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INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS
INTRODUCTION
TO SEMANTICS
by
Adam
Schaff
OLGIERD WOJTASIEWICZ
Pergamon
Press
Book
PERGAMON PRESS
122 East 55th Street,
1404
Headington
&
New York
Rue des
N.Y.
5.
D. C.
PRESS LTD.
Oxford.
Hill,
London W.
5 Fitzroy Square,
PERGAMON
PRESS
1.
S.A.R.L.
Ecoles,
Paris
PERGAMON PRESS
G. m.
24,
22,
N. W., Washington
PERGAMON
4
INC.
V*.
b.
H.
am Main.
Copyright
1962
by Paiistwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowc
Warszawa
Library of Congress Card
Number
61
18879
Printed in Poland
CONTENTS
Page
IX
Preface
Part
One
22
The
53
Language as a product of
59
76
arbitrary convention
90
Two
Part
f2.
3.
The essence of
the
113
problem of communication
the transcendentalist
118
and the
naturalist
130
conception
as
the
starting
140
155
point in the
155
2.
162
3.
173
4.
176
5.
A. Signals
181
B. Substitutive signs
185
The
194
specific
fv]
Contents
VI
On
2.
Meaning
212
215
the sign-situation
as a real or ideal object
228
The conception of
intentional meanings
3.
Meaning
as a relation (1)
4.
Meaning
as a relation (2)
230
247
263
B.
228
who communicate
264
The
268
origin of
meaning
274
The
linguistic
approach
to the issue of
and meaning
meaning
295
301
311
1.
312
2.
Language and
reality
321
3.
Language and
effective
Bibliography
Index of
Names
cominunication
352
366
391
to bring
I wish
of
who had been kind enough
First
all,
and penetrating
to
to its present
it
form.
criticism helped
me
to
add
many
pas-
Wojtasiewicz
and
precision to
Mr
thank
the
translator
Dr
Olgierd
in existing
In
refers
due
three cases only they are given in the original version. This
to
to quotations
from
Husserl, Jaspers,
of these
and
Vossler,
and
texts.
A. S.
[vi.]
is
PREFACE
Authors'
prefaces
tend
my
case,
paid to usage. In
book. Hence
my
to
be
however,
to,
but
to treat
that
all
satisfactory degree.
cases,
it is
to be feared
many
other
I do not know whether I can satisfy that requirement properly, but I should like to explain what tasks I have
set myself, and why. It is up to the reader to decide whether,
and to what extent, I have achieved them.
First of all, I wish to explain, both to myself and to others,
what we mean by semantics. As a discipline, semantics is now
so intricate, and its name so ambiguous, that semantic analysis
must be applied to the very term "semantics", if deplorable misunderstandings and errors of logic are to be avoided.
token of mastery.
Such
is
would
like to
literature.
And
yet the
[ix]
Preface
In
its
semantics
is
embryonic form of
ed at the time of
in Lenin's time,
linguistic semantics,
Marx and
but
its
Engels. It
when he was
life,
otherwise absorbed.
tative
in Stahn's
Marxism and
the
rightly
in
issue
this
and no less
from adequate
linguistic semantics,
But that
it.
far
is
critical
The
philosophical
day,
this
show
it
can be
definitely affirmed
performances.
paedias,
to
creditable
dictionaries,
that semantics
which
etc.,
are
was understood
available
exclusively
The
credit
literature belongs,
for
it
all
is
characteristic that
it
is
mere removal
etc.) would
similar view
his 1984,
is
ex-
Orwell has
in
ct"HJioco(})Hn"
EojibuieeuK,
[Marasm
in
Preface
xi
will
become
in-
is
absolutely
no
circles close to
will
"in general"? Is
it
fair to identify
my
first
it
justification for
Such an attitude
is
Korzybski, as
that semantics
significance?
various fields concerned with semantics, and the various meanings of the
will
into
what
is
itself.
the
difference
between
semantics
linguistic
and semantics
has
shown
language
is
not only
is
semantics
latter
that
semantic philosophy)
and
finally,
what
is
for
pecuUarities
Of course, my
object
analysis, to extricate
by the
single
the actual
is
and to present
term "semantics".
all
I shall
real scientific
problems
it
formulates.
my
opinion,
show
new and
what
tics.
on the philosophical
significance of
Preface
xii
al-
tions, since
the point of view of their philosophical imphcaare concerned with the philosophical aspect of
of that disciphne.
importance
will
be ascribed to
sided, analyses, as
is
partial,
logic:
title
Intro-
who
is
is
of the book.
them
solve
be made
to
book.
There
distortions
lates
way simply by giving effect, as far as my abihand competences permit, to the notion of a scientific analysis
in a different
ties
issues.
Part One
Chaptek One
LINGUISTICS
Semantics (semasiology)
with what
does
a branch of
is
is
found in contemporary
To begin with
French
The ques-
and in what
and the semantic problems
it
linguistics.
tions
logic^.
the term
BreaP and
linguist
is
itself:
it
it
domain
that
has not been studied so far and which should be the result of
work
many
for
requested to
science
consider this
which
generations of linguists.
propose to
call semantics".
Tsxvv)
"E7)[i,avTt.x7)
word
o7)[Jt.aLvco
the
'denote', as
science
of speech sounds"3.
An
its
interests
Oxford
1957;
B.
A.
SBcrHHueB,
UUman, The
Ce^^acuoJlo^uH
Principles of Semantics,
[Semasiology],
MocKBa
1957.
2
Kronasser (op.
cit.,
p.
29),
who
denies that,
M.
p. 8.
\i\
the
What
new
defined
by the
how
in general
was
linguists?
we propose
to investigate
how
it
hap-
pens that words, once created and endowed with a certain meaning,
extend that meaning or contract
it,
value or lower
It
is
its
transfer
it
second part
this
it,
in a
that
word
constitutes
science of meaning"^.
i.e.
This shows that, for Breal, semantics was the science the
subject matter of
in
maintained to
Not
linguistics
all
is
not confined
(e.g.,
de Saussure,
who
and treats
signs),
but
all
linguistics as a
branch
schools of linguistics
Thus
all
by Breal.
For instance, Darmesteter conceives of the science of the
meaning of words, i.e. semantics, as a branch of the history
as understood
1948,
its
Ibid., p. 99.
Cf. A.
No.
W. Read,
4, pp.
78-97.
"'An
in
Word,
Linguistics
words themselves
problems of
al
"?.
He
linguistic semantics,
all
lit-
by Zenon Klemensiewicz^.
I shall later
endeavour
what the general programme of linsemantics stands for. But at this point I should like to
duction to Linguistics
defini-
and
in
linguistics
is
con-
tneaning of words
expressions''^^.
All this
on general
is
no
differences of opinion, in
some
mean
ther does
it
definition
and
<5
A, Darmesteter, La
vie
and
differences of opinion
(without date).
7 J,
8 Ibid.,
' Z.
pp. 240-241.
Lw6w-War-
MocKBa
1953, Pt. 2, p.
7.
'6
changes.
For him,
root
the
at
of semantic
the general
and the
ysis
Doroszewski analyses
"is".
It
"The potential
in every
inherent
conflict
ual
understood as a part of
tics
is
word
is
an
individ-
linguistics
that
is
as a science
semantics,
is
that issue,
is,
in so far
as
it
tliis
case,
is
it
justified
mantics and
A
guists,
its
research objectives.
was held
in
Warsaw
in 1955.
The
object
was
unfor-
W. Doroszewski,
Warszawa
1954,
p.
93.
to
on the
lin-
narrow
subject
[Selected Prob-
Linguistics
paper
Mysl
in
Filozo-
ficzna}'^.
liimself against
is
tionship between
from the
and
social
Doroszewski
that
sees
between
distinction
is
in that issue
linguistics
and
logical semantics.
of
tools of
human thought
words
ical
formal
it
logic,
in
what
is
outfruit-
discipline.
is its
most
essential content
is
"The
linguist
is
conventional terminology,
logic
are
linguistics
inchned to
investigate
and even
some
to
all
alien to
extent in contradiction to
its
basic
assumptions"!^.
12
in
Mysl
13
Filozoficzna, 1955,
That
No.
Semantics],
3 (17).
confirmed by the standpoint adopted by the admethod in semantics, and expressed by them explicitly
e.g., F. R. Blake in "The Study of Language from Semantic Point of View"
in Indogermanische Forschungen, 1938, 56, p. 242 (quoted by 3BerHHueB, op.
Ibid.
thesis is
cit.,
in
p.
their existence,
it
is
in fact
which would
RKStARcn Problems
Thus
Semantics
oi
and relationships
that
it
and
as between
not
words
is
it
is
specific feature
of linguistic semantics.
While laying
stress,
in
studies,
its
on the
historical aspect
linguistic
semantics
by de Saussure, is being continued by approwhich in its developed form becomes the theory
analysis, initiated
priate research
Jost Trier)i4.
Let us consider
now what
guistic semantics so
in the Preface,
we
Remember
interpreted.
all in
that,
lin-
as indicated
Linguistics
is
When
linguistic
the
tics
problem of
may
been, to
linguistic
some
interests.
signs.
when he made a
as a reflection of reality
and language as
a system
in
the
of signs^s.
minds of users
of language, and would study pure meanings regardless of their form and
development.
'4
On
that point
IS
W.
V.
cf.
Ullman, op.
cit.,
p.
152
ft'.
veigleicheiule SpiaclisiiuUum"
1,
p.
Taschenaus-
22.
Linguistics
^)
The problem of the sign often appeared subsequently also, especially in works on the philosophy and psychology of language^^.
of place
Pride
that
in
respect
of
work of de
by the
held
is
linguistic
its
its
De
of the problem.
linguistic aspect
ter as follows:
social life;
it
life
of
we
shall call
science
it
would explain
to us in
is
it is
existence,
its
place
its
That
'sign').
and by what
is
signs consist of
exist,
for
what
be applicable also to
which in turn
will
human
entirety of
De
affairs"i7,
his intentions in
phenomenon
'6
as docs not
depend on our
cited
will,
whether
by way of example: K.
indi-
Biihler,
New York
An
Introduction to a Philosophy of
Human
Culture.,
guage,
New York
1921;
W. Wundt,
Volkerpsychologie, Vols.
&
2,
Die
p.
33.
F.
de Saussure,
Cows
de
linguistique
generate, Paris
1949,
10
linguist
i.e.,
different point of
from a
way a
philosophers.
Linguistics as such has not developed semiology, but
problems
The
the
linguists
of meaningly.
theory
first
has
it
is
of
all
Some of them
vary.
meaning?
is
by way of example.
In Polish linguistic literature
versy
found
is
first
of
associationism
a contro-
all
ponents of associationism.
Stanislaw
Szober
meaning
interpreted
as
the
association
(i.e.,
of
attribute ..."19.
quite
different
opposing
position,
associationism.
was
who engaged
18 Cf.
19 S.
Linguistics],
1.,
Warszawa
1924, p.
5.
20 Ibid., p. 6.
21
associationism
is
to be
Pt. 2,
Lwow
found
in
1933, pp. 96
an
article
flf.
criticism
by M. Ossowska,
11
Linguistics
should like
now
to
to the interpretations
towards the
have chosen
in their attitudes
issue.
With de Saussure,
concept of meaning
the
is
inseparably
According to de Saussure, a
will
linguistic sign is
it
be analysed in
and notion22.
de
Saussure's
analysis,
is
that
meaning. This
is
between
relationship
why de
Saussure suggests
that the
"signifiant"
(that
is
The
sign
fulfils its
the
two-sided
members of which
The breaking
a system of signs.
relationship of
sign,
fully
is
and sound
is
What
It also refers to
language, which
in language.
Similarly,
in
the
matter of
is
interesting to
de Saussure, op.
Ibid., p.
157.
cit.,
p.
99.
12
It
is
interesting because
what
is
it
shows us the
possibility of
ferent
ual's
philosophical and
who
it
also
on the
We
background.
methodological
dif-
individ-
see
meaning
is
de
kind:
in
opposes
the
association
difference
which
theory,
of
sees
him inseparably connected with the function of denotaA word above all denotes some real fact or phenomenon
about which the individual wants to communicate something
to others. And meaning is the content of the word, revealed by
connections with reality. The proper meaning of a word is shaped
is
for
tion'^^.
by the history of
its
connections with
reality^s.
Two
is
new
in relation
which appears
tively),
on the
word
in
and emphasis
determining
its
actual
meaning.
attitude
rejects the
is
the dominant
I.
Smirnitsky
connected with
13.
12-13.
13
LrNGUlSTICS
tiie
which
reflects the
must
confine myself
fragment
the intermediary
reality^6,
make
explicitly
is
am
in
is
not to be
record.
derivative issues.
What
linguistic entities
That problem
is
when
me and
the
guistic elements
issue
guistic
is
often to be
met with
way of example
in linguistic litera-
ture.
meanings and
at-
meaning,
numerous
which
an
is
predecessors
and following
meaning (independent
abstraction,
principal
26
separate question
that of caique
meaning
is
Vendryes, op.
28 Ibid.,
pp.
cit.,
103-104.
p. 86.
JVq
2,
pp.
82-84.
14
which develops
actual vocabulary or
the
in
\
from
neologisms
The second
in
its
and the
history of language
ment that
it
is
guistics are to
state-
be found.
And
it is
linguistic
in meanings.
specific trait
bility
of meanings
are
itself
or in factors
to language.
either
seen
psychological
The laws of
or
sociological
external
who
in principle
life in
The
social
and
class factor
was
..."30.
most
E.
P.
KypHJiOBHM
Meaning of Words],
in
Breal, op.
31
First published in
in the
book by A.
Paris 1948.
les
mots changent de
"SaMCTKH o 3HaHeHHH
Bonpocti
.H3biK03Hanu.H,
cjiOBa"
1955.
sens^^.
[Remarks
3,
pp.
on
78-79.
pp. 105-106.
-'0
cit.
Comment
Meillet, Linguistique
16
Linguistics
Meillet
velopment of meanings
of words:
autonomous
and the
"...
Changes
in the de-
laws of the
object
denoted,
he says:
in
which
is
differentiation in the
component
elements of society"-^2.
Vendryes,
who
Similarly, Klemensiewicz,
the
The
factors
reflected in
ing dead
we have
seen, against
words themselves33.
linguistic
of the extra-linguistic
all,
factor in that
changes in
respect.
human
life,
and forms of
life)
and
as formation of
neologisms (denoting
words
(cf.
the
oil,
is
petrol,
and
electric
meaning of a word. As a
them euphemisms
substituting for
Bulakhovsky,
who
etc.34.
the
significance of
and meanings.
32
53
Vendryes, op.
34
Klemensiewicz,
cit.,
op.
pp. 229-230.
cit.,
p.
21
ff.
16
and
development of material
technology,
science,
art
disappearance of
many
changes
with
culture
spiritual
we
in
notice,
the
in
general
character
of
The understanding of
the
and
social
historical
character
let,
it
Even
Breal,
when
"We must
Roman
which
magistrates, wrote:
it is
history.
them well''^^.
Hence he concluded that semantics belongs
to understand
to
historical
disciplines.
words and no
among
peculiarities of syntax
From
35
BynaxoBCKHH, op.
cit.,
112.
37 Ibid., p.
38
p.
88.
256.
les
societes
inferieures.
1953).
17
Linguistics
like to
the
which
at
others^s. I should
issues as that of
character
prelogical
works of such
and
(accusations which, in
understanding)
my
and
Levy-Bruhl
others
were
on a mis-
charged
with
etc.39.
interpretation:
those re-
I refer to
facts
hfe,
It
find
one
is
inadmissible. It
and in particular
contrast
many
to
the
fantastic
is
and correct
his analysis
historical
elements.
It
is
method
in
maintained that
also
sharp
contained
Marr's
39
only by crossing,
DlenflKHH
<t>.
constituted
co4)HH,
in
0u/toco(/)CKiie
MocKBa
vulgarization
1950, p.
janucKu,
148-175.
Bbiu.
in
5,
the
of the
wMnepHajiHCTH-
Service of Imperialist
AH CCCP,
HHCTHxyT
Re-
cJphjio-
18
is
Man's
theory,
many
interesting
and valu-
from the
hypothesis
connecting
development
the
of language-thinking
in
And
such ar-
As
meaning
is
with
all linguists
linguistic laws
ac-
of such de-
velopment.
If
we
again, by
way of example,
in principle the
same
fessional analysis, to be
in
both
met with
in all textbooks,
40 Cf.
B.
and seasoned
languages,
quote
attempted by Vendryes.
many
in
subject,
B. BHHorpaflOB
"CBoSojlHaa
[A Free Discussion
AHCKycciia b 'IlpaBAe'
^aJibHeflraero
in
'Pravda'
no
pasBHTHH co-
on
Linguistic
Jl,.
^uu MbiuiJieHU.H
ii
Pemi, Bun.
81,
MocKsa
1956.
19
Linguistics
from a general to a
meaning
specific
from a
there
is
a transition
when
specific to a general
either are
(e.g.,
when
contains to what
is
meaning of a word
contained, from cause to
the
shifting
from
is
is
shifts
effect,
from what
from
sign
of shiftings,
different
etc.) ..."4i.
This
is
why
numerous
linguistic data^^.
Finally, I should
linguistic
aspect of
analysis,
used in philosophy
a fact
which can
has a
much
to Aristotle).
It
its
sources (although
was
in this context
that Breal
'!
Vendryes, op.
42
cit.,
Klemensiewicz, op.
44
ByjiaxoBCKHH, op.
45
Ullman and
H.
p. 235.
'-^
of S.
the problem
cit.,
cit.,
pp.
p.
49
Kronasser,
10-14.
ff.
will
quoted above.
20
Rfsearch Problems
remedy
against
meanings46.
the
The
danger
of
oi
Semantics
the interpretation
slips in
of Vendryes was
attitude
similar-*?.
He
of
dif-
Bulakhovsky, too,
of eliminating
"There
all
is
it.
are,
science
above
imum
importance.
ed
-to
why
the
(logical)
is
subordinat-
understanding of
is
pre-
served
meaning such as
no additional
in principle evokes
associations.
what are called terms that are such precise ... words, defined
become directly conventional"48.
Thus linguistic semantics appeals for making speech more
precise, which is the main methodological postulate of semantic
analysis. But the linguists also observe the danger entailed in
It is
so as to
overwhelming majority of
meaning
its
is
word
for
the
connection
it.
cases,
its
becomes so
close that
we
fol-
We are so easy-going as to
accept counters
for reality
ideas,
we push
which
into
*o
Breal, op.
'^
Vendryes, op.
cit.,
48
ByjiaxoBCKM,
op.
cil.,
p.
background the
the
143
ff.
pp. 232-233.
cit.,
p.
22.
extra-linguistic ideas
broken our
21
Linguistics
we
need to
satisfy the
feel that
tact
ever abuses
it
which sooner or
That
is
clarity
it,
just
associated with
It is
con-
later
must lead
to
of mind"49.
sterility
of real images
empty verbalism
it
in
mind
in
our
As we have
is
As regards the detailed spheres of interest of hnguistic semanwe have succeeded in distinguishing the following issues:
the nature and the function of the sign how it is that signs mean
something; ambiguity in the form of homonymy and poliseray
tics,
etc.
seems however that they are the principal ones and that to
49 Szober, op.
cit.,
pp. 20-21.
in
our further
Chaptek Two
LOGIC
giving
effect
our intention to
to
by analysis
investigate,
for
it is
We
its
thus
research problems,
come
losophy. This
is
means
we
pursuits
most
why we encounter
with phi-
related
closely
here numerous
difficulties,
is
significant
philosophical
(linguistic)
imphcations.
It
obvious
is
plainly
philosophical
(which
positions
they
the
up
quite
sometimes
state
that
in specific ways.
is
dif-
ferent.
from
we have
to
do with a
is
only
is
involved here
is
an
entire
Now
is
what tends
we disregard
is
to be
an exception in
is
technical fields
of logical
first
semantics
of
calculi,
all,
if
logic
Secondly,
[22]
linguistic
so because,
it
is
so because the
23
Logic
logical
with
as
it
philosophical
definite
were
trends
connection
in a close
within
framework,
their
(also
neo-positivism
is
last
few decades
not only
difficult,
And
yet
that
we can
or
possible,
is
it
from
its
artificial
it
is
about
only thus
worse philosophical
shell;
those
problems have
research
still
we
human knowledge,
and the
it.
if
genetic
may be
which
work
raised that
certain
abstraction
an
of
instead
ex-
by no means neces-
plaining his
method of presenting
his
objective
known argument
must repeat
is
always empirical
The
he
a presentation can, and often must, be the result of the abstraction process already performed.
Of
full
background
which
is
historically
philosophical interpretation.
their philosophical
conditioned
and
their
24
Reverting now,
of the problem,
brief digression,
that
after
it
if
to
the
history
by semantics we mean,
in a
'
flections
on
the
history of philosophy,
we
who
philosophers
various
find
are
of quite
difficulties
specific
not
only
instrument but
an
overcome
to
well.
Far be
it
from
me
of research
object
difficulties in laying
logic
and logic as
ij
an
also
in
was
i^
j;
the
language by logicians.
genous,
and
connected
logic,
and independent
of -
even
needs of mathematics
if
accompanied by
at the
second volume of
time
when
Rus--
contradiction
great mathematician
and
logician,
entire
now
system.
believed
to
Hence
that
have been
write
the greatest innovator in logic since Aristotle, had to
the
"Appendix"
to
his
work
these
sad words:
25
Logic
befall
scientific
his edifice
shaken
work is finished.
"This was the position 1 was placed in by a letter of Mr.
Bertrand Russell, just when the printing of this volume was
the
after
Hearing completion
...
comfort,
if
comfort
it is;
for everybody
who
I.
What
is
question
in
my
have
at least
made
in his
the
same
sets, is in
not just
is
has
particular
way
all''^.
set theory,
sig-
logical
To
now be stated.
"Nobody will wish
a man.
We
(if
classes that
it
do not belong
First, let
falls
it
now
itself,
it
it
is
say
For
it
that
itself. I
fix
extension)
to themselves.
now
us suppose
its
falls
we
will call
belongs to
Let us
is.
we may speak of
itself.
it
class
when
concept
men
is
is.
Thus
if
Writings of Gottlob
Frege,
Oxford 1952,
p.
234.
26
Our
itself.
Secondly,
then
thus
let
falls
it
supposition
first
leads
self-contradiction.
to
itself.
itself,
and
Here once more we likewise arrive
it
itself is,
at a contradiction! "2
paradox achieved
Russell's
came to be formulated in
more or less difficult.
more or
various manners,
Not
less intuitive,
all
it
many
although
fame,
special
mind
that for
shall
must be borne
and "property"
It
"set"
are identical.
be a function,
no man
is
to
be a number,
is
Frege, op.
in greater detail
cit.,
is
The property:
an attribute of
problem of paradoxes
Principia Mathematica,
Vol.
is
1,
92
W. Ackermann, Gnwdziige
F. P.
ff.;
D.
Berlin 1928,
if.
to
itself.
p. 235.
Russell,
it
be a man,
to
be a property
etc.,
Mostow-
pp. 204-222
logiki formalnej
Sciences],
Lwow
Lwow-Warszawa
Warszawa 1949, pp.
More
specialist
works by
S. Lesniewski, L.
L.
[1935],
Chwistek,
pp. 125-
13-19.
27
Logic
"If
normal
we
Thus the
of
sets
all sets is
set
has
W^
W there
any property
W:
be a normal property
{W
elements.
to
(1)
own
not normal.
now examine
"Let us
for
we
sets
is
the set of
all
normal
sets.)
Thus,
the equivalence:
is
WJ ^ {W
the property
a normal property),
is
"Let us
"If
W^
now
is
ask whether
or
is,
W^
is
is
not, a
not an attribute of
W^. Hence by
W^
normal property.
(2)
we
W^
is
to the
(1)
it
W^
is
W
not
is.
Hence by
so that
itself,
infer that
we
W^
infer that
assumption that
it
is
is
W^
an
is
attribute
of
itself.
not.
still
of formula:
"The
From
definition of the
that definition
Mostowski, op.
W^
is
we obtain
h
'*
property
cit.,
Xe W.^i{XeXy,
p. 209.
28
W for the
{p^p')^Bp.p\
letter
it
X,
follows
that
it
is
set
and
In Principia Mathematica,
"all".
ferentiate
Russell
still
...
mathematical and
by F.
Ramsey
P.
linguistic (semantic)
paradoxes; that division was accepted by Russell in the introduction to the second edition of The Principles of Mathematics
(1937).
What
is
like the
adox),
appears
involved
is
no
be
to
sophistic
quibble?
The
problem
trifling
thus
gave
rise
to
Russell's
and
is
tan-
similar par-
the law of the excluded middle and the logical principle of contradiction, that
it,
is
logic as
we know
e.g.,
the
classical
more
so since
antinomy of the
Linguistic
in
logic thus
resulted
Ibid., p. 210.
