1

Components of the e-Content Module: (Logic II:Module 35)

Component-I (A)-Personal Details
Principal Investigator

A. Raghuramaraju,

Paper Coordinator

Content Writer

(1)
RanjanMukhopadhyay
(2) Pradeep Gokhale
DevendraNath Tiwari

Content Reviewer

Heeraman Tiwari

Language Editor

RaghavendraHarnoor

Department of Philosophy, University of

Hyderabad
(1) Vishvabharati, Shantiniketan (W.B.)
(2) Central University of Tibetan Studies, Sarnath
(Varanasi)
Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras
Hindu University, Varanasi.
Senior Fellow, Israel Institute for Advanced
Studies
Freelancer, Hyderabad

Component-I (B) Description of Module

Subject name
Philosophy
Paper Name
Logic-II
Module name/Title The concept of proposition (Pandit-philosopher project edited by Daya Krishna and
others).
Module ID
Prerequisites
Objectives
Key words

7.35
Russells theory of proposition, Indian theory of language and meaning.
To understand early Russells conception of proposition in the context of Nyya
and Vykaraa schools of Indian philosophy
Proposition, Vkya(sentence), Vkyrtha, Vkyrthabodha, Pratibh, verification,
truth, falsehood

Component II: e-Text (Logic II. 35)

The Concept of Proposition

Introduction
Samvda(1991)1 is the record of a weeklong dialogue on Early Russells Theory of Proposition
and Naiyyikas response to it organized by ICPR, New Delhi, between philosophers trained in the
classical Indian tradition of philosophizing and those trained in the western tradition as well. The purpose
of the dialogue was to make the understanding of Russellian Proposition pointedly clear for enabling
Indian Sanskrit pandits to find a response to it from Indian thinking if there is a parallel concept. The
dialogue had a bearing on concepts such assentence, word, meaning, knowledge, beliefand
truth.This is an area, as M. P. Rege says in his Introduction, which overlaps epistemology and
ontology, as well as formal logic with its formalized syntax and semantics.2
In Principles of Mathematics (PM, 1903) Bertrand Russell deliberated on the nature of
proposition but inPhilosophical Essays, 1910 collection, he attempted to deal with the issues of language
without a need of proposition. Again he devoted a chapter on An Analysis of some problems concerning
propositions in his book An inquiry into Meaning & Truth(1950) and in the chapter Propositions: what
they are and how do they mean of his book Logic and Knowledge(1956). This shows that Russell went
on changing his philosophical position and this is why the organizers of dialogue confined the discussion
to Russells early theory on the nature of proposition as presented in his book Principles of Mathematics,
with the view that it is like an attempt to make a new beginning in philosophical analysis by turning
ones back on what has gone before and that it does not demand references to the tenets and arguments of
earlier schools and thinkers and the points of agreement and disagreement between them. 3
So many diverse points were presented and discussed during the dialogue and it is not possible
even to summarize them in one lesson. We will concentrate only on the major points concerning the
theme: the concept of a proposition in its comparative perspective. The lesson is divided into two parts. In
the first part we will try to understand the concept of proposition according to early Russell with its
different dimensions. In the second part we will try to understand the views of two Indian philosophical
systems viz. Nyya and Vykaraa. The lesson will end with some concluding remarks.
Part I.What is a proposition according to Russell?
1.1. Proposition as the meaning of a sentence:
Russell, like G.E.Moore, thinks of proposition as that the sentence expresses. It is a kind of
intermediate something, an entity which subsists between a sentence and a fact which is something there
in the world.
Sentence---Proposition---Fact

Savda: A dialogue Between Two Philosophical Traditions, edited by Daya Krishna,

Published from ICPR, New Delhi, 1991.
2
3

Savda (1991: xxviii)

Savda, (1991, xxv)

