Fernandez v.

Atty Novero
Sps. Garcia v. Bala
Concept Placement Resources Inc v. Atty Funk
Sesbreno v. CA

Sandoval v. CA
Reyes v. Duque
Dacena v. Malanyaon
Villaueva v. Judge Buaya
Sps Lago v. Judge Abul Jr.

RIZALINO FERNANDEZ v. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR.Mendoza, J:

Facts:
Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for alleged
patentand gross neglect in the handling of their civil case against the Bacolod City Water District. The
complainant imputed that the respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing nor seek a
postponement, for which reason the trial court considered respondent to have waived further
presentation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits. However, respondent failed
to formally offer his exhibits, prompting the trial court to order the dismissal of the case. The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal however he did not file his
motion within the reglementary period. He even tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming
that the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last witness. The truth was that
complainants sister had already testified. The respondent submitted his Answer and averred that the
complaint filed against him was baseless, purely malicious and speculative considering the fact that it
was not made under oath. He contended that complainant engaged his legal services after the first
counsel had withdrawn and he had no knowledge of what had happened in the case before he handled
it because complainant did not furnish him with the records and stenographic notes of the previous
proceedings despite his repeated requests. He alleged that he failed to formally offer the exhibits
because complainant tried to take over the handling of the case by insisting on presenting more
witnesses who failed to appear during trial. The Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report finding
respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his
suspension. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines also submitted a report and recommendation for the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling of the civil case?

Held:
The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even
malfeasance or nonfeasance would be binding on his client. A lawyer owes to the client the exercise of
utmost prudence and capability in that representation. The respondents attempt to evade
responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant due to the latters failure to turn over to him records
and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence and inadequacy in handling the
complainants case. The respondent Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect of his clients case and is
Suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month with Warning that repetition of the same
negligent act will be dealt with even more severely.

Garcia Vs. Atty. Bala

Facts:
Complainants engaged the services of respondent to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of
the DARAB. Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. Because of respondents
error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.
Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Rolando S. Bala for the latters failure to render a legal service contracted -- the preparation of a petition
for review that he was to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case. Moreover,
he supposedly refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for the purpose. Finally, he
allegedly hurled invectives at them when they asked him for a copy of the petition that he claimed to
have filed.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer?

Held:
Yes. Respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as
regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly assured the complainants that the supposed petition had
already been filed. Moreover, respondent purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them on
the appeal, misled them as to his whereabouts, and hurled invectives at them when they visited him for
an update on the case. Complainants had the right to be updated on the developments and status of the
case for which they had engaged the services of respondent. But he apparently denied them that right
Hence, a violation of Rule 18.02, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent should return the money paid by complainants for his legal services were virtually
nullified by his recourse to the wrong remedy and the legal fees were not commensurate to the services
rendered. Hence, in the absence of a contract, the Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are
reasonable under the circumstances, also known as quantum meruit. Lawyers must be able to show that
they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts in pursuing their clients case, taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, and is ORDERED to pay Spouses Eduardo and
Teresita Garcia the amount of P9,200 -- with legal interest from April 8, 1999 -- within 30 days from his
receipt of this Decision.

Concept Placement Resources, Inc . Vs. Richard V. Funk

Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari. Concept Placement Resources, Inc. engaged the legal services
of Atty. Richard V. Funk on a retainership agreement, wherein Atty. Funk shall be paid regular retainer
fee for various legal services, except litigation, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings and similar
actions. In these services, there will be separate billings.
In a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner, respondent, as counsel for petitioner, filed
with the POEA its answer with counterclaim for P30,000.00 as damages and P60,000.00 as attorneys
fees. While the labor case was still pending, petitioner terminated its retainer agreement with
respondent. Nevertheless, respondent continued handling the case. POEA rendered a Decision
dismissing Felosopos complaint. POEA, however, failed to rule on petitioners counterclaim for damages
and attorneys fees. Respondent advised petitioner of the POEAs favorable Decision and requested
payment of his attorneys fees. Petitioner rejected respondents request, citing one of the reasons, was
because the POEA did not rule on petitioners counterclaim for attorneys fees. This prompted
respondent to file with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
MTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
RTC reversed the MTC Decision on the ground of res judicata. CA sustained the award to respondent of
his attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to attorneys fees for assisting petitioner as counsel in the
labor case?

Held:
Yes. However, respondent did not encounter difficulty in representing petitioner. The complaint
against it was dismissed with prejudice. All that respondent did was to prepare the answer with
counterclaim and possibly petitioners position paper. Considering respondents limited legal services and
the case involved is not complicated, the award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees is a bit excessive.
The court agrees with the petitioners pose that he and the Private Respondent had agreed on
the latter paying him the amount of P60,000.00 by way of attorneys fees for his professional services as
its counsel in POEA Case. Private Respondent did categorically and unequivocally admit in its
Compulsory Counterclaim in POEA, that it engaged the services of the Petitioner as its counsel For a fee
in the amount of P60,000.00.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
of attorneys fees is reduced to only P10,000.00.

