Kendall Brill akelly LLP @ ORIGINAL @ KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP Bert H. Deixler (70614) FILED bdeixler@kbkfirm.com Superior Court of Catton Nicholas F. Daum (236155) ndaum(@kbkfirm.com 10100 Santa Monica Bhd , Suite 1725 a Los Angeles, California 90067 Short Bu vo OticeCerk Telephone: 310.556.2700 2, Depaty Facsimile: 310.556.2705 RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD, KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, LLP Eric M. Lieberman (pro hac vice) 45 Broadway, Suite 1700 New York, NY 10006 Telephone: 212.254.1111 Facsimile: 212.674.4614 Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology International JEFFER, MANGELS, BUTLER & MITCHELL, LLP Robert E. Mangels (48291) 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Seventh Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: "310.203.8080 Facsimile: 310.203.0567 Attorneys for Defendant Religious Technology Center SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO, Case No. BC411018 Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. John P. Boyle, Dept. 58 v. DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT INTERNATIONAL, a corporate entity, AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, previously sued herein as Doe No. 1, a Date: March 7, 2016 California Corporation, and DOES 2-20, Time: 8:30am. Dept: 58 Defendants. Action Filed: April 2, 2009 270951.1 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONSe st oy es 9 9 I u 12 13 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 a oO 22 rs) Q 24 25 26 27 “28 wane nL. Il. IV. 270951.1 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PLAINTIFF'S PRIVACY CLAIMS BASED ON HER ABORTION FAIL 2 A. Plaintiff Chose To Have Her Abortion For Personal And Religious Reasons 2 B. _ Plaintiff's Abortion-Related Privacy Claims Fail Under California Law.... 4 1 Plaintiff Cannot Prove Common-Law Intrusion 4 2. Plaintiff Cannot Prove The Constitutional Privacy Tort. 5 PLAINTIFF'S “LIBERTY” CLAIMS BASED ON HER TIME IN THE RPF FAIL 6 A. Plaintiff Remained In The RPF Because Of Religion, Not Force 6 B. There Is No Claim Against A Private Party For “Constitutional” Deprivation Of Liberty... PLAINTIFF'S EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM FAILS... CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE § 970 DOES NOT APPLY.. A. Section 970 Does Not Apply To Prospective Ministers B. The Court Should Construe Section 970 To Avoid Constitutional Error... C. Even If Section 970 Did Apply, Plaintiff Could Not Prevail..... THE MINIMUM WAGE LAWS DO NOT APPLY TO RELIGIOUS WORKERS ACTING ON BEHALF OF A CHURCH. i ADJUDICATION.1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page 3 CASES 4 Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Service 5 38 Cal.3d 384 (1985)... Barbee v. Household Auto. Fin. Corp. 113 Cal. App. 4th 525 (2003)..... 6 7 Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of California, Inc 8 68 Cal. App.4th 101 (1998).. 9 0 Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. | 39 Cal.4th 384 (2006) . e Fowler v. Rhode Island u 345 US. 67 (1943).. 12 || Funk v. Sperry Corp. 842 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1988). 15, 18 13 Garfinkle v. Superior Court 14 21 Cal. 3d 268 (1978) (Section 7)... 15 || Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. 26 Cal.4th 1013 (2001) : Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin 7 201 Cal.App.4th 1041 (2011). 18 || Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. 7Cal. 4th I (1994)... Holy Trinity Church v. United States 20 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 21 || Hutton v. Fid. Nat'l Title Co. 213 Cal.App.4th 486 (2013)... 5 @ eS Jones v. Kmart Corp. 23 17 Cal.4th 329 (1998). © 24|| Katz v, Superior Court, nN 73 Cal. App.3d 952 (1977)... Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California "26 29 Cal.4th 300 (2002) . r+ 27] Kerr v, Nelson 7 7 Cal.2d 85 (1936) Kendall Brit! || 2709511 if & kelly LLP ii eosin a DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ie iegt cas? ADJUDICATIONSoe rn awe in 12 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 2B 4 25 26 27 © 28 Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP. (eho casi Larson v. Valente 456 USS. 228 (1982)..... 14 Ley». Superior Court infor Los Angles Cnty 15 Cal.2d 692 (1940) . Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983) ..... Melican v. Regents of University of California 151 Cal. Appath 168 (2007).-rcn Mendoza v. Town of Ross 128 Cal. App.4th 625 (2005), Molko v. Holy Spirit Association 46 Cal.3d 1092 (1988)... Moore v. Driscoll 135 Cal. App. 770 (1933). Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)... Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley 137 Cal.App.4th 107 (2008)... Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013)..... Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharm. 86 Cal.App.4th 365 (2001)...eoee Schleicher v. Salvation Army 518 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2008)... Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.Milivoevich 426 US. 696 (1976) nn Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc. 18 Cal.4th 200 (1998) Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co. 221 Cal.App.3d 799 (1990).. Turner v_ Unification Church 473 F. Supp. 367 (DRI. 1978).. 20 Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 34 148 (1985) Universal Pictures Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty. 9 Cal. App 2d 490 (1935). 15,16 270951.1 iii DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONKendall Brilt & Kelly LLP we wn 10 i 12 13 14 15 16 bg 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal. 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass.1982) . Visueta v. General Motors Corp., 234 Cal. App. 34 1609 (1991). Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1969).. STATUTES Civil Code § 52.1 Government Code § 12926(()..... Labor Code § 3352... Labor Code § 971 OTHER AUTHORITIES Wage and Hour Division, Dep’t of Labor, Field Operations Handbook § 10b03(b). 2709si.1 iv DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONKendall Brill & Kelly LLP 26 27 28 age cas? INTRODUCTION Alll of Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. Abortion-Related Privacy Claims. Plaintiff brought two causes of action alleging that she ‘was forced to have an abortion. Plaintiff concedes that she was not physically compelled to have an abortion. Rather, Plaintiff's facts, if accepted as true, show that church officials made efforts to convince her to obtain an abortion, to remain in the Sea Org to fulfill her religious vocation and commitment. They also show that Plaintiff's husband also strongly urged her to have an abortion so that the couple could stay in the Sea Org. Plaintiff does not dispute that Sea Org members could not remain in the Sea Org while parenting a young child. Plaintiff does not dispute that, at the time of the abortion, she had the option of routing out of the Sea Org if that was the path she chose to pursue. Plaintiff testified that she ultimately obtained the abortion for religious and personal reasons. These facts do not support her two abortion-related