6 Ibid.,
pp. 315-320.
ji
20
Logic
inate
It
inevitably
an
exposed
word
set
"every", which
a system
enon:
that
too universal,
is
in
which
'too'
but
That
why
is
separate philosophy
chapter,
my
so
difiicult,
logic
as
mentioned above,
these matters.
in
Although
my
philosophy as a
my
so, in
is
it
and
strictly
ing
That
stricto.
it
vestigations.
to
thus intertwine
new
opinion,
more
sist in
is
briUiant in
also
its
is
an object of
than
scientific
was raised
much
earlier
at the very
self-evident that
Ibid., p. 320.
it
As a developed
logical
As a statement
seems almost
trivial.
it is
is
now
But such
in fact a prod-
so simple
is
and
the fate of
30
all
science.
has
a general statement.
The
and
took
analysis of language
(some
different layers
Then
semantic
of investigation.
(di-
let
us not
fall
into error
field
of
re-
a.re
linguistic expressions
thus in
when we speak of
guistic intuition
tics
We
deals, in
it
between
full
agreement with
ical (linguistic)
we
from
histor-
word. This
is
why
it
is
logic,
from semantics
in
of Alfred Tarski.
the'
of
lin-
In such analysis,
in
and
He understands
is
in
full
and
which
(as
example
Logic
31
ing),
tics" is
verbis refers to
expressis
whole of semiotics
the
syntax
(i.e.,
of the term 9.
But
As
let
its
consequences.
is
theoretical
on the
between
tradition of differentiating
we know,
linguistic
The
in
As
logic
possibilities
on that
idea
was presented
issue
in Principia
and the
full-fledged
Mathematica, which
Thus,
tradictions.
A. Tarski,
Foundations for
pt.
was
Scientific
in
semantyki" [On
Laying the
Przeglqd Filozoficzny,
Vol.
39.
50.
p.
1,
it
Towarzystwa Naukowego za
posiedzen Lodzkiego
No.
Vol. 2,
\.
(3),
Lodz
I polrocze
1947,
1947, p.
und philosophische
1892.
'0
Zeitschrift
'1
we read
"It
fiir
Philosophie
Kritik.
&B.
p.
is
negative:
it
Russell, op.
cit.,
Vol.
I,
VH).
32
transition
what
to
the
called
is
simplified
it
intuitive
and brought
manifested
in
theory of semantic
Stanislaw Lesniewski's
cate-
Russells's idea
is
the elements of a
strictly defined
validly only
all
set,
put
To
But
let
"An
they
all
circles in
may
made
observe
at the root
lie
This
paradoxes.
is,
Russell speak
analysis
result
fail to
is
briefly, the
that set
of a vicious
if
all
that restriction,
and
set,
for
himself:
from
The
vicious
contain
means of
defined by
'all
propositions
would seem,
propositions'
12
L. Chwistek,
referred
to
"Antynomie
some already
logiki formalnej"
Vol. 24,
collection.
definite
[Antinomies
1921, pts. 3
and
4,
in
Formal
and Granice
Lesniewski,
"Grundziige eines
neuen
der Grundlagen
Systems
Towarzystwa Naukowego
4-6.
in
"O pod-
Sprawozdania z po-
Warszawskiego, Section
3,
Vol. 23,
1930.
33
Logic
which
cannot do
it
about
new propositions
if
We
propositions'.
'all
statements about
'all
shall, therefore,
ally,
to
total,
we
true,
as
when
these
it
will contain
shall shortly
are
up our
to such as
restricted
see,
In such cases,
a.
necessary to break
it is
each of which
is
capable of a
This
ties
total.
is
may
lection
collection';
total,
it
or,
all
totali-
of a col-
conversely:
'If,
because
it
We
shall
call
assumption of illegitimate
way
totalities
...
'All
propositions'
must
limited before
applies
the
totality
it
fall
outside
of paradoxes
analysis
to
propositional
vi-
We
fallacy at
it
is
"
Whitehead
&
Russell, op.
cil.,
pp. 37-38.
34
we
leads, as
When we
"...
is
its
avoidance
we mean
say
that
ambiguously denotes
'cpjsc'
(pa,
96,
9c
etc.,
that
is
that
'cpx'
say,
values
function
are
of
it is
its
is
already
well-defined.
if it
follows
It
tion
was
while
from
is
to
all its
this
that
its
essence to be ambigu-
etc.,
conversely, as
its
we have
is
by the
vicious-circle principle.
some one of a
hence
function
certain totality,
this totality
vicious-circle principle,
no totahty can
do"i5.
relations
of individuals,
ing
to
contradictions
in the case of
between
individuals,
The "types"
etc.
it
relations
sets
of
between
possible to distinguish
and
paradoxes.
As we already know,
a nonsense, that
5 Ibid.,
pp. 38-39.
Logic
35
is
and
their
however, was not intuitive enough and moreover had for techni-
of reducibility.
It is the so-called
is
that in logic
is
it
it is
nected with that theory, propositional functions (which are equivalents of classes) in
over objects
which there
16
fied
still
more natural
in Stanislaw Les-
The theory of
Bertrand Russell.
in a
at least
is
It is
it
suffices to
it
it
really
can be expressed in
call individuals.
No
adopt classes of
classes of
individuals,
of individuals, etc.
"That is all. It is obvious that here a concept of
classes
sense.
class as
is its
such has no
objects.
Conse-
rejected as
devoid of sense.
me
tek,
in
my work Antynomie
first
time formulated
Chwis-
"
"In
1922
outlined a certain
my
to
speak meaningfully,
me
would have
and which,
to adopt even
if
there
in
deprived,
my
desire
had been
no
3^)
Here too,
theory, stress
gories,
is
laid
on
Since
and
technical
his
we
full
of-
we cannot
at
the
same semantical
category if (I) there is a sentential function which contains
one of these expressions, and if (2) no sentential function which
contains one of these expressions ceases to be a sentential function
if this expression is replaced in it by the other. It follows from
this that the relation of belonging to the same category is reimate formulation: two expressions belong
flective,
to the
of abstraction,
all
two expressions are put into one and the same class
and only if they belong to the same semantical category, and
classes, for
if
is
it
Among
suffices to
the
mention
which
include
respectively
the
names of
as
individuals,
between
antinomies' whatever.
in
My
in-
variables)
a close formal connection with the known 'theories of logical types' as far
its
aspect, rather to
Husser!"
its
Edmund
as in type|
(S.
and
intuitive
parts of
Herr
14).
Logic
37
same category"i8.
to the
order
number
assigned to
is
category. It
if
the
assigned a par-
The same
number of
free variables
tical
is
all
said of
is
semantical type,
to every category
of every seman-
the same.
is
types,
The operation
tical categories.
is
of semantical categories'^.
18
A. Tarski Logic,
19
Semantics,
Oxford 1956
Mathematics,
and
theories,
216.
p.
The introduction
"The
ositional function
which
'if
is
is
it
p.
^cpx''
of which
all
is
'x".
came
and the
XIV)
reads:
merely this
a man, x
is
in:
Given a prop-
are expressions
we can
values of
set
'jr'
in ^(p\
always been
ary
is
difficulties,
and complications,
recognized. In the
it
has
was custom-
is
to
point
38
In any case,
it
may be
in-
retical
was the
mies
first
to differentiate
not
sufficiently
lected in Principia
also admitted
is
Mathematical
two fundamentally
distinct
entirely neg-
is
we
groups, which
and
by Ramsey who
antinomies
theoretical
set
"It is
into
(set theo-
B.
will
fall
call
as follows:
members of
are not
themselves.
(2)
The
relation between
not have
itself to
(3) Burali-Forti's
B. (4)
'I
am
the other.
of the
contradiction
greatest
ordinal.
lying'.
(5)
The
(6)
The
(7)
Richard's contradiction.
(8)
nameable
in
teen syllables.
last indefinable ordinal.
'heterologisch'.
is
of fundamental importance.
which, were no provision
itself.
class
logic or mathematics.
reference to
is
thought, language,
is
or symbolism,
a proposition,
logical or
tlien 9;a is
all
logical,
and
contain some
not a proposition,
39
Logic
may
logic
and language"2o.
uh
intensified
the
theoretical
of logicians
interest
in
conception
this
to
the
is
elimination
of logical
antinomies.
the
difficulties
let
us take a look
disciplines
in
mum
clarity,
liar).
problem from
its
sophistic
shell.
symbol
tence printed
on
from the
top'.
Consider
now
is
20
Ramsey, op.
21
This
is
cit.,
pp. 20-21.
stated explicitly in
An
Inquiry into
Meaning and
Truth,
1951, p. 62.
22
in line 17th
from
top.
London
40
"Having regard
meaning of
to the
symbol
tlie
we can
'c',
establish empirically:
(a) 'c is not
a true sentence^
is
its
names) we
not a
is
c.
up an explanation of type
set
'c is
identical with
a true sentence
is
(2)23
and only
if,
if,
sentence.
true
"The premises
and
(a)
((3)
tion:
c
is
a true sentence
Commenting on
and only
if,
"The source of
in the
scheme
is
why such
we have
an expression which
(2)
if,
Nevertheless,
(...)
no
contains the
itself
rational
ground can
ciple"25.
Weyl's
antinomy:
This antinomy
still
word
the
consisting
heterological, then
it is
is
is
it is
heterological?
"heterological"
when we say
that
no
this
used to
shown
to result
Group
B, which are
may
this distinction,
Here
1910, p. 117).
distinction of
totality is possible is
it
may
I,
1st ed.,
be
sufficient to
from
23
irrelevant elements
sentence", which
24
is:
"x
is
a true sentence
if
and only
is
a true
if /?".
158.
p.
158.
in
Logic
41
of the
predicates
are
'short'
'heterological'
predicate
of
that
it;
first,
is,
If
is
it
meaning
its
not
is
it
is,
is
it,
like
word
the
meaning
a predicate of
made
attempts were
Let us
not a
is
is
word
the
long.
of them,
Now,
its
So we have a complete
heterological.
At
thus
itself;
'long'
heterological.
heterological?
not heterological,
it is
others
autological;
'short',
word
the
adjectives
call
word
adjective
but
short,
is
if
it
is
and therefore
contradiction''^^.
came
It
was
The
bear
is
mind the
difference
is
made
{metalanguage).
classic
in
example here
e.g.
is
being
the dis-
Such a situation may, however, occur within one and the same
language,
to
if
being
fixed
We
meaning,
by
their
lesser
or greater "richness".
Of
course,
(i.e.,
includes
all
26
Ramsey, op.
cit.,
pp. 26-27.
of the
42
and
is
a correct distinction
if
is
made
names
(structural-descrip-
logical expressions27.
If such
is
If
of various
we say
levels
that "c
that sentence
is
is
true
ly
impossible
if
object language
separate. This
"true",
is
when
it
comes
to the
comprehensive
is,
to
we observe
language.
language which in
its
when we use a
the prohibition
metalanguage
if
strict-
too
avoided
that
(names of expressions
and
such
categories
ordinary language.
pressions.
It is universal
and includes
it
is
normal use of
all
exposed to
possible exall
sorts of
dangers, which have been exploited since the time of the Sophists.
Yet what
27 Cf.
in
ordinary language
is
in
Formalized Languages",
A. Tarski, Logic, Semantic, Matliematics, pp. 166, 170-171, 173-174^ 212214, et passim; R. Carnap, Tlie Logical Syntax of Language, pp. 153 ff; and
in
Introduction to Semantics,
3-4.
43
Logic
trick
when
comes
it
to
formahzed
it is
precisely in those
it
But
theories.
an object of study.
The
distinction
more advanced
presses for
teria for
has given
en language, in
its
of a giv-
of the term.
Let us
now
these fields
try to characterize
of research and
it
deals with,
it
nary language
is
is
which
all
these problems
and
interests
dif-
of syntactical
and semantical
The
true
development
strated that
the theory
it
What then
matter?
is
is
and what
is its
subject
44
According to Carnap,
it is
such a
field
of
linguistic research]
in
the
between
expressions^s.
Carnap
Elsewhere,
defines
a theory as
is
only in the kinds and the order of symbols of which those expressions are built29. In such an interpretation, logical syntax
down
establishes
transformation
rules
for
entities,
them.
and formal
logic
gle
logic
(in
sin-
character).
Conceived in
cific calculus.
this
fail
ical,
to
and
come
tactical study
concepts
as,
e.g.,
"sentence
we now
ask,
in
[the
system]
K'\
etc.^o.
tion,
28
R. Carnap, Introduction
29
^0
to Semantics, p. 9.
p.
at the time
45
Logic
saw in
when
and philosophers'
panacaea
to include
not only
stone,
syntax
logical
was made
all
all
that
difficulty
this
of separating
concrete case,
The
is-
I shall also
now
being discussed.
First of
all,
there
is
problems of syntax
When
aspect of language,
adoption of this
that
governed
is,
logic
is
so-called
principle of tolerance^i
choice of rules32.
He
free
later
when from recognizing syntax alone, he passed to a broader theory of semantics. At that period, the basing of syntax
and semantics on the conventionalist principles is to be found
in his Introduction to Semantics^^. The same attitude is no less
sharply marked in Carnap's article of 1950, "Empiricism, Seperiod
perspektive,
31
an idea that
32 Ibid.,
p.
"
is
Cf. pp. 13
and
29.
and
24.
L.
XV
52.
46
'
is
endeavours are
made
to contain within
not only
it
and even
to
was
syntax embrace
the
so-called
at that time
philosophy was
guage,
i.e.,
of syntax, but
all logical
;
from
freed
field
all
logical
let
all
all
pseudo-problems
represented by neo-positivism.
left
Whatever of
it
and
analysis
syntactical
is
philosophy.
idealistic trends in
philosophy,
it
def-
all
also
neo-posi-
.,
{Scheinprobleme),
and
'
and of the
rules
syntax.
close to the
problems of syntax
4;
all,
syntax
come
grammatical interpretation.
is
'Naukowa perspektywa
in
in its
logical
swiata"
[A
Scientific
321-323.
R.
Carnap,
The
pt. 4.
Logical
XIII,
47
Logic
tailed) syntax,
The
formal in nature.
[expressions
names of
relations
between them
(in partic-
The
work on the
translatability
now
be
of con-
crete
ters (a
make
etc.
we can now
see,
not only in formal logic. True, a reading of treatises on the subject (e.g., the
now classical work of Carnap on the logical synmay give rise to doubt as to whether the issues
tax of language)
any practical
and
in particular,
and
care-
fully
I
significance,
my
express here
But
much more
easily
be
moved with
the hand.
Now
that sen-
now
indispensable
in
electric
by way of
48
would be difficult to declare with conviction that research of any kind is useless just because we fail,
for the time being, to see its practical significance and apphcability. In that respect I fully agree with the interesting and correct formulation of the problem by Tarski.
"... I do not wish to deny that the value of a man's work
may be increased by its implications for the research of others
and for practice. But I believe, nevertheless, that it is inimical
to the progress of science to measure the importance of any research exclusively or chiefly in terms of its usefulness and applicability. We know from the history of science that many important results and discoveries have had to wait centuries before they were apphed in any field. And, in my opinion, there
are also other important factors which cannot be disregarded
Hence, I beheve,
in determining the value of scientific work
and applications,
it
. .
intellectual satisfac-
who
stand
I
to
it
think that
under-
it"37.
we should endorse
that opinion
when
passing
of two factors.
First,
is
not
it
sufficient, that it
pursuits.
Such
syntax alone
logical
scientifically
for philo-
why
at least a certain
branch
after
L.
M. Kokoszynska, "Logiczna
sktadnia j^zyka,
semantyka
Knowledge],
in:
pt.
1.
logika
Logic
of
49
Logic
(in
shown
accordance with
its
definition)
without
in
metatheoretical
the
research
morphology
of
syntax from
logic,
and has removed from many issues the brand of "pseudoproblems". In any case, there came a full development of the
study of problems of truth, denotation and meaning. Carnap
introduced corrections to his former ideas expressed in llw
tax,
tics
tensional character
modal
logic^o,
nominaMst
More
logic
of meaning
is
super-
fluous'"^^.
thesis
detailed
analysis
which
sign,
will discuss
meaning and
As
i.e.,
this is neither
the
task
of this book nor the subjects matter of our analysis. The reader
39
R. Carnap, Introduction
40
41 Cf.
to Semantics, p. 249.
50
who
is
quoted above
all
is
Introduction to Semantics
>;
sity.
The
domain of purely
ties
made
has
on the
"decree'"
character of research
sion
relations
linguistic enti-
is
of one's
world.
a breach in that
of models
is
The theory
philosophically
important since
it
raises
the
problem of
is
the
object spoken about, the object which exists not only outside
apparatus of language
is
is,
it
The conceptual
As
as
indicated above,
is
shall
will
be
42 J.
Logic,
Vol. 2; by the
Systems", in Fundamenta Mathematicae, 1952, Vol. 39; H. Rasiowa, "Algebraic Models of Axiomatic Theories", in Fundamenta Mahtematicae, 1955,
'
Logic
in
discussed
51
The
starting
point
is
difficult in
least intuitive.
its
Suszko;
models
an
is
which
is
and the
is
meaningful with
may speak
in a given language,
is
model,
i.e.,
ref-
which one
model
set
consists ot
two parts
of individuals which
may
model,
that
characteristic of the
to
an element of the
is
represented by a constant
same type and about which one can speak in the given language.
But, as Suszko points out, the problem should be viewed from
another angle as well: there
Vol. 41;
is
Semantical
Reference",
in
1936, pt.
I.
52
Among them we
all
group and
its
struc-
distinguish
social
activity)
"We
stances
is
to the family
language
/,
RMAt{J)
(i.e.,
to
A.
S.).
We
is
t)
human
group, of
J,
As
that
the
is
through sensory
model becomes
better
is
with the theory of models. These ideas are closely connected with
the philosophical interpretation
in the following chapter.
of semantics, to
be discussed
Chapter Three
SEMANTIC PHILOSOPHY
is
pithy,
am
St.
John's
tempted to think
(Bertrand Russell:
TfflS
Human Knowledge)
it
was addressed
speciahzed disciplines,
raises
in prin-
by the various
semantics in
As
in
contemporary
is
not only
if
sense of the word) are connected with definite problems of specialized disciphnes
and
for the
first
most
closely
Not
scientific discoveries.
such has
alone
is
[53]
54
of
the
Lwow- Warsaw
I shall
do
my
thesis.
it
various shades.
admit that
its
in
so
much
ophy.
in agreement with
My
thesis is thus
my own
contemporary semantics.
is
spir-
fathers of that
His
understanding
of such
matters
sig-
nificant.
in recognizing language to
conflict
between
to the inter-
It is
to
its
all
my
intention
book we
may
it
is
not
first
of aU
more so
do not want
as I have already
I principally
my
to discuss in too
much
had an opportunity
detail,
to present
mean
55
Semantic Philosophy
so full of political
and
to
an epoch. That
my
now under
is
why
and
is
affirm that
here written.
consider
should like
I believe
manner of
that criticism.
First of aU, in
my
criti-
is
it
is
it
should not be
to attaching labels,
itself
presentation
of opinions
under discussion.
it is,
There
are,
however,
other,
more
of
criticism. First
me
subtle,
all,
requirements as
explain that
more
literature
fully.
that
must disarm and annihilate the opponent; to recognize that some of the views of
that opponent might be correct was tantamount to "objectivism", which distorted analysis, and to succumbing to academic
if criticism is
to be ideologically engaged
it
vices.
heavily
way
views only what was false, passing over in silence what was true,
Warszawa
1952.
56
overhelmed.
there
is
no
It is
difficulty in
if
tion
is
ples
and
this
easy triumph.
will
It
is
critic's
who
how
if it is
of science.
is
It
is
mo-
simply not
to hold
But
in
reality,
matters
signifi-
even
anti-scientific (an
57
Semantic Philosophy
on the problem
solution.
well
is
And
itself is
where
pecially in philosophy,
of opponents. This
errors
is
positive
its
can be no monopoly
at all, es-
on the
how new
problems, stimulating
Does
it
its credit.
is
to be weakened,
be
The point
least.
is
adherence
properly:
is
to be aban-
ideological
principles
to perform
its
is
not to be a
proper task,
it
rite for
interest
the effectiveness
who
are
To
i.e.,
may
all,
to convince those
say
and
final verification
little,
is
usually impossible,
means very
stick to his
all,
of theses
own
in the
and
its
place
solution as in error
it
it is
ability to
The
in-
has been, in
my
criti-
But
let
us
come back
to the point.
58
we cannot
tics
separate
its
from the
is
attitude.
We
might
that now.
What
I call
is,
all
those philosoph-
ical
its
thesis that
language and
and ultimately
this
its
logic,
may
be
is consistently complemented
from neo-positivism, that language is the
most important
my
research problems).
role
my
am
philosophy
positivism,
Circle,
since
was the
interested.
its
influence,
especially
will also
shall confine
problems
of the Vienna
in
which we are
more or
less
69
Semantic Philosophy
P
1.
first
under the
significant title
"What, then,
philosophy? Well,
Philosophy":
in
it
is
down
itself
not
now
itself
it
can be
a science.
It is
teristic
it is
it
and that
is
it is
must
the charac-
ophy
is
is
an
asserted
activity
or
explained.
and
with this
issue,
sets
ing,
ing
method which can be characterized most briefly as consistof a logical analysis of theorems and concepts of empirical
science ..."3
Vol.
Vol.
M.
Schlick,
in Erkenntnis,
1930-193L
in Erkenntnis,
1930-1931,
1.
1.
R. Carnap, "Die
alte
60
programme.
few years
after
syntax of language:
"Philosophy
is
is
that
of the language of
is
science"'^.
necessary
ever
for
trivial
considerations.
future
According to one of
its
variations, reality
is
tantamount to com-
immanent
That attitude
leads,
in
its
logical consequences,
is
to
solipsism.
given in cognition
is disre-
recollection.
that
a theory
which
limits
one's
an external
of subjective ideahsm.
tions of that trend
It is
comes
The point
p.
Xm.
61
Semantic Philosophy
of consequence
is
leads to solipsism,
that this
and that a
man was
also,
it in an
was
Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the
exphcit way. That man
spiritual
set aside
my
undertaking,
few words
marked
particularly
in the
character of
logical empiricism. I
of semantic philosophy,
empiricism
its
which was
for the
must now
deal, in a
the
of neo-positivism.
fathers
Abrogating
empiricism.
strictly
mean
here
speaking the
Empiricism, in particular in
its
The
inner experience.
classical
of empiricism were
interpretation
moment when,
interprets experi-
it
representatives of that
Hume and
Berkeley.
It
is
their
Rehmke,
The
ideas.
immanentists,
who
Schubert-Soldern,
forms of immanentism,
neo-positivism.
icism,
in
latter
The
last
particular
to
and
others),
(e.g.,
"pure"
Schuppe,
"shy"
such as empiriocriticism
and,
named
empiriocrit-
directly
Mach's
refers
doctrine
to
lately,
of elements,
i.e.,
tion
programme
retrospective
by
held
its
views
founders
Wissenschaftliche
of
the
origin
and outstanding
of neo-positivism
representatives
as
all
62
these
looked
further
still
Russell criticized
as
that
tences, to
it
its
all
to
Machism^. Neo-positivism
Hume and
Berkeley,
may, the
which
the edifice
back,
Be
insufficiently.
of protocol sen-
doctrine
neo-positivist
our knowledge
also
although
is
elementary
of cognition,
is
empiricism.
From
it
might by
who
all
for the
inter-
most
who wanted
what
is,
in
my
bordering on solipsism.
Empiricism, which refers to the positions of clock hands and
of measuring
recordings
verifiabihty
based on
it,
of
human
must be
instruments,
controllability
and
and
to
is
alluring to representatvies
if it
makes
it
possible to be
enology
man who
And
yet Engels
Semantic Philosophy
when
it
construction. This
for
tivists,
Little
elements
all
is
their
would have
or
anti-metaphysical
against the
directed
the neo-posi-
criticism
Koordinationsreihe,
and Empiriocriticism,
to
declarations.
added to the
to be
is
what happened
precisely
Avenarius's
nin's Materialism
treatise
63
of Mach's
contained in
Le-
radically subjective,
neo-positivist
who
it
Circle, subjectively
all
reliability
indecision arising
all
in
and pseudo-problems.
7 I
think that
it is
all, it
was
they
all
tra-
their
precisely
not under-
and neo-positivists in
he
is
is
an
Marxism and
is
of the
members of
It is
that
64
them
in fact, this
was again an
analysis, a
new
offer
of subjective
version of ideahsm
scientific
new
reflected in the
name of
original
the
is
is
and
its
such a philos-
is
ophy of language which is genetically and organically connected with immanent empiricism. As such it has developed
as a variation of subjective idealism.
its
role
and place
had been
prelin-
logistic.
not only with the problem of antinomies and the related problem
in
elementary
(atomic
p.
332.
65
Semantic Philosophy
all
knowledge 9,
disciple,
to them,
as
solipsism
between English
logistic
By coming thus
to Wittgenstein,
we have reached
the essential
His Tractatus
is
certainly
manner of
exposition,
accompanied by claims to
precision.
It is
whose intention
to eliminate
is
all
metaphysics
is
in fact the
we
is
is
science;
meaningless metaphysics.
Many
years later,
late sentences
it is
full
solidarity
it is
is
limited
by the
totality
of objects.
tions.
5.6
The
limits
A. N. Whitehead
and
Compare
XVI
my
& B.
language
mean
the limits of
my
world.
1,
Cam-
flF.
Its Philosophy,
1
of
pp. 31
Frank
in
his
Modern Science
ff.
66
5.61 Logic
limits
its
fills
...
erately
acquires
is
it
is
is
his
my
the hmit of
world, since
tell
us that
my
language
that which
we can
thought
is
my
world,
on sohpsism.
is
a truth.
be
said,
but
it
shows
is
my
5.63 I
5.64
my
am my
it
cannot
itself in
language which
understand)
mean
world.
5.621
world, shows
the limits of
is
itself.
life
are
one.
...
strictly carried
out coincides
we can
is
talk of a non-psychological
The / occurs
is
my
in philosophy
/.
through the
world'.
The philosophical
'2
it.
is
human body
London
1933.
Semantic Philosophy
or the
67
who
Is there
objects
limits
of the world.
On
courage
frightened
epoch of
by the spectre of
brilliant
positivists did
solipsism.
In continuing
Russell's
of that sohpsism
limits
is
The
essential sense
to
play
of
all,
is
of thoughts.
Philosophy
13
Ibid.
in
is
activity.
68
philosophical
The
work
consists
essentially
of elucidations.
number of
'philosophical
propositions', but to
which otherwise
He
are, as
it
also says:
the thoughts
Mauthner's
is
'critique
is
to have
shown
that
its
real form"i5.
from
it
being thereby
it
made of
what transcends those hmits was considered by him to be unsense, and consequently a pseudo-probFinally, everything
lem.
"4.003
Most
propositions
We
Most
all,
but
we do not under-
more or
And
so
less identical
it is
Good
Ibid.
Semantic Philosophy
"6.522 There
is
it
is
69
itself;
the mystical.
The
6.53
right
i.e.,
this.
To
say
i.e.,
else
him
he
that he
correct method"i8.
So much for Wittgenstein's philosophy. The numerous quoabove correspond to the importance of his phi-
tations given
Now
let
us see
and developed by
illustrations
itative
how
his ideas
given by
delving
positivists
language
plicitly
is
And
in ex-
(logical)
fection.
What
an interpretation
neo-positivism?
18 Ibid.
19 Apart from the reminiscences referred to above those of Frank
and von Mises and the work of Reichenbach, the following books pertain
to the issue
now under
discussion:
J.
ical
2,
J.
R. Weinberg,
An Exam-
70
is
Even
in Der
lated,
Vienna
Circle,
Carnap formu-
Basing himself on
solipsism.
and
Carnap
The theory
Russell's theory,
affirms that
basic ideas.
The
conception
is
latter
joined
'that
is
compound
and
linguistic
identical
(and in
given".
which
is
maintains that
his
all
conception
neutral
in
the
"materialism
versus
linguistic in
purely
is
concepts, that
is,
at the
same
ships
...
The view
to sohpsism
that which
is
given,
is
my
experience,
is
common
consti-
all
is,
manner. In the
same applies
21
Ibid., p. 249.
p.
3.
to the
Semantic Philosophy
71
of
this
my
interpretation,
my
'the
ticular significance.
all state-
tions
neo-positivists,
"atomic
Now
first
step
positivist interpretation,
the
same
direction,
By making a
further step in
left
to convention.
make
sentences, to
is
to explain
came
ideas consequently
to
In taking
and others
(as
replacement of
all
22
C. G. Hempel,
"On
No.
I shall
72
al-
ready been cited above. These ideas have been repeated hundreds
of times in neo-positivist
cept that
what
literature, as
in philosophy
is
The
latter
divided
He
The
theoretical
all
exclusive
pertain to the
domain of empirical
form of expressions
proper content of
scientific
traditionally covered
field
logical.
under investigation
disciplines.
The
latter
(their
by philosophy
is
metaphysical unsense
translatability
i.e.,
which makes
to
eliminate
it
sentences
human
we
it,
fact, is the
only object
study).
a theory
is
a transposed
mode
word
of speech.
(or a sentence)
No
into
the
2^
is
sciences"24.
meaningless.
24 Ibid., p.
313.
more
generally,
p.
309.
73
Semantic Phtlosophy
"In
the
field
namely that
result,
be clearly seen
It will
how
is
we began with
simply meaning-
is
less.
that nothing
I
istic theses,
since
it is
obviously
resulting
studied
in the appraisal
the assertion
in
philosophy.
and refutation of
trivial
ideal-
statements
is-
The
(the theory
ments
is
case of philosophy. It
is
fact that
depends.
It
is
acter of a certain
in the eyes
of an
idealist.
On
idealistic char-
the contrary,
it is
view
when
to
it
comes
idealist
to a situation in
is
(logical empiricism).
25
That trend,
like
Machism before
it,
pro-
1,
p. 220.
74
claims
its
ism,
by writing
ity
Now
ideal-
physical unsense.
and
its
which
itself
to include the
is
whole of
classical philosophical
problems,
(Russell
when
physics,
own
one's
Why
philosophical attitude
is
based on the
No
less
language
is
is
And
such
immanent empiricism
is
combined with a
leads,
specific
As
at once,
mean
I
do
even should we
much
many
anti-metaphysical
bringing to light of
sumptions
case.
is
much
its
easier
and
at the
same time
idealistic
as-
decisive in our
me
to choose Russell's
words
Semantic Philosophy
this chapter,
75
my
Inquiry into
prompt
section.
In his
An
tailed analysis
He
and wrote
"When
is
is
shining', I
tradiction; I
is
simple fact,
fit
my
dinner, I
do not want
ence
what
of food.
I
go into
words to
is
balist theories
my
less
convenient.
The
ver-
a neo-neo-Platonic mysticism.
the beginning
word means'.
It is
lose themselves in
remarkable that
and
the attempt
to
meta-
be ultra-empir-
icar26^
I
this appraisal.
guage which we analyse. But the problem of the origin of that lan-
guage and of
its
problem
26 B.
148-149
is
Russell.
(italics
An
A.
S.).
76
'
room
we may learn something about actual realmapped by that language. I have said explicitly that
interpretation might be such had we not dotted the fs and
the
is
crossed the
sible
I therefore
the
?'s
and
its
pos-
?'s
all
the
/'s
that frees us
from
all
all
manner
is
the only object of philosophical analysis, but also that that language
is
chosen or created by us
in
it
is
is
accessible to us
As we
shall see,
of
is
also changed,
idealistic
philosophy.
own
ideas),
solip-
sism.
2.
is
that language
consequently,
arbitrarily
is
when choosing
this
or that language,
we may
when accompanied by
formed
in
its
sequel,
affirming
is
of the world, and not only that there are different images of the
77
Semantic Philosophy
is
images
closed
no connection whatever.
of that
that
is
what
is
what
form of
strange
concerned here,
naive and
trivial,
is
their origin,
ideaUsm.
linguistic
is
af-
it
investigation.
is
Without
by what we
refuted
whom
And
it is
the
very
known what,
well
what
is
is
is
also well
it
meant by "to
is
well
different languages
known
can
and resolution of
known what
is
meant by the
Was
Moreover, the
temptation
to
There
sources.
of more or
(the
exist
less arbitrary
"language"
we
of flags
disregard the
we can
speech,
used
by
subtle
this sense,
represents a "language"
Does
ships),
ciphers,
the gesture
"language of flowers",
distinction
etc.
communication. In
vention.
etc.
lems in a similar
my
exist
is
human
which
is
78
uial
much
guages have
It is
and
not
my
in
common
with
ones?
artificial
differences
languages. Such
artificial
of which
is
an immense problem
now,
since
on
aspects
will
is,
reality
some
in itself,
in
my
opinion
puts
it
issue.
all
artificial
and
it
the comparisons
artificial
and
is
prehensible.
are based
on
is
why, for
all
the analogies
and
similarities
human communi-
in
sions
error,
in
well exist
precisely
without
because
artificial
natural
ones,
languages
whereas the
is
basically
can
perfectly
latter
must be
based on the fonner and as such shine with reflected light only.
We
reality
of
e.g.,
the
may
somehow
it
we have
at that.
We may
natural languages.
to
from the
a
issue
conclusion,
We
do with products of
we may
abstract
however,
is
Semantic Philosophy
Carnap,
genstein,
By reasoning
which
my
in
and
others)
and
71)
conventionalists.
radical
in
opinion,
lies at
ception of language.
The
cognition
scientific
is
is
no
is
is free,
made by a
given individual
is
conditioned psy-
chologically28.
That conventionalist
the
ism,
more
so
thesis
by the
neo-positivists
tolerance
and of
logic.
up
his
own
All that
27
is
logic,
i.e.,
his
required of him
own form of
is
that, if
is
at liberty to build
language, as he wishes.
he wishes to discuss
it,
he
el
et
E.
in
Revue de Metaphysique
80
must
state his
methods
clearly,
rules instead
of philosophical arguments"29.
That principle of
arbitrarily
own
all
the
its
is
was brought
by neo-posi-
mean
in
radical
into a
only
the
is
subject
in a sense
intro-
problem
in question.
such a solution
alone, but their
we
it
is
my
intention to
make
that thesis
radical.
combine
to
all the
and
29.
p.
52
XV
Semantic Philosophy
81
which
apparatus,
ceptual
We
make mappings of
will
world"^o,
Ajdukiewicz's view,
certainly
by the neo-positivist
supporters of semantic philosophy. But Ajdukiewicz was not
alone in his opinions which fitted Carnap's principle of tolerance
did not
and,
fail
the theories of C. G.
e.g.,
HempePi.
is
is
how Carnap
This
is
"The
that
is
is
From
this
it
follows that
tally diverse
30
is
the
included
sciences.
in
Erkennt-
Views], in
Mysl
Filozoficzna,
by
1953,
Prof.
A.
No. 2
SchaflF
On My
Philosoph-
(8).
''1
^2
See
e.g.,
R.
Camap,
"Die
physikalische
Sprache
als
3.
Universal-
"Soziologie
33
R.
Camap,
Tiie
82
Hence
their tendency to
of the exact sciences, hence, too, their hking for physics and
its
on sociology as a branch of physics). There is no doubt that physicahsm was a manifestation of the yearnings of naturalists.
But
this
is
conventionalist
from
its
inception,
it
science
unified
to
some form of
epistemological realism.
minimum
be confined to a
For
^4
Camap
My
many
statements
"The
says that
thesis
will
language
in the
will
of examples.
versal language,
language of physics
partial
is
a uni-
i.e.,
tlie
events,
ted".
do
so,
he might also
if
call
it
'materialist'.
No
objections
may
be raised
between early
But somewhat
earlier
thesis
as 'methodological materialism'.
that
we have
sibility
here to
do with
non-existence')
and not
of what
theses
which exclusively
derivative theses,
spirit:
is
to
some
'given',
a logical pos-
refer to
transformations and
of deducing
'reality'
or 'non-reality' ('existence' or
what
"psychic",
is
what
is
"physical"'.
83
Semantic Philosophy
Moritz Schlick,
who was
supporter
his
its
epistemological foun-
dations.
"The
mean any
is
e.g.,
reality,
rather a
it is
construction, as,
not any distinct properties of real things, but always merely a manner of presenting
them by means of
ideas"35.
precisely
trick,
that
direction
and transforming
problem.
Carnap wrote:
"It is easy to
and the
thesis
both
see that
on the unity of
(i.e.,
science
A.
S.)
thesis,
syntax
And the
syntax may
The
and
its
theories.
form.
35
M.
36
320.
27 i.
84
its
sentences
as between themselves.
is
always an object of
else.
if
it
ahsm
and
all
main
As
theses.
doubt. Philosoph-
these are
do not intend
that would above all require
so-
its
of
It
done.
word by way of
conclusion.
My
conventionahst thesis on the arbitrary character of natural languages, treated in abstraction from reality and from thinking
that reflects that reality, does not in the least
all
mean
K. Ajdukiewicz). Comparative
pological studies
in that respect,
(Sapir,
linguistic
reservations.
and anthro-
no philosophical
IV.
that I negate
Neurath^ op.
cit.,
p. 403.
book (Chapter
Semantic PhilosophV
{^5
One of
the
weak
is
Ayer
at
e.g.,
the theory
opinions either of
such
all neo-positivists
or of some of them.
And
modify
their views
present-day opinions.
It is
obvious that a
critic
may
trends
their
as far as I
it
to-day, at least in
investigates a
its
phenomenon
much
original form.
The
is
It is
is
who
under
theory in general.
researcher
and not
in that
is
just
what
intend to do now.
more
realist views.
86
certain duality
and
was inherent
vacillation
in the theory
was
But
if
ability
we compare
it
work Die
was a position
quite univocal. It
as I have described
it
above.
to
of semantic philosophy,
we
shall
not
fail
certain concepts
The same
tivism,
A.
J.
Ayer,
if
we compare
expounder
of neo-posi-
such as Lan-
its
is
an exclusive recognition of
and
logical
From
the philosophical
spite
of lack of con-
and the
the problem of an objec-
stricto,
philosophy.
if
is
is
seman-
circle
of formal
lin-
Semantic Philosophy
87
of philosophical inves-
tigations.
is
It
In semantics, they
of models which, as already mentioned, gives a theoretical generalization to the thesis that language
models,
i.e.,
a mapping of some of
is
may
expressions.
of considerable
is
one of
philosophical
its
its
as part of the
instruments, but
an
as
significance
it
is
also
expression
would be
difficult
one
now how
to say
more
may be accompanied by
field
now
My
duty
separate mention
is
due here to
show
draw
to
attention
their trend.
semiotic, a product of
Occam
{scientia
Stoics,
sermocinalis),
(characteristica
pragmatism and
behaviour.
tic,
its
mean
universalis),
here above
all
the
on human
signs arose
38
Ch.
pp. 285
flf.
from the
W.
interest
shown
in syntax
and semantics
New York
1946,
88
lems of language.
trends in philosophy.
version of semiotic
Morris
ideas. Charles
which,
semiotic
is
now
the best
known
representative of
in
signs
is
As a
capital
P.
the
syntactic,
is,
the process
component
parts.
of Philosophy with a
Morris wrote:
of
human
activities
activity
and
the activities
to fulfil
and
their
interrelationship,
since
all
these
which mediate
its
human
own
it
is
activity
89
Semantic Philosophy
that
is,
It
proclaim
philosophical neutrahty:
its
"Semiotic
ticular philosophy.
on nor
science of signs
necessarily
imphes a par-
'naturalistic'
and a
'supernaturalistic'
and prescriptions
In
verified
form one's
theless
since
decides
religion.
scientifically
it
it
tematization
...
will
This
ogical
is
is
and terminol-
more
reaUst attitude,
is
coming
made
Reference might be
much
do
his
of language.
paragraphs
article
still
clearer
in
when
comes
it
is
The last-named
issue
is
of especial
interest.
Yet Morris's
views on the essence of signs and on semiosis will not be presented here, since they are discussed in greater detail in the second
part of this book, where the process of
Ch.
W.
Ch.
W.
human communication
come
to the forefront.
tional Encyclopedia
in that process
in
Interna-
Chapter Four
GENERAL SEMANTICS
article
"It is
is
a sober and
discipline
conflicts.
Nor
not
It is
difiicult to
is
speaking nonsense"!
who
guess
spirit
is
band";
it
is
Korzybski,
unknown
my
hus-
and actions of
blockages;
many
much quoted
in
alleviate different
'emotional
in
Poland:
disturbances',
semantoincluding
extent
from the
and
the Philosophv
p. 17.
[90]
...";
reprinted
in
General Semantics
known
"It is well
as
some
that
91
and
'sex' disorders,
such
some
alcohoHsm,
etc.,
and therefore neuro-semantic and neuro-linguistic oriIn general semantic training we do not go into the medical
genic,
gin.
angle as such.
and
in
We
Knowing
I
is
word
use the
work
willing to
at himself seriously"2.
of semantics,
tives
can
easily
advisedly
on reading
must be said that Alfred Korzybski also emphasized the difference between former semantics and what he
In fairness,
it
"There
is
tions
to
living
environments"^.
One cannot
fail
Ibid., p.
A. Korzybski's book
p. VIl.
X.
general semantics. It
is
is
recommend
three ex-
92
circles
classing
same
intellectual current. In
any
case,
we cannot
tics,
which
eral
is
representatives
seman-
identify
most
radical
a psychotherapeutic technique.
is
se-
mantics and general semantics, but they are superficial and confined rather to points of formal influence. In fact,
we have
to
do with trends and opinions that are not only different one from
another but often opposing one another, especially if the attitudes of their exponents are taken into consideration. That
why
Marxist
literature,
on
is
There
is
is
extremely embarrassing.
no doubt that
this state
of
affairs is
review
is
is
correct
in error, ridiculous
and
to disregard
what
does not
fit
is
the
apparent. Ignorance
losses
we
"What
Is
Meant
General Semantics
93
I
and painful: we lose a certain amount of knowledge acquired
by mankind and, sometimes still more important, valuable stimuli to creative analyses. Books can be read in two ways. First
in search of
wrong and stupid in them, "prey" for critthe manner of reading typical of those who
what
icism this
is
is
work
it
many
reject
our practices,
when
v^e discuss
we
all
see
crit-
and sometimes cannot overcome an embarrassing susmany cases that criticism has been marked by
picion that in
many
all,
semanis
only
is
those
difficult
who
none of
is
book which, on the contrary, I hold to be, apart from all its
other defects, morbid and marked by monomania. But the criticism of
its
it
essential errors
and has
been at
fault
it
problems
94
it
discusses. It
and Sanity
vastly
is
is
an obscure work of a
different
concepts
it
and
dilettante, eclectically
unceremoniously
is
amassing
assimilating
it
has been
what
is
correct in
it is
old,
others?
There
is
When
that
is
it
is
the
cel-
"The
accusations
of cultism
leveled
against
Korzybski's
fs
Many
of
'movements' and
panacea to beheve
cults.
They
in.
Books programme as for dianetics. And so insome of them among the adherents of general
General Semantics
semantics
...
95
actually
helped
by general
sufficient
faith,
movement with
its
own
all
cult.
the
This
of
characteristics
is
confirmed by the
realistic critic
of
book
an obscure
work of a dilettante and that, contrary to declarations, it is in
no way a result of empirical research. And then he concludes:
Rapoport
that "sect".
is
this role,
important.
He
is
not
He
the
is
men
are
all
"that
He
not important.
way a member of the sect replaces a rationally thinkman! A very instructive phenomenon for an understanding of what is general semantics, and for ascertaining the secret
of its social successes in the 1930s, when the birth of Nazism was
In this
ing
accompanied by growing
of propaganda
conception.
ideas, since
A. Rapoport, "What
6 Ibid., p.
deliberately
refer
here to
Korzybski's
17
(italics
Is
A.
Semantics?",
S.).
p. 6.
96
and that of at
least
some of his
The
continuators.
latter I
not only
Their opinions and activity account for the fact that general
semantics
may
real
problems which
I shall
now
it
has raised.
He
semantic and
to
neuro-hnguistic reactions of
"environment"
semantic
above).
(see
human
individuals
Rapoport defined
it
calls
pragmatics.
is
we have
above
all
a psychothera-
The
on which he based
theoretical assumptions
his
ideas
were as follows.
The
a general theory of
first
books.
From
man and
ogy of
life,
of the pathol-
signs.
fact.
rational
Korzybski's conception
is
tion
plines.
And
the
main
idea, to
be observed in
and you
and
will
all his
social pathology
be saved!"
4.
New York
1921.
is
explana-
semanto-
General Semantics
The
the
recipe to be used
obsolete
is
a system which
i.e.,
jects the
tic
system of language in
(two-valued)
Aristotelian
97
all evil,
re-
will disappear
at
once.
Of
somewhat exaggerated.
The problem of the role of symbol in social life was drawn
by Korzybski from many sources, above all from behaviourism
and the Pavlovian theory (Korzybski considered his theory to be
course, his idea, as formulated here,
is
technique set
That conception
is
of
in.
is
are
ideas
in
it is
no way
completely
mystified.
language system. The existing system of language which Korzybski calls Aristotelian (his
more reasonable
followers, e.g., S.
I.
On the contrary,
a non-Aristot-
whatever),
is
ideas taken
logic
flings
said to have
an
infinite scale
common
into
is
any system
many-valued
manner
fit
of appraisals. The
his theory of
"colloidal",
new
applications.
justi-
98
But
new
this is
First of
all,
"The word
hibited.
On
we
learn
details
is
we say "This
is
a table"
we can
we are
for identification
is
is
pro-
it
when
word with
level"
positivists.
normal
man
identifies the
and the
suggests,
it
word with
becomes a
No
caricature.
manner he
is
not a ta-
invented by
differential"
The second
of shamanism^
Korzybski, savours
map
not
is
The
tive.
istic",
plete
is
a'
territory",
fully representa-
said to be "elemental-
and
absolute.
And
is
"non-
Gestaljz-
psychologie.
Finally,
the
third
is
principle
is
map
affirms
"multi-ordinality"
map
the
we must
is
level
of abstraction
we
are.
We
find
no
by Russell's the-
article
is
given by
and Philosophy,
New York
1949.
in
Max
his
Black in the
book Language
General Semantics
99
who
is
mentally der-
is
to
to
consolidate the
its
relation to
This
sum of
the
new structure
human behaviour.
social health;
hence the
supposed to increase
is
title
of the book
Science
and Sanity.
Korzybski also made a number of concrete proposals intended to modify language by imparting to
it
a "non-Aristotelian"
structure.
First of
eral
nouns
all;
in order to
if
we
say
we
shall
social
phenomenon
as racial hatred.
etc.
with the
word
"etc.", in order to
we never
looking
title
semantics:
Finally,
achieve
full
ETC).
Korzybski recommends the use of quotation marks
to indicate that
we
dissociate ourselves
of certain words.
As a remedy, Korzybski recommends exercises with an instrument he has designed and called a "structural differential";
100
make
word
that the
is
words occupy
that
Does
different
brief
this
is
new,
is
correct,
is
it
refers,
first,
and, secondly,
of abstraction.
levels
summary confirm
in Korzybski's theory
what
is
known; and
in error?
it
may be
that in
some
cases
may
help.
But that
is
a separate
issue.
sense to be
thrown
in the dustbin? Is
it
would appear
from many Marxist publications? I am not at all sure.
For all its oddity and its simply maniacal traits, Korzybski's
mystification dictated
by
class considerations, as
It
may be
that that
light-
in
made
it
who
are
Malinowski, P.
scientists,
W. Bridgman,
it
me
also
There
is
no doubt
that
all
is
sometimes a hard
critic.
marked by ascribing
would
when
it
comes to
social issues
which Korzyb-
in terms
For
problems of Com-
of neuro-semantic
reactions to
definite signalsio.
his
at-
101
'
General Semantics
critics,
perform
That idea
reality.
is
its
it
if reflects
cam-
paign in favour of
J.
Lee, S.
I.
word
primitive
the
its
own
word
as as-
similar, structure,
one who
will reflect
upon
cannot
miss
semantic
the
point
that
and ultimately a
-
10
11
It
the
scientific
method
pathological,
order" 12.
his later
work,
102
is
of secondary impor-
fit
The more so
formulations.
The more
conception.
and hackneyed
at the very
have been
"The
behaviour
is
and
we run
ship,
reality, be-
this relation-
'13
Why, even
"What
the picture
One
on producing a
"best-
same:
is
to
get.
is
may be wrong;
better
his
judgments
by happenings
is
judgments may
err.
in the
is
his skuir'i4.
"Good language
things behind the
of the world
we
names
live in.
ty
W. Johnson,
14
S.
People
will help us to
Good
in
language
Quandaries,
will help us to
New York
p.
206.
1946. p.
communi-
113.
General Semantics
cate with
now we speak
is
reasonable! Contrary to
and
to
expecta-
That
made
all
tions, these
tivists
103
conform
And what
evaluations
all
to be
that
Korzybski,
static, inter-
is
fact
argumentation of at
too,
is
least
of language, Korzybski
"It is impossible,
and to formulate
at the
is
an
(i.e.,
which would be
third' as
acter
to
it is
The
sometimes
is
this
'logic'
S.)oo-
A.
structurally
it
must be
never appli-
establishes,
'logic',
non-Aristotehan
cable to processes.
to the tra-
ditional formulation
as
and
general
what
must
principle,
be unsatisfactory" 16.
is
still
ahead of
us.
and
Now
my opinion he is
am even inclined to
in
Korzybski
between
refers
his ideas
and
to a certain ex-
believe that
Ko-
system i''.
15
Ibid., p. 361.
17 Ibid.,
pp. 315-316.
p. 405.
104
"My
to a
structural,
linguistic,
each other
man
the application to
leads
theoretical revision
non-el.,
reinforce
reflexes.
The
and support
is
researches"i8.
I
minology he
is
If that
uses.
striking in
is
But even
itself.
if
problem remains
influence, the
more so
The point
intricate.
ter-
is
that the
human behaviour
per-
The
at stake there, is
comes
precisely
work the
real
is
words. If
is
we
level
"How
how words
Hayakawa,
on
the
outer
of his
affect those who use them" (S.
book, put it in slogan form: "How men use words and words
in the following
way:
use men".).
Thus,
Korzybski's idea
is
concerned with
many
This
is still
followers
in
more
the
school
of general
is
is
some of Korzybski's
semantics.
the
18
Ibid., p.
326.
General Semantics
manner: grammar
investigates
relations
ositions
105
and
and on that
their referents,
on human behaviour:
tions
not merely
is
grammarian)
but
ticist),
all
This
is
no coincidence
is
semiotic,
much
it
home of pragmatism.
different,
is
In
its
interest revealed
by such
and
cultural
above
factors
of
all
human
to increased
anthropology,
behaviour.
in
"neuro-linguistic"
human
that
among
the stimuli
experience
in
conformity
with
definite
way on
in organ-
patterns.
language, on
its
Both
struc-
ture,
and on
research
19
A. Rapoport, "What
Is
Semantics?",
p.
14.
Research Problems of
106
SeiCiantics
This
1930s.
in
gave
rise
to
an interpretation of social
conflicts
by Korzybski, who was followed by Stuart Chase, S. I. Hayakawa, Wendell Johnson, and others. It must be said that as early
as 1949 S. I. Hayakawa, in the preface to the new edition of his
Language
efforts,
in
Num-
and
facilities in
human communi-
cation; etc. These issues have given rise to a rich literature, based
on the
iour,
influence of language
on
correct
special field
is
constituted
is
should
call
influence of lan-
Language
to
(a study
The
not
mean
much
further.
do
to influence
upon
General Semantics
literature
These
and
are, to
art, to
say the
107
This
is
why
have
and
their
importance
is
it
may,
it
must
Max
Black,
who
in his
work on Korzybski's
provides a
tems evoked
further that
Do
That
is
and
useful
it
it
a separate question.
and
technicians,
20 I offer
Its
Many
In
may
is
social
all
be of help to those
who
like to
value, can
scientific
ETC
be added
would
theoretical sys-
book form
articles
as Language,
from
Meaning
and Maturity.
series
Affair?,,
New York
W. Johnson, People
Man. A Study
in
in
21
Black, op.
I. J.
Semantic Orientation,
cit.,
Human
New York
1952;
Philosophy,
Ability,
1941,
K.
p. 246.
S.
Keyes
New York
How to
Jr.,
1950,
and Operational
108
from philosophy sensu stricto than the semantic problems connected with logic and epistemology. Nevertheless, general semantics
implications,
idealistic
abom
in
Marxist
criti-
cism. But there are also other implications passed over in silence
criticism, since they spoil the schematic pattern
by that
more so
harmful. The
is
and blur
in silence
is,
raised
not
ETC
in the
Autumn
(in the
comment
(in
ed without
comment
as an
Dictionary
sophical
Rus-
sian, ed.
many
which
came
were
reprinted
without
comment
periodical
Preuves.
Thus our
ideological
opponents consider
there
criti-
the best
weapon
against
cism?
22 I
mean
here the
work of
T. A.
jective
Idealism!,
MocKsa
1957,
General Semantics
first
part of
my
109
book.
and the
Jt
subject matter of
its
accumulated in Marxist
insufficient
knowledge of the
literature,
mostly as a result of an
and
criticism.
and meaning,
will
Part
Two
Chapter One
And
in the land
Go
bum them
thoroughly.
of one speech.
east, that they
And
make
us
to, let
brick,
and
top
we be
to, let
scattered abroad
And
the
men
let
upon the
the children of
whose
heaven; and
us
make
a name,
us
lest
builded.
And
the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have
one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will
be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
that they may not understand one another's speech.
So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face
all
of
all
left
{Genesis,
"Error
is
never so
difficult
to be destroyed as
when
XI,
it
1-8)
has
its
roots in Language".
(Bentham)
Even
on
men
golden chains.
after him,
people came
reality,
and the
social
tongue with
their sub-
From
it
seems that to
compared with
themselves.
[113]
114
power of the word. And the chains which tied people to Hertongue were but the words which flowed from his lips
the
cules'
to their mindsi.
in hterature,
em
and mod-
and
same time many-sided and broad analysis of the problem
of the social role of language, and in particular the problem of
the philosophical significance of language, we had to wait until
the most recent times. In the 20th century, the problem of language has become the dominant philosophical issue.
Hence an embarrassing situation for one who has resolved
English).
(chiefly
scientific,
at the
to give a
ious reasons.
First of aU, the wealth of literature. In the latest period alone,
and the
is
absolutely im-
possible to exhaust
be
selective
Finally,
but
there
so broad that
select
idealistic
is
but a small
what?
an additional
difiiculty
from
it
in a single
it
to
is
is
positions.
years neglected
from the
arising
many
who
Marxist author
and automatically
often been
takes
also a disis
in
some
The choice of problems, therefore, must be extremely cautious and somewhat restricted, especially at first.
sense a pioneer.
is
in
his
work "Herkules
is
made
Galijski"
Works], War-
to begin
and
considerations
detailed
by
analysis.
also seems
It
developed research:
and by outlining
the dialectics of
all
is
it
advisable
115
be able to work
fruit-
overshadowed by
What
generalities
and verbalism.
What
is
them?
The
its
revealing
A num-
made
its
was confined to
artificial
this,
sit-
of
its
entitled to
is
essary, in
is
even nec-
entails
over, in presenting
its
issues
of language, precisely
is
is
those
and gnoseolog-
11 fi
is
its
got into
made even
Attempts to remove
full
i.e.
beyond the narrow formal treatment of language by the neopositivists. The tendencies of general semantics to analyse the
social influence and the social power of language go still further.
At the same
no use
who
attack
its
its
all
been
criticized severely
linguists,
of linguistic phenomena.
new
by the
asocial analysis
For
also
criticism^.
is
the need of
researches:
social
metaphysics must be
istic
logical
atomism and
rejected
(this
logical empiricism,
and
rela-
if
a-
only
what
Cf.
'
Cf.
J.
O.
Max
i.e.,
is
Urmson, Philosophical
Analysis,
Oxford
1956.
It is
in strength. This
is
a matter
is still
is
themselves,
have been
difficulties
felt
117
gaining
clearly
crisis lie
erroneous
is
precisely this
theoretical role of
which
Marxist
philosophy.
By
organically
com-
diflficulties
with
interpretations
Marxist philosophy
is
as
it
historicism
in
methodology,
and symptoms of
crisis
we now ask
What
is
be,
beyond
all
doubt
the theory
first ?,
the answer
of communication^.
issues
Far be
for instance
it
from me
when
we leave the purely technical ground, we immediately face the paramount question, a question on the solution of which depends
this or that solution of a number of problems that are usually
to deny the scientific importance of such problems, but
is
what is the
process of
human
Let us not shirk the issue, but begin by analysing that prob-
lem
first.
Reference
communication,
and
is
made
now
psychological,
extensively developed.
linguistic,
118
1.
who have
ren-
programme of
communication:
"In yet another respect
all
ethnologist
and
laws
losophy'
of derivation;
principles
all
philosophers
with
'phi-
psychology has
now
is
partly psychological,
and
may
be
point where
common
common
this
all
kinds of informa-
and in this sense communicate with one another, the philosopher starts asking questions: but how do they do that? and
why? and what does it all mean? He often questions in a way
involving risk to his reputation, a way which leads laymen to
tion,
must
a derogatory shade.
may be
So
it
right in ridiculing
common
5
sense.
The honesty of a
C. K. Ogden
1953, p.
8.
&
I.
pels
me
poem by
Erich
little
119
known,
Philosophenkongress:
Noch
Da
unerschlossenen Daseinsgrundes.
Mit Dietrichen,
An
Schliisseln
dem
Und
bestellten
Aber
die
Weisen
grossen Fragezeichen
da unverdrossen.
Und
schliesslich
kamen
sie iiberein,
sein.
Soeben begannen
tJber: als ob,
Da
trat ein
Aus
fassen:
Wollte
man
Ignoranz:
ein so wichtiges
Problem
man doch
Und auserdem
Brauchte
Ware
Do
ja
That
will
be
120
our
suffice for
scientific,
philosophical,
etc.,
investigations.
Human
communication embraces a
'as
far
may
that
from neghgible
philo-
common-
we say
to a person
we
life
"hand
me the
axe, please"
to.
It is
all
we
so simple and
it
as something extraordinary
and seek the causes of such a state of things. Just the fact what
we are stimulated to reflect on the communication process only
when it becomes disturbed shows how natural that process
seems to us. Nevertheless here lies a philosophical and sociological problem of enormous significance: how does it happen
that people do communicate with one another? It is only against
the background of that problem that we see in a proper fight
and in a proper context the traditional, almost classical issues
of semantics, such as the questions of sign, of symbol, of meaning,
of language and speech, and the related philosophical
gnoseological) issues.
Of
course,
it
is
(strictly:
it
is
looms
large.
He has
to
do
willy-nilly, a philosopher.-
To understand
that,
suffices to
it
121
communi-
cation process, a controversy between the tv/o principal conceptions in that respect: transcendental
and
guments in
Urban
follow
That con-
naturalist.
show the
ar-
in choosing as the
certain general
Dewey
one of the
certainly
is
it
commu-
of knowledge, of
finition
arguments
their
I
Bi
But as background to
conception.
naturalist
because
verifiability
matter for wonder that philosophy cannot disregard that problem, if epistemology
is
phenomena of
social hfe
The controversy
Urban
triv-
possibility
of
Urban
Communi-
Chap.
ist
is
life
one of the
cation".
in
is
in
is
Cf.
Ill
theory of communication.
8
Cf.
J.
122
which
It is self-evident
life.
that the
also
No
ular attention to
forts
the
must be made
lies at
the root of
problem of communication
problem from
above.
First of all, however, the concept of
communication must
I follow
principal
categories:
acts
acts of
(intelligible
communication).
Marx
man
is
said after
FrankUn
symbols. In
fact, in
pects of the
social
i.e.,
and
as-
The process of
human communica-
life.
tion are
connection
is
society.
its
hive-mates to
its
"dance" and
and thus "communicates" something to them. The same applies to the ants, which with touches of the antennae warn their
123
I
"community"
against
threatening
danger.
Birds'
love
songs,
and the rutting of the deer, are also specific forms of communication. "Communication" of a similar kind with others; expressing fear, exultation,
occurs between
etc.,
men
as well; in extra-
body "com-
transfers
it
ual
is this
communication? In so
knowledge of emotional
from one
states
far
individ-
sit-
acts
meadows
that
leaving for
of "communication"
abound
of the
bees
with which
But
we
is it?
is
that
transfers certain
human form
knowledge and
of communication
Are we
in fact concerned
above
all
Men communicate to
al-
states,
one another their experiences, emotionknowledge and mental states in various ways, and
is
also to be observed in
force in
mob
moments of
men.
It
forms to a large
social
and
cer-
124
of that
ular manifestations
form of communication?
specific
grammized"
perception,
that
against
is
its
"pro-
music
"translating"
They maintain
at
all,
mits,
then
it
reflects
if
only emotional
communicates something to
music
states,
"reflects"
and that
others, then
it
anything
if it
trans-
communicates
just such states only. I mean, of course, good, great music. But
do not agree with the assertion that that is the "true" comcommunication par excellence, although I admit
that it is a different, special form of communication.
Is not, e.g., the escape sought by the visual arts in abstractionism connected with the existence of that form of communication? The abstractionist thesis is that the intellectual content
of visual experience should be rejected and only the "true" transmission of certain emotional states should be left. The promoters of "dadaism" and other similar trends in poetry were also
I
munication,
some
direct
states
and experiences.
transmission
common
communication",
of their
others
to
all
those
own
with
emotional
artistic
trends,
what
is
to
tive
all
work.
What that
known to
life
after
can best
be seen
if
we compare
it
125
instance, of music.
Now
presses
it
and
ex-
many
someone
years,
else
knowing
and without any programmed deciphering of their
meaning
and
ever,
this is
no
Prelude',
provided, how-
he belongs to a definite
who
For a Hindu
Hindu music for a European. One point more: since we have to do with an emotional
"contagion" by non-intellectual means here, no one can know
whether he experiences the same feeling as did the composer,
or as do other people listening to the same composition. The
music
is
as non-communicative as
fact that
reaction to the
is
old
his
own emo-
Some people
"language" of music
not
decide that
parentheses,
arises
is
point
that there
say that
it
some
should
it is flexible.
I shall
all
declarations,
"contagion" those
:
who
who
126
receive
it,
tlie
similarity
communicated
largely depends
reaction to v^^hat
is
tional context in
is
on the emo-
is,
lectual states?
No
detailed
analysis
be undertaken here.
of such of
its
I shall
will
general traits as
make
it
possible to distinguish
it
him
the axe.
is
that
from the
situational context
tell
is
statement, understands
it, i.e.,
one can
And
that
is all.
of communication discussed.
127
by means of poetry as
tain extent
contrary,
purpose
its
tional state:
love,
may
hatred,
is
aspect.
On
the
and is transmitted through the intermeHence we should agree that the "language"
of music or images is more suitable for a direct transmission
of emotions than is the language of words. As the poet says,
content,
intellectual
mehr".
intellectual con-
of
human
"lan-
etc.
As mentioned
mutes.
above
all
based
interpret-
it.
being com-
is
no communi-
is
which
is
case
of
emotional
"programmatic"
communication
interpretation
(cf.
the
of musical
prohibition
of
perception,
as
128
communication
to say
is
communication
intellectual
is
conditioned by
and the
is
own mental
states
com-
(we imply a
full
shifting of
emotional,
associations.
etc.,
now be done
with
itself
later. It will
it
provisionally, because
mean when
cation of what I
above in
must be defined
is
understood
"in a context".
to.
Similar,
though
ings of certain
terms of poetry,
according to whether
statements
or science,
or
some
arise.
we speak
specialized
in
disciphnes;
which
but
fully agree
an object located in a
definite univers
du discours, in other
129
is
referential,
but
is
interpreted
is
it
is
of accumulated experience,
way
general
we
the intellectual
called
Let us be
individual recipients.
satisfied,
The
to the entire
and to
term "communication":
human manner
specifically
domain of man's
intellectual experience.
of communication
spiritual fife:
refers
both to emotional
fields
of spiritual
fife
moods (emotional
tional
"contagion")
is
concerned,
the
ex-
pressive
communication, requires
Intellectual
communication,
linguistic
i.e.,
means).
communication intended
is
to
a linguistic communi-
here
common
cours.
^
Urban, op.
cit.,
p,
232.
common
parties,
reference to the
reference to the
same
same
univers du dis-
130
as
between the
is
con-
we
submit
2.
to
are
now
going to
analysis.
critical
transcendentahst
process certainly
of view of
aUty
the
communication
philosophical background.
empirical
it
its
is
Historically,
who above
doctrine of Plato
cognition, that
of
common
cannot
conception
an
insight that
re-
all
in neo-Platonic mysticism;
it
and
in Bergson's intuitionismio
in Husserl's
phenomenology ii.
^'Spricht die
Seele,
And
"Does anyone believe that by means of lancommunication can pass from man to man?"i2
Maeterhnck says:
guage any real
Yet the
le
sique".
11
Cf. Ideen
zu einer
reinen
Philosophie.
12
Quoted
after
Urban, op.
cit.,
p. 242,
into
131
is
philosophical
in
its
of
all
soil
provided
by
mind
transcendentalism,
especially
T". That
type
of speculation obviously hes at the root of the so-called transcendentahst theory of communication.
them
we
ask,
how
is
it
plays
it
pos-
communicate by transmitting from one individual to another certain mental states, by understanding one
sible for
to
in Jaspers's
is
from the chapter several dozen pages long, dethe communication process, in Volume 11 of the author's
a quotation
voted to
Philosophy.
er selbst
als
das
132
alle
Bindung
"Jedoch kann
in
der
sondern nur durch die Medien der Inhalte trefDas Ineinsschlagen der Seelen bedarf der Wirklichkeit des
Handelns und des Ausdrucks. Denn Kommunikation ist nicht
unmittelbar,
fen.
ohne
im
ob
Raum und
Zeit,
Wohl
es in Augenkann im Transzendieren iiber alles Weltdasein sich erfiillen. Aber auch dann
ist Weite und Klarheit des objektiv gewordenen und nun transzendierten Inhalts das Mass fur die Entschiedenheit des Augenblicks der eigentlichen Kommunikation. Diese gewinnt ihren
Aufschwung durch Teilnahme an Ideen in der Welt, an Aufgaben
Selbstseins
bhcken,
als
ist
und Zwecken"i3.
But it is the concept of "transcendental 'I'", introduced in
some form or another into the theory of communication, which
is
who
clearly formulated
by Karl Vossler,
communication
intro-
side
of "empirical language-community"i4.
According to Vossler,
it
is
who
is
the
1^
Jaspers, op.
14
Vossler, Geist
cit.,
much
further.
His explanations
p. 67.
und Kultur
in
stellt
von
findenden Gesprache
dem
sich
begriffen
abspielen.
All das,
gedacht werden, in
dem
Geist, in Milliarden
all
samtliche
ist,
die
hienieden
eine
statt-
was im Laufe
riesiges Selbstgesprach
und aus
Vielheit
beliebiger
133
der menschliche
sich entfaltend
ist,
"Daraus
folgt
nun
freilich,
fragt sich,
nicht verwirklicht"i5.
Be
ogist
that as
it
philol-
is
certainly
not
Kant
himself
"Few
would
be
symbolized
not a myth.
is
itself
It is
a necessary condition of
its
much
15
Ibid., p.
finite
minds
live
all-
13.
10
134
as these issues are in""other contexts, they are not the significant
What
minimum
minimum
thing here.
is
or the
Such an assumption
communication cannot,
And
of
is
intelligible
communication" ^ 6.
made because
it is
human
the process of
this is
supraindividual "I".
is
"transcendental,
T":
"The
and, therefore, by
definition,
not
supra-empirical
is
verifiable as
supra-empirical
an empirical
fact
"i"^.
titbit
in favour
that
cannot
so
if
it
may
be of a peculiar kind,
is
it
finds,
and human
when conceived in
ciology. It is upon
science
Such evidence
so.
The
analysis,
is,
institutions.
iso-
and
all its
works, both
is
mind
purely naturalistic terms of history and sothese considerations that the evidence rests.
to be sure, largely negative, but not wholly
on
we have
more
16
especially of understanding
Urban, op.
17 Ibid., p.
cit.,
259.
255-256.
which
is
seen
it
to be,
135
is
if
acknowledged
real
munication
recognized,
is
then the
'transcendental considera-
But
let
us
now
tutes
us
let
behaviourists,
Their thesis
is
i.e.,
can mutu-
ally
and
intellectual structure
to
is
all.
more or
is
I.
less the
po-
A. Richards in his
similar formulation
is
offered
if
Dewey admits
But
at the
same time
it is
they
who
since they
we
more
society.
explain
Yet
it
by having recourse
it
in the satisfaction of
the
human
18 Ibid.,
p.
19
London
260 (itaUcs
1955, Chap.
A.
heart of language
S.).
136
is
much
less
expres-
is
To
nership.
in action;
is
understand
fail to
misunderstand
to
is
to fail to
to set
come
up action
into agreement
cross pur-
at
poses"20.
And
here
is
tion of language
"Language
is
mode
specifically
of interaction of at least
it
presupposes an organized
It is therefore
whom
they
a relationship,
we
common
attribute
signs,
and an
as between persons
who
is
object.
his intent,
we
When
take for
things
quence. This
It
is
anticipatory,
predictive.
'transcendence',
nothing
relational,
intrinsically
absent, or
reference to the
many
formulations,
that animals
have no tools
Dewey comes
do not
Without
is
a tool.
'think'
is
..."2i.
stand in
relief.
These matters
Dewey, op.
21 Ibid., p.
cit.,
185.
p.
179.
will
be discussed at a
later stage,
of the transcendentalists,
who
let
critical
who
in his
argumentation
Gardiner,
137
mean
here Alan
Gardiner
starts
Dewey who,
while concentrating
liis
attention
com-
Ustener but
at the
same
time,
is
naturalists
(e.g.
common
and
to
all,
but Gardiner, by
admits a
new
theoretical element
rialism.
"As a
between
first
approximation
let
my
firstly,
lie
is
is
always concerned
meaning
22
and
understanding
(Gardiner
draws
an
explicit
138
1
(
What
is
is
communi-
cating organisms have similar structures, and (2) the reality reis common to both parties in the process.
And what do the transcendentalists reply?
ferred to
common
entire reasoning,
although
it
a logical error
appeals to
sense,
it
it
includes
be proved.
Their arguments
First
of
all,
are
as
follows.
of a
common
139
duce by
stealth, in the
is
some
makes communication
And
possible.
of mere secondary
is
it
T"
or "similarity of organism".
Secondly,
thesis
transcendentahsts
the
that communication
environment
("common
made
is
reahty").
also
by
possible
That
similarity
would be
On
of
they
applies,
thesis
which
communication.
to a reality
is
which
is
not only a
universe of discourse,
is
to be proved
naturalists,
concept of "reality
common
the
to
communication.
cannot be said that transcendentalist
It
its
criticism,
even in
the
naturahsts themselves,
opinions tendentiously, or
although certainly
is
it
distorts
and
is
and incon-
such
historical explanation
(1)
human
of the
common
differences in
is
its
and of
the individual
140
3.
No
Marxist, or any
criteria,
man who
it
is
He
finds,
to his
own;
much
nearer
which come
some of
No
is right,
capital.
Transcendentalism
tion based
is
simply
on mere metaphysical
counterscientific
faith.
Naturahsm
some of
and
and
what it
But there must be agreement with many of
they stand for science and
quently, has to treat the
common
two trends
its
reveals gaps
its
opinions
theses because
Marxism, conse-
sense.
differently,
although
attempt to
own
specula-
consists rather in
ist
party
its
is
it
cannot
why a Marx-
must be
offered here.
"It is
only now,
found that
man
we have
is
not
any a
is
The
'spirit' is
141
'infected'
comes
Speech
is
is
sciousness which exists both for other people and for myself.
And
it
exists for
For an animal,
its
will
Where a
rela-
in a relation to nothing.
is
Thus, consciousness
and
me; an animal
is
remain so as long as
men
social product
will exist"23.
three of
drawn
life
human
of
human
indi-
The
Thesis VI:
the
human
essence.
its
reaUty
is
no abstraction
it is
the ensemble
"Feuerbach,
real essence,
1.
To
religious
abstract
from the
isolated
The human
hended only as
human
an
itself
individual.
essence, therefore,
'genus', as
historical process
sentiment as something by
an abstract
2.
who
consequently compelled:
is
internal,
many
individuals."
K. Marx,
1958, p. 30-31.
is itself
3,
Berlin
142
whom
stract individual
ticular
form of
Thesis VIII
he analyses belongs in
reality to a par-
society".
"Social
life is
essentially practical.
AU
mysteries
my
Marx
of that
problem.
As
indicated
naturalists
commit
the
error called
cir cuius
in
demonstrando:
planation of social
To
phenomena
human
human
indi-
such an analysis of
man
is
dumb
human
many
indi-
viduals".
of materialism.
For
if
the
human
individual
is
isms"
24
the
is
treated naturaUstically,
if
as
End of
Classical
German
in
Pliilosopliy,
F. Engels,
Moscow
1949, p.
62-63.
what
right
143
The
an assumption?
which
etc.,
transcendentalists
will
not be simply
are right.
With such
This
is
human
be solved at
all in
vidual",
whom
vidual
the
in
Do
isolated
of society". This
cepts"
human
society cannot
is
social
a criticism of
all
sciences.
They
communi-
all
them
in the dark.
that fact, I
nat-
transcendentahsts, that
lated".
human
is
But the fact that they do not give voice to such nonsense
does not
mean
is
it
explains
And
why
it
is
probably a
naturalists
still
they are
perhaps they
it
self-evi-
can be answered
144
and
listener
trivial fact in
did see and fuUy understand the importance of the social conditioning of the position of the individual as an individual in
society,
for this
silent,
is
an important
issue
which would help them to dissociate themselves from the standpoint of their opponents
an eloquent testimony
stances
definite situation
is
And
status of the individual: that done, then all secrets of "the similarity
of minds"
mysterious
character"
of communication,
etc.,
disappear
at
once.
Marx
in
human
social relations".
essence
its
reahty
is
no abstraction inherent
it is
lies
in understanding
somewhat obsolete
lar idea,
in style).
Can
it
is
now
is
of man's spiritual
the social,
ble
was preceded by
on human opinions
on the
(Grerman
idealists).
Marx,
however,
human
not
only
145
on a new foundation
ently and,
the root
products.
The human
human
as a
cisely
ety
if we
individual
consider
object
is
individual,
artistic taste,
spiritual
as the
but pre-
i.e.,
festations of his
etc.,
hfe:
"religious
disposition",
speech,
consciousness in general.
As a "human
individual"
man
is
and
spiritual
development can
men
speech
men
the practical,
as
...
The
...
real
and
...
and
its
will
...
existing
also
and speech
be
consciousness
We
its
is
speech.
exist".
is
and
er-
from the naturahstic interpretation of social phenomena are eliminated, and the study is based on the principles
of consistent materiahsm? Can the transcendentahsts reasonably
rors arising
in
demonstrandol
146
Of
Equally inadequate
is
may
"...
in purely naturalistic
to
latter
those terms,
is
who
if
we
analysed in
can, in reply,
gage in speculation.
smashed
been
the
thesis
effective in attacking
No, because
concerning
its
foundation has
"absolutely
isolated"
nothing
is
left
Nothing
of the
is left
critical
of that
thesis,
and
errors
and consequently
tahsts.
