Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Presented By:
Dela Rosa, Divine Angelique
Duran, Marjorie
Jaspeo, Kim Ivy
Perez, Bethxyz
Presented to:
Karen Catacutan
Gladys Tumbali
Jermin Mabborang
INTRODUCTION:
Background of the Study:
In solving the problems dealing with delinquent payers in a business firm, the group
aims to solve the said matter through knowing the reasons for not paying promptly and
find out the best solution in dealing with them.
In a business firm, rules should be improved and strictly followed for the success of
running a business. Once it is not followed, many problems will surely be experienced
or encountered that can lead to bankruptcy. For instance, a lending company for it to
prosper there should be an effective collection or strategies to follow. One of it is to
impose punishments to delinquent payers. In this manner, the client will find means and
ways to pay the monthly payments of his loan. Once credit in loan is extended inevitably
the debtor could hardly pay the loan amount. If this case will happen always, then the
lending will not prosper likewise tendency is the debtor will either escape from his
responsibility or leads to renewal of loans. The responsibility to collect is greater than
the responsibility to pay since the interest will grow bigger and bigger. In other words,
the creditor should run after the debtor and running is a must to be able to collect. The
creditor should know how to handle delinquent payers and maintain their good
reputation to motivate debtors to continue business with them.
Indeed, an amount not being paid could not be accounted if not being collected. That is
the purpose of imposing effective collection of money. If collection fails then profitability
of the business will also suffer. In the study of Salima Y. Paul, S. Susela Devi and Chee
Ghee Tehmany entitled Impact of late payment on Firms' profitability: Empirical
evidence from Malaysia (2012), Pacific-Basin Finance they
payment (LP) by customers impacts firms' profitability. And it was found that 60% of the
sampled firms experience LP and LP has a significant inverse effect on their profitability;
and those with shorter credit terms and Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) perform better
than those with longer credit terms and longer DSO.
Therefore before having a final transaction to the client, through evaluation of this
background especially on financial aspect or sources of income should be considered.
Only capable and qualified client should be given attention or the chance so as not to
have problems in the collection. Because when Alex Addae-Korankye conducted a
Underpinning Theory
While punishment can be effective in some cases, you can probably think of a few
examples of when punishment does not reduce a behavior. Prison is one example. After
being sent to jail for a crime, people often continue committing crimes once they are
released from prison.
Why is it that punishment seems to work in some instances, but not in others? Gershoff,
E. T. (2002) have found a number of factors that contribute to how effective punishment
is in different situations.
First, punishment is more likely to lead to a reduction in behavior if it immediately
follows the behavior. Second, punishment achieves greater results when it is
consistently applied. It can be difficult to administer a punishment every single time a
behavior occurs. Punishment also has some notable drawbacks. First, any behavior
changes that result from punishment are often temporary.
"Punished behavior is likely to reappear after the punitive consequences are
withdrawn," Skinner explained in his book About Behaviorism.
Perhaps the greatest drawback is the fact that punishment does not actually offer any
information about more appropriate or desired behaviors. While subjects might be
learning to not perform certain actions, they are not really learning anything about what
they should be doing.
The factors contributed by Gershoff, E. T. (2002), Psychological Bulletin, 128, 539-579
will be used in the research, given the importance of perception.
Literature Review
Discussion of Literature by Themes
Length of Time Creditors Collect
Most consumer debts, whether credit card debt, student loans, medical debt,
auto loans, or mortgages, are paid in their ordinary course. According to one estimate
conducted by Fair Isaac Corp., approximately 95 percent of all consumer debt is paid on
time and less than half of consumers have been reported as 30 or more days late on a
payment. Even this high level of voluntary payment depends in part on the perceived
effectiveness of the debt collection system in the event of non-payment.
Credit Price that Creditors Impose
A study published by William Dunkelberg in 1978 finds evidence that stricter
regulation of creditor remedies results in higher prices and lower levels of credit for
consumers. In 1973, the state of Wisconsin enacted the Wisconsin Consumer Act
(WCA), which, among other things, imposed substantial new limits on the remedies
available to creditors on a consumers default.
