Professional Documents
Culture Documents
4:
1. Auto
Bus
Transport
System
Inc.
v.
Bautista
[May
16,
2005]
2. Jose
Sangco,
et.
al.
v.
NLRC,
et.
al
[Mar
23,
1990]
3. Douglas
Millares
and
Rogelio
Lagda
v.
NLRC
[Jul
29,
2002]
4. SLL
International
Cables
Specialist
v.
NLRC
[Mar
2,
2011]
5. American
Wire
&
Cable
Co
Daily
Rate
EU
v.
American
Wire
&
Cable
Co
[Apr
29,
2005]
6. TSPIC
Co.
v.
TSPIC
EU
[
Feb
13,
2008]
7. Lepanto
Ceramics,
Inc.
v.
Lepanto
Ceramics
Employees
Assoc
[Mar
2,
2010]
8. Eastern
Telecommunications
Phils
Inc.
v.
Eastern
Telecom
EU
[Feb.
8,
2012]
[G.R.
No.
156367.
May
16,
2005.]
AUTO
BUS
TRANSPORT
SYSTEMS,
INC.,
vs.
ANTONIO
BAUTISTA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J
p
Facts:
Antonio
Bautista
has
been
employed
by
petitioner
Auto
Bus
Transport
Systems,
Inc.
(Autobus),
as
driver-conductor
paid
on
commission
basis,
seven
percent
(7%)
of
the
total
gross
income
per
travel,
on
a
twice
a
month
basis.
On
03
January
2000,
while
respondent
was
driving
Autobus
No.
114
along
Sta.
Fe,
Nueva
Vizcaya,
the
bus
he
was
driving
accidentally
bumped
the
rear
portion
of
Autobus
No.
124,
as
the
latter
vehicle
suddenly
stopped
at
a
sharp
curve
without
giving
any
warning.
Respondent
averred
that
the
accident
happened
because
he
was
compelled
by
the
management
to
go
back
to
Roxas,
Isabela,
although
he
had
not
slept
for
almost
twenty-four
(24)
hours,
as
he
had
just
arrived
in
Manila
from
Roxas,
Isabela.
Respondent
further
alleged
that
he
was
not
allowed
to
work
until
he
fully
paid
the
amount
of
P75,551.50,
representing
thirty
percent
(30%)
of
the
cost
of
repair
of
the
damaged
buses
and
that
despite
respondent's
pleas
for
reconsideration,
the
same
was
ignored
by
management.
After
a
month,
management
sent
him
a
letter
of
termination.
Thus,
on
02
February
2000,
respondent
instituted
a
Complaint
for
Illegal
Dismissal
with
Money
Claims
for
nonpayment
of
13th
month
pay
and
service
incentive
leave
pay
against
Autobus.
Petitioner,
on
the
other
hand,
maintained
that
respondent's
employment
was
replete
with
offenses
involving
reckless
imprudence,
gross
negligence,
and
dishonesty.
To
support
its
claim,
petitioner
presented
copies
of
letters,
memos,
irregularity
reports,
and
warrants
of
arrest
pertaining
to
several
incidents
wherein
respondent
was
involved.
aEHIDT
Furthermore,
petitioner
avers
that
in
the
exercise
of
its
management
prerogative,
respondent's
employment
was
terminated
only
after
the
latter
was
provided
with
an
opportunity
to
explain
his
side
regarding
the
accident
on
03
January
2000.
Labor
Arbiter
Monroe
C.
Tabingan:
DISMISSED
Complaint
for
Illegal
Dismissal
but
ordered
Autobus
to
pay
13th
month
pay
and
SIL
NLRC:
MODIFIED
by
deleting
the
award
of
13th
month
pay.
The
other
findings
are
AFFIRMED
Issue:
W/N
RESPONDENT
IS
ENTITLED
TO
SIL
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
Generally,
Service
Incentive
Leave
shall
not
apply
to
employees
classified
as
"field
personnel."
The
phrase
"other
employees
whose
performance
is
unsupervised
by
the
employer"
must
not
be
understood
as
a
separate
classification
of
employees
to
which
service
incentive
leave
shall
not
be
granted.
Rather,
it
serves
as
an
amplification
of
the
interpretation
of
the
definition
of
field
personnel
under
the
Labor
Code
as
those
"whose
actual
When
the
matter
was
elevated
to
the
CA
on
a
petition
for
certiorari,
it
affirmed
the
findings
that
the
private
respondents
were
regular
employees.
It
considered
the
fact
that
they
performed
functions
which
were
the
regular
and
usual
business
of
petitioners.
According
to
the
CA,
they
were
clearly
members
of
a
work
pool
from
which
petitioners
drew
their
project
employees.
The
CA
also
stated
that
the
failure
of
petitioners
to
comply
with
the
simple
but
compulsory
requirement
to
submit
a
report
of
termination
to
the
nearest
Public
Employment
Office
every
time
private
respondents'
employment
was
terminated
was
proof
that
the
latter
were
not
project
employees
but
regular
employees.
The
CA
likewise
found
that
the
private
respondents
were
underpaid.
It
ruled
that
the
board
and
lodging,
electricity,
water,
and
food
enjoyed
by
the
private
respondents
could
not
be
included
in
the
computation
of
their
wages
because
these
were
given
without
their
written
consent.
The
CA
added
that
the
private
respondents
were
entitled
to
13th
month
pay.
ISSUE:
W/N
RESPONDENTS
ARE
REGULAR
EMPLOYEES;
W/N
ENTITLED
TO
MINIMUM
WAGE;
W/N
EMPLOYEES
WERE
UNDERPAID
HELD:
YES
RESPONDENTS
ARE
ENTITLED
TO
MINIMUM
WAGE
AND
WERE
UNPAID.
RATIO:
Private
respondents,
on
the
other
hand,
are
entitled
to
be
paid
the
minimum
wage,
whether
they
are
regular
or
non-regular
employees.
Section
3,
Rule
VII
of
the
Rules
to
Implement
the
Labor
Code
specifically
enumerates
those
who
are
not
covered
by
the
payment
of
minimum
wage.
Project
employees
are
not
among
them.
Section
1
of
DOLE
Memorandum
Circular
No.
2
provides
that
an
employer
may
provide
subsidized
meals
and
snacks
to
his
employees
provided
that
the
subsidy
shall
not
be
less
that
30%
of
the
fair
and
reasonable
value
of
such
facilities.
In
such
cases,
the
employer
may
deduct
from
the
wages
of
the
employees
not
more
than
70%
of
the
value
of
the
meals
and
snacks
enjoyed
by
the
latter,
provided
that
such
deduction
is
with
the
written
authorization
of
the
employees
concerned.
Moreover,
before
the
value
of
facilities
can
be
deducted
from
the
employees'
wages,
the
following
requisites
must
all
be
attendant:
first,
proof
must
be
shown
that
such
facilities
are
customarily
furnished
by
the
trade;
second,
the
provision
of
deductible
facilities
must
be
voluntarily
accepted
in
writing
by
the
employee;
and
finally,
facilities
must
be
charged
at
reasonable
value.
Mere
availment
is
not
sufficient
to
allow
deductions
from
employees'
wages.
These
requirements,
however,
have
not
been
met
in
this
case.
SLL
failed
to
present
any
company
policy
or
guideline
showing
that
provisions
for
meals
and
lodging
were
part
of
the
employee's
salaries.
It
also
failed
to
provide
proof
of
the
employees'
written
authorization,
much
less
show
how
they
arrived
at
their
valuations.
At
any
rate,
it
is
not
even
clear
whether
private
respondents
actually
enjoyed
said
facilities.
The
Court
makes
a
distinction
between
"facilities"
and
"supplements."
It
is
of
the
view
that
the
food
and
lodging,
or
the
electricity
and
water
allegedly
consumed
by
private
respondents
in
this
case
were
not
facilities
but
supplements.
"Supplements,"
therefore,
constitute
extra
remuneration
or
special
privileges
or
benefits
given
to
or
received
by
the
laborers
over
and
above
their
ordinary
earnings
or
wages.
"Facilities,"
on
the
other
hand,
are
items
of
expense
necessary
for
the
laborer's
and
his
family's
existence
and
subsistence
so
that
by
express
provision
of
law
(Sec.
2[g]),
they
form
part
of
the
wage
and
when
furnished
by
the
employer
are
deductible
therefrom,
since
if
they
are
not
so
furnished,
the
laborer
would
spend
and
pay
for
them
just
the
same.
In
short,
the
benefit
or
privilege
given
to
the
employee
which
constitutes
an
extra
remuneration
above
and
over
his
basic
or
ordinary
earning
or
wage
is
supplement;
and
when
said
benefit
or
privilege
is
part
of
the
laborers'
basic
wages,
it
is
a
facility.
The
distinction
lies
not
so
much
in
the
kind
of
benefit
or
item
(food,
lodging,
bonus
or
sick
leave)
given,
but
in
the
purpose
for
which
it
is
given.
In
the
case
at
bench,
the
items
provided
were
given
freely
by
SLL
for
the
purpose
of
maintaining
the
efficiency
and
health
of
its
workers
while
they
were
working
at
their
respective
projects.
RULING:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DENIED.
The
temporary
restraining
order
issued
by
the
Court
on
November
29,
2006
is
deemed,
as
it
is
hereby
ordered,
DISSOLVED
AKD|LABSTAN|DIGEST|2016|PAGE
6
HELD:
NO.