claims, Common-Law and Constitutional “Liberty” Claims Based On The “RPF." Plaintiff also brought two causes of action alleging that she was coerced to enter and remain in the Sea Org program known as the “RPF.” Plaintiff's deposition testimony, which she cannot now controvert, conceded that she was a voluntary participant in the activities of the RPF. She testified that she never believed she had been held in the RPF against her will until many years after she left Scientology, and that she voluntarily chose to remain in the RPF. Plaintiff largely ignores this testimony as if it does not exist. But it is black-letter California law that a party cannot directly contradict his or her deposition testimony with a self-serving declaration to avoid summary |judgment. Visueta v. General Motors Corp., 234 Cal. App. 34 1609, 1613 (1991) (“Admissions or concessions made during the course of [deposition testimony] govern and control over contrary declarations lodged at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.”). Here, the most Plaintiff can show is that on several occasions she expressed a desire to leave the Sea Org or the RPF, and that some church officials importuned her to convince her to stay, and succeeded in so doing, Non-violent efforts by a religious order to retain a member in furtherance of religious commitment are protected by the First Amendment. 2709511 1 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.10 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff's emotional distress claim relies on assertions that she was subject to “brainwashing” to explain her willing acceptance of the lifestyle constraints upon which she bases her complaint. Plaintiff ignores the extensive legal authority cited by Defendants holding that, under the First Amendment, such claims against a religious order cannot be the basis for legal liability. Rather, plaintiff rests her argument on the fact that she joined the Sea Org at the age of 12, based on what (she claims) were purportedly misleading statements. However, Plaintiff's status as a minor when she joined the Sea Org does not alter the inherent Constitutional infirmity of her “brainwashing” theory. Plaintiff joined the Sea Org with the support of her Scientologist parents. Young people of many religions undergo intensive indoctrination. If such young people choose to devote their lives to the religion in which they ‘were taught, that commitment cannot be dismissed as the mere result of brainwashing. In addition, Plaintiff's principal claims, relating to her abortion and to the RPF, occurred at times when she was fully and legally competent to make the choices she did, Labor Code Section 970 and Minimum Wage Claims. Plaintiff also brings claims under Labor Code Section 970. As shown below, Section 970 does not apply to this case at all, because the Legislature plainly did not intend for the statute to apply to solicitations made to recruit ministers. Moreover, application of Section 970 also directly violates the First Amendment, because it would require intensive scrutiny of the Church’s recruitment practices. Plaintiff's minimum wage claims also fail. ARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFF’S PRIVACY CLAIMS BASED ON HER ABORTION FAIL A. Plaintiff Chose To Have Her Abortion For Personal And Religious Reasons The facts concerning plaintiff's abortion are set forth in Defendants’ moving papers and are effectively undisputed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's argument is that Defendants convinced her to have an abortion, allegedly improperly. Opposition to Motion For Summary Judgment (“Opp. Br.”) at 38 (Defendants interfered with Plaintif?'s privacy rights by “repeatedly and systematically convincing her to have an abortion and that an abortion was her only option”). Plaintiff concedes that the abortion was not “forced.” E.g., SMF 45-51, 55-56. Plaintiff claims that she initially 2951.1 2 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONKendall Brill & Kelly LLP wie wn 1 a 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 2B 24 25 26 ar 28 wanted to have a baby after she became pregnant, and was met by strong and determined opposition from her husband, who felt they were too young to undertake the responsibilities of parenthood, and who also did not want to give up his commitment to the Sea Org. Id. In addition, church mi ers urged plaintiff not to abandon her commitment to the religious life of the Sea Org, arguing that her activities as a Sea Org member would provide greater contributions to the Sea Org goal of “Clearing the Planet” and creating a sane and peaceful world (using the term, “the greatest good for the greatest number of dynamics”). Id. Plaintiff testified that she agreed to these entreaties. SMF 55. Si ilar decisions are made by women every day in our society, weighing the desire for motherhood against career and personal considerations. It is not a matter for this court to evaluate the merits of such decisions. Plaintiff argues that after she disclosed she was pregnant and wanted to have a baby, she should have been permitted to “freely leave the Sea Org.” There are two problems with that argument. First, plaintiff did not express a wish to leave the Sea Org. Rather she expressed a wish to have her baby and remain in the Sea Org. SMF 44-51, 55-56, But that was contrary to Scientology religious policy, about which plaintiff knew. SMF 43-45. The First Amendment does not permit courts to require churches alter its requirements for child-rearing for its own members. ‘Second, if plaintiff wanted to leave the Sea Org, she could have done so, by following well-known and established religious policy and procedure. SMF 18, 21, 43-44, 52-54. Numerous people have left the Sea Org by following such policy and procedure. SMF 19, 52-54, Such persons include plaintiff's sister and plaintiff's then-husband Jesse, who routed out with his second wife ‘when she became pregnant and they chose to have the baby. SMF 18, $4. Such departure procedures are common to religious orders and, absent physical abuse, are protected by the First Amendment. To be clear, defendants do not argue that a church may physically force a woman to have an abortion, But that is not the issue here. Under the First Amendment, churches may encourage a minister or member of a religious order to forego child rearing so she or he may continue in the religious life. Courts may not interfere with those efforts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ two abortion- related claims fail. 270851.1 3 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONKendall Brill & Kelly LLP 10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 iaeaget case Plaintiff's Abortion-Related Privacy Claims Fail Under California Law Even putting aside the First Amendment, Plaintiff cannot state the elements of either a common-law or constitutional privacy tort based on her abortion. Plaintiff argues at length that the state or federal government is constitutionally forbidden from banning or over-regulating abortion as a legal matter. See Opp. Br. at 37-40, But that is not at issue here, No court has ever recognized a privacy tort based on the mere encouragement of abortion by one private party to another. 1. Plaintiff Cannot Prove Common-Law Intrusion Plaintiff admits that the only common-law privacy tort she has put at issue is “intrusion on seclusion.” Opp. Br. at 37. To prevail on the tort of intrusion, a plaintiff must prove that the “defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained ‘unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. ‘The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or data source.” Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200, 232 (1998) (emphasis added). Defendants are aware of no case, anywhere, in which the mere participation in a private conversation about a sensitive matter by a defendant constituted the tort of intrusion, There is no “seclusion” in a private conversation, and a participant in such a conversation does not “intrude” on privacy in a relevant sense. To the extent that personal information is disclosed in such a conversation it is with the plaintiff's consent, and is not actionable. Sanchez-Scott v, Alza Pharm., 86 Cal. App.4th 365, 376 (2001) (consent bars all privacy torts). Here, plaintiff freely admits that she did not keep her pregnancy, or her thoughts about abortion, private or hidden from defendants. To the contrary, she emphasizes that she herself informed Church officials of her pregnancy and her intended decision concerning its termination. SMF 43, 49. There is no evidence whatsoever that defendants violated plaintiff's private physical or “sensory” (i.e., viewable by the senses) space. There is no claim that defendants obtained information from plaintiff that she had intended to keep secret from them. Instead, plaintiff's only 2951.1 4 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION10 ul 12 13 14 1s 16 7 18 19 20 a 22 aos O24 25 26 7 28 Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP Taher castor claim is that defendants, due to their purported “brainwashing,” convinced her to have an abortion. That does not state an actionable common-law privacy claim. 2. Plaintiff Cannot Prove The Constitutional Privacy Tort Similarly, plaintiff cannot assert a viable constitutional privacy claim based merely upon defendants “convincing” her to take a particular course of action concerning an abortion. The constitutional privacy tort is primarily focused on informational privacy (that is, information a person wishes to keep private). Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 (1994). To the extent that the constitutional tort is intended to embody “autonomy privacy,” ie, freedom to make personal decisions, the California Constitution focuses on freedom “from government interference in the form of penal and regulatory laws.” /d. Defendants are aware of no decision (inside or outside California) in which mere “convincing” by a private party was held to constitute a constitutional privacy violation. Given this background, this Court should certainly not create a novel Constitutional privacy claim based on a church’s encouragement of its ministers on the subject of abortion. Moreover, as discussed in defendants’ opening brief, the privacy provisions of Article I do not create a private action for monetary damages. Since that is the only relief the Plaintiff seeks, the constitutional privacy claim must fail. Plaintiff does not distinguish (or cite) Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal.4th 300, 317 (2002), the controlling case on the issue. Plaintiff does not even argue that she has a viable direct constitutional privacy action. Plaintiff cites, instead, to Civil Code § 52.1(sometimes known as the “Bane Act”). However, the Bane Act cannot save Plaintiff's Constitutional damages claim. First, Plai iff never pled relief under the Bane Act, and thus has waived reliance on it. Hutton v, Fid. Nat'l Title Co., 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (2013); see also Melican v. Regents of University of California, 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 182 (2007) (“We do not require (defendant] to negate elements of causes of action plaintiffs never pleaded.”), Second, and equally importantly, the Bane Act by its plain terms is inapplicable. Even if Plaintiff could claim she was “coerced” into an abortion, the Bane Act does not apply, at all, to speech, unless that speech directly threatens violence. Cal. Civ, 270951.1 5 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONewe ao 10 u 12 13 14 1S 16 7 18 19 20 21 Q 2 cs O24 25 26) 27 pa 2s Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP (ages cas? Code, § 52.1) (“speech alone” does not support a claim under the Act, unless the speech “threatens violence” and the person “reasonably fears” that violence will in fact be committed against that person); Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 (1998); see CAC 3066 (Bane Act does not apply to threats or coercion not involving a violent consequence). Plaintiff has never claimed that a threat of violence induced her to obtain an abortion, and thus the Bane Act cannot save her Constitutional privacy claim, I. PLAINTIFF'S “LIBERTY” CLAIMS BASED ON HER TIME IN THE RPF FAIL A. Plaintiff Remained In The RPF Because Of Religion, Not Force Plaintiff's two claims for false imprisonment and constitutional deprivation of liberty are based entirely on allegations about her time in the “Rehabilitation Project Force,” or RPF. Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) § 39-64. Plaintiff's deposition testimony, not her summary judgment declaration, is controlling on these claims for purposes of this motion. See Visueta, 234 Cal.App. 3d at 1613. Plaintiff's prior testimony is described in detail in Defendants’ opening brief. Br. at 10-13. Her testimony makes clear that Plai iff was not “forced” to go to the RPF, or physically restrained to stay within the RPF or the Sea Org. The key points are these. First, Plaintiff was an adult when she agreed to participate in the RPF. SMF 77-79. Second, over the course of two weeks, she had many meetings with a Scientology minister named James Parselle, who, in her own words, “eventually . . . ended up convincing me to go to the RPF.” SMF 77. Parselle “was trying to revitalize the original reason why I joined the Sea Org ... to help people . .. which he succeeded in doing.” [Jd] Third, in her deposition, she agreed that her “decision to go on to the RPF was a decision which consisted of a desire . . . to one day be able to return to the Sea Org [and] a desire to remain married to Jesse ...” SMF 79. Fourth, Plaintiff admitted that she went to the RPF voluntarily and that she did not believe during the entire period she was there that she was being held against her will, ie, that she was being imprisoned or deprived of her liberty. SMF 80. Plaintiff explicitly testified that she never thought she had been compelled to go to or to remain in the RPF against her will: Q You didn’t tell them (her parents] that you had been held against your will at the RPF? 270951.1 6 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONScena aweun 1 u 12 13 4 1s 16 17 18 19 20 21 Q 2 23 O 24 25 te 26) 27 28 Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP. iota