For a lender to make a loan profitably, it must be able to price the risk of loss
accurately according to Todd Zywicki (2010) on his Testimony Before the United States
House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Committee on Small
Business. Therefore, if the risk of loss is higher, a lender will need to charge a higher
price to compensate for the heightened risk of loss. If the lender is unable to accurately
price the risk of the loan, such as because of regulatory limits, then the lender will
reduce its risk exposure either by lending to fewer borrowers (and, in particular, by
limiting credit offered to higher-risk borrowers) or by lending less to the same borrowers
by reducing credit lines and loan size. One element of the risk of loss is the ability to
collect from a debtor who defaults. If collection powers are weaker, the loss rate will be
higher, for two reasons. First, if the creditor is more limited in its ability to collect, it will
recover less from the defaulted debtor, and collection efforts will be more costly.
Second, if the consequences of default are less severe, borrowers will be more likely to
default. As a result, greater restraints on the ability of creditors to collect will tend to
increase their losses. In turn, lenders will respond to this increased risk of loss by
raising interests to compensate or by reducing risk exposure.
As an a priori matter, therefore, it is not clear whether borrowers as a whole will
be made better or worse off from stricter regulation of collections. Although they who are
already in default generally will benefit from greater restraints on collections, the benefit
will come at the expense of other consumers who may end up paying more or obtaining
less access to credit (including the borrower currently in default, who may want new
credit in the future). Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981) said at the time of
making a loan a lender cannot perfectly predict which particular borrowers will
eventually default; all potential borrowers will be forced to pay higher costs for credit,
but especially riskier borrowers. Conversely, weakening creditor remedies will increase
the risk of loss for creditors, thereby raising the cost of lending. Such a reform will lead
to a reduced supply of lending and higher prices, everything else being equal.
Creditors General Provisions
A recent study by economist Viktar Fedaseyeu confirms the standard economic
analysis that mandatory restrictions on creditor collections have an overall adverse
effect on consumers access to credit. Fedaseyeu created a database that rates the
strictness of states collection laws and the effect on access to consumer credit in each
state. He finds that stricter regulation of third-party debt collectors results in a lower
level of credit card collections in each state (9% lower on average for each additional
restriction on debt collection activity) and that this circumstance leads to a decrease of
2.2% in the number of new revolving lines of credit for consumers.
Nadia Massuod, Anthony Saunders, Barry Scholnick (2011) and Anthony Siaw,
Evans Brako Ntiamoah, Emmanuel Oteng, Beatrice Opoku (2014) found evidence that
penalty fees are positively related to measure of bank market share. It also finds that
fees are increasing in customer risk, supports the position of defenders of penalty fees
such as banks. Fees increasing in market share are consistent with rent extraction, and
the concerns expressed by politicians and regulators.
Size of Lending Institutions
Responses from the sample firms conducted by MICHAEL J. PEEL(2000) were found
to differ significantly with respect to firm size; larger small firms had a worse late
payment problem and consequently had to do more in the way of 'back-end' credit
management (i.e. collection, analysis of late payment and debtor days). However, there
was barely any support for credit management training among this sub-group. The
smaller (micro) firms had a lesser late payment problem and subsequently did less
'back-end' credit management but were more concerned with various aspects of
institutional finance.
HYPOTHESIS:
The writers hypothesize that there is no significant difference in the perceived
effect of imposing punishment in collecting the payment of delinquent debtors in terms
of profile variable.
Research Paradigm:
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable
1. Profile
I. Years of Existence
II. Type of Institution
III. Capitalization
Perceived effects of
punishment to delinquent
debtors
The diagram shows that the independent variables which are the punishments imposed
affect the payment practices of delinquent debtors.
Methods:
A descriptive research methodology will be used by the researchers to assess the
perceptions of selected respondents regarding the perceived effect of imposing
punishment to delinquent payment practices of debtors. The respondents will be the
lending institutions basing from their observation to the behaviour of their delinquent
debtors after they imposed punishment to collect the late payments. Questionnaires will
be utilized and be floated in various credit institutions here in the Tuguegarao. Prior to
the conduct of the study, the questionnaires will subject to reliability test. The
respondents will be requested to indicate the extent to which the punishment affects the
delinquent debtors. The data was collected through a five-point Likert scale and
analyzed through use of percentages.
