RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION
Miranda vs. Arizona [384 US 436, 13 June 1966]
Facts: [No. 759; Miranda vs. Arizona] On 13 March
1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home
and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station.
He was there identified by the complaining
witness. The police then took him to
"Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective
bureau. There he was questioned by two police
officers. The officers did not advise Miranda that
he had a right to have an attorney present. Two
hours later, the officers emerged from the
interrogation room with a written confession
signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement
was a typed paragraph stating that the
confession was made voluntarily, without threats
or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge
of my legal rights, understanding any statement I
make may be used against me." At his trial before
a jury, the written confession was admitted into
evidence over the objection of defense counsel,
and the officers testified to the prior oral
confession made by Miranda during the
interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to
30 years' imprisonment on each count, the
sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's
constitutional rights were not violated in
obtaining the confession and affirmed the
conviction. In reaching its decision, the court
emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not
specifically request counsel.
[No. 760, Vignera vs. New York] Michael Vignera,
was picked up by New York police on 14 October
1960, in connection with the robbery three days
earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to
the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in
Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he was taken to
the 66th Detective Squad. While at the 66th
Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the
store owner and a saleslady as the man who
robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he was
formally arrested. The police then transported
him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in
Brooklyn, "for detention." At 11 p. m. Vignera was
questioned by an assistant district attorney in the
presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed
the questions and Vignera's answers. This
verbatim account of these proceedings contains
no statement of any warnings given by the
assistant district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a
charge of first degree robbery, the detective
testified as to the oral confession. The
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transcription of the statement taken was also

introduced in evidence. Vignera was found guilty
of first degree robbery. He was subsequently
adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced
to 30 to 60 years' imprisonment. The conviction
was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Division, Second Department, and by the Court of
Appeals,
also
without
opinion,
remittitur
amended. In argument to the Court of Appeals,
the State contended that Vignera had no
constitutional right to be advised of his right to
counsel or his privilege against self-incrimination.
[No. 761, Westover vs. United States] At
approximately 9:45 p. m. on 20 March 1963, Carl
Calvin Westover was arrested by local police in
Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City
robberies. A report was also received from the FBI
that he was wanted on a felony charge in
California. The local authorities took him to a
police station and placed him in a line-up on the
local charges, and at about 11:45 p. m. he was
booked. Kansas City police interrogated Westover
on the night of his arrest. He denied any
knowledge of criminal activities. The next day
local officers interrogated him again throughout
the morning. Shortly before noon they informed
the FBI that they were through interrogating
Westover and that the FBI could proceed to
interrogate him. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that Westover was ever given any
warning as to his rights by local police. At noon,
three special agents of the FBI continued the
interrogation in a private interview room of the
Kansas City Police Department, this time with
respect to the robbery of a savings and loan
association and a bank in Sacramento, California.
After two or two and one-half hours, Westover
signed separate confessions to each of these two
robberies which had been prepared by one of the
agents during the interrogation. At trial one of the
agents testified, and a paragraph on each of the
statements states, that the agents advised
Westover that he did not have to make a
statement, that any statement he made could be
used against him, and that he had the right to
see an attorney. Westover was tried by a jury in
federal court and convicted of the California
robberies. His statements were introduced at
trial.
He
was
sentenced
to
15
years'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to
run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit.
[No. 584, California vs. Stewart] In the course
of investigating a series of purse-snatch

robberies in which one of the victims had

died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Roy
Allen Stewart was pointed out to Los Angeles
police as the endorser of dividend checks
taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15
p. m., 31 January 1963, police officers went
to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of
the officers asked Stewart if they could
search the house, to which he replied, "Go
ahead." The search turned up various items
taken from the five robbery victims. At the
time of Stewart's arrest, police also arrested
Stewart's wife and three other persons who
were visiting him. These four were jailed
along with Stewart and were interrogated.
Stewart was taken to the University Station
of the Los Angeles Police Department where
he was placed in a cell. During the next five
days, police interrogated Stewart on nine
different occasions. Except during the first
interrogation
session,
when
he
was
confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart
was isolated with his interrogators. During
the ninth interrogation session, Stewart
admitted that he had robbed the deceased
and stated that he had not meant to hurt her.
Police then brought Stewart before a
magistrate for the first time. Since there was
no evidence to connect them with any crime,
the police then released the other four
persons arrested with him. Nothing in the
record specifically indicates whether Stewart
was or was not advised of his right to remain
silent or his right to counsel. In a number of
instances, however, the interrogating officers
were asked to recount everything that was
said
during
the
interrogations.
None
indicated that Stewart was ever advised of
his rights. Stewart was charged with
kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and
murder. At his trial, transcripts of the first
interrogation and the confession at the last
interrogation were introduced in evidence.
The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and
first degree murder and fixed the penalty as
death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
California reversed.
Issue: Whether the written confessions made
in uncounselled interrogation, with the
accused not appraised of his right to consult
with an attorney and to have one during the
inerrogation, nor his right not to be
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compelled to incriminate himself, are not

admissible as evidence.
Held: In No. 759, from the testimony of the
officers and by the admission of the State of
Arizona, it is clear that Miranda was not in
any way apprised of his right to consult with
an attorney and to have one present during
the interrogation, nor was his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself effectively
protected in any other manner. Without
these warnings the statements were
inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a
statement which contained a typed-in clause
stating that he had "full knowledge" of his
"legal rights" does not approach the knowing
and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights. Similarly in No. 760,
Vignera was not warned of any of his rights
before the questioning by the detective and
by the assistant district attorney. No other
steps were taken to protect these rights.
Thus he was not effectively apprised of his
Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right to
have counsel present and his statements are
inadmissible. In No. 761, there is nothing in
the facts that Westover knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to remain silent
and his right to consult with counsel prior to
the time he made the statement. At the time
the FBI agents began questioning Westover,
he had been in custody for over 14 hours
and had been interrogated at length during
that period. The FBI interrogation began
immediately upon the conclusion of the
interrogation by Kansas City police and was
conducted in local police headquarters.
There is no evidence of any warning given
prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any
evidence of an articulated waiver of rights
after the FBI commenced its interrogation.
The record simply shows that the defendant
did in fact confess a short time after being
turned over to the FBI following interrogation
by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI
agents gave warnings at the outset of their
interview, from Westover's point of view the
warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process. In these circumstances
an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights
cannot be assumed. Law enforcement
authorities
are
not
precluded
from
questioning any individual who has been

held for a period of time by other authorities

and
interrogated
by
them
without
appropriate warnings. A different case would
be presented if an accused were taken into
custody by the second authority, removed
both in time and place from his original
surroundings, and then adequately advised
of his rights and given an opportunity to
exercise them. Lastly in No. 584, In dealing
with custodial interrogation, the Court will
not presume that a defendant has been
effectively apprised of his rights and that his
privilege against self-incrimination has been
adequately safeguarded on a record that
does not show that any warnings have been
given or that any effective alternative has
been employed. Nor can a knowing and
intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed
on a silent record. Furthermore, Stewart's
steadfast denial of the alleged offenses
through eight of the nine interrogations over
a period of five days is subject to no other
construction than that he was compelled by
persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth
Amendment privilege.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21

February 2001]
Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around
7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her
house together with her husband (Danilo
Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and
Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to
her "on the upper part" of her body. At
around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her
up because he sensed someone going
down the stairs of their house. She
noticed that Nairube was no longer in the
place where she was sleeping but she
assumed that Nairube merely answered
the call of nature. Nairube's blanket was
also no longer at the place she slept but
that her slippers were still there. After
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three minutes of waiting for Nairube's

return, she stood up and began calling
out for Nairube but there was no answer.
Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw
that the backdoor of their house was
open. She went outside through the
backdoor to see if Nairube was there but
she was not. She found a pair of rubber
slippers on top of a wooden bench outside
of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers
was red while the strap was a
combination of yellow and white; said
slippers did not belong to any member of
her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to
the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for
help. Then, in the morning of 16
September 1997, she went to the police
station to report the loss of her child. She
also reported the discovery of the pair of
slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She
then went home while the police began
their search for Nairube. At around 12:30
p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with
the searching team. During the search,
Alma Diaz found a panty which she
recognized as that of her daughter. After
seeing the panty, she cried. She was
thereafter ordered to go home while the
others continued the search. Thereafter,
they continued the search and found a
black collared T-shirt with buttons in front
and piping at the end of the sleeve
hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave
the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria
informed him that the two items were
worn by Clemente John Lugod when he
went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At
around
7:00
p.m.,
SP02
Gallardo
apprehended Lugod on the basis of the
pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He
then brought Lugod to the police station
where he was temporarily incarcerated.
At first, the accused denied that he did
anything to Nairube but after he told him
what happened to the girl. Later,
although he admitted to having raped
and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to
make a statement regarding the same.
After having been informed that the body
of Nairube was in the grassy area,
Gallardo together with other members of
the PNP, the Crime Watch and the
townspeople continued the search but

