Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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T!-IO.MAS RISSE
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THE
TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY,
IT
IS
BECOivllNG
l~lubal norms and rules. Even the discourse on failed, hilin~, and flagile sL1Lcs
S!?l__t:I1~Jo_ct(s-;~~~~~;~~~~- i;),
---
- - - --
--
<...-
200i;
'-
Rothcrv
200+
<::'1
-0 t:( ~j')~~~~~i:!~-~-, Zti~-;cr:;;:;:.;1s ~;( ;,1;; Jlit;-~j- -_~ratclluod ,';f~ ~;m devc:l~~ping and
tr,;mi.no.li L:l ~ IJllries to failing ami G1ilcd states intod:1y's conflict 7nnes and-J;i-st<Jric:{lly -: iri ~:ol(mi:ll societies. \rc..1o of lim ilt:L sL.lLcbond .uJ th e l':l J':lCit1 1wj;lJillCtllCJ_ii- :1iif.l ciiJ(.liCc -Cci1 Lr.1l dcL:is i ~;~~~~ ,~;;j ,; 111;11~c;J ;c;j~-;,;1 t];7 ~;sc
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c:--
This chaprer hegins by introducing the book's key cunceprs such .1s lim andBOPCmiWCC.
CorKeptu~ll ClarificaticJilS
~;~~~~s.
<.. .-
--------- -
'- --
ii
V (
( Plw.-'
. ) . ~ J\ r
inL~ l'ulii~cal science, history, and law. From a theoretical perspective, the vol-
llllll' ch.1llcngcs
the co11ventional wisdom of the g'ovcrnancc debate as beinob
~
shared s< :':~J_c_i_ ):il:t.!Y This is 1:1irl)' olwiuus in colonial goveriiJnce a.s well as i11 d eue~
rf 'q ------- ---- - ~ ~ - - .
,,
.
.
.
.
, 1 modern
l)rnlL'ctor;Jtcs whnc 111tcr11:1tlonJl ;md tTansn;11JOn;1l actors prov1dc: ~..::..e.~G~
- - ~ - - - - --- - ---
F v l'' (~ ! () ( ._i
'0
ited stntc/;ood
histnncal ;Jccident or some deplorable deficit of most Third World and transit ion countries that has
~--J---- --- --
Jinks 1hc local with national , n:gion ;ll, :mel global levels :llld is h;1snl o11
~~~e
- - - -- --- ----------------------
0'1tact, ~hey
Step lien Krasner's ter;ns (Krasner ;YY9 ).
devclorJcd
Schncdcncr
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crp!il'r;l~;zt:)'to
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/
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risk," ;~-~~j-;,~~-;;;~:\;;:~1
2-0o);
Rolbcrg ~~oo-1 ).
{1
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to ex:.err
lnrroductiOil
anu
.
.=.
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vv,o,.,o\'l.ol'-'1
,
v
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to mc.c ~i. f D< E.Ll fC : ~E. <.: E';,.;. (V c~i clo2 t I & 1 on S
, ir.h:.J:~~~~~~!~r :v~s_t~t:t~. :~m~c_t;~a:~_?!!1?- _is _~1a!yti_ca]Jxproblema~i_c, too, bercsu.:ict~d along va rious dimensions: ( 1) ~.~J.S~~ial, that is,_ parts of a coumry's
ai:iSe it tends to conf11Se dcfimtJ~)[1-~ ts~::5:s and__resea~c!1_ suestJ?J:s. If '2'~tern tonal spaces; (2) ~cc~~l-~, that IS, With regard to spwfic policy areas; (3)
~cfine stat~~ -~; -p01li:{(3fen.tl.ucs- cl1~t provide all kind~ c:fscrvices and public
;:2.~i~l, that is, with regai7rf0 speci fic parts of the population; and ( 4 ) r_e_J21-
~~J-~ds, st;~h as scni.r!ty, ~~ic rule of law, _welfare, and a clean environment,
-) ov
the most relevant research gucstion: Who goven1S _for ~:hc:n:_, and how are I!
l-:---_-1ance services provided under conditions ofwealr statehood?
i,
1011 1
g~L
.....
_, . ..
Thus, we have delibe!:at~lY._ _?.p~e-~ for a ~:~th_er_ nar~()'\I . C:~nccpt of state\10od. wJ-;ii~;~~' l:;i:i;~;:-closcly ~-a~ _V.~eb~r's conccptuali_zation of statehood
[as
.. ~;;
. ;;sr.li:i:itioiialiicd ,:iiJe stmcture. with. the ability
. . . .to
. .. rule .authoritatively
. .
1
!(r{c;.:,~ci;nft-~JC.rbaiid) ai1d ~~~e~~~:~:~~~~- =~-I::rol tl~e~1~e~:s 0~ _violct1Ce (Ge~pa./tmonopol, cf Weber J92T/rg8o; on statehood in general sec J3enz
2001;
Ieffective controfw.ithi;~ i:l~c-~o.r~~:.~?~~~1e}:~~~v:~Y?~i~y" (1999, 4 ). This under, sta~~(ij"1;g-a-n0\vs 1is-toStiTcdy distinguish between statehood as an institutional
r cu~
state~-,
"limited statehood" usually docs not~i1t:ai~1 for a st~te a~ ~~b~~~-b~t; i1~ "~;~~-;;:~;
th;\t_l_s,
which the latter have lost their ability to govern. While the Pakistani govern-
n~Ci1r;lor example, enjoys a monopoly over the usc of force in many parts of
its territory, the so-called tribal areas in the country's northwest are beyond the
control oftl1c central government and, thus, areas oflimited statehood.
I~ also follows that limited statehood is by no means confined to the de-
Jegftirnatc i]JOnopoly . (?':c~:. :!l~u~:l~~~-~s :>_f~j~_:~~C.::.~~1ckin~2..~t lea~~~npoto enforce mlcs or to control the means of violence can be
Ofl
ho~~ ~-s_tl-:;_~)~:>~ ;~-p.1;:ti<:~iy co;Jtt:? l_ tl_l~ ins~r~;~~e.nrs offorce and are only partially able to enforce dccisions, _ n}_ai~1!y _lor reasonsof insufficient political and
admi;~i~~;;tiv~ ~,;,~a~i~ics.~~;;-dM~;;, ~;1 the one hand, and Somalia
and Sudan, on the other, 'COi1stlnlte opposite ~nds of:-;_-~;;;t~~;~~;;;- -~t:-~~
f'! prftsed
the m ean. o r Yio lcnce for a short period of time. However, this book C0!_1_:._
lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which the
\flOOC l)
os
Scluippcrt-;:c;c;:;;sd{n~~k~1~er
Ill
~e lopeq
.I
"u f
thoriti es w.cr ' uu<tble to enfb rce decisions and to upllold the monopoly over
.~ .
(,
scct"oral, and social dimmsions. The chapt er on South Afri ca by Borzel et aJ.
concentrates on policy senors in wh ich th e South African state docs not have
the capac ity to implement and enforce its ow n laws.
Moreover, if we conceptualize limited statehood in such a configurative
way, it becomes clear that areas oflimited statehood arc an almost ubiquitous
phmomcnon in the contcmpo~;.1l)' .i ntcrn:nional system and also in historical
<"Omparison (sec the chapter by Conrad ami Stange). After all , the sta te m o nopoly over rhe means of violence has only been
1.10
:~roundfor a littk~;,-;;-1~~
I
I
co mpletely enjoy the mon opoly over the means of violence, or h ave limited
c~j)_aciti~~- to enforce and implement deci s i on ~, at least i~~~~J?C::.P~~!~cy _a~:~:~
ur with regard to large parts of the popubtion. This is wh at Somalia, Brazil ,
.~ n(!Indoncsia but abo the People's Republic of C hina have in common ~md
share with modern protectorates such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Hosnia11erzegovi n ~l-- i J~enu ~i~:J_':~y__t:ecog!~izeL! ~t~1_l_es__tbi\Ilack 5'Y~slj2)nli,tn
SUI '
;1
' . ...
(Krasn er 1999 ).
co mbin~tion
Sl-cL\-~.1 .
fAll."''()
Lndcx (BTl) measurin g deg rees of, first, th e state mo nopo ly ove r the m eans
of violence, and , second, basic administrative structures+ The countri es
-~
FAl~ l
NC:r
marked in w hite arc fully co nsolid ated states located in the Western world ,
;Js well as
:1
LLirk gray) co untri es, mostl y in s ub -Sa har~n Afiica. The re mainin g coumri es
f-~i.-)'
(marked in gray) -- the vast majority of states in th e contemporat)' interna - CON .SO~ i OM!!!)
tiona! system-conta in areas o f limited statehood in tl1c se nse ddin cd earlier.
Note th ;lt about Ro percen t of the world's popula tio n lives in or is exposed
to such areas oflimitcd srarchoo d.
nor
These data ha ve se riou s comeq uences f(Jr the way in which we think abo ut:
c.t{ W C'-(j..\
st.Hchood in general. \>\Th ;Jt: if the modern, developed , and sove rei gn nati oll SLlte turns om ro be a hi sto rical excepti on in th e context of this diversity' of
:trC.lS of limited sr;Hehood ? b-en in Europe, rhc birthplace
12om!, nation -states were
but 1
au o rc c<l~~
(j
l'c
r.
<S"C()...I.(!,
r,.
X lntrodllction J!H.t Overview
of sovereign statehood as the dominant featu re of.tl1e contemporary internatio;~l~;;:;i~~~]);-rook -pl-a-ce_i_n tl71_c_I_9-:6-o-s,-a-s_a_l_cs:-::ur.lt,..,o,..,t'""'d,-e''cotoillza:tlo!i
""
~ --
(-Jver rhC!rtcmt0;:!es
Cc._l\, ~'d
fr
;' v'l t en.. (:.,..,
\:i o11
C;1
lll t E'iiiJl
[f~i 10
!? j 110 ''
0
,
I
1
political, social, or economic order.~~-~<:.. '~'<:akl!css d oc~ ~1o.~si 1!2~ Iy_ tr:n:sLl.t~
to the absence ofJ~?JJ.!L<:.?L<~rcjcr, ru lc making, or the provision ofbasic serv i ~~~~Lil;,itZd statehood does not mean an ~rcl~y it~ a Hobbc~ia11 .sense. rn
fact, we ~vc;~-fi;;~ftaTiecTstatcs 5l1C:ri;-;;-s(),:n;rra ,\; h-e;~- Ti;;-Jt~d' ~t:;;r~Eood is
-I sumes that states arc fully capable of implementing and enforcing the law.
all-pervasive but where govern ance takes place regularly and collecti ve goods
l! (
m:, u~
il
i Y\tE'fUQ..wnc; <1 and some degree of social well;1re. This "govcrmnce package" constitutes a
'1:
'.
~l ,
;~ eecl eq world cultural script (Meyer 1987) and is applied to developing and transi(ne~ itO tion coumrics as well as to failing and failed states. "State building" is part of
i V\
, bew.G<K
~
in f~iling or i:1ilcd states (sec chapters by Schneckcncr a11d Brozus). But the
the institutionalization df~y
.i.
1u
, ~'f.\ c(..(.q
1:
S ~Je hcv)
: nor tv.
i,id'-' (CA r"-G''J Studies and development policies, namely, tha t fully COnsolidated Statehood
!
to
has to be the ya rdstick agamst wh1ch most ex1stmg states arc measured.
c.o V' u .v cr
~ R:1ther, we assu me tl1 at areas of limited statehood constitute much of the
!' h ou;l i: empirica l context 111
.
. t I1c contemporary Jntcrna.
most exJstmg
states, bo tl1 u1
1
,,
cloiYle.:>n
<(f.. c.c'r'
<..
i tiona! system and from a historica l perspective. But this volume is not about
explori ng rhe causes uf lim ited statehood . ln r:1ct, th ere arc multiple causes
t-o
(c..t.\lin.J
<A ll
hop t2.
, , \,:,c. 1
eJ
i<VVlP aP f"\ r 1 r
f
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r "'\ 1
J:' r
: ~ !rl
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l l l l l ~ l l l l l \. I 1 ~1t I
Co\'lTI1;1JKC
to
1992;
2005;
i11/\n.:as uf
Lilllitcd Sl<ltchoud
11
stckc r 2002 ). Uuw~~:.'> <1~ the chapter by Conrad and .Stange demonstrates,
these "new" ni(;dcs ul governance arc by no meam specific to the contcmporai-)i'li1tc ni-ation ~ll systent. rhc colon i~~---;;r;r~:--;:-~;~~~lj~~ ~~; ~~~; ;r~;~~ll-;1 1
Z L'trn
as collective goods. 5
The modern (VVestcrn) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance struc-
''public-private" c_<:_~_~~1ies (e.g., the Hudson Bay Coni'pan y in N.<);th AjllCI.--:ica -cJt~- tl;c: J~;;~~nclia Comp;tn y in Asia),,:md loCJI
decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the generally accepted norms of these institutions for atlthorirativc rule making. Second, the
Western nation-state has the task to protect the internal ami c.xrcrml scetl-
~~~~.
(C\Jvc'--\ :
nc e 0
Covcma1 1ce as a process entails two dimensions : acrors and modes of co-
responsibilities of the stare, from the creation of economic stabi lity and the
vmrantce of minimal social security to public health, education, and, tod ay,
;~lC 111,1in tcn,uKe :md th creation of a clea n enr iw nmcnt. fn sho rt, the mod -_...
(G >1 -
ern Wesrcnu1at ion -swe provid es )!,0.\'CTnancc in the ,lreas of rul c--;:;;~ IZi ~~:.l;lJ .
~;;-1;;;.~:~~c~r: ~;71tT;C:~~;;-ha~;-d , and collect ive good ~ such .1s-sccuri ty, 11 cli:u'C,
~ --
warlords :md other violent ;u:!'ors (sec chapter by Chojnack i and Branovic 111 c 0 , ~
------ . -~ ... . . . ---- . .. - . .. .. ..
....,,_
this l'olumc). The second part ofrhis book explores !'he va ri ous contributions v , ,~..,,
--~-~ - " ~
-.
- - -. . -
- - -
- -
-- -- -
.-
J "''
~--
~l;;;;l~ti~~;~-( 1~~~~;~1
rc~~::_rio~:_of firms_ (chapter by .Bi)rzc l ct Ji. in this vol um e) and even by Sec(, ,
that is, ;Juthoritative ly cnf(Jrcing the law, ultimately through policing and
"top-down" command and contro l. lt is precisely this ability to enforce dcci-
;;;x;. . .
i-vc ,-
sions thar is lacking in JtTas orlim itcd srarehood. T<_J the cx tcnt_~~~ll_!_e.!::~_rc hi - c \6""
['his chang;cs profoundly under c<::19_~t!~12~YJ'Jil_l].it~d ..\tillc.hoo.~.L . Govrequires providing these very gover-
crn;Wcm:ifcas-of rr;-;;-;i.c~r~r~r~T;;;c;Zl
cal steering and aut'horit<ltivc rule do take pb cc in areas of limited statehood, co(., " r...,.v ' \
n,mcc ~CI'I'ICCS ~~~1_: 3~1s_encc of a fully_ fi.~t:5~t-ot~t-ng_~t~te's .~xe:-~t:g ~tt lc,JSt .1 (St(). ~~ 11 we-1;~0~) look Cor acwrs other th~-~lc n atior~?.!__govm~mctlls . As c;r;;;: 1M" <.<A '
nJcki and Branovic point our in rhcir d1apter, '";';lrlords and local " hig men"
"shadn_12:__~~t_ h1~rarc:hy" With the ab1ltry to enforce and unplcment dcctstons. ~ r 1 v 1
structure, security, :1ml other collective goods (for a discuss.ion of these no rm;ttive problems, see L1dwig
2.007;
\t--
1
N
J.,<~\)
__
, , , ,e
c;"''0
,,,.r r"" I
.J,, sometimes exert hierarchical control in war-torn arc1s of lim ired st;Hehood.
v. O
- .. - ..
i'J
This implies that we will have to look for lilt tCti <mal sg1ti v~1lct 1L,~ to m o dern_
--
Muc h more common , however, arc nonhierarchical modes of social co in this volume).
;> :><L'"' ,,_. Ju..._ - - --- - --- -. ,,
ordinal'ion in arc;Js of limited sutehood (Bt)rz.cl and R.i ssc 200 5; Ccihlcr ct
This book nplo rcs the variom forms of govern;lncc emerging i11 the
ai.
....
'
Cutlct:;-J-];,ufkr, and Porter 1999; Cr:mdc and Pauly 2005; !-Jail and Bier-
.:._-
2009).
---
.,.,..---- -
~ :
'
benefit caku latiul lS of the releva nt p.lrti cs and to induce l'IK des1rcd behavior.
- - --- - ------------ -- -- --- -- --- . . ..---- - - - - ~ --- -~-
12
ln rrodun ion
;111d
--
O vcrvin v
at best-- f(Jr
,; ~
u rJ.imitt.:d
St ~nthoud
13
"chi efs" the authoriry to rule hi crctrchiol ly. Ep.,60: cl td(cif clt:OhVI Gt.: 11- eu ll"e
Applyin g the public-private di stinction Lo contemporary areas of limited <..t t ;-c,~?
statel~~od
is Jus_t_as
difficult:. Of cou rse, \ IT "11 otill diqln b~ru is h-f(; i:m :Ul .\' h10 E'Jrc..tcc(Q:;~
/\_n.: a~
auth ority 0 11 behalf of the Brit~sh Em12irc. The same h~_!_<:is n:~~- !.c~:-~ll_eJ.~ctlni ti on of indi genous elites as "privare'' acto rs, since co l on i ze~s o~~e ri__Favc_~~~c:~ l_
'
0
Go vcnuncc in
01
"'!(
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. ',.
rc lc ~,-'\...l.., ....
............_
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--- - - - - -
((-lfl1j1 ,wic:
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--
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GQ . prnY.i.ck
- - --
; .-~~
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111\I Ch
-- - ~
nccdcd
- - - -- - - -- -
:;c- lil"'
and l)i)rzcl et a!. in thi s vo lum e). In o ther we_>~~~' th~ i!."!.lPJi~i~ a0~_un_ptio11 of
:.:::---- --- - '.Z\ the pt~_L:!_~riv:g_c___t\L'itini:..ti_Qn accm~governmcnts gove rn ,md
SL' i--
---- -
(0. twivat~ _<~cto_l~_mi nd their own business is o ften t11rned 01 1 its head in arc?:':_
of JiJ~!i~-~~~~~_<:ll o~~i.:_Jh ' di~tillL. tion rh,lt CO!Il CS with \ estern modcm ity,
~/
l0
accordi llf!. o which '\t,JLe ~ puhltc" .11Jd '' no nstatc ~ priv.ltc" is eno rm o usl y
172\]l a. ~
v , ,~
prohlt: nl:;ltic in ~1rc a s uf limitcl:l otdtch ood .
hood as defin ed earlier.
111 (Vl ") '
\
'J:1kc tb'e exa mple of Palestine und er Yasscr Ararat: The Palestini:m Author\"~
. occ'
,
L;IY'-'<:
.Li:e\1\
ity was !)lO fT or less corrupt at the tim e and the devclopmcm aid provided
1
'b <;t' (V-!L.
by th9 intcrn ational cornnnmit y to julll]J-starr chc l'alesrinia11 st;lte eJtLkd
'/ he Distinction Between the "Public 11 a71Ii the "PriJitJ/.e v SjJhcres
'{'
.
'
1
,e.;,>r '. up in nriv:ll-c coffe rs. At rhc same time, d1c militan t fslami st organization of
\...\..)
J
Hanus provid ed crucial gnvern ;l nce servi ces in the soc ial , education, :md
])dining governance and the modes of governance in term~ of including
public health sectors vf the p,llc.stini ;m territori es. So, who go\'lTIJ ed Palc.<;state ,111 d nonstatc acto rs in the provision of collective goods more often
ti
nc at rhc. tim e? lf wc usc the previously stared guvern;mce definition, 1-Llm:ls
~>t relics on the distinction between thc~blic" anc_L'_[Jrivate" rea lm s.
is Jan us-faced : On the one hand , it is a. governance Jct:or providing publi c
Th i. i.> tinction, howc\'cr, stems frum mod ern sutc hood in it s \Vc.,trm an d
services in Palestine. O n th e od1cr h:md :md almost ar the same time, it is a
Euwrcnrric umk~' 'lndi ngs . This is prohlcm.1tic when we dppl y rhc govcrterrorist" organiz.arion that undermin es govc rn a.ncl' in the sccurit"y realm. The
n.l iHT rolll cpt ro ot i1CI histori c:~ ! comcxt.' or other cultura l experiences i11
~a me held tn1 c for the l\ilcst ini an Authority under Araf:ll: fts securit y agencies
rhr cn nt_rmpor.l t)' inLrrlf,ltion.J! system . IlistoricaUy speak ing, the mode rn
<l t least tried ro maintain public security in the occu pied rcrritorics , whilc Pal Western notion or rhc "pri va te sphere" is co nnected to processes of indiestinian "state" acto rs undermined governance with regard to the provi sion o r
vidualiz:ltion ~nd personalization th;lt no.!) emerged in the second h.dr or
other collective 0i!( JOlls.
cigll_tccntl -ccururv Eu r~ pc leadin g, to t h ~-~~Jl~':_<l ~~~~ oft he ln1blic ;md the
.
ct
.u.J.!J' categories is inhcrcn rly problematic wi th rcg,.m l to colon ial nile.:_ They
dcmonstr:ltc, fo r example, d1at !"he diJJc rc n ce~ between statc-Cu nded admin istrativ~. ~:,:~;;,~-~~~j;~;;T,;atc" acrors an2ong the coloni1-rrs wc;-c margin al
f'-' <1 fo
e)
o!:"'vt~l.<_
tr-..... :z....~>
I c"
J.1
/'
'
f f"
15
apostl.
.J
2007, 2008).
] 11tcntion.ality
T hese considerations lead to a second problem w ith regard to the app licabi l-
ity of the governance concept to areas o flimited statehood. The govc rn ::m ce
These examples challenge the way in wh ich the concepts of "state" and
concept as deli ned earlie r is gea red toward producing and implementing col-
"pu blic" as well as "nonstate" and "private" arc mostl y used interchangeably
lecti vely binding ruJcs and provid ing collective goods. In other words, gover-
111
the social sciences based o n the hi sto rical experience of 'vVestern moder-
nance implies
nity They also show the implicit normative connotations of the distinction
(sec Lad~g-~t-;;-r_-2c;c;?; ~-;-;-~hapt~r by I~ach;,ig~~;-;:{ Rt;~J;;I fi t~--~i~i ~-~;j~t~~e ).
..
justit)r their actions with regard ro the common good (sec Zi.i rn
2005).
Whil c:-
ass um e that governance institutions s11ch as the state or its "shadow of hi erarchy'' embody intentions toward providing collective goods. Second , we need
pl~i~c-~~Jlstitutic>ns lackin g tJl c__ c:lp~cityj;; ~1str~i11 pmvcr- m a.x i n;! 7ft~g_ ac
acrors flrsnch
c (~ ,, \:J 1u~G\
~he ~!mmunity {jobs, wclLHe,_\J.). B~t we als~> ~lSSL1_!12C _r[pt priya~e. aC!"_Qt:s
1
J.e~'l'c0' r;~ 1 nf~KL wH!llll the mnf'ines of the l.1w-.md 1f not, tiE!! tl~_c;__co_~~!~~-U rake c11e
of th em.
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',___./ :
l
The inherent intentionali ty of gove rnan ce becomes problematic w hen applied to arcJs of limited state hood . F irst, as noted earlier, we can no lo nger
we can throw them oul through democratic proced ures or, in th e wo rst case,
c.1scs or to assume rhat state actors promote the public inrercsr. As t:o private
,,
11;-\o"'d' 1
toward gove rn ance in the commo n interest. And if they abuse th eir power,
2004-, 67) .
II
in tention :~ ]
community (Mayntz
:~.~~~~~l~c public rather than the private interest. At least, they are su pposed to
Jl~ li cy- nukcrs might be power-~cking, ~tate in st i ~_':i:>_l_?~~ -a cc~_nsoJj:cbted
I I
f~K ilitic s
Th c~c .l,Sll lllj' ti on: rh.11 conK wi th rhc " public-j1riva1c" di stin ction arc
pri va te good . Protecting such f:Kilities mi g ht b:JVc positive extcrn :llitics t<x
_mi.,., itH! 111 ,1IT:1S of li mi ted ~ t.He hood. At least, they ca n-11o lo t1ger be taken
the s urro unding neighborh oods insofar as the security lirm s mi g ht un inten-
rional ly deter arnwd gangs or militias fro m attacking n e~uby vill ages too. Tn
"
thi s se nse, t he firms while primarily providing a private good fo r Bl' wou ld
:~void the distin ction between th e public ;md private rea lms or between state
also contrib ute to public security, albe it indirectl y. But we wo uld not call this
:1 I
J
)
J
I .
I .I
~:1_:_1_~~-lst;llc actors (e.g., J>
JC!ll e eta. 2002 . B~~- sue 1 a s~-~~2.)' SIC e-
sec urity gove rn ance because of the lack of intention;uity. This ~1 ct i viry could
16
ln other cases, we arc fa ced wid1 a continuum r;mg ing fio m governance
in the sense defi ned here to " racketeerin g :" The Afgh~n wari(Jrd who uses his
mili tias to provide public security ~or__ the ~rca
?f his
17
lutions. 01: _tJ_:c_oncha;Ki, if !j_ovct~n <~Ke _is o:e rbl~~:9 cnctl __,::it1J_ s ~1c~l1 _~ ~trc::ng
the public intci:e~t, we
govc~:I:ial1c_~ -~~~~~ ~he p~i\i~ti zat ion of collecti ve g oods bas IHJnmti ve weig ht
equ al to thcp rovisio n of pu b lic goods.
~ t~gges t something in bct\':_Cen~!s _: way out : w~t:!_ cons_i~cr govc:r -
--I
access . In_c~~:'l::~S-~~~ ~_l~?re_ c~ rtai12 seTv) ce_~ at~c:_ _onl y provided Jc1r exclusive
groups and the m o re collcct:i vc goods are tran sform ed into club or private
goods ,;~z~~-:;;bfc ~;;,Jy i:~ ti1;~e ~vh~l pay fo-r the n~ ~r wl_1o belo ng to specific et:h-
1;ic o~:!:~li~io;I~~
Jn parti cular, applying d1e no ti o n o f collective goods ro <Jrcas of limited statewhi ch gove rn ance is provid ed. In m an y cases, those entitled to receiving col-
only accessi ble to th e citizens rather tJ1an th e residents, even noncitize n res i-
lective goods such as securi ty arc di stin ct from t he addressees o f govern ance
dents enjoy some basic ri ghts as well as access to at least some public services .
chapter by C hojnacki and Bran ovic in this volume; also D e Ia Ros a ct al. 2008) .
it remains unc lear who arc the addressees o f governance, who is entitled to
which govern ance services, and w ho acntaJl y receives them in practice. \Ve
It f(Jllows th at the bord ers between governance and "racketeerin g" <li'C
ra ther fluid in areas of li~i-~~~i-:;;-~~h~~(;d.- ;6~~- ~'~~;k~r and th e m<)I:C flagi lc
cann ot simply ass ume that the coll ectivity fo r w hich governance is provid ed
benchm arks derived Ji-o m m odern cl cvcl opcd states . lbthcr, we sho uld stri ve
dl at arc beyond the control of central gove rnm ents. Arc tJ10sc enti tled to
(,{.~ ("':
'I
GOI>CJ7J.anre
eut'J fvt.1c;--
~ ;:
Cc[.. ~ :, .
:I
:;. I
to areas of limit ed sta te hood concerns wha t has been called the "sh adow of
;llld
[o,.,Uue-
r'n-
Ci-1f'e;(_
/-; ~..
1- '
.---
7u.:::,l r . -~;; :
r; - ,)
f
(. '
-,.._., __1
r;::- r r
. "}/~
(; f'(
:' <."' i t
/'~L.f,
rl
1X
.]
i/
'\' . ~"'
0 ,\..
statehood? The chapters in tl1is volume suggest that there might be func-
) ,y 0-"'' )
~\J.j .\,~
.'
lf} i
[
j
t(;--I~g}-slate if private actors do not get their act together or do not pro-
r>'-~
'i
-- ~
!\___~
;!"
".:; u--
;,f- '~,v-
statehood (sec Bi:irzcl 2010 ). Fnst, in the case of the modern protectorates,
rcregulation by tbc modern state (e.g., Heriticr 2003; Borzcl 2007; 2008).
in dus volum e; sec also Lake 2009 on hierarchy in the intcrnation:~l order).
and Rudolf in tl1is vol~,~~~) ." wh;lc~l!~~':_c~l:~~_:r_~Cdlcsc standards is inherently problematic, the increased legalization of these sta-;lci <1 r~is indi.rdl!ig the
rcguircd for
' \J ,-~ S !em-solving capacity of govcrnar:cc_ (Bor~.:_l _:oo9, 2oro )- Managing politic-_~~
~~ - 1,:-.J'vb. IL <lLJ tl_J_ority rc~uirc~ ciTCctivc state capacities i~cluding / stro~:g "~~~~_::>~~
\e( , -J-.:,5- 'J-~~( hierarchy!'
- -- --- -- ---------- T~~-:;; __.:-~~te u r l-o r~ sub~ h 'r\J\1" i-j .::; n::, ;-c
lective goods even und er the most dire circumstances of limited statehood.
As Chojnacki and Branovic argue in their chapter, ~vcn w~~<::rds, l c:_~~ "big
men;' or rebel g roups somet im es provide security as a collecti ve good in
\' ~IL'~ lf these findin gs arc universaLly applicable, then govern ance in a~eas of
~9'~ 1 limited statehood rs doomed. Areas of ltmrtcd statehood arc by dehmtto n
\ /
~ 1'u ~,v \ characrcrizcd by weak state c1pacities to implement and enforce decisions,
r.,~~"'"~,<:-,)' ~'I '\ th;lt is, by _wcak "shadows of hierarchy." Moreover, the contribution of nonrf:_->J~~fl.-'b
-~
nancc by governments rather than to complement it. lf the B1ll & Melinda
~"'() ~
_.. \J
9
}i0"t"
rc~:,rulation. lf; f(x example, brand-name firm s target hi gh -end 111Jrkcts or arc
J Irsubjcctcdto
NGO campJ igns, they arc likel y to provide col lective goods in
j:
~ ~A
/l
"' "
~ --- - - --
- -In ~ um, .!"his overview suggests that there arc some implicit biases in the
-J' -1.'-..
govcrn:1 ncc concept as it has been developed in the context ofvVcsten1 -b3scd
<o
socia l sciences and modern statehood. However, one should not throw out
ll!JTrs in South Africa were to withdraw _li-om fighting HIV /AIDS at thc_iJ_-__
tl1c baby with the bathwatcr. The governance concept provi des J usdi.d tool
""'0
. ._.(
~'" .'<."-
\i..}
-~..,
production facilities and the s urroundin g_i!_~S\S, the fight there against tllC
~Q 1';1;~1;;-;;~-~- would be doomed -(B-brzel, Hcritier,-a-nd Mi.illcr-Dcbus 2007;
ll
'<
~ Mtillcr-Debus ct al. 2009). The same holds true for environmental protcc.;;;""s Q.. "'~v/tion in South AJI-ic~, as the chapter by Bbrzel ct al. reveals. In each of these
v-"'<<---<;J'<.
rJK"'r.:,/
..
G/
\) { {\ .e_vk, i
--- --
nil; substi tute lo r r.uhcr t ll.ll l com plcmc ;i!- go vernJ IJce by th e st-;ltc.
~\)1'6"
~' (7
";;!
fromj)J:~:;dj~~~iccs in _.
rh~--arca of public hc:~ltb- for example, the immuni zation of children - in
'>( '
. .;.;<-r:.
-:..,.f'
c~
1y
0\\-
cause it directs our attention to the role of nons tate actors, on the one hand ,
iI
ing stJt-cs as we ll as d1c modcrni z;uion bias of most deve lopment studies.
\\
St.ltc butldm g Jll ateJs ofltm Jtcd statehood 1111ghr be futile, hut "govcJn.mcc\
~(/\.;
cJ...LV
b~..,~~
\JA~~ I 1, t
v\"
~ ""
"\
~~'". "-'~)
- ('!'~"
._,Jr>'(\
/ '
20
C~uvc rn ancc
21
I now turn to the contriburions in this book in more detail to explore the
wlc of nonstat:c actors in the provision of governance, on the one hand, and
to
governance in areas of
explore what happens to publi c Jaw in the comext of the demise of th e state
(Bntstantlic/Jun;_:J) and the dcterritori;~]i ;,ation of political rule. in areas of limited statehood. He focuses on diverse ex~1mplcs such as the rules governing
vci~E_~~t~l~~s, !"hey hav:_to -~~~~t~L~I5.-~: ~~~ t~t~ -~~~~_kQeS_:'!~~- in areas o f limi ted
~1_;1!:~!2~~ll_<.i , l~ir jJl_ L'~!:~~ -<Jf.~I_Je tcni~<lJ:y, in p()licy sectors, or with regard to
1'~0.1~.J?.~} 1i<:.>n .
l(> begin with, the chapter by Sebastian Conrad <md Marion Stange. provides a historical perspective to the discussion of governance. in areas of limited st:,Jtchood. In the long history of statehood, the id eal type of the "Wcstph;Jiian system" frcqucmly evoked in definitions of govcrnan_cc was probably
the excepti on rather than the rule. The chapter discusses what the longer
genea logy of forms of governance impli es for cu rrent debates usi ng the example of colonial swes. Conrad and Sta l~-~_J:gt!C!ba_LPUdcr.<.;o J)diti ous of
colonialism, statehood was consistently dcpemlcrlt" upon nonst;!l_c .actors. and
t l~fJZg:it{~>~; jJTtl~l~~r ~r~d a~~~~ori_t:)1_~2 _tjlc~n. ~s a ~esult, the distinctio n
~~~;~~-~ "!lublic'' and "private" actors that has been central for_tl1~ __ gl~V<;}"~_
11 a;1cc c~nccpt-a.;;r-ri;sctc\;Cfoj)ed in,)oTfr~c~T~~~i-~~c_c_,_}~:i~-~~~~~-~!JrJ?E?_l:Js!.,l ~
;Jtic. Mo~~;-\~e~,-tiJC ch~il;~~~;tgg-;;~~- cl~;t we cannot start understanding the
g~~rn:mce problcm:nic in areas of limited statehood witho ut taki ng coloni:1l
legacies into account, which is also highlighted by postcolonial studies (Conrad ;nJd Randcria 2002).
U ighlighting the role of nonstate actors in governance and p;lrticularl y in
rule making cldlcngcs our understanding of law as wedded to the state. In
the German context, f(Jr exa mple, rule of law tTanslates into Rccht.utnrrtlic/;l<cit
(bw of 1hc state) as a result of which human ri ghts, predictability, and th e
business tr~msacti ons among diamond dealers in New York, the Ameri can cotron market at the. Memphis Stock Exchange, the transi1at:ici!JaJ s-1J"qrts law, and
the various trans nation al standard-setting bodi es. These exampl~s constitute
rule maki ng by 11o nstate ac tors thJt arc self-enforc ing and do not require state
regulation in order to be effective. I Tow ever, as Schuppcrt argues, it would he
misleading to analyze these form s o fru.lc making J"i-o111 a perspective that treats
rhc private and !"he publi c as polar opposites. Jn this sense, he agrees with the
historica l anal ysis by Conrad <Uld Sta nge. Law by the state is entangled in many
instances of private ru le makin g - if on ly by providing a "s hadow of hierar-
chy:'' At !"he same tim e, reputational concerns and the embedded ness of private
rule making in social o rders can m ake. "law w itho ut a state" self-enforcing,
w!~i~~-~~ -~~~ctl y what Bi:>rzcl e_t al. argue -in -their cT;aptt~c;~~-i:hc "Z(;;;~Tit;OllS
under which com pani es engage in environmental self-regulatio n.
- 'Ili"C..sttbsequ cnt four chap~~ r~ de;; , with th ~ g~vcrn ance role of non state
actors in areas of 1imi ted statehood fiom va rious em pirical perspectives. :.rhc _
ch,lpler by Sven Chojn-:1ck.i and ?.cljkn Bra no1ic takes o n a particularly hard
cas:~)~~~=~!i!.~ ~~ith~Ji~~-~;;cii ii~~~;~~~i;;~wh ich ~~c t;~~~; .'1': 1n > ile~i (w:-r:J i her
han a<; a >ri \'al"iJ-ed good em he prm idn l n >cJl un der the most adve rse con-
( ' I~:_.
'}, j
~~-- f
-:
tr ~ t;_ ..l . ; ~
J
"{' /
I ~
t r; l.l''
, ('! <--'1 ,;
(.!
' : /Vi!!