.
Literature Matrix
Researche Bibliography
rs
Major
Objective/
Main
Problems
Delineated
Factors/
Variables/
Themes
Beatrice
Njeru
Warue
Factors
Affecting
Loan
Delinquency
in Micro
finance Instit
utions in
Kenya
(2012),
International
Journal of
Management
Sciences
and
Business
Research,
Vol. 1, Issue
12, 2012 )
To establish
which of the
factors
significantly
affects loan
delinquency
performance
in MFIs in
Kenya.
Microfinance
institutions;
Self-help
groups
specific
factors and
external
factors:
Loan
Salima Y.
Paul,
S. Susela
Devi,
Chee
Ghee Teh
Impact of
late payment
on Firms'
profitability:
Empirical
evidence
from
Malaysia
(2012),Pacifi
c-Basin
To examines
whether late
payment
(LP) by
customers
impacts
firms'
profitability.
Late
payment;
Credit
management;
IFRS;
Profitability
Methods/
Data
Gathering
tools/
Respondent
s
Survey
Questionnai
re
delinquency
Major Findings
Random
Sampling
Technique
The microfinance
institutions and selfhelp groups specific
factors and external
factors significantly
affect loan
delinquency
performance among
microfinance
institutions
in Kenya. It
recommends that
MFIs portfolios
management
strategies focus more
on the internal
causes of
delinquency which
they have more
control over and seek
practical and
achievable solutions
to redress
delinquency
problems.
Chris
Mayer,
Tomasz
Piskorski ,
Alexei
Tchistyi
Finance
Journal
Volume 20,
Issue 5,
November
2012, Pages
777792)
The
inefficiency
of
refinancing:
Why
prepayment
penalties are
good for
risky
borrowers
(Journal of
Financial
Economics,
Vol. 107(2),
694 - 714.
2013)
To provides a
theoretical
analysis of
the efficiency
of
prepayment
penalties in a
dynamic
competitive
lending
model with
risky
borrowers
and costly
default.
Inefficiency of
refinancing;
Prepayment
penalties;
Risky
borrowers;
Mortgages
Descriptive
Methodolog
y
Nadia
Massoud,
Anthony
Saunders,
Barry
Scholnick
The cost of
being late?
The case of
credit card
penalty fees,
(Journal of
Financial
Stability, 7
(2011) 4959)
To examine,
theoretically
and
empirically,
credit card
penalty fee
pricing.
Credit Cards;
Penalty Fees;
Risk
Using a
unique data
set
Anthony
An Empirical
To identify
Loan Default
Survey
Siaw,
Evans
BrakoNtia
moah,
Emmanuel
Oteng,
Beatrice
Opoku
Alex
AddaeKorankye
Stephen
S. Taxa,
Young
Sally
Kimb,
Sudhir
Naira,
Analysis of
the Loan
Default Rate
of
Microfinance
Institutions;
(European
Journal of
Business
and
Management
(Vol.6,
No.22, 2014)
Causes and
Control of
Loan
Default/Delin
quency in
Microfinance
Institution in
Ghana
(American
international
Journal Of
Contemporar
y Research
Vol.4, No.12,
December
2014)
the causes of
loan default
and the
processes
involved in
granting loan
by
Microfinance
institutions in
Ghana.
Rate;
Monitoring
and
Repayment;
Microfinance
institutions.
positive correlation
between the
constructs of loan
default causes and
how loans are
granted.
To analyze
the causes
and control
of loan
default/delinq
uency in
microfinance
institution in
Ghana.
Loan default;
Loan
delinquency;
Default rate;
Microfinance
Institutions
Random
Sampling
Technique,
Questionnai
re,
Interview
Getting The
Right Payoff
from
Customer
Penalty Fees
(Business
Horizons
Volume 56,
Issue 3,
MayJune
2013, Pages
To identify
the aspects
of penalties
that generate
customer
dissatisfactio
n and
negative
emotional
and
behavioral
Customer
penalties;
Fees;
Relationship
management
Collect and
Analyze
Data
Young
Sally K.
Kim, Amy
K. Smith
377386)
responses.