3
ASentence is composed of words consisting of subject, predicate and their relation. It is the entity we
speak and write differently in different languages, which differs in shape, size, tone, etc., but expresses
the same proposition. For example, It is raining.(English), varati (Sanskrit), varahorahhai
(Hindi), and likewise several sentences in different language communities express the same proposition.
Fact is what is meant by a true sentence. If a proposition corresponds to a fact or facts, it is true.
According to early Russell there are facts over and above things and that unless there were facts,
sentences would not be rendered true or false. Facts have to be admitted for the purpose of truth and
falsity; it is the state of affairs (vastusthiti). Propositions are of two sorts--verified and non-verified. A
proposition is true when it is verified and, thus, it can be said that true proposition is identical with fact.
Fregeremarks thata fact is nothing but a true thought. Russells position comes close to Freges thought.4
The view that results from the above consideration is that themeaning of a sentence is proposition
that the sentence expresses5. It is the logical necessity of translatability of synonymous sentences.
1.2 Propositions are the sort of things that can be analysed and thus have parts:
A proposition expressed by a sentence is composed of meanings of words and phrases of which
the sentence is composed, grossly, subject and predicate. A subject out of them is the thing or object
about which something is asserted. The meaning of the predicate is that which is asserted about the
subject. For example, in the sentence Socrates is wise, Socrates stands for an object, that is individual,
and wise is predicate, which means wisdom, that is a property of Socrates, the individual. Is is the
relation that relates the object with the property and the sentence Socrates is wise made of these parts
expresses a proposition. Verbs generally relate the two, the object and the property. Thus the constituents
of a proposition are:
(i)Object; (ii) property; and (iii) relation
A verb in a sentence performs two functions
i.
ii.

it expresses a relation, and

it asserts the relation of the subject with the predicate

1.3. A proposition is either true or false

If a proposition is true it cannot be false and vice versa. For example, if John ismortal is true, it
cannot be false and vice versa. However, we also use sentences expressing cognitive attitudes like belief
and doubt where the object of belief or doubt is a proposition believed or doubted to be true. For example,
to say that I believe that the earth is round is to say that I regard the proposition expressed by the sentence
the earth is round to be true.
1.4.Reasons for postulating the notion of proposition:
1stArgument:
There are languages and, hence, all possible synonymous sentences. The translatability of a sentence of
one language into another language is possible only if there is some common meaning pattern which is

4
5

Savda, (1991, p.166)

Savda, (1991, p.35)

4
constant across the translations. To deny proposition is to deny not only the synonymy but also the
possibility of translation.6

2ndArgument:
He irrigates with fire is not a sentence because it does not express proposition. Wet with fire is not a
sentence because it does not have quantification. We cannot know whether the sentences are true or false
only by looking at or hearing them but by cognition/experience of meaning the identification of which is
not ascertained merely through the sentence. In our verbal cognition we distinguish between sentence,
sentential meaning and their truth or falsity and that isnot possible if propositions are not accepted.
3rdArgument:
If one says there is a book on the table when there is no book on the table, thenthe sentence does not
convey something which is there (a fact). But the listener understands what is conveyed by the sentence
and what he understands is the proposition. What a sentence conveys is always a proposition and what a
hearer grasps when he understands the meaning of a sentence is always a proposition. When a proposition
corresponds to facts it is true, the knowledge which is generated by it is valid. Otherwise it is invalid. 7
1.5. Proposition as a unity
Proposition is not merely a list of entities but a unity of them. The unity of the parts is possible
by the role of the verb that serves to connect the constituents into a unit. For example, is in the
proposition Socrates is wise is a verb because of which the object Socrates, that is the individual, and
the attribute wisdom are connected for expressing the proposition as a unity: Socrates is wise.
1.6.About the meaning of a word:
According to Russell, every word occurring in a sentence must have some meaning. The
correctness of our philosophical analysis of a proposition may therefore be usefully checked by the
exercise of assigning the meaning of each word in the sentence expressing the proposition. A word, for
him, becomes meaningful if it refers to external entity. 8The meaning of a word is the entity for which the
word or the phrase stands. The point of controversy there is: if the entity is external or internal, a thing
outside or a thought.
According to Russell, entity comprises
i.
ii.

That which is expressed and

The individual exterior to the word.