RATIO:According
to
TSPIC,
it
is
specifically
provided
in
the
CBA
that
"the
salary/wage
increase
for
the
year
2001
shall
be
deemed
inclusive
of
the
mandated
minimum
wage
increases
under
future
wage
orders
that
may
be
issued
after
Wage
Order
No.
7."
The
Union,
on
the
other
hand,
insists
that
the
"crediting"
provision
of
the
CBA
finds
no
application
in
the
present
case,
since
at
the
time
WO
No.
8
was
issued,
the
probationary
employees
(second
group)
were
not
yet
covered
by
the
CBA,
particularly
by
its
crediting
provision.
As
a
general
rule,
in
the
interpretation
of
a
contract,
the
intention
of
the
parties
is
to
be
pursued.
Littera
necat
spiritus
vivificat.
An
instrument
must
be
interpreted
according
to
the
intention
of
the
parties.
It
is
the
duty
of
the
courts
to
place
a
practical
and
realistic
construction
upon
it,
giving
due
consideration
to
the
context
in
which
it
is
negotiated
and
the
purpose
which
it
is
intended
to
serve.
Absurd
and
illogical
interpretations
should
also
be
avoided.
Considering
that
the
parties
have
unequivocally
agreed
to
substitute
the
benefits
granted
under
the
CBA
with
those
granted
under
wage
orders,
the
agreement
must
prevail
and
be
given
full
effect.
it
may
be
reasonably
concluded
that
TSPIC
granted
the
salary
increases
under
the
condition
that
any
wage
order
that
may
be
subsequently
issued
shall
be
credited
against
the
previously
granted
increase.
The
intention
of
the
parties
is
clear:
As
long
as
an
employee
is
qualified
to
receive
the
12%
increase
in
salary,
the
employee
shall
be
granted
the
increase;
and
as
long
as
an
employee
is
granted
the
12%
increase,
the
amount
shall
be
credited
against
any
wage
order
issued
after
WO
No.
7.
To
compute
for
the
increase
in
wage
rates
for
the
year
2001,
get
the
increase
of
12%
of
the
employees'
salaries
as
of
December
31,
2000;
then
subtract
from
that
amount,
the
amount
increased
in
salaries
as
granted
under
WO
No.
8
in
accordance
with
the
crediting
provision
of
the
CBA,
to
arrive
at
the
increase
in
salaries
for
the
year
2001
of
the
recently
regularized
employees.
Add
the
result
to
their
salaries
as
of
December
31,
2000
to
get
the
proper
salary
beginning
January
1,
2001.
With
these
computations,
the
crediting
provision
of
the
CBA
is
put
in
effect,
and
the
wage
distortion
between
the
first
and
second
group
of
employees
is
cured.
TSPIC
also
maintains
that
charging
the
overpayments
made
to
the
16
respondents
through
staggered
deductions
from
their
salaries
does
not
constitute
diminution
of
benefits.
We
agree
with
TSPIC.
Diminution
of
benefits
is
the
unilateral
withdrawal
by
the
employer
of
benefits
already
enjoyed
by
the
employees.
There
is
diminution
of
benefits
when
it
is
shown
that:
(1)
the
grant
or
benefit
is
founded
on
a
policy
or
has
ripened
into
a
practice
over
a
long
period;
(2)
the
practice
is
consistent
and
deliberate;
(3)
the
practice
is
not
due
to
error
in
the
construction
or
application
of
a
doubtful
or
difficult
question
of
law;
and
(4)
the
diminution
or
discontinuance
is
done
unilaterally
by
the
employer.
As
correctly
pointed
out
by
TSPIC,
the
overpayment
of
its
employees
was
a
result
of
an
error.
This
error
was
immediately
rectified
by
TSPIC
upon
its
discovery.
We
have
ruled
before
that
an
erroneously
granted
benefit
may
be
withdrawn
without
violating
the
prohibition
against
non-diminution
of
benefits.
Hence,
any
amount
given
to
the
employees
in
excess
of
what
they
were
entitled
to,
as
computed
above,
may
be
legally
deducted
by
TSPIC
from
the
employees'
salaries.
TSPIC,
in
turn,
must
refund
to
individual
respondents
any
amount
deducted
from
their
salaries
which
was
in
excess
of
what
TSPIC
is
legally
allowed
to
deduct
from
the
salaries
based
on
the
computations
discussed
in
this
Decision.
RULING:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
September
13,
2001
Decision
of
the
Labor
Arbitrator
in
National
Conciliation
and
Mediation
Board
Case
No.
JBJ-AVA-2001-07-57
and
the
October
22,
2003
CA
Decision
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
68616
are
hereby
AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION.
TSPIC
is
hereby
ORDERED
to
pay
respondents
their
salary
increases
in
accordance
with
this
Decision.
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