Crime and
Punishment
Examining
Customers
Responses
to Service
Organization
s Penalties,
(11/2005),
pages (162180.)
The study
examines the
effects of
penalty
attributes
(severity,
flexibility,
adequacy of
an
explanation),
attributions
(i.e., causal
inference),
perceived
justice,
disconfirmati
on, and
emotion on
customers
evaluations
of penalties
imposed by
service
organizations
,
Crime and
Punishment.
Effects of
penalty
;Customer
Response;
Punishments;
Crosssectional
survey
design
of penalties,
effectively educating
customers on the
offer, ensuring that
penalties are clear
and transparent,
linking penalty
decisions to
responsibility for the
transgression, taking
into account narrowly
missing avoiding a
penalty, and
consideration of the
customer relationship
and employee
empowerment.
The results show that
penalty attributes,
attributions,
perceived justice, and
negative emotion
have significant
effects on customers
responses to
penalties.
Crime and
Punishment. It also
provides useful
guidelines to help
service organizations
manage penalties.
Timothy
Besley,
Stephen
Coate,
Group
lending,
repayment
incentives
and social
collateral
(Journal of
Development
Economics
Volume 46,
Issue 1,
February
1995, Pages
118)
To
investigate
the impact
on
repayment
rates of
lending to
groups which
are made
jointly liable
for
repayment.
Joint Liability;
Lending
Data
Analysis
Moh'd AlAzzama, ,
R. Carter
Hillb, ,
SudiptaSa
rangic,
Repayment
performance
in group
lending:
Evidence
from
Jordan(Journ
al of
Development
Economics
Volume 97,
Issue 2,
March 2012,
Pages 404
414)
Group
lending;
Repayment
performance;
Count data
Data
Analysis
Joseph E.
Stiglitz
Credit
Rationing in
To
investigate
the effect of
screening,
peer
monitoring,
group
pressure,
and social
ties on
borrowing
groups'
repayment
behaviour as
an indirect
test of
different
theoretical
models.
Whether to
extend
Credit
Standards;
Credit
scoring,
The analysis
suggests that such
schemes have both
positive and negative
effects on
repayment rates. The
positive effect is that
successful group
members may have
an incentive to repay
the loans of group
members whose
projects have yielded
insufficient return to
make repayment
worthwhile. The
negative effect arises
when the whole
group defaults, even
when some members
would have repaid
under individual
lending.
It suggests that peer
monitoring, group
pressure, and social
ties reduce
delinquency. The
paper uncovers
interesting evidence
about the role of
social ties and
religion. Most notably,
in an area where
religion contributes to
attitudes and beliefs
of individuals, we find
that religiosity
improves
Although credit
scores can predict a
and
Andrew
Weiss
Markets with
Imperfect
Information, (
71 AM.
ECON. REV.
393 (1981))
Risk of
Defaults;
Credit
Borrowers
Discriminant
analysis,
decision
trees, and
expert
systems
Debt Dilution,
Seniority,
Sovereign
Default
Quantitativel
y
Realistic
model,
Creditors
Dealing with
deadbeats
Wall street
journal eastern
edition.
10/1/2007,
vol. 250
issue 77,
pr10. 0p.
credit, how
much credit
to extend,
when
collections
on
delinquent
accounts
should be
initiated, and
what action
should be
taken.
Study
whether the
inclusion of
seniority
clause in
sovereign
debt
contracts is
the reason
on borrowing
too much
and default
too
frequently
To offer
advice for
small
business
owners on
dealing with
clients who
are
delinquent
payers.
ViktarFeda
seyeu
Debt
Collection
Agencies
and the
Supply of
Consumer
Credit (Fed.
Reserve
Bank of
Phila.,
Working
Paper No.
13-38, 2013)
Barlyn,
suzanne
reports@
wsj.com
Small
business;
payment
systems;
business
enterprises
Financial
transactions
processing,
reserve
Banks
Lending
Review the
credit
Credit
practices;
Price level
examination
William
Dunkelber
Achim
Machauer
and Martin
Weber
Jeffrey B.
Steiner
and Jason
R.
Goldstein
Response to
Restricted
Creditor
Remedies
(Credit
Research
Ctr. Working
Paper No.