Early Russell is a realist and therefore he is justified in saying that the substance, that is,the
individual and the property,are external to the words which stand for them. They may be internal or
external things in the empirical world but are external to the words which stand for them. The identity of
word and thing cannot be acceptable to Russell. If it wasacceptable, there would be no sense inthe
expression the word stands for. We can distinctly say that proposition is the entity expressed by
sentence and word-meaning is the entity for which the word stands. Here it is essential to take note of the
difference of mode of the use of the entity in regard with proposition and word. In the former case, the
6

Savda, (1991, pp.67-68)

Savda, (1991, p.82)
8
Savda, (1991, p.7)
7

5
entity, namely, idea or thought, is expressed by the proposition; but in the latter case,the entity, that is the
external thing, is pointed or indicated or represented by the words. The word cow stands for the
individual cow in the external world. The former is abstracted from sentences in their different
occurrences and instances and the latter is individual, the external object /thing pointed to by the words.
1.7.What is a term?
Russell says whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true orfalse proposition
I call a term. I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entityanythingthat
can be mentioned, is sure to be a term and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be
false.9 A term is a thing that has existence. Can there be a term without existing? Russell uses the word
term for whatever the meanings of words and the constituents of propositions are. He thinks that
everything which exists can be an object of thought-- that there is no difference in kind between the
constituents of thoughts and the constituents of reality.
Russell classifies terms as -i. Thing and ii. Concept. The former terms are indicated by proper
names. And the latter are those indicated by all other words. Properties and relations are the meanings of
predicates.
1.8. The Problem of Empty Names
Russell admits that there are several non-existent terms. 10To deny that such and such thing is a
term must always be false. Different from this we find a sentence Pegasus does not exist which seems
true. Pegasus has a meaning and all meanings are terms but Pegasus does not exist in the empirical world
and therefore it is true to say that something is a term and thus has a being but does not exist. Russell here
makes a difference of being and existence; terms like Pegasus and other non-existents have being but not
existence. By existence he means corresponding entity existing in the world of experience and hence
having the value of truth and by being he means a term which has meaning but not corresponding value of
truth.
The
distinction
between
being
and
existence
was
dropped
by
mature
Russell.11ArindamChakravartyremarks the position that there is a sentence, there is a fact and in between
the two there is a proposition is an opinion which Russell gives up when he drops the distinction between
being and existence and since then confines his talk to existent objects, he also drops the notion of
proposition.
Part II.Nyya and Vykaraa views on Word/Sentence/Proposition
2.1. Nyya View of sentence and sentence meaning:
The concepts theNyya system discusses are pada (word), padrtha(wordmeaning), vkya (sentence)
and vkyrtha(sentential meaning). A pada, word in English, is the original unit of language that denotes
wordmeaning. Padrtha is the meaning of a word. All the categories (padrthas) accepted by Nyya are
called so because they are knowable and expressible through words (jeya and abhidheya). A sentence
conveys sentential meaning. It is an outcome of the relation of word-meanings in a syntactical order.
Padrtha is individual qualified by universal and, thus,it is not an utterly external entity in the way in
which it is so in Russells theory.