The human individual is a social product both in his physical and his psychical evolution, both from the point of view
of his phylogenesis and his ontogenesis. There is nothing mysterious in "the similarity of organisms", as there
is
nothing myste-
by the way, leaves room for individual differences) is most natural and normal, being acquired
by up-bringing in society, by taking over its historical heritage
chiefly through the intermediary of speech. Both these factors
ness".
That
similarity (which,
effect
on aU members or
tum
society,
nary in the fact that they smash the myths of "absolutely separated"
individuals.
It
becomes
quite superfluous
to
introduce
transcendental factors in
mystical,
cess of
order to
not naturalistic.
natural, but
It is social.
This
is
ication.
is
147
problem in a consistently
scientific
the problem of
commun-
it
interpre-
tation.
No
Marxism of
the rejection by
less decisive is
transcendentahst objection
ity
the second
be
re-
discourse,
in
What
On
this
they
sumption.
is
themselves,
in
or,
strictly
speaking,
is
is
The
once
made
its
oJBF
objection
is
of no consequence.
What
is
at stake here
is
The controversy
is
field
another
is,
or
is
not, because
it
who communicate
common
with one
minds and
discourse.
in-
148
Of
sism.
in general
all
all
but
own
is
private construe-
Here the difference between epistemological and ontological solipsism is blurred. One must realize clearly that we put
'
tion.
e.g.,
Urban
and
if
ideal-
And he
immediately continues:
"On
objective ideahsm.
Any form
Thus the
doning
all
point
ple,
is,
we speak about
nite universe
Now
is
done,
e.g.,
by Urban. Their
they might say, that in communicating with other peoobjects; but objects located
by us
in a defi-
we
use.
a "transcendental
mind" is necessary.
The argumentation is simply astounding. Yet it sufiices to
ask: "But why?", and the spell is broken. For, in fact, why is
25
Urban, op.
cit.,
p. 264.
26 Ibid.
149
object of knowledge?
And what
is
if in
communication
is
It
it
would be
always
difficult
noumena,
an
It
must be
possibility of
mind
communication. Tertium
own
subtleties.
light
of the
materiahstic epistemology?
If
the
we hold
object
outside all
of the word).
mind
some
somehow
reflects
is
it
(in
a special sense
an abstraction: the
triv-
is
involved here
is
diflEiculties,
particularly since
what
And
for
that purpose
suffice
it
to in-
dicate clearly
quires
T"
will help
me
listener.
No
mystic "tran-
II
150
quantum mechanics,
if I
am
not familiar
One
"Social
feels
which mislead
life is
human
practice
controversy
that
that
not a truism;
Is this
ed in science? Not at
That
its
is it
naturalists
to assess
is
do not
proved by the
on phenomena
all.
not a truism
it is
and
focuses
fully
That
it is
by the controversy
not a
in
triviality, is best
properly.
it
controversy
now under
by
the tran-
look
discussion,
common
common
Should we then
sense.
(as
sense,
and
applying shocks
was suggested
to
me
in
and consequently reject them as unimporas was said in that discussion either
ascribe to them such absurd opinions, I do not understand
ty or schizophrenia
tant?
May we
that, if I
say
am
if their
ponents?
other.
is
Contrary to
all
either the
my
op-
one or the
Even mysticism
is
a social
common
is
in the bour-
phenomenon and
a social
151
fact,
one does not want to come out on the losing side in the ideological strife now proceeding in philosophy. Nor may I say,
if
although
may
find
it
struggle. After
all, I
that
(e.g.,
communication
effect
some transcendental
possible owing to
is
"I", just
from
opponent could
say.
an end to
progress,
of the
So
scientific
let
discussion,
that,
convinced
to all intellectual
a harmful monopolization
standpoint.
Marxist
the
all
all
mean an end
we
standpoint
on the
if
discussion
issue
of
is
indispensable,
communication
is
from
the
social
both
materialistic
and
historical
point
of view.
Certainly,
great
discoveries,
once
assimilated
trivial to
by
science,
those whose
The
That
fact
152
when, as
is
is
neither universally
It
human
consciousness
Marx and
thought lan-
human
society.
These
is
communication. Such
makes
it
is
153
We
is
communi-
cation.
scien-
tific
Of
course,
is
it
we
possible, for
witness
it
everywhere.
Not
the
mystic one. as to what transcendental factor makes communication possible. This can be explained without resorting to mira-
cles
this point
is:
how,
scientific
at
in
place?
Social psychologists say that
the
parties
communication
consists in that
their opposite
The issue
may be formulated so, it may be formulated otherwise. Be that
as it may, intellectual communication is always connected with
understanding, with the same understanding by the two parties
and thus come to understand
position
their words27.
arably
I
connected
with speech.
A
will
of
all
stricter
be given
who
insep-
of what
is
one
how one
de-
later.
regardless of
the enormous
definition
is
There
differences in that
In speaking,
ticular
human
man
speech.
York
G. A. Lundberg, C. C. Schrag
1954, p. 389.
&
O. N. Larsen, Sociology,
New
154
berg
when he
says:
as transmis-
communication
the three fundamental notions which require further investigation: sign (symbol),
To understand
28 Ibid., p.
360.
Two
Chapter
ST
"We
The
first
The
all
that of their
Reality
upon improving
own
Country.
other,
whatsoever:
And
all
Words
in Point of
in
An
Expedient
was therefore offered, that since Words are only Names for Things,
it would be more convenient for all Men to carry about them such
Things as were necessary to express the particular Business they are
to discourse on.
)
the
their Leave".
1.
The
assertion
that
the
social
process
of
communication
social
up
and formalism
how
the process of
human communication
[155]
il
Selected Problems of Semantics
156
ticular, to
categories as "sign"
that process
Such
is
warped.
entirely
Of
course,
is
it
from the
in isolation
cation process.
The
social
It
problem
is
is
tacitly
its
meaning from
its
wide for
philosophical speculation.
sterile
The problem
natural
social background,
and
as to the essence
its
and con-
varieties,
process
of development,
reference
if
is
often
made
only to communication
in
some
among
specific sense
level.
of course
Hence
not
157
We
tion
is
in
its
(in
need
for,
it
of,
Im Anfang war
(on the
human
level
and not
(scientific,
genetic sense, of
also
who
held that
It is in
we speak of
many problems
communication
the
for
common
find the
in
i.e.,
we
is
practice,
is
communica-
process
and
the
problem
of
the sign.
is
etc.
to a search for
ing
and
is
etc.,
is
very interest-
of animal psychology,
it
its
calling
for
investigation.
Nevertheless,
human
restrict
animals
human
speetc.
process of communica-
merely consciously
of
my
analysis.
158
is
Men
in various ways,
communicate
the
ical
need to exchange
Yet
men
Hence
abstract ideas,
need for a
writing,
etc.
the practical
Men
etc.,
stimulate emotions,
to
and
definite theory
of
signs.
communicate by means of
pictures,
we have
gestures,
phonic language,
signals
etc.
But
in
such casses
writing,
signals
all
to
these are
of
whom
tures
pointing to
had to use
objects,
signs,
now come
all
signs,
imitative
however primitive:
gestures,
or pictures.
ges-
No
to be considered
by certain philosophical
For instance,
forms,
it is
and the
And
rightly so.
.t
i|
We
specifically
human
restrict it still
;
159
process
of communication;
intellectual
interest to the
now we
shall
communication,
transmission from
intellectual
man
to
man
man by means
gesticulate,
objects
actions
When
man
speak, write,
they
denote
when I
or symbohzing certain
transmitted from
is
use
by a convention,
for
is
it
abstractions
me
connected with a
in order to
etc.
or
evoke
we say
in
some-
that in the
the
signs.
Two
must be distinguished
in this connection:
ture of the subject not only connected one with the another, but
actually confused;
be demonstrated by an example.
When someone
communicates to me, for example, the thought concerning divine omnipotence, I understand perfectly what he means, but
it
it
does not
In this book,
we
shall
160
and*!!
What
human com-
wiU involve a
is
their nature?
specific analysis
The
and typology of
signs as an in-
As
sign,
process of cognition
ess of
is
communication,
it is
essential to start
is
the proc-
activity.
In a Marxist
from that
point, which
a definite social
(cf.
Peirce,
communication process
on the
subject, there
own
plan of attack,
the player
is
a well-chosen
of his opponent,
to apprehend
understanding, consists in such placing of oneself in the position of the partner, and in attempts to envisage his situation.
The same
is,
exchange
to carry
161
sacks containing
But
it
was a misconceived
entailed the
it
signs,
it
The fun-
else:
from
work
because there
is
I shall
all
in-
such really
is
from others,
beyond doubt, and
criteria (inseparable
But
it
is
is
final stage
it
replaces
of communication
is
language,
it
makes a system of
is
all,
it
falsely
sug-
of falhng into
thesis
It is
162
"languages"
determined.
reveals,
first,
their
variety and,
and importance in the procof human communication; and, secondly, their homogeneity
common
all signs,
them are
derivative
The
concerned.
is
rest
of this chapter will deal with just that thesis and the
2.
The
theories
vast
literature
of signs
on the
subject
two conclusions.
very volume and divergency of such suggestions
impels rejection of the idea of making a synthesis of them and
implies
First, the
that the
2 When this book had akeady gone to press I came across the book
IIoHHmue u CAoeo [Notion and Word] by JI. O. PesHHKOB. I regret I have
not been in a position to take into consideration here many interesting ideas
of that author. I should only like to emphasize that I am in solidarity with
many
concerned.
163
As already
process of
problem may be
on the point
better illuminated
and the
refuted.
human communication
is
the
No,
it.
do
this is
not
and
investigations. I
among
I referred,
this v^hen
is normal in practice.
Thus we start from the process of human communication
which, though complicated in its course and functions, is a selfevident fact, a fact that men communicate in action, i.e., in
co-operation (since all action is social action), by transmitting
definite meanings through the intermediary of signs; by so doing,
we estabhsh a specific framework and theoretical background
of such a method
that
if
we have
to
do with
is
not
in-
is
trivial.
trivial at all,
We
but
We
of a
fall in
is
(symbol) of mourning,
(signal)
it
moon
that firing
a sign
is
we
since
is
a red rocket
black
is
is
a sign
an agreed sign
of water
is
a natural process,
are
"in themselves"
material
objects,
possessing
their
164
own
properties,
It is
etc.,
process which
social
signs.
are
called
signs.
There
new
is
is
that
nothing
Neither
is it
although
sistent
it
Marxism which
most con-
how
it
is
by
He
i.e.,
if
there
all
is
someone who
in the process
is
now
Introduction to Logic)
the statement
is
and
initiated
it.
The
essential point
in
It is to
new
the
field
philosophy
not only for study and research, but also for philo-
it
to indicate,
by way of example,
is
its
purposes
a penetrating thinker,
on, symbols
man's
allegedly
innate
faculty
all
new
con-
of symbolizing, of "creating"
through symbols,
etc.,
savour of
who
165
idealistic speculation
and
idealistic
philosophical background.
The
a sign
first result
is
process, that
is,
that
communication
phenomenon within
phenomenon which is inter-
only an object or a
an object or a
preted by someone) can be a sign, involves the undermining
that
process
(i.e.,
all
What
is
striking
is
concerning signs
literature
is
"sign",
attempts to impart
scientific
marked vagueness
the
No
attempts to explain the function of signs are intimately connected with attempts to establish a typology of sign which would
make
it
the point of view of their extent and content, and thus to bring
some order
What
is it
typologies?
that
is
most
which function as signs into those which are natural and appear
human
are interpreted
man
by
activity
as signs of something,
In a sense,
we
weather
is
around the
moon
is
is
a sign of a
fall
is
ageing, etc. In
is
that
12
166
monument
on a handkerchief
that a knot
thing, etc. In
still
another sense,
is
is
that a definite
sounds
is
is
is
a sign
a red rocket
firing
is
marks are mathematical or logical signs, etc. All these are signs
in some sense, but they are different signs with different meanings.
When reference is made below to signs tout court, that will
mean proper
sciously
signs,
i.e.,
produced by
artificial in
man
communicating
'
fall
differ essentially
from all other categories of signs, above all in that they are not
produced or evoked consciously by man for communication
purposes, but exist independently of
in
man
as natural processes
utilized
footnote
3).
By
is
to be
inter-
signs a
meaning
signs, a
and
to the natural
sense. This is
why
at
of the issue
may
and proper
in this
made
in analysis
between
(artificial) signs^.
book and
to be used
below requires
additional explanations.
The
signs,
which are
in
some
167
division
pressions).
something
the latter
stricto. If,
else
on the one hand, the natural signs (indices) of the type of frozen
water or the moon's halo, and on the other the verbal signs,
we reach the model of the typology of signs made by Husserl. He
name
some
of them require explanations in order to show the motives which have guided
in making my own choice.
The ancients distinguished between
me
would have
all
on the strength of a convention. This applies above all to the iconic signs,
which function on the strength of similarity to the object they stand for (they
stand for such objects in the sense that a picture makes us think of
the
objects
which
it
represents,
an object, of corresponding
respect:
from natural
of the effects
similarity,
caused by
usually
There
feelings, etc.).
such
is
ample
atic
is
Hebrew alphabet
their
shape
is
etc.).
Yet there
work on
is
a schem-
names of
no doubt
that an
vention.
(cf.
E. Martinak, Psychologische
signs,
men produce
view which
The
is
in
characteristic
communication.
division adopted
Martinak, yet
is
He
above
in this
book
168
phenomena ambiguously
Two
make
reasons
it
bed of extremes.
to speak, in a classical
ing
principle of interpreting
the
many
signs includes
socially
(2) his
and
historically
the
authors. Every
own
typologies of signs,
but none of them can vie with Husserl's in the matter of influence
exerted
on
others. It
sign, symbol),
as
an
Thus the
Husserl
propriate interpretation
may
easily
communication process. In that process, these are signs which are being
consciously produced by men for communication purposes. In my opinion
the term "proper signs" is the best term with which to denote them since natural processes function as signs only in a secondary
and a derivative
sense.
Alternatively with the term "proper signs" I use the term "artificial
signs", since I
such are
point,
artificially
independent of
human
activity,
the
proper
above
in Philosophical
all
Ch.
S. Peirce,
Writings of Peirce,
New York
1955.
169
in other words, of
takes into account the specific nature of verbal signs, their specific
is
to
all
among
may
that he
certainly
is
be
highly significant)
right
the
of the
specific character
and
in-
(I
iconic
signs,
all
call signals,
symbols,
Thus,
etc.).
at the
which do
consequently,
meaning.
in the chapter
on meaning),
should
fall
is
all
proper signs
whoever
connection,
in the
loses
its
is
or an event
somehow
interpreted
included
function as a sign
is
by someone, must
a thing
reject
as
expressive,
i.e.,
On
the con-
communicompany of language
all
170
is
so because
man
is
all
i.e.,
they
re-
that fact,
because the signs are detached from the social context of the
from the Ausdriicke, but even opposes the latter to the former. And yet in fact these two categories are intimately connected one with the other, and not only are they not in
the Anzeichen
is
be in opposition
is
based on erroneous
initial
assumptions.
press something,
is
contained in the
meaning of the given sign. And if the word "to express" is interpreted otherwise, namely associated with information concerning emotional, and not intellectual, experiences, then the indices
(natural signs) can also express something
tears express sadness, a blush expresses
in
this
sense
(e.g.,
shame or embarrassment,
etc.)
for
Man sometimes
instance
communication
hand he stops a pedestrian
when with
'points to
his
a speeding motorcar.
And
yet
the ordinary
.j
into
171
the
different languages)
The same
self-evident
when
it
comes
is
etc.
When an
makes us
set
it
cate-
accompanied by
is
the noise of falling stones. But that noise becomes the sign of
the fact that an avalanche
is
phenomenon. In
itself,
it
who
is
signal
properly interpret
men understand
when
it
is
preceived by
is
those
a manifestation.
is
very important.
who
knowledge,
frozen water
is
necessary
fall
etc.,
of temperature.
situation
is
different
is
mean
172
how
does
it
happen
that a phe-
that
is,
it
as
its
if it
we
it is
Nature which
"partner" in
us.
That
specific
our
anthropologization of natural
is
something to
sign.
begin
artificial
its
process of communication
know
(it
we have come
to
of a sign;
ing.
But
it
all this is
to a definite
like
cation by words
an index
it is
is,
Thus
light,
all
they
somehow
we always
Gushing
in
terms
because
on thinking
signs.
in his
when
interpreted,
think by
who have
is left
apart, since
it
This
is
which
purpose of
all
173
say that
human communication,
are
meaning that
is
Not
signs express
all
thoughts
rect
in
the
substitutive
and must be so
all
the signs
if
at all.
Thus Husserl's
untenable.
into Anzeichen
division
It fails
all
and Ausdriicke
when he
all
signs
is
is
is difficult
of verbal language,
If our standpoint
is
selected
that of a spe-
we must
reject
all
by
it)
makes
his
typology unacceptable in
3.
view.
my
common form
of the
words
in the
communication process.
174
Every attempt to
offer
would be
it
difficult to
I
too begin
my
plans.
such as
re-
is
justifica-
purpose),
and
with
all
attempts to offer
sign.
It
is
essential,
it
is
touch
upon
in so far
Moreover,
fine
that
therefore,
indicated
above,
in the
shall,
myself to proper,
i.e.,
definition to
artificial,
signs,
is
a process which
my
is
par excellence
an element, and
try
the whole.
Hence
it is
is
is
176
as a
there
is
also this
the purpose
de-
its
finition.
sign in the
an
it
appears
an event
By saying
is
in definite
use
it
it
is
and complicated
is
a relation we abbreviate
which appears as a
sign,
who
etc.,
which
it
in the context of
(and not, as
is
it
which does
and yet
is
is
of
the principal
to inform
when
in the
communication process
it
framework
reality, that is
concern-
to the
communication
process.
Such a
my
is
176
But
it
common
and
before
property
the
to
of
variations
the
all
of informing about
something,
communi-
of
it
signs
is
the fact
4.
signs
is
common
As mentioned above,
were
conventions. In
connected
many
cases
wrong
it is
in that if terminological
with
different
in fact so,
and then
solely
its
its
essential
foundations.
appropriate
it is
It
has
no natural
meaning, and that we
is
But
veil the
e.g.,
in
different
First,
may
clas-
of phenomena
in the case of
The
on
different
Variety
is
177
when
greater
still
it
in engaging
problem
is
it
better
some general
Certainly,
found in the
literature
For
situations.
of classification to
principles
may
of the subject
is
be
be useful in certain
and conven-
ris's
characterizing
same
and
universal)
may
The
(sign-event)
as
an inscription
concerning
the
distinction
(sign-design),
and
between the
it
is
which
also of Witt-
sign
as
not possible to
it
is
on the
relation the signs and their referents (indices, iconic signs, symbols); with Morris's typology, distinguishing only signals and
symbols and deliberately giving those terms meanings different
from the current ones; with Biihler's, who ascribes specific meanalso not possible to agree with Peirce's typology based
may
objection
vision
is
not uniform,
the classification
etc.
Thus,
stimuli
all
but
With
reference to
all
is
such classifications
I
may be
it is
evidently arbitrary,
When we have
di-
as
my
own.
is (1)
type.
178
ac-
(indices,
(or artificial).
Second, the proper signs are divided into verbal signs (and
and
makes with
all
an analogy to the
is
The
similarity consists in
the fact that a clearly distinct character of the verbal signs as op-
posed to
all
other signs
is
is
recognized
distinction Husserl
and the
difference
in
the
the Anzeichen.
only repeat
what has already been said: because of the special role of the
phonic language and of the verbal signs in the process of human
thinking and communication, these signs occupy the special,
supreme place in the hierarchy of signs.
And now
Natural signs
Artificial, or
proper, signs
indices
Verbal signs
Proper signs
with a derivative expression
Fig.
all
other
artificial signs.
In view of the
179
made
and analysed.
It is
necessary to reahze
and what
details
how
far such
supposed to cover.
an analysis
is
to reach,
to be borne in
It is
mind
By basing
classes of signs.
it
it is
for example,
that,
artificial
on
the classifications
different criteria,
is
some
down
am
to
may
cases
mere
be quite interesting,
concerned above
all
with distinguishing
sign), is
known
in
indices
are consciously
purposes. This
is
is
word
also.
an
artificial
sign.
men
produced by
for
communication
special,
we mean a
is
is
et
an agreement, social
and not individual in nature, be concluded at any time in a conscious manner. Artificial signs may be called into existence on the
nunc (although this
is
180
of a conscious and
strength
at a specified date
owe
(cf.
all
agreement conclud
deliberate
may
equally well
which in turn
action
although
naturally,
is
a definite
is
arises
socially accepted
without
any
and
traces
is
being continued
any
of
deUberate
convention.
Thus
all
The
ventional as well.
is
artificial,
enabhng
factor
human
munication
the
one
action, in
and
their
in principle con-
further
division
process of com-
function
case,
and evokes
some
human mind
in the
ideas,
reflected in
is
human
action, although
it
does
not in the least follow that the appearance of the sign should
always entail the same results as does the appearance of the object,
etc.,
It
for
stands).
every sign
human
is
of communication,
influencing
artificial,
behaviour.
It
it
(substitutive signs)
of
is
but
AU
that
is
human behaviour
consists
(signals),
in
and
substitution
indirect.
classification,
purpose of somehow
we may
181
Here
is
and symbols.
the graph:
Proper signs
with a denvatii^e expression
Signals
Substitutive Signs
sensu stncto
Fig.
We now
Sumbols
A. Signals
me
Of
course, that
word
is
is
used in
meanings also
is
(e.g.,
a signal). But
which
is
not a symbol
if
am
word
We
desist from,
usually
some
is
to evoke, to change, or to
make
action.
someone
to.
is
a signal of a
tells
fall
us to do so)
of temperature,
13
182
or that wrinkles
On the
and in
on a person's
other hand,
my
it is
classifica-
tion of signs, to say that the firing of a blue rocket was for soldiers
way
is
is
is
is
a signal
work.
What
have in
is
the point in
common
that
all
makes
What do
they
combine them
into
all
it
possible to
the
some
of communication. Thus
in
order
manifestations
It is
of
human
activity.
Signals
an appropriate group of people have concluded an explicit agreement by virtue of which a given phenomenon functions for
them
as a signal.
Thus,
if
must be so informed
mean
and only
in such
183
phenomenon, lacking the assigned property of conveying informaFor a third party the blue rocket is not a signal at all (since
tion.
know
he does not
On
further point
mean an
that whenever
is
we
refer to signals
is
we always
utilized
or
or
(e.g.,
is
the rocket
is
fired
when
air raid is
the attack
imminent
when
the
verbal signs are uttered or written down, yet they do not appear
in their
which
abandon some
exists
signal, that is
know
action, etc.); or
we mean an
object,
a given convention
(e.g.,
184
which
with, photocells
or other signals to
warn of danger,
arbitrary, established
group of people;
its
(2)
its
appearance
The
is
fact that
it
occasional
in
con-
replaces a certain
The
always
is
artificial
virtue
verbal statement
sound
etc.)
analysis thus
made shows
proper signs.
it
is
a substitute
replaces
them
as
The metaphorical statement that every signal is "imbued" with the phonic language
and its meaning, is thus, in the case of signals, explained directly and very simply. The signal has, hke every meaningful group
every code replaces a phonic language.
it
What
then
is
we have
that
shape,
"signal"
and
it
quite clear
refers
reactions,
to
relations
In Pavlov's terminology,
concerning, physiological
the
stimuh
situation, treated as
its
No
as a physiological stim-
reference
is
made
there
differs
complete-
ly
from that analysed above. For the time being, that statement
is
sufficient for
our purposes.
185
B. Substitutive signs
ive
The second large class of proper signs comprises substitutsigns. By contrast with signals, they are signs of something,
emphasized function of substituting, representing
two
subclasses according to
is
into
an abstract notion,
represents
thing
material,
which
is
ships,
material properties,
i.e.,
some-
sometliing
i.e.
etc.,
but in
itself is
we speak of
not a material
substitutive
signs
sensu
stricto,
tively simple.
What
is
by
stricto is
compara-
signs)
are
all
photographs, sculptures,
paintings,
stitutive signs
etc.)
all
Of course,
the division
is
which
is
that of the
mechanism
dehberately dis-
The only
serious
of that "substitution" or
is
in-
arise,
one of a
fields
of social
fife.
186
my
In
and
signs
characteristics:
(1)
the representation
(2)
known
representation
by a
is
a given symbol
if
of substitutive
be understood;
to
is
is
sign,
be
conventional
(3)
to
senses
is
is
in
not be violated
is
it
that
called a
is
of Christianity, a crescent
of the Mosaic
star
five-point
woman
we
a symbol of
is
is
a symbol
We
"symbol"?
of
and a sword
in her
hands
is
dignity, yellow
on a
envy, white
flag
symbohze
innocence,
(one's) nation
red
love;
and mother-
it is
doubtful
may be
may be).
land,
etc.
