1.

)BADILLO v CA
Petitioners are the registered owners of several lots adjoining a road lot. Annotated at
the back of the title of the said lot is a court-ordered entry which reads as follows: "It is hereby
made of record that as per order of the Court, the street lot covered by this title shall not be
closed or disposed of by the registered owner without previous approval of the court.
In gross violation of the court order, del Rosario sold an unsegregated portion of the
road lot to his co-respondents without obtaining prior court approval. Subsequently, del Rosario
sold TCT No. 35101 to Goldkey Development Corporation (Goldkey)
Petitioners alleged that the Register of Deeds violated the court order when it allowed
the registration of the sales and the subsequent issuance of new titles without first obtaining
judicial approval. Petitioners claimed that Goldkey had built cement fences on the lot, thus
blocking the ingress and egress of petitioners. Petitioners prayed that the sales made in favor of
Conejero, Sonoron, and Goldkey and the partition of the road lot be declared void
In its Comment, Goldkey alleged that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy and not the regular courts.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
It stated that the property had been approved by the HLURB for development into a townhouse
project. The subject land was therefore removed from the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
trial courts decision was upheld by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion by dismissing petitioners' appeal on the ground that jurisdiction does
not lie with the regular courts but with the HLURB
HELD: NO
Jurisdiction Lies with the HLURB
The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. The extent to
which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends on the provisions of the
statute creating such agency. Courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion. PD 957,[21]otherwise known
as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," granted the National Housing
Authority (NHA) the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate business.
Clearly, the scope and limitation of the HLURB's jurisdiction are well-defined. The
HLURB's jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action,
the subject matter or property involved, and the parties.
In the present case, petitioners are the registered owners of several lots adjoining a
subdivision road lot connecting their properties to the main road. Petitioners allege that the
subdivision lot owners sold the road lot to a developer who is now constructing cement fences,
thus blocking the passageway from their lots to the main road. In sum, petitioners are enforcing
their statutory and contractual rights against the subdivision owners.
This is a specific performance case which falls under the HLURB's exclusive jurisdiction.
In Osea v. Ambrosio, [26]the Court held that the provisions of PD 957 were intended to
encompass all questions relating to subdivisions. This intention was aimed to provide for an
appropriate government agency, which is the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the

implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said
category of real estate may take recourse.
The Court ruled that when an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within its jurisdiction. Split jurisdiction is not favored. As observed in C.T.
Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada: [29] The argument that only courts of justice can
adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fastchanging times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by
virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is
exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain
activities falling under their particular expertise.

2.) VILLANUEVA v PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Pursuant to its rule-making authority under RA 7611, the PCSD promulgated the SEP
Clearance Guidelines, which require all proposed undertakings in the Palawan province
to have an SEP Clearance from PCSD before application for permits, licenses, patents,
grants, or concessions with the relevant government agencies. Generally, the PCSD
issues the clearance if the ECAN allows the type of proposed activity in the proposed
site; it denies the clearance if the ECAN prohibits the type of proposed activity in the
proposed site.
The controversy in the instant case arose when PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to Patricia
Louise Mining and Development Corporation (PLMDC) for its proposed small-scale nickel
mining project to be conducted in a controlled use area in Barangay Calategas in the
Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan.
The petitioners, who are farmers and residents of Barangay Calategas, sought the recall
of the said clearance in their letter to PCSD Chairman, Abraham Kahlil Mitra. The PCSD,
through its Executive Director, Romeo B. Dorado, denied their request for lack of basis.
On August 7, 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against
PCSD and PLMDC with the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. They prayed for the
nullification of the said SEP Clearance for violating various provisions of RA 7611 and
PCSD Resolution No. 05-250. They alleged that these provisions prohibit small-scale
nickel mining for profit in the proposed site,which, they maintain, is not even a
controlled use zone, but actually a core zone.
PLMDCand PCSD sought the dismissal of the Petition on various grounds, including the
impropriety of the remedy of certiorari. PCSD argued that it did not perform a quasijudicial function.
The trial court denied the said motions in its Orderdated September 20, 2006. It ruled,
among others, that certiorari is proper to assail PCSD action. PCSD Administrative Order
(AO) No. 6 series of 2000 or the Guidelines in the Implementation of SEP Clearance
System states that the PCSD must conduct a public hearing, and study the supporting
documents for sufficiency and accuracy, before it decides whether to issue the
clearance to the project proponent. The trial court concluded that this procedure is an
exercise of a quasi-judicial power.