Principles of Mathematics (1903), p.47

Principles of Mathematics (1903), p.48
11
Savda, (1991, pp. 31-32)
10

6
A sentential meaning according to Nyya is the outcome of association of word-meanings. In a
verbal cognition, the words in a sentential set denote their meanings. The word-meanings are known first
in sequence.Then they are retained in memory in order and are associated with the last word-meaning
denoted by the word uttered in the last and that association of word-meanings is called sententialmeaning.
For example, in the set Rmapustakapahati( Rma reads a book), the word Rma is
uttered that conveys Rma, the Individual, the agent and the word pustakamconveys the object of the
action denoted by theverb pahati performed by the agent. These word-meanings disappear in sequence
leaving memory of their cognition and the sentential meaning Rma reads a book emerges by their
association that is sansargrtha. The sentential meaning is true if there is corresponding state of affairs
and is un-contradicted but is false if it has no corresponding state of affairs and is contradicted. Their
theory of verbal cognition for which word-meanings are known first and then they are associated for
sentential meaning is marked as abhihitnvayavda(Expression precedes connectedness). Sentential
meaning is different from word-meaning. In this context we can say a few things about Russells
proposition. First, a proposition does not emerge by association but the sentence expresses it. It can be
said that the sentences express association of word-meanings and this is quite near to Naiyyikas notion
of Vkyrtha which is made of parts but not confined to the meanings of parts; it is over and above the
meanings of parts. Russells proposition is also an association of object, predicate and verb that relates the
earlier two. This way the proposition of Russell and vkyrtha of Naiyyikasare similar concepts. So far
as the truth and falsehood of propositions are concerned, Russell accepts something asa fact if the
correspondingproposition is true,otherwise, he would not accept it as a fact. Correspondence with external
things is accepted by both of the parties: for a decision of truth and falsity of proposition in the case of
Russell and for vkyrthabodhain the case of Naiyyikas. Naiyyikas make a difference between
vkyrthaand vakyrthabodha. However, Naiyyikas do not accept a proposition in addition to vkyaand
vkyrthabodha. The un-contradicted character of sentence as a condition of the truth of a verbal
cognition is given primacy by Nyya.
35.2.2: Padrtha and Fact: Individuals and Universals
The question is, why didRussell introduce the word proposition in lieu of the term meaning,
very popularly used in the tradition of Russell? Is proposition different from meaning? If we accept that
all sentences have meaning; but if they are fit to be true or false they are called propositions, then how do
we know their fitness? If their fitness is decided on the basis of facts, what is that fact? Is it thatthestate of
affairs is different from sentence and proposition? Russell will say- yes, a fact is that which makes a
proposition true. Over and above padrtha, Naiyyikas do not accept facts.
According to Nyya, padais the original unit of meaning (padrtha =padeakti).Padrtha is
defined as that which has jeyatvam (knowable) and abhidheyatvam (nameable, expressible by a word).
All the categories accepted by Nyya are called so because they are objects of knowledge and are
nameable. Abhva(negation) also possesses these characteristics and hence a padrtha. Non-being is
known by the same sources (pramas) by which the counter-positive of that non-being is known. Is
padrthaan external entity (bhya)? Or is it an inner idea(buddhistha), that is, the object of cognition
which may or may not have existence over and above cognition? I According to Nyya it is something
which exists in time and space and is the object of cognition as well 12 ; it comprises both the
being(saviayakavtti) and the existence(bhyasatt).
Is padrtha an Individual or universal or individual qualified by universal? Russellian entity is
Individual but how can a Russellian being be an external individual denoted by words? According to
Nyyaan individual qualified by universal is the denotation of word and thus they do not accept a
12

Savda, (1991, pp. 26-27)

7
padrthadevoid of being and existence and the difference between the two. Badarinath Shukla observed
that a proper name like Devadattadenotes universal because of particular changing series of his stages of
childhood,youth,old-age etc. An Individual cannot be referred to on its own. His view is that if the
delimiting factor (akyatvacchedaka) of a referent is universal the addition of a further limiter is not
necessary because universal can be referred to on its own(svarpata). However, true or false of a
sentential meaning is decided on the basis of individual.
According to early Russell, facts are there in the world and the world is totality of facts but the
world for Naiyyikas is totality of things and not of facts. The meaning of a word is the thing meant in the
external world and the meaning of a sentence is association of the word-meanings in the sequence of the
sentential set. For Russell facts are accepted for the truth and falsity of the propositions. For Naiyyikas
the truth and falsity is known by the cognition and the corresponding things as per the verbal cognition.
2.3. Nyya position on sentence
i. Sentence is a get-together or association of words Nominal-Verb- Accessory. For example
,Devadattapustakapahati (Devadatta reads a book) the nominal word (Devadatta),verbpahati) and
pustakam (accessory-object) are all independent but from their association(sasargamaryd) by
expectancy, capability, proximity and purport, emerges a new meaning over and above the wordmeanings and that association is called sentential meaning. This view is accepted by Mmnsakas also.
The words are denotative (vcaka) and their meanings are vcyrtha but sentences since they
haveemerged out of association of words are lakaka (metaphorical) and the sentential-meanings are
figurative(lakyrtha).
ii. Word-meaning is denotative-meaning of words and sentential meaning is the purpose involved
in the use of words which is known after the cognition of the word-meanings in a sequence in a gettogether of words. For example,consider the sentence: Gangyghoa here the denotative meaning
of the word Gang is the current of water(Ganges) andthat of ghoais residence. This is not conducive to
the purpose of the use. The purpose of the use may be something different and then the set of that use
may mean residence on the bank of the river Ganges, or cool and sacred residence or a houseboat
and likewise.
iii.The explanation of many meanings of a word is possible if it stands for universal. It is this
difficulty that some Naiyyikas accept that sentential-meaning is the word-meaning satisfying expectancy
of a complete sense. In this situation word-meaning is reposed for a sentential meaning, that is, universal
is reposed for specific sentential meaning by expectancy or intention of the use of the set of words. This
view is quite in tune with asatkryavdaof Naiyyikas. Sentential meaning is analyzed into
meanings(parts) of the words constituting the sentence. For Nyya, it has being and the being is not
different from existence. Here we find the Nyya position to be different from that of early Russell. It
does not accept any concept like proposition different from sentential meaning;it gives equal importance
to sentence and sentential meaning and makes no difference between being and existence.
A radical difference between Nyya and Russellian view concerns the interpretation of sentences.
Nyya gives primacy to the agent and a secondary status or qualifying position to verbs in a sentence; but
Russell, like the Mmsakas, gives primacy to verbs that not only relatethe agent and the property but
make the unity of propositions possible.
2.4. Position of the Indian School of Grammar (Vykaraa)
In their analytic scheme, Vaiykaraas like Naiyyikas and Russell, do accept separate
existencesof the meaningful expressions (vcaka) namely, words (pada) and sentences(vkya) which
independently express their respective meanings(vcyas), that is, word-meanings (padrtha) and

8
sentential meanings (vkyrtha) respectively. They consider the issue under two schemes i. cognitive
and analytic.
i)

ii)

Cognitive level:At the cognitive level the words express word-meanings that is universaland accept their
existence as intelligible beings in contrast with external existences as Beings (with capital B). Sentencetokens differing in form and shape in different language communities, which Russell calls synonymous
sentences, express the being of sentences themselves first, from which the being of sentential
meaning,that is, indivisible being, a unit of awareness that satiates the expectancy of a complete
sense(buddhisthasatt), is expressed non-differently.
Analytical level:Unlike for Nyya and Russell, sentence for the Indian system of grammar is the original
unit of language, that in an analytical scheme is divided artificially into different kinds of words and their
independent meanings are decided accordingly as universal in some and individual in some other cases.
The word-meaning and the sentential meaning are universal that flash in by respective words and
sentences non-differently. But they maintain a difference in the interpretation of generality of the
sentential cognition. It is universal only in the sense that identical cognition in their different instances
and occurrences is accomplished and that they are manifested by several individual words used. So far the
words are concerned; expectancy of a complete sense is not satiated by the word-universals and the
meaning-universals while the satiation of a complete sense is brought about by the sentential cognition.
Respective external objects or individuals outside them are known by imposition/implication of the
universals expressed directly by language on them as their external substratum (bhya-samndhikakaa)
on the basis of some similarity inhering in the respective universals.
Russell, like Vaiykaraas, accepts that sentences express meaning(proposition) but unlike them
he does not accept proposition as the intelligible being of sentence but of meaning. They make a
difference between sentence and sentence-token or sentential garbs. Out of them the sentential
garbs(external) express the sentence(being). If a proposition is the being of a sentence that the sentential
garb expresses is accepted,then Russell is very close to Vaiykaraas. Since proposition in early Russell
is constant content by which we know that this proposition is the meaning of this sentence and later on it
serves as the basis of searching empirical correspondence and deciding true and false of the sentence, he
is very near to Vaiykaraas. But he radically differs from them, because he takes proposition as
meaning, while Vaiykaraas accept the being of sentence as the constant content that flashes meaning.
A proposition cannot bemeaning and the expresser of meaning at the same time. Even if it is accepted, the
being of sentence and the being of proposition must not be different like the garb and thought. Sentence,
for Vaiykaraas, does not mean only the syntactical formation of words; the being of sentence is not
constituted by parts (words);it is the unit of awareness and there is no possibility of any real division in a
unit of awareness. Sentence is not constituted by words and so is sentential meaning. The parts are
derived by artificial analysis of the indivisible sentence to make the undivided understandable to those
who can understands it only through a piecemeal scheme. Russell never says that proposition is
undividable and analyzed only artificially into parts. Sentence-tokens are linguistic units that are external
things we perceive and are constituted by word-tokens. If the being of a sentence of different synonymous
sentential tokensis not accepted, sentential garbs cannot express proposition. Propositions are not given
beforeus tobe perceived by senses, picking out the parts perceived and then forassociating for sentential
meaning. These are perhaps the reasons that the mature Russell gives up the idea of proposition,
difference between being and existence and the idea of individual as the meaning of the words. 13

13

During the discussionBadarinath Shukla from the point of view of Nyya remarked that being

and existence are the same, equivalent and this is the reason that caused Russell to give up his
belief in proposition.