they were still not able to find the body of

Nairube. It was only when they brought
Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the
location of the cadaver, on 18 September
1997, that they found the body of
Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was
charged for rape with homicide. Upon
arraignment, Lugod with the assistance of
counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October
1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him
to death, and ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for her death and P37,200.00 as actual
damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Lugods confession and
subesequent act of pointing the location
of the Nairubes body may be used
against him as evidence.
Held: Records reveal that Lugod was not
informed of his right to remain silent and
to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to
have counsel of his choice, he would be
provided with one. Moreover, there is no
evidence to indicate that he intended to
waive these rights. Besides, even if he did
waive these rights, in order to be valid,
the waiver must be made in writing and
with
the
assistance
of
counsel.
Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing
to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed
Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having
transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill
of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our
Constitution which cannot be disregarded
or ignored no matter how brutal the crime
committed may be. In the same vein,
Lugod's act in pointing out the location of
the body of Nairube was also elicited in
violation of the Lugod's right to remain
silent. The same was an integral part of
the- uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Even if we were to assume that Lugod
was not yet under interrogation and thus
not entitled to his constitutional rights at
the time he was brought to the police
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station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his

apprehension cannot be characterized as
having been voluntarily made considering
the peculiar circumstances surrounding
his detention. His confession was elicited
by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that
he would help him if he told the truth.
Furthermore,
when
ugod
allegedly
pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2
Gallardo, the whole police force as well as
nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti
escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated
that the townspeople were antagonistic
towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him.
The atmosphere from the time Lugod was
apprehended and taken to the police
station up until the time he was alleged to
have pointed out the location of the body
of the victim was highly intimidating and
was not conducive to a spontaneous
response. Amidst such a highly coercive
atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was
beaten up and maltreated by the police
officers raises a very serious doubt as to
the
voluntariness
of
his
alleged
confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified
that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell,
he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his
face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that
he was maltreated. Considering that the
confession of Lugod cannot be used
against him, the only remaining evidence
which was established by the prosecution
is the fact that several persons testified
having seen Lugod the night before the
murder of Nairube and on several other
occasions wearing the rubber slippers and
black T-shirt found at the house of the
victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as
well as the testimony of Romualdo
Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that
he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16
September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia
without a T-shirt and without slippers.
These
pieces
of
evidence
are
circumstantial in nature. The combination
of the above-mentioned circumstances
does not lead to the irrefutably logical
conclusion
that
Lugod
raped
and
murdered Nairube. At most, these
circumstances, taken with the testimonies
of the other prosecution witnesses,
merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on

that fateful evening and places Lugod at

the scene of the crime and nothing more.
Lugod was acquitted.
2. People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755,

14 April 1999]
Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and
6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped
his tricycle by the side of Nita's
Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan
City, when three women flagged him.
Parked at a distance of about 1 meters
in front of him was a tricycle driven by
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that
point, Alonzo saw 2 men and a woman
(Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession
of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one
of the two men (Ernesto "Jun" Marquez)
armed with a gun started chasing a man
who was trying to help the woman, while
the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya)
kicked the woman sending her to the
ground. Soon after, the armed man
returned and while the woman was still
on the ground he shot her on the head.
The bag taken by the man was brought to
the tricycle of del Rosario where someone
inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received the
bag. The armed man then sat behind the
driver while his companion entered the
sidecar. When the tricycle sped away
Alonzo gave chase and was able to get
the plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he
went to the nearest police headquarters
and reported the incident. Upon finding
the name of the owner of the tricycle,
SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team
proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house
of the barangay captain where the owner
of the tricycle was summoned and who in
turn revealed the driver's name and was
invited
for
interview.
Del
Rosario
volunteered to name his passengers on
13 May 1996. On the way to the police
station, del Rosario informed them of the
bag and lunch kit's location and the place
where the hold-uppers may be found and
they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After
lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma
composed of 15 armed men where a
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shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00

to 4:00 p.m. After a brief encounter, they
went inside the house where they found
Marquez dead holding a magazine and a
gun. While all of these were happening,
del Rosario was at the back of the school,
handcuffed by the police because
allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they
were afraid that he might attempt to
escape. After the encounter, they went
back
to
the
police
station.
The
investigator took the statement of del
Rosario on 14 May 1996, and was only
subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while,
he was detained in the police station as
ordered by the Fiscal. His statements
were only signed on 16 May 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del
Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that
he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos
to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas
Edward Coliseum but was directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the
robbery homicide occurred. He claimed
that the 3 men alighted and warned del
Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise
he and his family would be harmed. Del
Rosario then went home. Because of the
threat, however, he did not report the
matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to
the barangay captain and the police. Del
Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and John Doe
alias "Dodong" were charged with the
special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide for having robbed Virginia
Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of
P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on
the occasion thereof shot and killed her.
While del Rosario pleaded not guilty,
Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at
large. Thus, only del Rosario was tried.
The trial court found del Rosario guilty as
co-principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death,
and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia
Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages
and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether del Rosario was deprived

of his rights during custodial investigation
at the time he was invited for
questioning at the house ofthe barangay
captain.
Held: Del Rosario was deprived of his
rights during custodial investigation. From
the time he was invited" for questioning
at the house of the barangay captain, he
was already under effective custodial
investigation, but he was not apprised nor
made aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the
name of the tricycle driver and the latter
was already a suspect in the robbing and
senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since
the prosecution failed to establish that del
Rosario had waived his right to remain
silent, his verbal admissions on his
participation in the crime even before his
actual arrest were inadmissible against
him, as the same transgressed the
safeguards provided by law and the Bill of
Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas,
del Rosario too was a hapless victim who
was forcibly used by other persons with
nefarious designs to perpetrate a
dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence. Del
Rosario was threatened with a gun. He
could not therefore be expected to flee
nor risk his life to help a stranger. A
person under the same circumstances
would be more concerned with his
personal welfare and security rather than
the safety of a person whom he only saw
for the first time that day. On the other
hand, conspiracy between him and his coaccused was not proved beyond a
whimper of a doubt by the prosecution,
thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity
in the crime charged.

National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, are

assigned. Patrolmen Alcantara and Dayao
proceeded to the scene of the crime of
Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon
arrival they saw the deceased Pagdalian
lying on an improvised bed full of blood with
stab wounds. They then inquired about the
circumstances of the incident and were
informed that the deceased was with 2
companions, on the previous night, one of
whom was Ramon Bolanos who had a
drinking spree with the deceased and
another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till
the wee hours of the following morning, 23
June 1990. When Alcantara and Dayao
apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm
of the deceased on the chair where Bolanos
was allegedly seated. They boarded Ramon
Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police
vehicle and brought them to the police
station. In the vehicle where the suspect was
riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted
that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian
because he was abusive," after he was asked
by the police if he killed the victim. Bolanos
was charged for murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14,
under Criminal Case 1831-M-90. The trial
court, even if the alleged oral admission of
Bolanos was given without the assistance of
counsel when it was made while on board
the police vehicle on their way to the police
station, found Bolanos guilty of the crime
charged and imposed on him the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00.
The Office of the Solicitor General threafter
filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's
Brief), claiming that the lower court erred in
admitting in evidence the extra-judicial
confession of Bolanos while on board the
police patrol jeep.
Issue: Whether the extra-judicial confession
of Bolanos while on board the police patrol
jeep may be used to prove Bolanos guilt.

3. People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3

July 1992]
Facts: The death of the victim, Oscar
Pagdalian, was communicated to the Police
Station where Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara
and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated
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Held:
Being
already
under
custodial
investigation while on board the police patrol
jeep on the way to the Police Station where
formal
investigation
may
have
been
conducted, Bolanos should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights under

Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution

which explicitly provides: (1) Any person
under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the service of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any
confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The
law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violation of this section as well as
compensation and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices and their families.
Considering the clear requirements of the
Constitution with respect to the manner by
which confession can be admissible in
evidence, and the glaring fact that the
alleged confession obtained while on board
the police vehicle was the only reason for the
conviction, besides Bolanos's conviction was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court has no recourse but to reverse the
subject judgment under review
4. People vs. Mahinay [GR 122485, 1

February 1999]
Facts: Larry Mahinay y Amparado started
working as houseboy with Maria Isip on 20
November 1993. His task was to take care of
Isip's house which was under construction
adjacent to her old residence situated inside
a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T.
de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. mahinay
stayed and slept in an apartment also owned
by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria
Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in
Dian Street. She used to pass by Isip's house
on her way to school and play inside the
compound yard, catching maya birds
together with other children. On 25 June
1995, at 8:00 a.m., Mahinay joined Gregorio
Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 a.m.,
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Mahinay, who was already drunk, left

Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from
Isip to go out with his friends. Sgt. Roberto
Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to
his in-law's house between 6 to 7 p.m. met
Mahinay along Dian Street. That same
evening, between 8 to 9 p.m., he saw Ma.
Victoria standing in front of the gate of the
unfinished house. Later, at 9 p.m., Mahinay
showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy
lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed Mahinay that
there was none left of it. She noticed that
Mahinay appeared to be uneasy and in deep
thought. She asked why he looked so worried
but he did not answer. Then he left and
walked back to the compound. Meanwhile,
Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma.
Victoria, was missing. She last saw her
daughter wearing a pair of white shorts,
brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue
blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando
and blue rubber slippers. Mahinay failed to
show up for supper that night. On the
following day, 26 June 1995, at 2 a.m.,
Mahinay boarded a passenger jeepney
driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa.
Mahinay alighted at the top of the bridge of
the North Expressway and had thereafter
disappeared. That same morning, around
7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of
Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy
immediately reported what he saw to the
victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan.
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the
lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved
from the septic tank. She was wearing a
printed blouse without underwear. Her face
bore bruises. Back in the compound, SPO1
Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro
were informed by Isip that her houseboy,
Mahinay, was missing. At the second floor of
the house under construction, they retrieved
from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white
short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair
ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to
belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They
also found inside another room a pair of blue
slippers which Isip identified as that of
Mahinay. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were
an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty
long pants and a pliers positively identified
by Isip as Mahinay's belongings. These items

were brought to the police station. A police

report was subsequently prepared including
a referral slip addressed to the office of the
Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1
Virgilio
Villano
retrieved
the
victim's
underwear from the septic tank. After a
series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was
finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station. On 7 July 1995,
with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes,
Mahinay
executed
an
extra-judicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how
he raped and killed the victim. Also, when
Mahinay came face to face with the victim's
mother and aunt, he confided to them that
he was not alone in raping and killing the
victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his
co-conspirators. Thus, on 10 July 1995,
Mahinay was charged with rape with
homicide, to which he pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the lower court rendered a
decision convicting Mahinay of the crime
charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to
the victim's heirs. Hence, the automatic
review.

watchful and vigilant to notice any

irregularity
in
the
manner
of
the
investigation and the physical conditions of
the accused. The post mortem findings show
that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual
strangulation;
Traumatic
Head
injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with
the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the
victim and the latter's head hit the table and
the victim lost consciousness. There being no
evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of
violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency nor
that the investigating officer could have been
motivated to concoct the facts narrated in
said affidavit; the confession of the accused
is held to be true, correct and freely or
voluntarily given. In
his
extrajudicial
confession, Mahinay himself admitted that
he had sexual congress with the unconscious
child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides
8 others, established the felony of rape with
homicide defined and penalized under
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, RA 7659.
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

Held: Larry Mahinay during the custodial

investigation and after having been informed
of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the
Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his
statement admitting the commission of the
crime. Said confession of Mahinay given with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is
believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the
proper authorities of any maltreatment on
his person. He did not even inform the
Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the
truth of his statement on 8 July 1995 that he
was forced, coerced or was promised of
reward or leniency. That his confession
abound with details known only to him. The
Court noted that a lawyer from the Public
Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and
as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed
and explained to Mahinay his constitutional
rights and was present all throughout the
giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by Mahinay. A lawyer from
the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be
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1. People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July

1989]
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk
of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at
its Baguio City station. It having allegedly
come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the
PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted into the matter
of 9 February 1986. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On the
day before the investigation, 8 February
1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten note stating the at he was
willing to settle irregularities allegedly
charged against him in the amount of
P76,000
(approximately)
subject
to
conditions as may be imposed by PAL on or
before 1700/9 February 1986. At the

investigation of 9 February 1986, conducted

by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City,
Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station
Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk
Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward
Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was
informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to
questions by Cruz, were taken down in
writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect
inter alia that he had not indeed made
disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had
been "misused" by him, that although he had
planned on paying back the money, he had
been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by)
shame," that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a "compromise to
pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount
would be known in the next investigation;"
that he desired the next investigation to be
at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he
should be represented therein by "Shop
stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he
was willing to sign his statement (as he in
fact afterwards did). How the investigation
turned out is not dealt with the parties at all;
but it would seem that no compromise
agreement
was
reached
much
less
consummated. About 2 months later, an
information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa
allegedly committed in Baguio City during
the period from 12 March 1986 to 29 January
1987. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe
Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and
trial thereafter ensued. At the close of the
people's case, the private prosecutors made
a written offer of evidence dated 21 June
1988, which included the statement of
Ramos taken on 9 February 1986 at PAL
Baguio City Ticket Office, as well as his
handwritten admission given on 8 February
1986.
Ramos'
attorneys
filed
"Objections/Comments
to
Plaintiffs
Evidence." By Order dated 9 August 1988,
Judge Ruben Ayson (Branch 6, RTC Baguio
City) admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they
are worth," except Ramos' statement of 9
February and his handwritten admission
dated 8 February. The private prosecutors
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filed a motion for reconsideration. It was

denied, by Order dated 14 September 1988.
The private prosecutors, in the name of the
People of the Philippines, filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders
of 9 August 1988 and 14 September 1988.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of a
person under custodial investigation comes
into play during the administrative inquiry.
Held: Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term
should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in
which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under
custodial interrogation did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him
on the first day of the administrative
investigation, 9 February 1986 and agreed
that the proceedings should be recorded, the
record having thereafter been marked during
the trial of the criminal action subsequently
filed against him, just as it is obvious that the
note that he sent to his superiors on 8
February 1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a
free and even spontaneous act on his part.
They may not be excluded on the ground
that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos. As to the danger of
violation of the right of any person against
self-incrimination when the investigation is
conducted by the complaining companies or
employers, it suffices to draw attention to
the specific and peremptory requirement of
the law that disciplinary sanctions may not
be imposed on any employee by his
employer until and unless the employee has
been accorded due process, by which is
meant that the latter must be informed of
the offenses ascribed to him and afforded
adequate time and opportunity to explain his
side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee
under such administrative investigation in his
defense, with opportunity to solicit the
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and

friends. The employee may, of course, refuse

to submit any statement at the investigation,
that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do
so, in his defense to the accusation against
him, it would be absurd to reject his
statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal
action brought against him, because he had
not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to
silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant
only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is
self-evident that the employee's statements,
whether called "position paper," "answer,"
etc., are submitted by him precisely so that
they may be admitted and duly considered
by the investigating officer or committee, in
negation or mitigation of his liability.
2. Office of the Court Administrator

vs. Sumilang [Administrative Matter

MTJ-94-989, 18 April 1997]
Facts: Court interpreter Felicidad Malla, who
was the officer-in-charge from 1 July 1992 to
15 November 1992, took a maternity leave
for 1 month (16 November 1992 to 15
December 1992) and reassumed her position
on 16 December 1992, until her resignation
on 31 August 1993. On 1 September 1993,
Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of
officer in charge. It was during her tenure on
8 August 1994, that an onthe-spot audit
examination was conducted by the Fiscal
Audit Division of the Office of Court
Administrator. In the course of the
examination, several anomalous transactions
were discovered. One involved a manager's
check deposited in the name of Teodorico
Dizon in connection with Civil Case 858,
wherein Entero Villarica, on 7 August 1992
during the tenure of Malla entrusted the
amount of P240,000.00 to Malla instead of
handling it over to the Clerk of Court
pursuant to Supreme Court Circular 13-92.
When
asked
to
explain
where
the
P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she
deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch
of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) but she
and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it
allegedly under the belief that Dizon would
demand the delivery of the money upon the
termination of the case. Upon further
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questioning
by
the
examining team,
however, Malla admitted that she lent the
amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter
Edelita Lagmay, P40,000.00 to stenoreporter Nieva Mercado, and P81,000.00 to
Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She
spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of
her husband and the remaining balance for
personal purposes. Later on, she executed an
affidavit stating that only Lagmay and
Mercado
borrowed
P55,000.00
and
P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand,
she used P100,000.00 for her personal
needs. Upon learning that they were being
implicated in the anomalous transaction,
Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that
the amount of P55,000.00 was from the
personal account of Malla and not from the
P240,000.00 amount deposited before the
court and such loan has already been paid.
Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the
amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only
two weeks before the audit took place, when
Malla was no longer employed with the court.
Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any
involvement in any of the transactions. Judge
Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita
Lagmay
and
Nieva
Mercado,
court
employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pila, Laguna were charged in a memorandum
report by the Office of Court Administrator
dated 16 August 1994, for misappropriating
funds deposited by Spouses Entero Villarica
and Felicidad Domingo in Civil Case 858. On
5 October 1994, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution treating the memorandum report
as
an
administrative
complaint
(Administrative
Matter
MTJ-94-989).
In
addition, a second complaint was lodged
against Malla for removing judicial records
outside the court premises. The Court
decided to include this matter in the original
complaint earlier docketed as AM MTJ-94-989
in a resolution dated 6 March 1995.
Issue: Whether Malla's constitutional rights
were violated when she signed an affidavit
dated 14 September 1994 before the Office
of the Court Administrator, where she
admitted her misdeed.
Held: The constitutional provision under
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may

be
invoked
only
during
"custodial
investigation"
or
as
in
"custody
investigation" which has been defined as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." The
investigation is defined as an "investigation
conducted by police authorities which will
include investigation conducted by the
Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI
and such other police agencies in our
government." Thus, the Office of the Court
Administrator can hardly be deemed to be
the law enforcement authority contemplated
in the constitutional provision. At any rate,
Malla admitted during her testimony that she
received the said check from Villarica
covering the amount of P240,000.00 payable
to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit
it with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter
refused because there was no order from
Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica
entrusted said check to her. It was at this
juncture that she used the money for
personal purposes. During the investigation,
Malla repeated what she basically stated in
her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial
amount of the P240,000.00 for her personal
needs. This effectively refutes whatever
pressure and coercion she claims was
employed against her. By repeating her
confession in open court, Malla thereby
converted it into a judicial confession.
People v. Uy (G.R. No. 157399)
Facts: The accused in this case accused Uy at the time
stated in the information was a Treasurer at the
NPC; accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time
mentioned in the information was the Manager of Loan
Management and Foreign Exchange Division
(LOMAFED); Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial
Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time mentioned in the
information; Gamus does not have any custody to public
funds; Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not
require him to take custody or control of public funds.
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC)
became embroiled in a controversy involving the
disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which
were originally on deposit with the Philippine National
Bank, NPC Branch (PNB) but were subsequently used
to purchase two (2) managers/cashiers checks (the first
check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00 while the
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second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with

its loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC
was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous
procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this
case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M.
Kalaw Branch), which local bank was supposed to remit
the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank
(in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then
supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to
a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo
Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account
of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned
banks (embodied in three 3 Payment Instructions)
included a value date (which was July 13, 1990), the
mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned
procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the
NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais
(the second bank) remitted Japanese Yen
1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch.
Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw
Branch was supposed to have remitted on said value
date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M.
Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had
already issued two (2) managers/cashiers checks for
such purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to
Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no
payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of
Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have
offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw
Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25
to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were
diametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered
by the two PNB Managers checks by falsifying a
commercial document called an Application for
Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number
(A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name
of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that
NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the
Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB
to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs
savings account did not contain any account number.
Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded
in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch
in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas, George
Aonuevo and Mara Aonuevo.
On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
Decision, finding the accused Jaime B. Ochoa guilty of
the crime of malversation of public funds thru falsification
of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable
doubt accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias
warrant of arrest was issued against Raul Gutierrez.
Issue:

Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of

Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents?

People vs. Jaime Ochoa, et.al, G.R. No. 157399, November 17,
2005

Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty
of malversation, the prosecution must prove the the
offender is a public officer; that he has the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; that the funds or property involved are public
funds or property for which he is accountable; and that
he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.
The Supreme Court further ruled that Malversation may
be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property or passively
through negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation,
there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence and while the prevailing facts of a case may
not show that deceit attended the commission of the
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to
prove the existence of negligence because both are
equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust,
and whether it is committed through deceit or
negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes
a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the
putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner
yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the
information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first
mode of misappropriation would still be in order.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by
negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense
is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even
if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction
thereof is proper. The question of whether or not an
information charging the commission of the crime by
means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of
negligence is neither novel nor of first impression. An
accused charged with willful or intentional falsification
can validly be convicted of falsification through
negligence.
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Facts: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for

allegedly having falsified the NPCs application for managers checks
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS
and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), Philippine
Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), and thus succeeded in diverting,
collecting and receiving the total amount mentioned), Philippine
Currency from the National Power Corporation, which they thereafter
malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power
Corporation.
Issues: What is custodial investigation? Was the accused under
custodial investigation? Was his statement, taken without counsel,
admissible in evidence?
Ruling: The investigation under Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution refers to a custodial investigation where a suspect has
already been taken into police custody and the investigating officers
begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the suspect. Thus, the accused, considering the
circumstances that his statement was taken during the administrative
investigation of NPCs audit team before he was taken into custody
and was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and
where there was no specific suspect yet, was not under custodial
investigation. And though it appears that statement was taken without
a counsel, the sworn statement was conducted by NPC personnel for
the NPCs administrative investigation therefore does not fall in the
ambit of Section 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution, and after having
denied that he was coerced or intimidated, affirmed the contents of the
document as a true reflection of his statements and even signed the
same, the statement therefore is admissible.

POLICE LINE-UP
1. Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27

June 1988]
Facts: On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 a.m.,
Christopher Gamboa y Gonzales was
arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of
arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia.
Thereafter, Gamboa was brought to Precinct
2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy
and then detained therein together with
several others. The following day, 20 July
1979, during the lineup of 5 detainees,
including Gamboa, Erlinda B. Bernal pointed
to Gamboa and said, "that one is a
companion." After the identification, the
other detainees were brought back to their
cell but Gamboa was ordered to stay on.
While Bernal was being interrogated by the
police investigator, Gamboa was told to sit
down in front of her. On 23 July 1979, an

information for robbery was filed against

Gamboa. On 22 August 1979, Gamboa was
arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held.
On 2 April 1980, the prosecution formally
offered its evidence and then rested its case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel,
instead of presenting his defense,
manifested in open court that he was filing a
Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On
13 August 1980, Gamboa filed said Motion
predicated on the ground that the conduct of
the line-up, without notice to, and in the
absence of, his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. On 23 October 1980, the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in
Criminal Case 47622 issued the order
denying the Motion to Acquit. Gamboa filed
the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Issue: Whether Gamboa was entitled to a
counsel, as part of his right in custodial
investigation, at the time he was placed in a
police lineup.
Held: The right to counsel attaches upon the
start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an
offense. Any person under investigation
must, among other things, be assisted by
counsel. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (similar guarantees in Section
12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) are
clear. They leave no room for equivocation.
Accordingly, in several cases, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel, engaged by the
person arrested, or by any person in his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right
may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid
unless made in writing and in the presence
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of counsel. However, the police line-up (at

least, in this case) was not part of the
custodial inquest, hence, Gamboa was not
yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
2. People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35,
16 January 2002]
Facts: At around 8 p.m. of 27 December
1996, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and
Mark Lucena were playing inside a jeepney
parked in front of a boarding house owned by
Pacita Aguillon at No. 17 Margarita
Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2,
Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them
hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the
boys were told by a man sitting inside the
jeepney to go home lest they would meet an
accident. The man was later identified by
Joniega and Esmeralda as Anthony Escordial.
Living in a boarding house in front of which
the jeepney was parked were Michelle
Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa
Gellaver. While the three were asleep, Erma
was awakened by the presence of a man.
The man had his head covered with a t-shirt
to prevent identification and carried a knife
about four inches long. Michelle and Teresa
were awakened thereafter. The man was able
to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00
from Michelle. After getting their money, the
man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold
Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold
Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and
then began touching her in different parts of
her body. The man succeeded in inserting his
penis into Michelle's vagina. Although
Michelle was blindfolded and could not see,
she could feel that the man had no cover on
his face when he was raping her. She felt
that his chest was rough and had some
scars. When he placed her hands on his
nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the
other hand, Erma claimed she was able to
see through her blindfold and that she saw
the man's face because of the light coming
from the lamp post outside the boarding
house. After he had finished raping Michelle,
the man sat on the bed and talked to the
three women. After a while, the man told
Michelle he wanted to have sex with her
again. Michelle pleaded with him, but the
man threatened to call his companions and
said it would be worse for her if his

companions would be the ones to rape her.

He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach
and then inserted his penis into her anus.
When he was through, he gave Michelle a
blanket to cover herself and returned to her
a pair of earrings which he had taken from
her. He then left, but not before warning the
women not to report the matter to anyone or
he would kill them. Michelle, Erma, and
Teresa were so frightened that they were not
able to ask for help until 30 minutes after the
man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo
Anong, that a man had come to the house
and robbed them. They also called up Allan
Aguillon, the son of the owner of the
boarding house, who in turn reported the
incident to the police. When the policemen
arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the
attacker, but she told them that she could
only identify his voice and his eyes.
Accompanied by the police, the three women
looked for the man around the Libertad area,
but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma,
and Teresa were taken to the police station
at Bac-Up for investigation. But, at Michelle's
request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the
others that Michelle had been raped by their
attacker. Upon returning home, Michelle
found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her
aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle
was again taken to the police headquarters,
where she was referred to the Women's Desk
to report the rape. They were able to go
home to the house of Michelle's aunt at
around 5 to 6 p.m. The following day, P03
Nicolas Tancinco went around Margarita
Extension and learned about the children
playing on the street around the time the
intruder entered the boarding house. The
description of the suspect fitted that of a
worker at a caf called Coffee Break Corner,
about two houses away from the boarding
house. On 2 January 1997, Tancinco and
some companions proceeded to the Coffee
Break Corner and interviewed the security
guard, who told them that a certain Fidel
Hinolan owned the caf. When interviewed
by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel
Hinolan told them that Escordial was his
helper and that the latter had gone home on
27 December 1996 to Barangay Miranda,
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Based on the
information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco
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and his fellow police officers, Michelle

Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon
went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental at around 10 a.m. of 3
January 1997 and asked the assistance of the
police there to locate Escordial. PO2 Rodolfo
Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the
Pontevedra police to accompany Tancinco
and his companions. They found Escordial at
the basketball court and "invited" him to go
to the police station for questioning. He was
transferred to the Bacolod police station for
further investigation. At the Bacolod police
station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver,
Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were
asked whether Escordial was the same
person they saw on the night of the incident.
They were taken one by one to the jail cell
and asked to point to the person that they
had seen that night. They picked Escordial
out of four people who were inside the jail
cell. Escordial was charged with the crime of
rape in Criminal Case 97-18117. He was also
charged with robbery with rape in Criminal
Case 97-18118. When arraigned on 25
February 1997, Escordial pleaded not guilty
to the charges, whereupon the two cases
were jointly tried. On 26 February 1999, the
trial court rendered a decision, finding
Escordial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Rape, the
commission of which being attended by
three aggravating circumstances of (1)
nighttime; (2) that the crime was committed
in the dwelling of the offended party, and (3)
that craft, fraud and disguise were employed
by the accused in the commission of the
crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The
court sentenced Escordial to the maximum
penalty of death, and condemned him to pay
Darunday the sum of P3,650.00,
representing the money taken by the
accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the
costs. Escordial appealed.
Issue: Whether the out-of-court identification
in the show up at the police station, made
after the start of the custodial investigation,
may be used in court.