20, 1978)
Bank
behavior
based on
internal
credit ratings
of borrowers
(Journal of
Banking &
Finance
Volume 22,
Issues 10
11, October
1998, Pages
13551383)
Construction
Loan
Remedies,
and Lender
Borrower
Relations
practices of
the creditors
and what
collection
methods to
be imposed
on its
borrowers.
rules;
Creditors
collection
methods
creditor remedies
results in higher
prices and lower
levels of credit for
consumers.
In credit risk
management
a usual goal
is to price
loans
according to
their risk
exposure.
The purpose
of this tactic
is obvious.
Lenders
should be
compensate
d for the risk
that
borrowers do
not repay
their loans.
To
conditioning
disbursemen
t of loan
proceeds on
loan
balancing,
construction
loan
documents
limit a
lender's
obligation to
fund in the
event liens
are filed by
Using the
variables of
the debt
contract.
Analysis is
based on
data from
five leading
German
banks.
Project-based
learning, Selfdirected
learning,
Educational
technology,
Higher
education.
Survey
In dealing evidence
and other extrinsic
communications may
help courts fill in the
gaps in contract
language, lenders
should be particularly
careful in
administering
construction loans
and communicating.
AbdulRahman,
H., Kho,
M.,and
Wang, C.
Late
Payment and
Nonpayment
Encountered
by
Contracting
Firms in a
FastDeveloping
Economy ( J.
Prof. Issues
Eng. Educ.
Pract.,
Volume 140,
Issue 2 (April
2014)
10.1061/
(ASCE)EI.19
435541.000018
9)
Brian T.
Melzer
The Real
Costs of
Credit
Access:
Evidence
from the
payday
loans,
Payday
Lending
Market (The
workers at
the property,
as such liens
may threaten
the priority of
the lender's
mortgage
lien.
To identify
the
underlying
causes of
late payment
in the
construction
sector in a
fastdeveloping
economy
Malaysia
and to
develop
effective
solutions to
mitigate this
kind of risk.
To estimate
the real
effects of
credit access
among lowincome
households.
Nonpayment
risk, Late
payment, Fast
-developing
economy, Co
ntracting
firms, Payme
nt
capacity, Cas
h flow risks
Questionnai
re Survey
Payday Loans
Survey
Questionnai
re
I find no evidence
that payday loans
alleviate economic
hardship. To the
contrary, loan access
leads to increased
difficulty paying
mortgage, rent and
utilities bills.
Marie
Godquin
Quarterly
Journal of
Economics (
2011) 126 (1)
: 517-555.)
Microfinance
Repayment
Performance
in
Bangladesh:
How to
Improve the
Allocation of
Loans by
MFIs (World
Development
Volume 32,
Issue 11,
November
2004, Pages
19091926)
To produce a
comprehensi
ve analysis
of the
performance
of
microfinance
institutions
(MFIs) in
terms of
repayment.
Microfinance;
social ties;
group
homogeneity;
nonfinancial
services
Comparativ
e analysis
Kibosia
Naomi
Chelagat
Determinants
of loan
defaults by
small and
medium
enterprises
among
commercial
banks in
Kenya,
pages 5-23,
2009
This study
sought to
determine
the
relationship
between
Nonperforming
Loans
associated
with SME
sector and its
determinants
among
commercial
banks in
Kenya.
SME factors,
Nonperforming
loans
Descriptive
survey
design,
Commercial
banks
Laura C.
Haynes,
Donald P.
Collection of
Delinquent
Fines: An
To test the
effectiveness
of mobile
Delinquent
fines; text
messaging
Adaptive
trial design
We test for
endogeneity of loan
size and use
instrumental
variables to correct
for it. In the second
section of the paper,
we use a
comparative analysis
of the determinants
of the repayment
performance and of
loan size in order to
make policy
recommendations on
the allocation of loans
by MFIs.
The study found out
that Loan defaults by
SMEs has
significantly been
increasing and a
number of
determinants affected
the loan defaults key
among them interest
rates and how long
the business has
been in operation.
The character of the
applicant has been
found to have a
significant impact on
loan
Defaults
Text messages,
which are relatively
inexpensive, are
Green,
Rory
Gallagher,
Peter John
and
David J.