9
What determines the truth and falsity of sentential-cognition? Sentential cognition generated by
assertive or by negative sentences is always veridical; it is called pratibh (flash of consciousness) and
flashing of sentence and sentential cognition expressed non-differently by the former is veridical in each
case of assertion positive or negative. The sentences Tree exists and the tree does not exist distinctly
express their meanings independently of each other. Cognition expressed by them is veridical because of
which we know them distinctly. Even the sentence Hares horn does not exist expresses its meaning
positively and that is why we know that the sentence is true. Similarly hares horn does not exist, he
waters with fire expresstheir meanings because of which we know them and give reasons for them being
false and contradicting sentence respectively. Modifying the Nyya position, Pt. Badarinath Shukla
observed: To say that there is a proposition but it is contradicted is as absurd as saying that there is
hares horn but it does not exist14As against this it can be said that it is not justifiable to say that a false
sentence does not express proposition because in that case we will not be able to know whether the
sentence is contradictory or false. If we deny proposition we will deny its translatability.15 It may be
observed that a sentence cannot be the meaning and a meaning cannot contradict or negate itself at the
same time. If a false sentence expresses a false proposition then the substantive of the proposition is not
the constituent of that proposition or it may be a constituent only by proxy. Whatever exists has the being
we know but not vice versa. This shows that truth and falsity are the qualities of sentences and not of
external things with which we are concerned when we have logical demand for the verification of truth or
falsity on the basis of corresponding things or facts in the empirical world. According to the
VykaraaSchool, the object of cognition is confined to language and meaning; they are only intelligible
beings out of which meaning shines forth directly after the flashing of the sentence.
Sentence and not the proposition or meaning is given before us for analysis. A sentence or a
sentential cognition can only be true and false. One can abstract several instances and occurrences of a
sentence and give that abstraction a name proposition but that name cannot be Russellianproposition or
meaning. No real parts or constituents are possible in the unit that is expressed or cognitive in nature.
Identical cognition of a sentential meaning by a sentence is not possible if sentences are taken only as
confined to means for abstraction of proposition.In fact the cognition of proposition needs a cognitive
ground in order to be known as abstracted from sentences. Thus the idea of proposition either as meaning
or as the class of synonymous sentences is logically and cognitively inconsistent for Vaiykaraas.
Conclusion
According to early Russell, what a sentence conveys is always a proposition and what a hearer
grasps when he understands the meaning of a sentence is always a proposition. When a proposition
corresponds to facts it is true, the knowledge which is generated by it is valid; if otherwise it is invalid. 16
On ontological status of propositions, it can well be said that they are abstractions; abstracted from the
sentences. If a proposition is an abstraction then it will be subordinated to the sentence from which it is
abstracted and the mind which abstracts it. It is clear that there is no room,especially in Nyya and
philosophy of grammarians, for a concept like proposition because they accept verbal cognition or
awareness to be either true or false. It is parallel neither to sentence nor to sentential meaning/cognition.
Russell might have felt a logical need to postulate proposition as a logical link between sentence and
sentential meaning. But by placing proposition in the centre of his analysis he not only subordinated
sentence but split the notion of meaning into proposition and meaning such that proposition was
concerned only with the meaning that can be true. This is a great underestimation of the power of
sentences.Here one is overlooking sentences that work but cannot be falsified or testified on the basis of

14

Savda, (1991, p. 65)

Savda, (1991, p. 67)
16
Savda, (1991, p.82)
15

10
correspondence. How can a philosopher be justified in placing meaning(proposition) that is not given
before us for analysis, interpretation and philosophical reflection, in the centre of a philosophy that works
primarily with sentences put before us?From the perspective ofIndian philosophers, one can criticise the
early Russellthat his attempt to understand the linguistic understanding in a new frame neither provides
logical skill nor does it add substantially to the understanding of natural skill of verbal cognition. It is in
view of the conflictraised above between proposition as meaning and it as class of synonymous sentences
and between being and existence that Russell might have felt that the concept of proposition cannot
resolve the conflict and that might have led him to leave out this concept in his later philosophical
thinking.