Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The authors would like to stress that the views presented in this work do not represent those
of their respective organisations.
285
286
1. INTRODUCTION
The British East India Company founded the modern port of Singapore in
1819 as a centre for entrepot trade. The port served mainly as a regional
distribution centre for cargo trafc originating from and destined for the
Malayan hinterland (Huff, 1994). From the late 1960s, however, Singapore
began to focus on positioning itself as a transhipment centre for international cargo. Hence, the throughput of the port now consists not only of
local cargo from Malaysia and neighbouring Indonesian islands, but also
includes cargoes that are transhipped through the port to and from Europe,
East/North-East Asia, Australasia and the Indian subcontinent. Over the
years, Singapore has become recognised as a focal point for some 200 shipping lines with links to more than 600 ports in over 120 countries worldwide.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the port of Singapore.
Section 2 provides a background to the port, analysing the sources of its
hinterland and transhipment cargoes, its overall performance across a
number of parameters and the nature of the operations that take place
within it. This is followed in Section 3 by a focus on the governance structure for the port, focussing in particular on the role of the relevant regulatory agency, the ownership structure of the container handling sector and
the potential for privatisation within this sector. Section 4 analyses the major challenges facing the port, while Section 5 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. The Maritime Industry Context
From the perspective of calculating its contribution to the national economy, the government of Singapore classies the maritime industry as comprising the following individual sectors and activities: the port, shipping
lines, shipping agencies, shipbuilding and repair, offshore, marine equipment, bunkering, ship chandlery, cruise, inland water transport, shipbroking
and chartering, classication societies, ship management, maritime logistics,
maritime-related legal services, maritime-related insurance, maritime-related
nance, maritime-related education and training, maritime-related research
and development and maritime-related information technology. In terms of
economic contribution, Table 13.1 shows that in 2002 the maritime industry
in Singapore (thus dened and as a whole) generated US$4.7 billion worth
of direct value added and accounted for 4.9 percent of GDP.
Table 13.1.
287
Indicator
Number of establishments
Number of employees
Direct value added
Direct value added as % of GDP
Direct and indirect value added
Direct and indirect value added as % of GDP
Value
4,400
86,500
US$4.7 billion
4.9
US$7 billion
7.3
288
Indicator
1999
2004
Containerised
Conventional
Oil
Non-oil bulk
176,569
11,985
124,386
12,963
% Change
from 2003
19992004 CAGR
223,500
17,376
129,328
23,183
16.6
17.7
4.8
29.7
4.8
7.7
0.8
12.3
325,902
15,945
393,388
21,329
13.1
15.9
3.8
6.0
18,891
23,567
13.3
4.5
Container vessels
Oil tankers
Chemical tankers
LPG/LNG tankers
Regional ferry
332.0
244.7
7.7
20.9
10.4
397.1
276.5
24.5
30.7
9.9
10.0
6.6
24.4
5.5
3.1
3.6
2.5
26.0
8.0
1.1
877.1
1042.4
5.7
3.5
289
56.8 percent. This was followed by bulk oil cargo, which accounted for 32.9
percent. Together, these two cargo categories accounted for almost 90 percent of the total tonnage of cargo handled in the port of Singapore.
Bunker sales also grew to a new world record of 23.6 million tonnes in
2004. This is mainly attributed to various measures that have been introduced
to strengthen the integrity of the bunker trade a strategy prompted by the
prospect of greater competition in the region, mainly from new Malaysian
and newly privatised Sri Lankan bunker suppliers (Anonymous, 2002a).
These measures include more stringent bunker checks for ship-to-ship
transfers and bunker tankers loading at terminals. Constituting one of Asias
largest ag eets, the Singapore Registry of Ships (SRS) also grew from the
11th largest merchant eet in 1999 to become the worlds 6th largest eet in
2004, totalling 27.7 million gross tons.
2.3. Sources of Cargo Throughput
Local cargo handled by the port of Singapore comes mainly from what is
referred to as the SIJORI region (SIngapore-JOhor-RIau; refer to Fig. 13.1).
