MOYA VS DEL FIERRO 69 PHIL 199 (1939)

In this petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the CA declaring

del Fierro as thecandidate-elect mayor of Paracale, Camarines Norte with a
majority vote over Moya. He contended that the CA committed errors in
admitting and counting in favor of del Fierro several ballots. The SC
dismissed the petition because in result even if the ballots contested are
counted in favor of Moya,del Fierro still wins by one vote. The SC avers
that in republicanism, the citizens have the voice in the government and
whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases to give it efficacy and not
to stifle. This is the fundamental reason for the rule that ballots should be
read and appreciated if not with utmost, with reasonable liberality.
MOYA VS DEL FIERRO 69 PHIL 199 (1939)
Facts: In this petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the CA
declaring del Fierro as the candidate-elect mayor of Paracale, Camarines
Norte with a majority vote over Moya. He contended that the CA
committed errors in admitting and counting in favor of del Fierro several
ballots.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring de Fierro as
elected mayor of Paracale, Camarines Norte.
Held: The SC dismissed the petition because in result even if the ballots
contested are counted in favor of Moya, del Fierro still wins by one
vote. The SC avers that in republicanism, the citizens have the voice in
the government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases to
give it efficacy and not to stifle. This is the fundamental reason for the rule
that ballots should be read and appreciated if not with utmost, with
reasonable liberality.

MAQUERRA VS BORRA 15 SCRA 7 (1965)

In this petition, Maquera seek that the RA 4421requiring all candidates for
national, provincial
cityand municipal offices to post a surety bondequivalent to salary or
emoluments to which he is acandidate. The Court granted the petition as it
is inconsistentwith the nature and essence of the Republicansystem
ordained in our Constitution and the principleof social justice underlying
the same for said politicalsystem is premised upon the tent that

sovereigntyresides in the people and all government

authorityemanates from them and this in turn impliesnecessarily that the
right to vote and to be voted
forshall not be dependent upon the wealth of theindividual concerned, whe
reas social justicepresupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and pooralike
and that accordingly no person shall by reasonof poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected topublic offic

ROMUALDEZ VS RTC 226 SCRA 406 (1993)

The petition of Romualdez is granted and reversedthe decision of the CA
cancelling his name from thelist of qualified voters of Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.In election cases, the Court treats domicile andresidence as synonym
ous terms, thus: "(t)he term"residence" as used in the election law issynon
ymous with "domicile", which imports not
onlyan intention to reside in a fixed place but alsopersonal presence in that
place, coupled withconduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile"denotes a fixed permanent residence to which whenabsent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons,one intends to return

Maruhom vs COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor.

Because of several irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the
petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the winner. Petitioner filed a case
with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later withdrew it. He also
filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally moved for dismissal
of the protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the Revision
Committee to convene and start the revision of the ballots. Petitioner
alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
petition.

HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of petitioners Motion to

Dismiss was not a grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. The filing of

the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to

prevent the early termination of the proceedings as evidenced by a
confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by
petitioner to avert the revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a
prohibited pleading in an election contest filed before the regular courts.

JOSE LINO LUNA vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 13744. November 29, 1918
Facts: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was
held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio
Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office.
The election was closed, the votes cast were counted, and a return was
made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of
Canvassers, who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having
received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected governor of said province.
Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new trial was ordered.
Additional evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the
inspectors in Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 oclock p.m., and that
a large number of persons voted after that time. The judge then directed
that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without ascertaining how
many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were
valid.
Held: The ballots were valid. The law provides that at all elections, the
polls shall be open from seven oclock in the morning until six oclock in
the afternoon. The polls should be open and closed in strict accord with
said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within the
hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time for
closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is
prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to
vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then,
certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire
vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were
cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter should not be
annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of
his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election
inspectors should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the
law, they should be punished and not the innocent voter.

Romualdez v. RTC etal, Sept. 14, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez
and a niece of Imelda Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the days of People Power,
relatives of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal
safety, fled the country. One of them are the Romuladezes they left the
country and sought asylum in the United States.
However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the
U.S. or else theyll be deported. Upon receipt of the information,
Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay his return to his
residence in Leyte and immediately registered himself as a voter.
In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude
petitioner from the list of the voters alleging that the latter is a U.S.
resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter. However,
the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition
to the RTC, the appellate court reversed MTCs ruling and disqualified
Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog,

Tolosa, Leyte despite his sudden departure to the U.S?

Ruling:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter

because he is still considered a resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Stating that, the political situation brought about by peoples Power
Revolution must have caused great fear to the Romualdezes, and as
having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is
understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as
voluntary or abandonment of residence.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political

right; a bounden duty of every citizen enabling them to participate in the
government process to ensure the will of the people.
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for
the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the
eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed,
allegedly by the latters men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were
attempts to railroad the private respondents proclamation, the petitioner
went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent
was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was
void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on
Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the
canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until
further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari
before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was
set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day
period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July
23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this
petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this
Court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis that it should have
been decided by COMELEC en banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. And a
year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987
Constitution.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and
academic.
Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the
petitioner being dead and the respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the
private respondent the winner in the election?
Held:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the
office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of
whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification
for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here
raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible
terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but
also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of
law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same.
There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has
been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But
there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this
case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act
then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2. No.
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the
1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective

provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall
be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision.

equivalent to salary or emoluments to which he is a candidate.The Court

granted the petition as it is inconsistent withthe nature and essence of the
Republican systemordained in our Constitution and the principle of
social justice underlying the same for said political system ispremised upon
the tent that sovereignty resides in thepeople and all government authority
emanates from themand this in turn implies necessarily that the right to
voteand to be voted for shall not be dependent upon thewealth of the
individualconcerned,whereassocial justice presupposes equal opportunity
for all, rich andpoor alike and that accordingly no person shall by reasonof
poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to publicoffice.canonizado

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of

all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and
decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related
thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police

Commission when Republic Act. No.8851, otherwise known as the PNP
Reform andReorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic
Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of officeof the incumbent
commissioners were deemed expired.Petitioners claimed that this violated
their security of tenure.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in

requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be
heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most
careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be
achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation
had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-toofamiliar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of
many unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the frustration of the
popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The
respondents theory would make this gambit possible for the preproclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily
decided by only three members in division, without the care and
deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission
en banc.

HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service.Republic Act No. 8551
did not expressly abolish thepositions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975,
the NationalPolice Commission was under the Department of Interior and
Local Government, while under Republic Act. No.8551 it is made an agency
attached to the Department of Interior and
Local Government. The organizationalstructure and the composition of the
National PoliceCommission remain essentially the same except for
theaddition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. Thepowers and duties
of the National Police Commissionremain basically unchanged. No
bona fidereorganization of the NPC having been mandated byCongress and
insofar as RA 8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting
in their separation fromoffice, it is tantamount to removing civil
serviceemployees from office without legal cause therefore, itmust be
struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for
the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic,
this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission
on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 154198

January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:

MAQUERRA VS BORRA 15 SCRA 7 (1965)

In this petition, Maquera seek that the RA 4421 requiringall candidates for
national, provincial city and municipaloffices to post a surety bond

Comelec denied petitioners request to substitute her deceased husband in

the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner
apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name
in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private

respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed

winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and,
hence, the only candidate running.

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in

barangay elections, a prohibition against said substitution cannot be said
to exist.

Issue:

Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when

COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election,
it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and
procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the
way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied
petitioners request that she be allowed to run for elections.
Ruling: