G.R. No.

L-12986

March 31, 1966

THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C.

AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.

namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high

enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it
was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and
beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized
iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt
when subjected to intense heat. Defendants'
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the
cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread
thereof to the neighboring houses.

Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at

the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila.
It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the
hose was inserted, when an unknown bystander threw
a matchstick into the nozzle after lighting a cigarette.
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring
houses, including the personal properties and effects
inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners
here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo
Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and
the second as its agent in charge of operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed
as the cause of the fire. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due
care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.

Facts: This is an action for damages arising from

injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that
the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by
the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos
at a fixed compensation; that while tending the
animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of
them and later died as a consequence of his injuries;
that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to
force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and
heir depending upon him for support.

Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause

and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply so as to presume negligence on the part
of appellees.

Defendants moved for the dismissal of the

complaint for lack of a cause of action, and the motion
having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has
taken this appeal.

Held: Reversed.

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under

article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:

The gasoline station, with all its appliances,

equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew
or could have known how the fire started were
appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
The report submitted by a police officer in the
performance of his duties on the basis of his own
personal observation that the gasoline station being
located on a thickly populated area, a person lighting a
cigarette cannot be excluded and poses as a secondary
hazard, may properly be considered as an exception to
the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the
location and objective circumstances surrounding the
operation of the gasoline station in question,
strengthen the presumption of negligence under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they
called for more stringent measures of caution than
those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence
under ordinary circumstances.
Even then, the fire possibly would not have
spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of defendants,

Margarita Afialda v. Basilio Hisole and Francisco

Hisole
G.R. No. L-2075

November 29, 1949

The possessor of an animal, or the one who

uses the same, is liable for any damages it may
cause, even if such animal should escape from
him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the
damage should arise from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.
Issue: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when
damage is caused to its caretaker.
Ruling:
NO.The lower court took the view that
under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the
owner of an animal is answerable only for damages
caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to
the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable
only if he had been negligent or at fault under article
1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court
was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the
article 1905 does not distinguish between damage
caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable
whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.
The distinction is important. For the statute
names the possessor or user of the animal as the

person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this

for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has
the custody and control of the animal and is therefore
the one in a position to prevent it from causing
damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody
and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's
business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those circumstances,
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
There being no reversible error in the order
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but
without costs in view of the financial situation of the
appellant.

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals

160 SCRA 315
FACTS: On April 13, 1972, Alfredo Amadora while in the
Auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his
life as well.
The herein petitioners, as the victims parents,
filed a civil action under Article 2180 NCC against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high
school principal, the dean of the boys, and the physics
teachers together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial the CFI of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the
respondent court, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved.Hence this
action for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are liable under
Article 2180 NCC.
HELD: The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of
them was the teacher in charge during the time of the
accident. Each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in
charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipline.
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the Article because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage caused by
the students of apprentice. Neither can it be held liable
to answer for the tort committed by any other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending
students or has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such custody.
G.R. Nos. 114841-42 August 23, 1995
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF
MANILA, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO,

HEIRS OF CRISTETA CASTILLO and CORNELIO

CASTILLO, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner company commenced the
construction of a steel fabrication plant in the
Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating
dredging operations at the Batangas Bay in an area
adjacent to the real property of private respondents.
Private respondents alleged that during the ongoing construction of its steel and fabrication yard,
petitioner's personnel and heavy equipment trespassed
into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to private
respondents without their consent. These heavy
equipments damaged big portions of private
respondents' property which were further used by
petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying any
rent therefor, nor does it appear from the records that
such use of their land was with the former's conformity.
Private respondents further alleged that as a
result of the dredging operation of petitioner company,
the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited
upon their land. Consequently, the said property which
used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice
production and each averaging an annual net harvest
of 75 cavans could no longer be planted with palay as
the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and
unsuitable for agriculture.
Petitioner company denied all the allegations of
private respondents and contended that its personnel
and equipment had neither intruded upon nor occupied
any portion of private respondents' landholdings. The
alleged sea silt with water, according to petitioner was
due to the flood brought by the heavy rains when
typhoon "Ruping" hit and lashed the province of
Batangas during that year.
An action for damages was filed with the trial
court which decided the case ordering defendant to
pay private respondents.
Petitioner company appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the said court affirmed the trial courts
judgement with modifications on the amount.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court
misapplied Article 2177 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: When the Court of Appeals ordered the
petitioner to pay the private respondents not only the
expected total amount of profits the latter would have
derived from the expected sale of their palay harvest
for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half hectare
agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00
per square meter of their said entire landholdings it
misapplied Article 2177. What Article 2177 says is that
no damages can be twice from the same act or
omission.
However, the Supreme Court finds that
respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error of law in increasing the amount of damages
awarded to private respondents by the court a quo.
Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it modified the judgment of the trial court by
increasing the award of damages in favor of private
respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose
an appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are
presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication made by
the lower court.
The procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a
party who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
those granted in the decision of the lower court.

The evidence on record indubitably support the

findings of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner
company is liable for the destruction of the property of
herein private respondents and consequently entitle
the latter to an award of the damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED with
regard to the amount of damages awarded to private
respondents and the awards of the trial court on this
matter are hereby reinstated for that purpose. In all
other respects, the decision of respondent court is
AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
BATIQUIN VS COURT OF APPEALS
258 SCRA 334
GR No. 118231 July 5, 1996
Facts: Dr. Batiquin was a resident Physician at the
Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City,
performed a simple caesarian section on Mrs. Flotilde
Villegas on the latters first child. Days after the
operation Mrs. Villegas checked out on the said
hospital and paid the amount of One Thousand Five
Hundred
Pesos
(P1,500.00) as
Dr.
Batiquins
professional fee thru the latters secretary.
Soon after leaving the hospital Mrs. Villegas
begun to suffer abdominal pains, so she consulted Dr.
Batiquin, who prescribed her certain medicines. And in
the meantime Mrs. Villegas was given a medical
certificate by Dr. Batiquin to report for work.
Mrs. Villegas reported for work at the Rural
Bank of Ayungon, Negros Oriental but the pain kept on
recurring prompting Mrs. Villegas to consult Dr. Ma.
Salud Kho.
When Dr. Ma. Salud Kho opened the abdomen
of Mrs. Villegas, she found a piece of rubber material
which she described a foreign body.
Mrs. Villegas sued Dr. Batiquin for damages.
Issue: Wether the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
applies.
Held: Yes The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies as
the entire operation proceedings was under exclusive
control of Dr. Batiquin; aside from the caesarian
operation Mrs. Villegas underwent no other operation
which could have introduced the rubber; and Dr.
Batiquin, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
Bonifacio vs BLT Bus Co., Inc.
Facts: Jovito Bonifacio Sr. and his wife, together with
their neighbors were on their way to Los Banos,
Laguna. The spouses Mercedes Benz was driven by
Alberto Concepcion, a duly licensed driver.
They began to travel at 4am and around
5:20am Concepcion noticed a cargo truck parked on
the left portion of the highway without any parking
light. Concepcion was running the Benz only at the
speed of 30 miles per hour because it was drizzling. He
also noticed a bus on the left side of the highway which
was going the opposite direction as they were. Since
the benz was on the correct lane Concepcion continued
the route. Just as he was about to pass the parked
truck, the bus swrved to the lane of the benz and
collided with the latter. This caused Jovito to be thrown
out of the car and die. Others were seriously injured.
Issue: who among the drivers is at fault? Is the
employer of the guilty driver liable?

Held: De Luna, the driver of the BLT bus was at fault.

Concepcion was not at fault.
De lunas defense that he did not know that
anyone else was using the highway was no excuse to
his negligent operation of the vehicle, since he should
be especially be watchful in anticipation of others who
may be using the highway; his failure to keep a proper
lookout for persons and objects in the line to be
traversed constitutes negligence.
Concepcion on the other hand, did not have
sufficient time to evade the sudden swerve of the bus.
He was on his proper lane and the speed of the Benz
was not a cause of the mishp.
On the second issue, BLTB company contends
that they excercised due diligence in selection of
employees because their drivers underwent proficiency
tests and issued service manuals to employees.
However, due diligence in selection will not help if it is
proved that there was no diligence of a good father in
the supervision of such employees.
It was proven that: (a) brake linings were
changed more than 30 days prior to the incident when
linings last 30 day only, (b) De Luna was at the wheel
for more than 11 hours already when the accident
happened, (c) De Luna had 31 infractions prior to the
mishap but received warnings only, (d) the overhauling
of the bus was overdue by 6 months.
Therefore, BLTB co. inc. is liable as employer
due to its negligence in supervision.
BUSTAMANTE, ET AL., VS. CA, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 89880, 6 FEBRUARY 1991.
FACTS:
Six thirty in the morning, a collision
occurred between a gravel and sand truck and a
passenger bus. The front left side portion (barandilla)
of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of
the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the
driver's seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and
died as a result of the injuries they sustained. During
the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant
Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar. The
passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The
vehicle was registered in the name of defendant
Novelo but was owned jointly by Magtibay and Serrado.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo
truck and the passenger bus were approaching each
other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters
away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of
the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck
was heading towards his lane. Not minding this
circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the
truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to
third gear in order to give more power and speed to
the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the
road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand
tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of
the highway. While the bus was in the process of
overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck
was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped
each other at each other's left side. After the impact,
the truck skidded towards the other side of the road
and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a
coconut tree and felling it. CA reversed and set aside
the trial courts decision, and dismissed the complaint
insofar as del Pilar and Montesino are concerned. SC

reversed and set aside the judgment of the CA

reinstated that of the lower court, with the modification
on the indemnity for death of each of the victims which
increased to P 50, 000.00 each (lasque, mervins
digest).
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of last clear chance
applicable in a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against the owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles?
RULING:
The Appellate erred in applying the doctrine of
last clear chance as between defendants because the
case at bar is not a suit between the owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, it erred in
absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability. Furthermore, because as between defendants,
the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable of the injured person by reason of
his discovery of the laters peril, and it cannot defend
by pleading that another had negligently failed to take
action which could have avoided the injury.
CAPUNO VS. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES
GR. No. L-19331 / April 30,1965
FACTS: The case arose from a vehicular collision which
occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga.
Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon
Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision
proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers,
the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi
was charged with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence in the CFI. The information was
subsequently amended to include claims for damages
by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal
case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan
spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for
damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi. At that
time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was
rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused
Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior
thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein
appellants commenced a civil action for damages
against the Pepsi-Cola. This is the action which, upon
appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in
its, from which order the present appeal has been
taken. The grounds upon which appellees based their
motion for dismissal is that the action had already
prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by petitioners
based on quasi-delict is barred by prescription.
HELD: The action filed is barred by prescription.
There can be no doubt that the present action
is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict,
which action must be instituted within four (4) years
(Article 1146, Civil Code). When they commenced the
civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case
was still pending, showing that appellants then chose
to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for
otherwise that action would have been premature and
in any event would have been concluded by the
subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33
includes bodily injuries causing death. In other words
the civil action for damages could have been
commenced by appellants immediately upon the death