cama ‘A. I did not tell them that. I didn’t feel that way at that time, Q You didn’t -- as of 2004, 2005, you didn't feel you had been held against your will? A No. Q You believed as of 2004, 2005, you volunteered to go to the RPF; correct? A. [believed that I thought that it was the greatest good for me to do it at that point. Q And you later changed your mind about it? A Yes. Q Okay. And when did you change your mind? A In 2008 when I started opening my eyes to things that I hadn't looked at before. SMF 81. Indeed, after Plaintiff's husband, Jesse, told her that he wanted to route out of the Sea Org, Plaintiff testified that she made the decision to stay in the RPF and the Sea Org without Jesse even though that meant they would be divorced: 1 did know that he wanted to leave. And I had decided that I was going to complete ~ I was 50 close to finishing that I had decided that I would finish the RPF anyway, «I chose to continue and complete and not stay married to him if he was going to leave SMF 86. Directly contradicting this deposition testimony, plaintiff now claims that she was held against her will on three occasions. The first occurred in April 2001 after plaintiff returned from her grandfather’s funeral. See Def. Br. at 11. Plaintiff argues that she submitted a letter in which she asked to leave, but instead was held against her will and required to do “mest work” (physical labor). Opp. Br. at 8-9. Plaintiff's characterization is inaccurate. In that letter, she confessed to ‘numerous acts of irregularities in the performance of her religious duties. SMF 69. She further wrote, “I feel quite illogical and psychotic. ... like 2 different people, I that is sane and 1 that is insane.” In her deposition she testified that “I was probably certifiably crazy at the time,” “I was going nuts,” and “I was a blubbering mess.” Id. She, as she testified, asked to be relieved of her duties (not to leave) and allowed to perform “mest work.” SMF 70. In response to her erratic behavior and her alarming description of her mental state, CSI officials placed a “watch” upon plaintiff. A fellow female Sea Org member stayed with her in her room and the door was kept open. After she calmed down the “watch” ended, and her request to perform “mest work” was granted. SMF 71. There is no evidence that this “watch” held Plaintiff against her will, 2709511 7 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY, ADJUDICATIONKendall Brill & Kelly LLP 10 u 12 13 14 1S 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (othe castor ‘The second alleged incident occurred shortly thereafter. Plaintiff left her position unilaterally and flew to Portland to visit her grandmother after she learned that she was going to be assigned to the RPF as a result of the conduct she described in her letter. After telephone discussions with her husband, her minister James Parselle, and her mother (who recommended she return to the Sea Org because it was so important to her), she retuned to Los Angeles. SMF 74- 75. She then engaged in a two week process in which she discussed with Parselle whether she should go to the RPF or route out. As noted above, Parselle “eventually . .. ended up convincing me to go to the RPF.” SMF 77. Again, Plaintiff was convinced, not forced, to join the RPF. ‘The third incident occurred shortly thereafter when she again waivered about entering the RPF. After discussing the matter until late at night, she agreed to go forward with the RPF. PSF 88-92, SMF 78. When these incidents are read—as they must be—in the context of plaintiff's controlling deposition testimony, they show she did not consider such efforts by her fellow Sea Org members and minister to constitute holding her against her will. Nor did she consider her decision to stay as being coerced by anything other than her religious beliefs. As she testified, “I thought that it was the greatest good for me to do it at that point.” SMF 80. Plaintiff now argues that even aside from her experiences in the RPF, she was deprived of her liberty as part of her everyday experiences as a Sea Org member. She did not plead these incidents as part of her false imprisonment or constitutional liberty claims, and the Court may ignore this argument for that reason alone. See SAC {f 39-64; Laabs v, City of Victorville, 163 Cal. App.4th 1242, 1258 (2008) (“It is the allegations in the complaint to which the summary judgment motion must respond.”). Regardless, the record is clearly to the contrary. For the first two years of her Sea Org experience, she lived at Church buildings on Sunset Boulevard, and worked at the Church’s main building at 6331 Hollywood Boulevard in Hollywood. SMF 39. Both buildings are completely open to the street. Id She usually would travel to work on a church provided bus, but on occasion would take the subway, a taxi, or the Hollywood Dash, a form of public transportation. Jd. In 1993 she moved to the former Hollywood Inn on Hollywood Boulevard, within a short walking distance to her place of work. That building, too, is open to the 270951. 8 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONW o 7 Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP 10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 erga caste street, without surrounding walls or fences. Id. She attended events at various venues in Los Angeles, travelled to England, Mexico and Canada, visited doctors, went to the beach, and took leaves to visit her family. SMF 40. In her first year alone, she took three such leaves, and continued to do so throughout her work in the Sea Org. SMF 30. When on the RPF, she took a leave to go to her sister’s wedding, and left with her husband to visit her grandmother, SMF 85. She spoke to her mother by phone several times a week. Laura Dieckman Decl. Ex. H and Ex. U. Quite simply, plaintiff could have left the Sea Org every single day. She could have ‘walked away at any time. She could have not returned from her various travels away from Los Angeles. She could have called her mother. She could have routed out and remained a Scientologist in good standing, like her sister did. Or, she could have left without “routing out.” The reason she did not was because she did not want to. She was a committed Scientologist. Plaintiff cites several cases stating that churches are not categorically immune from liability for false imprisonment. Pl. Opp. at 27-28. To be clear, defendants do not claim that a true false imprisonment, such as that alleged in O'Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal.App. 770 (1933), protected activity. But here the plaintiff herself has testified that she did not believe she had been held against her will. Her ultimate decision to remain in the Sea Org and RPF was based not on force, but upon religious faith. The First Amendment does not permit claims on these facts to go forward. B. There Is No Claim Against A Private Party For “Constitutional” Deprivation Of Liberty Plaintiff cannot assert a viable claim for deprivation of liberty under the California Constitution. As demonstrated in defendants’ opening brief, the liberty provision contained in Article I, Section I of the California Constitution