityof alternativereadingsof
the data. Thus it was noted that the 'beautifulanswer' had 'had
manybuffetsin recentyears'. But thesepossibilitiesare treatedas
tangentialand are usually quicklyexplainedaway (see quote 6);
even thoughthe diversityof judgmentsabout theseresultsamong
otherscientistsoftenseems veryconsiderable.In contrast,when
another'sscientificclaim, theytend to
scientistsare undermining
and theyshow
emphasizethat data always requireinterpretation
are actually
that, in particularcases, alternativeinterpretations
available. When scientistsare directlyjustifyinga claim by
results,theirstatementsare constructed
referenceto experimental
so that the data appear to speak for themselvesand to speak in
theirown
arejustifying
favourof theirclaim; whilstwhenscientists
are contheir
statements
an
claim,
alternative
positionby rejecting
data
all
most)
(or
which
the
as
to
reveal
interpretation
so
structed
whichhas been carried
requireand to challengethe interpretation
out by theiropponents.
This latterpointis illustratedin the followingquotation,where
data (withwhichhe has no quarrel)in a
the speakerre-interprets
waywhichsuggeststhattheyhave no relevanceto thetheorywhich
theyare supposed to support.

Scientific
Belief
397
13. He consideredthathe was lookingat a primaryejectorof protonswhichwas

not accompaniedbyanythingelse,and he was talkingof backlash- thatis protons were ejected by the respiratorychain, chargingup a condenser (the
mitochondrialmembraneis a condenser).Now that in fact was not the case:
whathe was lookingat was theuptakeof calciumbythemitochondria
and what
he thoughtwas the capacityof the condenser(thatis, you couldn't add more
than a certainamount of oxygen)was not the capacityof the mitochondrial
membrane,the electricalcapacity,but the amount of calcium that was there.
(Burridge,1:11, 12)
On occasion, scientiststhemselvescommenton the flexibility

withwhicha givendatummay be interpreted
to supportquite differenttheoreticalcommitments.
This is trueof thefollowingquotation, in whicha proponentof one positionon the stoichiometry
issue commentson thereasons forthecontinuingcontroversy:
14. The basic observationis agreedon - thatif you add NEM you see more
protons. The experimentsthat are done to demonstratethat this is real because it's energeticphosphatetransportor because it's doing somethingdifferent- are not actuallydone by bothsides, I don't think.One side does them
and makes some interpretation.
The otherside criticizesthatinterpretation
and
does different
whichare thencriticizedby the firstside.
experiments
Whydoesn't one side repeattheexperiments
of theotherside?
I thinkthat's basicallybecause we expectwe'd getthe same result.So there's
not much pointin doing it just to confirmyou can demonstratethisparticular
effect.(Norton,25)
This scientistis describinga situationin whichthe basic observationaldatum,that'you see moreprotonsifyou add NEM', is taken
as common to and agreed by both sides. Nevertheless,the controversycan continuebecause the interpretations
to be placed on
thisfactdiffer.The speakertalkshereas iffurther
experimentation
and moredata are not alone enoughto resolvethedispute,because
those data are also open to alternativeinterpretations.
Elsewhere,
however,when seekingto justifyhis theoreticalpositionvis-a-vis
thatof Spencer,he movestowardsa moreconventionalviewof experimentalevidenceand theory-choice.
15. I'm fairlysureI shan'tchangehis mind. ... I findit quitedifficult
to argue
about this,because I cannot see how he cannotaccept thatour argumentsand
experiments
are right.I suspectthathe has the same problem.So I don't think
it's a problemof straightscience.(Norton,23-24.)
Even here, Norton continuesto recognizethat both sides to the
398
as undispute are treatingtheir own data and interpretations