Torgerson
Daniel F.
Kohler
Mindy
Leow
Jonathan
Crook
Adaptive
Randomized
Trial to
Assess the
Effectiveness
of Alternative
Text
Messages
(Journal of
Policy
Analysis and
Management
Volume
32, Issue
4, pages
718730, Aut
umn 2013)
To pay or not
to pay: A
model of
international
defaults
(Journal of
Economic
Behavior &
Organization
Volume 84,
Issue 1,
September
2012, Pages
216228)
Intensity
models and
transition
probabilities
for credit
card loan
delinquencie
s (European
Journal of
Operational
Research,
volume 236,
January 7,
phone text
messaging
as an
alternative
method of
inducing
people to
pay their
outstanding
fines.
found to significantly
increase average
payment of
delinquent fines. We
found text messages
to be especially
effective when they
address the recipient
by name.
Debtors
prison;
Default;
Imprisonment
Empirical
analysis
We estimate
the
probability of
delinquency
and default
for a sample
of credit card
loans
Risk analysis,
probability of
default,
intensity
modeling,
time-varying
covariates,
state space
modelling,
retail loans
Semiparametric
multiplicativ
e hazard
models with
time-varying
covariates
J. Crook
J. Banasik
Eyo
Emmanuel
O.1,
Merrian A.
Nwaogu1
and I. A.
Asuquo1
2014, pages
685-694 )
Forecasting
and
explaining
aggregate
consumer
credit
delinquency
behaviour
(International
Journal of
Forecasting,
volume 28,
January
2012, pages
145-160)
Effectiveness
of Loan
Delinquency
Management
Strategies of
Formal
Lenders
We model
aggregate
delinquency
behaviour for
consumer
credit
(including
credit card
loans and
other
consumer
loans) and
for
residential
real estate
loans using
data up until
2008.
Finance, Cointegration,
ARIMA
models, Error
correction
models, Time
series, Unit
roots
Correction
models
We find evidence to
support the portfolio
explanations of
declines in credit
quality for consumer
and for real estate
loans, but support for
the reduced stigma
explanation was
restricted to real
estate loans.
Evidence supportive
of household-level
explanations of
irrational borrowing
and unexpected net
income shocks was
found for consumer
and real estate loans,
but evidence of
strategic default was
restricted to the
volume of consumer
loans and real estate
loans, and not for
credit cards. We also
found that the error
correction model
gave forecasts of the
volume of delinquent
consumer debt which
were of an accuracy
comparable to that of
an ARIMA model.
To assess
the
management
strategies
aimed at
reducing
loan
Loan
delinquency;
formal
lenders;
farmers; Akwa
Ibom State.
Multistage
sampling
technique ;
questionnair
e
Bismark
Addai and
Chengyi
Pu
among
Farmers in
Akwa Ibom
State,
Nigeria(Britis
h Journal of
Economics,
Management
& Trade,
ISSN: 2278098X,Vol.: 3,
Issue.: Issue
4 (OctoberDecember))
delinquency;
compare the
extent of
loan default
among
lending
institutions
and analyze
the impact of
some
variables in
reducing
loan
repayment
problems,
under the
existing
regime of
loan
delinquency
management
strategies.
The Impact
of Delinquent
Loans on
Financial
Performance
of Banks in
Ghana
(British
Journal of
Economics,
Investigates
into the
impact of
delinquent
loans on
financial
performance
(interest
income and
net profit) of
Delinquent
Loans;
interest
income; net
profit;
financial
performance;
banks;
Ghana
Quantitative
Research
Approach;
Sampling
Method
behavior of selected
variables under the
going delinquency
management regime
suggest that primary
occupation, loan size,
loan use, duration of
loans and visits of
bank officials are
some of the variables
that need to be
manipulated to
achieve the desired
level of loan
repayment.
Invariably, proper
implementation of the
existing loan
delinquency
management
strategies and proper
manipulation of
factors that support
loan repayment
would be invaluable
in enhancing the
effectiveness of the
existing loan
delinquency
management
strategies in reducing
loan repayment
problems in Akwa
Ibom State, Nigeria.