PLMDC and PCSD again filed Motions to Dismiss but this time on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. They argued that, under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, only the
Court of Appeals [CA] can take cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
filed against a quasi-judicial body.
The trial court agreed and issued the assailed Order. Petitioners appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.
In their respective memoranda, all the parties submitted that PCSD is exercising quasijudicial functions.They only diverge on the issue of which court the CA or the RTC has
the jurisdiction to review the actions of this quasi-judicial body.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent PCSD in issuing the SEP clearance exercised its
quasi-judicial function?
HELD: PCSD has no quasi-judicial function
POLITICAL LAW: quasi-judicial functions
The parties herein submit that the public respondent PCSD is exercising a quasi-judicial
function in its issuance of the SEP clearance based on the procedure it follows under its
own AO 6 or Guidelines in the Implementation of SEP Clearance System. This procedure
includes reviewing the sufficiency and accuracy of the documents submitted by the
project proponent and conducting public hearings or consultations with the affected
community.
The Court disagrees with the partiesreasoning and holds that PCSD did not perform a
quasi-judicial function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari.
There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power upon
the administrative body. RA 7611, which created the PCSD, does not confer quasijudicial powers on the said body.
Save possibly for the power to impose penalties under Section 19(8) (which is not
involved in PCSD issuance of an SEP Clearance), the rest of the conferred powers, and
the powers necessarily implied from them, do not include adjudication or a quasijudicial function.
Instead of reviewing the powers granted by law to PCSD, the trial court found the
following procedure outlined in PCSD AO 6, as supposedly descriptive of an adjudicatory
process.
The Court disagrees.
First, PCSD AO 6, cited by the trial court and the parties, cannot confer a quasi-judicial
power on PCSD that its enabling statute clearly withheld. An agency power to formulate
rules for the proper discharge of its functions is always circumscribed by the enabling
statute. Otherwise, any agency conferred with rule-making power, may circumvent
legislative intent by creating new powers for itself through an administrative order.
More importantly, the procedure outlined in PCSD AO 6 does not involve adjudication. A
government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or
awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have
the same effect as a judgment of the court. These decisions are binding, such that when

they attain finality, they have the effect of res judicata that even the courts of justice
have to respect. As we have held in one case, "judicial or quasi-judicial function involves
the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties
are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. In other words, the tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function must be clothed with power and
authority to pass judgment or render a decision on the controversy construing and
applying the laws to that end."
In issuing an SEP Clearance, the PCSD does not decide the rights and obligations of
adverse parties with finality. The SEP Clearance is not even a license or permit. All it
does is to allow the project proponent to proceed with its application for permits,
licenses, patents, grants, or concessions with the relevant government agencies. The
SEP Clearance allows the project proponent to prove the viability of their project, their
capacity to prevent environmental damage, and other legal requirements, to the other
concerned government agencies. The SEP Clearance in favor of PLMDC does not declare
that the project proponent has an enforceable mining right within the Municipality of
Narra; neither does it adjudicate that the concerned citizens of the said municipality
have an obligation to respect PLMDC right to mining. In fact, as seen in Section 5 of AO
6, the PCSD bases its actions, not on the legal rights and obligations of the parties (which
is necessary in adjudication), but on policy considerations, such as social acceptability,
ecological sustainability, and economic viability of the project.
Further, PCSD receipt of documents and ascertainment of their sufficiency and accuracy
are not indicative of a judicial function. It is, at most, an investigatory function to
determine the truth behind the claims of the project proponent. This Court has held
that the power to investigate is not the same as adjudication, so long as there is no final
determination of the parties respective rights and obligations.
Lastly, the fact that the PCSD conducts public consultations or hearings does not mean
that it is performing quasi-judicial functions. AO 6 defines public hearing/public
consultation simply as an "activity undertaken by PCSD to gather facts and thresh out all
issues, concerns and apprehensions and at the same time provide the project proponent
with the opportunity to present the project to the affected community." Its purpose is
not to adjudicate the rights of contending parties but only to "ascertain the acceptability
of the project in the community and to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are
considered," pursuant to RA 7611 policy of "encouraging the involvement of all sectors
of society and maximizing people participation x x x in natural resource management,
conservation and protection." On the other hand, the purpose of hearings in judicial
bodies is to ascertain the truth of the parties' claims through an adversarial process.
Clearly, the purpose of PCSD public consultations is not for adversaries to pit their
claims against each other. Since the PCSD actions cannot be considered quasi-judicial,
the same cannot be reviewed via a special civil action for certiorari. Where an
administrative body or officer does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power,
certiorari does not lie.
3.) CITY OF MANILA v GRECIA-CUERDO
THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL
PERALTA, J.:
NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
1
and set aside the Resolutions dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the
taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the
taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised
Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. private
respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint
denominated as one for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or ErroneouslyCollected Local
Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
4

