1. G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner, filed petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and
the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990.
Issue:
Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
Held:
Yes. Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Practice of Law, Concept
Black's Law Dictionary
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions.
Pr
actice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill."
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

2. G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
The complainant in this case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would
be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the Justice of the Peace (JP)
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above
ruling. Notwithstanding, the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.
Counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor
in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing. He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. The JP Court ruled on the motion by

upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in
private law practice.
On appeal, the CFI held that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend
of the offended party.
Issue:
WON the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule constituted private practice.
Held:
No. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

3. Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner prayed that respondent Clinic be enjoined from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines".
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure
the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Issue:
WON activities of respondent Legal Clinic, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

Held:
Yes. The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court.

The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed
to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law.

Q: When can it be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of
the law) is not engaged in the practice of law?
A: it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law)
is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
4. A.C. No. 7902

March 31, 2009

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.
Facts:
The complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of respondent Valdez as his
legal counsel. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees, Atty. Valdez refused to perform
any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainants request for a
report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the complainants demands for
the return of the money paid to him. Overgaard then filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez
before the IBP. Respondent Valdez was disbarred for having committed multiple violations of the
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Respondent contended that "he had no inkling whatsoever of the existence of the disbarment case
filed by the complainant. He claimed that because he "abruptly abandoned"his Makati office, he was
not able to receive the demand letter sent by the complainant. The respondent argues that he did
not abandon his client. He denies that he refused to perform any of his obligations under the contract
for legal services between himself and the complainant.
Issue:
WON respondent Valdez should be disbarred.
Held:
The respondents disbarment is not anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the cases
entrusted to his care, but on his abandonment of his client.
The Court found that respondent Valdez has committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He has failed to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good
faith and, thus, we sustain his disbarment.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise,36 and it may be extended or withheld by this Court in the exercise
of its sound discretion. As guardian of the legal profession, this Court has ultimate disciplinary
power over members of the Bar in order to ensure that the highest standards of competence and of
honesty and fair dealing are maintained. We find that the respondent has fallen below such exacting
standard and is unworthy of the privilege to practice law.
5. A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

Facts:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978 for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. He had
repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. Since the disbarment, however, there were other
communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was discernible. The tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked the state of his health and his
advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable,
defender of the causes entrusted to him. This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement
could be ordered and so it did.
Issue: WON the reinstatement of Edillon is justifiable.
Held:
Yes. In the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum
of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to
disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.11
It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is
concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that
membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by
any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due
contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of
such a privilege.
6. G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975
OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of
Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners Omico Corp and Webber entered into a contract of personal and professional services
with Judge Catolico, then a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, under the terms of which
he was to head defendant corporation's legal department with the condition that he should render
such services only after his office hours, "even into the dead wee hours of the night and wherever
such services would not run in conflict with his duties as Judge". Petitioners contended that the
contract is illegal, void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of the Court of First Instance who is
prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court from engaging in private practice
as a member of the Bar.
Issue:
WON contract of professional services entered into between Judge Catolico and the petitioners,
while the former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted private practice of law;
hence, a void contract.
Held:
Yes. The contract of professional services entered into between private respondent and the
petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted private
practice of law and in contravention of the express provision of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited Rule was promulgated by this Court, pursuant to its

constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for
there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law
are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and
privileges of a judge of the Court of First Instance. 24 This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the
judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire
to promote the public interest.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the Bench of
the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended
and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position. 25
It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a contract, whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is considered
inexistent and void from the beginning.
7. .M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983
HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by. Noriega against Atty. Sison on the ground of malpractice
through gross misrepresentation and falsification. Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent
Sison is a regular and permanent employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a
Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil service rules and regulations,
more particularly ... the prohibition of government employees to practice their professions"; that to
circumvent the prohibition and to evade the law, respondent assumed a different name, falsified his
Identity. In his answer, respondent claimed authorization given by the Associate Commissioner of
the SEC, for him to appear as counsel of a close family friend, in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila. Respondent alleges that he never held himself out to the public
as a practicing lawyer and that he provided the legal services in view of close family friendship and
for free.
Issue:
WON Atty. Sison should be disbarred.
Held:
No. The SC held that the allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the respondent.
There is no evidence that the respondent has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct,
violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and
willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so.
The degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that
the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal
and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to
say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the
fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him.
On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained
and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power,

some discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be
exercised. 2
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and
clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