Held: While it cannot be denied that

Escordial was deprived of his right to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel,
he has not shown that, as a result of his
custodial interrogation, the police obtained
any statement from him whether
inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used
in evidence against him. No uncounseled
statement was obtained from Escordial which
should have been excluded as evidence
against him. However, Escordial was never
assisted by counsel, whether of his own
choice or provided by the police officers,
from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental to the time of his
continued detention at the Bacolod police
station. Although Escordial made no
statement during this time, this fact remains
important insofar as it affects the
admissibility of the out-of-court identification
of Escordial by the prosecution witnesses,
namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca,
Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and
Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a
police line-up considering that such is usually
not a part of the custodial inquest. However,
the previous cases are different inasmuch as
Escordial, having been the focus of attention
by the police after he had been pointed to by
a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator
of the crime, was already under custodial
investigation when these out-of-court
identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused
can be made in various ways. In a show-up,
the accused alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification, while in a
police line-up, the suspect is identified by a
witness from a group of persons gathered for
that purpose. During custodial investigation,
these types of identification have been
recognized as "critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution" which
necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these
pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality." The Court thus ruled that
any identification of an uncounseled accused
made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for
that matter, after the start of the custodial
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investigation is inadmissible as evidence

against him. Herein, Escordial was identified
by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on 3
January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma.
Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark
Esmeralda in a police line-up on various
dates after his arrest. Having been made
when Escordial did not have the assistance
of counsel, these out-of-court identifications
are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these
witnesses regarding these identifications
should have been held inadmissible for being
"the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come
at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"
3. People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5
December 2002]
Facts: On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m.,
Luz Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout
Bayoran, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon
City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who had
earlier gone. As she was walking by the gate
of the company compound where they
reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for
help because Mateo was being mauled by a
group of men. She rushed out of the
compound and saw her husband being
beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito
Garcia and five others. She tried to pacify the
aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz
embraced Mateo in an effort to protect him.
It was then that Niel picked up a large stone,
measuring about a foot and a half, and
struck Mateos head with it. Then, Lito
approached Mateos side and stabbed him at
the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face.
Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue
Medical Center where he later died because
of the injuries he sustained. Niel Piedad y
Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and
Richard Palma y Ider were charged with
Murder. Upon arraignment, all the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued
thereafter. The trial court rendered a
decision, finding Piedad and Garcia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder with no modifying circumstances
present, and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. Piedad and Garcia were likewise held

solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the

victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of
P50,000.00. Richard Palma was acquitted on
the ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad and
Garcia appealed.
Issue: Whether the way that Piedad was
identified by prosecution witnesses was
suggestive and fatally flawed; that Piedad
should have been put in a police lineup
instead of being shoveled into a
confrontation with the alleged witnesses
and immediately singled out by the police as
suspects.
Held: The claim by the defense that Piedads
pre-trial identification was suggestive due to
the absence of a police lineup is more
theoretical than real. It must be pointed out
that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan
knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand,
knew Piedad because they played basketball
together. Hence, the witnesses were not
identifying persons whom they were
unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper
suggestion may set in. On the contrary,
when the accused were presented before the
witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm
whether they were the ones responsible for
the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not
incriminate the accused simply because they
were the only ones presented by the police,
rather, the witnesses were certain they
recognized the perpetrators of the crime.
Besides, there is no law which requires a
police lineup before a suspect can be
identified as the culprit of a crime. What is
important is that the prosecution witnesses
positively identify the persons charged as the
malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no
reason to doubt the veracity of Luzs and
Fidels testimony. The records show that Luz
and Fidel positively, categorically and
unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one
who struck Mateo on the head with a stone,
and Garcia as the one who stabbed Mateo on
the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head
injuries and a stab wound which eventually
led to Mateos death. Indeed, if family
members who have witnessed the killing of a
loved one usually strive to remember the
faces of the assailants, the Court sees no
reason how a wife, who witnessed the
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violence inflicted upon her husband and who

eventually died by reason thereof, could
have done any less. It must be stressed that
Luz was right beside her husband when the
concrete stone was struck on his head,
hence, Luz could not have mistaken the
identity of the person responsible for the
attack. She was only a foot away from Piedad
before the latter hit Mateo on the head.
Garcia on the other hand was identified by
both Luz and Fidel as the one who was
shirtless at the time of the incident. There
was light from a bulb 5 meters away from
the scene of the crime. Experience dictates
that precisely because of the unusual acts of
violence committed right before their eyes,
eyewitnesses can remember with a high
degree of reliability the identity of the
criminals at any given time. Hence, the
proximity and attention afforded the
witnesses, coupled with the relative
illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters
the credibility of identification of Piedad, et.
al. Neither is the lack of counsel during the
pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et.
al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any
extrajudicial confession or admission with
regard to the crime charged. While Piedad
and Garcia may have been suspects, they
were certainly not interrogated by the police
authorities, much less forced to confess to
the crime imputed against them. Piedad and
Garcia were not under custodial
investigation. In fact, Piedad averred during
cross-examination that the police never
allowed them to say anything at the police
station on the day they voluntarily presented
themselves to the authorities.
*Cases before January 17, 1973 not
applicable
Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3
March 1975]; also Simeon vs. Villaluz [GR L37424] and People vs. Isnani [GR L-38929]
Facts: No preliminary facts are available in
the body of the case. Judge Miguel M.
Manguera of the Court of First Instance
(Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A.
Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig,
Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede admissible

the confessions of the accused in said cases

(Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and
Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De
Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros,
Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto
Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424).
District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First
Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in
GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared
inadmissible the confessions of the accused
in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime
Dalion), although they have not been
informed of their right to remain silent and to
counsel before they gave the confessions,
because they were given before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions
for certiorari were filed with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the right to counsel and to be
informed in such right, incorporated in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, applies prospectively or
retroactively.
Held: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution granted, for the first time, to a
person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, the right to
counsel and to be informed of such right.
And the last sentence thereof which, in
effect, means that any confession obtained
in violation of this right shall be inadmissible
in evidence, can and should be given effect
only when the right already existed and had
been violated. Consequently, because the
confessions of the accused in GRs L-3720102, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in
accordance with the rules then in force, no
right had been violated as to render them
inadmissible in evidence although they were
not informed of "their right to remain silent
and to counsel," "and to be informed of such
right," because, no such right existed at the
time. The argument that the second
paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083
enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every
case, the person detained shall be informed
of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed, upon his request, to communicate
and confer at anytime with his attorney or
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counsel," impliedly granted to a detained

person the right to counsel and to be
informed of such right, is untenable. The only
right granted by said paragraph to a
detained person was to be informed of the
cause of his detention. But he must make a
request for him to be able to claim the right
to communicate and confer with counsel at
any time. The historical background of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution shows that the new right
granted therein to a detained person to
counsel and to be informed of such right
under pain of his confession being declared
inadmissible in evidence, has and should be
given a prospective and not a retroactive
effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive
effect to this constitutional guarantee to
counsel would have a great unsettling effect
on the administration of justice in this
country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty
individuals and thus cause injustice to the
People and the offended parties in many
criminal cases where confessions were
obtained before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and in accordance with the rules
then in force although without assistance of
counsel. The Constitutional Convention could
not have intended such a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice.
For if the cause of justice suffers when an
innocent person is convicted, it equally
suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.
*Rule under the 1973 Constitution
(voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver)
1. People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17
January 1980]
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed
on 14 September 1973, in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, an information for
murder against Paquito Yupo y Gonzales
(Criminal Case 146-V-73), with the case, after
the raffle, being assigned to Branch VIII,
presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa. Upon
arraignment on 5 October 1973, Yupo
pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then
proceeded, the prosecution having presented
6 witnesses, including the father of the
deceased, Miguel Tribol, and his common-law
wife, Lydia Begnotia, who allegedly received

the ante mortem statement of the victim,

Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the hearing on 3 June
1974, the prosecution presented Corporal
Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police
Department, before whom a written
statement of Yupo and his alleged waiver of
his right to remain silent and to be assisted
by a counsel of his own choice was taken.
After this witness had identified the
statement of Yupo and the waiver, he was
questioned on the incriminating answers in
such statement to the police, but there was
an objection on the part of the defense
counsel based on the ground of such
statement being inadmissible in evidence, as
the statement was taken by the police
without any counsel assisting the accused in
the investigation. Judge Caguioa sustained
the objection of the defense on the view that
such judicial confession of the accused is
inadmissible in evidence for being
unconstitutional, it appearing that the
accused was not assisted by a counsel when
it was given. He likewise stated that such
right could not be waived. Upon his refusal to
reconsider such ruling, the petition for
certiorari was filed.
Issue: Whether the right to remain silent and
right to counsel during custodial
investigation may be waived.
Held: While there could be a waiver of the
rights of an accused, it must be intelligently
waived, otherwise a court's jurisdiction
starting at the beginning of the trial may be
lost in the course of the proceeding.
Statements made during the period of
custodial interrogation to be admissible
require a clear intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, the suspect being
warned prior to questioning that he has a
right to remain silent, that any utterance
may be used against him, and that he has
the right to the presence of a counsel, either
retained or appointed. The prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
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by law enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other
fully effective means are devised to inform
accused persons of their right of silence and
to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does not make
may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of those
rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the
individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question
him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned. Tested by such a
clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged
waiver herein falls far short. Yupo merely
answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to
Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the Police Force
of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko
sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang
paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko
ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay
may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung
ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na
magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto, at
dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang
sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon
o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?"
and that was all.
2. People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28