And
there
is
it is
firing
of a rocket to start an
at-
has frozen,
etc.,
187
have suggested.
is
always a substitutive
thing. It is also
some-
is
symbols from
to distinguish the
first
require certain
The
all
issue is as to
what
is
represented by a symbol.
I fol-
justified in protesting
in general.
My
the symbol
is
assertion
is
the representation
courage,
justice,
nationahty, etc.
this is
is
why
hterature,
Communism
social systems,
love,
envy,
mourning,
dignity,
consists
all
and
mass movements, propaganda
men by
presenting to
is
in a
difficult to
grasp
It is
it
is
closely con-
188
may
know
abstract
to
the truth.
particular their
is
linked
with the
that
second
of representing
function
is its
is
of
specific
abstract
To understand any
the
sjrmbol,
appropriate
convention
must be known. Those who do not know the Old and the New
Testament, Greek and Roman mythology, who do not know
from very childhood) the symboUsm of colours as used
in Europe, who are not versed in our political life and in the
symbohsm of the various national emblems and colours
(usually
will
fail
to
symboUsm of
is
deities,
so because
is
artificial,
cultural circle
in the East
it is
it is
black which
is
as that in the
European
it is
purple which
is
it
is
wisdom, courage,
if
compared
virtue, etc.,
in
common
the
The
by a symbol
first
such
is
trait.
always
It
has
been said that in the case of the symbol we have to do with the
substitution of
object,
189
Were
not so,
it
it
is
is
But a symbol
is,
The
and white
artist
or the sculptor
who
picture will be
or
it
will
the intermediary of
what
is
is
general through
particular.
in literature).
frequently
(especially
such
formula-
tions as "the
as
as
of wisdom,
And
etc.
emblems
(the
in the story
|f.
Of
image
usually
course,
is
etc.)
it
also
abstract in character,
sometimes
some
it
and
imaginary
combinations of colours
flags),
interpretations
links with
(e.g.,
(e.g., as
association
symbols of emotions),
as national
(e.g.,
its
through
explanation
of national
in such a case
the
swastika),
symbols of
infinity,
negation, etc.)
J90
conventional.
gestures in
Hindu dances,
Sound and
the symbolism of
aromas so wide-
etc.
their
For
ing of bells
instance, a slow
is
i|
mourning; the same holds, by analogy, for the melody and the
rhythm of a
way of illustration, and not as any exhaustive enumeration. The gamut of symbols is extremely wide
and its possibilities almost unlimited. But in all the cases we
All this
is
only by
symbol
is
(represents)
(which
is
the function
such a representation
not
symbol,
organically
stricto);
when based on
possible only
replaces
it
etc.)
that
intuition
sions.
purpose,
and
This
is
fact
is
conformity
in
adjusted
is
to
the
ordinary
sense
of
language
expres-
with
existing
by history
offer a certain
ilarities
to
but
if this
is
is
phenomena
it
pertains,
191
more
forcefully
which
problem
names
us that terminology
is
semantics above
It is
all
which
is
it
it
comes to the
classification of things
comes to the
As already mentioned,
of language.
cognitive function
typology and
Husserl's
Cassirer's
is
made
to
include
signs the
all
and thereby
is
which
extended so as to cover
all
similarity
the signs
they obscure, as
we
all
important
specific
signs
with marked
common
characteristics.
192
The
understood in a proper,
all
i.e.,
way
restrictive,
is
enormous, above
scholars as
and
social
myths. That
is
it.
proper solution of
an open issue. Marxism is the trend potenmost suited to undertake that difficult but promising task.
So far however the matter remains in the air.
The understanding of the nature and function of symbols*!
depends above all on the criterion adopted for the classification of
that problem
is still
tially
is
Ausdrilcke,
iff*
which practice
virtually
eliminates
the
ij
off!
possibihty
i!
'j
occurring in the
all signs
process of
tarbinska
is
but that
dichotomic
classification,
any interesting
is
if
Ko-
many
certainly
though formally
results
in practice
This
is
between the
signal, the
sign.
symbol
(in the
may be
Morris,
S.
as arbitrary as
might appear
how
by no means
reminds
signs.
As already
sifications
of
or categories,
indicated, there
and the
signs,
may
is
distinction of
in
my
opinion,
there will be
may
no
ever, to devote
analysis of
classification which,
the
is
We
193
classification,
collision
criteria,
should
like,
and
how-
in the light
difficulties
mean
on
movements such as gestures, facial expressions, expresmovements of the body, etc. Do not those signs express
I
physical
sive
above
all
human
consequently with
it
its
experiences
and
particularly
is
it
it
not
the
of
all
it
must be said
communication process,
all
this
is
the classes
we have
distinguished:
that
accompany
indices; gestures
speech
may
and
facial expressions
may be
phenomena
classed as
movement of
the
presents
no
difficulty.
Thus there
adopted in our
is
no cause
classification
for alarm.
194
So
we have been
far
As
signs
and
their
specific nature.
5.
The
and consequently
and
life,
its
And
investigation.
in the Upanishads,
From
we
It is
came
is
main
subject
human
attention.
And
role in
precisely
it
its
the
is
found
is
its
first:
categories of signs;
it
is
and
possible to differ
But
it is
was and
is,
all
the
known
which progress
impossible.
and a
triviality that
especially in semantic
analysis.
For
it
it
is
might be
only seemingly
follows from
that
unless
we
with
cannot be explained
it
195
all
other "languages". If
it is
all
of signs are "imbued" with meaning taken over from the verbal
and that they shine with reflected light, then the division into
the (phonic) language and "languages", drawing attention to the
signs,
contemporary
raise
semiotics,
is
also justified.
semiologies,
etc.
And yet
the various
which
after
all
signs
subject
verbal sign.
For
all
on the
is
to denote the
and other
signs
and simply
adds to the confusion. In some cases the term used is just "the
sign", which is certainly correct, but by being too general does
if
we bear
conceals
concep-
mind
tions
specific
neither
just a sign
sense of the
theories.
is
196
would be
scienti-
defini-
the operation
fic
childishly naive
tion which again obscures the specific nature of the verbal signs.
Thus, the verbal sign complies perfectly well with the general
definition of the sign as
principal property,
is
communicated.
is
Can any
the
tives
way
on
Such information concerns above
positive information be
in
found in the
literature
mean
common
we
take authors
who
Rubinshtein,
we
Delacroix,
them
is
that
when we
proper
signs,
we do not
H. Delacroix, Le language et la pensee, Paris 1924; C. JI. Py6HHOcHoebi oOufeu ncuxoAoauu [The Principles of General PsycholoChap. XI: "PeMb" [Speech], MocKsa 1946; W. M. Urban, Language
7
uuTeflH,
gy],
and Reality, London 1951 S. Ossowski, "Analiza poj?cia znaku" [An Analysis
1926,
of the Concept of Sign], reprinted from Przeglqd Filozoficzny,
Nos. 1 & 2.
;
197
to such
is
an extent confused with meaning that except for the cases of disturbed perception we do not reahze the existence of the material
aspect for the verbal sign.
an
sential; this is
As
to
who has
"transparency to meaning"
the formulation
issue that
that
not es-
is
is
of the problem. But the fact that the otherwise diverging opinions are in agreement
When we
we
implication
its
at least
on the
speak of
subject.
signs,
substitutive
signals,
and
signs
symbols,
serve the
by virtue of the
communicating
parties understand
them in one and the same way, each of such signs informs the
communicating
parties.
Each of these
signs
is
in a relation to
and to a
a sign,
definite
i.e.,
and
between them,
relations
about which
it
conveys information,
functions
it
only as
it
is
always a fact that the relation between the material and the
semantic aspect of the sign admits of a certain "autonomy" of
meaning;
meaning
this
is
signifies
that
except
for the
iconic
signs
it
(in the
sign,
is
all
which
must
signs
is
signs.
This
is
why we can
all
the
so because
and
categories
we
of
are simply
14
198
and
signs,
is
a secondary
process, a result of the various conventions (in the broad, historical sense of the term),
and
it is
and as such
And what
it
about verbal
is
is
always
signs,
is
and language
quite different
first
of
as their system?
all,
because they
form a
whole. There
is
separately,
and
that
sign
concept-and-verbal-sign.
exists
Of
is
no thinking
no concept
is
separately,
that exists
is
only
who
think
there
that not only can one think without resorting to verbal signs,
to language, but that
from Plato up
it
many
is
believers in
which
is
"true".
etc.
It is
they
by
sadly
repeat
mehr".
so
who
Stalin, in his
From
Marxism and
the
Problems of Linguistics.
munication
why
this is
ing",
if
we
reject
199
although
it
is
it
And
is insufficient,
between the phonic aspect (the sound picture) and the meaning
(the conceptual content)
It is
esting
made an
inter-
is
the sound
ceptual content (de Saussure used the terms signifiant and signifie,
is
a psychic entity
same way
To
different angle.
we must
it
sign"
is
sisting
entities
There
is
also
trivial
200
consisting in aphasia
when a person
preserves the
memory
of the
Both
to him.
and
said
is
we have
to
do with a
certain
anomaly
And it is here,
persons.
problem
arises:
how
is
its
although
it
is,
unfortunately, unavoidable
Two
One of them
is
exist independently
between a
definite
sound and a
is
this connection.
who
maintain that
definite
when
the periodical
Mind
similar position
con-
was
oc-
Delacroix, op.
cit.,
!'
and
'
p. 365.
p. 398.
201
associated with
meaningly.
variation
of the associationist
who
defended by Martinak
Be
that as
it
That
indirect, that
is
as
it
and
originally
sound with a ready meaning, which consequently must have been somehow ontogenetically shaped outside
the language and independently of it. The verbal sign is here
treated in the same way as any other sign with relation to which
ciation of a ready
meaning
is,
as
we have
seen,
"autonomous",
i.e.,
shaped outside
by the nature of
their links
differ
from other
signs
Biililer
endeavour to
as
"simply
naive"
its
The other
attitude
is
specific
that
the meaning
and marked precisely by this
is not "autonomous", that it can neither be shaped
nor appear outside of that unity which is language-and-thinking,
word-and-idea. The only argument, and a very naive one, is that
to other signs
of a verbal sign
we
10
E. Sapir, Language,
New York
1921, p. 10,
202
when we
is, when
start to think in
when we
cease to translate,
their
What
is
generis that
is
another question.'
such an answer
is
controversial (which
is
thesis,
or even
case,
does not of
here,
itself refute
connection
between sound and meaning in the verbal sign, although supported by formidable arguments,
still
attempt to offer
attention,
signals, will
There
is
be discussed below.
Whitney.
11
F.
It
who
referred
to
de Saussure,
p.
99.
w
The Sign: Analysis and Typology
the
stressed
signifie (in
to be
nature
arbitrary
and the
signifiant
community
given language
free,
but
way with
same time
203
sounds of words
words
is
not
conditioned socially.
is
is
sharply
the
criticize
conception
of the
arbitrary
of
its
connection
being established
must
tivist literature. It
adherents
among
only
also be
formahstically-minded
failed to notice
historical
logicians
and
who
social character
It has,
For a
linguist
ample,
S.
L.
Rubinshtein
as
apphed
historical
its
criticizes
to language signs
analysis,
is
quite natural
cognitioni2.
is
genetic,
conventions, and
and comprehensible.
its
similar argumentation
is
12
13
is
thesis
is
some natural
204
verbal signs
is
The view
is
it is
its
is
the
"partner", but
generis
hnk of
if,
less
if,
we
physical shape
with which a no
and only
independent meaning
is
combined
in this
when we
ceive the material shape of the sign (except for cases of disturbance
in the
of
its
is
is
now, as referred
The
verbal signs should not be confused with that specific and very
useful
I
subclass of substitutive
in
signs
conformity
already
with
analysed,
which
current linguistic
symbols
connection between sound and meaning in verbal signs comes out against
calling the latter symbols, because
is
Urban
also
is
is
most laudable.
is: if
what
206
is
in turn
And
we
fashion, than
we impart
if
an arbitrary
of symbols to verbal
in
term
want to avoid.
The verbal sign
For
all
or
and thus
it,
so,
which
is
oblit-
just
what
is
the respect for those suggestions (since thus far they are
research)
it is
is
just
No
is
was a
brilliant scientist.
no one
certainly
is
precisely in the
is
bound
all his
one denies
name of
done).
Anyhow,
one
is
of signals
at
least in that
form
in
is
known
at present.
The contradiction
from
his
many
as can be seen
Wednesdays,
and
of
the
of signals
verbal
sign.
is
Hence
denial
the
of
danger
that
of
specific
nature
vulgarization
206
of
problem
the
(similar
the
to
vulgarization
characterist
of behaviourism).
is
verbal statement
the process of
and
is
human communication,
the signal
qualitatively
after all
par excellence
linguis-
produce conditioned
the
may
is
"imbued" with
is
is
reflexes in animals.
different,
it
is
all,
in every disci-
free to
is
sufficiently
precise.
meaning
in a conventional
human
same
reflexes is the
in
is
man and
of conditioned reflexes?
field
attitude
It
also
is
not
is
Now
man
and of the
my
both to the
the point
socially.
we encounter problems
But in so
and consequently
always conditioned
implies that
in the animal.
of communication processes,
towards them.
nected with
on the
if
identically referred
is
his
conditioned reflexes
of
human communication,
And
and are
man
can-
man
This
is
why we have
qualitatively
to
from the
Whoever
differs
fails
to
207
notice that,
human organism
the
tions,
as
is
phenomena
is
all
a vulgarization.
Matters become
would have to
is
a misunder-
man's social
life.
Of some
other signals?
(e.g.,
do not appear
beyond a suggestion.
Thus, at best we do not know what kind of signals is meant.
In a worse situation, we do know, and then we may say that in
principle there are no such "signals" in human social processes.
What then is that signal of signals? The same signal, only on
got
human
is
an adherent of
dialectical
just
it
is
better to
208
even
if
now
say the
to
is,
least,
is
is
why we have
neither a signal,
nor
we must
abandon
rather
that
terminology.
known
of the other
its
ovm
at all
names have
it is
specific nature.
is
may
its specific
some of those
it
signs.
can
The
verbal signs
properties
classification
of signs
special significance
is
and
made. This
role
is
communication process.
The second
is
first (i.e.,
the
process
From
is
in fact
and
role
of abstraction.
other sign,
There
which
is
evidently a product
nothing strange in
this.
is
all
perception
connected with
would not be
possible.
of sign which,
is
in
observable
functioning
209
human communication,
subject to
is
all
is
may
all
formulate
simphfy,
is
toto,
etc.,
between the
differentiation
The point
something
is
an
in
that every
abbreviated
all
these cases
it
mental image;
as generic
instrument, which
specific
property,
is
its
it
and
to be separated
As
the psychologists
in our
kind
here
mind with
of connection
is
tell us,
with
is
is
associated
a totally different
is
involved
verbal sign
is,
its
who
understand a
given sign in the same way). Because of the unity of sound and
its
word
if it
is
not
strictly
which subsumption
210
Of course,
would require
special researches
And
finally,
my
purpose.
its
from the point of view of a precise communication between men. The issue here is so obvious that no lengthy
special properties
analysis
needed.
is
do communicate,
in fact
means of
manual "conversation"
As has already been
style
is
is
grammar of
the
simplest
kind for
relativity,
this
or
that
nor even
language
is
which makes
and its rise to highand higher levels of abstraction, which makes it possible to
discover and formulate increasingly wide and profound regularities in the universe, and thereby enables man to become the
master of the world. One may complain about the ambiguity and
possible a further development of thinking
er
imprecision
ularly convenient
and
flexible
is
and endowed with almost boundless possiof perfecting itself. And this is one of the most important
improvement
bilities
is
The
undertaken in
21
analysis
on the
this
quite natural
justified
by
essential reasons.
my
One of such
work.
It is
now
lems of meaning.
To
Chapter Three
'When
use a word',
means
ful tone,
'it
nor
'The question
less'.
mean
diiTerent things',
'which
is
to
Humpty Dumpty
what
just
is',
choose
mean
neither more
you can make words
said Humpty Dumpty,
to
'The question
be master
it
that's
is',
all' ".
U
(Lewis CarroU: Through the Looking-Glass}
"Men
use,
as if the very
peau,
vous
s'il
plait".
understand you."
my
He
repeat the
is
same thing
mon
cha-
do not
English: "Give me
to reply: "I
in
me my
hat.
One of
flashes red.
traffic light
"You
means
that
stops of his
own
volition
when he
sees a red
light.
He now
And
so
it
always
sign-situations:
is
when we have
to
do with
signs
and with
sign in question.
in
sign-situation
in the process
or,
of human
i(
if
we
213
by means of
signs;
it is
When
speak, write,
crossings,
at street
draw maps or plans, fix "poison" labels on bottles, sew epaulettes on uniforms, hoist signal flags, etc., then in every case I am
using certain signs for communication purposes (even a mental
monologue
is,
as
we know,
has already been said that sign and meaning form a unity
which
is
in question
is
not understood,
is
metaphysicians.
an
sign,
if
signs,
must take
and meaning.
we have
we
it
as to
it
signs,
we have been
unavoidable in
all
is
not the
we
have to do with a mutual inter-relationship or with a close connection between the aspects or elements of the phenomenon under
is high time now to fill that gap, for otherwise
both the analysis of the sign and consequently the analysis of the
investigation. It
is
suffer.
The more so
since
the
life,
if
not for
15
214
other reasons),
complicated and
difficult.
now
the limits of
my
interests
and
indicati
shall disregard.
'
Ogden and
C. K.
I.
is
Illj
actually
and shows that the actual usage is marked by a chaos "not dreamedi|
of in our philosophy", although
it is
To put an end
which are
in actual use. In
many
as
term,
ings.
In
all,
additional, secondary
mean-
list
it
Is
exhaustive?
Do
meanings?
These questions are certainly important and interesting from
and
to
We
Moreover,
term "meaning"
manner
(in
languages).
list
(in
it
would hardly be
possible
any
rigid
We
of that term
group which
refers
to
the interpretation
communication
process,
the
function
which
makes
possible
215
we
say,
is
process, then
we
as
is
we
we
restrict
do not eliminate
it
first, it
all
considerably. That
absolves us from
which we are
more
interested,
strictly the
Thus,
we
are
and secondly,
it
enables us to outline
maximum
is
that
we should
G. C. Lewis:
"A
verbal discussion
of significance, but
it is
their
may be
significant or devoid
it is
verbal".
on
of those processes.
rise
1.
My
task, as I
ambiguity
arises,
ON THE SIGN-SITUATION
understand
it,
is
216
appear when we use the term "meaning" under certain circumstances, but also to
And
to subject a given
to light
its
to one's
own
different senses.
One must
is
so
controversies
is
special
most im-
to
may
importance
its
is
already
ways
either
cessful
may be
used in different
is
analysis (suc-
a further question), or as
is
That
is
is
why
among
thinkers
special stress
who
must be
are positivlaid
on the
of
Our
failure.
process of
human communication,
in analysing the
in
been defined:
it
is
the real
especially
more
to
First
all,
to
add sometliing
starting point.
is
'
responsible
problem.
[
many
for
"There
is
no
such
thing
meaning"
as
pedantry (as
is
217
is
in
this
recollection.
"Meaning"
which
refers
is
meaning, but to
worth remem-
is
bering
of
led astray
by the delusive
name
its
One
feels
/'s
refers.
it
?'s
more
meaning and notion entail some ontoland a fragmentary treatment of those problems
all,
it
all
all
an external stimulus of our sensory exThus there exist things (material objects) which in
is
word
(it
is
is
known
in
is
name
problem
is
is
treated
by
(1)
whatever
exists
has
objective
existence,
is
is
i.e.,
ex-
This interpretation
218
characteristic
is
every
But things
make
it
exist
and
relations
We
between things,
that which
(i.e.,
marks
all
in the
human mind
finds reflection in
somehow
which we
call
men,
etc.
In
all
we have
to
something what
and of
all
mind
the
etc.,
is
satisfied,
Relations,
processes,
we have
but the word
world. Consequently
material world,
an
properties,
attitudes,
in
independently
occurs
to
"exists"
speak
in this
connection of sub-
to the material
is,
etc.),
etc.,
states,
we
etc.).
say
Thus
reistic
we say
we simply
would be
some
219
ties.
ses,
It is
the
and
also
meaning, notion,
slippery
etc.
philosophical aspects
a con-
Brentano,
Husserl
and
of cognition
subjects
is
in the
is
From
others.
is
the
the
which in the
common
point
materialistic
counterpart
of various
form of things
(in the
ideal objects,
attitudes, etc.,
things.
word
(this is
and the
an analogous
this
and
issue to "existence"
Having made
essential
word
in the direct
as discussed above).
brief explanation
world
of
my
understanding
revert to the
main course
220
of
my
what
analysis.
is
Two
we
call
meaning
ap-
we have
ing. Consequently,
do with a sign-situation: for we communicate only and exby means of signs. That thesis is correct enough, yet
it conveys but little. To add something on the subject we have
to analyse the sign-situation. For that purpose I should like
to present three conceptions of Ogden and Richards, of Johnson, and of Gardiner. The choice is not accidental in so far as
all these conceptions resort to schemes similar and yet different
and somehow complementary, and as such form steps leading
to what in my opinion is a correct interpretation of the problem.
Ogden and Richards are authors of a now classical book
on the theory of meaning! and undoubtedly have in that reto
clusively
why
their
is
it
classical, in spite
formulated earlier
(cf.
Russell).
Since
considered almost
expresses
am
had been
not interested in
we
well be
since they claim that between the various elements of the relation of
meaning there
is
a causal nexus.
We
are,
above
however,
all
in the
1953,
C. K.
Ogden
&
I.
distinguish
:
the
following three
ele-
;j
ogy
is
the
same
definite
and the
artificial
inter-
terminology
is
with
221
semantic
tradition.
THOUGHT OR REFERENCE
SYMBOL
REFERENT
Stands for
(an imputed relation)
TRUE
The
situation
and to the
is
clear.
The authors
refer to
communication
shown
in the
is
an
when we have
do with a
the
similarity
suggestion
that
the
sign-situation
is
2 Ibid., p. 20.
222
an
as
illustration
because
its
interprets
it
is
a rather typically
social sciences.
have chosen
an
and
their
communication
arrangement also
is
is
and that
different,
in a characteristic
A
The Speaker, or SLjmbol User
Fig.
Not only
the
(reference,
ref-
is
used
yet this
to such
my
York
E.
S.
1956.
Johnson.
Theory
is
is
and Practice of
the
Social
Studies,
New
223
i.e.,
is
still
and so avoids a
consequently,
(and,
is
different
picture.
and consistently
of communication
in
to consist),
of the
Gardiner
social theory
sign-situation),
relation.
Gardiner
is
an eminent
which,
statements
teristic
"As a
linguist.
his charac-
my
approximation,
first
let
between man and man, of articulate sound-signs for the communication of their wishes and their views about things. Note
that I do not deny the thought-element in speech, but the emphasis of
which
my
wish to
stress
are,
lie
firstly,
is
it
is
always concerned
added the
actual
listener,
words themselves" 6.
metrical figure
all,
is
with the
Ibid., p.
Ibid., p. 28.
18.
i
224
five.
number of the
The geometrical shape is ir-
separately, the
relevant here
base, etc.).
is,
as
we
is
common
have
term
very
ing",
problem which
resembles ours. We are seeking the sense of "meanand Marx wanted to explain the sense of "value". In the
much
who
investigated
that
is
"embodied"
in
is
225
phenomenon
situation:
is
now
An
analogous
here, too,
who
is
between men who "produce" signs (or use them). This credit
if it is
tions of theirs. I
mention
it
must
is
to be
found
Morris,
is
and the
Gardiner, of course,
is
objective reahty.
signs.
But
this fact
does
not hmit the significance and the general vahdity of what he says.
Linguists,
communication process.
On
the contrary,
the importance attached to the role of those signs veiled all their
is
the
.226
The statement
"...
am
about everything
short,
is
my
about
writing,
ever to
realistic
make wide
Why,
house,
appeal,
my
books,
in the world.
else
it
must
this
my
family, and, in
If linguistic theory
clearly be placed
The rudest
than at present.
basis
that
villager
all
upon a more
knows
that
can see or
from the
theorist
of language?" 7.
It is
not
difficult to
of
texts,
to
what
"sign
is
both in the
implicitly
text of
John-
is
at the
word he combines
may
Gardiner, one
least
in
sign
say that
into
an
indivisi-
be in solidarity with
the sign-situation
occurs when at
and thought
in declaring oneself to
all,
role of the
some
who
perceives
and
interprets
it
7 Tbid.,
p.
22
(italics
A. S.)
227
ter that
moves.
Thus we are
on the
and
begin with a
list
drawn as to include both the opinions which are in fact represented, and also such important combinations as can be obtained
by manipulating the elements of the
^
sign-situation:
(1)
meaning
is
(2)
meaning
is
a property of objects;
(3)
meaning
is
an
is
a relation:
ideal object,
is
the name;
or an inherent property of
thought
(4)
meaning
(a)
between
signs,
(d)
(e)
between the
by means of
Of
course, like
of schematism, but
in
all
it
signs.
classification,
this
sin
the
people's views,
own
it
standpoint.
criticism
of other
228
2.