This IndonesiaMalaysiaSingapore growth triangle, ofcially formed in
1994, is based on the concept of trilateral cooperation that emphasises subregional development within the wider regional context of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Through strategies that engender
mutual cooperation, the main aim of establishing SIJORI is to facilitate
economic development by enhancing the attractiveness of the region for
foreign investments. The SIJORI triangle now constitutes one of Southeast
Asias most vibrant economic zones, with Singapore as its focal point.
Hinterland cargo from the SIJORI region comprises mainly container and
liquid bulk cargo and, as its name implies, the structure of hinterland
transportation can be split into three smaller geographical areas, namely
JohorMelaka, the Riau Islands and internal to Singapore.
Cargo originating in the JohorMelaka area is mainly containerised. Despite the presence of a railway line running northsouth from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore, the primary form of hinterland transportation from this
area is road haulage. Most hauliers prefer to use the NorthSouth Expressway and Federal Highway Route 2 that run parallel to the railway line. In
recent years, the Malaysian government has achieved some success in encouraging industries in this area to use Port Klang as their gateway port in
preference to the port of Singapore (Robinson, 2005; Robinson & Everett,
1997). The motivation for this is obviously national self-interest, but the
comparative success of this strategy can be largely attributed to continuing
290
Fig. 13.1.
291
amount of liquid bulk cargo is also transported via both road haulage and
pipeline.
Transhipment cargo is sourced mainly from Singapores traditional hinterlands in Southeast Asia. However, as illustrated in Fig. 13.2, the geographical position of Singapore on the mainline EuropeFar East shipping
route has meant that the port is also able to serve as the transhipment point
for cargo originating from, or destined for, the European, East/Northeast
Asian and Australasian markets. In the case of container trafc, Singapore
has beneted greatly from the signicant transhipment potential it offers for
container trafc movements between Europe and East/Northeast Asia.
292
NORTH AMERICA
EUROPE
Eastbound
Traffic:
1.66 m
EUROPE
NORTHEAST ASIA
Annualised
Slot
Capacity:
9.55 m
Westbound
Traffic: 2.86 m
Asnnualied Slot
Capacity: 4.16 m
NORTH AMERICA
NORTHEAST ASIA
Eastbound Traffic:
8.84 m
Westbound Traffic: 3.56 m
Annualised Slot Capacity: 13.30 m
Westbound
Traffic: 6.33 m
Fig. 13.2.
Erastbound Taffic:
2.88 m
293
SEMBAWANG
WHARVES
JURONG
INDUSTRIAL
ESTATE
SHIPYARDS
CRUISE TERMINAL
TANJONG PAGAR TERMINAL
BRANI TERMINAL KEPPEL
TERMINAL
JURONG
PORT
TUAS VIEW
JURONG
ISLAND
Fig. 13.3.
Port of Singapore.
years up to 1994, after which the next doubling occurred only in 2004. It
should be acknowledged that the early rapid expansion in container
throughput (pre-1994) at the port of Singapore was facilitated by the rapid
adoption of the containerisation concept within the main economies (Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) whose trade feeds into the hub of Singapore.
Although Singapore is widely acknowledged as offering one of the highest
service standards in the region, the recent past has seen both MaerskSealand
and Evergreen relocating their Southeast Asian regional transhipment hubs
to the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP); a brand new port development located on what was once a greeneld site lying just across the border in
Malaysia.
MaerskSealand announced its decision to relocate its hub from Singapore to PTP in August 2000. This decision had the immediate effect of
diverting about 2 million TEUs of container throughput, or about 10 percent of PSA Internationals volumes handled in Singapore. In pursuit of its
global strategy of vertical integration into the ports sector, MaerskSealand
simultaneously took a 30 percent stake in PTP, which was estimated to be
worth US$165 million (The Business Times, 2000). Nevertheless, the strong
connectivity offered by Singapore has ensured that MaerskSealand continues to tranship a signicant share of its container trafc through the port
of Singapore (Yap & Lam, 2004).
294
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
Containerised
Fig. 13.4.
Conventional
Oil
Non-oil Bulk
295
296
petroleum rening centres in the world, with total crude oil rening capacity
of 1.3 million barrels per day. The three main reneries include those operated by
Exxon Mobil with a capacity of 580,000 bbl/d
Royal Dutch/Shell with a capacity of 430,000 bbl/d
The Singapore Rening Corporation with a capacity of 285,000 bbl/d
To maintain Singapores long-term status as the energy hub in the region,
Jurong Island was created in the 1990s by reclaiming land to conglomerate
seven smaller islands to produce a cost-competitive location for highly integrated, world-scale petrochemical plants. Representatives of the petroleum and petrochemicals industry that have operations on Jurong Island
include Exxon Mobil, Shell, Chevron Texaco, BASF, Sumitomo Chemical
and Mitsui Chemical. The aim of the government is to develop Jurong
Island into a self-sufcient petrochemical complex that incorporates all of
the key accompanying support facilities. Reclamation work is scheduled for
completion by the end of 2005, when the size of Jurong Island will be
3,200 ha. By 2010, the island will be able to accommodate ve reneries and
150 companies with an estimated xed asset investment of US$24 billion.
One problem on the horizon, however, is that the demand for oil products in
Singapores traditional export markets has gradually been met by import
substitutions from more local production facilities, such as the reneries that
have been established and developed in India, Malaysia and Thailand.
2.4.3. Bunkering Operations
Singapore is the largest bunkering centre in the world. A record volume of
23.6 million tonnes of bunker fuel was sold in 2004, generating revenues in
excess of US$8.5 billion. The strategic location of the port on one of the
worlds busiest shipping routes ensures a steady source of potential demand.
Singapores bunker market is characterised by intense competition and
speculation between buyers and sellers and the Maritime and Port Authority
of Singapore (MPA) has always placed a heavy emphasis on ensuring bunker quality, the adherence to international standards, and maintaining the
cost-competitiveness of the industry.
Some recent measures aimed at protecting the quality of bunkers sold in
Singapore include the Accreditation Scheme for Bunker Suppliers and the
Code on Quality Management for the Bunker Supply Chain. These measures are also complemented by restrictions on Outside Port Limit bunkering
and on supplies from unknown sources and, therefore, of unknown quality.
The MPA advocates that adhering to international norms will help create an
297
assurance of high product quality and instil greater condence in its bunker
customers. In an effort to achieve this objective, revisions have been made to
the Singapore Standard for Bunkering (SSCP60) that includes new provisions on health, safety and the environment. In the attempt to boost business volumes while keeping bunkering costs low, the Special Bunkering
Anchorage scheme has been extended to include both the Eastern and
Western sectors of the port. In these locations, vessels of 20,000 gross tons
and above stand to enjoy more than a 50 percent concession in port dues.
With such measures in place, the authorities intend to maintain Singapores
lead as the worlds busiest bunkering port.
3. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
3.1. Regulatory Administration
The main organisation currently involved in the regulation of the port is the
MPA. Until 1996, cargo operations and port regulation were handled by
three government agencies. These were the National Maritime Board (a
statutory board in the charge of the Ministry of Transport that overlooked
matters relating to the training of seafarers), the Port of Singapore Authority (a statutory board in the charge of the Ministry of Transport that
overlooked matters relating to cargo operations and port regulation) and
the Marine Department (a department in the Ministry of Transport overseeing the ship registry).
In February 1996 the MPA Act (1996) passed into law. The MPA was
established by combining the regulatory functions of the three entities, while
the commercial and marine activities of the original Port of Singapore Authority were separated to form the PSA Corporation, a wholly owned entity
of Temasek Holdings, the investment company of the Singapore government. The changes are represented in Fig. 13.5 below.
As the port authority, the MPA manages and administers the port of
Singapore through the regulation of essential port and marine services and
facilities. However, it is not involved in any operational aspects of the terminal businesses. In fact, the MPA performs several functions, including:
(a) Regulating and licensing port and marine services and facilities. This includes discharging the MPAs responsibilities with respect to Singapores role as both a ag and port State, ensuring that regulations are
kept up to date and complied with as well as adhering to various
298
Ministry of Transport
Regulatory
functions
Maritime and
Port Authority
Temasek
Holdings
Marine Department
PSA Corporation
Fig. 13.5.