8. G.R. No. L-28899 May 30, 1974

ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao to hear an administrative case of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated
against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Respondent Judge required Petitioner to explain why he should not be removed or suspended from
the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual
averments which petitioner knew were false.
Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear and
determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is
vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance.
Issue:
WON the CFI Judge has the jurisdiction over the disbarment case.
Held:
Yes. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to
engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An attorneyat-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually
accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted
to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued
enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise
it. When it appears by acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust
reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the
professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of
Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.
The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:
SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such

suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises.
SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the
Court of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court
shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the
facts warrant.
SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any
sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the
initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own
officers. 1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper
proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or
of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said
court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer,
or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of
the general public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice.
Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or suspended from the practice
of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel" (Sec.
30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court). 2
While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a reasonable notice, Sec. 9 of Rule
139, of the Revised Rules, provides that as far as applicable, the procedure outlined by the
preceding actions of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against
attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance." Section 2 of Rule 139, provides that
the respondent lawyer in disciplinary proceedings is granted 10 days from service of a copy of the
complaint within which to file his answer. It is desirable, therefore, that a similar period should be
granted by the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the purpose of uniformity in
procedure. We find, however, that in the case at bar, petitioner not only failed to question as
unreasonable, the period granted to him by the court within which to answer the complaint, but
actually was not substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint within the
period of 72 hours from receipt thereof.
Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that as far as may be
applicable, the procedure for the investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints against lawyers
referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints
against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General, and not

respondent Judge, should be the one to conduct the present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of Rule
139 are not applicable to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals
and in Courts of First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139
refers to complaints referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of
Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation
themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of
suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and the
statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the
Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant." In
other words, under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General would, therefore, be
unnecessary.
9. Rudolph Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)
Facts:
New Mexico has a system for the licensing of persons to practice law similar to that in effect in most
States. 1 A Board of Bar Examiners determines if candidates for admission to the bar have the
necessary qualifications. When the Board concludes that an applicant qualifies [353 U.S. 232, 234]
it recommends to the State Supreme Court that he be admitted. If the court accepts the
recommendation, the applicant is entitled to practice law upon taking an oath to support the
constitutions and laws of the United States and New Mexico. An applicant must pass a bar
examination before the Board will give him its recommendation. The Board can refuse to permit him
to take this examination unless he demonstrates that he has "good moral character."
In 1953 the Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico refused to permit petitioner to take the bar
examination, on the ground that he had not shown "good moral character," and thereby precluded
his admission to the bar of that State. Petitioner was qualified in all other respects. Petitioner made a
strong showing of good moral character, except that it appeared that, from 1933 to 1937, he had
used certain aliases, that he had been arrested (but never tried or convicted) on several occasions
prior to 1940, and that, from 1932 to 1940, he was a member of the Communist Party.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, Rudolph Schware, be denied a license to practice law in New Mexico for not
showing good moral character.
Held:
No. (a) A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a
manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (b) A
State can require high standards of qualifications, such as good moral character or proficiency in its
law, before it admits an applicant to the bar; but any qualification must have a rational connection
with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. (c) Even in applying permissible standards,
officers of the State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails
to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. (d) Whether the practice
of law is a "right" or a "privilege" need not here be determined; it is not a matter of the State's grace,
and a person cannot be barred except for valid reasons. (e) Petitioner's use from 1934 to 1937 of
certain aliases, for purposes which were not wrong and not to cheat or defraud, does [353 U.S. 232,
233] not support an inference of bad moral character more than 20 years later. (f) The arrests of
petitioner are insufficient to support a finding that he had bad moral character at the time he applied
to take the bar examination. (g) Petitioner's membership in the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940
does not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral character. (h) The use of aliases, the
arrests, and former membership in the Communist Party do not in combination warrant exclusion of

petitioner from the practice of law. (i) In the light of petitioner's forceful showing of good moral
character, the evidence upon which the State relies cannot be said to raise substantial doubts as to
his present good moral character.
10. G.R. No. L-4663

May 30, 1951

FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners instituted two special civil actions of mandamus against the respondents General CourtMartials of the Philippine Army. The Petitioners alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals
excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the
accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are
attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are
disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said
defendants.
Said Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly
be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress
during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
Issue:
WON the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial.
Held:
Yes. The words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a
criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as
counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a
Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where
words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over
the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited
sense is intended."
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved
by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect
the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death
penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our
Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there
exist the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to
appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our
Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex.

11. A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Facts:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement which is a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public.. Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first
denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted
having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not
to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once and
that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Issue:
Whether law is a profession or can be a trade.
Held:
Law is a profession and not a trade.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
12. July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C.
REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO,
BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC,
EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
Facts:
Two separate Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, and by the
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. Petitioners based their
arguments on Article 1840 of the Civil Code which states that:

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name,
or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership.
Petitioners also used Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association which declares that:
t.hqw

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use.
Issue: WON practice of law can be a commercial partnership.
Held:
Commercial Partnership vs. Professional Partnership
Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only
in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from
the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill
of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed
as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an
asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals
or for business. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by
other professionals or for business. The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust."
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local

custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships.
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the
era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order
each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as
the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The
best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in
that they secure and maintain that spirit.
13. A.C. No. 6672

September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims. 4To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
Issue:
WON the act of Atty. Tolentino constitutes unethical conduct.
Held:
Yes. hus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession
in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should
not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos "referrals."
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.21Respondent committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule
8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer s fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to
the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of these circumstances may lead the
lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the clients cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the exercise
of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used
to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.
14. (same as case 3) Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
15. Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Facts:
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to
the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained
an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in
1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. This bill became
Republic Act No. 972 or the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Issue:
WON RA 972 is constitutional
Held:
No. The law is contrary to public interest because it qualified 1,094 law graduates who confessedly
had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation
and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An

adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There
were abundant materials.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as
is the case with the law in question.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of
a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court.
16. B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada and became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. In July 2006, pursuant to Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue: WON petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Held:
Yes but he has reacquired it by virtue of RA 9225. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the
State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement;13faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
17. A.M. No. L-363

July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Facts:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, being admitted in 1945. He
was convicted of the murder of Samaco and was sentenced to the penalty of death. After serving a
portion of the sentence, respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August
19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
The widow of deceased Samaco prayed through a complaint that respondent be removed from the
roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,
admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the
decision of this Court in the case of I
Issue:
Resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the
scope of the rule on disbarment.

Held:
No. Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and
man.
In Lontok case, "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a
conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has
been granted."
However, in that case, the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. The foregoing
considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged
upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The
crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such
as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards
of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.
18. A.C. No. 439

April 12, 1961

LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
QUINCIANO VAILOCES, respondent.
Facts:
This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar for having
been convicted of the crime of falsification of public document
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered against him in the
criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the
charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein
complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
Issue:
WON falsification of document is a crime against moral turpitude.
Held:
Yes. Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving

moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice,
honesty or good morals. 1 Among the examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice
Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage. 2 The crime of which respondent was
convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly
contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime involves moral turpitude. Indeed, it
is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral
turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving
moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules
of Court. It is futile on his part, much as we sympathize with him, to dispute now the sufficiency of his
conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a closed chapter insofar
as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we are concerned is that he was found
guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.

19. A.C. No. 9604

March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
Facts:
Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar Atty.
Bancolo and his partner, alleging that Bancolos signatures in the letter-complaints from their firm
were being forged by their assistants. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. Atty. Bancolo admitted
that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his
name by a secretary of his law office.
Issue:
WON Atty. Bancolo violated the CPR for the acts stated above.
Held:
Yes.
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is

attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer
to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.
The SC found that respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

20. B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
Facts:
After having passed the bar, Medado took the laywers oath but failed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. By the time Medado found the
notice, he was already working. When Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to
be credited.10Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys. Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning
more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended that the instant petition be denied for
petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.
Issue:
a. WON Medado be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
b. WON Medado has been engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Held:
a. Yes. For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed
the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his
own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
b. Yes.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oathtaking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing

therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to
the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt 29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

21. G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Facts:
The above-named petitioners were complainants in an unfair labor practice
(ULP) case before the CIR. The CIR ordered the reinstatement with
backwages of complainants Entila and Tenazas. Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's
lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Quentin Muning filed a
"Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of case show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. Appearances made in behalf of
the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by
respondent Quintin Muning. The CIR awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case.