It is recommended
that banks embark on
effective and regular
monitoring of the loan
from the time of
disbursement till the
final repayment as a
means of reducing
delinquent loans and
its antecedent impact
Bassey
Nsikan
Edet1*,
Elizabeth
A.
Atairet1,
Kesit
Kufre
Nkeme1 a
nd Udoh
Ekaete
Sunday1
William
Brent,
Lynne
Kelly,
Debby
LindseyTaliefero,
Russell
Price
management
& Trade,
9(2);1-8,
2015, Article
no. BJEMT.
19268)
Determinants
of Loan
Repayment:
A Study of
Rural
Women Fish
Traders in
Akwa Ibom
State,
Nigeria
(British
Journal of
Economics,
Management
& Trade,
ISSN: 2278098X,Vol.: 4,
Issue.: 4
(April))
Determinants
Of Mortgage
Delinquency
(Journal of
Business &
Economics
Research,
Vol 9, No 2
(2011))
banks in
Ghana.
The paper
estimated
the loan
repayment
index and
examined
the
determinants
of loan
repayment
from a
sample of 80
rural women
fish traders
obtained
through a
multi-stage
sampling in
four selected
markets in
Akwa Ibom
State,
Nigeria.
Examines
mortgage
delinquency
rates for
loans in each
state and
Washington,
DC from
2004 through
2009 in order
to gain
insight into
the key
factors that
drive
of interest income
and net profit.
Loanable
funds;
households;
loan
providers;
loan default.
Descriptive
and
inferential
statistics
Real estate
financing;
foreclosures
and mortgage
lending
Empirical
Analysis
The paper
recommended the
evolution of a more
proactive loan
monitoring procedure
by lenders such as
verification of the
loan worthiness and
previous loan
repayment history of
borrowers before
granting loans,
encouraging the
patronage of formal
credit sources,
pursuing policies that
would reduce
household sizes as
well as the setting up of loan delinquent
court to prosecute
defaulters as the way
out.
The findings suggest
that borrower income,
type of loan, and the
general health of the
economy remain
important in
determining
delinquency
risk. Also, factors that
determine 30- and
60-day delinquency
rates differ from
those that determine
90-day and 90+ day
delinquency rates.
Eric
Arentsen,
David C.
Mauer,
Brian
Rosenlund
,
Harold H.
Zhang,
Feng Zhao
Wei Jiang,
Ashlyn
Aiko
Nelson,
and
Edward
Vytlacil
Subprime
Mortgage
Defaults and
Credit
Default
Swaps
(The Journal
of Finance
, Volume 70,
Issue 2
April 2015
Pages 689
731)
Liar Loan?
Effect of
Original of
Origination
Channel and
Information
Falsification
on Mortgage
Delinquency
(the review
of economics
and
Statistics,
Vol. XCVI,
March 2014,
No. 1)
residential
mortgage
delinquency.
To offer
empirical
evidence on
the adverse
effect of
credit default
swap (CDS)
coverage on
subprime
mortgage
defaults.
To Identify
and qualify
the Microlevel
fundamental
causes of the
mortgage
crisis and
highlight two
major
problem.
Credit Default
Swap;
Subprime
Mortgage
Empirical
Analysis
Mortgage
delinquency;
Falsification
Unique
Proprietary
Data Set
Questionnaire:
We students from the University of St. Louis Tuguegarao conducting a study about The
______________________
______________________
DIRECTIONS: Answer the following questions by putting a check mark on the space
provided using the following
1
Never
2
Seldom
3
Often
4
Sometimes
5
Always
QUESTIONS
1. If the debtor dont pay his debt punishment is impose
2. After the punishment is imposed the debtor
immediately pays his due.
3. After the punishment is imposed the debtor goes to
the credit institution to talk about how to settle the
account.
4. After imposing the punishment the delinquency rate
decreases.
5. The punishments affect the payment practices of
debtors.
6. After imposing punishments customers still come to
avail credit.
7. Customers never take any action even if punishments
are imposed.
8. After the punishment is imposed the customer never
avail any credit in the institution.
9. The institution filed lawsuit against the debtor in order
to collect payment.
10. After the debtor settled the account the institution
limits the amount of credit given to the particular debtor.