is intended to apply to state action alone. It has ‘no application to private parties. Plaintiff misteads Barbee v. Household Auto. Fin. Corp., 113 Cal.App.th 525, 530 (2003) for the proposition that “Article I, Section 1” of the Constitution permits private rights of action, Barbee dealt only with the privacy provisions in Article I, Section 1. As explained in Hill, 7 Cal 4th at 15, the privacy provisions of Article I, Section 1, uniquely can be enforced against private 709511 9 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONKendal gait Sea Eee parties (although, as explained above, not for money damages). That is because, as Hill held, the privacy provision in Article I, Section 1 was added to the Constitution by initiative in 1972, The context of the 1972 initiative, particularly ballot statements, made clear that the “privacy” provision was enforceable against private parties. Jd. The liberty provisions in Article I, Section I, however, date not from 1972, but from the 1849 Constitution. Those 1849 pro ions were, as the Supreme Court has made clear, designed to apply to state action alone. Golden Gateway Cir. v Golden Gateway Tenants Assn., 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1027 (2001) (holding that the framers of the 1849 Constitution were focused exclusively on state action). Nor does the fact that the Constitutional liberty guarantee is significant and “inalienable” mean that it is applicable private parties. The Supreme Court has made clear that equally important constitutional rights, such as the due process guarantees of Article I, Section 7, or the free speech guarantees of Article I, Section 2, apply only to state action. Golden Gateway Ctr., 26 Cal.4th at 1027; Garfinklev. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 268, 272 (1978) (Section 7), Plaintiff again cites to the Bane Act. But the Supreme Court has made clear that the Bane ‘Act does not create a right of action against a private party when an underlying constitutional provision is restricted to state action. Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.Ath 329, 334-35 (1998) (Bane Act could not remedy a “seizure” by private parties, when constitutional provision applied only to state action). It is black-letter law that if, as here, a plaintiff cannot prove that any substantive constitutional rights have been violated, a Bane Act claim will fail. Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley, 137 Cal.App.4th 107, 124 (2006). From any angle, Plaintiff's Constitutional liberty claim fails. I. PLAINTIFF'S EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM FAILS As Defendants’ opening brief showed, the life style constraints of the Sea Org are not “outrageous,” but in fact are common in certain kinds of religious communities. The right of religious organizations to impose such constraints is protected by the First Amendment. Def. Br. at 36-40. Plaintiff's response is that defendants’ are precluded from invoking those protections because of the decision in Molko v. Holy Spirit Association, 46 Cal.34 1092 (1988). Plaintiff misreads Motko and ignores its unique factual setting 270951.1 10 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION10 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 oO 24 25 ‘26 ex 28 Kenda eat & kelly LLP Fa cee In Molko, the Unification Church attempted to invoke religious freedom defenses to charges that it engaged in “brainwashing” of prospective members. The key issue to the Court was that the Unification Church, as a matter of regular policy and practice, hid and actually denied to prospective recruits that the organization had any religious content or affiliation, 46 Cal.3d at 1102-1107. Recruiters even expressly denied that they were part of the Unification Church. Jd. Having failed to recruit its members by appeals to religion, the Court held that the Unification Church was estopped from invoking religious freedom protections to complaints that its lifestyle caused emotional distress. Id. at 1120 (the “misrepresentation and concealment of the Church's identity for the purpose of inducing [Plaintiffs] to submit unknowingly to coercive persuasion” gave rise to the ITED claim); 1122 (the “conduct at issue” for the HED claim was “fraudulent inducement into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion”). The uncontroverted facts in this case are directly to the contrary. The ITED claims here arise from Plaintiff's experiences as a knowing, committed member of the religion. She was a member of the religion when she joined the Sea Org. Plaintiff was brought up in a family of Scientologists. She was taught and indoctrinated into the Scientology faith by her parents and the local church. When plaintiff considered joining the Sea Org, she was well aware that it was a ‘commitment to be a volunteer in an elite religious order. Laura Dieckman Decl. Ex. HH. Later, after plaintiff had flown to Portland to be with her grandmother, she discussed with her mother whether to return to the Sea Org, including the RPF. Her mother recommended that she return. SMF 75. When plaintiff was in the RPF, she urged one of her sisters to join the Sea Org and her mother signed consent forms for two sisters to join. Reply Statement of Undisputed Facts (CRPSUF”) at 16. Plaintiff's allegation that an individual named Shane Whitmore promised that she could have phone and personal contact with her family, that she would receive a secular education through age 16, that she would receive medical care, and that she could have a child while remaining in the Sea Org cannot possibly rise to the same level of disqualification as the misleading statements in Molko. There was no misrepresentation about the Church’ identity or its status of a religion. Plaintiff and her parents were Scientologists and knew the Sea Org was the 270951. ul DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONKendall Brill & Kelly LLP 1 W 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 tage cass religion’s elite order. SMF 22-23, 28. They were not surprised to find themselves intensely intertwined with a religion. This is in direct contrast to the essential holding in Molko. Thus, the Church cannot be estopped from invoking its religious freedom defenses. Moreover, plaintiff cannot show a substantial failure to meet the alleged statements of Whitmore. Plaintiff did have numerous visits with her family; in her first year alone, she left on three occasions to visit them, and continued to do so thereafter. SMF 30. She spoke on the phone with her mother several times per week. Laura Dieckman Decl. Ex. H and Ex. U. Plaintiff did receive a secular education. sufficient to enable her to pass the test and receive a high school equivalency certificate, which requires proficiency in all of the main areas of secular education, SMF 33 and RPSUF 7. Plaintiff did receive quality medical care throughout her experience. SMF 32 and RPSUF 15. ‘With respect to the issue of having a baby while in the Sea Org, plaintiff herself testified that it would have been impossible to be a responsible parent while living the life of a Sea Org member. SMF 43. In 1996, the Church, in recognition of that