of their decedent. But the complaint here was filed only

on after the lapse of more than five years.
An action based on a quasi-delict is
governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the
question of when the prescriptive period of four years
shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action)
maybe brought" which means from the day the quasidelict occurred or was committed. The institution of a
criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting
the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
China Air Lines, Ltd. vs Court of Appeals
GR 45985. May 18, 1990
Facts:
Jose Pagsibigan bought a Manila-TaipeiHong Kong-Manila ticket from Transaire Travel Agency.
The latter contacted Philippine Air Lines who was then
a ticketing agent of China Airlines. PAL ticketing clerk
Roberto Espiritu issued a CAL ticket of the desired flight
with a departure time 5:20pm.
Pagsibigan arrived at the airport one hour
before the mentioned departure time only to be
informed that the flight he was supposed to take had
already left for Taipei 10:20 in the morning of that day.
Pagsibigan filed for damages.
Issue: Who may be held liable?
Held: Espiritu and Philippine Air Lines are liable,
China Air Lines is not.
It is important to recognize that the contractual
relations of PAL between CAL is one of Agency.
However, this action premised on the negligence of the
employee and the complainant seeks recovery for the
resulting damages from both PAL and Espiritu without
qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct
and primary liability of PAL as an employee under Art.
2180 of the new civil code.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of
an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the
employer in the selection or in the supervision of its
employees. Such presumption is rebuttable by clear
showing of the exercise of care and diligence of a good
father of the family by the employer.
In the case at bar however, PAL failed to
adduce
evidence
sufficient
to
overcome
the
presumption of negligence against it. Its main defense
that it is only an agent and may not be held liable to
third persons when duly acting is untenable. A case for
damages against the agent arising from torts is an
admitted exception to the rule invoked by PAL.
Therefore, Espiritu is primarily liable under Art.
2176 while PAL is liable under 2180.
City of Manila vs. Teotico 22SCRA267
Facts: On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 pm, Genaro
N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P.
Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and
unloading zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him
down town. After about five minutes, he managed to
hail a jeepney that came along to stop. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a
few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head
hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
In addition to the eye injury he suffered, Teotico also
had several injuries in his body which necessitated
medical treatment.

As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence,

Teotico filed with the court a civil case for damages
against the City of Manila as provided by Article 2189
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
The City of Manila, on the other hand,
contended that P. Burgos is a national highway, which
meant that it did not belong to the City of Manila and
thus could not be held liable.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for
the damages caused by the defective road to Teotico
Held: Yes, the City of Manila is liable.
In Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary that the defective road or street belongs to
the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either
control or supervision over said street or road.
In the case at bar, even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from its control or
supervision by the City of Manila, as provided for by
Section 18 of Republic Act 409.
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. # L-21291, March 28, 1969
Facts: Preciolita V. Corliss whose husband, the late
Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one,
the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was
driving collided with a locomotive of defendantappellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight
on the evening of Febuary 21, 1957, at the railroad
crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga.
Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially
declared in his deposition, that at the time of the
accident, he also awaiting transportation at the
entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards
away from the tracks and that while there he saw the
jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep
slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made
a brief stop but that it did not stop
dead stop.
Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing
down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was
what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he
could see the train coming from the direction of San
Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was
not sufficient enough to avoid the accident. Virgilio de
la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on
the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago
checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and
a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He
stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and
saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was
pushed forward. He stated that he saw the jeep
running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did
not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him.
Issue: Whether the plaintiff can recover damages
from defendant
Held: The accident was caused by the negligence of
Ralph Corliss. The latter was sufficiently warned in
advance that defendants train was coming because of
the siren and signal of the train, and besides, the
victim knew about the setup of the checkpoint, and the
existence of the trucks. Under the circumstances, the

victim should have stopped completely before the

crossing and should have allowed the train to go
through its course. Having failed to do this, the victim
is considered negligent, and plaintiff was not allowed to
recover damages.
CRUZ vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 98273 October 28, 1991
FACTS: Clarita V. Cruz went abroad pursuant to an
employment contract that she hoped would improve
her future. Although a high school graduate, she
agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in
consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave
benefits she could not expect to earn in this country.
But her foreign adventure proved to be a bitter
disappointment. On March 18, 1988, after completing
her two-year engagement, she was back home in the
Philippines with her dead dreams and an angry
grievance.
On March 23, 1988, she filed a complaint
against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.)
and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya
In its answer and position paper, the private
respondent raised the principal defense of settlement
as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed
by the complainant
NLRC dismissed the complaint by the
petitioner. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of desistance
signed by the complainant is a valid waiver of her right
to
collect
for
compensation
against
private
respondents.
HELD: No.
The Court is convinced that the petitioner was
not fully aware of the import and consequences of the
Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly
with the assistance of counsel.
This decision demonstrates once again the
tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to
the lawless exploitation and impositions of his
employer. The protection of our overseas workers is
especially necessary because of the inconveniences
and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for
a better life in a foreign land away from their loved
ones and their own government.
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, ET AL. vs. ALFONSO
MONFORT
G.R. No. L-24101
September 30, 1970
Facts: Cuadra,12, and Monfort,13, were classmates in
grade six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. On July 9, 1962, they were assigned to weed the
grass in the school premises. While performing the
assigned task, Monfort found a plastic headband.
Jokingly she said that she had found an earthworm,
and as a prank to frighten Cuadra threw the headband
towards her. At that precise moment, Monfort turned to
face her friend, and the headband thus hit her right
eye, injuring it. Cuadra treated it with some powder.
The next day, the eye began to swell, and the parents
thus took her to a doctor where she had to undergo
surgery, despite that, she eventually lost sight in that
eye, as a result of the said injury.
The parents of Ciuadra sued for damages,
based on article 2176 and 2180 of the civil code,
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is

obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or

negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
Issue: Whether or not the parents of Maria Teressa
Cuadra may be held liable for the acts of their minor
childs tortuous act?
Held: The act of throwing the head band was
deemed to be a childish prank, and was in fact not an
act contemplated by 2176 of the civil code. Being a
childish prank, the court declared that there was no
way that any parent could ever anticipate such prank.
The said act also did not reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and
for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
CULION ICE, FISH,ETC. vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS
Facts:
The manager of defendant corporation
accepted the job of changing the gasoline engine of
plaintiffs boat. After installing a new fuel tank and a
new carburetor, the boat was taken out for trial.
During this period, a backfire occurred in the cylinder
of the engine. The boat was ultimately destroyed.
Plaintiff filed an action to recover the value of the boat
from the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not there is negligence on the part
of Philippine motors and was the accident avoidable?
Held: The burning of the boat resulted from an
accident but this accident was in no sense an
unavoidable accident. It should not have occurred if he
observed the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do. When a
person holds himself out as being competent to do
things, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work, which he attempts to do.
The
defendant was held liable for the value of the vessel.
DAYWALT vs. RECOLETOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-13505
February 4, 1919
FACTS: In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a
contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to
Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land upon the issuance of a
title to the land and a Torrens certificate. A second
contract was executed in the form of a deed of
conveyance. The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000,
and the area of the land enclosed in the boundaries
defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares
and a fraction.
In 1908, the parties entered into still another
agreement, superseding the old. Later on, the Torrens
certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia,
but in the course of the proceedings, it was found by
official survey that the area of the tract was about
1.248 hectares instead of 452 hectares. In view of this
development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to
transfer the whole tract to the purchaser, asserting
that she never intended to sell so large an amount of
land and that she had been misinformed as to its area.
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres
Recoletos,
is
a
religious
corporation
whose
representative, Father Isidro Sanz had long been well
acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over

her an influence and ascendancy. Teodorica appears to

be a woman of little personal force, easily subject to
influence, and upon all the important matters of
business including the tract in issue, was accustomed
to seek, and was given, the advice of father Sanz and
other members of his order with whom she came in
contact.
As Teodorica still retained possession of said
property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with
her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the
defendant corporation were pastured upon said land.
Litigation prospered due to Endencias change
of mind and refusal to comply with her agreement with
Daywalt despite order of the court for specific
performance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inducement made by Father
Sanz to Endencia constitutes actionable interference in
the contract
Whether or not the defendant corporation
made itself a co-participant with Endencia in the
breach of the contract due to the alleged unlawful
intervention.
HELD: No. As preliminary to a consideration of the
first of these questions, we deem it well it dispose of
the contention that the members of the defendants
corporation, in advising and prompting Teodorica
Endencia not to comply with the contract of sale, were
actuated by improper and malicious motives. The trial
court found that this contention was not sustained,
observing that while it was true that the circumstances
pointed to an entire sympathy on the part of the
defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica
Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land, the
fact that its officials may have advised her not to carry
the contract into effect would not constitute actionable
interference with such contract. It may be added that
when one considers the hardship that the ultimate
performance of that contract entailed on the vendor,
and the doubt in which the issue was involved to the
extent that the decision of the Court of the First
Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the
Supreme Court itself was divided the attitude of the
defendant corporation, as exhibited in the conduct of
its procurador, Juan Labarga, and other members of
the order of the Recollect Fathers, is not difficult to
understand. To our mind a fair conclusion on this
feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his
associates believed in good faith that the contract cold
not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged
if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or
assistance which they may have given was, therefore,
prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in
our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have
surrendered the documents of title and given
possession of the land but for the influence and
promptings of members of the defendants corporation.
But we do not credit the idea that they were in any
degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the
desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of
grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the
prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff.
Whatever may be the character of the liability
which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or
assisting one of the parties to evade performance,
there is one proposition upon which all must agree.
This is, that the stranger cannot become more
extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance
of the contract than the party in whose behalf he

intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages

in excess of those that could be recovered against the
immediate party to the contract would lead to results
at once grotesque and unjust. In the case at bar, as
Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the
contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant
corporation, even admitting that it has made itself
coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no
even exceed hers. This leads us to consider at this
point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to
the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the
certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in
possession.
DE GUZMAN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 90856 July 23, 1992
FACTS: Arturo de Guzman was the general manager of
the Manila office of the Affiliated Machineries Agency,
Ltd., which was based in Hongkong. On June 30, 1986,
he received a telex message from Leo A. Fialla,
managing director of AMAL in its main office, advising
him of the closure of the company due to financial
reverses. This message triggered the series of events
that are the subject of this litigation.
Immediately upon receipt of the advise, De
Guzman notified all the personnel of the Manila office.
The employees then sent a letter to AMAL accepting its
decision to close, subject to the payment to them of
their current salaries, severance pay, and other
statutory benefits. De Guzman joined them in these
representations.
These requests were, however, not heeded.
Consequently, the employees, now herein private
respondents, lodged a complaint with the NLRC against
AMAL, through Leo A. Fialla and Arturo de Guzman, for
illegal dismissal, unpaid wages or commissions,
separation pay, sick and vacation leave benefits, 13th
month pay, and bonus.
For his part, the petitioner began selling some
of AMAL's assets and applied the proceeds thereof, as
well as the remaining assets, to the payment of his
claims against the company. He also organized
Susarco, Inc., with himself as its president and his wife
as one of the incorporators and a member of the board
of directors. This company is engaged in the same line
of business and has the same clients as that of the
dissolved AMAL.
NLRC held petitioner jointly and severally liable
with AMAL
ISSUE: Whether or not de Guzman can be held jointly
and severally liable with AMAL.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the petitioner, while
admittedly the highest ranking local representative of
AMAL in the Philippines, is nevertheless not a
stockholder and much less a member of the board of
directors or an officer thereof. He is at most only a
managerial employee.
Petitioner cannot be held directly responsible
for the decision to close the business that resulted in
his separation and that of the private respondents.
That decision came directly and exclusively from AMAL.
The petitioner's participation was limited to the
enforcement of this decision in line with his duties as
general manager of the company.
We hold that although the petitioner cannot be
made solidarily liable with AMAL for the monetary
demand of its employees, he is nevertheless directly

liable to them for his questionable conduct in

attempting to deprive them of their just share in the
assets of AMAL.
Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
This is supplemented by Article 21 of the same
Code thus:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Although the question of damages arising from
the petitioner's bad faith has not directly sprung from
the illegal dismissal, it is clearly intertwined therewith.
The predicament of the private respondents caused by
their dismissal was aggravated by the petitioner's act
in the arrogating to himself all of AMAL's assets to the
exclusion of its other creditors, including its employees.
The issue of bad faith is incidental to the main action
for illegal dismissal and is thus properly cognizable by
the Labor Arbiter.
It is stressed that the petitioner's liability to the
private respondents is a direct liability in the form of
moral and exemplary damages and not a solidary
liability with AMAL for the claims of its employees
against the company. He is being held liable not
because he is the general manager of AMAL but
because he took advantage of his position by applying
the properties of AMAL to the payment exclusively of
his own claims to the detriment of other employees.
Dichoso vs. CA
GR No. 55613 December 10, 1990
Facts: Spouses Gaspar Prila and Maria Beldad owned
a parcel of land at Cagmanaba, Ocampo, Camarines
Sur surveyed in the name of Gaspar. Upon the death of
Maria in 1925, the eastern half was given to their only
daughter, Vivencia, and when Gaspar died, the
portion pertaining to him was divided into three: a third
was given to Vivencia, another third to Asuncion
Pacamara, and the last third to Custodia Parcia. The
terms of said settlement were agreed to by the three
parties and the deeds were duly registered at the
Register of Deeds. This was further confirmed judicially
by the CFI of Camarines Sur. In 1955 Vivencia sold her
portion to petitioner Dichoso who has been, ever since,
in actual possession thereof, exercising various acts of
ownership thereof. On the other hand, Asuncion sold to
wife of private respondent Teodolfo Ramos her share
but the deed mentions the area to be in excess of her
share. Hence, said property which Ramos claims to
have possessed is now the land in question.
Respondent Ramos took possession of the
contested Riceland upon its purchase. It yielded an
average harvest of 20 sacks of palay per planting
whish was twice a year. One-third of the harvest went
to Ramos and the remaining two-thirds was the
tenants share. Dichoso, meanwhile, claims that the
disputed land was inside his property. Sometime in
1962 Ramos, with a constabulary soldier and two
policemen, allegedly seized the produce of the land
consisting of 50 cavans of palay from petitioners
tenant. In retaliation, petitioner brought with him a
constabulary soldier and appropriated 6 cavans of the
produce.

On December 1967, respondent filed a

complaint for quieting of title over the Riceland before
the CFI of Camarines SUr. It rendered a decision in
favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
trial courts decision.
Issue: WON the CA erred in requiring petitioner to
deliver 40 cavans annually to respondent despite its
finding that only 1/3 of the produce went to Ramos.
Ruling:YES. Petitioner alleged that since respondents
share of the harvest is only 1/3, only the 1/3 of the
annual harvest must be awarded to him. Ramos
contention that his tenant will be deprived of his share
if only 1/3 was awarded to him. Actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must
be duly proved, and proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that
they have suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof. In view of his dispossession from 1964
and the fact that his tenant has vacated the land the
same year, he cannot allege that his tenant is entitled
to his 2/3 share.
EPG Construction Company vs. Court of Appeals
210 SCRA 230
Facts: Herein petitioner EPG Construction Company,
Inc. and herein private respondent University of the
Philippines (UP) entered into a contract for the
construction of the UP Law Library for the stipulated
price of P7,545,000.00. Upon completion, the building
was formally turned over by the petitioner to UP; the
latter issued a Certification of Acceptance. Sometime
later, UP complained to the petitioner that six airconditioning units in the building were not cooling
properly. The latter agreed to shoulder the expenses
for their repair, which was, however, never undertaken.
UP was forced to contract with another company which
repaired the units for P190,000.00. UP then demanded
reimbursement of the said amount plus liquidated
damages from the petitioner, which the latter rejected.
UP then filed an action against the petitioner. After the
trial, the trial court ruled in favor of UP and ordered the
petitioner to pay actual and liquidated damages. Said
decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner contended that by issuing the
Certificate of Acceptance, UP has waived the guarantee
provision in their contract and is now estopped from
invoking it.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable under
the
guarantee
provision
in
the
contract
notwithstanding the Certificate of Acceptance issued
by UP?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. All
UP certified to, when it issued the Certificate of
Acceptance, was that the building constructed by the
petitioner was in good condition at the time it was
turned over to it. It did not thereby relieve the
petitioner of liability for any defect that may arise or be
discovered later during the one-year period of the
guaranty. The defects complained against were hidden
and UP was not expected to recognize them at the time
the work was accepted. Moreover, there was an
express reservation by UP of its right to hold the
petitioner liable for the defects during a period of one
year.
Decision Affirmed.

SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957
Facts: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy
Scouts organization and a student of Balintawak
Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed
by the schools supervisor to attend a parade in honor
of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students
boarded the jeep that was going to take them to the
parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat
by his side. They have not gone too far when the jeep
turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi.
Issue: Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held
jointly and severally liable with his son Dante Capuno,
for the civil liability of his tortuous act?
Held: Although at the time of the accident the father
was not present, plaintiff contends that at the time of
the accident Dante was a minor who was living with his
parents. The court thus found that Delfin Capuno
should be held solidarily liable for the tortuous act of
his son Dante, for his failure to exercise proper parental
authority.
Fabre vs. CA, 259 SCRA 426
G.R. No. 111127. July 26, 1996
FACTS: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were
owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used
the bus principally in connection with a bus service for
school children which they operated in Manila. The
couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired
after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take
school children to and from the St. Scholasticas
College in Malate, Manila.
Private respondent Word for the World Christian
Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for
the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in
consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through
Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen
was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was
unfamiliar with the area ,it being his first trip to La
Union, was forced to take a detour through the town of
Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night,
petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the
highway, running on a south to east direction, which he
described as siete. The road was slippery because it
was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the
speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and
sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus
Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side,
coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The
bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it
had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not
see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the area and he could not have seen the
curve despite the care he took in driving the bus,
because it was dark and there was no sign on the
road. He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly
slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too
late.

The Lingayen police investigated the incident

the next day. On the basis of their finding they filed a
criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil.
The case was later filed with the Lingayen Regional
Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano
P1,500.00 for the damage to the latters fence. On the
basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance the case
against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured,
brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila.
As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from
paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the
waist down. During the trial she described the
operations she underwent and adduced evidence
regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy.
The trial court found that no convincing
evidence was shown that the minibus was properly
checked for travel to a long distance trip and that the
driver was properly screened and tested before being
admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence
presented have shown the negligent act of the
defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident
subject of this case.
The trial court ordered herein petitioners to pay
Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms.
Amyline Antonio for they were the only ones who
adduced evidence for their claim for damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but
dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the
ground that they failed to prove their respective
claims.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, jointly or
solidarily, were negligent and if they are liable for
damages and to what extent.
HELD: The finding that Cabil drove his bus
negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned
the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employee is fully supported by the evidence on
record. These factual findings of the two courts we
regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are
by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that
on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a
consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark.
He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that
there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is
undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50
kilometers per hour and only slowed down when he
noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. By
then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the
road. Given the conditions of the road and considering
that the trip was Cabils first one outside of Manila,
Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate
speed. There is testimony that the vehicles passing on
that portion of the road should only be running 20
kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour,
Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Considering the foregoing, the fact that it was
raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that
he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even
on a good day the normal speed was only 20
kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the
terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held
liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent
Amyline Antonio.