Cargo
operations
and marine
services
100%
owned
POST-CORPORATIZATION
299
300
301
302
terminal operations on a global scale. At the time of writing, PSA International operates 17 terminal facilities in 11 countries worldwide (www.
internationalpsa.com), including
Singapore port (through its 100 percent ownership of PSA Corporation)
Delwaide and Churchill Docks, Europa and Noordzee Terminals and Deurganckdok West in Antwerp, Belgium and OCHZ terminal in Zeebrugge,
Belgium
Holland Terminals in Rotterdam
Voltri Terminal Europa and Venice Container Terminals in Italy
Sines Container Terminal in Portugal
Tuticorin Container Terminal in India
Dalian, Fuzhou and Guangzhou Container Terminals in China
Incheon Container Terminal in Korea
Muara Container Terminal in Brunei
Eastern Sea Laem Chabang Terminal in Thailand
Hibiki Container Terminal in Japan
The booming Chinese economy and an expansion of container volumes
emanating from the rest of Asia has helped PSA Internationals prots reach
US$544 million in 2004, an increase of 29 percent over the previous year. At
only 5 percent, however, revenue growth was notably slower than global
growth in container throughput, which was up 15.5 percent year-on-year to
33.11 million TEUs. PSA International itself attributes this partially to the
sale of non-port businesses (Hand, 2005).
Throughput at the port of Singapore was up 14.1 percent to 20.62 million
TEU in 2004. However, although its home base port still accounted for 62.2
percent of total container throughput handled by PSA International in
2004, Singapore port operations accounted for only 45 percent of group
revenues. Despite this, it did remain the most important source of group
prot, with PSA International indicating that the port of Singapore accounted for over 50 percent of its prot, which itself grew by 17.2 percent
compared to 2003 gures. Interestingly, the net prot reported in 2004 (but
relating to 2003) for the newly established Singapore-based company PSA
Corporation actually exceeded total group net prot (Hand, 2005).
In terms of future plans for further expansion and/or diversication,
COSCO is keen to expand upon its cooperation with PSA International and
the two companies already have links not only in Singapore but also in
China and the European port of Genoa. The seemingly close working relationship is cemented and complicated by the fact that Temasek Holdings
303
304
4. FUTURE CHALLENGES
High cargo volumes and shipping tonnage generally translate into more
business opportunities for the port. However, the port of Singapore faces
increasing competition from neighbouring competitors who are able to offer
ever-improving service quality at competitive prices.
The major challenges the port of Singapore faces as a consequence of the
increasingly competitive environment in which it has to operate can be
summarised as three main areas:
1. Port competition in Southeast Asia is likely to centre on transhipment
containers, with price being the key determinant of port choice decisions.
Singapores ability to overcome the competition it faces from other ports
in the region depends crucially on how well it can leverage the competitive and comparative advantages of each ASEAN member in order to
sustain its position as the regions premier transhipment hub.
Other than fullling customer demand for the delivery of high-quality
services at competitive prices, there is also the need to strengthen feeder
connections within the region and, more importantly, to generate greater
intra-regional and external trade volumes. The current strategy being
305
pursued by Singapore for securing this expansion of trade mainly involves the establishment of bilateral Free Trade Agreements and multilateral agreements within ASEAN and between ASEAN and other
regional groupings or countries (ASEAN, 2005; Government of Singapore, 2005). Although these agreements do not relate directly to cargo
handling, the greater trade volumes that are expected to be generated
from these initiatives will yield greater opportunities in an expanded regional transhipment market not just for Singapore, but for all the regions
major port players. This could mitigate, at least to some extent, the deleterious impact of price competition across the regions port sector as a
whole. This proposed cooperative approach is also likely to lead to better
management of economic resources that are currently devoted to intense
port competition and enable the regions ports to engage in competition
through more economic and sustainable means.
2. As an alternative approach to enhancing the relative competitiveness of
the port of Singapore and, thereby, overcoming the intensifying port
competition in the region, the government is actively pursuing a policy of
developing the country to achieve the status of IMC. The rationale for this
policy is to move up the value chain by focusing on knowledge-intensive
activities that are harder for competitors to emulate and, in consequence,
propel Singapores maritime industry onto the next level of economic
competence. The same higher-level activities also have the potential to
generate stronger and wider positive multiplier effects for the maritime
cluster and the national economy overall. However, a world-recognised
IMC usually possesses a wide range of ancillary services that exhibit no
particular dependence on a single or narrow group of activities.