Nothing
is
thought
which communication
pertains, or the,
which is inseparably
to divorce them
for
it
connected
j
from
that
:j
i|
contradiction
with
its
identification
about
as
raised
by Husserl
p. 47,
analysis).
His conclusion
8
Kritik,
G. Frege,
is
"Vom
1892; there
Philosophical
9 B.
is
an English-language version
Writings of Gottlob
Russell,
Frege,
in Translations
from
the
Oxford 1952.
after
B,
Russell,
t!
229
we ask "What
When
their designata,
agreement
concerning these
expressions
different.
may
This can
reach a linguistic
and formulate
their
definitions without realizing that they refer to one and the same
object.
There
is
questions
different
different
meanings
latter case,
its
of a sign
we
is
the
correct in stating:
express
we ask about
its
its
reference.
its
By means
reference"io.
of descriptions).
We
meaning and denotation. That distinction is equivalent to the statement that in a certain sense "meaning" is identical
with the object of which the given expression is the name (I understand here the term "expression" in a broad sense, covering
tion between
Frege, op.
cit.,
p. 61.
16
230
This
is
an indubitable
fact
"What does
...
under
(2)
an ideal
The "object"
is
understood here in a
specific
sum of
entity,
i.e.,
its
connotation,
is
way, as
the properties
an ob-
equivalent to meaning.
B.
is
The conception of
intentional
In our classification,
are
now
meanings
Husserl's theory
is
listed
we
T. Kotarbiriski, Elementy
...
[Elements...],
under
we take
Lwow
(3),
ideal object,
1929.
Husserl's
tion.
must therefore
anon.
I
in this
I
231
justify
my
classification,
explanation
but of that
much
as to
why
For
if
this there
striking,
and
my
in
is
standing. Regardless of
positivist trends,
doubt in direct
serl's
all
phenomenology.
Husserl's
philosophy
is
undoubtedly
importance should be attached to the postulate of formal correctness and precision of analysis. I am not one of those adherents of the
Lwow-Warsaw
school
who
are so
"radical" in
is
scientific.
There-
do under-
often find
fore I
that difficuh.
But
"I
12
sions],
1-^
can
fall
K. Ajdukiewicz,
Lwow
scientific character in
philosophi-
znaczeniii wyrazen
1931.
Warszawa
1949.
'
232
Or
is
it
most important
What
point.
is
important
says,
an
not the
is
is
ij
seem necessary
It is
more
attention than
would
'
at first glance.
is
addressed to
meaning and of
The
intentional
act does involve his entire system including his epoche, eidos,
Wesenschau,
the
theory
of universals,
phenomenological
the
Otherwise
etc.
it
word about
is
tional conception.
would be easy
On
How
not a
works of Pohsh adherents of the intenthe contrary, when reading those works it
that in the
sharply
men
is
con-
such a flagrant
not
It is
my
intention to
all
form of quotations,
theses without which
as far as possible)
in my
opinion
it
shall begin
fact
that Husserl
of ideal
233
but also
entities,
considers
im Sinne von
darum
Sie sind
in der 'Welt', so in
existieren;
Greiste
'allgemeinen Gegenstdnden\
nicht Gegenstande,
einem
wenn
die,
oupdcvLoi;
xo-koc,
nicht irgendwo
oder im gottlichen
ware absurd"i4.
we read on:
Wer sich daran gewohnt
And
our scepticism
grows as
"...
dem
wird
die
grundverkehrt erscheinen:
finden,
als
als
Anzeigen
fiir
die
iiber
nun
sich
fragt,
als
'wahrhaft
seiender
In der Tat:
Gegenstand'
logisch betrachtet,
die
vom
Krafteparallelogram
werden
zugesprochen
sind
ein
miisse.
sieben regelmassigen
die sieben
Weisen; der
Stadt Paris"i5.
What
important
is
is
that
14
And
that fact
is
beyond
entities,
and meanings
dispute:
15 Ibid.
own
a secondary issue.
is
2, Pt. 1,
HaUe
1913, p. 101.
234
"Naturlich
ist
...
mit
stellen
Die
dem
idealen
Gegenstdnde
...
wahr-
existieren
vom dem
Rote,
sie als
die
muss
all
...
was
ist,
mit Recht
auf
Wahr-
Seins
seiend und
im Denken als
als so
als
sein,
seiend
In der Tat
verwerfen diirfen.
Whoever
fails
is
an objective
intentional
conception
of meaning.
|
"Wir haben bisher vorzugsweise von Bedeutungen gesprochen, die, wie der normalerweise relative Sinn des Wortes Bedeutung es schon besagt, Bedeutungen von Ausdriicken
An
sind.
Zusammenhang zwischen
als
Bedeutungen fungieren,
16
Art ausdriickliche
Ibid., pp.
124-126.
Bedeutungen
sind.
Jeder
Fall
einer
235
realisiert
Wie
Bedeutung
Zahlen
die
einer
Gesetzlichkeit
objektiv
scharf umgrenzten
festen,
Inbegriff
von
von
rein-
von generellen Gegenstanden, denen das Gedachtund Ausgedriicktwerden zufallig ist. Es gibt also unzahlige
Inbegriff
Bedeutungen sind, wahrend sie niemals zum Auskommen und vermogen der Schranken menschlicher Erkenntniskrafte niemals zum Ausdruck kommen konnen''^'^.
bloss mogliche
druck
This,
on the
again,
issue of
calls
meaning
to the principle
for
is
no comment.
Husserl's
standpoint
present
its
author's
is
opinion
we have to do
which look somewhat strange to a modern
authoritative way, but also
I confine
in
myself
not only
deliberate:
the
most
them
inexactly.
this
is
When
speaking
meaning
and changeable, and meanings as ideal entities which
are unchanging. Thus meaning always is one and the same, but
its expressions can be various and changeable. Now there is a
vacillating
17 Ibid.,
pp. 104-105.
236
direct passage
and
its
tasks.
wo immer
sie
von
Begrif-
This
is
Husserl,
quite comprehensible
who
in that matter
meaning as an
ideal entity
is
is
when
it
is
realized that
for
is
<l
;j
'
is
The
is
"Die
Ideahtat
Bedeutung
des
zeigt sich in
difference
Verhaltnisses
zwischen
identical
logic.
Ausdruck und
(z.
B.
Lautgebilde
meinen, den
The matter
is
quite clear,
when we have
18 Ibid.,
pp. 91-92.
19 Ibid.,
pp. 42-43.
to
e.g.,
ij
'
"the square
237
is
is
itself
is
its
For Husserl,
of that statement.
occurrences
exist as
an
this
sufficient
is
"Mein
Urteilsakt
vergehend. Nicht
ist
ist
und
Hohen
und Vergehendes. So
Punkt
oft ich,
oder
sie
urteilen,
iiberall dasselbe.
Es
ist
verschieden.
das
ist
Identisches,
So verhalt
falsch
es
ist
die
sie
im strengen Wortverstande
selbe geometrische
Aussagen,
erkennen wir
ein
und
eine
auch jeweils
...
mag
auch, was
Wahrheit.
sie
sagen,
in evidenten
sie darin"20.
As we
entity
it is
amounts
us not
into
someis
but
20 Ibid., p. 44.
(as
demonstrated
above)
238
is
what
common
is
to these
is
constructed
what
etc.)
is
i|
extrapolated,
said to be a proposition or
is
That
it is
a construe-
tion
Hence Husserl's
ideal object or as
serl
"Meaning
an
as
This
is
'
Now
that
we know, probably
clearly enough,
let
how
Husserl
us pass to inten-
and
eidetic seeing,
were formulated; yet that work already includes ideas that came
to be the foundations of those theories. This refers above
meaning
as
an ideal
all
entity,
to
and
'
"Was 'Bedeutung'
ist,
ist,
sein,
We
ist.
Es
lasst sich
ist
same meaning
the
231)
it
ion of self-evidence.
That
namely the
criter-
criterion,
by Husserl from
"...
sich
die
soil;
durch
erst
um eine blosse
Erklarungsergiebigkeit
ihre
heit in
Franz Brentano.
master,
his
als eine
Hypothese,
rechtfertigen
only
is
an ideal
entity,
in Husserl's
that
meaning
is
accessible to us
conception of meaning.
As already
in
is
acts
intentional
21
act,
as
Ibid., p.
183.
22 Ibid., p.
100.
23
Cf. the
understood by Husserl
posthumous
collection
(and
consequently
240
we
we have
when
at the
same time it includes a lot of other theses, such as a soberly thinking man must consider to be at least strange, theses which are
taken over as part and parcel of the theory of intentional acts.
According to Brentano (Husserl adopts
manner of
Hus-
In
"...
der
in
im Begehren etwas begehrt usw. ... Nur eins halten wir als
fiir uns wichtig im Auge dass es wesentliche spezifische Verschiedenheiten der intentionalen Beziehung, oder kurzweg der In:
tention
(die
ausmacht)
gibt.
Weise des
Urteils, das
'Aktes'
den Sachverhalt
fiir
ist
eine andere,
wahr oder
falsch
hah"24.
an intentional
to
object, is
is
a reference
a re-
an intentional
act.
As we
shall see,
pose that
sciousness
we have
and
two things
dif-
and the
inten-
on the
us not sup-
let
There
is
241
trait
"...
Je
sie
das
und
liegt,
'Beziehung
voUzogen, eo ipso
das
die intentionale
ist
ein
ist
Gegenstand
der
existieren
iiberhaupt
Erlebnis; aber er
ist
existiert
gemeint,
und
d. h.
vielleicht
ist
gar
Wahrheit
in
nichts"26.
is
my
way of
the example of
experience
I find
how we
imagine,
It
picture of Jove
is
is
is
when
the object of
das Bewusstsein
vorgestellte
leicht
ist
Gegenstand
gar widersinnig
existiert,
ist.
Fiir
viel-
Dom,
sein.
als
den Kolner
mdssigen Tausendfldchnef'^''.
A strange theory,
that
it
to content,
in the
26 Ibid., pp.
27 Ibid., p.
372-373.
373.
242
be one at
all,
is
Elsewhere in
act.
his
identical with
is
'
ing
that
still
further
by suspend;
as
all
J.
is
M. Bochehski
only what
is
ent
it
The
is left
real
this
of the object
world
and deprived of
way,
totally
is
\.\
independ-
its
This
is
first
water,
and seems
to
entities,
is
revealed
his
meaning
the
objective idealism
of his concep-
tion of
as
an ideal
entity
in the
demonstrate below.
objective
and
No -
subjective
manner which
shall
idealism
by a bridge that
remains,
is
52.
243
'
mannigfahigen
Die
"...
entsprechenden
Rote
"...
Bedes
Bedeutung
...
verhalt
wie etwa
specie zu
in
Rote 'haben'
diese selbe
And
ideal-einen
Aktmomente
sieh also
die
Die
Bedeutungsintentionen.
die
Bedeutens,
zur
Einzelheiten
alle
"3o.
elsewhere:
Denselben
voU ausdriicklich
auf den
Beziehung
fundierenden
anschau-
Vorstellungsgehalt
und
Aktqualitat
auch
also
Akte
verleihenden
oben
d.h.
vorweg
offenbar
derselben
derselben
in
Materie.
ausdriicklichen
die
fiir
in
in
ausgesprochen
reelle
haben,
Bedeutungsmdssiges,
ihr
Wesen zusam-
menfant"3i.
Thus the
situation
is
clear.
as
it
were,
specifications
of ideal
meaning; their intentional objects coincide with the phenomenolconsciousness) correlate of ideal
ogical (i.e., appearing
in
meaning.
Meaning
is
thus
an
ideal
entity
manifesting
itself
Is that
We
is
trifle
as
theory
Husserl, op.
31
Ibid, pp.
cit.,
p.
420-421.
100.
of meaning.
marked by
hold
extra-
244
intellectual
who can
only Bergson
It is
is
precisely
vie with
him
in that respect.
What'
cal,
My
attitude
meaning,
ideal
self-evident
is
Husserl's philosophy
to
and unequivocal
seeing, eidetic
eidetic
entities,
who
that of a philosopher
my
In
of
opinion the
reduction, transcendental
views,
Why?
philosophy.
mands,
which
among
:\
\[
method
and de-
other
things,
that
communicability
inter-subjective
Nor do
said.
My
the
is
possibility
due to the
have said,
verifica-
do not maintain
of solving
atomism
am more
philosophical
ophy and
"liberalism", as
positivists,
As
is
garb.
on the
(a
series
lot
In
delivered
his
in
between philos-
of the
sceptical about
controversies.
relation
attitude
an
is
certainly
interesting
of truth.
between science and philoswhat you more or less know and philosof
is what you do not know. Philosophy is that part
about,
opinion
science which at present people choose to have an
"...
ophy
ophy
is
;j
that
1|
idealistic
clear opposition to
in thinking,
of
that science
is
had
it
become
. . .
245
they
ing,
charm of it
in the
fact that
you can play with hypotheses. You can think out this or that which
may be true, which is a very valuable exercise until you discover what
is
when you
true; but
discover what
is
whole
true the
is
curtailed,
and you
will
fruitful
abandon
The fact that philosophical controversies continue for miland that the basic standpoints in those controversies have
survived millennia, the fact that to this day there are discussions
lennia
man
Xenien:
his
dem andern.
Doch keiner
all this
at least
some of
serl
and
if
entities, if
their
eyes
which
demand
my
is
is
scientific
aplomb that
and that
am
it is
it,
my
opponents
is
them a
and
and methodologically
B. Russell,
anti-scien-
32
wrong?
justified
precisely
in the
What then
their standpoint
What
Russell's
correct.
ascribe to
But
it
all
from
definite
that
is
17
246
defect:
does not
it
And
opponent
if lie sticks
original
to his
this
tles
it
is
is testified
byj
beheve that
this
why
in a discussion as to
it is
nor do
so,
philosophy.
Butj
And
the
sion
is:
not
agree
adherent
may
neither be ignored
'
'
nonsense.
What
of
do
all,
then
is
exist.
as a philosopher,
may
be
won
operate in
only by convincing
my
op-
makes
my
no way
certain.
But in order not to be at a loss on that slippery ground of philosophical problems, where one
moves
in a different
way from
where one
is
is
And
From the
if
realize which
way and
to
is
where one
is
no small one.
is
going.
certainly not
much,
i|
MEANING AS A RELATION
3.
Among
247
(1)
two
will
last,
now be examined
in detail,
whereas the
rest
will
to
know the
translation of
'la
thereby to
when
know
Consequently
and
am
satisfied
that
It
I
is
have come
also similar
do not know,
the
is
mechanism of explanation
involved here
by
its
is
in this case
is
different.
What
For instance,
ask "What
such an answer as
"A
is
and
an explanation as to what a
In these cases meaning
is
differential gear
as
much
obtain
wanted
is.
known
may
to us or a definition of a
word given
is
in that language.
When
the sign
248
on a broader
is
We
required.
list,
in
we
shall
when
is
only in such
all
is
to a psychological or mentalistic
human body
in a social interpretation
human
human organism
we
ap-
The
is
most
marked
meaning
all,
I shall
my
reser-
"meaning"
is
name of
and the
in Pavlov's terminology)
In other words,
"meaning"
is
it
reflex associated
is
249
with that sign.
traditionally called
is
human organism
in fact a reflex of
to the sign
(signal).
of certain
study
Nevertheles,
organism.
philosopliical
direct,
physiological
specific
his
human
of
reactions
These
implications.
implications
appear
all,
mean
here pragmatism.
Not pragmatism
as
inates
common name
very
ions
which
cisely
in certain points
come
is
close to materialism.
It is
pre-
When
conception,
his ideas
In his article
"How
to
Make
action
He
To develop
its
(i.e.,
thinking's
says:
Ch.
S. Peirce,
of Change {Selected
Press 1958, p. 123.
"How
to
is
to
A.
produce habits of
meaning, we
S.)
what habhs
Make Our
Writings of
is
it
involves"^^.
Charles
S.
Peirce),
produces,
it
in
Stanford
a Universe
University
250
And
then he concludes:
"It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third
of clarity of apprehension
is
as follows: consider
what
grade
effects,'
is
itself is
very
we
later on,
although
fluence
pragmatism
itself,
and
on other philosophical
at the
in-
trends.
human
action.
"What
if
static 'relation'
34 Ibid., p.
35
ism".
124.
articles
"What Pragmatism
Is?"
and
"'Issues
of Pragmat-
them
into
like
an a
particle,
25]
if
grow
active
and
lie
Schiller then
untaristic interpretation of
meaning, and
meaning
is
states that
"meaning
is
with respect to
relative
is
given by George H.
effects
of the direct
in-
human organism
by gesture"39.
"Meaning
is
it
field
of experience into
itself.
The
re-
meaning of that
Meaning involves a
gesture"40.
it
this reference
37 Ibid.,
38
responded to in
indicates or initiates,
by another organism
p. 389.
39 Ibid.,
pp. 75-76.
40 Ibid., p. 78.
252
is
the meaninfi]
of the gesture"4i.
in
operationism
and
influence
All
semiotic.
in
these i
of experimenters
resentatives
tivism)
from the
who combatted,
aimed
at
the
be said that
new
(neo-posi-
sciences
at least subjectively,
the metaphysics
whether or
is,
how
how
all criticism
it
must
interesting
physicist
in
that
who
tries
count above
all
number of
man and
is
Two
equal to the
sum of
the opera-
*! Ibid., p. 81.
far
its
practical experience
253
it
is
sensible,
verbal)
Peirce,
Bridgman
"We
writes:
evidently
is
required.
To
length
is,
if
we can
an
tell
physicist
object,
we
is
therefore fixed
measured are
much
as
length
is
when
fixed: that
is,
more than a
set
set
of operations by which
is
synonymous with
is
physical,
is
measured; or
if
the concept
is
mental,
as of
tions,
gregate of magnitudes
And
is
continuous "^2.
it"43.
is
"If a specific
find operations
42 p.
p.
W. Bridgman, The
5.
43 Ibid., p. 7.
it ... I
believe
New York
1927,
254
many of the
that
subjects will be
brings
is
made
meaning
to
is
(e.g.,
prehensibility of certain
words
still")
(e.g.,
"Woggled
upon
such statements as
i.e.,
is,
some
sense)
and
is
is
devoid of practical
scientific
statement.
neo-positivists in their
The
basic ideas
tionists are
found
in neo-positivism to
its
conceptions.
was shaped
An
New York
is
to be
1953.
255
is
(cf.
Wittgenstein)
marked by
At
one of them
least
pressions of a language
means here
a) to use
To understand
them
ex-
in appropriate
by F. C.
images)
S.
its
of meaning-
word means
it
so-and-so'.
less
his conception
"It is
'this
who opposed
Schiller,
is
The
relation of a
of a causal law,
a
word
is
for a planet
ler's
45
which
is
its
law."
46 Ibid., p. 291.
256
"He
thing.
sense
may be
But in
his theory
images retained by
would say
memory
rather: reproduced
and produced
words
And
may
in 'thinking'. This
lines.
used
and
fully dealt
most
ideas).
be spoken of together
since
with on behaviourist
is
medium of images
this
When
seems to be a
they
telesis
re-
meaning
of signs
is
is
While in the
field
of the
first
of physiological reactions of
of the second
Yet
light
in
it
human
is
in
of a causal relation.
ideas of linking
"Meaning, in
my
view,
a characteristic of
is
300-301.
48 Ibid., pp.
302-303
(italics
A.
'signs',
and
actions
257
The
what
is
is
is still
a disciple of Russell's,
latter
if
who
we take
Ludwig
Wittgenstein,
the greater
is
from Tractatus
some dozens of
In this Tractatus, he
images,
still
years).
He
262
appHcation.
is
way
in
used, there
is
nothing
else
though
not for
all
in
the
Meaning
is
49
50
51
52 Ibid., p.
20.
is
p. 402.
London
1933.
1953.
p.
3.
258
Now
all
these views. It
we have
is
to
is
typical in
meaning of "meaning".
Among
the former
members of
particular,
Carnap.
Schlick raised the problem of
Erkenntnislehre,
and
meaning
later reverted to
it
in
his
Allgemeine
Gesammelte
in the collection
Aufsdtze.
"Meaning and
adopted by the Vienna Circle
as a whole, was that the meaning of a sign is the same as the
method of its verification. Hence a transition to the concept
of unsense that is, statements which have the grammatical
Verification"53.
form of a sentence but are devoid of sense since they are unveriSchhck combined that typically operationist conception
fiable.
(to
whom
he referred expressis
Verification",
mentioned above.
"Thus, whenever
it
mean?', what
we
we ask concerning
expect
is
meaning of
a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the
sentence is to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in
which it can be verified (or falsified). The meaning of a proposiin wliich that sentence
tion is the
53 First
54 In
method of
is
to be used
...
Stating the
its verification''''^^.
M. SchUck, Gesammelte
The
situation
is
somewhat
259
Carnap.
when he
in
meaning
to
is
Semantics)
name
of the
(cf.
The International
was
is
{Testability
and not a
confirmation,
full
verification
or falsification.
But,
related matter,
Finally,
rep-
So
far, I
such and such views on the one hand and pragmatism and behav-
we have
do with an obvious connection with such views, since semiotic was born in the union of
to
which we have
emerge
in
previously
called
the
is
why
itself
is
most
Wittgenstein. Tractatus
....
willingly
4.003.
those tendencies
biological
conception,
Meaning
human
avoided.
is
inter-
organism,
260
it is
Signs,
is
much
make a
necessary to
distinction
my
on
later
clear
Foundations
his
in his
book
sets forth
a reasonable con-
opposes
firmly
Platonizing
all
of
semiosis
is
interpretations.
In conformity
("sign-situation"
terminology).
other
in
"Nothing
such only
is
is
so far as
something through
its
as existences at
characterized in terms of
is
but becomes
it
this,
process as a whole.
'Meaning'
is
trees, rocks,
a class
is
of semiosis" 57.
The aspect
quite different
is
when
marked
it
comes
by
Max
Black^s
and
J.
to Morris's fun-
its
insigni-
ideas as
made
Kotarbinska59.
versity of
Chicago
1,
No.
2,
Uni-
Press, 1938.
57 Ibid., p. 45.
58
and
M.
Black,
Pfii/oiopfiy,
59 J.
New York
in
M.
Black, Language
1949.
6,
pp. 57-133.
is
26]
among
the basic
scientific
signifies
any and
all
it is
and
which meaning
to discriminate''^^.
fails
The declaration
is
One has
to
mean" and
time to
It is
ways to preparatory
of that "signi-
human organism
stimuli.
said so far
and
to
draw more
general conclusions.
To avoid
my
misunderstandings,
trend;
on the contrary, there are sometimes considerable difNor do I claim that the theory of meaning
61
Ibid., p.
New York
1946, p. 19.
18.
18
262
is
on the contrary,
it is
sometimes
and
a certain
is
is
common,
trends.
That solution was born of opposition to metaphysical conwhere meaning is transformed into
meaning
man's
in
and
form of a
spiritual life
and
resort
specific relation
definite action
sign.
Thus, in the
light
but with
briefly
less precision,
it
Psychological categories are here replaced by categories of objective behaviour, the action
of
human
way we
inter-
subjectively.
How
It
is
virtues.
First,
the opposition to
same source
the
Yet
ories
and
it
their
is
above
all
all,
these the-
some
ing
meaning
which take as
social
relation
fail
to notice that
between
mean-
men who
act
fall
off!
problem
in the
'
among
is
no doubt
263
(as
when
completely
is
it
fails
and interpretation
Of
approach
draw attention
etc.
number of other
to a
erroneous views
That
positive conception.
4.
One of
the
is
it
to formulate a
I shall
now
MEANING AS A RELATION
ways of
interpreting
more
satisfactory
attempt.
(2)
"meaning"
is
to conceive
It is
who
discussion.
My
misunderstandings:
is
is
on the appropriate
writings. This
is
making use of the Marxist method. This is in fact my intention and this is how my declaration is to be understood. But
from this definite deductions can be made. The study of a problem
from a certain methodological standpoint does not imply a moview,
may
264
commit an
error
and be mistaken
same
theoretical
different,
The
may
assumptions,
and even
some
in
results of research
from the
starting
in concrete
matters reach
and
theoretical
Be
that as
it
fact that
is
difiicult, intricate
and extremely
me on
I shall
say will
at variance
it
the
with
more
based
on Marxist
studies, since
principles
(primarily
theoretical
hnguistic
is
my own
sible solutions.
all effective
analysis
265
social process
Consequently,
situation.
meaning
is
a definite
we
are concerned
What
is
a word, an image,
the
if
i.e.,
etc. If
the intended
eff'ect
fact
in
been conveyed
we
What we
call
meaning
appears where
which we have referred to above in analysing the concept of
sign-situation.
become
with
are
signs only
men who
somehow
of signs,
when they
them as
use
i.e.,
It is
only
which
their
material
all
vehicles
participate,
it
is
entities,
we have
in
to
then
we
are concerned
is
266
human
involved. Similarly,
it
is
cognition
is
by
in society)
life
in a better
ing, or
what system of
There
relations.
men and
between
another;
reality ;
all
between the
sign-situation:
between
cer-
as
it
human
It is
all
on the psychological
and actions. But it
attitudes
is
is
treat such a
as
we have
not permissible to
this involves,
Thus, meaning
between
may be
etc.)
men on
first,
is,
We may
also refer to
men who
that
is
which
act
and
feel,
refer to
some
A closer explanation
of
its
elements,
of the term.
virtually
each of
mono-
human
is
at
whose every
step,
i.e.,
both as regards
and communi-
267
psychology.
in
It
we must of
connected. Thus
which are
human communication,
in the process of
that
is,
in the process
an
is
intricate
made
An
how
we
it
A
of
human
actions
is
made
we
are concerned
human behaviour
In other words,
to the sphere of
For in
it
human
fact these
situation.
it
in a subjective interpre-
subjective property of
autonomous mental
meaning to be
processes.