':"l . ; :. ! ;-
quasi -stare or n o nst~te actors. Tn order to systematically ditferentiatc and analyze the provision of security in areas of limited sta tchood,_.~lc autho rs trace
sever;1! modes of security leadin g to va rying forms of security govern ance
(security as a public good, as a club good, and as a private commodity). 1he
chapte r uses the analogy of the market t"O argue t hat the emergence of dif~
--~ ------- --~-~-
tYt ct f vt e ~:,
OJ? rch'th or"l
I
.: )!";
~
"i-:
22
'
[ ntroductioJ l
.md Overview
l;O\'CrllJrl CC
in Areas
23
actors such as warlords or rebel groups ~cc m it in their i1Jt e rc~ t to provjJe _
there arc good rational reasons why firms should contribute to environmen-
or limited
lic goods in the issue areas of development, public health, social services,
in the 1990s and can be found in all policy areas. The study investigates the
countries rely heavily upon finaneiaJ reso urces provided by private creditors.
public health, food, and energy for developing countries. The authors evalu-
govcrnmciJts, the key focus of this interaction is the provision of' macroeco-
ex ternal debt. From the perspective of private creditors, the key interest is
setting partnerships. This confirms arguments taken from legali zation re-
to limit losses fi'om potential defaults. In other words, while the chapter by
search according
to
lkishcim also show ihat the process management of the PPPs intluences
Jirnitcd statehood-weak reg ulatory quality and low governm ent effcnive-
with high corruption and weak rule of Jaw. ln contrast, neither democracy
ticr, Nicole Kra1n, <UJd Christian Thauer reach similar conclusions as Liese
gove rnment
behavior toward private creditors. In some, t:he weaker tl1e stare, the more
companies to enter a regulatory race to the top pushing f(x strict environ-
it drives <1 lurd bargain toward its imernational aml private creditors. The
chapter shows that eve n weak and heavily indebted states arc in the driver's
leads ro a "r;1cc rot he bonom" among countries (f()r :1 simibr argumcllt sec
Prakash woo; Prakash ;l!ld Potoski
20 0 6 ).
sclcctnl firm s in the automotive, food and beverage, :111d textile industTies
Jn sum , th ese ch<1ptc.rs yield d1e ldlowing conclusio11s with regard to the
propensity of non-stare actors to comributc to govcrn <1nce in areas of limited
state hoo d:
sell~ regulation or pressing f(:>r stricter state rules. These bctors include the
~p
~
24
t"'J
'"
'5
that similar phenomena arc all too common in the globJ.l South (on multi
]eve! governance in the VVestcrn context see, e.g., Hooghc and J\1arks zoor;
Hooghc and lvlarks 2003; Kohler-Koch and Eising I999; Benz zoo+b).
in areas Jimired statehood. Bernd Ladwig and !kate Rudolf argue that rather
tic;~~;;~~!~~Ec~~;id~-~~~;crion~I:q:t!valcn~~E~r~_st_aE~ ~':'1Jac~o~v_c2Lili~ra;~h)~'
bur-;1 ~t ie~~t,
tlJc_~t~tc_~:~~s_a::
international law and that they can also be justified by a rights-based approach
not absent in areas of limited statehood. The debate is not between either gover-
tional community as a whole in the in tern a I afl:1irs ofsratcs and arc preemptory
norms (iw crLrrens) that arc obi igatory for any country in the contemporary sys-
cases (sec chapter by Endcrlcin ct al.), even hostile interactions can contribmc to
on be made and the existence of J political authority that has the ultimate
.''
I
suits from necessity given tlJC state weakness in these _cout2!2jC:~.:.JD. m.Jny_
casl.~s:1; 1-[c;:-~1;-d;;,~;;~ati~;~;;r;~tc;r~-dit:ecti),i;J~~rf~r~ with the "Westphalian
sovereignty" in ar-eas of limited statehood, that is, they authoritatively rule
1999).
Second,
z;us; Krasner zoo+; Fearon and Laitin 2004-). In other words, shared sewer
central decisions.
However, shared sovercignty::-th;_ divi~i_on ~I!~~- d_istributi<;n ol p_olitical
ifi:1tthc-cncirmrius literature
em
responsibility. They
<lr~ue,
~Ktors
the
predominantly deals with the European Union (E.U.) has not yet realiz;ed
CKc their own problems, ;Js Ulrich Schncckcncr ,ngucs in his chapter. He
".(._i
0'-''
26
curity first," "institutionalization first,'' and "civil society first." Each of these
from the status quo, focusing on civil society leads to the opposite pitfalls
ternati o nal community. llii impl ies that th ~modern i zation p acbgcll..tha
external ~c to rs try to "se ll" in-a rc;1s o f limi ted statehood, is not on ly hi g hl y
berwecn the goals and time-hori zons of external actors, on the one hand , and
external actors might ;~ctually weaken already limited statehood further and
that cl1c key issue for extend actors is not how to avoid counterprod uctive
ernance structures. fJ3 rozus C.Ql1d udcs--th:n th e aim of the intc rn ationJ I com-
sovc reignry of states, but how to cope wicl1 them. First and foremost, they
of the process and its dynamics. Since external efforts at stabilizing postconHict si1:1.1at:ions result in multilevel governance structures, the "imernationals"
have to rCJli zc roo that they arc bound up with the political, social, eco-
which includes human rights, the rule of law, and the right to participate in
those being interfered with nnd the intervenors. ln other wo;ds, govcrnanc~
governance of areas
travels back.
The concluding chapter by Lars Brows takes up these challenges ind
discusses th e co nsequences of the book's findin gs for international folign
and security policy. Current inrernatjonal forei g n and security policY, 0,fl2atcs
picture areas oflimited statehood as presenting security challenges t(fthe socalled developed world. ~<JS t o f' th e scciJ.Iri m di sc[lssc.d refe r to ch .1 llcnges
1n 11 1ting Jio m intn nJ tional dcs tJbiliza ti on because of co nfli cts spi lling-m cr
finm arc;Is ufl imircd statehood. Terrorism, organiz.cd crimc,._<l!_ld mass move-
~-,
,.".
have to underst;U1d that th ey arc not external to loca l developments, but part
1\
or limired statehood.
posrc~nf~i~t:._ situations
have rarely rcsult.cd in establishing li.Iily consolidated states, but have instirurion-
alir,cd
m~thilc.v~~l
IS
the rule.
At this point, ho weve r, we have com e fi.ill circle: Ladwig <md Rudolf
argu e in their chapter that the only moral and legal jmtification for external inte rven tion~ in ~rca s of lim ired starehood can be to fi:Jstc r c!fectivc and
sclfsu staincd governance, that is, sl"at:c bui !ding. Schm:ckcncr and 13rozus
areas of limited
invol vement of extcmal actors in mulrile vc l gove rn:mcc stru ctures and that
sta tehood. Tni.Ci iiatioii;1! iiitcr\'el-l tions diller widely with respect to their de-
"quick impact" strateg ies arc illusiomry. lf we accept their point that gov-
fi.JC US O il
inevit~bl y
~r
l_:,
:''
20
that also involves nonstate actors in a systema6c fashion (sec the chapters in
the second part of this volume), we may actually witness the emergence of
'-9
transformation of modern statehood. Thus, exposing the governance concept to areas of limited statehood yields new insights with regard to governance under conditions of consolidated statehood.
These issues do not only have academic and tl1eorctical implications, but
also far-reaching political and practical consequences. First, the international
community is oriented almost completely toward the ideal of developed and
Conclusions
This book ,1rgues that the social science debate on governance implicitly or
. -1 .
,,,cdded to an ideal t"]1e of modern statehood-with full
cxp!Clt)'
IC 11131 115
,
!
,
,
l
-, . ,,e 1eignt" and t11c canaCJt)' to make, tmplcment, and enforce deocIomcstK so
~ 1 '
'
- r . a glol1tl as well as a historie<lilxrsoective, however, the modern
s1ons. -~1 0111 ' ._
<-
.::
Western nation-state constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Outside
ucD world we find areas of limited statehood that lack
tI1e cl eve 10 pCl l O1 "
'
. vcret'g11 tu Under such conditions, g-overnance requires the incluLIomesttc so
~ ;- .f
stJtC as ,11ell as external actors in the nrovision of collective goods
StOll 0 lll11 ]. '
'
t
~
and the regulation of social issues.
Yet, our conccprual apparatus is ill-equipped to deal with tllC governance
proo'-I ema t'tc- 1-11 ,-1rc,1s of' limited statehood. The
. Western
_
.governance discourse
1 llea\'t-1)' int1ucnccd b)' modermzatJon theory, but also assumes
JS not on y
'
.1. tcJ1oc1c' and 1 full\' functioning state as a background condition. I
mOtl ern s a
-'
'
.
have tried ro illustrate this point with regard to the applicability of the gov- cpt tc> a1c1s cJf limited statehood. In ]Jarticular, I have discussed
crn;mcc colll
' '
. 11-j1 1-cnard to the distinction between tl1e "publit:" and the "pripro l1 Iems w
-b'
_
.
_
_ _
.. " . l -co the im]1licit mtennonal1ty and normat!Vlt')' of the governance
vatc sp JCI ,,,
- . 'l't . Li concerning~ the "shadow of hierarchy."
cOnlC , 111
'J'l liS
( 1.
- , -on '<1f1JKars to demonstrate that, on the one hand, governance
ISl 11551
II
- ies - scrul concCjJtual tool to stud)' [JOlitical issues and the provistt proVll . 1 11 1 '
_ _
_
_
. !' . llectt-\'e goods in areas of llll11ted statehood. ln parttcular, Jt reston o co
~
't"tc-cc 11 tric bi1s in the study of1Jolitics and focuses our attention
moves t Ite s "
'
_ t t, --cJn of nonstate actors as well as on nonhierarchicalmodes
Ull t IlC LOll 11 ' 111 1
'
S l'a so oood I On the otl1cr hand, d1e ability of the governance
o1 stccrmg. , c1 ' 1, to
concept r-o travel to areas of limited st;Jtchood has its own limits. Discussing
zation and development strategies. If, however, areas oflimited statehood arc
here to stay J()r the time being and become the rule rather than the exception,
this strategic oricmation of the international community becomes problematic for practical ~1s well as normative reasons. If governance in areas of limited statehood requires the systematic inclusion of non state actors, a rei iancc
on nonhierarchical modes of steering, and the continuous involvement of
the international comnnmity, we need to figure out the scope conditions for
the success and C1ilurc of these "new" modes of governance. vVhat alternative
modes of governance can we think of that provide functional equivalents of
modern democratic and developed statehood without constantly assuming
the Western model as the underlying cultural script>
Second, we need to think aJ2C:'\~-a~~Jli_t_~he_jntcr!l;ttioi~~LtJ~!l~ocratj;ca!i<_:n,
-- -------~------------
....
Last but not least, this book argues that multilevel governance, including
shared sovereignty, is the reality of governance in areas oflimitcd statehood.
,
cJc conditions of limited statehood reveals several blmd spots
crovcrnancc l 111 1
'
~~ith rcpard to implicit ;UJd explicit theoretical and normative assumptions.
Thus, the global North is deeply entangled with the global South, and vice
'J'I . , ~~.
l tions concern the modernization bi:~s of the governance conJcsc assum 1- --c -J)' used in the social sciences, which requires some conceptual
ccpt as cmt 111
_
_
:
"1'1 csc 1-JltlOV'Jtions however nught even shed new ltght on the
tnnovauon. 1 '
'
c'
'
~
,,
t~
~0
2005;
3. Weber's notion of legitimacy witlt regard to the control o1u the means of vio-
iciKe should not be con!i.Ised with an empirically derived notion of <Jicgirimatc order
th:lt is considered just and fair. Rather, "legitimate monopoly over the means of violence" conccrJJS the claim that the order is legitimate.
.1. Data fi"orn "Derailliene__ Wertc_BT!zow.xls;" www.hertclstnann-transfonnation
-itKkx.dejhtijnmk.iltg/.
5. !Jere, 1 follow tlJC usual definition of collective goods as characterized by nonexclusive access and/or nonrivalry in comurnption. At least one of these conditions
has to be present for a good to CJllalifJ' as collective or common (sec 1-It'ritier 2002).
(J.
,St.ncllo1 ld
~1
-~. 20 u4a.
NOTES
2.
.imitcd
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+I
lonial rule because of the often hybrid nature of agents involved in colonial
that is, in premodern and early modern societies, and, most conspicuously,
confines and often comprised a wide range of diflcrent ethnic groups with
from the concept of modern statehood. Because the colonizing powers' cen-
determine the governance collective, that is, the group of people who were
tral authority was debilitated by a diverse set of external and internal factors
only in the colonial context but also when looking at many of today's hagilc
or failing states, the historical perspective can help to sharpen the concept of
governance in areas of limited statehood.
hierarchical rule exerted by official agents but also comprise alternative forms
of governing, the governance concept can thus be of usc in the study of colo-
cusing on both the processes and the agents of governing, the concept allows
cl1at illustratc;s the historical contingency of the I'Ve stern model or centralized
This literature stresses, first, the proccssual and negotiative character of early
modern political rule. A good example for this trend is Greene's work Nfii]o-
tiatcd Authorities in which he argues that power was not a fi\ccl cor1stant in
renegotiated between the rulers and cl1e ruled (Asch and Freist 2005; Daniels
sights both fix historical research and political science. By linking the go\'-
Gln
and Kennedy 2002; Greene !99+; Hindle 20oo; Meumann and Prove 200+ ).
Second, governance also ties into clu~ rich historiography on formal versus
the potential benefits as well a' the limitations of rl1c concept when used
tl1c colonial state, the chapter thus deal' with the problems that historians
incur when applying the governance concept to the colonial context. Bring-
ing to light the underlying notions of modern 'tatehuod still inherent in the
concept, the chapter's third section f(xusc' on the bin;1ry differentiation be-
thus carries the risk of reiterating the mistakes made by earlier generations of
tween "public" or "state" actor' on the one hand and "private" or "nonstate"
actors on the other. Thi, is a distinction that is at the center of many current
governance dcb;1tes but which proves to be inadequate for the colonial con-
lic" and "private," fc1r example, might be useful in the context of governance
text:, where the role of actors involved in political organiz;1tion was often of a
::r.,-:.p
10
f But recent scholarship, with its focus on the everyday dynamics of colonial rule, has rclativizcd this macro perspective. Indeed, it has demonstrated
tbat in many respects, colonial control was limited and that the colonial sL1te
rion needs to lake into account the great variety of coioniaJ experience. The
Jaws ,md regulations that were applied di!Tcrcd greatly fiom one. colony to
the next. The structures of coloni;l] power varied according to rcgion:rl dif
cases, legal traditions, political structures, and societal cleavages can only be
fcrcnccs and diJTCrcnt types of colony, and they f(JJlowed different chronolo-
gies. They were also aiTcctcd by local geogr:1phy and by the dynamics of local
societies. The level of control desired by the colonial state. <liso depended
on the objectives being pursued for each colony-in trading colonies like
Lat"in America, it can also tell us a great deal about the roots of governing
Hong Kong or Togo, the state's presence was limited to a small number
practices, ethnic divides, and legal systems in a country like the United States
or administrators,
of settlers and the demands for labor by landowners led to the state taking
more control over loc:rl territories. Last but not least, colonial governing
practices and structures and the power of the colonial state varied according
to the time period in which coloni7>ation took place. While late nineteenth-
The colonial states were set up on the belief that the model of the European
modern statehood in the colonizing countries, this was not the case with
st;ltC system could simply be applied to the colonies. But the practice on the
ground turned out to be very different fiom the theory. "~'he colonial state
North America. Here, the limitations of centralized power were not only
was not simply an extension of the western Europcm model, but, as Jiirgen
determined by the distance between colonizing power and colony and by the
Osterhammcl suggests, "a political form in itself" (1995, 62). JVIorc impor-
long lines of commtmication this distance entailed, but also by the absence
untly, even during its heyday in the age ol high imperialism (I8RO-I9I4),
the colonial stare was essentially a weak st;ltc. It was therefore dependent on
f(mm of go\'ernance in which power was delegated to local actors and native
existent (Lchmkuhl2007).
the
terns of the specific weakness of colonial power. The following account ex-
amines the difTcrcncc between the modern state, defined by Max VVebcr in
nial rule is very much the result of recent scholarship. It runs counter
to
it also runs counter to thc fact that viewed in long-term perspective, colonial
rule did indeed initiate a radical transformation in the nature of the stJtc. It
cracy, and the colonial state. VVhilc the argument is a general one, we will w:e
Jed to the creation of territorial states under international law that aspired
examples from
VVc will f(x-us on two dimensions of colonial rule. First, 1he colonial state
this took place in regions where boundaries had previously been imprecise
was generally weak in terms of the extent and depth of its colltrol. This was
L~erman
and constantly changing, and where there had been a wide variety of dif-
partly related to its lack of legitimacy and idcologic1l hegemony, the second
The characteristic feature of the colonial state was that it only reached into
local societies to a limited extent. There was a vast difference between the colonial powers' aspiration to total control of the colonies and social practice
1\'C
+I
the presence of the state was often very limited. Jn theory, colonial state;
crogcneous. This w:1s rcinfin-ced hy the facr th~t a large number of other in-
the entire territory they claimed as theirs. Even if Germany's suggestion that
cfkctivc control over an area would determine colonial rights was defeated
or the colonial administration and did not fCc! hound to the latter's wishes.
power should he limited (at the Congo Conlcrence in Berlin in 1884- and
1~85 ), the monopoly of power remained the ofilcial ambition of the colonial
viduals; given the costs involved, a large number of regions had no colonial
However, these visions remained largely unfulfilled; theory and social rc<llity did not coincide. For the most part, the European colonial states did
not exert full control over d1eir territories. The colonial states were weak
of the vast majority of [the] citizens of Europe's Ati-ican colonies was one of'
an essentially shallow penetration by the colonizer" (Appiah 1992).
ITcrc, too, we must dificrcnt:iatc. The administration's ability to comrol
st<ltcs, even though the ofl-ice of governor was usually equipped with a wide
its territory generally increased over time; in the German colonies, this was
the case especially after the Colonial Ofticc was set up in 1907. It also varied
;md, because governors could issue ordinances, tlJCy could add regulations
from one colony to the next; a greater degree of control was possible in
to the kg<1l system almost at will. The governor was the head of the colonial
regions, colonial rule was more thoroughly institutionalized than in the hin-
Duignan 1978). In the German case, the Foreign Office, and, from r907, the
Reich Colonial Office, had very little control over the governurs' actions-
colonial mctropolc. But outside these colonial centers, the creation of a full
not least because the letters that were the main form of communication be-
t\\'een Berlin and the colonies took two months to aJTive._ In addition, this
between eight and ten million African and immigrant inhabitallt's. At this
wlonial policies Jess likely. EJch governor stJycd in his post for only a few
level, the administrative presence was even slightly higher than in the Brit-
ish colonies, hut some sixty times lower than in Japanese-occupied Korea.