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Issue:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
Held:
NO. An agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a
non-lawyer is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award
by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle
the representative to compensation for such representation.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications
and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession,
as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of
courts, clients and the public.
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at
law unless ha has been duly admitted to pracitce and is an attorney in
good standing at the time.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court,
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a
person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9
and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in
hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the
bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable
to disciplinary measures.

22. A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ

June 20, 2012

JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, ANGELINA P. CIOCON, MARIVIT P. CIOCONHERNANDEZ, and REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
General Santos City, Respondent.
Facts:
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and
Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court
The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and
slanderous language, continually attributed all sorts of malicious motives
and nefarious schemes to Judge Lubao regarding the conduct of his official
function but failed to substantiate his allegations. The OCA further noted
that this case is just one of the many cases Karaan filed against various
judges in other courts where the same pattern of accusations could be
observed.
The OCA noted Karaans modus operandi of offering free paralegal advice
and then making the parties execute a special power of attorney that would
make him an agent of the litigants and would allow him to file suits,
pleadings and motions with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf
of his "clients." The OCA noted that Karaans services, on behalf of the
underprivileged he claimed to be helping, fall within the practice of law.
Issue:
WON Karaan is engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
Held:
Yes. In Cayetano v. Monsod,3 the Court ruled that "practice of law" means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession.4 Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. 5 Here, the OCA was able

to establish the pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would

require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to
allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then,
he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings "acting for and
in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative" of the
parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a
member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance
Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually
engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person
"[a]ssuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority," is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of
the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank "may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both." If a respondent is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he "may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both.

23. A.M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983

HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison employee of the SEC
as a Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil
service rules and regulations, more particularly the prohibition of
government employees to practice their professions and that respondent
falsified his Identity to be one "Atty. Manuel Sison "at the times that he will
handle private cases in representing one Juan Sacquing.

Respondent presented the written authorization by Associate

Commissioner of the SEC for him to appear for Sacquing, a close family
friend, alleges that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing
lawyer and that he hat he never represented himself deliberately and
intentionally as "Atty. Manuel Sison.
Issue:
WON Atty. Sision is engegaed in unauthorized practice of law and should
be disbarred.
Held:
No.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment
depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function
should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and
clients may rightly repose confidence in them. 3
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.
Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the
complaint do not warrant disbarment of the respondent. There is no
evidence that the respondent has committed an act constituting deceit,
immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an
attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so.

Beltran Jr. vs. Abad, 132 SCRA 453

(BM 139)
31
24.

JUL
.date
FACTS:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of the 1978 bar examinations. His
subsequent practice of law was questioned and complained by the President of
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc. Respondent explained that:

He had already paid for the Bar Admission Fee;

He was notified of the oath-taking by the Supreme Court and signed the
Lawyers Oath by one clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidante;

He participated Annual General Meeting of IBP Quezon City, and paid his
statement dues and was included as a voting member for officers and directors
also conferred to him a certificate of Membership in Good Standing from IBP QC
Chapter;

The Supreme Court never issued any order in the striking of his name in the
roll of attorneys, and paid his dues and PTR;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contempt of court.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was sentenced fine and imprisonment for twenty five (25)
days.
RATIO:
Respondent should know that the circumstances which he narrated do not
constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right (or privilege) to
practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
He was found in violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing x x x:
xxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
xxx

25. G.R. No. L-12510

August 27, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CESAREO DURBAN, defendant-appellant.

In 1914, a lawyer named Salvador Laguda filed a petition before the Iloilo
CFI recommending that he is appointing Cesareo Durban as his
procurador judicial (legal representative). The judge of the CFI approved
the petition. The authority granted to Durban, a non-lawyer, is limited to the
following: appear in matters signed and presented by Laguda with his own
signature and when the latter should send the said Durban to attend to such
matters; that the said Durban should have no authority to make contracts to
represent any person in any justice court; that all contracts and appearances
should be made by Laguda, and that the latter could send Durban to represent
him in courts; and finally that said Durban should not collect any sum for any
service.
In one instance however, Durban agreed to represent one Eustaquia Montage
in litigating her claim over a P20.00 worth parcel of land. Durban charged for
appearance fees; he even won the case. Montage paid Durban a total of
P50.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Durban engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
HELD: Yes. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 1919, says:
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in
the occupation of appearing for or defending other persons in
justice of the peace courts without being first authorized for
that purpose by the judge of the Court of First Instance.
Durban acted beyond the authority granted him; he was likewise in violation
of the provision above.
Public Officials and Public of Law
26. A.M. No. 202 July 22, 1975