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari holding
that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
the
said
case
should,
likewise,
be
filed
with
the
CTA.
7

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this
petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory
order
issued
by
the
RTC
in
a
local
tax
case.

HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In
transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be
assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992)
where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of
the lower court.
FALLO: petition is denied

4.) SEC v GMA

Facts: Petitioner GMA filed an application for various amendments to its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent SEC. The amendments include, among others,
the change in the corporate name of from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA
Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another 50 years.

The petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing
fee for the application for extension of corporate term (P1,212,200.00) The petitioner formally
protested the assessment. SEC approved the other amendments. (corporate name and the
principal purpose)

The petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety
of the assessment. SEC, through Assoc. Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, issued its ruling
upholding the validity of the questioned assessment.
An appeal was taken by the petitioner on the ground that the assessment is not in accordance
with law. SEC En Banc issued the assailed order dismissing the petitioners appeal for lack of
merit.

It filed an appeal with CA. GMA argued that its application for the extension of its corporate
term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of incorporation. It further
averred that the basis for the assessment is not valid. (SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series
of 1994)

CA agreed with the SECs submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant of a
fresh license for a corporation. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment. However, the CA ruled
that the Memorandum Circular is invalid and ineffective for not having been published in
accordance with law.

Issue: Whether or not the Memorandum Circular (MC) is valid.

Held: GMA points out that the MC No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fees for amended
articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate
existence. The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to filing fees for articles of
incorporation. Thus, the former circular should apply to its case. Assuming that MC No. 2, Series
of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the latter did not take effect for it was neither filed with
the UP Law Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation.

R.A. No. 3531 provides SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it assesses and
collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of
incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.

R.A. No. 3531 provides a standard which should guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its rates
and fees. If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court would have been inclined to
rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as outlined in the questioned MC.

However, we agree with the CA that the questioned MC is invalid as it was not published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore it has not been filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center
as required in the Administrative Code of 1987.

The MC cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This is an

implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the
public at large. It cannot be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation
of the law.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No.
3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to
determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its
rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to
property

The petition is denied.

5.) NHA v ALMEIDA
Facts:
The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land inSan
Pedro, Laguna. She had two children, Francisca and Beatriz(she died before her mom;mother of
PR). When Margarita passed away, Francisca executed a deed of self-adjudication claiming that
she was the only remaining relative of Margarita. The deed of was based on a 'Sinumpaang
Salaysay' allegedly executed by Margarita. The survivingheirs of Beatriz filed a case for
annulment of the deed. A decision was rendered and thedeed was declared null and void.
During the trial, Francisca filed an application with theNHA to purchase the same lots. The NHA
granted the application.The PR appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA reso was
affirmed.When Francisca died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate
whichthey submitted to the NHA. The transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The heirs of
Francisca directed PR to leave the premises that she was occupying.Feeling aggrieved, PR sought
the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a complaint in the
RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. She invoked her 40 yearoccupation of the property and re-raised the
fact that Francisca's declaration is a nullitybecause the other heirs were disregarded. The RTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision and remanded the case
for further hearing.The RTC rendered a decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the
decision of the Office of the President. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay"was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property whiwhich shall take
effect upondeath. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before
it cantransfer property.The NHA and the heirs of Francisca filed their respective motions which
were both denied.The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court
Issue:
WON the decision of NHA is arbitrary.
Ruling:
Yes. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering
that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the
estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over thedisputed properties. To the
extent of the interest that the original owner had over theproperty, the same should go to her
estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in theproperty and that interest should go to her
estate upon her demise so as to be able toproperly distribute them later to her heirs - in
accordance with a will or by operation of law.When the original buyer died, the NHA should