problematic.But thisbalanced viewgeneratesa problemforhim,
judgments.If
as he seeks to justifyhis own actionsand scientific
bothpartiesare beingequally 'scientific',thatis, ifhis experiments
do not eliminateSpencer'sconclusions,thenit is impossibleto provide a clear-cutscientificjustificationfor his own position. The
is hapsolutionhe adopts is to suggestthat'somethingunscientific
is too
that
Spencer
suggest
to
on
he
goes
pening'.More specifically,
to
to
objectively
respond
unable
hence
and
this
theory
to
committed
the available evidence.Having notedthatdata requireinterpretation, Nortonis able to focus on Spencer'sattemptsat interpretation and to portraythemas unsatisfactory.
undermine
featureof our materialthatscientists
It is a recurrent
each other's choices of theoryby drawingattentionto the 'imof data. The proceduresused to gatherdata
properinterpretation'
are typicallysaid to have been influencedby the researcher's
theoreticalviewpoint,with the consequence that disconfirming
evidencehas not been collectedor has been disregarded.In the
passage below,thespeakerfirstmakesa pointabout thedesirabili- muchthe
tyof a strictseparationbetweentheoryand experiment
He then
theory-choices.
same separationas thatused in justifying
to a
thosewho are over-committed
observesthatsome researchers,
of theirresults,
interpretations
theory,maynotconsideralternative
and so may fail to produce evidencewhichdoes not fitwiththat
theory.
16. You haveto be verycarefulabout how you look at things.The theoryshould
neverinfluencethedata. If you do that,and it's verycommonin thisfield,then
you are bound to disaster.Because there'sno way thatyou can keep factand
fancyapart any more.
How do you mean,thatthetheorymightinfluencethedata? Can you giveme
an example?
thedata. It just meansthatifyou getvery,verybound
The theoryinfluencing
in thesensethatyou thendo
up in yourtheory,it feedsback intotheexperiment
the experimenttoo closely designedto the theoryand you don't do the appropriatecontrols.That's one of themost obvious errors.People who are, for
example, chemiosmoticin the extremewill not botherto run controlsabout
will automaticallybe as a membrane
chemical thingsor theirinterpretation
potentialor whatever.Withoutaskingthequestion,'Well, is it really?'Because
thetheoryrequiresthattherebe a membranepotentialwhichhas certainproperwhenyou see somethingthatbehavesthatway it's assumed
tiesand, therefore,
to be that. (Hawkins, 9-10)

ScientificBelief
399
his own non-chemiosmotic

Hawkins,in the course of justifying
beliefs,accounts for some of the evidencewhichapparentlysupviewbyquestioningwhetherall therelevant
portsthechemiosmotic
data have been collected.Doubt is cast on the use of experimental
data as an infallibleguideto theselectionof thecorrecttheoryand
and correctexemphasisis placed on the need forinterpretation
perimentaldesign.The importanceof theselatterelementsis then
used to underminethe credibilityof chemiosmoticwork and, by
implication,to endorsethespeaker'sown rejectionof thattheory.
In theseaccounts,thedivergencebetweenthespeaker'sscientific
viewsand thoseof anotherscientistis routinelyresolvedin favour
of the speaker.It is his statements
about thephysicalworldwhich
are takento represent
therealphysicalworld.Consequentlyitis the
other's failureto recognizethe speaker's versionof the physical
worldwhichneedsto be explainedby reference
to theother'sinterto supposed
pretativeinadequacyand, in manycases, by reference
non-cognitive
influences.This tendencyto treatphysicalrealityas
equivalentto thespeaker'scurrentviews,tombinedwitha flexible
repertoirefor depictingthe relationshipbetweenfactand theory,
makesitpossibleforscientists
to explainaway evenverypreciseexperimental'confirmations'of theory.For example, in the next
passage thespeakeruses theveryprecisionwithwhichexperimental
findingsappear to supporta theoryas a conclusiveindicationof
theinadequacyof thosefindingsand of thedistorting
effectof the
experimenter's
theoreticalcommitment.
17. The greatpro-Spencerian
Nesbitt.Nesbitt'snumbersalwaysagreewithwhat
Spencerwould want. I mean,it's bizarre.So you getall thesedifferent
numbers
comingout and I am sure I could do an experimentand produce almost any
numberI wanted... I thinkone needsto forgetthat(kindof research)and start
afreshand just studythe individualspans of the chain chemicallyand see what
theyare doing and how theydo it. (Harding,26-27)
Having underminedNesbitt'sworkby presenting

its agreement
withtheoreticalpredictionsas 'bizarre',in viewof thediversity
of
resultsproducedby otherexperiments,
and by implyingNesbitt's
over-commitment
to a theory,the speakerreturnsto the conventional view of experimentalfactsin outlininghis own alternative
researchstrategy.Thus, once again, we can observea speakermoving selectivelybetweentwo views of experimentalevidenceas he
makes senseof divergentfindingsin sucha waythathis own scien-
400
tificjudgmentscome to appear natural, commonsensicaljudgdespitetheir