Over large areas or the colonies, then, ITJ.I implementation of the supposed
Below the governor, the local administrative units were led by the district
oJliccrs (Bc:::.irlmnntmiimJcr) and station heJ(k They were the most impor-
tors undertook travel outside the <Jrea of real control at their own risk. If
an ofTiccr went on leave or was ;1hscnt 1()1' any other reason, administrative
ami rhe French cOJill/Innrlrmt.r rlc u:n!c, they had a range of competencies over
activities often ceased for a considcrable period. The few administrative sta-
Llllt
which the governor, in his turn, had little control. They were the rol cre-
tions within the country were "is!J.nds uf power" (Pesek 2001) that struggled
at(li'S of empire. Their loc.1l powers were such that in Togo, JiJr example, one
l n 1903, f(ll example, there were only thirty German stations and military
over the course of his twenty-year rule, appointing more favored candidates
pu~;ts
in their stead. Like thctr superior, the Bczirl1.rmntmd7171rr attempted <111 aris-
avaibhlc mc111t power could only really he exerted at isobted poims. After
the sc:lt of government; they justified this with tlJCir superior knowkdgc or
the Reich Colonial Ofiicc was set up in l\!07 J.nd 1\cchenberg installed as
in German East Africa, and in many cases they were almost helpless
1'0
''~',,,,
+6
governor (in 1906 ), and with the changing focus on rational, "sci emilie" Co-
1
(
'
lonial policy, this began to change. Life in the colonial stations became strictly
rhc fact that colonial rule always meant fc1l-eign rule. Even where the cultural
rcgubted, and the separation between officers and troops, and Gcnn;Ins and
rncnts always picked up on this issue, even when they themselves were hm-
register their address in order to make administration easier; they were also
b;;nned from changing their names. In practice, however, these policies were
almost impossible to enforce. The Aliican population was able to make usc
bas described the rule of the British Empire in India. Following Antonio
of their superior lmowlcdge of the local situation for their own purposes.
tion ;md
the stations in the colonial hinterlands were often dependent on the cooperation of local traders and power holders.
The second aspect of the weakness of the colonial state was related to
to
but through the "agreement'' of its members. In co11trast, the colonial state
]lad little ch,mce of relying
011
its lack of "grass-roots" legitimacy-the colonized did not believe that the
traditions. The British Empire in India was a model in this respect:: the East
the impression that their interventions were done for the benefit of those
order to profit from the latter's prestigious status. Similarlv, German colonies
ruled. Their main instillment in this regard was the promise put f(mvard
made usc of indigenous customs ;l!ld habits, typically in the context of institu-
by the "cultural mission"; tlJC colonizers firmly believed that the stJte's or-
tions of indirect rule. Tbis strategy was mosr successful in Samoa, but Gcrn1a11
or dKsc at-
democratic rcpre~cntation.
This rundamemal weaknes~ or the colonial state- due to it~ limited resources and means or g<wcrnmental cont rul as well ;1s its lack of legitimacy--
+~
~
I
:b
I
:$
'
new power holders had no option but to enter into alliances with locals ,
who thcmsehTs were pursuing their own goals. The strategy of divide and
rule was, of course, not unique to Germany. This f(m11 of indirect rule was
a common practice in the British colonial states, the famous example being
Nigeria under Lord Lugard. The objective was to achieve careful moderniza.
tion while maintaining traditional structures. The other end of the colonial
spectrum--at least in d1cory, because in practice these differences tended
to become blurred -was represented by France and Pormgal, who aimed
to achieve complete control over their colonies, with little scope for local
agency. German policies were located somewhere in the middle. During the
early phase of German colonialism, power was based on close cooperation
wid1 chiefs like Samuel Maharcro in southwest Africa (although he was later
to lead the armed resistance to German rule). Later, the Germans tended to
involve selected local individuals in the colonial administration. Examples
were theA/zida, used as local administrators in d1e coastal regions of East Af-
many examples of states d1at depend upon the incorporation of non private
actors and institutions. Instead, colonialism was the fundamental geopolitical and cultural condition that structured the global spread of the modern
state. Analysis of governance patterns in colonial states thus helps to contextualizc the concept of the modern slate and its many historical manifestations
(Dirlik 2007; Reinhard 1999).
Moreover, the case of the colonial state enables us to critically examine
an aspect that lies at the heart of many current governance debates: the dichotomy of public and private. The dynamics of rule in colonial statcs render
the binary category of public and pri\'atc actors highly ambivalent and problematic, not least on normative grounds. The boundaries between public and
private were blurred both among the colonizers and between the colonial
bureaucracy and indigenous potentates. Moreover, in the colonial situation
sus private actors remained largely theoretical. Most visibly in the early periods of colonial rule, but also later on, distinctions hcrwcen state-Cunded
administrative personnel and a wide range of nonstatc actors were marginal.
This was particularly obvious in the case of British lndia, where political
power was deliberately delegated to the private East India Company. ln the
case of imperial Germany, the government invested colonial activists like
Carl Peters with the right to ~lllncx territory fi:n Germany. Tn the early r88os,
private entrepreneurs and companies also exercised quasi-state powers. 'lb
the extent to which the German colonial empire consolidated, these com
petcnccs in foreign policy were monopolized by the colonial government.
3)
3)
ltV
3)
The colonial state, it is important to remember, was not just one among
rule as such, because the power of the colonized was not derived fiom their
own power resources; rather, they were taking on a role wid1in d1e colonial
potmtatcs, so-called chief.>, to strengthen colonial rule by delegating limited powers. This strategy enabled colonial governments to rule over vast
territories and large populations with only small armed forces and limited
administrative personnel.
:e
ruk, governance was fundamental to colonial states !iom dlC very beginning.
rica, or the Lul11rri, their counterparts in New Guinea. This was not indirect
ers to cope with the task of ruling over territories and populations largely
oms ide governmental control. They used the prestige and ~;uthority of loc<ll
:a
+Y
diflcrent governance collectives interacted and overlapped. This made it diflicult to define the constituency for which governance services were provided.
There arc three components to this argument, which we will examine in
::rJ
But in many other policy f1clds, private initiative remained crucial. This was
true in particular lor the cdt1cation system that was largely built by mission
societies and withom state fimds (Krause 2007).
\1\lhilc these forms of delegating power and authority seem to fit the definition oi'govcrn;mcc fi"om the point of view ofthc coloniz,cd, the diflcrenccs
between state institutions, missions, plalltation owners, traders, members
of scientific explorations, and so on were m:Jrgin~ll. This was nor- only the
case in the early years in which, in Cameroon for example, the adjudication
50
of criminal l.nv was explicitly dellned as the ta'k of all Europeans (Schaper
theY were not mere "pnvatc" persons but rather fullillcd ofllcia.l tlmctions in
,;coJ(J ). Even after colonia.! bureaucracies had been firmly installed, the car-
thc.loccl1 societies the)' represented. Wh;H was more, in m;mv parts of rhc in-
c"orical difTcrcncc between sratc and private actors was not p.lrt uf' every-
accessible hinterlands rhe colonial government did not eYen h;wc the power
to enforce rheir own orders, and rhe umcept of indirect rule was clcarlv but
,uwcT 0
:damcutallv
1111
C\Tll
11 ot
described <lS coexisting wil'i1 local rule. The lslamic hdbc rulers were i(Jr-
lnsrcad, wh.1t was crucial was the boundary of race. Colonial ~;ocictics
relied
011
the case ol British South Asia. By this he means the ideological and practical
thcmsc!Ycs made usc of the colonial power and were able, with the milit<1n'
ii11porrance of the idea that there was a fundamental dichotomy between the
Wirz 1072).
'vVhat this means, then, is th.lt the rhetoric
t<J?O;
rhat their colonial subjects would at some point in the future be capable of
the danger
rule. The colonial state was no more "public" tlnn the multiple political entities it purported to govern. Instead, the complex mechanisms nf colonial
1093)
be sure, the notion of race was not monolithic, and many competing
tion of racial difTcrence could not be taken for granted but was,
JS
Ann Stol-
'-
work of the color line was the fundamental reality of colonial rule. It was
immediately apparent in the sc:paration of living spheres in colonial cities,
on the context, the local rulers did not derive their authorit;' fi0111 being
invested by a colonial bureaucracy. Their rights to ruk were cqu;1Jiy based on
the power structures of the loccll population and they aimed at representing a
"state" that could claim higher legitimacy than the colonial state.
Third, the coloni~ll setting renders the question of who constitutes the
governance collective a highly complex one. \Vlm wcrc: Lhc illlliYiduals and
<lS their hendici,l!'ies were 11uid and changing, and they are an,llytically hard
2001).
tes of groups thaL bencfitc:d fiom governmental measures and were urgncd
to pin down for the histori.m. \Vithin a given colony, highly diverse groups
and .1ecess to
tbmentally.
.. stwc to m.1kc up for rhc weakness of thc colonial st':~tc. From the fXrSj)CC-
f'IL,
t"
(_)(' CO\II'SC:,
J'OW<.T,
ti,c nf the colonial government', these arrangements did indeed involve pri-
peculiar. But the conditions under colonial rule were spcciflc. For example,
v.ltt' ;Ktors who were tcmpor;1rily invested with state competctJCes. Bur f(Jr
ccnaimy or justice ami the reliability and transpJt-cncy of the law were val
ucs that the colonial govcmmetll' ch;1mpioncd and used to legitimate its
tion a "stare," and the local communities mere "priv.ne" institutions. Indeed,
the !c1c 11'\bids" were selected by the colonial bureaucracy precisely bcc;Juse
From the perspective or the coloni;.cd population, the mechanism of' leg.1l
. lill ],.J\1'
, [n,ights I"
.111d J!j,wr\'
-rete case.5
c\'cn if in cone
. I s c1sc it is imJ10rtant to stress that a strai~htforwarcl
-' 1J1 t )J,
'J(J be sutc, _...1nd ruled is misleading, mainly f(lr two reasons. On the
1 5'
truc1
chchotD11i)' 0
_ ]Jrship has complicated the strict dichotomy between
! 1cccnt sc 1J<l' . . .
.
.
.
.
<>llC lull('
zed as posned lll culomal cilscoursc. /\spate of thco1
. . .. lild t'O ont .
.
.
. : -. I work has explored ami oposed the hntt k I >oundancs
coloni!<l s
.
l nlpnttl
.
rctJC.d ;llll t
.nt 1ct.. 1' lt'JJ!itics, and rulers .md nrled 111 e1crrday
. . colonial
,l \\'hitcllcss, w of t;Jking a racially based "rule or difkrence" for gr;Jntcd,
incrnsinglv at the shifti1w, negotiahlc "politics ofdif
pr.Jcticc. Instod
.
. " ]lave loo 1(CL1
, ,
c "
hiswnan.,
~ . Buetmcr woo; Cooper zoos; bschcr-lttJC and l1ehr.
, (A 1nold 19< 3,
.
_
._
fcrcncc
.
,. McChntock 1995). On the other hand, the clJffcr00
. LcvJilC z 'r.
. .
. .
lll.lllil zoo!),
. the colonialnustcrs and the colomzccl, a dJfferemtaUon
[1ct\VtCI 1
.
-"
" . j .
. .
. .
entt.JI'J<'II
. rl , cxf1resscd Ill terms oi race, stooc 111 opposition to tllC
-rcasJIIg ) '
. .
. "fl!cachcd by the proponents of the cultural llliSSJon
th;ll was JilL
-''cicV<1ttOil
.
. .
.
.
.,
...
,-otKC['t of
_
in ideologies drll'!ng the coloma! proJect. 1 he Ct\'ilJZc
of
rhc
ma
':'
.
"
,
1hat 1\'.l.S 011 .
i . romote comprehensive .mctal dcvclopmcllt : to lacil. . 1Ji1lC' to f1
.
.
in 1 ~ mtsstOil
.,. end despotic rule, create a soctal order that was based
'
.. 1I lro<>J css,
irate rcclll11 '; l ~ix women f{x example) and JXlrticipation, and introduce
-ifY]llOil(I r. lOSitions. But "c IC\'aUon
. " antj" LIC\'C Iopmcnt " were a!Oil CJ11;]ill '
,, . tltur.l c ISJ
.
"modern c~
_ arity with the colontzers was co11stantly deferred. The
l' uonaL as l1 .
.
.
. . .
wa 1. s cone 1 . go<1u1 exatJlflle
of the tension between assnmlanon and
"
15 1
school svstcnl : L,, levari on" and the tmintcnance of fundamcnt;ll ditfcr[lct'II'Ctil C
.
_
.
dif1(:rencc,
:. , l the colonial proJeCt as a whole. VVestcrn education
. I lf,JLICI JZt t
. .
.
.
.
- en res t h.lt c 1'
.. its rccit1ients famthar With the prmc1plcs of hnropcan. -d ro nJ;l 1,c ,
.
.
. .
was ~aq.1posc . .
hut at the same nmc, teachlllg was !tmttcd to J very
- 1tz-1non,
l ~hristian uvt "' _ , . it did l'rovide resources that colonized inhabitants
T0 be t 1c.ll,
b;isic leveL
_ . llowed the children of slaves and other dependent groups
1 '1
--ss
I
.
( st 10 at1end at mtss1on
coukl ,JCtC
sc I1001s) access w cc IucatJon
.
.
.
..
. . Jficn t 1JC n.
. t of- imjll'l>Vtng then soual posttton. Many members
( wlw wctt ' , lro.spct
t1
rhus,
rhc
I
.
]J<J would later lead their countries 1'0 imlcpcndencc
,111 '
. 11 cittCS W
. .
.
, >(the n:itJtlil
.. : schools. Emanctp;ll!on was mdecd a goal, hut !'liciT
I the nllssto 11 .
also artcndct
. f- . the students to become equal citizem. The schools
' intent ot
w.ts never an)
... tc l'erfect "nativeS:' not hbck Europc.111s (Barth and
. I . j tO ctC.l
\HTC cst,1b!Is ill
. Conklin IY<J7; Fischer-Tim: and J\dann zoo4.).
lJt JCJJ1S.
I-
"
<'
L-
etliPi11'11 (Pill
,.
"
dif1crcnf' degrees, the interventions under colonial rule. \Vhilc the stare bureaucracy and its di!Tercnt "private" partners---such as mission societies and
indigenous ]'<Jtentatcs-- supplied the newly founded schools, the crc1tion of
Wcstcrni;ccd medical services, the ongoing elli>rts to "educJte the n;1tivcs to
work," ;UJd the introduction of VVc,J'crn legal standards, these services and
progranlS were ,J!wayo tied lolhe interests or the Europcm platltcrs, .scnlcrs,
merchants, and .tdmimstrators. Th\' l(mns of 111- and exclusion b;lsed on the
notion of race produced a f>inary discursive SII'UCl ure that made it diflicuJt
embrace the "benefits" of governance provisions without recognizing the
10
inhncnr connection
to
lr>rcign domit1.1tion.
Path Dcpcmkncy?
Studying the
proccs~cs,
This is not only true f\1r those /\flicm, /\sian, or Latin Amcrie;m C<llllllrics
tlw arc viewed :1s areas of limited st:H-chood tud.1y, but also J(>r stable dcmmTacies like ( :an:itla or the Unitecl St:1tes. Even in the United State., where
British ami l;rl'JJCh colonial rule encleclmorc than two hundred yc1rs ago,
the legacies or the COUDtry's coloni.JJ past continue lo influence the character
of the political ;lnd legal system. In rhis context, the usc of the gmc:rn;mce
concept proves tu he of value, since it allows f(>r a per.sl'cctivc un colonial
rule that not ottly {(JCuscs on the colonies' of11ci;ll politic1l stTl!Cl'llre, hm also
I+
ukcs into view informal modes of governing and the role of nonol11cial and
semiofficial actors in processes of politicaJ organization- characteristics of
colonial mlc that were often much more persistent than the formal structures
established by the colonizing powers.
In the following paragraphs, the long-term consequences of colonial gov-
\I
tiona! make-up as well as f(Jr the shape and character of regional and lucal
ovcrnance. The issue of the states' autonomy and political power in relation
StafCS history and remains so even today. The most vivid historical example
irs culmination in the American Civil \;y'ar (Drake and Nelson !'19'/). But the
dc.Jis with the political heritage of early modern settler colonies in North
America, the second one looks at the legacies of colonial rule in Africa during
the era of high imperialism. Although the long-acting cfrccts of colonial rule
that can be observed in these two cases difier <]Uite substantially tiom each
is the heated discussion oC"states' rights" during the antebellum period and
ernance arc illustrated on the basis of two case sn1dies. \;y'hile the first example
over the question of who was ultimately responsible /()r d1e coordination of
emergency relier This confusion
local, regional, ;md national level can be traced back to the country's colo-
tending dkctivc assistance and evacuating the ciry and contributed substan
tially to the high death toll in the city during the d.1ys following the storm.
States politics is the extraordinary strength of the individuaJ states within the
But the persistence of colonial legacies in the United States' political and
in 177(1, it was a mat1er of course for many former colonists that the newly
juridical system docs not only become visible with regard to the st,1lLJs and
CIT<lled states should be the principal centers of power and that a centralized
U.S. Constimtion, ratified in 1791 (Wood 19y8). The reason behind, this was
not only the fear tlut central authorities would abuse pO\ver at the states'
today can be traced b;JCk to their colonial pasts. Even the original thineen
cxpmse-the exact same constellation that had induced the colonists' resis-
British colonies' local governing practices and structures, though all based on
tance ag~1inst British rule in the first place- but also because long-standing
over the course of several decades. During most of the colonial era, the com-
mercial, political, and social relations that each colony maintained with Creat
was concentrated in the colony's capital Charleston, with only the Anglican
Britain were much stronger than those existing between the North American
church parishes serving as local gmnning units. Thgethcr with the different
tion and the relative fiTedom that Britain left her colonies with regard to the
c,u-
handling of internal affairs, it was thus possible for each colony to develop
ll1erchanr elite that was COJ1centrated in the colony's coastal area, whereas
its own governing practices and structures. Even more diversity was added
to this picnJrc when former French and Spanish colonies like Louisiana or
chants, ami craftsmen who were scattered throughout the province-- these
Florida became part of the United States. These dilli.~rences in the political
2002). Even today, town meetings in which the registered voters of each
town transact town business hy m.1joriry vote ;lrc an import,mt part orlocal
I
I
I
\(1
57
governing in Massachusetts and other New England states, while such prac-
further increased during the 17\!0S due to the inl1ux offi-ce blacks ti-om the
tices of direct democracy arc absent in other pans of the United St-ates, such
Caribbean during and after the Haitian Revolution. Their position had be-
come so strong that the newly established American govemment saw 110
other alternative than to continue the French ami Spanish authorities' policy
rO\rard them. Even though resentments among whites against the state's fi-ce
black population considerably increased during the I8+os and ISsos, the li-ce
people of color managed to maintain their high economic status throughout
rhc late antebellum period. Thcv did so in part by fcm11ing tight-knit soci;t]
The long-term consequences of colonial governing practices for presentday local governance can also be observed in the stJte of Louisi<l!Ja. l'l.tced
under French control during most of the eightemth century- with a thinyye.tr imcrmcno of Spanish rule during the latter half of the eighteenth century- Louisiana's development took a completely diflcrent direction from
tlnt of the British colonies in mainland North America. Legacies of hench
<llld Spanish colonial rule arc particularly persistent with regard to the role
.md influence of certain groups within the sociopolitical sphere on the local
level. During the Llltcr half of the eightcentl1 century, a three-c;tste society
evolved in Louisiana_ It consisted offree whites, mostly enslaved bbcks (like
other North American colonies), as well as a third, intermediary group of
people called JJCW ric coltlmr fibre.r. These "free people of color" (later also
1-cfi:rrcd to as Creoles of Color) were either the ollSpring of mixed-race relationships, usua!Jy between white males and free black females, or emancipated African slaves. The status of blacks and tl1e interaction between blacks
and whites in Louisiana was regulated by t11c Code Noir which had been
enacted by the French crown in 1724- and was later adopted by the Spanish authorities. According to this law, manumissions were much easier and
therefore more li-equcnt in Louisiana than in areas under British or, after the
f(mnding of the United States, under American rule. VVl1ik the ordimnce
prohibited marriage between whites and blacks in general, n1ixed-race unions
between whites and fi-ce blacks without marriage were tolerated, resulting in
,\relatively large number of mixed-race children_ Although freed slaves also
existed in the British colonies, the status of t11C fi-ee people of color in French
and Spanish Louisiana was unique in colonial North America because they
enjoyed, with very !Cw exceptions, the same rights and privileges as the white
Louisian.1 settlers. Like colonists of European origin, they could own propcny and li-ccly choose their prolCssions. Many of them worked as artisans,
1r~tdcrs, or merchants and a few even owned slaves and operated pbmations.