SESBREO vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement
and backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The
employees and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorneys fees and 20% as expenses
taken from their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered the Province of
Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties in
April 1979. The former employees waived their right to reinstatement among others. The Province of
Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty. Sesbreno as Partial
Satisfaction of Judgment. The amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and gratuity pay
due to the employees. Ten employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they
agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from their back salaries. The lower court issued two
orders, with which petitioner complied, requiring him to release P10,000.00 to each of the ten private
respondents and to retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining to the latter out of the P2,300,000.00
released to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial court fixed the attorneys fees a total of 60% of all monies
paid to the employees. However, trial court modified the award after noting that petitioners attorneys
lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have been only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to
the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services but was even further reduced to 20%.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorneys fees
awarded to petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, notwithstanding the contract for professional services
signed by private respondents?

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the
parties 6 authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the employees back salaries only. The trial
court, however, fixed the lawyers fee on the basis of all monies to be awarded to private respondents.
Fifty per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the provincial government,
according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to the contract
of professional services. What a lawyer may charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to
judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for professional services
ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds
such stipulated amount unreasonable unconscionable. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this
jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express
contract. if the attorneys fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances.
Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserves, is used as the basis for determining the lawyers
professional fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court averred that in balancing the
allocation of the monetary award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be allocated
among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a
commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they
had hired to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of the total amount collectible by
these employees. 20% is a fair settlement. Petition is DENIED

Sandoval vs CA
Facts:
A parcel of land in Quezon City on which a five-door apartment building stands is the subject of
this case. Such land was covered by a TCT in the name of Lorenzo Tan.
October 1984, Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. (real Tan Jr.) was notified of the need to present his owners
copy of the TCT to the Registry of Deeds, Quezon City in connection with an adverse claim. He explained
that he was still looking for his copy of the TCT. November 1984, he discovered that one Godofredo
Valmeo had an adverse claim annotated on his title in the RoD. Another Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. (fake Tan Jr)
had mortgaged the property to Valmeo to secure an obligation.
December 1984, real Tan, Jr. filed a complaint for cancellation of the annotation of mortgage
and damages. In April 1985, real Tan Jr. met Juan C. Sandoval who claimed to be the new owner. He
informed Sandoval of the case he previously filed. Upon further investigation, Sandoval discovered that
as early as September 13, 1984, fake Tan, Jr. sold such property on Pacto de Retro. He also executed a
waiver in favor of Bienvenido Almeda. Consequently, fake Tan Jr's TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was
issued in the name of Bienvenido Almeda. Almeda then sold the property to Sandoval and a new CT was
issued in favor of Sandoval.
Real Tan Jr.'s original annulment complaint was amended and he impleaded Sandoval with
additional causes of action: nullification of the deed of sale with pacto de retro, the waiver and the
cancellation of TCT Nos. 326781 and 329487 in the QC Registry of Deeds. He alleged that Sandoval had
prior knowledge of legal flaws which tainted Bienvenido Almedas title. Petitioner claims that he was a
purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. He bought the property through real estate
brokers whom he contacted after seeing the property advertised Manila Bulletin in the March 3, 1985
issue. After guarantees were given by the brokers and his lawyers go-signal to purchase the property,
petitioner negotiated with Bienvenido Almeda who executed a Deed of Sale and a new TCT in
favor of Sandoval. RTC ruled in favor of real Tan Jr.
Only Sandoval appealed to the CA wherein Justice Luis Victor, the one who penned the decision,
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review with the SC where Sandoval prays for
the reversal of the CA decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First, he contends that he was
denied due process when the ponente of the decision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not
inhibit himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo
trying the case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who should not
be held accountable for the fraud committed against real Tan, Jr.

Issue:
W/N the Justice who penned the decision in the CA should have inhibited himself from
taking part in the case?

Held:
NO. The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a
judge from deciding a case where his ruling in a lower court is the subject of review or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.
To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiffs evidence
and ruled on motions. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas
Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevation
to the Court of Appeals, it was only the time that Justice Victor became the ponente. Hence, he cannot

be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial
court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case. Nevertheless, Justice Victor
should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier
involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which is intended to preserve and
promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While it is not legally required, it
is the court's view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a just or valid reason,
under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.

Reyes vs Duque
Facts:
Susan O. Reyes filed a complaint against the respondent for Impropriety, Corruption and Gross
Misconduct. The action was based on the alleged acts of lewdness committed by the Judge respondent
against Reyes, and for the latters solicitation of an amount of Php 100,000 from the complainant in
order to settle the matters in a case with the PS Bank against the spouses Choi, wherein herein
complainant is a party-in-intervention.
Reyes failed to hand-over the full amount of Php 100,000 to Duque in the latters hose, as
agreed upon by them, which resulted to the alleged acts of lewdness committed against Reyes. The
complainant tried to struggle and free herself, she shouted for help but the TV was too loud for her to
be heard. In a desperate move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa
hotel, sasama ako sayo. Judge Duque suddenly stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her
hair.

Issue:
W/N Duque is guilty of Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct?