ments.Nesbitt'sresultsare presentedas unconvincing,
unusual coincidencewiththeoreticalexpectation,by highlighting
whichmust,giventhecortheelementof 'spuriousinterpretation'
rectnessof the speaker's own scientificposition, have attended
theirproduction.Accordingto the speaker's formulationof his
alternativeapproach,however,the spans of theredoxchain could
could be designed
be allowed to speak forthemselves.Experiments
simplyto reveal'whattheyweredoingand how theyweredoingit'
withoutrecourseat all, it appears, to fallibleinterpretations.
Discussion
We have triedto illustrateabove some of the discursivemethods
We have
in furnishing
accountsof theory-choice.
used by scientists
shown how scientistsdraw flexiblyin the course of semi-formal
versionsof, or perspectiveson, the
conversationson two different
relationshipbetweenfactand theory.On the one hand, scientists
conceptionof science,according
employa conventionalempiricist
to whichdata, obtained fromimpersonal,standardizedroutines,
are used to establishthevalidityof hypothesesand to discriminate
unequivocallybetweencompetingtheories.From thisperspective,
and any
researchersare expectedto be detachedand self-critical;
for
underas
a
basis
in
can
used
this
be
respect
observed'failure'
of
of
the
conception
This
course,
a
is,
knowledge-claim.
mining
sciencewhichis displayedmostclearlyin the formalliterature.In
our moreinformalmaterial,thisviewis typicallyadoptedwhenthe
speaker is fashioninga direct,experimentaljustificationfor his
own scientificopinionsor for the cognitiveefficacyof sciencein
general. The great advantage of this formof account is that it
makes the speaker's scientificconclusions appear entirelyunproblematicand in need of no furthersupport.The experimental
data are presentedas revealingwhat the physicalworld is really
like; and the match between data and theoryis skillfullyaccomplishedby means of selectiveand simplifiedformulationsof
both theseelements.
On theotherhand, scientistsare also able to depicttherelationmanner.8
ship betweenfactand theoryin a muchmorecontingent
Whenthisperspectiveis adopted, factsare no longerpresentedas
speakingforthemselves,but are seen as dependingnecessarilyon

ScientificBelief
401
interpretation
whichcan alwaysbe wrongand whichis all too easily
influencedby non-cognitivefactors.This repertoirefor talking
about fact and theoryis similarto the informalrepertoirewhich
scientistsuse to describelaboratorypracticeand in whichgreatimportanceis attachedto intuition,personalinterestand craftskills.9
From this alternativeperspective,the connectionbetweentheory
and the observationsproducedby individualcraftsmenwithvaryingdegreesof skillcan easilybe made to appear muchless certain,
and muchmoredependenton highlyvariableinterpretations.
This
perspective
tendsnotto appearin theformalliterature.
However,it
plays an importantpart in informalinteraction,because it allows
scientiststhe interpretative
scope necessaryforthemto strengthen
theirown claimsby rejectingthoseof theiropponents.
These twoperspectives
mustnotbe seenas furnishing
incompatible abstractversionsof the relationshipbetweenfactand theory.
As we have stressedabove, scientists
moveflexibly
betweenthetwo
as theymake sense of theirsocial worldin the act of constructing
accounts of theory-choice.
Thus, for the actors,thesetwo repertoiresare resourcesto be drawnon as and whentheirversionsof
eventsrequire.The formal incompatibility
of the two versionsof
'fact and theory'does not implythatscientists'specificinterpretations are inconsistent.As we have shown elsewhere,generalized
formulations,such as thesetwo versionsof scientificrationality,
are applied to particularcases by means of specific,ad hoc inter10 Thus we would expectthat,werean apparentinconpretations.
sistencyabout the role of factsin choosingbetweentheoriesto be
noticedin thecourseof conversation,thespeakerwould be able to
explainit away, perhapsby referenceto some supposedlyspecial
featureof the theoriesor experiments
he was talkingabout. Certainly, one is not struck by interpretative
inconsistencywhen
discussingwithscientiststherelationshipbetweenfactand theory.
Scientists'use of two formallydivergentrepertoires
onlybecomes
observable when the sociologist records and systematically
examinesscientists'talk. Duringordinaryconversation,theserepertoiresare employedquite effectively
to sustainthe speaker'sown
scientificviewsas well as thetraditionalconceptionof theconnection betweenfactand theory.They are used to conveyan overall
impressionthatcorrectscientificbelief,whichalmostalwayscoincideswiththespeaker'sviews,is unproblematically
groundedin experimentaldata.
It has been noticedbeforethatwhen scientiststalk about their
402
professionalactions, theytend to devise theiraccounts of those

actions in accordance with their current scientific views.1
Respondents' actions and those of their colleagues are made
understandablein the lightof what the speaker takes to be excorrect.In otherwords, scientists'
and theoretically
perimentally
organizedin ways
accountsof action and beliefare systematically
which both explain and provide scientificjustificationfor the
speaker's actions, whilstexplainingand condemningthose of his
opponents.Condemnatoryaccountsachievetheireffectby linking
actions and beliefsto contingentpersonal and social factors.In
such accounts, speakers 'show' that specificactions and beliefs
would have been otherwiseif it had not been for the impact of
irrelevant
influences.Althoughthepotentialrangeof
scientifically
such contingentfactorsis verywide,thebasic procedureof underminingthe scientificlegitimacyof actionsand beliefsby showing
12
is highlyrepetitive.
themto be contingent
accountwithwhichwe have been mainThe kindof justificatory
ly concernedin thispaper is organizedto 'show' thatthespeakers'
(or some otherscientists')actions and beliefscould not properly
have been otherwise.This can be achievedon some occasions by
particularactionsor judgmentsas followingnecessarily
presenting
froma proceduralrule whichcan be taken forgranted.We have
describedelsewherehow Popper's rules of scientificmethodare
regularlyused in thisway by thescientistswe have studied.13 More
achowever,our scientistsformulatetheirjustificatory
frequently,
that
terms
in
empiricist
countsof theory-choice straightforward
is, theypresenttheiractions and beliefsas followingnecessarily
to be the case in the
fromwhat has been revealedexperimentally
natural world. Rule-based justificationsand empiricistjustifications are similarin thattheyboth minimizethe elementof choice
available to actors in reachingtheirscientificviews. The actor is
presentedas beingforced,eitherby some invariantruleof conduct
or by the naturalworlditself,to come to certainscientificconcluremoval of the
sions. Indeed, it is preciselythis interpretative
accounts
capacityforpersonalvolitionin rule-basedand empiricist
whichmakes themparticularlyeffectiveas justificationsof scientificactionand belief.
betweenthetwo parThereis a rough,butclear,correspondence
in
this
paper and the two broad
ticipants'repertoiresdescribed
in the scholarly
are
available
which
on
science
perspectives
and
on thesocial natureof science.14 Scientists'empiricist
literature

Scientific
Belief
403
rule-basedversionsof actionand beliefcorrespondto thestandard

view of science and scientists'contingentversionsto the radical
view of science. We wish to suggestthat these two opposing
analysesof sciencemay derivetheir'evidence' fromthe two main
repertoiresscientistsuse.
Finally,itwillhelpto establishthesignificance
of thispaperifwe
compare its conclusionsto those containedin the one published
studyin which,at least in some of itschapters,a similaranalytical
approachis adoptedin theanalysisof theory-choice.
In Laboratory
Life,15Latour and Woolgar suggestthat in the early stages of
researchon a giventopic therewill be variouscompetingpropositions or hypotheseswhich participantsregard as attemptsto
characterizea segmentof theworldas yetnot fullyunderstood.At
thisstage,scientificstatements
are treatedas distinctfromthereal
world. However, as scientificagreementis achieved,so scientists
come to explain the success of the statementwhichhas been acceptedas beingdue to itscorrespondence
withthereal world.
From theirinitialinceptionmembersof the laboratoryare unable to determine
whetherstatementsare true or false, objectiveor subjective,highlylikelyor
quite probable. Whilethe agonisticprocessis raging,modalitiesare constantly
added, dropped,inverted,or modified.Once the statementbeginsto stabilize,
however,an importantchangetakesplace. Thestatementbecomesa splitentity.
On the one hand it is a set of wordswhichrepresents
a statementabout an object. On theotherhand it correspondsto an object in itselfwhichtakeson a life
of itsown. It is as iftheoriginalstatementhad projecteda virtualimageof itself
whichexistsoutsidethe statement.16
Latour and Woolgar implythat scientists'own philosophizing

tendsto varyin accordancewiththe stageof scientificdebate and
withparticipants'positionsin thatdebate.
Dependingon the argument,thelaboratory,thetimeof year,and thecurrency
of thecontroversy,
investigators
willvariouslytakethestandof realist,relativist,
idealist,transcendental
relativist,skepticand so on."7
If one combinesthisstatement
withthepreviousquotation,theimplication seems to be that scientistsformulatetheiraccounts of
in 'realist' termsonlyafterany controversy
theory-choice
has settledand aftera highdegreeof consensushas allowedthereal world
to come to be seen as thedeterminant
of scientificopinion.
Our analysisclearlysupportsthe generalclaim of theseauthors
404
that scientists'views of the natureof fact and theoryare highly

variable and dependenton social context.However,we have extendedtheiranalysisby showingthatscientists'versionsof theorychoice are highlyvariableevenat one pointin time.The degreeof
interpretative
flexibilityis much greaterand more subtle than
Latour and Woolgar imply.Moreover,we have also shown that
as a
scientistsconsistently
adopt a 'realist'or 'empiricist'position"8
way of groundingtheirown claims,evenwhentheseclaimsare not
acceptedby otherresearchers.In the courseof ordinaryconversaas
statements
tion,19scientistsconsistently
take theirown scientific
an independentreality.An empiricistpositionis not
representing
to situationsof consensus,but is constantlyavailable to
restricted
resource.Even duringperiodsof conscientistsas an interpretative
troversy,actors' accountsof factand theoryseem to be generally
organizedso as to enable all those involvedto presenttheirown
positionenablesactors
claims in 'empiricist'terms.The empiricist
to constructself-containedaccounts of theirchoices of theory
beyondwhichfurther
explanationor justificationis not required.
NOTES
This researchhas been supportedbytheUK Social ScienceResearchCouncil (Grant

HR5923).
1. For generaldiscussionsof the positionwe are adoptinghere,see A. Schutz,
The Phenomenologyof the Social World(London: Heinemann, 1972); H. Gar(London: Prentice-Hall,1967); and M.A.K.
finkel,Studiesin Ethnomethodology
Halliday, Language as a Social Semiotic (London: Edward Arnold, 1978). For
discussionsspecificto the sociologyof science,see SteveWoolgar 'Writingan IntellectualHistoryof ScientificDevelopment:The Use of DiscoveryAccounts',
Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6 (1976), 395-422; Michael Mulkay, 'Action and
Beliefor ScientificDiscourse?', Philosophyof the Social Sciences,Vol. 11 (1981),
163-71; and Mulkayand G. NigelGilbert,'What Is theUltimateQuestion?', Social
Studiesof Science,Vol. 12, No. 2 (May 1982), 309-19.
2. MichaelMulkayand G. NigelGilbert,'AccountingforError:How Scientists
ConstructTheir Social World When They Account for Correct and Incorrect
Belief', Sociology,Vol. 16 (1982), 165-83.
is presentedin
documentation,
3. A similarnotion,althoughwithoutsystematic
B. Latour and S. Woolgar,LaboratoryLife: The Social Constructionof Scientific

Scientific
Belief
405
Facts (BeverlyHills and London: Sage, 1979), e.g. 21.