During colonial rule, t"ilC lice people of color thus emerged as an important
and sclJ:conlidcnt socioeconomic group within colonial society that- had to
he reckoned with by the ruling authorities in political and social maners
(!vlc1llers woR, +R-p ).
By the time of the Lmnsiana Purchase, the Jl-ee people of color made up
almost onc-fifilt of New Orleans' overall population, their number having
~r
16
lnoiglm
lt"Olll
governing in Massachusetts and other New England states, while such practices of direct democracy are absent in other parts of the United States, such
<lS
The long-term consequences of colonial governing practices for presentday local governance can also be observed in the state of Louisiana. Placed
under French control during most of the eighteenth century-with a thirtyyear intermezzo of Spanish rule during the latter half of the eighteenth century-Louisiana's development took a completely different direction from
that of the British colonies in mainland North America. Legacies of French
.1nd Spanish colonial rule arc particularly persistent with regard to the role
and influence of certain groups within the sociopolitical sphere on the local
level. During the latter half of the eighteenth century, a three-caste society
evolved in Louisiana. It consisted of free whites, mostly enslaved bbcks (like
other North American colonies), as wcJI as a third, intermediary group of
'1","'
I
~
I
57
further increased during tl1e 1790s due to tl1e influx of free blacks from the
Caribbean during and afrer t11e Haitian Revolution. Their position bad become so strong that t11e newly established American government saw no
other alternative tl1an to continue the French and Spanish authorities' policy
roward them. Even though resentments among whites against the state's f"icc
black popubtion considerably increased during the 184-os and 185os, the fi-ee
people of color managed to maintain their high economic status throughout
the late antebellum period. They did so in part by forming tight-knit social
networks. Living in the same neighborhoods, attending church together,
providing for a joint education of tllCir children, and promoting marriages of
their children only wit11 other Creoles of Color of a similar economic stand-
people called gens de coulerrr fibres. These "fiec people of color" (later also
ing, they successfully secured tl1cir intcrmediaq position between whites and
the mass of enslaved blacks until the end of the Civil liVar. With the emancipation of all slaves, they lost their special legal status and were forthwith,
at least officially, on the same level as the fieed slaves (Schwcninger 1989 ).
But because of their former status and their superior education, they man-
lationships, usually between white males and free black females, or emanci-
pated African slaves. The status of blacks and the interaction betvvecn blacks
Reconstruction (1863-77). All of the black delegates sent to tl1e 1868 state
and whites in Louisiana was regulated by the Code Noir which had been
cnJctcd by the French crown in 1724- and was later adopted by the Spanish authorities. According to this law, manumissions were much easier and
therefore more frequent in Louisiana than in areas under British or, after the
{(mnding of the United States, under American rule. Whi.le the prdinance
constitutional convention f"l~om the states' prairie regions, for example, were
Creoles of Color. Although the dividing lines between Creoles of Color and
the rest of Louisiana's black population became increasingly blurred, the fixmer free people of color maintained their cultural identity throughout the
following decades. Even when eventually joining forces with the mass of
tllC Louisiana blacks in the course of the civil rights movement, tl1cy were
still disproportionately inHuent ia1 due to their former privileged status and
their
existed in the British colonies, the status of the free people of color in French
and Spanish Louisiana vvas unique in colonial Nortl1 America because they
enjoyed, with very few exceptions, the same rights and privileges as the white
Louisiana settlers. Like colonists of European origin, they could own property and fi-cdy choose their professions. M<my of them worked as artisans,
traders, or merchants and a few even owned slaves and operated plantations.
Dming colonial rule, the free people of color thus emerged as an important
and selfconfidenr socioeconomic group within colonial society that had to
be reckoned with by the ruling authorities in political and social matters
(Mi)l!crs wo8, 4-8-52).
By the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the free people of color made up
almost one-fifth of New Orleans' overall population, their number having
sclf~conception
I
I
I
I
I
'
I
I
.\K
n
:0
:0
xe
~
II
:m
:tj)
I)
colonial rule.
Frequently, tl1is specific colonial order based on the legal rcification of
"tribes'' had long-lasting consequences. The 1994- lll<loS killings of Tbtsis in
Rwanda, convcntionaJly rendered as a paradigmatic example of the dangers
oCiimitcd statehood, is a case in point. Of course, the genocide was the product of a complex set of C1etors that cannot be reduced to issues of historical
continuity (Malkki 1995; Straus zoo6; Uvin 2001 ). But among the long-term
origins of tbe conflict was the strict differentiation of Hunr and Tursi under
German (and then Belgian) colonial rule. The administrative segregation of
ethnic groups that in everyday practice were not at all separate was a concern
of the colonial stare that relied on a rlirirlc ct impcra strategy to safeguard its
rule. The establishment of diHcrcnt legal spheres, reinforced by partial political autonomy, was organized by colonial administrators who both employed
and produced the relevant and1ropological and legal knowledge of the time
(sec, for example, the "Instructions for ethnographic observations and collections in (;crman East Africa;' written by Felix von Luschan, director of
the Anthropological Museum in Berlin, specifically for colonial bureaucrats)
(I [onke 19qo; Scrvaes 1990 ). Colonialmlc was thus intimately tied,to colonial knowledge, and the stmctures it created lived on 1'0 shape life in the region well into postcolonial times (Mamdani 1996b; Newbury 1998; Schmuhl
:woo).
Mahmuod Jvlamdani has convincingly demonstrated that tl1is was a general pattern. The access to rights and power remained conditioned on indigenous status. "If we look at d1e dciinition of citizenship in most J\fiican
states, we will realize that the coloni~1l st:ltc lives on .... In privileging the
indigenous over the non-indigenous we turned rhe colonial world upside
down, but we did not change it" (Mamdani 2001, 6_11\). As a colonial legacy
to postcolonial times, a culture of entitlement developed in which ethnic
categories were not only employed to dciinc cultural identity, but also to
legitimize social and political claims. When in the context of mobility and
labor migration spawned by capitalist development an increasing number of
people came to live on the territory of a "i(Jrcign" ethnic group, thcy always
c.1rricd their minority rights with them. This transfCrability
or competing
<<i
legal orders exacerbated social problems and political conflicts and at the
same time posed 1imita6ons un the ability of the stare to imervcnc and control. The problematic of limited statehood in contemporary Africa, in other
words, can be traced in part to rhis colonial legacy. Mahmood /Vlamdani
therefore goes as far as to say that the inst-itutionalization and politicization
of the statu.<: of"indigcnous" ll'as the most inllucntial and long-lasting effect
ofcolonial rule (l'vlamdani I<N6a).
Conclusions
The usc or the governance concept in the study of colonial rule presents
the historian with both opportunities and problems. On the one hand, the
notion of governance proves to be highly useful for systematically inquiring into the mechanism of colonial rule. In particular, it allows iclemifYing
path dependencies of colonial governing practices and structures, as we have
argued in the fourth section of the Jrticle. Providing a broad perspective on
modes of political organization existent in colonial contexts, the governance
approach allows for a view on colonial governing that not only focuses on
the official systems of rule established by the colonizing powers, but also
on the inf~nmal (and at times cooperative) f(nms of governing that evolved
during colonial times and in many cases proved to be more persist-em in the
long run than the formal instil'lltional structures. As the case srudy on d1e
legacies of colonial rule in Aflica demonstrates, the long-term consequences
of colonial governance arc still keenly !Cit in many of the formerly colonized
regions of Africa, resulting in postcolonial predicamellts that have srymicd
the development of stable politics on the cuntincnt until today. In the United
States, although quite di!Tcrcnt fiom the J\fric.u1 case and much less dr<mJat ic
and negative in their cflcc:ts, colonial legacies arc also still visible in tile counn-y's political system, as the example of stares' rights and of the pcculi,1rities
of local governing practices and structures illustrate.
In contrast, the critical discussion of the concept's transferability to the
colonial context in the third part of this chapter has vividly demonstrated the
limitations of a classic underst:mding of governance when applied to coloni<ll
contexts. The diversity of actors involved in colonial governing processes and
the oJ-I:cn hybrid nature of their roles in colonial rule cannot be adcquatclv
described using the binary categories or "public" and "pril'atc" that J1'C or
central importance in many of the current debates on governance. Likewise,
~>u
Imights fiom
L111'
,wd History
due to crlmic divides, the varying inJlucncc of specific social groups, and
the colonies' blurred territorial bow1darics, a clearly defined and coherent
govcrn;mcc colJccrivc as the object of governing did not exist in the colonia]
. c [n
~-
processes. of governing, and on the inst it11tions of rule as well as the inform ell
modes of govcrnmg.
context, rendering the task of clearly distinguishing between the rulers and
the ruled more complex.
The conceptual wealmesscs of the governance concept when applied to
the colonial past may also be of relevance l(x the study of governing practices and structures in modern-day areas of limited statehood./\ first step to
~Kcommodat-c this criticism would be to nndcrsL1nd governance as "institu-
Oil
~1pplying
tions outside the purview of the Western nation-state. Used in this w:~y, it
m~l)' serve as a heuristic instrument that enables us to take ~l broad look at
modes of governing ami at rhc actors involvcclthcrcin in a historical pcrspcc-
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Arnold, David. 1()83. "White Colonization ami Labour in Ninetccnth-Centrrr\' Indi.r."
journal o[Connnonn'ralt/; Hi.rtmy 11 :t33-5~Asch, Ronald l;., and Dagmar Freist, cds . .wos. Starll.rbildm(tr als lmlturcllrr Pm::.c.rs.
StmlltllnFf1.1idclH711f hjTitimalirm Fllll I lcrrsclmfi i11 dcr Frii/;m Nmc:.cit. Cologne:
Hiihlau.
Barth, Boris, and ]tirgen Osterhammcl, etls. 2001. ZiFili.ricrm'!J.I"111is.riollm. Imperiale
Wcltvcrbrs.rrmi!IJ scit dem 18. ja!Jrlmndr:rt. Konstan:r.: UVK.
Berman, Larry, and Bruce 1\. Murphy.
River, N.J.: Prentice I L111.
200;.
Br<lSScaux, Carl A., Keith P. Fontenot, and Claude F. Oubre. t<)<Jo. Crrolcs o(C:olor i11
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Conklin, Alice.
19lJ7-
200-J.
Dirlik, 1\rif:
2007.
de Bruxcllcs.
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- 199 6b. "From Conquest to Consent as the Basis oLSratc Formation: Reflections
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~- ;z,oor. "lkyond Settler and Native as l'oJiticalldcntities: Overcoming the l'ulitical Legacy ofColoni<llism." Compn.mtiPr Swrlir.r i11 Society a11d 1-Ii.<IOI)' +3:611-6,+.
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komplcxcnl\c;!Jcl.<y.<lcmcn, edited by Artl1ur Benz, 65-76. Wicsbaden: VS.
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Contc.>t. New York: Routledge.
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Sd11Parz uurl TVci(J'-Dic Free People of Color in Nell' Or/cam. Bielefeld: transcript.
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[ntcmlztimlcn z;l!'isc/;c1! China tmrf Dmt.rciJ!rrnd, IS<J?-1974. ;'vlunich: Oldcnbourg.
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University of North Carolina Press.
HE AIM
the understanding of "Goverrunce in Areas of jjmited Statehood" by discussing these issues in the broader context of new
developments in the area of rule making. What can be witnessed here-the
dccoupling of state <md law, the emergence of new modes of governance by
rule making in the process of transnationalization- are developments that
arc of immediate importance f(;r underst~mding areas of limited statehood.
Furthermore, it would improve--at least in the long run-the research on
governance in areas of limited statehood if this research would stay in close
touch with the broader discussion about changes in governance.
z(
4
,,
I,,' [
,:III,
II
emerge?
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we assume, first, tl1~t sc;~_uJj_t~-~
can
in fact be provided without the
state or even its rudimentarv structure!),
-------~ . --~------" ... ~ - ~-~---~
. -~--............. ~~ ..--.--~-~ .. ,.__ ..... -~--~--~..._.-___......... _:;_;________ -"""'
_,
and, second, that tl1c governance approach can in turn be usefully applied to
analy;r.,c security dynamics in areas of limited statehood. Thereby, we define
security in a narrow sense as tllC Jbsence of threats to a defi1;;;d ~~~f~r;;,-~~<~~1-p.
~--
:!!)
ln terms ofconfigurarions oflimitcd statehood, we focus on the territuri.1l
to
of violent conflict, there arc times and spaces in which non state armed ac ,e t coUectivcly binding decisions and arc interested in a mini 11111111
rors all 11 1
.seu11
. .11.,y r11 this context ' however, it is theoretically necessary to take irJto
0!
.
t . twofold transformation in the provision of security: first, an iuaccoun 1
r1..1g111ent1tion ofnarticin,mts
in the resj1ectivc securit)' markets', and
crcas111g
t
r
volume). The lack of state authority in such areas leaves space and time for
"L
SCL0l1 ,
.
c
-J 1a1 1ctcrizcd b)' a Sj1ectfic shortage of armed nrotcctlon, a fragmcnscclln 1l', c
r
f t]Je SJKctrum of rafl~Kious armed groups, and a lack of collective!)'
tatJOll o
"
.
. -cgrulations second areas of stmtrgic .rcmrit,,, in which sccuritu is
1 1
ll!I1LII1g
1: J tLJ ,a ous degrees of sCOj1C and inclusiveness, and by various acproVIl cu 1 ' 11
.
.
.
.
rors. Sccurit)' can be prov1dcd both mtcntJonally by armed actors (sccunl:)'
. ce as the instit11tionalization of territorial control of violence), and
govcrna11 ,
. .
. . .
.
Y1ttcrns of sclf-dcknsc b)' V!Cl!m!zed CJTOUJlS (self-protecnvc setile
I
nrougJ
o
!
l
curity)." In our view, the governance concept can be usefully applied preciseof[nrtially institutionalized macronctworks of strategic
I 'SC 11 roccsses
]y I o tiC.
"
.
. ..
. . 'J'] 11s 1
dca
is
not COlllJllctcly new, but rather bmlds upon llllttal apscuTIItY,
,
L
>
')'
'
=
c
.
'
I!:!
:,.1
'I
,:,lj
lj,
1:~
1:
i:l
I'
;:i;
~
'
nonstatc armed actors to recalihrate their imcraction with tl1c civilian population and invest in the provision of security. Contrary to the conventional
diffcrcnriation between .rtro1(fT, JPCIII<Jmkd and mllap.rcd states (Rotbcrg 200 ,,
zoo4) that uses the state as ccutT<11 unit of analysis, "limited statehood'' is
rhus a configurational conception reflecting spatial variations nf security ,111 d
allowing for the analysis of specific security dynamics within or across territorial boundaries.
The chapter starts with explaining three unique modes of security in ,ucas
of limited statehood. \Vc then connect these modes theoretically with the
logic of security markets and the opportunity structures that uJme alo!l):'.
with them. The chapter doses with an assessment concerning the uscfi.dm:ss
')
IIj,
and temporal loss of both, the monopoly of the usc of force and rhe abilitv
make .md enforce collcCLivelv binding decisions (cf Risse, chapter r, rhis
risk level with respect to cxistrntial threats. Thus, even under the conditions
of linking security with governance. The underlying assumptions :1rc that the
formation and the paths of security go\'crnance arc closely linked, f1rst, to
the logics of security markets that crnerge f!om a lack of monopolizJtion of
the legitimate usc ofl(xce, and, second, to material opportunities that change
over time. Specific economic or geographical opportunity structures do not
constitute simply an explanatory EJCtor for the outbreak or the dynamics of
violent conflict, they also provide inf(>rmation about the conditions undn
which providers of security determine the functions
As we will argue in the subsequem sections, the prob:Jbility of the provision or security is tied both to the lll.lrkct or violence ami the material cl!ld
geographical st.ruc!'ures of opportunit)' that influence the strategies of the
usc of Ioree. 1-lowcver, in order to measure the qu:ility of security, one h,1s
to consider the logic of consumption first. Who act.uallv consumes the security as a commodity ami what range docs th.H consumption assume> II'
security is defined narrowly ~IS the clhst:!Jcc ol physical fi.Jt-ce and <111 increasing rcliahilil:)' of protection, then violent groups such as rebel organizations
or warlords svsrems can produce internal and cxtcmal security in a dciincd
()2
ll
specific protection measures arc thus not only closely interconnected, but
!(
also constitute the core clements for the identification of areas of strategic
security or insecurity.
.
.;
TAJJLE 4.1
,.-T)j!C
r-
Protection provider:
monopolist
Coercive security
institutionalized system
Securit-y equals public
of taxation and order
good (no selectivit-y
ICmgc: territorial control within tbc territory)
Ivieans: military
protection of the
of security witl1in an area, not only is tl1c effectiveness and stability of the
security system called into question, but security also docs not attain tbe
quality of a public good. Nevertheless, there arc ways out of insecurity and
functions)
tl1e "protection screw" (Mchlum, Mocnc, and clorvik zooz, 448), which per-
l(mns of protection against internal or external threats (self-protective security). A third conceivable alternative form of sccurit)' production is tl1c del-
Protection provider:
recruitment among
mit security as a good to once again move more markedly fi-om the private
toward the public realm on a quality axis.
Idc;11ly, in war-torn areas of limited statehood, tlvo basic l(mns of security
without or beside the state can be ascertained: (1) security by coercion and
a certain degree of institutionalization and reliability; and (z) self-organized
.
Self-protective
security
.
.