have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person" likely to stand in to fulfill the
obligation to pay the rest of the purchaseprice. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase
by Francisca Herrera should haveput the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the
Decision in the said CivilCase No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which
rendered the deedtherein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs
to theinterests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate
orintestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots

In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial
powerthat which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of
adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." This function
applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The
doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches
the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate,
and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat,
impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
6.) CONSTANTINO v SANDIGANBAYAN
Felipe K. Constantino (Constantino), mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, was
charged of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Municipality of Malungon listed as one of its priority programs, the acquisition of a
fleet of heavy equipment needed by the municipality in its development projects. For this
purpose, it appropriated an amount of P2.2 Million per annum for a period of five (5) years
beginning in 1996 for the amortization of such purchase. Pursuant thereto, the municipality
conducted two (2) public biddings for suppliers of the required fleet of heavy equipment. Both
attempts, however, failed. Hence, the Sangguniang Bayan instead passed Resolution No. 21 on
22 February 1996, authorizing petitioner Constantino to enter into a negotiated contract for the
lease/purchase of the needed fleet of heavy equipment.
Constantino entered into a Lease Agreement with Norlovanian Corporation,
represented by Lindong. The agreement required, among others, the municipality to provide
Norlovanian Corporation with a guaranty deposit.
In January 1997, Tomanan submitted his report detailing the following adverse findings
relative to the purchase of the subject fleet of heavy equipment: (a) the lease/purchase contract
was disadvantageous to the municipal government because of the rigid terms and conditions
therein required of the municipality before the latter could acquire ownership over the pool of

heavy equipment; (b) Norlovanian Corporation had no proof of ownership of the fleet of
equipment as the audit revealed that title to the equipment was in the name of Lindong; (c) the
lease/purchase procedure violated Sections 27 and 28 of the Rules and Regulations on Supply
and Property Management in Local Governments;[16] and (d) the lease/purchase procedure
utilized by the municipality was uneconomical and resulted to a wastage of P9,658,000.00 of
government funds.[17]
Complainants then filed a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan. The said court
convicted Constantino and Lindong. During the pendency of the appeal, Constantino died,
making the case moot and academic. However, the SC continued to try his case because the
resolution of his case is intertwined with the case filed against Lindong.
ISSUE: Whether Constantino is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019
HELD: NO
Manifest partiality could not be rightfully imputed to Constantino.[40] The prosecution
did not present proof that he was actuated with malice or fraud sufficient to meet the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.[41] However, the respondent court found that
Constantinos act of entering into a purportedly pure lease agreement instead of a
lease/purchase agreement was a flagrant violation of Resolution No. 21. In view of the rigid
terms of the subject contract to which Constantino assented, coupled by his failure to secure
the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into the agreement, the
Sandiganbayan found that his conduct constituted gross inexcusable negligence.[42] Likewise,
the anti-graft court ruled that Constantinos acts resulted in undue injury to the Municipality of
Malungon.[43] Notably, in the course of trial, the prosecution admitted that it had no proof that
unwarranted benefits and advantage had been given to Norlovanian Corporation.[44]
With the demise of Constantino during the pendency of his appeal, the same should
normally be regarded as moot and academic following the norm that the death of the accused
marks the extinction of his criminal liability. However, the present two petitions are so
intertwined that the absolution of Constantino is ultimately determinative of the absolution of
Lindong. Indeed, the exoneration of Constantino will necessarily signify the injustice of carrying
out the penalty imposed on Lindong. Thus, the Court in this instance has to ascertain the merits
of Constantinos appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against Lindong.