4. This is pointed out in B. Barnes, ScientificKnowledgeand Sociological
Theory(London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1974).
5. See also, Michael Mulkay and G. Nigel Gilbert, 'Putting Philosophyto
Work: Karl Popper's Influenceon ScientificPractice', Philosophyof the Social
Sciences,Vol. 11 (1981), 389-407.
6. This sample constitutedapproximately50 percentof those Britishand
Americanscientists
who have publishedmorethanone or a fewoccasionalpapersin
thearea. However,because we are nottrying
to reconstruct
whatactuallyhappened
in oxidativephosphorylation,
thequestionof therepresentativeness
of our sampleis
relativelyunimportant.
More significant
forthe kindof analysiscarriedout in this
paper are the detailsof how we dealt withthe interviewdata on theory-choice.
The interviews
lasted,on average,between2?/2to 3 hours. Theyweretaped and
transcribedin full. We thenread throughthe transcripts
and identifiedthe topics
beingdiscussedon each page. These topics werelistedon an indexat the frontof
each transcript.At the same time,we copied and extractedthe pages dealingwith
each topic fromall thetranscripts
and placed themin a seriesof topic files.In this
way,we had convenientaccess to all theinterview
materialreferring,
say,to consensus or replication,in a givenfile,as well as the abilityto referimmediately
to the
in any particularcase. We foundthatit was possibleto allocate
completetranscript
virtuallyall the materialin our transcripts
to topic files.Many pages of transcript
wereincludedin severalfiles.It is, of course,impossibleto formulateexplicitrules
foridentifying
interview
materialrelevantto particulartopics.Our procedurewas to
tryto makeeach fileas inclusiveas possibleand to makesurethatno passageswhich
could be read as dealingwiththattopic wereomitted.
Our procedurefordealingwiththe fileon theory-choice
was as follows.We examinedin turntheinterview
talk on thistopic foreach respondentand comparedit
to otherdata, such as lettersand researchpapers. We also looked at theadditional
materialin closelyrelatedtopic files,as wellas at the commentsby otherscientists
on each respondent'sacts of theory-choice.
The preliminary
objectivewas to see
how farconsistentaccountsof each scientist'stheory-choices
could be builtup. In
due course we concluded,as we had withothertopics,thatparticipants'accounts
dealing with theory-choicewere so diverseand variable that this goal was unattainable.We do not mean by thisthatparticipants'varyingaccountswereintrinsicallyincompatible.It is presumablyalways possible for the analystto extracta
coherent,compositeversionof actionsand beliefsfromeventhemostdiversesetof
accounts.But our experienceis thatthisprocessof reinterpretation
in orderto distil
an authoritative
analyst'saccount can produce firmconclusionsonly by disregardingcopious interpretative
uncertainties.
For each reinterpretation,
if it is checked
carefully
againstothermaterialand againsttheanalyst'sotherinterpretations,
simply provokes furtherinterpretative
problems. These methodologicalissues are
discussedelsewhereand we will not pursue them furtherhere. See Mulkay and
Gilbert,op. cit. note 1: JonathanPotterand MichaelMulkay,'Scientists'Interview
Talk', in Michael Brenneret al. (eds), The ResearchInterview(London: Academic
Press, 1982),in press;G. NigelGilbertand Mulkay,'In Searchof theAction:Some
MethodologicalProblemsof QualitativeAnalysis'(mimeo,Universitiesof Surrey
and York, 1981).
Our responseto thevariability
of scientists'accountswas to takethevariationsin
participants'discourseabout theory-choice
as our subject matter.Althoughpar-
406
ticipants'accountsare difficultto reconcilewhentheyare used as indicatorsof actions and beliefs,theydisplay certainevidentregularitieswhen treatedsimplyas
products.In thispaper, and in two otherpapers
scientists'patternedinterpretative
we have triedto displaycertainaspectsof thesediscursivepaton theory-choice,
terns.Because the originaldata consistof complex,qualitativematerial,it would
have been quite inappropriateand unconvincingto have subjectedthemto rigid,
quantitativecontentanalysis. Thus we had to finda way of displayingscientists'
methods, whilst at the same time doing justice to the
regular interpretative
qualitativecomplexity,variabilityand richnessof the data.
We have triedto resolvethisproblemby writingthreepaperson theory-choice.
The othertwo are 'OpeningPandora's Box' and 'Scientists'TheoryTalk' (mimeos,
Universitiesof Surreyand York, 1981). By writingthreeparallel papers on this
single topic we have been able to make available in the literaturemore of our
originaldata than can be containedin any one, necessarilybrief,researchreport.
Thus the presentpaper contains17 passages from11 respondents.'Opening Panand 'Scientists'TheoryTalk', 10
dora's Box' contains8 passages from3 transcripts,
passages from4 scientists.Only one scientistis quoted in two papersand different
passages are used on thesetwo occasions. In thisway,we have been able to present
in thesethreepapers 35 passages from17 of our 34 respondents.(Each passage is
identifiedby the scientist'spseudonym,and the relevantpage numberin the interview transcript.)This strategyfor the detailed analysis of multiplesamples of
qualitativedata on specifictopics followsfromthe discussionin Michael Mulkay
and Vozin Milic, 'The Sociologyof Sciencein East and West', CurrentSociology,
Vol. 28 (1980), 1-342,at 93.
Althoughthedata containedin thesethreepapersare similarin certainrespects,
in each.
aspectsof discourseabout theory-choice
we have triedto illustratedifferent
on scientists'use of
For example,in 'OpeningPandora's Box' we have concentrated
and we have devotedmorespace thereto comparcriteriaor rulesof theory-choice,
ing our formof analysisto that of previouswork. Referencesto such work are,
on furnishing
therefore,
providedin thatpaper. In thispaper we have concentrated
and on showdocumentationof scientists'standardjustificationsof theory-choice
ing how such empiricistaccounts of theory-choiceare selected fromtwo interpretativerepertoiresdealingwiththe relationshipsbetweenfactand theory.In all
threepapers,our formof analysisleads us to make close comparisonsbetweendifferentpassages of discourseproducedby a smallnumberof respondents.Passages
have been selectedforeach paper (a) in orderto illustrate
byparticularrespondents
clearlythe specificthemeof thepaper, and (b) in orderto make available new data
fromrespondentswho do not featurein the otherpapers on theory-choice.The
documented
is progressively
variability
guidingthemeof participants'interpretative
thatthisseriesof papers willhave a
throughthethreepapers. We hope, therefore,
papers
cumulativeimpacton thereader.It wouldhave beenpossibleto writefurther
We decided,however,
on theory-choice,
usingdata fromtherestof our transcripts.
thatthiswould have been excessive.
7. In this paper, as in our other papers on scientistsworkingon oxidative
as faras possiwe have triedto preserveparticipants'anonymity
phosphorylation,
ble. We have, therefore,replacedtheirreal names withpseudonyms.Because our
are closelyrelated,we have
on theory-choice,
paperson discourse,and particularly
in all our papers. Thus if a reader
used the same set of pseudonymsconsistently
to, a scientistcalled, forexample,'Watson' in two
findsquotationsby,or references