March 1980]
Facts: At around 10:00 a.m. of 14 January
1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the

national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal

and a patient in the emergency ward of the
prison hospital, went to the toilet to answer a
call of nature and to fetch water. Jose Tampus
y Ponce and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the
same penal institution, who were tubercular
patients in the hospital, followed Saminado
to the toilet and, by means of their bladed
weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8
incised wounds on Saminado while Avila
stabbed him nine times. Saminado died upon
arrival at 11:00 a.m. on that same morning in
the prison hospital. After emerging from the
toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a
prison guard with their knives. They told the
guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang
po kami." The motive of the killing was
revenge. Tampus and Avila, both members of
the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of
Eduardo Rosales (also a member of the Oxo
gang) in December 1975 by a member of the
Batang Mindanao gang, a group hostile to
the Oxo gang. Saminado was a member of
the Batang Mindanao gang. The officer of the
day investigated the incident right away. In
his written report submitted on the same day
when the tragic occurrence transpired, he
stated that, according to his on-the-spot
investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when
the latter was seated in the comfort room
and his back was turned to Avila, while
Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and
neck. Two days after the killing, or on January
16, another prison guard investigated
Tampus and Avila and obtained their
extrajudicial confessions wherein they
admitted that they assaulted Saminado.
Tampus and Avila were charged for murder
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch 36 (Criminal Case 18510).
After trial, the court convicted Tampus for
murder, sentencing him to death and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim,
Celso Saminado, an indemnity of P12,000.00.
In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the
coaccused of Tampus, was convicted of the
same offense and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 14 years and 8 months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to
pay the same indemnity. Avila did not
appeal. (Avila was sentenced to death,
together with Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala,
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in another case, Criminal Case 1187. The

death sentence is under review in GR L38141). The present automatic review
involves Tampus' conviction.
Issue: Whether the custodial investigation
pursued by Lahoz, where allegedly Tampus
was not informed as to his rights to have
counsel and to remain silent, negates the
extra-judicial confession made by Tampus in
the killing of Saminado.
Held: As the confession in the present case
was obtained after the 1973 Constitution
took effect, section 20 of Article IV applies
thereto. There is no doubt that the
confession was voluntarily made.
Investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta in
taking it endeavored, according to his
understanding, to comply with section 20.
Even considering that Vivencio C. Lahoz
investigated the killing two days before the
confession was taken by investigator de la
Cuesta on 16 January 1976 and that
allegedly during said custodial interrogation
Tampus was not informed as to his rights to
have counsel and to remain silent, Tampus
and Avila had already admitted it when, after
coming out of the toilet, the scene of the
crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S.
Eustaquio, the first guard whom they
encountered, and they revealed to him that
they had committed an act of revenge. That
spontaneous statement, elicited without any
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and
at the same time was a voluntary confession
of guilt. Not only that; the two accused, by
means of that statement given freely on the
spur of the moment without any urging or
suggestion, waived their right to remain
silent and to have the right to counsel. That
admission was confirmed by their
extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and
testimony in court. They did not appeal from
the judgment of conviction. It is further
contended that after the fiscal had presented
the prosecution's evidence and when counsel
de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the
trial court should have advised him of his
constitutional right to remain silent. That
contention is not well-taken considering that
Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an
extrajudicial confession. The court during the

trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused

that he has the right to remain silent. It is his
counsel who should claim that right for him.
If he does not claim it and he calls the
accused to the witness stand, then he waives
that right. It should be stressed that,
however, even without taking into account
Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea
of guilty and testimony, the crime was
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution.
3.

People vs. Sayaboc, GR No. 147201, January 15, 2004

Facts: On December 2, 1994, accused, committed murder. On March

8, 1995, witnesses identified Sayaboc at the PNP Headquarters as the
gunman who shot victim to death. On the afternoon of that day, SPO4
Cagungao was called to take the statement of Sayaboc. Before taking
the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional
rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have a counsel of his
own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked
the police officers to get a lawyer wherein they brought Atty. Rodolfo
Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After
Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, okay, he continued the investigation,
during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However,
Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo
would leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc executed
an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to
killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of
P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and
attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.
Issue: Did accused validly waive his right to counsel? Did the police
afford the accused the right to be inflormed?
Ruling: The SC ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional
right to counsel. The facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc
and SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the
duration of the custodial investigation. The right to a competent and
independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself,
during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands
the import and consequences of answering the questions propounded.
In People v. Deniega, the SC said that the desired role of counsel in
the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the
lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the
advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.
The SC likewise ruled that the police did not afford the accused the
right to be informed. The right to be informed requires the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It
should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of
any waiver he might make of these rights. The police failed in this
regard.

THE GALIT RULE

People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20

March 1985]
Facts: In the morning of 23 August
1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a
widow, was found dead in the
bedroom of her house located at
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Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as

a result of 7 wounded inflicted upon
different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. More than 2 weeks
thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up Francisco Galit,
an ordinary construction worker (pion)
living in Marikina, Rizal, or suspicion of
the murder. On the following day,
however, 8 September 1977, the case
was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further
investigation in view of the alleged
limited facilities of the Montalban
police station. Accordingly, Galit was
brought to the NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI
Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores
conducted a preliminary interview of
the suspect who allegedly gave
evasive answers to his questions. But
the following day, 9 September 1977,
Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily
executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the
crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and
Pabling Dulay as his companions in the
crime. Actually, Galit had been
obtained and interrogated almost
continuously for 5 days, to no avail as
he consistently maintained his
innocence. The investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him
physically. They covered his face with
a rag and pushed his face into a toilet
bowl full of human waste. With Galit's
will having been broken, he admitted
what the investigating officers wanted
him to admit and he signed the
confession they prepared. Galit was
charged with the Crime of Robbery
with Homicide, in an information filed
before the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal. Trial was held, and on 11
August 1978, immediately after the
accused had terminated the
presentation of his evidence, the trial
judge dictated his decision on the case
in open court, finding Galit guilty as
charged and sentencing him to suffer
the death penalty; to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs.

Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether a monosyllabic answer
to a long question suffices as a
voluntary admission that may be used
against the accused.
Held: As held in Morales vs. Ponce
Enrile, "At the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right
to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence." Herein, there were no
eyewitnesses, no property recovered
from the accused, no state witnesses,
and not even fingerprints of the
accused at the scene of the crime. The
only evidence against Galit is his
alleged confession. A long question
followed by a monosyllabic answer
does not satisfy the requirements of
the law that the accused be informed
of his rights under the Constitution
and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and
every right explained in simple words
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in a dialect or language known to the

person under investigation. Galit is
from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog.
Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
Galit was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters
and other relatives did not know that
he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about
two weeks after he had executed the
salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement
does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by
one. At the supposed reenactment,
again Galit was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights. Trial
courts are cautioned to look carefully
into the circumstances surrounding
the taking of any confession,
especially where the prisoner claims
having been maltreated into giving
one. Where there is any doubt as to
the voluntariness, the same must be
rejected in toto.
*RULE UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION*
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE
COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL
1. People vs. Bandula [GR 89223,

27 May 1994]
Facts: On 27 January 1986, at around 10:00
p.m., 6 armed men barged into the
compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in
Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men
were identified by Security Guard Antonio
Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula,
Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and
Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who
wore masks were simply referred to as "Boy
Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the 2
masked men held Salva who was manning
his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and
tied his hands behind his back. They then

went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief

of Security and General Foreman of the
plantation, hog-tied him, and divested him of
his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .
38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the 6
armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow
proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito
Garay, Manager of the Polo Coconut
Plantation. Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed
downstairs while Bandula and the two
masked men with Salva and Pastrano went
up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing
their way into the house, the masked men
and Bandula ransacked the place and took
with them money and other valuables.
Thereafter, the hooded men who were
bringing with them Atty. Garay locked
Pastrano inside his house together with
Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and
Salva heard gunshots coming from the
direction of the gate of the compound. After
succeeding in untying themselves, Pastrano
and Salva went to report the matter to the
police. On their way, they found outside the
gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay (dead
with 3 gunshot wounds). On 28 January
1986, Dionanao was "picked-up for
investigation" and interrogated by Cpl.
Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in
Tanjay where he implicated accused Sedigo.
The following day, on 29 January 1986, he
was brought to the Office of the Municipal
Attorney of Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where
he supposedly executed his extrajudicial
confession in the presence of the latter. On 4
February 1986, upon the suggestion of
another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the
Supplementary Sworn Statement of
Dionanao, again in the presence of Atty.
Zerna. In his Sworn Statement, Dionanao
supposedly admitted that he was with
Bandula when the latter, together with "Boy
Short" and "Boy Tall," shot Atty. Garay. He
added that he was going to be killed if he did
not join the group. He also said that Sedigo
and Ejan were with them that evening. Then,
in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he
implicated 3 more persons but they were not
thereafter included in the Information. Pn the
other hand, Bandula was arrested on 28
January 1986, at around 6:00 a.m., brought
to the Tanjay Police Station and there
interrogated. He was investigated by Cpl.
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Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat.