Undoubtedly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 is quite
high which, in this case, was not hurdled by the evidence presented against Constantino. Verily,
the prosecution failed to satisfy the requisite proof to demonstrate Constantinos guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. While Constantino should have exercised more prudence when he transacted
with Norlovanian Corporation, he could not however be held liable for gross inexcusable
negligence as contemplated in R.A. No. 3019.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUE:
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as
the purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is mainly to protect the public
service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other
hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. However, the
dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject

matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case
because of the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist.

It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the level of proof
required in administrative cases which is substantial evidence was not mustered therein. The
same evidence is again before the Court in connection with the appeal in the criminal case.
Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with greater reason satisfy the higher standard in
criminal cases such as the present case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

7.) MAGALLANES v SUN YAT SEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Azucena Magallanes, Evelyn Bacolod, Judith Cotecson (representedby her heirs), petitioners,
Grace Gonzales, and Bella Gonzales were allemployed as teachers in the Sun Yat Sen Elementary
School in SurigaoCity. Paz Go and Elena Cubillan are principals of the said school. Willy AngGan
Teng and Benito Ang are its directors, while Teotimo Tan is the schooltreasurer. They are all
respondents herein.
On May 22, 1994, respondents terminated the services of petitioners. Thus, on August 3, 1994,
they filed with the Sub-Regional ArbitrationBranch No. X, National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Butuan City,complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages, payment of backwages, 13th month pay, ECOLA, separation pay,moral damages, and
attorneys fees. Likewise, on August 22, 1994,petitioner Cotecson filed a separate complaint
praying for the same reliefs.
Issue: (1) whether the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) erred in holdingthat affixing a wrong
docket number on a motion renders it "non-existent;"
(2) whether the issuance by the NLRC of the Order dated March 30,2001, amending the
amounts of separation pay and backwages, awardedby the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division)
to petitioners and computedby the Labor Arbiter, is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Held: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Resolutionsdated October 29, 2001,
May 8, 2003, and October 10, 2003 in CA-G.R. SPNo. 67068 are REVERSED. The Order of the
NLRC dated March 30, 2001 inNLRC Case No. M-006176-2001 is SET ASIDE. The Order of the
LaborArbiter dated January 8, 2001 is REINSTATED.Ratio Decidendi: 1. Court of Appeals (Seventh
Division) is correct when itruled that petitioners motion for reconsideration of its Resolution
datedOctober 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 is "non-existent." Petitionerscounsel placed a
wrong case number in their motion. Where a pleadingbears an erroneous docket number and
thus "could not be attached to thecorrect case," the said pleading is, for all intents and
purposes, "non-existent." It has neither the duty nor the obligation to correct the error orto
transfer the case to the Seventh Division. However, we opt for liberalityin the application of the
rules to the instant case in light of the followingconsiderations. First, the rule that negligence of
counsel binds the clientmay be relaxed where adherence thereto would result in
outrightdeprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so
require. Second, this Court is not a slave of technical rules, shornof judicial discretion in
rendering justice; it is guided by the norm that onthe balance, technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights. Thus, if the application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather

than promote justice, it is always within this Courts power to suspend the rulesor except a
particular case from its application.
2. We sustain petitioners contention that the NLRC, in modifying theaward of the Court of
Appeals, committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Quasijudicial agencies haveneither business nor power to modify or amend the final and
executoryDecisions of the appellate courts. Under the principle of immutability of judgments,
any alteration or amendment which substantially affects a finaland executory judgment is void
for lack of jurisdiction.
We thus rule thatthe Order dated March 30, 2001 of the NLRC directing that the
monetaryaward should be computed from June 1994, the date petitioners weredismissed from
the service, up to June 20, 1995 only, is void
8.) RUIVIVAR v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions
and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued
that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of
complainants witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with
copies of the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she
may deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted not to controvert the affidavits that were
belatedly provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not violated
and her administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman,
declaring that the law can no longer help one who had been who had been given ample
opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance.
(Yung doctrine nasa notes ni Sir)
9.) DELA LLANA v. COA
(Nasa separate PDF document. Hindi ko kasi macopy. from lawrev yung digest. protected by a
password)