Scientific
Belief
407
different
papers,he can be surethatthe same scientistis involvedand he can compare the passages in thesepapers withthisin mind.
It has been suggestedto us than thisproceduremakes it difficultforreadersto
thetechnicalliterature
identify
on oxidativephosphorylation.
For thoseinterested
in
this literature,a wide-ranging
set of reviewsby most of the leadingfiguresin the
fieldcan be foundin Annual Reviewof Biochemistry,
Vol. 46 (1977), 957-1025.A
usefulreviewintendedfora widerpublicis PeterC. Hinkleand RichardE. McCarty, 'How Cells Make ATP', ScientificAmerican,Vol. 238, No. 3 (March 1978),
104-23.
It has also been suggested,bya biochemistreferee,thatthereis no pointin trying
to hide thereal name of the scientistwe have called 'Spencer'. We acceptthatthose
alreadyfamiliarwiththe fieldwill knowwho Spenceris and willprobablyfindthe
use of this pseudonymratherunconvincing.But most of our readerswill not be
biochemists.They will not be familiarwiththe fieldand we suspectthattheyare
unlikelyto wantto knowSpencer'sreal name. As faras we can see, therefore,
there
is nothingto be gained by alteringthenamingprocedureswe have used in previous
papersand abandoningthis,or other,pseudonyms.Moreover,thesystematic
use of
pseudonymsin our textshelps to emphasizeour contentionthat the passages of
discoursewe examineare not of interestas statements
by Spenceror Watsonor any
otherspecificscientist,
of genericinterpretative
butas illustrations
procedureswhich
are commonto whole classes of scientistsand perhapsto scienceas a culture.
8. For otherdata and discussionsrelatingto scientists,expressionsof and accountsof theuncertainty
of experimental
results,see thepapersby Collins,Harvey,
Pickering,Pinch and Travis, in H.M. Collins (ed.), Knowledgeand Controversy:
Studies of Modern Natural Science, Special Issue of Social Studies of Science,
Vol. 11, No. 1 (February1981).
9. G. Nigel Gilbertand Michael Mulkay, 'Contextsof ScientificDiscourse:
Social Accountingin ExperimentalPapers', in Karin D. Knorret al. (eds), The
Social Process of ScientificInvestigation,Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook,
Vol. 4 (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1980), 269-94. Scientists'use of divergentinterpretative
repertoires
in different
social contextsis also documentedin H.M. Collinsand T.J.
Pinch, 'The Constructionof the Paranormal:NothingUnscientific
Is Happening',
in R. Wallis (ed.), On theMarginsof Science: The Social Constructionof Rejected
Knowledge (Keele, Staffs: Universityof Keele, Sociological Review Monograph
No. 27, 1979), 237-70.
10. See 'PuttingPhilosophyto Work', op. cit. note 5; also Michael Mulkay,'Interpretationand the Use of Rules', in Thomas Gieryn(ed.), Science and Social
Structure(Transactionsof theNew YorkAcademyof Sciences,SeriesII, Vol. 39,
1980), 111-25.
11. For example,Michael Mulkay, 'Methodologyin the Sociologyof Science:
Reflectionson theStudyof Radio Astronomy',Social ScienceInformation,Vol. 13
(1974), 1078-119.It shouldnot be assumed,however,thateach scientist
has a single,
coherentscientific
positionin relationto whichhe constructs
hisaccountsof action.
Each scientist,in the course of an interviewor a conversation,can construehis
'scientificposition' in varioussignificantly
different
ways.
12. See 'AccountingforError',op. cit. note 2.
13. See the referencesin note 10, and the paper by G.D.L. Travismentionedin
note 8: 'ReplicatingReplication?Aspectsof the Social Constructionof Learningin
Planarian Worms', Social Studiesof Science,Vol. 11 (1981), 11-32.
408
14. Michael Mulkay,Scienceand theSociologyof Knowledge(London: Allen&