Moso and Pat. Baldejera. In that
investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted
that he together with 2 others shot Atty.
Garay with a .38 cal. revolver. At that time,
there was no counsel present "because that
(investigation) was not yet in writing." Two
weeks after his arrest, Bandula allegedly
gave a sworn statement in the presence of
Atty. Zerna admitting his participation in the
killing of Atty. Garay. In that statement,
Bandula narrated that after "Boy Short" and
"Boy Tall" shot Atty. Garay, he (Bandula) was
ordered likewise to shoot the latter which he
did. Bandula, Sedigo, Dionanao and Ejan
were were charged for robbery with
homicide. On 5 May 1989, after hearing 12
prosecution and 9 defense witnesses, the
trial court rendered judgment finding
Bandula guilty of the crime charged.
However, his 3 co-accused were acquitted
"for insufficiency of evidence."
Issue: Whether admissions obtained during
custodial interrogations requires mere
counsel or independent counsel present.
Held: Bandula and Dionanao were
investigated immediately after their arrest,
they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel
came in only a day after the custodial
investigation with respect to Dionanao, and
two weeks later with respect to Bandula.
And, counsel who supposedly assisted both
accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this,
there are telltale signs that violence was
used against Bandua. Certainly, these are
blatant violations of the Constitution which
mandates in Section 12, Art. III, that (1) Any
person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel. (2) No torture,
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other

similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3)

Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The
law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims
of torture or similar practices, and their
families. The present case is analogous to
the more recent case of People v. De Jesus,
where it was held that admissions obtained
during custodial interrogations without the
benefit of counsel although later reduced to
writing and signed in the presence of counsel
are still flawed under the Constitution. The
Constitution also requires that counsel be
independent. Obviously, he cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted
Dionanao and Bandula when they executed
their respective extrajudicial confessions, still
their confessions are inadmissible in
evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does
not qualify as an independent counsel. As a
legal officer of the municipality, he provides
legal assistance and support to the mayor
and the municipality in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people,
including the maintenance of peace and
order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he
can effectively undertake the defense of the
accused without running into conflict of
interests. He is no better than a fiscal or
prosecutor who cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigations.
2. People vs. Quidato [GR 117401,
1 October 1998]
Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of
Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being
a widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house
at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian,
Davao. He owned 16 hectares of coconut
land in the area. On 16 September 1988,
Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two
hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie
Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of
copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid
the Malita brothers for their labor, who
thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and Bernardo Jr.
went back to Sitio Libod that same day. At
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around 6:00 p.m. of 17 September 1988,

Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo Malita to come
to the former's house to discuss an important
matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo
Jr.'s house, he saw that his brother Eddie was
already there. They started drinking beer.
Bernardo Jr. thereafter proposed that they
rob and kill his father. They went to
Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after
the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought
along a bolo. Upon reaching the house,
Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door, asking his
father to let them in. When Bernardo opened
the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the
old man down. Reynaldo then hacked
Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr.
and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador
looking for money but they found none; so,
the 3 of them left. The body of Bernardo was
discovered the next day by Bernardo Jr.'s
son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for
breakfast. On 27 September 1988, Leo
Quidato confronted his brother regarding the
incident and learned that Reynaldo and
Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for
Bernardo's death. The two were promptly
arrested by the police. Aside from arresting
the latter two, however, the police also
arrested Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988,
the Malita brothers were interrogated by
Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian
Police Station. When Mara apprised them of
their constitutional rights, including their
right to counsel, they signified their intent to
confess even in the absence of counsel.
Aware that the same would be useless if
given in the absence of counsel, Mara took
down the testimony of the two but refrained
from requiring the latter to sign their
affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita
brothers to Davao City and presented them,
along with their unsigned affidavits, to a
CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom.
Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom
conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again
advising the two of their constitutional rights.
The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of
the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita
brothers, who affirmed the veracity and
voluntary execution of the same. Only then
did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures
on the affidavits. On 17 January 1989,
Bernardo Jr. was charged with the crime of

parricide before the Regional Trial Court of

Davao. A murder case was likewise filed
against his co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and
Eddie Malita. Bernardo Jr. and the Malita
brothers pleaded not guilty. The two cases
were tried jointly. The Malita brothers
withdrew their "not guilty" plea during trial
and were accordingly sentences. Only
Bernardo Jr.'s case was tried on merits. After
due trial and on 2 March 1994, the Regional
Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, rendered
judgment finding Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in
the offense of Parricide which falls under
Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for
the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato,
Sr., and accordingly, was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to
indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo
Quidato, Sr., the amount of P50,000.00, and
to pay the costs. Bernardo Jr. appealed.
Issue: Whether an initially uncounseled
extrajudicial confession, signed in the
presence of a counsel in a later day, is
admissible as evidence against the accused.
Held: The prosecution relied heavily on the
affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie.
The two brothers were, however, not
presented on the witness stand to testify on
their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to
present the two gives these affidavits the
character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine
that unless the affiants themselves take the
witness stand to affirm the averments in
their affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary
admissions of an accused made
extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence
against his co-accused when the latter had
not been given an opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him. Likewise, the
manner by which the affidavits were
obtained by the police render the same
inadmissible in evidence even if they were
voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession without
a valid waiver of the right to counsel that
is, in writing and in the presence of counsel
is inadmissible in evidence. It is
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undisputed that the Malita brothers gave

their statements to Patrolman Mara in the
absence of counsel, although they signed the
same in the presence of counsel the next
day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of
Gina Quidato's (accuseds wife) testimony, as
well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial
confessions, nothing remains on record with
which to justify a judgment unfavorable to
Bernardo Jr. He was therefore acquitted.
3. People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7
February 1997]
Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's
cousin, purportedly acting upon the
instructions of Doris Wolf, borrowed from
Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00
and used the an Isuzu passenger type
jeepney (Plate DFB 550) as a collateral. The
amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00
cash and the balance in a check payable to
Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was
cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It
bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at
its back portion and a second endorsement
by Pons who subsequently deposited it in his
account. On September 11, Temporas asked
Pons to secure a special power of attorney
from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in
one or two weeks. But Pons failed to pay the
indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas
repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan,
Camarines Sur to collect the amount
borrowed but Pons always promised that he
himself would go to her house to pay.
Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce a
deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas
lodged a complaint against him for estafa
before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca,
Sr. reported the disappearance of his son,
Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to the
police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite
and the police stations in Silang and Imus,
Cavite. Two weeks after 4 September 1987,
the body of 23-year-old Andrew Patriarca, Jr.
was found in a sugarcane plantation in
Maguyam. His head was severed from his
body. The body of the driver, Geronimo
Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner
of the jeepney, was recovered after the
harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in
Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified the
body from its clothing. Acting on the

complaint, the NBI contacted the relatives of

the owner of the jeepney who went to
Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney and
informed the NBI that its driver (deceased
Geronimo Malibago) and conductor
(deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been
killed by carnappers. Patriarca's widow also
filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon
investigation, an NBI team led by Supervising
Agent Magno Toribio found out that the
carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of
Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork"
of a group of 4 persons named Rene
Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias
Toto, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The
team also discovered that the jeepney was
disposed of through Cid. Januario and
Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons
and Temporas to shed light on the
carnapping incident. The jeepney was
recovered in an auto shop with its engine
partly dismantled. Upon being informed by
the NBI that the jeepney had been found, an
insurance company brought it back to
Manila. From the "oral investigation" they
conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27
March 1988, the team learned that Sarita
and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago
inside a sugar plantation where presumably
they were killed. Because Januario and
Canape volunteered that their companions
were their neighbors in Paliparan,
Dasmarias, Cavite who could be in Manila
already, the NBI team decided to take down
their statements at the NBI head office in
Manila. The team traveled with Januario and
Canape to Manila, arriving there at around
1:00 p.m. of 28 March 1988. At the Taft
Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took
the statements of Januario and Canae one at
a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who
was "just around somewhere," to assist
Januario and Canape during the
investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took the
statement of Januario while Supervising
Agent Toribio took that of Canape. On 7
November 1988, an Information signed by
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr.,
was filed against Rene Januario and Efren
Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid,
Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @
Digo charging them with violation of Republic
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Act 6539 (AntiCarnapping Law). Arraigned on

7 February 1989, Januario and Canape,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by
counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of
not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos remained at
large. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City,
disposing of Criminal Case TG-1392-89,
rendered judgment finding Januario and
Canape guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Section 14, last
sentence, of Republic act 6539, otherwise
known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and
imposed upon them the supreme penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and
ordered them to pay jointly and severally,
but separately, the heirs of their victims,
namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew
Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for
moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 for
actual damages, and to pay the costs of the
proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue: Whether Saunars presence as counsel
in the custodial investigations satisfies the
requirements of Article III, section 12 (1).
Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the
custodial investigation of Januario and
Canape is, however, not a guarantee that
their respective confessions had been taken
in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1)
of the Constitution. This constitutional
provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have no less than "competent
and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice." Saunar was not the choice of
Januario as his custodial investigation
counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence
as a lawyer is beyond question, under the
circumstances described by the prosecution
however, he could not have been the
independent counsel solemnly spoken of by
the Constitution. He was an applicant for a
position in the NBI and therefore it can never
be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually
employed by the NBI a few months after.
Further, although Saunar might have really
been around to properly apprise Januario of

his constitutional right as reflected in the

written sworn statement itself, the same
cannot be said about Canape. Canape was
not properly informed of his constitutional
rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant
of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and
telling him that he could ask for counsel if he
so desires or that one could be provided him
at his request, are simply not in compliance
with the constitutional mandate. In this case,
appellant Canape was merely told of his
constitutional rights and posthaste, asked
whether he was willing to confess. His
affirmative answer may not, by any means,
be interpreted as a waiver of his right to
counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the
right of a person under custodial
investigation to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain and to
contemplate an effective communication
that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed. Canape's sworn statement, which
reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to
reflect compliance with this requirement.
Neither does the testimony of NBI Agent
Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached
only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should
have exerted more effort in explaining to him
his constitutional rights. The law
enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of
Januario's and Canape's constitutional rights
is shown not only by their failure to observe
Section 12 (1) of Article III of the
Constitution. They have likewise forgotten
the third paragraph of Section 12 of the
same article which mandates that an
admission of facts related to a crime must be
obtained with the assistance of counsel;
otherwise it would be inadmissible in
evidence against the person so admitting.
4. People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8
December 1999]
Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less
10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in
the national highway at Barangay Agusan up
to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y
Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took
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away, through intimdation or violence, cash

amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo,
booster and twitters owned by and belonging
to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver
wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all
amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or
about 16 April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m.,
more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-an,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Feliciano,
Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed
Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In
the course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto
Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April
1993, an information was filed against
Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan
charging them with robbery with homicide
(as per 16 April 1993 incident).
Subsequently, another information dated 20
May 1993 was filed against Feliciano and
Orlando Labtan charging them with highway
robbery (as per 28 March 1993 incident).
Only Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two
charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention
Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City
where he was detained while Jonelto Labtan
has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried
together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 found
Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal by direct participation in the crime
of robbery with homicide and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
offended party (the heirs of Florentino
Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
the offended party the sum of P35,000.00
representing funeral expenses and to pay the
cost. The trial court also found Feliciano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor as the minimum term to 14 years, 8
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period as the maximum term and to
indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of
P8,000.00, representing the value of the
P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter
and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of
P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch
divested from him and to pay the cost. The
trial court convicted Feliciano on the basis of
his sworn statement which he repudiated
during the trial. Feliciano appealed.

Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito

Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of
counsel.
Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right
to have a competent and independent
counsel when he was questioned in the
Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1
Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started
questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April
1993 regarding his involvement in the killing
of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito,
notwithstanding the fact that he had not
been apprised of his right to counsel.
Feliciano had been subjected to custodial
investigation without a counsel; inasmuch as
when SPO1 Cuarez investigated Feliciano,
the latter was already a suspect in the killing
of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty.
Chavez did not provide the kind of
counselling required by the Constitution. He
did not explain to Feliciano the consequences
of his action that the sworn statement can
be used against him and that it is possible
that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
Furthermore, Atty. Chavezs independence as
counsel is suspect he is regularly engaged
by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel
de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money
from the police as payment for his services.
5. People vs. Samus [GR 13595758, 17 September 2002]
Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling
and living in the land of Miguel Completo at
Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The
victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her
grandson, 6 year old John Ardee Balisi, were
the neighbors of Samus father at San
Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2
September 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector
Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at the 4th
PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional
Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba,
Laguna when he received an order from his
superior to investigate the murder of the two
victims. Their office had received a
telephone call from a local barangay official
informing them of the victims deaths.
Arriving at the victims residence at Block 8,
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Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang,

Calamba, Garcia and his team conducted an
investigation, making a sketch of the relative
positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints
from the crime scene and taking pictures.
Thereafter, an investigation report was
prepared by Garcia and signed by his
superior, Colonel Pedro Tango. The
investigators likewise found a pair of maong
pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and
dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the
house. A pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion
Balisi was likewise reported missing from her
body by her daughter, Nora B. Llorera. The
victims bodies were brought to the Funeraria
Seerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that same
day, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident
of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an
acquaintance of Samus, happened to meet
Samus at Sammy Pachecas house in the
same barangay where Samus asked
Ponciano to accompany him to Poncianos
wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Poncianos
wife was mad at first but upon Poncianos
prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with no
interest. The earrings were placed in a
jewelry box; thereafter, Samus received
another P250.00. At 6:00 P.M. on 10
September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the
Criminal Investigation Group received
information that Samus was the principal
suspect in the killing of the 2 victims and
that he was sighted inside the residence of
spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay
Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then
formed and led a team composed of SPO3
Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis
and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at
past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied by
local barangay authorities, asked permission
from the Vallejo spouses to enter the house,
which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they
heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing
outside, they saw Samus crawling on the
roof. They ordered him to stop, but he
suddenly jumped from the roof and landed
hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on
his ankle and bruises on his left and right
forearm. At that point, the police team closed
in on Samus who, while trembling and
shaking, admitted the killings upon a query
from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the
Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office

where he was informed of his constitutional

rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the
morning of 11 September 1996, Samus,
assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his
statement admitting the killings. SPO3
Malabanan also took the statements of
tricycle driver Rafael Baliso, the victims
relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and
witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus
enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the
same day, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel
Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from
Samus. His prints exactly matched with a set
of prints found at the crime scene. Later that
day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover
the pawned earrings from Ponciano who
turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Two
separate Informations were filed on 27
November 1996, charging Samus (in Criminal
Case 5015-96-C) with homicide for the death
of one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years
old), and (in Criminal Case 5016-96-C) with
murder for the death of one John Ardee Balisi
y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned on
28 May 1997, Samus, assisted by his counsel
de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course,
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 36, found Samus guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
(Criminal Case 5015-96-C), sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as
minimum up to 20 years of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum, and ordered him to
indemnify the heirs of Dedicacion Balisi the
amount of P50,000.00 for her death and
another P50,000.00 as and for moral and
actual damages and cost of suit. The trial
court also found Samus guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
(Criminal Case 5016-96-C), sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him
to indemnify the heirs of John Ardee Balisi
the amount of P50,000.00 for his death and
another P50,000.00 as and for moral and
actual damages and cost of suit. Hence, the
automatic review
Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are
absolutely inadmissible.
Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus
was not informed of his constitutional rights
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to remain silent and to have competent and

independent counsel. Hence, any admission
elicited from him by the law enforcers during
custodial investigation are normally
inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits,
the police officers readily admitted that
Samus was subjected to a preliminary
interview. Yet, during their examination in
open court, they tried to skirt this issue by
stating that it was only the media that had
questioned Samus, and that they were
merely present during the interview.
However, an examination of the testimonies
of the three law enforcers show the folly of
their crude attempts to camouflage
inadmissible evidence. In the absence of
testimony from any of the media persons
who allegedly interviewed Samus, the
uncertainties and vagueness about how they
questioned and led him to his confession
lead us to believe that they themselves
investigated Samus and elicited from him
uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly
shown by the Affidavits they executed on 11
September 1997, as well as by their
testimonies on cross-examination.
Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled
admission per se may be inadmissible, under
the present circumstances the Court cannot
rule it out because of Samus' failure to make
timely objections. Indeed, the admission is
inadmissible in evidence under Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution,
because it was given under custodial
investigation and was made without the
assistance of counsel. However, the defense
failed to object to its presentation during the
trial, with the result that the defense is
deemed to have waived objection to its
admissibility. If only Samus had made a
timely objection to the admissibility of
Pontaos testimony and the picture of a pair
of earrings together with the turnover
receipt, which Samus identified during his
testimony, the prosecution could have been
warned of the need to present additional
evidence to support its case. To disregard
unceremoniously a major portion of its case
at this late stage when it can no longer
present additional evidence as substitute for
that which is now claimed to be inadmissible
goes against fundamental fairness.

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.ELIZAR TOMAQUIN G.R. No.
133188 July 23, 2004

FACTS: ElizarTomaquin was found by the

lower Court to be guilty of the crime of
murder
of
JaquelynTatoy
beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner avers that
the trial Court erred when it convicted
him on the basis of his uncounselled
confession. The Court is confronted with
the issue of the admissibility of an
extrajudicial confession. This appeal
particularly involves the question of
whether a barangay captain who is a
lawyer
can
be
considered
an
independent counsel within the purview
of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is a lawyer at the same time barangay
captain competent and independent?

RULING: No, in this case, considering that

Atty. Parawans role as a barangay captain,
was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay
and therefore in direct conflict with the role
of providing competent legal assistance to
appellant who was accused of committing a
crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could
not be considered as an independent counsel
of appellant, when the latter executed his
extrajudicial confession. What the
Constitution requires is the presence of an
independent and competent counsel, one
who will effectively undertake his clients
defense without any intervening conflict of
interest. Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify
as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and
vigilant counsel. An "effective and vigilant
counsel" necessarily and logically requires
that the lawyer be present and able to advise
and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked
by the investigating officer until the signing
of the extrajudicial confession. The Court
cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could
have effectively safeguarded appellants
rights as an accused during the investigation
when he himself entertained the suspicion
that appellant is guilty of the crime charged,
and naturally, he would want appellant to
admit having committed it.
7.

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