RENE P. RAMOS, complainant,

vs.
MOISES R. RADA, respondent.
Rada a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, is charged with a
violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department:
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government:
He was extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation, thru its president, Jimmy
Tang, as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which
were foreclosed by the corporation. Rada accepted the appointment and discharged his duties as
administrator.
Issue:
WON Rada violated civil service rules.
Held:
Yes, but merely technical rule is violated.
ndubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting government employees from
engaging directly in a private business, vocation or profession or being connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head
of the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private business connection has not resulted in any
prejudice to the Government service. Thus, his violation of the rule the lack of prior permission is
a technical one, and he should be meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty, which is
reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire day of 24
hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such being his situation, it would be to stifle his
willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award a
premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private
undertaking outside of office hours and without foreseeable detriment to the Government service.
His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a
written permission from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, who
is hereby authorized to grant or revoke such permission, under such terms and conditions as will
safeguard the best interests of the service, in general, and the court, in particular.

27. G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of
Manila, respondents.
Facts:

Judge entered into a contract of personal and professional services with private individuals to
head defendants legal department for a fixed yearly salary.
The challenged judgment seeks to enforce a contract which is patently void because it is contrary to
law and public policy. The contract of professional services entered into between private respondent
and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted
private practice of law in contravention of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
WON judges are allowed to engage in private practice.
Held:
No.
The aforecited rule was promulgated by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the
practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a Judge of the CFI.
This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private
interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by au sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know that when he was elevated to the bench of
the CFI as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended and continued to
be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position.

28. (same as case 2)

G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said
case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case.
Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule
as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had
been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the
case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather hes doing it for free for his friend who
happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fules appearance for his
friend should be given credence.

29. A.C. No. 5118 September 9, 1999

(A.C. CBD No. 97-485)
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees
her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case
something went wrong. All for material gain.
Issue:
What is the nature of the lawyers oath?
Held:
The lawyer's oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral
flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the
lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust
that must be upheld and keep inviolable. 6 The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he
should be a person of good moral character. 7 This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. 8 We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit
to continue in the practice of law. 9
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant
when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel
agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake
travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he
sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondent's acts illegal, they are also detestable
from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar
and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. 10 We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer

has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be
heard. 11

30. A.C. No. 8269

December 11, 2013

PHESCHEM INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYs. LLOYD P. SURIGAO and JESUS A. VILLARDO III, Respondents.
Facts:
Pheschem insisted that the respondents acts were manifestly in excess of their legal authority; that
the regulatory agencies which granted them permits did not violate any law and the
respondentsattack on its ECC was without merit; that the respondents insistence that Pheschem
operated without a local permit was self-serving because it was themwho refused Pheschem a
permit; that the respondents acted in defiance of the injunction granted by the RTC; and,that Atty.
Surigao used his office to harass Pheschem in a private case. As to the town officials authority to
stop its quarrying operations, Pheschem argued that under Section 17(b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No.7160, or the "Local Government Code," municipalities are not entrusted with power over mined
resources but only the DENR and the provincial and city governments. These competent agencies
did not find any violations by Pheschem, thus, the respondents had no right to demand that
Pheschem obtain certain permits from the municipal government, such asa Mine Processing Permit,
a Development Permit, and an Ore Transport Permit.
Issue:
WON Atty. Surigao should be disbarred.
Held:
No.
Respondents merely performed their duties as public officials. Misconduct in the discharge of official
duties as government official, generally is not disciplinable unless the misconduct of the government
official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency.
In the case at bar, we find the orders issued by respondents in the regular performance of their
official duties were all based on the facts, evidence and the law. There is nothing on record that
shows that the assailed orders were motivated with malice, ill-intent or bad faith.
31. A.C. No. 5119

April 17, 2013

ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO
VEGA, Respondents.
Facts:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales)
and Pedro Vega (Vega). In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary
sanction against the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the
complainants in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected
with the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions.

IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended 34 that Florin be
"suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Issue:
WON the Code of Professional Responsibility is applicable also to lawyers in government service.
Held:
Yes.
A lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by
this Court as a member of the Bar.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service.
This is clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.
1wphi1