Pursuant to Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil

Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that
his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent
in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not
satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a
professional drivers license. The employer should also
examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience
and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on
the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions as well as actual
implementation
and
monitoring
of
consistent
compliance with the rules.
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil
to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not
consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school
children only, from their homes to the St. Scholasticas
College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after
a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for
certain matters, such as whether he could remember
the names of the children he would be taking to school,
which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a
long distance travel, especially considering that the
trip to La Union was his first. The existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on
the part of an employer.
Petitioners argue that they are not a common
carrier, hence, ordinary diligence or diligence of a good
father of a family is only the degree of diligence due of
them. As already stated, this case actually involves a
contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not
have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. The article makes
no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe
transportation of the passengers to their destination.
This duty of care is not excused by proof that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employee.
The liability of the common carriers does not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
with modification as to the award of damages.
Petitioners are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
private respondent Amyline Antonio.
F.F. CRUZ and Co., INC. VS Court of Appeals
164 SCRA 731
No. L-52732, August 29, 1988
Facts: Petitioner F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. is an owner of
a furniture shop in Caloocan City which was adjacent to
the residence of Mable family, herein private
respondents.
That sometime in August 1971, private
respondent Gregorio Mable requested to the herein
petitioner that a firewall be constructed between the
latters shop and their house. Such request fell on deaf
ears. Unfortunately, on September 6, 1974, a fire broke
out in the petitioners shop which eventually spread

into private respondents house. Both the house and

the shop were razed to the ground. As a result, the
private respondent filed an action for recovery of
damages against the petitioner. After the trial, the trial
court ruled in favor of the private respondents and
ordered the petitioner to pay the damages for the loss
of the formers house, furnitures and other valuables.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Lower
Court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITUR is applicable in this case?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Under
the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR: Where the thing
which cause the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care. The facts of the case at hand clearly call the
application of the abovementioned doctrine. In the
normal course of operations
of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible materials may
usually be found thereon.
Furthermore, negligence or want of care on the
part of the petitioner was not merely presumed; the
latters failure to construct a firewall in accordance with
city ordinance would suffice to support findings of
negligence.
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 75112. October 16, 1990
Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr.,
was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner
Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha.
As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered
multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a
total of twenty (20) days.
Evidence showed that at the precise time of
the vehicular accident, Funtecha, who only had a
student driver's permit, was driving after having
persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn
over the wheels to him.
Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for
damages before the RTC of Roxas City. Named
defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer
and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, the
director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in
his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized
and allowed Funtecha who was his houseboy at the
time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question
despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter
did not have the necessary license or permit to drive
said vehicle. Allan Masa, was not impleaded as a codefendant.
The trial court rendered judgment finding not
only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but
also Allan Masa, a non-party.
Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and
Allan Masa are at fault and negligent of the acts
complained of which caused the injury to plaintiff.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants.
The court absolved defendant Agustin Masa
from any personal liability with respect to the

complaint filed against him in his personal and private

capacity, because he was not in the vehicle during the
alleged incident.
Filamer appealed the lower court's judgment to
the Court of Appeals. Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court's decision in toto. Hence, the appeal.
Filamer contented that it cannot be held
responsible for the tortuous act of Funtecha on the
ground that there is no existing employer-employee
relationship between them.
Issue: Whether or not the term "employer" as used in
Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with
reference to Funtecha.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Funtecha is an
employee of Filamer and need not to have an official
appointment for drivers position in order that Filamer
may be held responsible for his negligent act.
The fact that Funtecha was not the school
driver or was not acting within the janitorial duties,
does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was a
negligence on its part either in the selection of the
servant or employee or in the supervision over him.
First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals
209 SCRA 660
Facts: Crisostomo Vitug fild a Civil Case against
defendant First Malayan Leasing and Finance
Corporation (FMLFC), to recover damages as a result of
a three-vehicle collision on December 14, 1983,
involving his car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck
registered in the name of FMLFC and driven by one
Crispin Sicat.
The evidence shows that while Vitugs car was
at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street and
EDSA in Cubao, Quezon City, northward bound, the oncoming Isuzu cargo truck bumped a Ford Granada car
behind him with such force that the Ford car thrown on
top of Vitugs car. The cargo truck thereafter hit Vitugs
car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and
setting the car ablaze.
FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was
not the owner of the truck, neither was it the employer
of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck
to Vicente Trinidad on September 24, 1980.
Issue: Whether or not First Malayan Leasing and
Finance Corporation is liable for the mishap
Held: Yes, FMLFC is liable for damages caused to
Vitug.
Regardless of who the actual owner of a motor
vehicle might be, the registered owner is the operator
of the same with respect to the public and third
persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences of its operation.
In
contemplation of law, the registered owner or operator
of record is the one liable for damages caused by a
vehicle regardless of any alleged sale or lease made
thereon.
In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor
vehicle to be valid against third persons, it must be
recorded in the LTO. For, although valid between the
parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely
on the public registration of the motor vehicle as
conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was
the owner and operator of the Isuzu truck, hence, fully
liable to third parties injured by its operation.

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R.No.55963,

December 1, 1989
FACTS: A pick-up owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government
agency driven by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said
agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden
by Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioners along
Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla and his companion were injured and brought
to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for
treatment.Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
The trial court rendered judgment, which
directed National Irrigation Administration to pay
damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether
or
not
National
Irrigation
Administration is liable for the negligent act of Hugo
Garcia.
HELD: National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is a
government corporation with juridical personality and
not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate
body
performing
non-governmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the damage
caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act
of its driver-employee(Hugo Garcia).In this particular
case, the NIA assumes responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, it becomes answerable for
damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is
predicated upon the existence of negligence on the
part of respondent NIA.The negligence referred to here
is the negligence of the supervision.
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN vs. ARSENIO DELIM and
the HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
FACTS: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded paying
passenger bus own by Arsenio Delim. Said bus is
bound to Baung La Union. During the course of the trip,
the passengers already noticed a snapping sound
which the driver ignored. Somewehre along the
highway of Bo. Payocpoc, the vehicle bumped a
cement flower po on the side of the road causing the
vehicle to go off the road, turn turtle and fall of the
ditch.
Consequently, several passengers including
Gatchalian were injured. They were promptly taken to
Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union for
medical treatment.
On 14 July 1973, while injured passengers were
confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of
respondent, visited them and later paid for their
hospitalization and medical expenses. However, before
Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers,
including petitioner, sign a prepared affidavit of quit
claim
Notwithstanding this document, Gathalian still filed
with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an
action extra contractu to recover compensatory and
moral damages.
In defense, respondent averred that the
vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that
petitioner had already been paid and moreover had
waived any right to institute any action against him by
virtue of the signed affidavit.
ISSUE: Is Gatchalian still entitled for damages despite
execution of affidavit of quit claim?

HELD: Yes, Gatchalian is still entitled for damages.

The Supreme Court held that since what is
involved is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a
common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence.
Thus, the waiver cannot be used as an escape for
liability.
Delim failed to rebut the statutory presumption
of negligence as prescribed in Artibles 1733 and 1755
of the NCC. To overcome this presumption, the
common carrier must slow to the court that it had
exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the
injuries.
The act of the driver of ignoring the snapping
sound and continued on driver despite it being noticed
by most passengers is a clear proof of utter negligence.
This could also mean that the bus had not been
checked physically or mechanically to determine what
was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred
so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to
it.
A common carrier is bound to carry its
passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, with due regard to all the
circumstances".
Gelisan vs. Alday
154 SCRA 388
Facts: Herein petitioner Bienvenido Gelisan is the
registered owner of a freight truck. On Jan. 31, 1962,
he entered into a contract with Roberto Espiritu under
which the latter hired the same freight truck for the
purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer.
Subsequently, herein respondent Benito Alday, a
trucking operator who had a contract to haul the
fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, entered
into an agreement with Espiritu for the hauling of 400
bags of fertilizer with the use of the truck leased by the
latter. However, Espiritu failed to deliver the bags of
fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega in Mandaluyong.
The respondent was then compelled to pay for the
value of the 400 bags of fertilizer to Atlas Fertilizer
Corp. This prompted him to file a complaint against
both Espiritu and the petitioner. The petitioner
disowned any liability on the ground that he had no
contractual relations with the respondent and that the
misappropriation committed by Espiritu was entirely
beyond his control and knowledge. After trial, the trial
court ruled that only Espiritu is liable to the respondent
and not the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals
modified the said decision and held that the petitioner,
being the registered owner of the truck, is likewise
liable. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, the registered
owner of the truck, is likewise liable for damages?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative.
The registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation or that may be
caused to any of the passengers therein. If the
property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased
to another without obtaining the requisite approval of
the Public Service Commission, such as what happened
in this case, the transfer is not binding upon the public
and third persons. However, the petitioner has the
right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount

which he may be required to pay as damages.

Petition Denied.
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FACTS:
The plaintiff, while she was about to
board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at
Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell
into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby
causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result
thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on,
confined, at first at the Pangasinan
Provincial
Hospital, for a period of 16 days. She also incurred
hospitalization, medication and other expenses.
Hence, a cilvil action was filed by plaintiff
Frorentina Guilatco for recovery of damages against
the City of Dagupan.
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal
drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not
under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to
the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of
Public Highways that has control or supervision through
the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is
held concurrently by the same person who is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE: Whether or not control or supervision over a
national road by the City of Dagupan exists.
RULING:
The liability of public corporations for
damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians
from the defective condition of roads is expressed in
the Civil Code as follows:
Article
2189.
Provinces,
cities
and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
Furthemore, it is expressly provided in the
charter of Dagupan that the City Engineer has care and
custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers
and is mandated to inspect and regulate the use of the
same.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides
that the laying out, construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and
regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the
Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that
the city indeed has supervision and control over the
sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact"
projects such as beautification drives, the end is more
important than the manner in which the work is carried
out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such
trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the
careless execution of the projects, causing public
inconvenience and inviting accidents.
JARCO vs. CA
G.R. No. 129792
December 21,1999
FACTS: Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa
Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations

manager,
and
supervisor,
respectively.
Private
respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar (ZHIENETH), a six year old child.
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit
card slip at the payment and verification counter when
she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud.
She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter
ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the
bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.
ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although
shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of
the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving
ZHIENETH from the floor.
As a result, ZHIENETH died fourteen (14) days
after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital
bed.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH
was accidental or attributable to negligence? and
(2) Whether ZHIENETH, a six year old child and
CRISELDA can be held liable for contributory
negligence?
HELD: Petitioners omission and failure to act on the
previous observation of an employee of the counters
unsafe structure belies the claim of the petitioners that
what had happened is an accident.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in
which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
Negligence, on the other hand, is "the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
As to the second issue, In our jurisdiction, a
person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is,
on that account, exempt from criminal liability.
Further, CRISELDA too, should be absolved
from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH
held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from
her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this
precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was
just a foot away from her mother; and the giftwrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant.
ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as
petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on
her.
G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995
LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME
TANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division,
SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON,
represented by PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y
MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y
MONTEROLA, respondents.
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which
occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of 15
November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver,
was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards

Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road

in Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
At about the same time, a cargo van of the
LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime
Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its
way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers
Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son
who was seated beside Tano.
When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the
airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles
racing against each other from the opposite direction.
Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing
vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made
visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust
to settled, Tano started to make a sharp left turn
towards the airport road.
When he was about to reach the center of the
right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola
suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on
against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died
from the severe injuries he sustained. A criminal case
for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed
against Tano.
A civil suit was likewise instituted by the heirs
of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with
Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the
recovery of damages. The trial court dismissed both
cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the
"accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio
Monterola.
Private respondent appealed the dismissal of
the civil case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court reversed the court a quo.
Issue: Whether or not LBC may invoke the doctrine of
Last Clear Chance in order to refute its liability.
Held: Affirmed. From every indication, the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who,
despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left
turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without
first waiting for the dust to settle.
It was this negligent act of Tano, which had
placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the
motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that
almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur.
Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross
the other lane until after it would have been safe from
and clear of any oncoming vehicle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last
clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The
doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or
when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule
would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against
the liability sought by, another if the latter, who had
the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling
along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be.
The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable
time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to

his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded

the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the
collision.
It is true however, that the deceased was not
all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too
closely behind the vehicle he was following.
We, therefore, agree with the appellate court
that there indeed was contributory negligence on the
victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of
petitioners liability for damages.
Lilius v. Manila Road Company
59 Phil. 758
FACTS: Plaintiff, his wife and his daughter, left Manila
in their Studebaker car, driven by plaintiff for the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, on a
sight seeing trip. At about 7 and 8 meters from the
railroad crossing at Dayap, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Lilius
saw a truck parked on the left side of the road and
noticed that several people have alighted from the
truck going to the opposite side. While slowing down
his speed at about 12 mile per hour, he sounded his
horn for the people to get out of the way. This
distracted his attention and shortly thereafter, upon
hearing two short whistles, his car was hit by a passing
train. The car was dragged ten meters away, and the
train stopped about 70 meters from the crossing. For
injury sustained by Lilius, his wife and child, he filed an
action to recover damages from the defendant.
ISSUE: Is the defendant liable?
HELD: The defendant failed to exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees. In fact, the flagman or watchman arrived
after the collision, and there was no notice nor sign of
the existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to
warn the public of approaching trains. The diligence of
a good father of a family, which the law requires in
order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful
and prudent selection of subordinates or employees
but included inspection of their work and supervision of
the discharge of their duties. Manila Railroad is
adjudged liable for its negligence and that of its
employees.
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon
66 SCRA 299
Facts: On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha
sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor
launch. A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the
corresponding information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de
Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was
in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander
of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment
commander in Balacbac to impound and take custody
of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to
impound the motor launch, explaining that its
subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking
custody of the same. Consequently, on July 6, 1962
upon the order of the Provincial Commander,
defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment
Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the motor

launch from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and

impounded it.
Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with
the CFI of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a complaint
for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Ponce
de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6,
1962, Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a
search warrant and then and there took away the hull
of the motor launch without his consent.
Issue: Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly
liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly
suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor
launch was unlawful.
Held: Defendants-appellees are civilly liable to
plaintiff-appellants. To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation
of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. A person
whose constitutional rights have been impaired is
entitled to actual and moral damages from the public
officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.
In the instant case, Delfin Lims claims were
amply supported by evidence that he should be
awarded damages. However, with respect to plaintiff
Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage
which he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful
seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had
already transferred the ownership and possession of
the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized
and therefore, he has no legal standing to question the
validity of the seizure.
MANUEL vs. CA
G. R. No. 96781 October 1, 1993
FACTS: Private respondents were passengers of an
International Harvester Scout Car owned by respondent
Ramos, which left Manila for Camarines Norte in the
morning of December 27, 1971 With respondent
Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver of the vehicle.
There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the
Scout car was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was
was driven by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. Due to the
impact, the Scout car was thrown backwards against a
protective railing. All its ten occupants, which included
four children, were injured, seven of the victims
sustained serious physical injuries.
The Lower Court and the Court of Appeals finds
for the respondent.
In their appeal before us, petitioners contend
that it was Fernando Abcede, Jr., driver of the Scout
car, who was at fault. Besides, petitioners claim that
Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was only 19-years old at the
time of the incident, did not have a driver's license.
The awarded damages were likewise contested as
excessive and unsubstantiated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the allegation of lack
of drivers license of the alleged driver of the injured
party will exempt petitioners from liability?
2. Whether or not the damages awarded is
justified?
HELD: The evidence with respect to the issue that
Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, was
the one driving the Scout car at the time of the
accident, could not simply exempt petitioners' liability
because they were the parties at fault for encroaching
on the Scout car's lane.
Nevertheless, the witnesses presented by
petitioners who allegedly saw "the younger Abcede

pinned behind the driver's wheels," testified on matters

that transpired after the accident. Discrediting this
allegation, the Court of Appeals noted that none of the
aforesaid witnesses actually saw the younger Abcede
driving the car and that the younger Abcede could
have simply been thrown off his seat toward the
steering wheel.
The damages awarded are proper. Plaintiffs
were able to prove their injuries and submitted
evidence to show expenses for their treatment,
hospitalization and incidental disbursement. The above
mentioned damages are considered actual or
compensatory (Par. 1 Art. 2197 in relation to Art. 2199,
New Civil Code). Evidence was also adduced showing
that as a result of the incident and the resultant
injuries there had been an impairment on the earning
capacity of some of the plaintiffs which are recoverable
pursuant to Article 2205 of the New Civil Code.
Considering the nature of their, injuries one month
each loss of income seem reasonable. Attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation is also proper. Since the act
complained of falls under the aegis of quasi-delict
(culpa aquilina), moral damages is likewise available to
plaintiffs pursuant to Article 2219 also the New Civil
Code".
MCKEE, ET AL. VS. IAC ET AL.,
G.R. NO. L-68102, 16 JULY 1992
FACTS:
Between 9 & 10 o'clock in the morning
of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City & San
Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place
between an International cargo truck, Loadstar owned
by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang,
and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision
resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and
Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee,
all passengers of the Ford Escort. Jose Koh was the
father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of
minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida
Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of 1 1/2
year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was
seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front
passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two
(2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which
was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice
weighing about 10,000 kilos, was travelling southward
from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand,
was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about (10) meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and
into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back
and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the
other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the
car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with
the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge
(lasque, mervins digest).
ISSUE: Whether or not the herein truck driver can be
held liable under the doctrine of last clear chance.

RULING:
The court ruled that it was the truck
driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate
cause of the collision. The court had the occasion to
apply the doctrine of the last clear chance which
expound that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. The doctrine applies only in a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant
in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to
plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of
the accident which intervenes between the accident
and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus
making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally,
the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although
it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic)
for damages. The court herein also imposed liability on
the private respondents as employers of the truck
driver under Article 2180 of the Civil Code are directly
and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their
only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
[G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.]
Facts: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going
toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura. Upon
crossing Taft Avenue and was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south turned
unexpectedly and struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
taken to the General Hospital on the very same day as
he was so severely injured.
The trial court ordered the Government of the
Philippine Islands to pay damages.
The Attorney-General on behalf of the
defendant urges that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is not liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true
that collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
Issue: Whether or not the Government of the
Philippine Islands may be held liable for the act done
by the chauffeur.
Held: The Government of the Philippine Islands is not
liable.
The substantive law touching the defendant's
liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents,
and employees can be found in paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the civil Code, which reads:

"The state is liable in this sense when it acts

through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable."
The state by virtue of such provision of law, is
not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining
to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of the public service and
in the appointment of its agents.
MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
236 SCRA 227
Facts: On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP
Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout
uniforms and other scouting supplies.
Sometime in October 25, 1983, petitioner
corporation
received
information
that
private
respondents Agnes Villacruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and
Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de
Guzman, and employee of petitioner corporation, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to
make a report to the Philippine Constabulary.
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 AM,
petitioner de Guzman, Captain Peafiel, and 2 other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion,
Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon city went to the
stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Without any warrant, they seize the boy and girl scouts
pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents
stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and
embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were
issued for the seized items. The items were then
turned over by captain Peafiel to petitioner
corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was
then filed against private respondents. On December 6,
1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all
private respondents. Late on, he also ordered the
return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands. Upon return of
the said items, some of them were of inferior quality.
Private respondents then filed a civil suit
against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. In its Decision, the trial court ruled for the
private respondents.
The Decision was appealed to the respondent
court. The latter affirmed the decision with
modifications.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct
in finding that the manner with which the confiscation
of the items from private respondents was tortious.
Held: Yes. Article III, section 2, of the Constitution
protects our people from unreasonable search and
seizure. In the case at bar, the seizure was made
without any warrant.

The respondent court correctly granted

damages to private respondents. Petitioners were
indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Firstly, they instigate the raid pursuant to their
covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scouting supplies.
The
raid
was
conducted
with
active
participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did
not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the bot and girl
scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the
officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation
which even received for safekeeping the goods
unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de
Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a
time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.
JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47863 October 3, 1986
FACTS: The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association decided
to construct an office building on its lot located at
Intramuros, Manila. The construction was undertaken
by the United Construction, Inc. and the plans and
specifications for the building were prepared by the
other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The
building was completed in June, 1966.
In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an
unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and the front
columns of the building buckled, causing the building
to tilt forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the
building in view of its precarious condition. As a
temporary remedial measure, the building was shored
up by United Construction, Inc.
A pre-trial was conducted on March 7, 1969,
during which among others, the parties agreed to refer
the technical issues involved in the case to a
Commissioner. Mr. Andres O. Hizon, who was ultimately
appointed by the trial court.
The Commissioner eventually submitted his
report on September 25, 1970 with the findings that
while the damage sustained by the PBA building was
caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake
whose magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they were also
caused by the defects in the plans and specifications
prepared by the third-party defendants' architects,
deviations from said plans and specifications by the
defendant contractors and failure of the latter to
observe the requisite workmanship in the construction
of the building and of the contractors, architects and
even the owners to exercise the requisite degree of
supervision in the construction of subject building.
United Construction Co., Inc. and the Nakpils
claimed that it was an act of God that caused the
failure of the building which should exempt them from
responsibility and not the defective construction, poor
workmanship, deviations from plans and specifications
and other imperfections in the case of United
Construction Co., Inc. or the deficiencies in the design,
plans and specifications prepared by petitioners in the
case of the Nakpils.
ISSUE: Whether or not an act of God-an unusually
strong earthquake-which caused the failure of the
building, exempts from liability, parties who are
otherwise liable because of their negligence.