Held:
YES. Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duques liability for impropriety and gross
misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes. No judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party
litigant even from a woman of loose morals.
A judge is a visible representation of the law and of justice, he is naturally expected to be the
epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duques conduct indubitably bore the marks
of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even
transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his misconduct
would have merited his dismissal from the service.
However, on the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found
insufficient evidence to sustain Reyes allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from
her in consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being
unsubstantiated.
Respondent is ordered to pay a fine of P40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Dacena v. Malanyaon
FACTS: A session was conducted wherein revocation of two previous resolutions granting authority to
operate a cockpit in the locale was being deliberated. Respondent, whose nephew-in-law was one of the
cockpit operators, heckled and interrupted the session by hurling various accusatory remarks and insults
(such as lies, they are lies, Lies! Can you do that even if they are lies? Even if you are being
deceived?) at the council members. Municipal officials later filed a joint affidavit-complaint for
Respondents dismissal and disbarment. Respondent admitted his presence during the council session,
but contended that he was not drunk and that he was there merely in his private capacity as a taxpayer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge?
RULING: Respondent FINED P20,000 for conduct unbecoming of a judge in violation of Canon 2, Rule
2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; with STERN WARNING that the commission of the
same or a similar act or omission in the future will be dealt with more severely. His actuations constitute
palpable violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that, a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities (Canon 2), a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01); a judge shall not
allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge (Rule 2.03).
Respondent needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day
when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a
judge retains the air of authority and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala.
A judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Indeed, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 in particular, mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge
Malanyaons suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as
that of a judge. In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of anonymity, for the members of
the council, as well as some of the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It is highly
probable that his invectives took on a greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a
judge, with all the authority attendant to the office.

Villanueva v. Judge Buaya

Facts:
Respondent was designated Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 17 of Palompon, Leyte
which was hearing the qualified seduction case against Vice-Mayor Constantino S. Tupa. Tupa went into
hiding but later surrendered to the authorities. Respondent granted his ex-parte motion to grant bail
without notice and hearing. The complainant in the case against Tupa, Villanueva, asked for the
reconsideration of the grant of the ex-parte motion as there was no notice and hearing which was
required in all motion to grant bail. In his defense, respondent said that Tupas offense was bailable and
he has the right to bail. The Court Administrator found the act of respondent to be unjust as even if the
offense was bailable, basic considerations of fair play should have compelled respondent at the
minimum, to consult with the prosecution. The OCA recommended that respondent be filed with an
administrative case for lack of prudence and be reprimanded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:
Yes. In the case of Basco v Rapatalo, the Court laid down the rules outlining the duties of a judge
in case an application for bail is filed which includes notification of the prosecution of the hearing and
conduct of the hearing. Judges owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they
are supposed to apply in a given controversy. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the
public and the court the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a judge displays
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public and the courts. A judge
owes the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected keep abreast of laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Adjudication: Respondent is fined of P20,000.00 with a warning that
repetition of the same similar acts in the future shall merit a more serious penalty.

Spouses Democrito and Olicia Lago v. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.

FACTS:
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 in Butuan City, who was
charged with gross ignorance of the law for the following: (1) assuming jurisdiction over a case without
the mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party and issuing a
temporary restraining order (TRO); (2) setting the case for summary hearing beyond the 72-hour
required by the law in order to determine whether the TRO could be extended; and (3) issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction without prior notice to the complainants and without hearing. Respondent filed
for a motion for reconsideration of the Courts Decision finding him guilty and imposing upon him a fine.
First, Judge Abul stresses that contrary to the allegations of the complainants, the Clerk of Court
conducted a raffle of the case in question, as evidenced by the letter by the Clerk of Court in the RTC of
Misamis Oriental. He explained that he issued the 72-hour TRO pursuant to the 2nd paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules in order to avoid injustice and irreparable damage on the part of the
plaintiff.
Second, Judge Abul admits not conducting a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72
hours from the issuance of the ex parte TRO to determine whether it could be extended. He explained,
however, that the holding of the summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the TRO was
not possible because the law office of the plaintiffs counsel was 144 kilometers away from Gingoog City
and under that situation, the service of the notice could only be made on the following day. Hence, it
would have been impractical to set the hearing on the same date when they would receive the service
of summons.
Finally, as to the third charge, Judge Abul belies the same by submitting a certified true copy of
the Sheriffs Return of Service stating that he actually served the summons on the complainants
together with the copy of the 72-hour TRO; and a certified machine copy of the summons bearing the
signature of complainant Democrito that he personally received the same.

ISSUE:
Is respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

HELD:
NO. With respect to the issues regarding the raffle, the lack of notice and hearing prior to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is satisfied with the explanation of Judge Abul
as it is substantiated by the official records on file.
As to the issue on the delay in conducting the summary hearing for purposes of extending the
72-hour TRO, the Court finds the reasons advanced by Judge Abul to be well-taken. Though the Rules
require the presiding judge to conduct a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it
could not, however, be complied with because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court
from the parties addresses. The trial court cannot proceed with the summary hearing without giving all
parties the opportunity to be heard.
It is a settled doctrine that not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance
of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent
to do an injustice. In this case, complainants failed to show that Judge Abul was motivated by bad faith,
ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. Complainants did not
adduce any proof to show that impropriety and bias attended the actions of the respondent judge.
He is meted a fine of P25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same, or any
similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more severely.