ELVIRA AGULLO, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Charged with, tried and convicted in Criminal Case No. 13579 for malversation of public funds,
herein petitioner Elvira Agullo, erstwhile Disbursing Officer of the then Ministry of Public Works and
Highways (MPWH), Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, now comes before the High
Court to assail the Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 16 March 1992, and its
Resolution dated 11 March 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration but reducing the
penalty imposed on petitioner.
As borne by the records, the charge of malversation against petitioner germinated from an audit
conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a
P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioners accountability. On the same date, Gerez
informed petitioner of said finding of cash shortage and required the latter, through a letter of
demand to "produce immediately the missing funds." Further, petitioner was required to submit
within 72 hours from receipt a written explanation of the cash shortage.
At the witness stand, petitioner Agullo unrelentingly maintained her innocence and vehemently
denied the accusation against her. Petitioner explained her side and she said that on October 20,
1985 she received in her office 13 checks in the form of cash advances in her name
totalling P26,076.87, which amount represented salaries of MPWH officials and employees. Later
that day, petitioner, together with driver of her office Benjamin Veridiano, went to Philippine National
Bank to encash the said checks. After leaving from the bank going back to the office, petitioner felt
dizziness, chest pain and nausea then requested the driver to drop her to her residence about half
kilometre from the bank. On the next day, petitioner, realizing that it was third-week payday of the
month, strove to report for work despite her weak physical condition. Petitioner Agullo testified that
she left her residence alone and brought with her the bag containing the money which she encashed
the previous day from the PNB. When she was walking along Juan Luna Street, he was stricken with
deep chest pain21 and experienced dizziness; her vision blurred and "the right part of (her) body
(became) heavy" to the point that she "could not move anymore." At this point, she collapsed and
lost consciousness. In the afternoon of the same day, she found herself in a hospital bed of St.
Pauls Hospital located about a block away from petitioners residence and confined in St. Pauls
Hospital for over a week from 22 October 1985 to 01 November 1985 - under the care of her
attending physician, Dr. Juan Abando, who issued the corresponding Medical Certificate which
diagnose her with Malignant hypertension.
Striking down the defense as "incredible and without basis," the Sandiganbayan rendered its
assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds,
ratiocinating principally that "no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government
funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner)."
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion and violated the presumption of
innocence doctrine of the accused as warranted in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Agullo in
committing the crime of Malversation of public funds. Records reveal that evidence for the
prosecution consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination, to prove the cash shortage in the
amount of P26,404.26 and the Letter of Demand signed by Auditing Examiner III Ignacio Gerez.
Aside from the aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted not to present a single witness to
buttress its bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie evidence of
conversion or presumption of malversation under Article 217.
On this matter, the Sandiganbayans conclusion that "there is no evidence to show that the accused
was then carrying the sum of P26,404.26 in her person when she allegedly collapsed at Juan Luna
Street, Tacloban City," is to say the least, without factual basis and not duly supported by evidence.
On the stark contrary, the records are extant, as petitioner Agullo, in fact, testified on the witness
stand that she had the money with her when she suffered a stroke and collapsed on the streets of
Tacloban City on 22 October 1985. Records likewise reveal that the amount of P327.39, which is the
difference between P26,404.26 and P26,076.87, represents the salary of Mr. Alcober, Jr.,
Administrative Officer of the DPWH in Candahug, who made a telephone call to petitioner for the
latter to bring the sum of P327.39, together with the payroll.
Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that
petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima
facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end,
petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds
was used for her own personal benefit or gain.
The decision of the Sandiganbayan was reversed by the Supreme Court and Petitioner was
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO BATO and ABRAHAM

BATO, accused,
Facts:
On May 9, 1988 at about three o'clock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father
Ernesto Flores, Sr., were going home from Barangay Tingib, Pastrana, Leyte to San Agustin, Jaro,
Leyte. While passing by Barangay Hibucawan, they were called by the two appellants, Abraham and
Sergio, both surnamed Bato, to join them in a drinking spree in the house of Paran Lescabo, which
Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2) meters away from his father while the latter
joined appellants for two hours drinking tuba. When his father was already drunk, appellants tied him
(father) with his hands placed at the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his father to somewhere
else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by
appellants (tsn, 6-18-90, pp. 3-10).