"own people"
Mechanism: reactive to
violent context, pooling
of resources
Range: territorially
limited to a defined
group (i.e., selective and
exclud,1blc)
tive good security for a defined group of protection recipients, the first type
fortification systems,
hiring of local militias
This involves tl1c specific strategies of militarily potent actors who invest in
the establishment of monopolies on the usc of J(xce, and advance processes
lvicans: patrols,
--
Protection provider:
commercial security
of governance formation-that is, the establishment of institutionalized political and economic systems of rule. First of all, dominant and sanction ap-
Comnlcrciali,Kd
proved armed actors usc tl1cir abilities to control territory and social relations
security
com pames
. Mechanism: competition
Security cqu;~ls
private commodity
Qual if)'
. Mechanism:
. ['
Form
implementation of
services
---- - - - -
---~-----
----------
t
I
I
'1-J
Statehood
''.i
along with statebood (e.g., licensing, credits, development aid). Jtis not sur-
I)Jising th;It coercive modes of security governance may possibly change into
statehood (as happened in Liberia with Charles Taylor) and m~1kc usc of
L.-
.__
condition fclr a funnioning political order (cr Rorberg 2.003; Komad and
racks by looting violent groups. Under these conditions, individuals or civilian groups aflccted by insecurity can decide to counter the restrictions of the
implies, first, formal and informal institutions that organize rhc monetary
tive capacities. Such fi:m11s of the provision of security arc usttally restricted
transaction between the provider and the recipients of protection, and also
to
1hird
security expectations, both on t.hc part of the civi!i;m population and of the
with the type of str;Hegic alliance. While alliances between village units ;Htd
dominant armed actors. The civilian population can assume, on the bases of
tion witl1 governments or strong rebel groups may promise grearcr levels of
degree of effectiveness, t'lut is, the protectjon provider in L1Ct appears as are-
security, at least temporarily. The frame of reference fnr the recipients is the
liable security monopolist in the eyes of t:hc population (cf VVcinstein 20o6,
protected are:1 and the particular benefit. From the perspective of economics,
sccurit)' here takes the form ofapoolgoorl in which resources and capacities arc
J()9-70 ).
tion will increase because of the perceived territorial security, since more time
merely mobilized for the purpose of providing security to the groups involved
civilian population ultimately has l(mr action options--to become the victim,
gwups secure not only their own organizational structures, but als<' takc into
account future investment decisions th;lt can therefore take on the quality of
stronger armed groups (cf Skapcrdas and Konrad 200+) --the probability in-
creases that in the long run, J(m11s ol sell~ protective security wiJJ merge into
;1
of production. l n sum, one could posit the hypothesis that the success or
011
lengers, and the reliability of agreements lxtwccn the milit;li)' leadership and
arc provided as ;\ l)rivatc ,ommodity f(lr :>peci;ll scutrity risks ( c .g., counter-
JS
the civilian population. Over time, however, even violent ;JCtors luvc to en-
l"ive, since only those who em p.1y f()r security services receive the bctJcfits
lic related scrvtces into other sectors (e.g., finance, health, education) char-
()(,
"Jb explain why and under which conditions violent actors engage in security governance, in the next section we mal;;_c usc of the concept o[ security
markets by assuming that the market structures and economic logics in the
security domain encompass the terms under which violent actors shape their
preferences, select strategies tor action, and make decisions.
Security Markets
Security, and in the narrower sense, protection, arc not ordinary market com-
modities and diller in many ways fl:om other consumer goods. 8 As Skaperdas (2oOJ) and Skapcrdas and Konrad (wo+) have plausibly demonstrated,
the competition in the provision of protection differs from classic economic
functional context: in cases of the usc for the protection of persons or build-
services assigned for societal and instit1.1tional reconstruction can also serve
i!
97
r!
Unlike ordinary commodity markets, greater competition in the protectionproviders' segment thercfixe docs not lead to more but rather less gain in
benefits Cor all (Skapcrdas 200J, 174-). At the same time, competition bct\vecn
nonstate armed actors witJ1 no regulating central autl1ority means that security dilemmas and arms races arise that favor an increase in violence. \Vithom
any cifective protection of their lives or property rights, large segments or the
population arc prevented l!om engaging in economically productive activities and arc Jot-ccd to invest in their own protection instead (Bates, Greif, and
Singh 2002, 613). This necessity to invest in the means of violence reduces
economic productivity and cilicicncy (Skaperdas,
2001,
in areas of limited statehood and the possibilities of profiting from the pro-
yK
much as that of security-market participants and well-organized <md militarily powerful rebel groups.
The spectrum of market participants can be extended still further. In
<N
pcrdas ;z,oo1, r87).u The prices that can _be demanded f(>r protection scnices
arc rhus cont:mgent on the number of armed actors, the degree of spatial
sub-
Saharan Afiica, this category includes not only rebel groups and local mili-
ternative options f(>r action for the affected population (e.g., flight or the
tias, but also criminal cartels, traditional flghters like the Kmnajors in Sierra
Leone, and ad hoc groupings like the Area Boys in Lagos (Nigeria) who
combat and resources and at the same time increase information deficits and
(see Bakonyi, l lcnsell, and Sicgclberg 2006 ). Another critical group of ac-
tors who
not only oftcr a variety of services on today's security markets but also oper-
ization of a political order that guarantees ownership rights and organizes the
mercial cntcrpri,es by states or private groups ( cf. e.g. Av<mt 2001; Leander
2003; Musah 2002; Singer 2003). However, the involvc1~1ent of this group
of actors :liTccts the military power relationship and local conflict dynamics,
actors for violent activity. But even under the conditions of armed contest
selves competitors fix resources and aggravate both the .available informa-
and Sandlinc International), and the self-defense groups of the Kamajor mi-
litias to fight the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (!\lxiullah
From the perspective of conflict theory, the problem underlying the in-
gically choose bcnvcen the provision of security and the maintenance of inse-
cure (Walter 1997; Cunningham 2006 ). However, the greater the number
curity. J-lowcvcr, the more promising military and economic prolits become,
of pmcntially violent state and nonstatc parties to a conflict io <lml the more
and the more uncertain a Ji.uure under conditions or peace appe,us (Fe;mm
2004-), the higher the value of insecurity strategies should become. ln view
+++)
,!symmetries and commitment problems. Such dynamics not only affect the
conflict behavior of armed actors, but also heighten the vulnerability of soci-
ct,ll groups (i.e., the civilian population) who cannot provide J(>r their own
ing greater profits imTC<lSeS the \'<l!Ue or violent COJlJlict Strategies, COillj1JI'ed
to ncgoti<ltcd scttlcmems. For the civilian population this has fJtal conse-
quences. First, the demand J()[- protection services rises with the increas-
ing degree
which it must pmvide credible proof of its ability to provide security (Ska-
greatly limited. Second, the risk increases th,lt actors in the conflict will turn to
100
ill
ii/.11
The structure and dyn~m1ics of security markets, like the question of the qual
ity of security, cannot be adequately understood without considering the
ch:mging opportunity structures in areas of limited statehood. If there is any
truth to rhe popular saying "opportunity malzes thieves;" it should be considered that the absence or breakdown of states creates extraordinary opportunities for entrepreneurs of violence to either enrich themselves by looting,
extortion, or resource exploitation, or else to offer protection against looting
by violent groups.
Theoretically, structures of opportunity encompass the conditions under
which actors formulate preferences, make decisions, and act (Siverson and
Starr 1991; Most and StaiT 1980; Collier and Hocfller 1998). In the research
into the causes of war, they have often been used as explanatory fac!"Ors for
the probability of the outbreak of both internal and international warfare.
101
Econmnic Opportunities
The lack or breakdown of security guar<mtccs ollCrcd by the institutions of
the sovereign state favor both conflicts over access to resources and targeted
looting strategies. Basically, material structures of opportunity refer to all
available resources that can be extracted and thus used to guarantee one's
own capability to exert force. Areas oC strategic insecurity arc therefore most
likely to arise in resource-rich areas: the greater the wealth of resources, the
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
c
I
I
t
I
I
t
I
t
I
w1
l~ovcrnmgArca~
of Limited StatchPod
the
ll'hich they might produce new resources ro loot. Bmh problems imply a
security market and compete with one another. Conscgucntly, the incentive
011
occurrence and perpetuation of organized violence is even more funda 111 ental. Empirical studies reveal that the effect of diamonds and oil is highly
(Fearon
2005;
2004).
The extrac-
;tr!
higher maintcn:mce expenses and hence ~111 increased demand {(Jr resource.'>.
The nurginal utility of looting can thcrcf(;rc occur in a dual manner: first,
does the looting of the civilian population. While the extraction of natura]
profits; and second, the profit no Junger covers the regular expenditures of
tion and storage sites and transportation routes, the taxation of humanitar-
ian aid and the looting of the civilian population by predatory gangs, rebel
groups, or regular soldiers tends to be carried out in a more ad hoc and often
nization can therefore certainly seize a dominant position in the course of the
financing of violence can vary in time and space, even within single conflict
conilict and tl1en take the opportunity of sh;Jring in the prollts of increasing
zones, and in each case generate specific strategies of violence and insecurity.
Resources not only create the risk of the emergence of violent conflicts
.iiJ
IC13
and provide opportunities for enrichment, they arc aJso a critical quantum
borh f(lr the survival of the civilian population and of various types of armed
2006 ),
d1e
2003,
able l(Jr the leadership of armed groups under certain conditions: if rebel
materia! motivation, they can rely on social relationships and provide cred-
highly iiacturcd into splinter LJCtiuns and in which there is a high demand
2002).
2006).
In the long run however, the looting of the civilian population also raises two
Gcrtrnrphic Opport11nitics
pmbkms: on the one hand, the number of competitive armed groups can
rise over time, and hence, too, the number of violent incidents; on the other,
a critical momentum for the explanation of the dynamics of violence and also
for the development of security markets. Appropriately, research on international war began as early as the 1970s to concepmalizc such geographical conditions as direct neighborhood and spatial distance as explanatory factors for
the occurrence and diffusion of armed conflicts and wars (e.g., Diehl 19 91 .
Starr 1991). Somewhat belatedly, recent civil war research bas discovered the
)
mained state-centered and oriented solely toward conflicts between governments and rebel groups. However, in areas of limited statehood, one can
forests and mount"ains, not only affect the manner in which internal violent
conflicts are carried out but also arc important in determining the prospect
of winning a battle or the war (cf. Gates 2002; Buhaug and Gates 2oo 2;
J3uhaug and Rod 2006). At the same time, geography also limits the number
of potential violent actors and provides information for an understanding of
arc characterized by the fact that the state's control of the usc of force is
tures of opportunity f-or political action or certain risks for the escalation
0 { violent conflicts, but also has an inherent significance and an identity-
of violent control and making profits from the resource extraction. First,
one has to bear in mind that nan1ral resources differ considerably in their
concentration and location (Lc Billon 2oor, Ross 2004-). Second, centrali:ocd resources such as petroleum and easily accessible mines arc consider-
building function for the development of security-related governance structures or even statehood (Knight 1994; Murphy 1996). Referring to Sack
(1986), we understand territoriality here as a spatial principle of the organization of social interaction and control. On the one hand, territoriality refers to
the existing government than more remote extraction sites (Lc Billon 2001).
force. At the same time, this has implications lor our understanding of governance: security is more closely tied to the conditions of territoriality than
The reverse is just as true: the further a potential extraction site is away from
1111'
assume neither the presence of a state with a fully functioning regular army
nor a dyadic conflict strucn1rc (state versus rebel group). Instead, these areas
.:I !~
101
the state center, the easier it is for nonstatc armed groups to appropriate
and the more probable will it be that violent conflicts, and hence areas of
Conclusions
dilemma, there are two contrary strategies: either, a high degree of military
organizational forms, as in the case of t~1c phenomenon of warlord systems
(B<lkonyi, Hensel!, and .Sicgelbcrg 2006). But even without access to valuable resources, the distance f1:om the capital or from state security guarantees
I
I
IJ
tJ
tJ
tl
ll
I
tl
I
I
I
I
I
1ol>
limited statehood can be characterized both by zones of permanent insecurity and by the institutiorulization of protection ~md taxation systems (areas
of strategic security), structures of politic.1l and soci<ll order emerge only in
the second variant that arc interesting fiom a governance perspective-and
which should ultimately be examined in terms ol efllciency, effectiveness, and
:1lso aspects of stability and legitimacy.
Security as a governance commodity is directly connected to the ability
to perf(m11 control over violent means and to provide protection goods.
Therefore, it must be taken into account that the provision of security has
an explicitly territorial component and is tied 10 the logic of the usc of fence
and of resource extraction. Changing geographical and economic structures
of opportunity contribute to the fact that even nonstate armed groups may
prefer the provision of security to the use of violence against the population,
particularly if considerations of cflicicncy predominate. ltJ this context, the
making of govenuncc should be expected as a preferred strategy of exerting
comrol over J dcJincd territory and population under certain material conditions (i.e., within economic valuable territories) in order to overcome or
balance the risks of survival and negative economic effects (overplundering)
in;rnncs of permanent violence. The formation of security structures may fail
or turn into the unmaking of governance if armed groups abstain to provide
both a minimum of internal security and deterrence fiom external threats, resources arc limited or become scarce, and support within the armed group or
population decrc:1ses. While Sonulibnd (1991-) and Pumland (1998-) clearly
represent alternative formations of security governance beyond the state,
p.utially instirutionalizrd macronctworks of strategic security like "TaylorLand" in Liberia (1991-96), "Nkunda-Laml" (:wo4-) in the Easrcrn Congo
or the Islamic Courts in Somalia (1999-200(J) srand for the conflicllTJ! making of security structures within war-Ulrn areas of limited statehood mul for
the failure or tTansitional character ofwch orders of violence.
The potcntial paths of governance fcmmtion dismsscd here suggest, first,
that the provision of security as a govcrn~mcc service can be provided hy a
v:~riety of nomt.1tc groups without the state; second, that it 111~1y he organized on the basis of a variety of regulatory structures and processes (diflcrcnt organizational f(mns and degree; of instittJtiomliz.ltion); and I hird, that
it v~1ries in its d1cctivc range (territoriality and consumption). !vloreover,
recourse to considerations of conflict theory (opportunity structures) and
f(mn~1 l ccunon1ics (markets of sccurity"or protection) in governance research
is more than worth it. As it has been shown, the quality of security has to be
107
ro8
New Modes
his system of rule, 'Taylor finally, in 1997, aimed for the presidency of all of
Liberia-with the well-known result of the renewed escalation of violence
in the war in Liberia and his arrest in March 2006. Aside from the ultimate
fate ofTaylor himself, it is clear that the state apparanrs and the perspective
ofintcrnational recognition remain important resources, both internally (political legitimacy, advantages over political rivals) and externally (e.g., in the
form of international financial aid or by access to international assistance).
It can therefore be assumed that opportunity structures such as the form of
a state and the norm of sovereignty will in the future continue to determine
the options for action of (some) private armed groups.
or Security
109
discussion, Baylis 2005) and widening the concept to include nonstate actors as cnucpreneurs of security governance strengthened by state collapse and the dynamics
of internal wars.
6. Vlc concemrate here on security dynamics without or beside the stare and will,
therefore, not discuss other possible forms such as "governance witl1 government." A
good example for tl1e latter is provided by Elisabeth Jean Wood (2.008). By exploring
different social processes of civil war she illustrates the emergence of "insurgent governance" in Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers ofT.<mil Eclam (LTIE). Since the early
19 9os the L1TE has drawn on state administrations and has cooperated with government civil services, but at the same time has maintained core functions of protection
Ill
NOTES
I
I
I
The concept of rhe "security market" refers to tl1e structure and composition of
While security can be seen as an aggregate state characterized by the absence of physi-
the spectnrm of actors as well as tl1c interaction of supply (provision) and demand of
cal violence toward a defined group over time, protection cncompascs all measures
1.
necessary for the production of security. Protection is thus the active process of tl1e
provision of security and hence the major asset traded on security markers.
group of recipients. Hence, tl1c present article operates with a minimal definition of
detail Powell 1999, chap. 2), which compares investment in civilian means of produc-
governance, without addressing here the broad range of differing definitions. Our
understanding of security governance also differs fi'om Krahmann (2003), who ap-
plies the term to tl1e emergence of complex security structures in Europe and North
pay in the form of cxploitat"ion licenses for the extraction of valuable resources and
America.
become protagonists in the war-economy systems. They not only profit from zones
J. The analytical distinction common in the debate over the privatization of se-
i.ll.lit
10.
of insecurity but also contribute to their perpetual ion (J\tlusah and Fayemi 2.ooo;
Pech 2000).
II. Andreas Mehler (2003) argues that over time, homogeneous or heterogeneous
Mandel 2003; Bt;'den 2006). In contrast-, its analytical utility is restricted: first, it
and security via market mechanisms, while innovative, nonetl1eless go only halfway.
establishes no immediat-e theoretical correlation between the shortage and tl1e active
First, the concept is confined to violent actors directly involved; and secoml, it E1ils
provision of security; second, neither the forms and expressions nor the quality of
to
or security.
12. Hirshlcilcr (2ooo) as well as the excellent Sllllimaty by Carfinkel and Skapcrdas
(zoo6).
13. Collier and I-Ioeffler argue that the outbreak of warbrc can he explained less by
oLm area. In the long term, they include the protection ofthe comrol against internal
the political motivation of the actors than by the oppornmitics fiJr economic extrac-
tion and accumulation in crisis-torn areas, i.e., via "at;,pical circumstances that gener-
to
5. vVc rhus oOcr a middle-ground strategy between the classical definition of secu-
rity as the absence of existential threats to a political unit (sec, for a comprehensive
I
t
t
I
t
I
I
110
Olson (1993) or Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003) have the problem that they
;Uld M. Caparini, 1-19. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control oC
merely auach tl1e extraction logic of violent actors to the civilian popul.1tion, but leave
Armed Forces.
Buhaug, I-Lllvard, and Scott Gates. 2002. "The Geography or War?' journal ofl'mcc
Rcscfl.rdJ 39, no. 4-:417-33]luhaug, Jialvard, and Kjetil Rod. 200(>. "Local Determinants ofi\liican Civil Wars,
16. Elwert (1999, R6) defines "markets of violence" as ''economic fields dominated
1y7o-2oor?' Politiml Gco<qmpby 2_1, no. J:oli-35Cirojnacki, S\'Cn. 2007. "(Un- )Sichcrheit, Gcwalt und CJovemance. Theoretischc
I-Icrausl(mlcrungen fi.ir die .Sicherhcitsforschung." In StaatszCT:fal! und GoPcmnllcr,
l.>y civil wars, warlords or robbery, in which a sclf:pcrpctuating system emerges which
Nomos.
Collier, l'aul, and Ankc 1-Iodlkr. ry9~C "On the Economic Cause of Civil vVar." Oxjimi
highly profitable systems these markets may achieve stability len certain periods of
time.
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vi
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1: lll-JO.
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Ross, Michael L. 200+. "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil
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Singer, Peter W. 2003. C01pomte Wnniors: T/;c Rise of the l'rimtizcti;Hilitm:r lndu.rtJy.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univcrsiry Press.
Siverson, Randolph lvl., and ITarvcy Starr. 19'!!. The Dij}itsion ofWor: A Stmf:y ~(Op
portmzit)' nnd lVillinlJncss. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sbperdas, Stergios. 200L "The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing
Protection VVhcn the State Docs Not." Economics ofGm>cmm1cc 2, no. 3:173-202.
- . 2002. "Warlord Competition.'']ouma/ ofl'mcc IV:smrch 39, no. 4-:4-3_1-66.
Skaperdas, Stergios, and Kai Konrad. 2004.. "What Kind of Order out of Anarchy?