Unwin, 1979).
15. Latour and Woolgar, op. cit. note 3.
16. Ibid., 176 (emphasisin original).
17. Ibid., 179.
18. Latour and Woolgardo not definepreciselywhattheymean by 'realist',but
theirdiscussionsuggeststhat thereis littledifferencebetweentheir'realism' and
whatwe have called 'empiricism'.
19. We have assumed throughoutthis paper that the interpretative
practices
which scientistsuse in interviewsresemblethose used in informalconversations
among scientists.However,giventhatwe emphasizethatscientists'discourseis intimatelyaffectedby its social context,this assumption is by no means unproblematic.In certain,as yetunknownrespects,itis boundto be inaccurate.Clearly, much furthercomparativestudyof the contextsof scientificdiscourseis required. In some of our otherpapersthisissue is exploredmorefully.See 'AccountingforError',op. cit. note 2, and 'Scientists'InterviewTalk', op. cit. note 6. See
also 'Methodologyin the Sociology of Science', op. cit. note 11, and G. Nigel
Gilbert,'Being Interviewed:A Role Analysis',Social ScienceInformation,Vol. 19
(1980), 227-36.
of
G. Nigel Gilbertis lecturerin Sociology at the University
Surrey.He has interestsin the sociologicalanalysisof
and labourmarket
scientificknowledge,in stratification
societies,and in the development
theoriesof contemporary
systems.He and
information-providing
of microcomputer
preparinga book on their
Michael Mulkayare currently
studyof bioenergetics.His recentpublicationsinclude
to LoglinearAnalysis
ModellingSociety: An Introduction
(London: Allenand Unwin,1981). MichaelMulkayis
of York. He is the
Professorof Sociology at the University
of Knowledge
and
the
Sociology
authorof Science
become
recently
He
has
1979).
and
Unwin,
(London: Allen
action
between
in
relationship
the
interested
particularly
engaged in the analysisof
and discourse,and is currently
discoursein science and in the finearts.Authors'
addresses (respectively):Departmentof Sociology,
SurreyGU2 5XH, UK;
of Surrey,Guildford,
University
of York,Heslington,
Departmentof Sociology, University
YorkY01 5DD, UK.

Warranting Sci Belief

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Warranting Sci Belief

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Warranting Scientific Belief

Author(s): G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay

Scientists,like other social actors, constructthe nature of their

social situations.As analystsof the social world of science,it is

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

rationalitywhentheytryto explainwhysome scientistsadhereto

Social Studiesof Science

A BriefHistoryof the ResearchArea

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

When scientistsaccount fortheirown beliefs,theyoftencompare and contrasttheirviewswithotherincorrectviews.As long as

1. I can tellyou in myown case whyI changed.I changedstrictly

Not onlyone's ownresults,

have been shownto operateacross a membrane'.

In the followingpassage, the speakerdescribeshow a colleague

evidenceis used as an inIn all thesepassages, the experimental

A problemcan ariseforspeakersin accountingforthefactthatit

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

took some years before they publicly admittedthat they had

The normalmode amongour scientistsforjustifying

In thesepassages, the speakersare makingseveralclaims about

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

ings,whichnow seem to have been upsetby anotherbiochemist's

In thiscontext,Cookson observesthat,despiteall theeffortsof

some compositeanalyst'saccountof how theoryof theory-choice

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

11. If thefield is likethat,can you assumethatthe 'right'theoryis goingto win

Hawkins respondsto the suggestionthat he and his colleagues

In the firstpassage, Hawkins manages to portrayscience as

preservedand, in the othercase, the speaker'scurrentintellectual

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

13. He consideredthathe was lookingat a primaryejectorof protonswhichwas

On occasion, scientiststhemselvescommenton the flexibility

Even here, Norton continuesto recognizethat both sides to the

Social Studiesof Science

as undispute are treatingtheir own data and interpretations

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

his own non-chemiosmotic

Having underminedNesbitt'sworkby presenting

Social Studiesof Science

tificjudgmentscome to appear natural, commonsensicaljudgdespitetheir

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

Social Studiesof Science

professionalactions, theytend to devise theiraccounts of those

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

rule-basedversionsof actionand beliefcorrespondto thestandard

Latour and Woolgar implythat scientists'own philosophizing

Social Studiesof Science

that scientists'views of the natureof fact and theoryare highly

This researchhas been supportedbytheUK Social ScienceResearchCouncil (Grant

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

Facts (BeverlyHills and London: Sage, 1979), e.g. 21.

Social Studiesof Science

Gilbert& Mulkay: Warranting

Social Studiesof Science

14. Michael Mulkay,Scienceand theSociologyof Knowledge(London: Allen&

You might also like