RULING:
The applicable law governing the rights
and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew
up the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if within fifteen years from the completion
of the structure the same should collapse by reason of
a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the
defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise
responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within
the same period on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms
of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises
the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion,
does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years
following the collapse of the building.
On the other hand, the general rule is that no
person shall be responsible for events which could not
be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable
(Article 1174, New Civil Code).
An act of God has been defined as an accident,
due directly and exclusively to natural causes without
human intervention, which by no amount of foresight,
pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could
have been prevented. There is no dispute that the
earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or
an act of God.
To exempt the obligor from liability under
Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must
concur:
The cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor;
The event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable;
The event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and
The debtor must be free from any participation
in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Thus it has been held that when the negligence
of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a
loss, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate cause of the damage was
the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss
because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss
or damage may have been occasioned.
The negligence of the defendant and the thirdparty defendants petitioners was established beyond
dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co.,
Inc. was found to have made substantial deviations
from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to
observe the requisite workmanship in the construction
as well as to exercise the requisite degree of
supervision; while the third-party defendants were
found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by them.
As correctly assessed by both courts, the
defects in the construction and in the plans and
specifications were the proximate causes that rendered

the PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake of

August 2, 1968. For this reason the defendant and
third-party defendants cannot claim exemption from
liability.
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(161 SCRA 335)
Facts: on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit
Central Luzon, passing through NAPOCORs (NPC)
Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project
area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to the
heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the
Angat Dam was rising perilously at the rate of sixty
(60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of
water from the dam, since the water level had reached
the danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the
corporation caused the opening of the spillway gates.
Due to the manner with which the spillway
gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary
large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit
the installations and construction works of ECI at the
lpo site with terrific impact, as a result of which the
latter's stockpile of materials and supplies, camp
facilities and permanent structures and accessories
either washed away, lost or destroyed.
NPC asserts that the destruction and loss of the
ECI's equipment and facilities were due to force
majeure. It argues that the rapid rise of the water level
in the reservoir of its Angat Dam due to heavy rains
brought about by the typhoon was an extraordinary
occurrence that could not have been foreseen.
Issue: Whether or not the NPC can be held liable for
the destruction of ECIs structures and equipments.
Held: The NPC is Liable. Based on the findings of fact,
petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it
opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at
the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very
well that it was safer to have opened the same
gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that
NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days
before it actually struck. And even though the typhoon
was an act of God or what we may call force majeure,
NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was
the proximate cause of the loss and damage.
Thus, it has been held that when the
negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in
producing a loss, such person is not exempt from
liability by showing that the immediate cause of the
damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability
for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by which the
loss or damage may have been occasioned.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
May 21,1993
161 SCRA 384
FACTS: When typhoon Welming hit Luzon in 1967
heavy rains fell and, to prevent an overflow of water at
the Angat Hydro Electric Project and Dam at Ipo,
Bulacan, NPC opened the spillway gates. An
extraordinarily large volume of water rushed out of the
gatesand hit the installations and construction works of
ECI at Ipo site with terrific impact as a result pf which
the latters stock pile of materials and supplies, camp
facilities, and permanent structures including its
accessories were either washed way, lost or destroyed.

An action for damages was filed. NPC raised force

majeure as a defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC should be held
liable for damages as a result of its negligence act.
HELD: NPC is liable. The negligent manner with which
the spillway gates were opened caused the
extraordinarily large volume of water to rush out of the
gates. If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
act of God there occurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay, or contravention of the tenor of the
obligation which resulted in loss or damages, the
obligor cannot escape liability. To be exempt from such,
he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct which occasioned the loss.
Thus, under Art.1174, NCC, for breach of an
obligation due to an act of God, the following must
concur:
1. the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of
the will of the obligor;
2. the
event
must
either
be
unforeseeable or unavoidable;
3. the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
4. the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of
the injury to the creditor.
Pantranco v Baesa 179 SCRA 399
Facts: The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and
their children Harold Jim, Marceline and Maricar,
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their
son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam
River, Ilagan, Isabela
The jeepney, while going towards MAlalam
River, collided with a speeding Pantranco bus while the
latter was negotiating a turn, which had encroached on
the jeepneys lane. As a result of the accident David
Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their
children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while
the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The
jeepney was extensively damaged. The driver of the
bus went in hiding after.
Pantranco contended that the proximate cause
of the collision was the negligence of the driver David
Ico. Furthermore, Pantranco raised the defense that it
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee.
The lower court rendered a decision against
Pantranco, which was sustained by the Court of
Appeals.
Thus, Pantranco filed a case in the Supreme
Court, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in
not applying the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance.
Issue Whether or not the doctrine of Last Clear
Chance is applicable
Held: The Court found no merit in the claim of
Pantranco that the negligence of the driver of the
jeepney was the proximate cause of the collision.
Neither did the Court find merit in the claim of
Pantranco that the jeepney driver could have avoided
the collision. It stated that even if the jeepney driver
saw from a distance the approaching bus, he could not
have had seen the impending danger, since it was safe
to assume that the bus would go back to its lane.

Moreover, the bus in this case was speeding, so much

so that it might have been too late for the jeepney
driver to do anything by the time he realized that the
bus was not going back to its lane. Hence, the jeepney
driver had no chance to avoid the bus.
Pecson vs. Court of Appeals
244 SCRA 407
Facts: Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial
lot located in Kamias Street. Quezon City on which he
built a four (4) door two- storey apartment building.
For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to
P12,000.00, the lot was sold to the Spouses Juan
Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid.
Pedro Pecson filed a complaint on the validity
of the auction sale before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City but RTC dismissed the complaint,
however, private respondent would like to include the
building and praying that a writ of possession must be
issued. RTC ruled that petitioner is a builder in good
faith and that a public auction of the building was not
included as appealed tax payer.
Private respondent
appealed to Court of Appeals and CA affirmed the
decision of RTC in toto and ordered Nuguid to pay the
construction cost. Petitioner move for MR but it was not
acted upon, Hence, it ordered the sheriff to place
movant Juan Nuguid in possession of the subject
property. Petitioner Pecson aggrieved by the decision of
the CA hence, he filed a petition to Supreme Court that
he be restored in possession.
Issue: Whether or not the issue here is that the
petitioner is a good faith?
Held: It was ruled
that
the
petitioner be
reinstated to possession until after the respondent
has indemnified the petitioner to the cost of the land
and building to its market value, in order that
respondent shall not unjustly enrich at the expense of
the petitioner.
PHILIPPINE MATCH CO., LTD vs. CITY OF CEBU
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
FACTS: Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City which was
approved by the mayor as well as by the Provincial
Board provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all
deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the City of
Cebu, or if not stored are sold" in that city, "shall be
considered as sales" in the city and shall be taxable.
Petitioner assails the legality of the tax which
the city treasurer collected on out-of- town deliveries of
matches, which it paid under protest and filed a claim
for damages predicated on articles 19, 20, 21, 27 and
2229 of the Civil Code. It argued that the city treasurer
refused and neglected without just cause to perform
his duty and to act with justice and good faith. The
company faults the city treasurer for not following the
opinion of the city fiscals, as legal adviser of the city,
that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not
subject to sales tax because such transactions were
effected outside of the city's territorial limits.
In reply, it is argued for defendant city
treasurer that in enforcing the tax ordinance in
question he was simply complying with his duty as
collector of taxes
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for damages filed by
the petitioner will prosper.
HELD: No.
Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or
omission of a public official is attributable to malice or

inexcusable negligence. In this case, it cannot be said

that the city treasurer acted willfully or was grossly
negligent in not refunding to the plaintiff the taxes
which it paid under protest on out-of-town sales of
matches.
The city treasurer acted within the scope of his
authority and in consonance with his bona fide
interpretation of the tax ordinance. The fact that his
action was not completely sustained by the courts
would not him liable for we have upheld his act of
taxing sales of matches booked and paid for in the city.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Internediate
Appellate Court
(148 SCRA 353)
Facts: Leonardo Dionisio was on his way from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio
was driving his Volkswagen car not far from his home
when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned
by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction
Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side
facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was
parked in such a manner as to stick out onto the street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and
his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which the driver
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and the driver, on the other
hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's
injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the
time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had
exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of
the dump truck driver.
Issue: Whether or Not Phoenix and the dump truck
driver may be held liable for the injuries sustained by
Dionisio.
Held: Phoenix construction and its driver is liable.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked
into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio
had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful
night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding
just before the collision with the dump truck; (c)
whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's
headlights before contact with the dump truck or
whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned
moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio
was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass,
it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the person
of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any
found in his car. As to the second, the testimony of the
patrolman present immediately after the accident was
given credence by the court, hence leading to the
conclusion that the volkswagon was moving fast. As
to the third issue, the court believes that the

petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than

that offered by private respondent Dionisio. Finally, as
to the fourth issue, the court finds there simply is not
enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in
fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. The
conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances
outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident.
Nonetheless, the supreme court agrees with
the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which
the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's
negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear.
The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory,"
that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Phoenix also ask us to apply what they refer to
as the "last clear chance" doctrine. It is difficult to see
what role, if any, the common law last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common
law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected,
as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Picart v. Smith
37 Phil. 813
FACTS: Plaintiff Picart was riding a pony in a bridge. He
saw an approaching automobile and he improperly
pulled his horse over to the railing in the right, the
wrong side of the bridge. The driver of the automobile
sounded his horn but Picart made no move to go to the
right side. The driver guided his car to the right without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away.
He turned to the right but passed so closely to the
horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around
and was killed by the passing car.
Picart was thrown off his horse and suffered
contusions, he sued Smith for the value of his animal,
medical expenses and damage to his apparel.
ISSUE: Who is at fault?
HELD:
Plaintiff Picart was originally at fault but
defendant Smith has the last clear chance to avoid the
impending harm by merely swerving his automobile.
Smith failed to do this and he should therefore be
chargeable for the consequences of his acts, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party. It
is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant
was in this case the immediate and determining cause
of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
PLDT v. CA 178 SCRA 94

Facts: The jeep which spouses Esteban ran over a

mound of earth and fell into an open trench, thereby
sustaining injuries. The trench was an excavation was
allegedly undertaken for the installation of conduit
systems of PLDT. Antonio Esteban also alleges that he
failed to notice the mound of earth and the trench
since there were no adequate warning signs and it was
dark at that time. Having sustained injuries, they filed
a claim for damages against PLDT.
PLDT for its part, denies liability contending
that the injuries were caused by the negligence of
Antonio Esteban. Furthermore, PLDT contends that if an
entity should be held responsible, it should be L.R.
Barte and Co., an independent contractor who
undertook the construction of the trench and the
installation of the conduit system. As such, PLDT filed a
third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under
the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no
manner be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or
any of its employees.
In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not
aware nor was it notified of the accident involving
respondent spouses and that it had complied with the
terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the
necessary and appropriate standard signs in the
vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of
the excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of the
presence of excavations.
Issue: Whether or not the accident was imputable to
the negligence of PLDT or to that of Antonio Esteban.
Held:
The accident was imputable to the
negligence of Antonio Esteban. First, Antonio Esteban
knew of the excavations, as he regularly passes by the
route. Secondly, the Court sustained the findings of the
trial court that the jeep could not have had been
running for only 25 km/hour since, if it was doing so, it
could have stopped before it reached the mound, or at
least before it went airborne. Also, if Antonio Esteban
could not have seen the mound which was fairly big
and visible, he also could not have seen the warning
devices, given the fact that he had his dim lights on.
SUBMITTED BY: SAYO, RICHARD EMMANUEL L.
PONCE VS. LEGASPI
208 SCRA 377
FACTS:
Spouses Ponce, petitioners herein,
owned 43% of the stockholdings of LNOR Corporation.
Spouses filed a disbarment case against Atty. Legaspi,
herein defendant, on the ground that Atty. Legaspi in
his dual capacity as legal counsel of LNOR and
YRASPORT (corporation which was incorporated by
some of the officers of LNOR to compete with the
latter with aid and assistance of Atty. Legaspi who
happens to be the retaining counsel of LNOR),
facilitated, assisted and aided in the fraudulent
manipulations, anomalous management and prejudicial
operations by certain officers of LNOR which caused
great damage and prejudice to LNOR. The disbarment
proceeding was dismissed. Thus, Atty. Legaspi filed a
complaint for damages against the spouses Ponce on
the ground of malicious prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not filing of disbarment
case makes out a case of malicious prosecution

HELD: Yes
RATIO:
Generally, malicious prosecution refers
to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded
to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and
humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a
cause of action or probable cause. The foundation of
an action for malicious prosecution is an original
proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment
proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and
therefore may be basis for a subsequent action for
malicious prosecution.
An action for damages arising from malicious
prosecution is anchored on the provisions of Articles
21, 2217 and 2219 of the New Civil Code.
Malice is essential to the maintenance of an
action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the
recovery of exemplary damages. Malice and want of
probable cause must both exist in order to justify
action. The general rule is well settled that one cannot
be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In
other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal
prosecution had been carried on without probable
cause.
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
No. 1719, January 23, 1907
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of the laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
companys yard in Manila. Plaintiff claims that only
one car was used in this work. The defendant,
however, has proved that they were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so
that the ends of the rails projected beyond the cars
both in front and behind. The rails lay upon two
crosspieces secured to the cars, but without side
pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the plaintiff, the men were either
in the rear of the car or at its sides. The defendant, on
the other hand, contends that some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near
the waters edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught
the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff broke his leg
which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
The trial court found that the dislodging of the
crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of
the bay raised by a recent typhoon was the cause of
the sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie,
which was the immediate occasion of the accident. A
fellow-worker of the plaintiff testified that a day before
the accident, he called the attention of the foreman
and asked the latter to have it repaired. It has not
been proved that the company inspected the track
after the typhoon or had any proper system of
inspection. It is upon the failure of the defendant to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition,
that the trial court based its judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal action is the proper
remedy for injuries through negligence.
Whether or not there was contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff which caused his
injury.
Whether or not the plaintiff may recover
damages if he is guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD: NO. The Civil Code provides that obligations

arising from faults or negligence not punished by the
law, shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
Title XVI. Since nowhere in our general statutes is the
employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain
safe appliances for his workmen,
his obligation
therefore is one not punished by law and falls under
civil rather than criminal jurisprudence.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a
negligent act or omission, it is not required that the
injured party should seek out a third person criminally
liable whose prosecution must be a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under the Penal Code, the responsibility of an
employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they
are in the process of prosecution, or in so far as they
determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law
and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the election of the injured person.
Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been
instituted, growing out of the accident in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code cannot affect this action.
YES. The plaintiff is charged with carelessness
in two particulars: a) that having noticed the
depression in the track he continued his work; and b)
that he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
As to the first point, there is nothing in the
evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the
displaced timber underneath the sleeper. While the
method of construction may have been known to the
men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise
with the plaintiff who had worked at his job less than
two days. Although the plaintiff perceived the sagging
of the track, his lack of caution in continuing at his
work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was
not so gross as to constitute negligence which would
bar him to recover from the defendant.
With regard to the second, while the plaintiff
and his witnesses testified that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly
directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of
the company and three of the workmen testified that
there was a general prohibition frequently made known
to all against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before
the starting of this particular load.
On this
contradiction of proof, the preponderance is in favor of
the defendants contention to the extent of the general
order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a
proximate, although not as its primary cause.
YES. In determining which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the
accident, a distinction must be made between the
accident and the injury between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, contributing to his own proper hurt.
In the case at bar, the cause of the accident was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace
it. This produced the event giving to the occasion for
damages. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came

to himself. On the other hand, had the crosspiece been

out of place through the act or omission of the plaintiff,
that would have been one of the determining causes of
the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
cannot recover. However, where, in conjunction with
the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
as in the case at bar, he may recover the amount that
the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
RADIO COMMUNICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 79528, March 13, 1991
FACTS: Minerva and Flores Timan sent a telegram of
condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Hilario
Midoranda, through Radio Communication of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), to convey their deepest
sympathy for the death of the mother-in-law of Hilario,
to wit:
Mr. & Mrs. Hilario Medoranda
Trinidad, Calbayog
May God give you courage and strength to
bear your loss. Our deepest sympathy to you
and members of the family.
Miner and Flory
The condolence telegram was correctly
transmitted as far as the written text was concerned.
However, the condolence message as communicated
and delivered to the addresses was typewritten on a
HAPPY BIRTHDAY card and placed inside a
CHRISTMASGRAM envelope.
Believing that the transmittal of the aforesaid
telegram in that manner was done intentionally and
with gross breach of contract resulting in ridicule,
contempt, and humiliation of private respondents and
the addresses, including their friends and relatives ,
the spouses Timan demanded an explanation
The Timans were not convinced of the
explanations of RCPI. Hence, their complaint for
damages against RCPI.
The trial court decided in favor of the Timans,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of thye
lower court in toto.
RCPI argued that it still correctly transmitted
the text of the telegram and was received by the
addressee on time despite the fact that there as error
in the social form and envelope used.
RCPI asserted that there was no showing that it
has any motive to cause harm or damage to the
Timans.
ISSUE: Is RCPI guilty of negligence? Is RCPI guilty of
bad faith, fraud and malice?
RULING:
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a
telegram company can choose to send his message in
the ordinary form or a social form. In the ordinary form,
the text of the message is typed on plain newsprint
paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is placed in
a special form with the proper decorations and
embellishments to suit the occasion and the message
and delivered in an envelope matching the pupose of
the occasion and the words and intent of the message.
The sender pays a higher amount for the social
telegram than for the ordinary form. Hence, when RCPI
typed the message of condolence in a birthday and
delivered the same in a colorful Christmas envelope, it

committed a breach of contract as well as gross

negligence. Its excuse that it had run out of social
condolence cards and envelope is flimsy and
unacceptable.
It could not have been faulted had it delivered
the message in ordinary form and reimbursed the
difference in the cost of the sender. But by transmitting
it unfittingly, through other special forms, clearly,
albeit outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of joy
and
happiness
and
thanksgiving,
RCPI
only
exacerbated the sorrowful situation of the addressees
and the senders. This botchery exposed not only RCPIs
gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard
for the sentiments of its clientele, which is tantamount
to wanton misconduct, for which it must be held liable
for damages
It is not surprising that when the Timans
telegraphic message reached their cousin, it became
the joke of the Midorandas friends, relative, and
associates who thought that the unpardonable mix-up
was a mockery of the death of the mother-in-law of the
senders cousin. Thus, it was not unexpected that
because of this unusual incident, which caused much
embarrassment and distress to Timan, he suffered
nervousness and hypertension resulting in his
confinement for 3 days at the hospital.
Under the circumstances, defendants plea of
good faith predicated on the exhaustion of social
condolence forms cannot be accepted, gross
negligence or carelessness can be attributed to
defendant in not supplying its various stations with
such sufficient and adequate social condolence forms
when it held out to the public the availability of such
social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the
transmission of message on said forms. Knowing that
there is no such forms as testified to by its material
control manager, and entering into a contract for the
transmission of message in such forms, defendant
committed acts of bad faith, fraud, and malice.
Salvosa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 70458, October 5, 1988
Facts: Jimmy Abon was a duly appointed armorer of
the ROTC Unit of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF). He
received his appointment as an armorer from the AFP.
Not being an employee of BCF, he received his salary
from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto
Ungos, Commandant of the said ROTC unit. Abon was
also a commerce student of BCF.
On March 3, 1977, around 8:00pm, Abon shot
Napoleon Castro, a student of University of Baguio,
with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of BCF. As a result, Castro
died and Abon was prosecuted and convicted of the
crime of Homicide by the Military Commission.
Subsequently, the heirs of Castro sued for
damages, impleading Jimmy Abon, Roberto Ungos,
Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the
Board of BCF), LIbertad Quetolio (Dean of the College
of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF), and Baguio
Colleges Foundation, Inc., as party defendants. After
hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision sentencing
only defendants Jimmy Abon, Benjamin Salvosa, and
Baguio Colleges Foundation jointly and severally to pay
private respondents (heirs of Castro). The rest of the
defendants were absolved. On appeal by petitioners,
the respondent Court affirmed with modifications the

decision of the Trial court reducing the amount of some

of the awards given by the Trial Court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Can the petitioners be held solidarily liable with
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
as a consequence of the tortuous act of Abon?
Ruling:NO. the petitioners cannot be held under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable
with Jimmy Abon for the damages resulting from the
latters acts.
The Court held that under the penultimate
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable
for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The rationale of such liability is that so long as the
student remains in the custody of the teacher, the
latter stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to
the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the student. Likewise,
the phrase used in Article 2180 so long as the
[students] remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time.
The Court held that Jimmy Abon cannot be
considered to have been at attendance in school or
in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Security Bank vs. Court of Appeals
249 SCRA 206
Facts: Private respondent Ysmael Ferrer entered
into a contract of building construction with
petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC)
in Febrary 1980. It was stipulated therein that
Ferrer would finish the said construction in Davao
City within 200 working days for the price of
P1,760,000.00.
Ferrer made demands for
reimbursement of the said expenses but was
repeatedly denied by petitioner who reiterated the
stipulated cost it the agreement. A complaint for
breach of contract was filed by Ferrer. The trail
court ruled in favor of Ferrer. The trail court ruled
in favor of Ferrer, prompting SBTC to appeal.
Issue: Whether or not SBTC may be held liable for the
payment of additional expenses incurred by Ferrer?
Held: It cannot be denied that SBTC derived benefits
when private respondent completed the construction
even at an increase amount. To allow SBTC to acquire
the constructed cost would undoubtedly constitute
unjust payment for the bank to the prejudice of private
respondent, Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by
law. So, therefore SBTC is liable for the additional
expenses incurred by private respondent Ysmael
Ferrer.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC on the ground of breach of
promise to marry against petitioner. Private respondent
alleged that petitioner courted and proposed to marry
her. Because of such promise, petitioner made private
respondent surrender her virginity to him and to live
with him. They agreed to get married after the end of

the school semester. Petitioner already secured the

approval of private respondents parents to the
marriage. The parents of private respondent, by reason
of petitioners promise to marry their daughter, made
some preparations for the wedding including giving of
invitations to friends and relatives. However, before the
wedding and during their cohabitation, petitioners
attitude towards private respondent started to change.
He maltreated and threatened her. Petitioner, despite
his promise, did not marry private respondent because
according to him he was already married to other
woman.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondent which
was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages may be recovered for
a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21
of the New Civil Code
HELD: Yes
RATIO: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However,
where a mans promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving
of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
SOLIMAN vs. TUAZON
G. R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
FACTS: On 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof,
while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and
premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL
COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled
student of said school taking his morning classes, the
defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date
and hour in the premises of said school performing his
duties and obligations as a duly appointed security
guard under the employment, supervision and control
of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any
provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill,
attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the
abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly
weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would
have caused plaintiffs death were it not for the timely
medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff was
treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center,
Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff
may not be able to attend to his regular classes and
will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual
work for a duration of from three to four months before
his wounds would be completely healed."
Issue: Whether or not the RCC may be held liable for
the action of the security guard who is an employee of
the security agency?
Held: Supreme Court held that as a general rule a
client or customer of a security agency has no hand in

selecting who among the pool security guards or

watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned
to it. The duty to observe due diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its security guard is the
agency. While it is true that the school was not the
employer of the guard its liability is not only based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court must
have read the case of PSBA vs. CA in dismissing its
judgment, for it should have allowed the petitioner to
prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contactu or ex lege on the part of respondent school.

but they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines. They could have done this
pending inspection of the wires. Likewise, they did not
take the necessary precaution to eliminate the source
of danger to the electric line, knowing that tall banana
plants were standing on elevated ground and which
were higher than the electric post. The Court also took
note of the negligence of Cipriano Baldomero. He being
an employee of the electric plant and aware of the live
cut wire, he did not take the necessary precaution to
prevent anybody from approaching the place.

David Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and

Light Company
Facts: David Taylor, 15 years of age and son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average
boy of his age and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics went together with a friend to
the power plant of Manila Electric to meet an employee
of the said company. When the employee did not show
up, the boys decided to roam around the vicinity out of
curiosity. They bought home a cylinder ( a capt size of
a pistol cartridge), which are indended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite and have in
themselves a considerable explosive. They opened it
and decided to light it with matches. The device
exploded and injured the two boys and a girl who
accompanied them. Taylor said the company for
damages.
Issue: Whether the company should be held liable?
Ruling:
No, the company cannot be held liable
because it was the plaintiffs own acts which caused
the injury. It was held that the boy well knew of the
danger that comes with lighting the device,
considering he was more mature and intelligent than
the average boy of his age; and the fact that he had
previous work experiences, yet he still recklessly and
knowingly produced the explosion. On this note, the
Supreme Court held that the just thing is that a man
should suffer the damage which comes to him through
his own fault and that he cannot demand reparation
therefore from another.

Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine

Islands
100 Phil. 186
Facts: Herein defendant Shell Company of the
Philippine Islands is the official supplier of gasoline of
Commercial Airlines, Inc. (CALI). The latter has an
existing debt of P170,162.58 to the former. In 1948,
the management of CALI called a meeting of all its
major creditors and announced that it was in a state of
insolvency and will stop its operations. The said
creditors all agreed to proceed with a pro-rata division
of the assets of CALI. The defendant then assigned its
credit to the Shell Oil Company in the United States.
The latter then filed an action in a California court for
the collection of the credit and for a writ of attachment,
which was granted, of a C-54 plane belonging to CALI.
As a result of the defendants action, CALI filed in the
Philippines a petition for voluntary insolvency. During
the proceedings of the case, the creditors of CALI
unanimously elected herein plaintiff Alfredo Velayo as
assignee. The latter then filed an action for recovery of
damages against the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant acted in bad
faith and is therefore liable for damages?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative.
The defendant clearly acted in bad faith when it
schemed and effected the attachment of the C-54
plane of its debtor CALI by assigning its credit to its
sister company in the United States. It took advantage
of its knowledge that insolvency proceedings would
most probably be instituted by CALI if its creditors fail
to come up with an understanding as to the manner of
distribution of the assets. According to Article 21 of the
New Civil Code, Any person who willfully causes loss
and injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. A moral wrong
or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a
statute or law, should be compensated by damages.
Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay damages in an
amount double the value of the attached aircraft.

Umali vs. Bacani

69 SCRA 263
Facts: A strong typhoon hit Alcala, Pangasinan on May
14, 1972 as a result, banana plants near Alcala Electric
Plant fell on the electric wire which caused it to be cut.
One end of the wire was left hanging on the electric
post and the other fell on the ground under the fallen
banana plants. Knowing this, the Captain of the
Barangay told an employee of the electric plant about
it and asked him to fix it. The latter said he will look for
a lineman to fix it. Unfortunately, Manuel Saynes, a boy
leaving nearby got in contact with the live cut wire
which led to his death. Fidel Saynes, father of Manuel
Saynes, filed an action for damages against Teodoro
Umali, owner and manager of the electric plant.
Umalis contention is that the death of Manuel
Saynes is due to a fortuitous event (referring to the
strong storm that caused the banana plants to fall and
cut the electric wire).
Issue: Whether the owner of the electric plant is liable
for damages?
Held:
Umali was held liable for damages. The
employees of Alcala Electric Plant were already aware
of the possible damage caused by the storm to the
electric lines which is dangerous to life and property,

VERGARA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987
FACTS: The defendant and his friend were traveling by
car to Manila from Baguio. From the opposite direction,
the following were travelling: a tricycle, a passenger
bus and a private jeep in that order. The bus tried to
overtake the tricycle but in doing so, it swerved into
the lane of the defendant. This prompted the
defendant veer his car to the shoulder of the highway
to avoid a head-on collision. Defendant, however, lost
control of his car causing it to collide with a private
jeep. No charges were filed against the owner of the
passenger bus. Defendant as then charged of reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property and

multiple physical injuries. Defendant claimed that he is

not guilty of criminal negligence because he lost
control of his car when the bus swerved into his lane.
ISSUE: Is the contention of defendant tenable?
RULING:
The owner of the car cannot be faulted
because he lost control of his car when in order to
avoid a head-on collision with a passenger bus which
suddenly swerved into his lane, he veered his car to
the shoulder of the highway and collided with a private
jeep.
The real culprit is the passenger bus but there
were no charges that were filed. The court held that
although the defendant was not criminally negligent,
and therefore cannot be held liable for a crime, there is
enough evidence to prove that defendant should have
exercised a little more caution and discretion in
reacting to the treat of a head-on collision.
For this reason, he was adjudged civilly liable
for the hospital expenses and unearned salaries of the
victims.
Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
179 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 74431, November 6, 1989
Facts: 3-year old girl Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a
dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil in
the house of the late Vicente Miranda, father of Purita
Vestil. Theness was rushed to the hospital where she
was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by
Dr. Antonio Tautjo. The following day, Theness died.
The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia.
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages
alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of Andoy, the dog that bit and eventually
killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge
insisting that the dog was owned by the late Vicente
Miranda, that the dog was tame, and that no one

witnessed that the dog bit Theness. After trial, the CFI
of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the
complaint.
On appeal, the respondent court arrived at a
different conclusion ruling that the Vestils were in
possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the
injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child
died as a result of the dog bites and not from causes
independent thereof a submitted by the appellees. The
respondent court ordered the Vestils to pay for
damages and for the death of Theness.
Issue: Are the Vestils liable for damages as possessor
of an animal causing damage to another under Article
2183 of the Civil Code?
Ruling:YES. The Vestils are liable for damages under
Article 2183 of the Civil Code.
The Court held that the evidence of the childs
hydrophobia (based on the medical report and
testimony under oath of Dr. Tautjo) is sufficient to
convince it that she died because she was bitten by the
dog even if the death certificate stated a different
cause of death.
The Court further held that the petitioners
contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact,
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable
even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter either
that, as the petitioners contend, the dog was tame and
was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers
even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forgot that
Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.