Self Protective Security, Autocracy, and Predatory Competition." Paper WP20o4-/2,
Institute of Govcrnmemal Studies, University of' California, Berkeley.
Starr, 1--Iarvey. 1978. '"Opportunity' and 'Willingness' as Ordering Conccpts in the
Study of"VVar." lntcmational Intcmctiom +,no. +:363--X7.
--. 1991. "Joining Political and Ccograpbic l'nspectives, Geopolitics, and International Relations." Intcmatio11trllntcnn1.ions 17, no. t: 1-9.
Walter, Barbara F. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." bztcnmtimm!
114
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2005.
in Developing Countries
ANDREA LIESE AND MARIANNE BEISIJE!l\1
KANSNATIONAL
PUBLJC-l'RIVATE
l'ARTNERS!l!l'S
perform functions and provide services that prcviomly rested firmly within
the authority of sovereign states. 1 These actors jointly govern across multiple
levels (transnational to local). In the OECD world, community-level Pl'Ps
often complement or supplement governmental rcgulatiorJ or services (Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000 ). l n at-e3s of limited statehood (sec Risse, chapter 1
in this volume; and Risse <md Lehmkuhl 2ooo, oo), however, the situation
is quite different. Here, PPPs often have d1C goal of providing collective
goods: They may provide rules or services that were simply absent before,
or, alternatively, PPPs might substitute state activities in a situation of state
lil:i''
2.3') ).
"Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor" aims at providing access to
and sanitation for people in urban slums.
\\'<llcr
RAGILE
STATES
ABOUND
IN
THE
WORLIJ
Runou:
TODAY.
The reasons for state fragility vary greatly, fiom ethnic temions, social
unrest, or increased migration caused by economic or environmental
J.
"fJiJing" or
"failed" state, it remains a state in the legal sense. This charactcri7>:ltion hardly
squares with the traditional requirement of the definition of a state according,
to which its authorities must exercise cfkctivc !'ower over its population and
tc>
the needs of their populations ::md to ensure thci ,-political particip.ltioiJ. These
demands stand 111 tension with the {;let jn'il mentioned that fiagilc stJtcs <liT
zoe)
il
'Ill
lJii'llli'ftl
.em
2.1,
international law by a treaty concluded between other states against its will
show that the rather ambitious sundards of good governance are already
part of positive law, and that they also can be justiJ1cd by a rights-based ap-
"I
from earlier times. Jvlost relcv;mt for prcsellt purposes is the extent to which
states' reserved domain was reduced considerably through rules that regu-
late the internal actions uf states. 1\s a consequence, the scope of application
of the prohibition of (nonmilitary) intervention shrank enormously: other
not only states, but nonstate actors and the international community arc
actions in areas hitherto within the reserved domain of states. vVith these
based on public international law and political morality that is built on the
protection of states through the prohibition of the usc of force became in-
is on tiagile states, that is, areas of limited statehood nearing the end of the
011
a decision
or the
norms (ius CIJ,!fCIIS) and hence cannot he clungcd hy agrccmems between in-
~II Hlj
~IJijH!Iil1~
',,,j'
dividual stares (article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law ofTI"catics). These
"
rules of i11s
Cl(f[f1lS
CriJJCllS
proves that sovcreignt y is not absolute, but that, on the contrary, there arc
iJI1illl:l1111"~1
MHiliili.IH;j
the exclusive legal power of a state to regulate matters within its own terri-
jljl
torv according
i[!: 1
iiiliiiiiPifl:l\1
to
its own will (Lautcrpacht 1997, l+o). Since the end of the
Goorl Grwcrnrmcc
First: I'Vorld \Var and with an ever increasing speed and substantive scope,
states have concluded international treaties by which they limit: their free-
dom of action, both within and outside their own territories. \ 1Vhilc some
seen largely as a myth" (Lllttcrpacht 1<)97, I+Y ), others rightly propose that
tion, t!JC)' have become relevant l()r international sovereignty in the context
the meaning ofsovcrcignty has not ck,nged (.Schrijver 1<)<)9, 91\) . .Sovereignty
of n:cognition of new starcs 2 ;mtl Jr1r the determination of whether the 1m>
today still means what it meant since the beginning of the \11/estphalian sys-
~02
'](1
I'll he
HIIcrnanonallaw standards of good governance will be examined 111 a nar.
''
a higher status under public intcm,1tional Lnv because they embody fllnda-
'
Some human rights arc considered part oCiw CI(!JCW. Hence, states cannot
'--"
cxts.
intemational law rules on the way in which power must be exercised within
of racial discrimination arc such pcrempl'ory norms. Arguably, a pro hi hiti( >n
1hc f(1Jlowin~,
we shaH examine the central com11onents of oPood ~a 01 ,e 1-11 .~cr
,
in this broad sense: lmman rights, the rule of law, responsivmes,,, and public
of arbitrariness with respect to survival ,1ml basic needs also amounts to i11s
cq!]CIJ.\. 6
participation.
HUMAN RIGHTS
ernance arc human rights, because they regulate the exercise of power within
a st;ltc. On the universal level, the cmtral sources arc the International Cov-
J.
particubr
enant on Civil <md Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant
ties, which guarantee human rights extensively (with the notable exception
the
principle of legality in the field of crimin;ll !Jw (n11llllm crimm, mt!ln ponw
sine lc,tp:), and the fic.edom of thought, comcicncc, and religion. The Human
treated with respect fm tl1C inhcrem digniry of the human person; the prohi-
quires swcs, both in their internal actions ((Jr their own development and in
provide for effective remedies against violations of human righr.,g l11s a!JJC71S
l'O
to realizing htilll<lll rights. rJuman rights thus set the priorities for devclop-
J)]Cnl; at the same time, development itself is understood as a process for tl1c
re,tlization oLtll human rights (Rudolf 2008). Under the internal dimension
of the right to dcvclopmem, every state is obliged to ensure development
10
it:ation of human righls. Since all human rights arc "universal, indivisible,
<llld intcrdcpemlcnt," 5 there is no hierarchy between civil and political rights
For fl,1gik states, the problem arises th:~t universally applicable hmmn rights
(the "lirst gcncr.lliun" of human rights), and economic, social, ami cultural
impose obligzttJons thev lunily can meet, either f(Jr lack of dfective inter-
nal regulatory or enfi)J-ccment power or li>r Llck of' sllnicicm means. The
A
zn+
>
')'
ou1
'
JCESCR takes the latter difficulty into account through the obligation to
realize economic, social, and cultural rights progressively (article 2. r).1o Thus
implementation."
the covenant docs not require states to fulfill the rights immediately, but "t~
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal;'u and "to
the maximum of its available resources" (article
2.1 ).
RVl,E OF LAW
core obligation" under each covenant right, namely "to ensure the satisfac-
r 1ilr:'
'1+.
1
r I
tion o( at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights" is not
l't
an absolute obligation, but must take into account the resource constraints
lrflll [I~
di!TC!s from related European concepts, namely, Ra!Jts:~tnnt and ctnt de droit,
1.l l
'
lilkr;,qjl'~~
11111lt~
i'llll!li'
'l, ill
i~l
lllll1fr.llllfll
1
. 1
lfl[
of human rights arc permissible only if provided by law, that is, iC there is a
prior Jaw of general applicability that was properly enacted and is accessible
be examined later.
The lCCPR does not contain a comparable provision on progressive
Jaws and their application must respect the principle oC cqmlit:y beCore the
Jaw (article 26, ICCPR). Lastly, at least f()r criminal and civil matters, comrul
200.1,
ligations;' that is, they require mere abstention, while economic, social, and
cultural rights give rise to "positive obligations," that is, they necessitate ac-
tion bv the state and hence the usc of financi<ll resources. Under a modern
edy (article 2.3, ICCPR). By these minimum requirements, the rule of law
ensures that the supremacy of the law is upheld and dms that restrictions or
obligations-to respect, to protect, and to fulfill (Eide !989, 37; Simma 1998,
human rights arc foreseeable. For states that arc not bound by the JCCPR,
s72 , with
the supremacy of lavv and the independence of the judiciaty arc binding as
reference to Shuc !980 ). This means that the state has to abstain
fi'om interfering with the exercise of the right ("to respect"), it has to take
general principles of Jaw (Rudolf 2oo<1, 102+ and Rudo!C 2ooo, "1-86~93, re--
measures against violatiom of the right by private actors ("to protect"), and
it has to create the necessary social condirions for an effective exercise of the
right ("to fullill"). Even the "respect" dimension may I"Ct]Uirc the state to take
(costly) action; in order to respect the right to a fair trial, for example, the
state must set up <UI independent court system. Equally, the "protect" dimension of the right to life obliges the state to establish a police force. Neverthe-
RESl'ONSIVENESS
less, it is no oversight that the JCCPR docs not limit d1c extent of the states'
obligations to their available resources. Rather, the immediate effect of the
obligations arising out of the rights guaranteed by the I CCl' R reflects the
must be "responsive
to
prer~isc undcrlyit~g that cm'cnant thar it is the purpose of the state to ensure
sive to the needs of the people" arc a key factor Cor economic development.' 7
W(>
of all individuals, on the basis of their active, hcc :tnd meaningful participation."'S Consequently, responsiveness reflects the convic6on that human
beings arc at the center of the development process. It is thus closely conncct:d with participation: responsiveness is rhe purpose and-ideally-also
the result of p.micipation.
Tile international documents citeJ here do not permit the conclusion
th<lt responsiveness, in the sense of a duty to be respomive, exists under
public international law. Llowever, states arc bound by law to create centra]
preconditions of responsiveness. Freedom of opinion and li-ccdom of association are necessary for the population to lcmnulatc its demands toward
state authorities and to express its support for, or criticism of, state policies.
Only if the population can express itself without fear of sanctions wiJl state
autl~oritics brn of the people's needs and demands. Although such expressions arc more el1ectivc if based on sound facts, states arc not duty-bound
to provide transparent decision making: freedom of opinion docs not (yet)
mcompass a right of access to all inf(mnation :wailable to a state (Rudolf
2000, 1023)
'1' :1'1
l;ifi\,;1
/
l~lilliilffl11
11
PUBLIC PAKTICJJ'ATION
hcillf!; hclpf\d. Documents of the last decade put an emphasis 011 democracy
.Js being b;1scd on participation, vet fall short of pronouncing a legal obhgation w:icmocrxy.'9 Jn this vein, the vVorld Summit called democracy a "uni,crsalv;1Juc has on the flcely expressed will of the people" and its "li.dl partici11arion in all aspects of their livcs."m Thus, the international community
did not ;1flinn tlJC more cxtmsi1c approach of the Commission on 1I uman
Ri>'hts. ]11 ,1 contested rcsolmion, the commission had declared full popular
eli
in the government
20~
209
\Ve will now transcend the bmmds of positive la1v and turn to normative po-
is morally entitled to, provided in forms and by means that arc themselves
compatible with human rights standards. This seems to be a tenable starting
point for explaining in a coherent manner the idea underlying the conception
of good governance outlined above.
liticJl theory. On the one hand, this widens the scope of arguments: political
philosophers should in principle feel fi-cc to make proposals for reform, even
A rights-based approach has tour adv~mtagcs. First, it is already widely accepted in principle, and also anchored in public international law, by means
regarding basic principles of existing law. The general reason is that any law
of treaties and custom, some of them even being ius cq_qcns. Consequently,
must be legitimate: although leaving open to its addressees tl1e motives for
compliance, one possible motive must be respect for tl1c law itself To tl1at end
its basic norms have to be compatible witl1 the basic principles of morality.
And notl1ing guarantees a priori tl1at an existing corpus of legal rules and
principles docs already fulfill tl1at demand.
sible starting point for constructing a fi"amcwork of moral norms that could
orientate further legal reform. Third, it rules out any purely instrumentalist
tures, at least witl1 regard to basic human rights. Second, it provides a plau-
On the other hand, morality itself provides us witl1 good reasons to talce
positive law seriously. The ultimate reason is tl1at to overcome any state of
must talcc into consideration tl1c integrity of positive law. This is especially
II.Iii
important in the case of international law, because more tl1an most national
From the point of view of a rights-based approach, states arc mere means
legal systems it is a law in tl1C making. That makes it highly sensitive to po-
for the full realization of valid claims of individuals. As such, they are in prin-
litical interests and power relations, but perhaps also open to moral insights.
lack the adequate means or the will to fulfill their core responsibilities. Even
passing over a stat"c's claims to sovereignty might be required if it is necessary
to give individuals what they arc entitled to. The international community
bears a subsidiary responsibility, and even nonstate actors can be obliged to
play a role in securing access to basic goods. As we argue, building and stabilizing institutions that protect basic human rights is a cosmopolitan duty
that gain more and more acceptance in the realm of public international law:
the duty is helping weak governments; <lnothcr part might be acting in place
Hnnum Ri;_qhts
tect their basic rights. 2 ' In that respect, at least, states and other structures
of institutions arc never ends in themselves. Political a\ll'horities arc basi-
Human rights can be justified fiom dilkrcnt moral staring poinrs, 111 accordance with more than one comprehensive doctrine, religious as well as
cally legitimate insofar as they arc suited and necessary ror guaranteeing se-
or an
"overlapping
210
2!1
consensus" concerning basic rights (Rawls 1993, 133lf). That fact relieves us
from the requirement of extensive moral argument that would clearly exceed
of human rights are at least prima facie imcrests: orlJCr things being equal,
the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, a few remarks concerning the philosophical background of the very idea of hum<m rights arc required.
they deserve universal esteem (for details, sec Gert 1998). Some arc even
more than prima facie interests. They at!Cct indispensable preconditions of
Human rights arc valid claims each individual has simply by virtue of his
or her humanity The validity of rl1e claims results from at least one moral
principle being valid itself~ What principle can play such a role? There is wide
acceptance now in moral philosophy as well as in international law that each
been presented by Henry Sbuc (1996), but with regard to necessary enabling
conditions for realizing any hm11an right. According to Shue, some rights arc
BASIC INTERESTS
Is global agreement on the content of human rights possible? .Must not every
such attempt fail in the face of the diversity of worldvicws? According to
reasonable pluralism (Rawls 1993, sSfT), human rights interests would have
to be so general that people with very different ideas about what is a good
basic in the sense that enjoying them is indispensable fix rl1c enjoyment of all
Third, one can determine t.hc content of basic human rights by asking
what is essential for being able to participate as a fi-cc and equal person in
human rights discourses. This route of argument has something in common
with Shuc's. But instead of directly identifying some rights as bJsic, it refers
to the intcrsubjcctivist "construction'' of any system of rights (Forst 1999).
Given rl1at rights arc always in need of moral arguments, and arguments
arc intersubjcctivc in and by themselves, the ability to participate in human
find three methods of determining the content of at least basic human rights.
First, we can directly look and sec if we will find reasoned agreement on
stand that as a rciicx.ivc turn in the very idea oCeqmJ concern and respect: the
basic interests. These would have !"0 concern preconditions for, or fundamental clements o{~ a successful life. It is not directly a good life that is at
stake here, but merely a humane lite. with dignity. Now, it seems pbusiblc
to
presuppose interests
Glll
of at least equal importance. If a person simply thrmvs his or her lite away
on a whim, we consider that grossly irrational and tend to regard the person
Gm
under-
basic principle out of which specific human rights normatively emcrge bas
prefer to see them as mutually supportive. A right that turns out to be basic
in the sense of protecting Jnd promoting interests necessary for leading one's
own lite as a self-aware person, f(x the very same reason will turn out to be
necessary J()l" consciously ::md cikctively exercising all other rights. What is
more, the approach of basic interests highlights the advantages that rights
arc made to protect and promote. It directs our attention to the relation between subjective rights a ncl intrinsic goods. ' 1 The approach of basic rights, in
212
211
13 o-33), and they c:nsurc that the cmts arc bearable for each individual person
by means of their fair allocation and the prohibition of fl-ee riding. This docs
not simply lessen the individual's responsibility, however. In cases where suf.
contrast, can help us to determine the normative status some imerests have.
Regarding the third approach, b~sic interests and basic rights can serve as
substantial restrictions within human rights discourses. They J{xus the participant's attention on the points of greatest urgency. To a large degree rights
ficicntly strong institutions arc already lacking, that responsibility shifts toward contributions to create and to strengthen them.
Consequently, we can distinguish two levels of duties concerning hum<m
rights. On a firor level, duties arc directly linked to the objects of human
will overlap with those needed for leading a personal life with dignity and
rights~ ror example, the duty to rdiainliom violation or the duty to prmidc
11m
with those needed for enjoying any other sorts of rights. Nevertheless,
a certain good. On a second level, there ;1rc duties regarding the prerequi-
it is highlj' likely that some rights turn out to be basic although not securing
sites of fulfilling duties on the first level. As alt-cc1dy indicated, among these
for a fi.Ill realization of hum all rights. Thus, the objection that certain rights
So much about the content of basic human rights. For the reasons just
or the
fix, or clcmcmJ.ry component of, a humane life with dignity, including the
action, and insof~1r as we arc able to coordinate our actions and to act col-
status of being the holder of valid claims and a free and equal coauthor of
CORRESPONDING DUTIES
states nowadays arc the primary duty bearers in the realm of human rights.
But neither do thcy have obligations only with regard to their own citiz,cns,
We want to finish the section on human rights theory by saying a fC:w words
nor arc they the only entities tlut can help individuals to get what they arc
about the duties that correspond to them. As indicated in the first part of the
entitled to. At least elementary norms such as avoiding torture and slavery,
prcvcming genocide, and providing the means ]()[' subsistence arc widely
inhibition of state action. Even rights to "negative liberties" arc fi1lly respect-
seen in literature as being backed by dut ics of humanity that do not pre-
ed only where provisions arc made regarding their sufficient protection and
and duties to aid the deprived (Iy()o, 52). Consequently, the allocation of
community, as a wholcY'
rhcsc duties is a cmtral task in any attempt: to realize hunnn rights. And with
respect to the second and the third type, at least, a moral division of labor is
required (Shue 1988; Goodin 1988).
i\lthough ult imatcly only individuals c1n bear moral duties, they sometimes need
to
With the last remarks about duties we have stressed the importance of insti-
portant roks in any approach of human rights. They improve the effective-
ttuions; hence our b<1sic norm that any human is entitled to access to institu-
ness of human rights actions, they spccif)r each actor's dmics (O'Neill JC)96,
tions that protect thcif basic rights. But it is equally important to emphasize
~-
' 111111
.,
JfLnli
11
1
, .,
that institutions must guarantee secure, inclusive, and nondiscriminatory access to basic goods in forms rmrl by mcrrm that arc themselves compatible with
human rights standards. That allows us to relate the other three components
of good governance, as outlined earlier, to that of hum;m rights. Although
human rights arc the core of our normative approach, they internally refer to
the mlc of law, to responsiveness, and to public participation.