fact, revised its policy to require that Sea Org members who wished to raise a young child route out of the Sea Org. (The prior policy required a Sea Org member to leave his position, but permitted him to assume a staff position with a lower level local church.) SMF 43-44, Such a revision of ecclesiastical policy is not a matter for the courts. Courts should not and cannot become entangled in the recruitment, assignment, ‘communications, and discipline of members of religious orders. Molko is entirely factually distinct Plaintiff also argues that the defendants should be deprived of First Amendment protection because she began her Sea Org career at the age of twelve, and therefore was subject to indoctrination such that she could not make decisions on her own, either then or at any subsequent, time in her life. Plaintiff's arguments would deny the protections of the religion clauses to many churches and individuals who undergo similarly intense religious experiences at an early age. In most religions, children undergo religious indoctrination from an extremely early age, attending services, reciting catechisms, going to Sunday schools, joining choral groups, becoming altar boys, entering religious study groups, studying for bar or bat mitzvahs or confirmations at early 2705511 2 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONul 12 13 4 1S 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 12 26 a7 © 28 Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP agin Amo ages under the intense supervision of rabbis, priests, cantors, ministers, etc., often with the close insistence of their parents. In more traditional and orthodox Christian, Jewish, Moslem, and Buddhist communities, childrens’ entire life is encompassed by religious indoctrination and study, and attending religious schools (including boarding schools). In Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 8.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), a minor girl and her parents sued their former church for em mal distress growing out of an incident where the church pastor led the church in physically restraining her to cure her of spiritual possession, The Texas Supreme Court held that these acts, though physical and directed at a minor, would “unconstitutionally burden” the Church’s right to free exercise, since the tort claim was closely “intertwined” with an examination of the Church's religious beliefs. Id. at * 11 (emphasis added). Plain iff also ignores the critical case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1969). In Yoder, the Supreme Court reviewed a criminal conviction of Amish parents for refusing to permit their children to attend public schools beyond the eighth grade. ‘The State argued that its compulsory attendance laws were necessary to protect children and expose them to broader ideas and knowledge. The Court agreed that life in the Amish community was isolated, controlled, and in stark contrast to that of modem secular society. 406 U.S. at 217. However, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the right of Amish families to raise their children according to the strict dictates of their religion, in isolation from secular society. The resulting “world view” of the children is simply a consequence of that protected decision. Yoder specifically protects the religiously-motivated conduct alleged to be at issue here—“brainwashing” teens into forgoing a secular education and performing religiously-directed manual labor. Plaintiff suggests that the level of indoctrination in the Sea Org is more intense than in other more mainstream religions. Even if this were true (it is not) a court is disabled constitutionally from comparing levels of religious upbringing so as to pick and choose which religions may retain First Amendment protection and which may not. The level of improper entanglement between the judiciary and churches necessary to pursue such a model would be breathtaking. Katz v, Superior Court, 73 Cal.App.3d 952, 987-988 (1977) (“When the court is asked to determine whether that change was induced by faith or by coercive persuasion is it not in 27095. B DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONSc wm ra 1 i 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 o 2 B oO. 4 25 1 26 a 27 © 28 Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP. tum investigating and questioning the validity of that faith?”). Such disparate treatment of churches violates the fundamental non-preference principle of the Establishment Clause, Larson v, Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1943) (“courts under our constitutional scheme” may not “approve, disapprove, classify, regulate, or in any ‘manner control” religious practices, because that is “merely an indirect way of preferring one religion over another”) Similarly, plaintiff's arguments that she was not subject to the ministerial exception, either at the early stages of her Sea Org career, or even later on, must be rejected. The ministerial exception is defined by the functions that the person performs, not the title he or she is given or his or her age. The term is a short hand for fundamental constitutional principles prohibiting government interference with essential religious relations within churches. “[TJhe minister's exception is better termed the ‘internal affairs” doctrine” because ‘minister’s exception’ is too narrow ....” Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.). Ifa 13 year old girl provides auditing, Scientology's central religious practice, to a parishioner, she is acting as a minister. If 12 year old boy preaches from the pulpit in a Pentecostal Church, he too is acting as a minister. The First Amendment's ministerial exception applies to both. Here, plaintiff attacks the entire experience of the Sea Org and the Church’s recruitment, indoctrination, training and discipline. Such an attempt to adjudicate “matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” is particularly ill-suited to civilian judicial review. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). See Marc Headley, v. Church of Scientology Intl, 2010 WL 3157064 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Claire Headley v. Church of Scientology Intl, 2010 WL 3184389 (C.D. Cal. 2010). IV. CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE § 970 DOES NOT APPLY In her SAC, plaintiff intertwined her minimum wage claim with a claim under Labor Code 970, but sought similar damages for lost wages under both. In her opposition, plaintiff now makes a separate argument under Section 970. She claims that Shane Whitmore induced her to move to California to become a member of the Sea Org by making misrepresentations. However, Section 970 does not apply to this dispute, as a matter of law. 270951.1 14 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION1 u bs 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 sy 22 % 23 Oo 4 25 ) %6 ss 27 O28 weap Ihe cast? Section 970 is intended to regulate the employer-employee relationship. It prohibits specific false representations made to induce an employee to move “for the purpose of working in any branch of labor.” Proving a claim under Section 970 requires demonstrating each of the elements of fraud with respect to the employer-employee relationship, including an intentional false statement of fact and “justifiable reliance.” Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing California cases); Tyco Indus. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal.App.3d 148 (1985). A. Section 970 Does Not Apply To Prospective Ministers Section 970 was enacted in 1937. As noted above, it concems exclusively false statements made to induce a person to join a “branch of labor.” (emphasis added) At that time, California courts specifically, construed the term “labor” to nor apply to the work of ministers: {I]t seems to be generally conceded, that individuals whose principal efforts are directed to the accomplishment of some mental task, such as those of ministers of the gospel... even though in its broad sense [they] perform “labor,” are not to be, nor should be, classified as “laborers.” That such a conclusion is in accord with the popular, everyday notion of what constitutes “labor” recognized and attested as a fact that its existence needs no illustration; but it is common knowledge Universal Pictures Corp. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App 2d 490, 493 (1935) (emphasis added). In Lewy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 698 and Kerr v. Nelson, 7 Cal.2d 85, 88 (1936), the Supreme Court construed the term “labor” in a labor arbitration statute, holding that the plain ‘meaning did not encompass professional employees, such as ministers, and the Legislature did not intend the term to be so understood. Levy, 15 Cal.2d at 698 (noting that the term “labor” was not generally used to apply to professionals, and that “courts are not justified in defining the term in its broadest sense when obviously to do so would not be within the legislative intent”); Kerr, 7 Cal.2d at 88. This still-binding California authority, in turn, relied heavily on Holy Trinity Church ¥. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892). In that case, the United States Supreme Court made absolutely clear that the term “labor” did not incorporate the work of ministers. Holy Trinity concemed a federal law that prohibited employers from importing aliens under contract to perform “labor of any kind.” The Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply to a New York church that had contracted with a minister residing overseas, because the term “labor” could not, consistent with common practice and values of respect for religion, be applied to the work of, 270951.1 15 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY, ADJUDICATIONos ta 9) ministers. [d.; see Universal Pictures Corp., 9 Cal. App 24 at 493 (relying on Holy Trinity); Levy, 15 Cal.2d at 698 (same), In short, at the time Section 970 was enacted in 1937, it was well-settled law that the term “labor,” as used as statutes concerning labor solicitation, did not include ministers, No case has ever applied the statute to ministers or to persons, such as the Plaintiff, who volunteer to serve in a religious order. Such a limiting construction is both consistent with and compelled by California labor law, which treats volunteer members of a religious order who agree, as plaintiff did, to volunteer without remuneration save for lodging, meals, and reimbursement for incidental expenses, very differently from ordinary “employees.” Thus, the Workers’ Compensation statute excludes from the definition of an “employee” any person “performing services in return for aid or sustenance only, received from any religious ... organization” and any person “performing voluntary service for a public agency or a private, nonprofit organization who receives no remuneration for the services other than meals, transportation, lodging, or reimbursement for incidental expenses.” Cal. Lab. Code §§ 3352(b), 3352(i) (emphasis added). Similarly, the California Department of Labor does not consider members of a religious order subject to the minimum wage laws. Cal. Labor Commissioner’s Office, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, Opinion 1988-10-27. The California Fair Housing and Employment Act, similarly, does not apply to volunteers. Mendoza v, Town of Ross, 128 Cal.App.4th 625, 632 (2005). Indeed, the California FEHA does not apply to any “religious organization” not organized for private profit, such as the Church at all. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(d). Given these provisions, there is no reason to construe Section 970 to apply to solicitations made to volunteer members of a religious order. Here, it is undisputed that the only solicitations at issue are those made to induce plaintiff to join a religious order. Plaintiff repeatedly testified that she clearly understood at the time that she was joining the Sea Organization that she was joining a religious order for the purpose of religious service, and that this service was not for purposes of ordinary employment but as a volunteer in a greater religious cause. SMF 24-25, 28; Daum Decl. Ex. B at 38 (“The purpose of the Sea Org was to protect the Scientology scriptures, to keep ethics in on the planet, and at that 270951.1 16 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONQ a Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP foe ool ge one et) 1 u 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Toa casi point in time I considered that I know if I joined the Sea Org I would be doing the most for Scientology”). The “solicitations” from Shane Whitmore, even if they occurred, were to induce Plaintiff to become a minister and an unpaid member of a religious order, not an employee. Section 970 simply does not apply as a matter of law. B. The Court Should Construe Section 970 To Avoi jutional Error Moreover, the Court should construe Section 970 as not applying to a church’s recruitment of a member of a religious order lest courts become enmeshed in the kind of close entanglement between Church and State over conditions of employment that the First Amendment and ministerial exception forbid. So long as a statute reasonably supports a clearly constitutional construction, this Court must construe the Legislature's statutes to avoid even the possibility of constitutional error. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Service (1985) 38 Cal.3d 384, 394 (“When faced with a statute reasonably susceptible of two or ‘more interpretations, of which at least one raises constitutional questions, we should construe it in a manner that avoids any doubt about its validity”). California law is absolutely clear that the First Amendment protects a Church’s ability to recruit its ministers, as well as false statements made as part of the employment process, even to people who are not yet or no longer ministers. Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1175 (1989) (“secular courts will not attempt to right wrongs related to the hiring, firing, discipline or administration of clergy”); Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., 167 Cal.App.4th 206, 217 (2008) (false and defamatory statements made about a minister after he left the church not actionable, because the statements were made as an “inseparable” part of the termination process). Similarly, here, the statements at issue in Plaintiff's 970 claim are “inseparable” from the Church’s recruitment practice. For Plaintiff to prevail on such a claim, the Court would need to consider evidence of Plaintiff's religious beliefs, the precise nature of her “work” within the Sea Org, the ‘Church’ religious practices concerning that “work,” and the Church’s position on education and parental involvement of its ministers. This is precisely what the First Amendment forbids, 270951.1 7 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONwe wn ey 10 uM 12 1B 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a > 22 23 Oo 24 25 26 7 anes. Kendall Bil Skelly LLP C. Even If Section 970 Did Apply, Plaintiff Could Not Prevail Finally, even if this were an ordinary employment case, and Section 970 did apply, Plaintiff still could not succeed on the claim. First, Plaintiff makes no showing that Shane Whitmore made a misrepresentation prohibited by § 970. Laura Dieckman Decl. Ex. HH. With respect to the “kind, character, and existence of the work,” plaintiff understood that the work was religious, working to further the ecclesiastical goals of Scientology and the Sea Org, and not of a commercial or secular nature. Jd. No more was required under the statute. With respect to “the length of time the work will last, or the compensation therefor,” plaintiff well understood that Sea Org work was a lifetime commitment, and she signed a contract for one billion years. Laura Dieckman Decl., 419. Again, plaintiff makes no claim that Whitmore represented anything to the contrary. Further, the agreement plaintiff and her mother signed made clear that the service was as a volunteer, with no salary compensation. Laura Dieckman Decl. Ex. HH. Second, a § 970 claim requires a plaintiff to meet all of the elements of common-law fraud or misrepresentation, including that she justifiably relied on the purported misrepresentation of fact. Funk, 842 F.2d at 1133. Here, plaintiff cannot demonstrate justifiable reliance. She (and her mother) signed a written covenant that (a) made clear she was joining as a volunteer as a religious order, subject to the Church’s policies governing that order, and (b) specifically disclaimed the binding effect of any oral representations about plaintiff's work as a minister. Dieckman Decl. Ex. HA. (“The Church shall not be obligated to honor any verbal promise, or any other terms or conditions not specifically covered in this covenant” ... the Sea Org subject to Church “policy” which could be changed at any time “with or without notice.”). The covenant makes clear that Plaintiff was expected to serve both “weekdays” and “evenings and weekends” and that she was “expected to study in their off hours and to assist with additional duties.” /d.! ' The Plaintiff, though a minor, was competent to sign this agreement at the time, subject to a later right of disaffirmance until or shortly after majority (which she never exercised). See Family Code § 6700. Plaintiff's mother, who also signed the contract, was entirely competent to do so. 270951.1 18 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY, ADJUDICATION1 Plaintiff neither has (nor could) set forth any facts to show that she did not read this 2'|| Agreement or understand these commitments at the time she made them, and is presumed by law 3 ]|to have done so. Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 93 (“courts must .. 4 | presume parties understood the agreements they sign”). These facts defeat—as a matter of law— Plait iff s Section 970 claim to have justifiably relied on oral representations. Employees may not, as a matter of law, justifiably rely upon oral promises about employment conditions that are 5 6 7 || directly contradicted by integrated written agreements setting forth the terms of employment. See, 8 |leg,, Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co. (1990) 221 Cal. App.3d 799, 807 (plaintiff's “alleged 9)|| reliance on ... promises of continuing employment is simply not justifiable because the || representations contradict the parties’ integrated employment agreement”); Dore v. Arnold 11 || Worldwide, inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 387-388, 393-94 (plaintiff “as a matter of law” could not 12 || have justifiably relied on oral promises in light of the existence of a written agreement). 13||V. | THE MINIMUM WAGE LAWS DO NOT APPLY TO RELIGIOUS WORKERS. ACTING ON BEHALF OF A CHURCH Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to unpaid minimum wages because she was not covered by the ministerial exception. Defendants have shown that she was. But even if the exception did not apply, Plaintiff nevertheless was not covered by the minimum wages laws because she was engaged in non-commercial religious work on behalf of a tax exempt church. The California Department of Labor does not consider members of a religious order subject to the minimum wage laws. Cal. Labor Commissioner's Office, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, Opinion 1988-10-27 (“If [a] person intends to volunteer his or her services for public service, religious, or humanitarian objectives, not as an employee and without contemplation of pay, the individual is not an employee of the ... religious corporation which receives the services” and not eligible for minimum wage) (emphasis added). This conclusion is amply supported by considerable federal authority, which holds that members of religious orders are not subject to federal minimum wage 7°) as, Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1140 (D. Mass. 1982) 13, 781 ctaft member of forerunner of CSI not covered by federal and state minimum wage laws because is 7 the legislative history and regulations [of FLSA] suggest that religious activities of non-profit Kendal | ao a Skelly LLP Pisetvcn ne DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY eta asec ADJUDICATIONROE eo) tt oso oa ye 27 © 28 Kendall aikelly LLP EE ce organizations were to be exempt”, she was not a “person whose employment contemplated compensation,” and “the labor she provided [was not] related to commerce or the production of goods for commerce”); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 377 (D.R.I. 1978) (member of religious order not covered by FLSA); Wage and Hour Division, Dep’t of Labor, Field Operations Handbook § 10b03(b): “[M]embers of religious orders who serve pursuant to their religious obligations ... shall not be considered to be “employees.” See also Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D. Mass. 1983). Thus, there is simply no legal basis for a ‘minimum wage claim here. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated the motion should be granted. DATED: February 24, 2016 KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP a By: Bert H. Deixfer Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology International DATED: February24_, 2016 JEFFER, MANGELS, BUTLER & MITCHELL, LLP a. . Matthew D. Hinks: Attomeys for Religious Technology Center 20511 _ DEFENDANTS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADIUDICATION