Rosales v Rosales

FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their
two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving
behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato,
Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand,
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the
deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING:
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right,
and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate
heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers
to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.

Dizon- Rivera v Dizon

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1
legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory
heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which included real and
personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceaseds estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her testamentary disposition where
she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based
on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or
properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash/properties to
complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas
were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide
that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed. The court cited that if the
proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation
of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In
Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's
words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an
early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus,
the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the
decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness
and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with
law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property
in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated
and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete their
legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in
her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as
approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they
would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they
would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other
half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her
whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear
intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions
were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the entire estate was made
by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of their
legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they
can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
OTHERS:
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by the contending
parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where
the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used
the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an
attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific

properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a
distribution in the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is
that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who
are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the
will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each
property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus
imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of
Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
FACTS:
1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of
the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1
2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute
regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The
private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing
Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation
was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate
any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or
if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner. The donation did not impair the legitimes of the two
adopted daughters and such donation was imputed to the free portion of Candelarias estate. The CA reversed the
decision holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1962. It
ordered the collation and the equal division of the net estate of the decedent, including the donated property between
Buhay and Rosalinda.
4. The deed of donation stated:
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim
ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat
ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako
rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay
kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi
sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay
Libre Disposicion.
ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate
HELD: No express prohibition to collate.
1. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and equivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Art. 1962. Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of
Art. 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the
free portion of the decedents estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious.
2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required
under Art. 1061. We surmise that We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should
not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared
by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is
reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Locsin v CA
Facts:

Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina Jaucian Locsin, as the sole
and universal heir of all his properties. The spouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of
them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his
"Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."
Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated
in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied
on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his
voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by
sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces.
She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his
Locsin nephews and nieces:
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she had made a will affirming and
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the
reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the
properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still
alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.
In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary
shares from her estate, filed action in the RTC-Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins
during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to
circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA affirmed the said
decion,hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death.
Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession."
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs.
Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents
since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there
were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime . All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject
only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in
full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced on petition of any person affected.
Petition for review is granted.

Milagros Manongsong v. FelomenaJumaquio Estimo

G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003
FACTS:

Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of
the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was
actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale dated October 11,
1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and
award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance
made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character and that
AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate
under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs,
and, therefore it has no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the property by Justina.
RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied
in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos
by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When
the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,
that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for
P250.00.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab initio was not based on evidence,
but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired
the Property during her marriage.

Spouses Joaquin v. CA
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Doctrine: The legitime of a compulsory heir is merely inchoate and vests only upon the death of the parents. While
still alive, the parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of
creditors.
Facts:

Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and
Natividad, as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant
parents in favour of their co-defendant children.

The plaintiff children are claiming that no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale were made and that
the purported sale was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs of their legitime.
Issue: Were the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children valid? Yes.
Ruling:

The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only
upon the parents death. While still alive, parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided such
dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.

Compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only
from the moment of death of the decedent.

There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. In determining the legitime, the value
of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered.

The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs cannot
claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.

The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all
executed for valuable consideration.
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.

Arellano vs. Pascual Digest

G.R. No. 189776: December 15, 2010
FACTS:
Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia who is represented by her daughters Agnes and
Nona, and respondents Francisco and Miguel.
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration, , respondents alleged that a parcel of land (donated
property) located in Makati, , transferred by the decedent to petitioner, "may be considered as an advancelegitime" of petitioner.
The probate court provisionally passed upon the validity of the donation then further held that the land in contention is subject to collation following
Art. 1061 of the New Civil Code. On appeal, the CA sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.
II. Whether or not the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; COLLATION
First Issue; Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion.
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator
to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during
his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion,
after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who
are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all
his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed
as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is
not subject to collation.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; DETERMINATION OF ESTATE
Second Issue; The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and
respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 1003 & 1004).
CA Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to Amelia, to the estate of the deceased is SET ASIDE and the records of the cases is
REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.