~t.llc
!+
hlj'IB
1n~~
li
.Jf1
tJ,j
IJii
actions. For both reasons, they must meet certain standards such as publicity,
generality, the exclusion of ex post facto laws, due process, independence of
the judiciary, and equality before tJ1e law. 27 To be sure, not any system that replaces rhc rule of people by those of law automatically shows proper respect
for, and is ultimately based on, human rights. But no system of human rights
would he feasible in a situation of violent chaos or of sheer arbitrariness in
the usc of power. In short, conl]dencc based on legal rules is a necessary, yet
insuflicient, condition f(x realizing human rights.
On the same line of argument, we can introduce the component of responsiveness. Public cmthoritics must be willing to fult111 the pt1rposc they
-crc confCrred for, and the presumed beneficiaries must be able to control
11
215
human rights. Given tJ1c moral principle of equal respect and concern, it is
always problema! ic that some persons should concentrate much more power
th<Ul tJ1c rest of a population. I laving a right to participate as a fl-ee and equal
person is an expression of the basic moral principle whcnevcr structures of
governance distribut-e powers t1ncqu.1! ~as almost any Structure of governance docs (Christiano 1996 ).
~{the
first sight, nothing seems Lo prevent us flom an aflirmativc answer. The basic
norm or ensuring access to institutions necessary for realizing basic human
rights only serves as a minimalist standard of justice that docs not conceptually presuppose strong, or even any sort oC st~tchood. The same is true with
regard to rule of law, responsiveness, and participation. The rule of law is
conceivable without a monopoly of rightful violence and a jurisdicriou based
on territory; responsiveness is cOJJCciv;Jh!c without a government; p.1rticip<ltion is concei\'ahlc without a demos (it might be a totality or stakeholders,
functionally dciinecl, instead). Although some sufficiently strong coustitutional governments do embody the stamLnds of goud governance paradigmatically, in and by themselves the st:,UJdards JIT form;:d and Jlcxible enough
to become transferred to more troubled conditions as well. In any sin1ation,
tl1e rights-based approach lends support to those structures of institutions
that arc best suited to fl_I!fillthc basic norm in l(Jrms and by means that arc
themselves compatible with human rights norms.
In this respect it is important(() note that the rule or law, responsiveness,
and participation arc principles demanding that we do the best we c1n to
make their fi_ill application possible. J\ principle is nut abolished by the bcr
those wwlding power respect and realize human rights. Consider Amartya
Sen's r;1mous claim th<lt democratic governance is the most cfJ(:ctive means
to prevent f:lmincs. According to .Sen, bmines arc almost always partly a con
sequence of political mismanagement and democratic accountability tends
that it is not <llways possible to act in direct accordance with it. This giYes
suflicicnt room for consequcntialist cJlculal"ions that arc especially important
where the conditions of governance arc E1r fiom optimal. ln order to weight
costs :llld benefits in a nonarbitrary way the ldlowing rule might be helpful:
Ill
' '
216
217
the higher the costs of realizing basic human rights in terms of any of the
that divide public and private spheres must be suHicicntly clear to determine
other components of good governance, the greater the gain in terms of basic
tl1C roles different actors might play with regard to structures of govermuKe.
The collectivity must not be the people of a state, and the authority must
human rights must he to justify such a policy. To give one example, passing
over demands for participation might be required as long as there is strong
evidence that a majority would 1:or respect hw11an rights standards toward
a minority. In contrast, if two policies arc feasible that meet human rights
standards equally, but one is much less costly in terms of anotl1er compo-
arc necessary conditions for realizing basic human rights, we might even
the first sort of problems "lack of vertical legitimacy" and the second "lack of
horizontal legitimacy" (1996, chap. 5). \Vherc the latter is lacking, communicative power in Hannah Arendt's sense-understood as the capacity to joint
action, built on agreement by discourse- is absent or at least very weak. And
be justilled in weighting the other way J.rou11d, too: the greater the loss in
terms of basic human rights, the greater the gain in terms of any of the other
without communicative power no public can hold the autl10rities responsible. liVhere vertical legitimacy is Jacking, the public misses the opposite of
components must be
a jointly accepted institutional structure with clearly defined roles fix achiev-
to
easy for governJ.ncc actors to conceal bad performance and to shift responsi-
Yet, even under extreme conditions, some human rights violations, for ex-
our basic norm: to guarantee th<H each individual has access to imtitutions
that protect their basic fights. Tb repeat, that norm docs not call for a spe-
Metaproblems ~f Ll{_qitimacy
be filled, and filling it means solving the meta problems of legitimacy. Most
basically this requires establishing and securing a societal order as such. In
Up to this point, we might have the impression that the problem of defining
standards of good governance for fragile states is only a matter of application: we must define the norms rather abstractly in order to be able to adapt
them in such a way that they make assessments of policies under non ideal
conditions intelligible. One fundamental difference between suflicicntly consolidated states and fragile states, however, should not be overlooked. In the
latter cases, we arc often confronted with meta problems of legitimacy that
these mctaproblcms. This is partly so because any concrete answer will most-
arc already solved in stable states. Our components of good governance al-
ready presuppose two things: the existence of a collcctivit:y f(Jr which binding
decisions can be made; and the existence of a political authority that has the
ultimate responsibility for such decisions. In this second respect, the borders
govcrn~mcc
actor on the
21X
second level should try his or her best to establish or strengthen those struc-
tures of institutions and those collectivities which most likely will satisfy all
SUBSIDIARY RESPONSIBILITY
219
f(lllr criteria of good governance. VVhcnever alternatives arc feasible, and accessible without prohibitive transaction costs, he or she should choose the
one that most likely will bring the best benefit instead of being satisfled with
a solmion that is clearly suboptimal (Keob;mc 2007). And any actor should
do so in forms and by means that do themselves express commitment to the
standards in terms of which they justify their engagement.
This bner requirement is a matter of integrity: acting in accordance with
unc's sdf~proclaimed procedures ami major goals. It is highly likely that an
actor will not foster compliance to norms by others if he or she manifestly
.md unnecessarily deviates from them. The decline of the United States' replltation as a consequence of its violations of human rights and international
task of governance, yet on a higher level. At that level, the demand for
has gained recognition in the past two decades. It flows from the fact tlut
sovereignty is not absolute, but qu;tlitiecl by obligations to protect human
rights, and hom the EKt that human rights, as obligations fl;[Jn onmcs, arc
considered the object of imernational concern. The international community uses international organizations, particularly the U.N., to prevent .md
counter human rights violations. In this context, it is significant that the
Security Council took binding actions under chapter 7 of the UN. Charter
in cases of massive human rights violations, even those that did not have
repercussions on neighboring states,'- 8 and in cases where a democratically
elected goYcrnmcnt was ousted by a military coup d'ctat 2
1n doing sn,
th~
legitimacy appears again. In the last instance, humanity as such has a stal<.e
interpretation. Jo
cosmopolir:misrn.
The f(JJTgoing analysis from the perspective of political morality has shown
that a uniquely state-based approach is unable to cope with the problem of
gmnmnce in and by fiagilc states. Public international bw, too, must take
this finding into account. As will be shown, there :tre ways to do so within
the nisting normative structures, ahhough the ~tate is, and remains, the central actor for the international legal system and hence the primary duty bearer
of intcrnatioual legal standards for good governance. For this purpose, we
will now look at the three aspects just developed liom the point uf view of
public international law: the contents and bearers of a subsidiary responsibility, the standards applicable to the fullillmcllt or the responsibility, and the
purpose of international engagement.
220
221
Before it, d1e proponents of such a right, mainly fi:om the United States,
munity to act, but docs not oblige it-there is no duty to protect. Thus, there
invoked a right of d1e state to save its own nationals abroad that d1ey con-
is a discrepancy between the moral duty to help and international law as long
the qncstion arises whether inclividual states or even nonstate actors such
a~
favor of another state's population was twofold: first, it was argued that the
the international community. Individual states may act because human rights
prohibition of the usc of f(Jrcc had to be harmonized with the other central
constitute obligations c1;grt omncs. Yet, the sovereignty of the targeted state
pillar of the U.N. system, the protection ofhm11an rigbts (Cassese 1999, 793).
genocide or "ethnic cleansing" (e.g., Doehring 2004, 44-8). Yet this approach
to
met with considerable and consistent opposition fi01n numerous states, such
can merely warn another state against impending human rights violations.
as Russia, China, and many developing states, and subscgucntly was not
This action does not violate the prohibition of intervention because the warn-
ing state has a legally recognized interest in the respect of human rights as
hmvcvcr, such as support for capacity building, presuppose the consent of the
targeted state, if the Security Council did not authorize them. Arguably, under
article 2.1 of the ICES CR., states arc obliged to accept international assistance if
The same conclusion holds true a fortiori for nonstatc actors, such as busi-
they Jack sut1icient means to realize economic, social, and cultural rights. It is,
ness enterprises or NGOs: if international law docs not permit states to act
however, still disputed whether states arc obliged to provide such assistanceY
on their own volition in the place of the international community if the Se-
As a protective measure, that is, when serious human rights violations arc
curity Council is paralyzed, it is only logical that it docs not empower non-
state actors to do so. These actors arc subjects of international law only with
the form of a call for cessation.l 3 Although basic human rights arc norms
respect to a specific rule that binds or cnt"itlcs them, and such rule concerning
n;ga 01/lllCS, individual states may not take any other tmilatcraJ nonforcible
is nowhere in sight.
l!SC
tor state is at 1J1e basis of the debate about the legality of unilateral, that is,
unauthorized, humanitarian interventions: it can be seen as an attempt to
By its standards f(Jr good governance within states, public international law
sets the f!-amcwork also t(Jr the way in which the international community
fulfills its subsidiary responsibility. These standards bind all subjects of this
legal order, including the U.N., if" they constitute customary international
fit
,_
~'
-,'~,,,
,I
.I
rtt.:,
::
t~1 r .:
122
law. l~or governance standards arising out of human rights treaties, in par-
by human rights under customary and treaty l<1w if they exercise governance
ticular those in connection with the fulfillment of social and economic rights,
functions imtcad of the st::lle. This result follows from the idea that human
rights stay with the people on a given territory, and flom the principle of
First, human rights treaty obligations belong to the people living in a given
territory, and stay there even in case of change of government or clismcmbcrmcnt oft:J1e state.'s Consequently, if governance functions arc carried our not
under this rule, the conduct of a person is attributed to a state "if the per-
by the state but by t:l1e U.N., tl1c latter arc bound by the human rights treaties
,
1
in {(xcc for t:l1at territory. This consequence has been suggested for insurgent
call for the exercise of those clements of authority." If, by law and irrespective
concept to any ot:l1er actor, be it another state that is not a successor state, an
of the state's will, a private act is attributed to it, the state bas
,1
legal interest
in t:l1at its international legal obligations arc respected by the private actor.
necessity (m;_qotior11111JJCslio), which applies when one actor (the "agent") acts
in the piace of another (the "principal") who is unable to take a required ac-
tion. In this sitmtion, the agent is under the duty to respect the obligations
binding upon the principal (Blihring and Htifken 2008). This concept GUJ be
found in aU legal systems of tl1c world, and serves as a basis for a claim of the
a2:cnt against the principal for reimbursement of his or her costs incurred in
c~,JTying out the action (Herdcgm 1989, 313-16). Such a claim presupposes
the -age~ 1 t's respect for the principal's interests when performing tl1c action,
bccu:se otherwise the agent would force an unwanted result- upon the prin-
\'ancc of his or her legal obligations as these restrict the principal's. choice of
geared toward the creation of conditions in which the state can live up to
actions were he or she to act. Logically, the concept of agency of necessity can
general principle of law in the sense of article 38.1.c of the ICJ-Statutc, which
structures arc at least equally dkctivc for the protection of human rights,
international law, it binds all subjects of that legal order, states and interna-
equally respect-ful of the rule of law, equally responsive, and equally open to
public participation.
Conclusions
rights. These requirements encompass h<1.sic human rights, the rule of Jaw,
have failed so far." Nevertheless, nons tate anors must he considered obliged
22 4-
':.
'
2 21
functions. Public international law does not contain special (lowered) standards of good governance for fragile states; it merely allows, in case of cn1ergcncy, temporary nonperformance of human rights. Yet it excludes tllis pos-
provide bad incentives, for example for corruption or flight of capital, which
most likely will weaken political authorities that are b:lsicaJJy legitimate.
permits taking into account the particular problems of fragile states. At the
same time, however, it obliges them to seek international help if they are unable to fulfill the Hobbesian minimw11. These findings arc corroborated by
considerations of political morality according to which states are only means
to fully realize hum;m rights, and arc as such replaceable in principle if ot11er
actors arc better suited to do that duty.
From both perspectives, that of public international law and that of political morality, the interrelationship of human rights and institutional stmc-
militaty interventions alone. Moreover, internationJJ law must develop approaches to ensuring the respect of leg;ll standards for good governance by
nons tate actors. Solutions will only be effective if they take into account the
different motivations and aspirations of d1e various types of nonstate actors,
although in principle, morally justif-ied cosmopolitan duties regarding basic
rnres turns out to be crucial. VVe have argued that solving the metaproblcms
human rights are binding to each actor, of whatever type, who is capable to
talcc part in improving the situation. Nevertheless, both !i:)r political morality
and for public international Jaw, the (consolidated) state will retain its central
and in the aspirations of peoples that up to now lack a political order they
can rightfully regard as their own.
NOTES
1.
e.g., Alston 2007; Bothe, O'Connell, and Ronzitti 2005; !(jngsbury 1998; Krasner
States in Eastern Europe and in rhe Soviet Union" of 1"11e EC Council of Foreign
Thus, insurgent movements as well as warlords, NGOs, or business corporations arc constrained by international law. Consolidated statehood remains
For a detailed ;1llalysis of the "rights-based approach to development" sec, e.g., Hamm
the model, and may be replaced only by such structures that are at least
2.
CL, e.g., the "Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of the New
to
Develop-
ment, December+, 1986, t\;RES/+1/128. Despite the ongoing debate :1hout the right
to development, this intcnnl dimension is not comestcd; the debate concerns the
Oil
Dcclarat ion and Programme of Action, 1\;CON F.157/23, Ju!y 12, 1993, par. 5.
.~
International
Cf !C), Case of Military and l'anmiJitary Activities 111 and against Nicaragua
(>.
. Sec, e.g., Human Rights Committee, (;cncr,ll C:ornm~nt No. 29, i\rticlc 4-: Dcr-
!Rij\3EN/J/RCY.7
1cs," I
"'-
Among .St.Jtcs in :\ccordancc ll"ith the Charter oft-he LTnired N,1tion~' U.l\'. Gmu.li
21.
,1
(zoo+. X.H\1,) .
This docs ll<>t mcu1 that ,1J1\'0J1c 1s ent1tled t<l an equal amount <1!" at!)' good
J,J-.
of some tnor;d rcJc,ancc. Bttl each jusuJiurion giwn f"(>r ;111 unequal di.striburiun of
<ill)'
<!.
i\sscmblr Res. z<\2.5 (25), October 2-e, 19:o ("Friendly Relations Dedar;1tion").
Lc~al
c"<l!llJilled in the rights gtwrallleed. CC, e.g., the jlCi"llliSsibfc limitations of the free
rnorallv relevant good Jllti.st he nm11utihlc with the equal mor.d ll"<>rth of ail
humans. Clc,tr c.1scs of violation< ,f this requiiC!llcnt ;11T r;1cist or sexist ju.stilicatiom
for unequal access to lirndametlt"allibntics, to public panicip.uion, w edur:1rion .md
basic health care, or to the opportunity strucwres of labor markets. We call antmcqu;ll
treatment "discriminatorv" if it o.press<'S disrcspecr fC>r rhc equal moral \\"llrth of ,my
person irrespective of gender, r.Ke, religiun, scxtul t>ricnt.llion, etc.
25. Martha Nussbaum (2006, :>.R+-81) emphasizes this rdation with rcg.1rd to her
capabilities approach that she t,\kcs ro be a specie's of the human rights appro.Hh.
health.'").
It. !CESCK Committee. Gcncr.ll Commcnt Nu. l (The n.Jtun:
or states parties'
l1bligat iom, <Jrticlc z, par. r, of rhe Covcnmt) (!<JYO ), par. 9. Reprinted in "Compii.J-
J\t tJJC same time, the capabilities appr<l<lch can be seen .1s one --but nor the onlypossible intcrpret<llion
2h. Even .lUI"ilOrS who deny th,tt there is a global scope of di.strihutive JUsrice de'
accept such a glob.1l scope with 1cg.mlto basic human righrs (sec Nagel
20<1)).
J<J,
ol>l
11
:>.DO+, +I<J
(,o).
28. SC Res. '"'33 (19y2) (Somalia), awl SC Res. VIR (t<J9+) (Rw;Juda).
SC Rr.J- (1993) (Haiti, still ll"ith rckrcncc to rrambmrml:1ry clkcts [rdilt"-ec,j);
29.
1'11". :..
11 ,_ C:c 1mm'n I /um. Rts Res. zoos/(JS,Aprill<>,
111
2005
the prnmorion and protection of hum.111 1ights"), par. 1 (adopted without a vote).
2ooc>,
p;1r. 25 and
2 o.
2005
1,
.Jill!
2008,
arc
in
.1
"I i [r i:;
p~1rticubrly
incumbent upnn
General Comnte11tS:' p.1r. I.J). It thm cv;ldc.s langu.1gc rh;Jt suggests an oblig;ltion. !'<!I
a positio11 in J.wor of" such tr.llt.sn;Jtion.11 hu111.111 rights <Jbligauon.s,
21
tice ,llld non-discrimination as csse1Jtial Ji>umbtions of dclllonacy"), April 1<!,
missiun on lntcri'C!ltion
2001.
Gibney
seT
Skogly :u1d
(2002")
n. /\rtick
lln:cm her u_,
~K.
2
>O 1.
ll. Sec lntcrn,\1 io11.il L1w (:om mission (ILC), I lr.11i Articles on St.Itc lZcspo!l.sibilily ll'ith ComtllCill;Jrtcs, J\/y>/1<> <llld C:ott. 1 (2''"1), cotntncnt.ll"V 011 ;Jtlic!c H,
p.ll".IJ.
IN,
'&El
lnrcmational Legal ,md J\lural S1andards
35
22y
Eidc, Ashjorn. 1yR9. "Realization of Social and Economic Rights ;md the Jvlinimum
Threshold Approach." 1-htmml R{!Jht.r Lmv ]ozmu1J 10:35-51.
Feinberg, )uel. 1980. "The Nature <Uld Value of Rights.'' In Rig!Jt.r, Justice, mzri t!Jc
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-
right or duty of non state actors tu help a state discharge its good governance obliga-
Forst, Rainer. IY99. "The Basic Right to )usti!ication: 't<Jwards a Constnrcti\ist Conception oCl-lum<tn Rights." CollJtcllntiollJ 6:35-60.
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Gert, Bernard. 1998. 1Homlity: lt.r Nrzturc and ]u.rtijimtion. New York: Oxford Uni-
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1
the U.N. Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E;CN.+/Sulu/2003/12/Rev.2, and their rejection by the Commission 011
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I-Iamm, Brigitte I. 2001. "A Human Rights Approach to Development." Jlmmm
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