As we have already seen, the Singapore maritime industry is dominated
by the port, shipbroking and chartering, shipbuilding and repair, shipping lines and agencies and logistics services. Hence, the government has
been focusing much effort on increasing the breadth and depth of other
maritime ancillary services by capitalising on its leading status in cargohandling, bunkering and ship repair. By so doing, it is attempting to
rmly anchor these sectors within the IMC-development strategy. This
will involve identifying key maritime activities for specic or joint development in order to generate greater economic spin-offs for the whole
of Singapore.
3. On the landward side, the constraint on available space for development
translates into high land values that dictate the need to optimise the
management of land-based facilities such as those involved in cargohandling activities. On the seaward side, a similar lack of appropriate
306
5. CONCLUSIONS
Although Singapore currently enjoys a clear lead in the region in terms of
both cargo volumes handled and shipping volumes received, the port community recognises that it must improve on its competitiveness by offering
higher standards of service and productivity at competitive prices. If it fails
to do so, it is fully cognisant of the risk of being replaced by upcoming
regional competitors.
This risk is especially prevalent since port competition in Southeast Asia
is expected to centre on the business of container transhipment. As a port
where transhipment represents 80 percent of its container handling activity
(Hong, 2002), Singapore is especially vulnerable to competition. As can be
deduced from Table 13.3, this is despite having the highest level of connectivity by shipping lines and their services, the importance of which in
winning transhipment business has been identied by UNCTAD (1993).
Hutchison Port Holdings took a 31.5 percent stake in Westport Terminal
in Port Klang in August 2001 (World Cargo News, 2001). Together with the
share in PTP taken by APM Terminals that has already been discussed,
Table 13.3.
Number of:
Singapore
Port Klang
Tanjung Pelepas
Laem Chabang
Tanjung Priok
Manila
307
1999
2003
1999
2003
100
52
0
28
40
31
100
63
13
34
41
32
100
35
0
13
17
23
100
43
14
18
19
23
308
One could argue that the changes that have thus far been made to the
governance of the port of Singapore have enabled the port to continue to
perform well. Apart from the growth in cargo-handling volumes mentioned
earlier, the port has also been voted the Best Seaport in Asia from 1989 to
2004 in the Hong Kong-based Asian Freight Industry Awards and terminal
operator PSA International has also been voted the worlds Best Container
Terminal Operator for the past 15 years.
The most important impact of the changes in governance has been that it
has allowed PSA International and Jurong Port to focus on port-related
business, while MPA addresses the broader issue of ensuring that the entire
maritime cluster continues to remain competitive and an important contributor to Singapores economic performance. Following the change in its
responsibilities, the MPA has acted on behalf of the government of Singapore in actively pursuing a policy of developing the country to become an
IMC. The rationale for this is to move up the value chain by focusing on
knowledge-intensive activities that are harder for competitors to emulate
and, in consequence, to propel Singapores maritime industry to the next
level of economic competence.
These same higher-level activities also have the potential to generate
stronger and wider positive multiplier effects for the maritime cluster and
the national economy overall. However, a world-recognised IMC usually
possesses a wide range of ancillary services that exhibit no particular dependence on a single or narrow group of activities. In fact, as has been
shown earlier, Singapores maritime industry is dominated by its port,
shipbroking and chartering, shipbuilding and repair, shipping lines and
agencies and logistics services. Hence, the government has been focusing
much effort on increasing the breadth and depth of other maritime ancillary
services by leveraging or capitalising on its leading status in the port-related
activities of cargo-handling, bunkering and ship repair. By so doing, it is
attempting to rmly anchor these sectors as the core of the IMC development strategy.
In conclusion, Singapores rich maritime heritage has allowed its maritime
industry to remain dynamic and competitive until now. That same industry
has also witnessed the nurturing of many companies that have progressed to
become world-renowned international players. However, there are major
challenges that must be faced and while the port will obviously continue to
be one of the main lynchpins of the maritime cluster, it is clearly important
that the clusters core is expanded to include other maritime activities that
are knowledge intensive and that generate wide-ranging and extensive economic spin-offs. The ultimate goal is therefore to create an environment in
309
Singapore that is conducive to the future prosperity and success of maritime-related businesses.
NOTE
1. The port sector is dened by the Singapore Department of Statistics to include
exclusively port operation services such as stevedoring and lightering activities.
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