It was only the following morning that they found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River, five
kilometers away from the place where he last saw him in the previous afternoon. He immediately
reported the incident to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tingib. The latter informed the police
department about the incident. Many policemen responded and the dead body of his father was
brought to the Municipal Building of Pastrana, Leyte (tsn, 6-18-0, pp. 10-11).
At the Municipal Building of Pastrana, Leyte, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Virisimo Opiniano,
conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased Ernesto Flores, Sr. He found that the deceased
sustained five hacking and seven stab wounds. The cause of death is shock, secondary to a hacking
and almost decapitating wound (Exhibit "A" and "B").
The trial court ruled that the prosecution witness, Ernesto Jr., positively identified the accused who
invited him and his father for a drink. He witnessed how they tied the hands of Ernesto Sr. before
they took him away. That the police blotter failed to state the names of the assailants did not negate
appellant's participation in the slaying. Further, the entry was based on the information relayed not
by the witness himself but by the barangay chairman, who had not witnessed the incident.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court and further declared that the totality of the
prosecution evidence "constitute[d] more than sufficient incriminatory and inculpatory circumstances"
to reach the conclusion that the appellants killed the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented to the court prove the guilt of the accused.
Ruling: The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from
the sole testimony of the son of the deceased. True, in the absence of direct proof, a conviction may
be based on circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, it has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion, to the exclusion of any other, that the accused are guilty. The circumstances
proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt.
The witness established only the following circumstances surrounding the crime: (1) that the Bato
brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) that after two hours of drinking, said brothers
suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away; and (3) that the following day, the
body of the victim, which sustained several hack and stab wounds, was recovered at the Binaha-an
River, about five kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.
Ernesto Jr. admitted that there was no enmity or bad blood between his father and the accused. He
further asserted that there was no altercation during the drinking spree. Likewise, he made no
statement that the Bato brothers, at the time, earned any bladed weapon which could have been
used in his father's murder. Moreover, he did not see where the appellants brought his father after
they had tied his hands. More significantly, he failed to testify on how his father was killed, who,
killed him, or even when he was killed. There is absolutely no evidence of what transpired during
that interval. The prosecution, in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to surmise that the
accused must have killed the victim during such interregnum. But conjectures, surmises and
suspicions cannot take the place of evidence, particularly where as in this case contrary
suspicions, surmises queries can also be floated and believed.
Notwithstanding the presence of other persons who were nearby when the appellants tied the hands
of the victim, the prosecution failed to present any other witnesses to corroborate Ernesto Jr.'s
testimony. As it was, his testimony was grossly insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has
been held that circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.
HEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Abraham Bato is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RONALDO DE GUZMAN y DANZIL, Appellant.

Facts:
Before this Court is an appeal by Ronaldo de Guzman y Danzil, accused in Criminal Case No. V1118, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Villasis, Pangasinan. He was charged with Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. In a decision dated
December 5, 2006, the trial court found De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a Decision dated June 26,
2008.
On June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug pushing activities to Alcala,
Pangasinans Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr. Soriano immediately formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation. Once there, the confidential informant introduced appellant to Senior Police
Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-buyer. He handed two marked P100
bills to De Guzman, and the latter, in turn, gave him two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing what was suspected as shabu. Thereafter, Llanillo gave the prearranged signal to the rest
of the team. Appellant was arrested and frisked. The team recovered from De Guzman two packs of
empty transparent sachets, three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the
marked money paid by SPO1 Llanillo.
At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation were turned
over to the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo Yadao. He then placed his initials on the packets of
suspected shabu, which were later submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory in Urdaneta City.Confirmatory tests revealed that the substance in the packets that
appellant handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed shabu.
At the trial, appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that, on the morning of June 10,
2003, he was on the second floor of his house watching television when he was informed by his wife
that police officers were looking for him. He claimed that SPO1 Llanillo informed him about a report
that he (De Guzman) was repacking shabu, which he denied. Thereafter, the police officers frisked
him and took the P3,000.00 from his pocket. The police officers also searched the cabinet, where his
television was, and found a lighter. Then, he was handcuffed and brought to the police station.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, finding De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating R.A. No. 9165. De Guzman appealed his conviction to the CA, which affirmed the RTC
decision in toto.
Issue: Whether or not De Guzman is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court finds that there are lapses on the part of the police officers in conducting the
buy-bust operation specifically in the handling of narcotic evidences that was procured during the
said operation.
The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with the burden to overcome
such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that
the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. As shown on record, the prosecution
successfully established the first and third elements of the crime. However, there is a problem in the
prosecutions effort to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti.
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items
has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender
reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person charged
with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecutions whole case still falls. The evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, appellant RONALDO DE GUZMAN y DANZIL is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ELOY MAGSI ET AL., defendants, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO, defendant- appellant.
Facts:
This is a mandatory review of a death sentence.
That on or about the 14th day of January, 1968 in the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, namely
ELOY MAGSI, JUAN PONCE y BILLON alias JOHNNY, PERFECTO ARCE alias PEPING,
conspiring and confederating with their fellow accused GERARDO FLORES alias GERRY, OPRING
OLAZO DORO DOE and PETER DOE, the latter four being still at large, and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill and with treachery, while the said accused were armed with carbine pistols
and revolvers did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniusly enter the house where JESUS
GALLARDO and his family live and once inside the said house, attack, assault and shoot one
JESUS GALLARDO, inflicting upon the said offended party JESUS GALLARDO multiple gunshot
wounds on the different parts of his body which caused the instantaneous death of the said JESUS
GALLARDO.
That the following aggravating circumstances were attendant in the commission of the offense: (1)
abuse of superior strength; (2) use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense was committed in the dwelling
place of the offended party; and (4) that the offense was committed by a band.
Altogether, this case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August
1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for
the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted
to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next
hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the
court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de
officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for
the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On
the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera
was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del
Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of
fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused.
Accused's allegation of' duress prompted Atty. Rivera to move for the re- setting of the case for the
study and presentation of possible mitigating circumstances. The case was accordingly re-set for
September 14, 1970. On the fourth hearing date. the presentation of mitigating circumstances was
not held as scheduled, but de officiocounsel Atty. Cariaso's explanation regarding his close ties with
the deceased and his family was heard, and his motion to be relieved as counsel by reason thereof,
and be replaced by one who can attend to the defense of the accused with candor, was denied by
the court. however, per the note presented to the Court by Atty. Cariaso presumably from Atty.
Baterina, de parte counsel for the accused, the contents of which sought the re-setting of the case
for the first week of October, the case was again re-set for October 6, 1970. The Court motu proprio
changed accused's plea of guilty to not guilty. At the fifth hearing, Atty. Cariaso who appeared in
court only after a warrant for his arrest was issued, informed the Court that those interested in the
conviction of the accused opposed his appearance, as de officio counsel, and at the same time, also
turned over another note, the contents of which asked for another resetting. The Court denied the
motion of Atty. Cariaso to withdraw as counsel. but re-set the case for October 19, 1970.
Issue: Whether or not there are lapses in hearing of the case
Ruling:
WE, the Supreme Court, have consistently enjoined strict and substantial adherence to our rulings in
cases where defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma appointment of de
officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the
court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are
not sufficient compliance with our injunctions.
The conduct of the court a quo taken in the light of the foregoing decisions clearly established the
fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the herein accused, who was convicted on an improvident
plea of guilty.
WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT CONVICTING ACCUSED TEODORO DEL ROSARIO IS HEREBY
SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS HEREBY REMANDED TO THE COURT A QUO FOR
REARRANGEMENT AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, NO COSTS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO RIVERA, accused- appellant.

Facts:
This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, 10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the
decision,1 dated June 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding
accused-appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay the offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago, municipality of Lubao, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13
year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latters will and without her consent.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her younger sister, Zaira,4 was
taken by their parents to the Escolastica Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga.
Complainants mother stayed with her sister in the hospital, but her father, herein accused-appellant,
went back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 oclock in the evening of the same
day, complainant was awakened as accused-appellant started kissing her and fondling her breasts.
Complainant tried to resist by kicking and pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts were to no
avail. Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty, touched her private parts, and then had
sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her, accused-appellant told complainant not to
tell anyone what had happened or he would kill complainants mother and sister. Hence, when her
mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had happened because she was
afraid of accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant was found guilty by the trial court hence file an appeal to this Court
contending that the lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of the Accused-Appellant to
due process and right to counsel and the lower court failed to consider the evidence of the AccusedAppellant.
Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that he was denied the same
because: (a) the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera concerning
the latters sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial court denied
the motion made by accused-appellants counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-examination of Dr.
Barin, the examining physician, because of which the said counsel consequently waived the crossexamination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded numerous questions to accused-appellant during
his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and (d) the trial courts decision was promulgated just one
day after accused-appellant submitted his memorandum.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was indeed deprive of his right to heard
Ruling:
Coming now to the merits of this case, we find that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of accused-appellant. In reviewing rape cases, we have been guided by the following
principles: (a) An accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and even more difficult to
disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to warrant a
judgment of conviction if found to be credible. It has likewise been established that when a woman
declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been
raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the
basis thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony.
Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part of complainants mother and her relatives for
bringing charges against him. He claims that complainants mother resented the fact that he used to
beat her up out of jealousy and that he had several paramours in the past. He further asserts that his
wifes relatives were angry with him because of the land which he caused to be registered in his
name to the prejudice of the latter.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we think that the imposition of the death penalty by the
trial court is erroneous. It is settled that to justify the imposition of the death penalty, both the
relationship of the victim and her age must be alleged and proved.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the modification that accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Erlanie

Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. OSCAR ALCANZADO, appellant.

Facts:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision1dated April 5, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66) of Makati City (RTC
for brevity) in Criminal Case No. 98-1634.
However, a careful examination of the records reveals that the assailed decision will have to be set
aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for reception of evidence for the defense.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on July 30, 1998. Trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution rested its case on October 13, 1998.3 Upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an
Order dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer to evidence.4 On November
19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence5 which was opposed by the prosecution. On April
22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein assailed decision convicting appellant.
The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the demurrer to
evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to
present his evidence.
Contrary to the RTCs assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the records
of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying appellants demurrer to evidence
before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the aforequoted
provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was
denied, the trial court should have given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally
astonishing is the fact that appellants counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC
or in this Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process.
Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is warranted. The
constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated.
So that appellant may be spared from further delay, the Court deems it necessary to treat the herein
assailed judgment as a mere resolution denying the demurrer to evidence and ascertain whether the
RTC has committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting the same.
Issue: whether or not the lower court violated the constitutional right of the accused to be heard
Ruling:
Given the circumstances on record, the Court finds that while the admission made by appellant to
PO2 Bucalan may not be admitted in evidence considering that the alleged verbal admission made
by appellant before him as homicide investigator was made without appellant being informed of his
right to remain silent and right to counsel and after appellant had been established as the suspect by
the police officers who had arrived at the scene of the crime before PO2 Bucalan came.
However, the Court cannot disregard the testimony of SPO1 Bagon who, together with his co-police
officers, responded to the call of the barangay tanod and immediately upon his arrival, appellant
spontaneously told him that he had shot the victim. This particular admission was made when
appellant has not been taken into custody by the police officers and therefore admissible in
evidence. The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused readily admitted having committed the crime.
Consequently, for purposes of determining whether the demurrer to evidence should have been
granted, the connection between the service gun and appellant as the perpetrator of the shooting,
without any countervailing evidence, had been sufficiently established. Thus, the RTC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence BUT it committed grave
abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua when appellant has not been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in
his defense, pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Further, the attendant justifying, mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as self-defense,
treachery and voluntary surrender could only be ascertained fully after the defense evidence,
rebuttal and sur-rebuttal, if any, shall have been adduced and evaluated by the RTC in the rendition
of its judgment on the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated April 5, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 66), Makati City is SET ASIDE for being null and void. Let the records of Criminal

Case No. 98-1634 be remanded to said trial court for reception of defense evidence and further
proceedings. The presiding judge is directed to conduct the trial of the case and render judgment
thereon with immediate dispatch.