268
To
my
treat
opinion,
meaning as
is
definite
in
way
complicated issue) in no
from that
on
(i.e.,
of the subject
all
to
an
ambiguous
so since
we
this
in
is
sense
we might draw
of the
word
nothing detrimental in
it,
more
atten-
use
the
pedantic
of
more
distinc-
meaning of "meaning",
but rather with a theoretical view of the foundation on which all
these meanings rest. Now, to explain that aspect of the problem
requires the adoption of some definite standpoint on the issue of the
tion between the various shades of the
is,
signs, turning
it is
equally
is
269
namely the
to be examined,
must
my
and
among
logicians.
Objec-
tions
justified, since
as that of
This
meaning deviate
meaning
is testified
is
by such
and Wittgenstein.
In his well-known work published in 1919, "On Propositions:
What They Are and How They Mean," Russell thus assessed
as Russell
towards
little
they to blame in
psychology"
Many
this,
since the
problem
one for
essentially
is
62.
years later,
when
his life
to a close,
Wittgenstein wrote:
"23
in language
two statements have in common is the understanding of the fact that the approach to the problems of language,
What
meaning,
these
etc.,
exclusively
psychologism
of men's psychic
life
a separation of issues
tations in
62
human
may
may
less
life
and
action.
p. 290.
12.
it
its
lead to
manifes-
270
which appear
how
it
This
etc.
is
mological question;
of the logicians
or take
sign without
meaning?
out
first
it is
who
first
And
vehicles of
human
com-
thoughts,
episte-
either abstract
as given. But
it
in the
in turn,
is
logic,
if it
may
aspire to a full
fundamental questions.
In reply to the question posed above (what are sign and meaning?)
it
origin of
meaning
is
connected
is
meaning
in conformity with
the
when
relation
of the
refer simply to
signs,
meaning
question
able to raise
in,
lets
aspects of social
ed
is
human thought
all
life.
Here again
must
and the
related
we
are interest-
signs,
tlie
which
is,
vidual,
is
271
becomes
socially
communicable by means of
signs.
This
a social level.
similarly understood"
connected
is
in the
form of action
the origin of
standing
we may
(interpretation)
These are in
of the sign.
two
fact
Meaning and
and consequently simthought processes (but not only such the same apphes
ilar
similar
to
similar understanding,
reaction in behaviour),
are intercoimected.
shall
By what
by what
is
it
is it
evoked, and
relation since
between
its
it
The meaning of
(the
the
in fact a
is
tive
thought, which
the sign
is
term "reflection"
the sign.
used here in
its
specific philosophical
reflection
Does
all this
is
a relation?
of a (cognitive) act
Thus, meaning
is
is
moulded
here again
we
are not
272
in a sense a
human mind
time
refers.
But
same
at the
it is
is
it is
impossible
Thus
meaning there
same
the
is
Man
forming
it.
may
Marxist epistemology,
that if
we
accept
appear
trivial.
"trifles" as
But
philosophy.
process of
From the
human
human
us bear in
mind
consciousness. These
its
When we have
all)
to
an
goal,
new viewpoint on
it is
is
criterion of
acquires a
let
64
trans-
are theses
and the
and
is
it,
meaning.
e.g.,
when
is
is
reference
origin,
name that
made to
is
or to abstract pro-
in
behaviour,
etc.,
that are
common
i.e..
indi-
on human
273
When
its basis.
it
accom-
is
which
a problem
who
pologists
is
We
known
perfectly well
and anthro-
to linguists
is
genetically
which
conditions. This
it
studies
is
is
concerning
is
features
all
to their
it
human
human
activity,
makes
pos-
it
from the
linguistic
is
interest-
much
havoc in philosophy
to neo-positivism
broadly understood
that
aspect
may
the
genetic
De
no natural hnk between the linguistic sign (including its semantic aspect) and the reality to which that sign refers, is, as we know,
is
in
the times
verbis
known
since
^74
analysis of value:
common
is
game
that
sign
is
S. L.
word has
its
Rubinshtein:
own
history,
"...
The
owing to
which
hves
it
its
had
pretation
C.
its
about meaning,
it
is
it
will enable us to
on the
relation
shall see,
the meaning of a
either
two
circles.
65
K. Marx,
Moscow
66
C.
Capital,
Vol.
I,
Foreign
1954, p. 100.
JI.
Py6nHmTeHH, Ocnoebt
MocKBa 1946, p.
eral Psychology],
ooiiien nciixo.ioih'tiii
405.
[Principles of
Gen-
The Meanincjs
ferent aspects
The
first
oi
"Mkaning'"
275
as a whole.
Marxist works. In
my
opinion
is
it
and
essentially erroneous
its
defence.
is a hnwhereas
guistic category,
notion belongs to the sphere of mental
processes, and as such to the field of interest of logic, psychology
is
to
some
respect to
at
least
interest
in
the
lin-
problem of meaning.
word
etc.
word
Now,
I assert that
such a
distinc-
tion between
who
is
There
is
to
be encountered in
wise, there
is
inahsm. Let them so think; such are their views, and the conception of the relation between meaning and notion
tion
from others of
their conceptions.
is
no devia-
276
The
situation
is
different
when
it
then this
is
an
is
come
objectively to
And
claim that
expound
it is
so,
who
salonitsky68,
and
in articles
by Kovtun and
the various
relate
S.
A. Fes-
poniatiye"^^.
fact, when
we speak of meaning and notion, we speak of different phenomena and categories, phenomena and categories belonging
to different spheres of human activity? Such an idea is suggested
in this connection.
all
those cases
when
is
placed between
of
all
elements of language
...
"As has been pointed out already, the forms of the mutual
relations between the two phenomena, closely inter-connected
notion and word should be understood as the relation
67
See
68 JI.
e.g.
C.
JVe
5;
Meanings of Words]
C. A. OeccAJioHHUKHii,
in
"053op HHxe-
parypbi no BonpocaM cbhsh asbiKa h MbimjieHHa" [A Review of the Literature Concerning the Connections Between Language and Thinking], in BonpOCbl H3blK03HaHUH,
69
1953,
JV"o
Bonpocbi .H3biK03HauuH
3).
1956,
JVs
6.
277
precisely in the
is
of,
or
mutual influence of
it
As
from
Wliile
still
word and
human
Any
as
and
we may
intricate
in the
com-
munication process.
nected with
notion,
psychic
life,
of
and meaning
if in
of reflection by the
signs? Before
we
is
mind of
pass to conclusions,
let
us hear those
means of
who
defend
different categories.
based on a
70
common
B. A. 3BernHueB,
in fact
foundation.
CeMacuoAozuH [SemasiologyJ,
p.
142.
19
278
in his
assert
filosofii'^^,
words) since
it
contains
all
which
designata,
its
and
richer
science
found
quoted above;
fully agree
with
Kovtun's
in
fundamental
his
grow
knowledge develop.
scientific
article
arguments.
Thus the argumentation of those who would separate notions from meanings is based principally on the claim that in
each of these phenomena we have to do with some other cognitive content. In conformity with the reasoning adduced above,
that content
would be broader
we
means
of a word
is
that
we assume
and
mean-
meaning
that in the
essential traits
and
]X-
n. ropcKiiH,
its
1952,
Role of Language
Xs
in
4,
and
"O
po.nH
of
a3biKa
in
no3HaHHM"
now
[f this
H paSBHTMH nOHTHw"".
Concepts],
my
development,
^uAoco^uu,
intri-
1953,
JnTq
2.
Bonpocbi
[On
It
the
must
eyes
is
of
Cognition],
in
the collection
82,
85.
Mbttu.ieuiie
is
279
it
fix
in the capacity
of
words of ordin-
of
circle
specialists.
It
is
ref-
erence to
It
is
is
an
difference between
essential
Anyone can
scientific definition
easily
Probably only
make
this
unjustified
compared with
of the correspond-
and
refer-
in scientific encyclo-
that
we
wrong
are referring to
comparisons.
notions
Scientific
places
and
should
be
scientific
We
it
go into
details
self-evident that
is
then
(anyhow
for Marxists,
and
overwhelming majority
it
and
reflecting
it
"^2
when he
also
describes
reflection,
in our
military
143.
280
scientific
horse,
its
diseases, its
anatomy,
tions.
etc.
common) and
notion of the
istics
of
all
no-
scientific
scientific
terms.
It
is
and
obvious
easily
comprehensible;
and
preci-
sion with which they reflect reahty from those contents which
between a
scientific
is it
pos-
notion and
starts,
entire
who
behave
like
people of
whom Marx
an abstract notion of a
in
etc.
aesthetic,
fruit in general, a
it,
in connection
mind
emotional,
etc.,
would
scientific
like to
notion
touch
in fact
is
more
the
issue
evaporates
if
let
we compare
us
ho-
73 That opinion is defended e.g. by B. M. BorycjiaBCKHH in his work "CjioBo H noHHTHe " [Word and Concept] in the collection Mbiiujieuue u ft3biK
[Thinking and Language], pp. 245 ff. It is worth while mentioning that Bogu-
is
meaning of a word, and uses these arguments to show that a concept and the
meaning of a word are two different categories, belonging to various fields.
281
The argument
that words have a long life and have unchangwhereas notions are changeable and continue
meanings,
ing
to be
proved
it
a word.
still
and unacceptable
much
as notions.
notoriously wrong
is
who knows
is
literature
would be difficult to accept conviction that noand meanings of words belong to different fields and form
different categories. Let us now see what are the philosophical
pletely futile. It
tions
word
ing of a
by statements
am
criticizing.
"The word
has been said before that view that notion and the mean-
"Notion
at
the root
"The word
of meaning",
(the criticism
above,
is
Now,
it
is
hard
and similar
to substantiate
definite
now endeavour
As
linguistic hypostases
my
opinion.
meaning of a word
interhuman cognitive
relations,
is
tantamount to
inseparably connected
with the act of cognition, and therefore with a psychic act. I say
same way
282
What
implied, then,
is
if e.g.,
word "horses"
the
realizes or ex-
presses the notion "horses", that that notion rests at the root
such an
entity,
beyond
water, and
first
The opinion
is
"be expressed,"
that
meaning
an objective category,
etc.
objective
is
|_
help.
a subjective,
is
This
is
all
to
logicians.
Russell
numbers,
relations,
classes,
Not
etc.
all
logicians
share his
widespread in con-
is
and warnings)
that
ses,
(e.g.,
common
the
is
to linguistic hyposta-
must be a
is
is
name
own mental
own
I
abstraction process.
shall begin
not
of judgement:
as
(judgements
the
Like
the
v/ith notion,
because
issue (perhaps
in
it
acts
process
is
less
of judgement,
logical
more
still
glaring
and
propositions
as
sense).
of thinking,
the
communication process
Certainly,
in
e very-day
speech we do
occasionally
The
and
sentence,
it
is
only
283
given case,
lishing, in the
is
many
tion of
notions,
but
language
(e.g.
logicians that
the sentence
is
a relation between
(e.g.
sentences
units
of
them
notions by placing
We
utter a
sentence
the
Some
ment an
is
What
sense
logical
a judge-
the sentence.
is
is
The need
proposition)?
(i.e.,
of which
authors assert
to
what Peirce
interpret
Now
here
called
the sentence
is
"consume"
possibihty of
its
being "consumed"
as a "type" (Carnap:
the fact
many
"sign-design"),
times.
which
is
it
it
It
remains the
then appears
characterized by
comprehendingly,
of that inscription
is
surgeon will
differ
experience of a
etc.
from
and the
horses,
the like.
Yet
to
all
in all
is
some content
that
is
common
284
who knows
English under-
Why
that so?
is
to a similar
who know
from
changing
the
all
those persons
phenomenon
is
in
ment. This
is
which
itself,
all
utterances
is
is
it
be possible to prove
(in
my
logicians
who maintain
entity
It
own
acts of judgement,
is
exist
that
would
we have
logical construc-
tion, obtained
not pos-
is
many
of the
apart from
judgements,
individual
ment immutable
to
explained
its
refers
common
acts of judgement.
But
all this
ma-
terialism.
Now
the situation
is
both
roles,
it
is
pair: proposition
Yet
terminologically.
in
performs
judgecase of
the
product of abstraction, a
construction
in reality:
reflecting
common
sometliing
specific cognitive
which
properties or traits,
idealist
objectively
common
and
logical
appears,
regularities, etc.,
But no material
entity
who
an independent
.
What then is
entity,
285
when
transforms
it
into
entity.
held by materialists.
and by Marxists in particular? They arise from the fear of a nominalist distortion
more detail.
As opposed
now be
explained in
of ideal entities)
of
an
and
Both
arbi-
subjective-idealistic
e. g.,
tendencies (negation
context,
idealist
who simply
For
rightly so.
And
inter-
pretation
falls
into
the
wide-spread
is
meaning and
argument discloses
clearly
Yet
its
defenders have in
lems which
we
mind
it
dangers of ideahsm? In
my
opinion, this
is
free
possible.
from the
286
The
ogism
between
controversy
in
modern philosophy
and psychol-
anti-psychologism
is
It is
a fact
vidual.
is,
indi-
and
men
ments are
etc.
Now
psychic
too,
are
life
exclusively
of "notion", "meaning",
in the categories
classified
these elements,
of subjective experience.
in terms
If
from the
and
is
the
standpoint
latter
historical point of
is
view
it
a conception inadequate
it
psychologism
human thought
do not
is
at all
automatically
want to imply
correct
and
flawless).
successfully expose
At the same
time, these
of psychic acts.
is
criticized
On
by those who,
in
the
name of
scientific
sobriety.
come out
tions in themselves"
The
analysis
it
is
a cognitive
is, it is
that
287
is
line
reflection
are very
much diff'erentiated). But one fact remains beyond diswe insist on some metaphysical conception and
pute (unless
fact
is
One might
ses.
separate thought process and separate process of linguistic experience, but there
and
ing
is
linguistic experience.
From our
cess of thinking
and
is
The pro-
be neither analysed
which
also
is
to
and
to
semantics in
its
broader theoretical
We
a sentence.
as
it
is
osition
without
its
given verbal
form
cannot
be
expressed.
288
different categories, or
even
distinct
and
ments)
by
in
studied
are
linguistics
true that
we
our
it is
expression
sentence
is
(sentences
with
is later
on joined by
appropriate
its
meaning).
is
possible in
which a thought, or
and
is
later joined
proposition-sentences, refers
is,
it.
in
toto to
of such
the meaning of a
is
called
on the one hand and experiencing a corresponding meaning on the other. When we
pronounce with comprehension the word "horse", this is accompanied by a thought process which is the process of underseparate acts of experiencing a notion
Nothing
else
its
meaning.
*i;|
appears in
'"horse"
real
cognitive
289
processes.
then
Is
notion
of reahty which,
communication,
is
of
number of
meaning
and
human
significant consequences,
all
notion
a generahzcd reflection
point of view of
called "meaning".
means
former
(the
between
understood
being
here
And what
is
usually veiled by
The
is
different
is
may
arise
analysed as to
its
aspects.
from the
fact
various aspects?
rather simple.
(for instance,
of a word, but does not differ from the meaning of that word
when used
may now
be consid-
ered elucidated.
There
is,
how
still
requiring explana-
from an individual act of experiencing a notion or a meaning to the intersubjective communicability of that act and to its repetition within a language
community? That problem rests at the root of the speculations
on propositions, notions, and meanings, as ideal or intentional
tion
is it
possible to pass
entities, etc.
time
it is
an objective process
which
is
it
is
process,
subjective.
is
But
it
individual,
at the
same
always involves
That conten-
problems which
interest us.
2(K)
First of
all,
ses
of that relation
is
disregarded here). If
we emphasize only
namely the
is
terference of
some
usually
is
problem becomes
trends), the
done by psychologistic
in fact insoluble
without the
in-
ideal entities
all acts
the
fact that
etc.
But
it
suffices
to take into account the fact that cognitive acts of subjects which
same
the
One has
reasons.
same
most natural
as
T"
no "transcendental
ideal
When
objects,
we may add
necessary;
is
that no
are
necessary
either.
are heard by
horses
in
the
which
place
indicate.
same way,
since
Both of us understand
we know
corresponding perceptive
reproductive
or
representations
de-
systems of values,
etc.).
is
always,
apart from the elements which account for the differences between
them
an element
applies
is
similar,
not only to
of a statement
made
though not
a
"common"
identical.
understanding
by
iia
is
above
experience
entity
which
is
periences
state of
are
will experience
He
of
will
appropriate
the
because there
understand the
proposition
and
is
in
(knowledge
psychically
Why? Not
notions.
comprehendingly
nol
have to do with
still
we
the inscription
English
"sign-design" and
treated as a
is
!iJM
because
is
in turn
due to the
reflec-
does not
suffice to refer to
is
quite simple,
extremely intricate.
is
explanation
explanation then
we again
we
is
is
true;
required.
rest
What
is
the origin
satisfied
and open the door wide for conventionalism. Such was the case of the numerous positivist interpretations of the issue with which we are concerned.
the position of nominalism,
life
ferences between,
act treated as a
the
language-and-thought
processes),
on the
notions
other,
connected
and
or
292
must be
It
realized
clearly
that
al-
something which
meaning"
is
that between,
of a
full
experience) and,
cognitive
tion or meaning.
When
statement
is
heard by people
but
then while
it.
differ
(differing widely
in
e.g.,
London
e.g.,
the
sales girl),
with rehgious
may
certain
personal reminiscences,
etc.
There
is
no doubt
that every psychic act, including those which are par excellence
cognitive acts, has not only a cognitive content (intellectual description),
(moral
valuation,
aesthetic
assessment,
If that
etc.).
called
is
integral
meaning
is
transformed
It
is
not to be wondered
at,
then,
"pubhc" partner
in the
that
in
such
may oppose
its
"meaning-notion".
But
this
is
293
riness
with which are connected certain particular acts, based on the specific
is
indispensable
...
if
one
is
to
mean?" or "What
is ...?"
we have
work. Usually,
to
all this
of a given language, in
a given society
that society.
is
wliicli
Hence we
remain unconscious of
member of
it.
On
and meanings of
scientific
scientific
notions
when
may
always
its
differ
emotional elements,
etc.
Thus notion and meaning are products of abstraction performed on the cognitive process by means of verbal signs. The
character of notions and meanings ordinary in one case, and
scientific in the other depends on the character of that abstrac.
20
294
and consequently
lion.
The
ings,
said abstraction,
perceived
as
by human consciousness.
all
According to whether
is
interpreted
from the
is,
according
or the other),
it
to
is
no other
difference between
The gnoseolform
ogist
and
in the
which
is
full
manifested
and
precise
in the
this
vocis.
So to the conclusions:
(1) The thesis that notion and meaning are
gories
with
different
contents
is
not
different cate-
acceptable,
because the
thesis
prove
On
the contrary,
it
is
and
and
that
in
ordinary language.
(4)
it
295
is
slips,
integral
com-
municable.
The
classified
by
used by
If
J.
we do
the procedure
is, e.g.,
so,
we obtain two
links
it
in
some
sign).
those
in association,
specific intentional
act.
This
ly
mechanism of the
links
this is the
it is
main or
That
is
why
it
is
worthy of
personal-
which help us
and meaning.
analysis.
As
and hence
and
different
This
is
from
specific
all
other signs
and
are,
proper signs
is,
296
All the proper signs (again except for the verbal signs-analysis
made
meanings by associative
This
links.
(e.g.,
syntax,
That
etc.).
instance, there
is
why
is
sense)
the
may
in meaning.
board, yellow with red edges, with a black curve in the middle.
signs
also
knows
is
nothing to prevent
from changing the shape and the colour of the board and the
the meaning of the
road sign "Beware! Sharp bend in the road!" will not be changed,
us
is
con-
we combine with
and
has, besides
74 B.
its
MocKBa
1956.
this
or
autonomously
(e.g.,
[The
aesthetic
Problem
of
297
its
it
meaning).
similar analysis
we
stricto
that
is,
signal,
in every
sign.
signs.
The
a
trifle
what
by association. Let me
St.
Augustine
says
in
refer,
is
Confessions:
his
my
would
would
point
make some particular sound, and
at or move towards some particular thing: and from this I came
to realize that the thing was called by the sound they made when
they wished to draw my attention to it. That they intended
this was clear from the motions of their body, by a kind of natural language common to all races which consists in facial expressions, glances of the eye, gestures, and the tones by which
the voice expresses the mind's state for example whether
"So
began to
reflect.
[I
observed that]
as they
made
elders
it,
ferent phrases, I
fied;
and forcing
them
to express
75 St.
dif-
came
my mouth
my own
to the
same sounds,
began to use
wishes" ^s.
J.
Sheed,
London
1943, p. 11.
298
Psychologically, there
a language than by
especially
when
child in action
it
is
way of
comes
associations.
by the
repetitions
When an
adult
who
already
learning
is
is
an association of sounds
That
is
why
language he
is
learning.
He
will,
when he
of course, really
ceases to translate
know
that
and begins
words
is
in
Meaning
failures.
well-known discussion
in
Mind
(he then
com-
among
e.g.
Szober.
as sounds with
are associated
is
is
closely
etc.
with
extremely
representations,
become
to names,
primitive
absolutely unacceptable
290
even
when
with
it
lespecl
comes
to
amounts to
phers as Ajdukiewicz
critics in
As
ception of meaning.
to
solidarity
have
of such philoso-
serl's
on that subject
in his
"On
paper
the
Meaning of Expressions"
'act
appears in consciousness, by
visually
is
used as an expression
is
however
in principle directed to
itself.
something other
makes up a uniform
experience,
but
would
The mean-
be, according to
Hus-
content must
fall if
is
to
be used as an expres-
The misunderstanding
sible,
"76
clears.
cit.,
To put
it
pp. 19-20.
as mildly as pos-
word "intention"
300
little
common
in
way
all
It is
That
why
word "intention" has with Ajdukiewicz a difmeaning from that it has with Husserl. It seems that such
is
ferent
Polish
the
authors
who
as
follow
him
When we
we
analyse what
common
my
intention
is
is
a secondary
criticize
cussion
is
method of imparting
its
performed
all
words,
links
is,
at the
wrong
etc., precisely
their meanings.
in
now under
No
deduction
investigation, actual-
and the
how
and that
is all. I
think
it
verbal signs
301
in the
is
For the
in association.
rest,
it
belongs to
it
made by
5.
field
ex-
in.
linguistic
in
has
its
own,
distinct,
which
ing
ing?
How
above
is it
all
etc.
an obvious
is
theory of mean:
What
is
mean-
On
the contrary,
formulates
What,
it
then,
Simply what
is
lies
behind
the
indicated in the
term
title
"hnguistic
meaning"?
approach to the issue of meaning from the point of view of linguistic interest, that is of those questions which are theoretically
significant in specifically linguistic research.
This
is
as natural
investigates linguistic
etc.,
in
302
manner
eral
in the
first
when
But
plained.
issues involved
at present
it
As opposoed
guist
is
and the
to the philosopher
what meaning
what language
units)
it is
an
attribute, in
it
is
changes,
but he
etc. I
agree with
signs
Quine'^'''
is,
of what (of
is,
knew very
what planets
well the
is
movements of
(e.g.,
ancient astronom-
planets without
knowing
are).
(2)
of meaning:
grammar
i.e.,
meaning;
expres-
lexicography
is
to
identify
synonymous expressions
(3)
ysis)
in a
meanings, that
is
to
list
pairs of
the
and of
regularities
in such changes.
This classification seems to be particularly lucid and convenient for the presentation of certain general theoretical
sues connected with meaning. It
is
is
is-
linguistic
means, applied to
phenomena. Thus
for
it
is
no general philosophical or
^7
W.
V.
logical considerations
in
can replace
Linguistics", in
W.
v.
303
analysis
which
search
is
for
it is
the
meaningful
least
an important problem
element
We
one
when have we
of meaning?
language.
in
involv-
do with a
to
the phonetic
is
This
vehicle
and verbal
(in
language,
in fact,
is
When we
by the terminology we
and-semantic unit
all
questions.
linguistic
we
assume,
word
(element) of language.
is
as
is
indicated
mean? What
is
meanings enter into relations with one another) have the semantic
function of a single word (e.g., "the author of Romeo and Julief).
The second
grammarians
difficulty
call "the
is
word"
is
often a
which the
compound whole
the
304
parts of which
the
(e.g.,
prefixes, suffixes)
The
linguists
issue
among
is
themselves
there
is
most fundamental appropriate problems; moreover, the terminology is not well established, and occasionally shows striking
differences when the works of different authors are compared.
Structuralism, phonology, the behaviourist trend,
represent
linguistics
The point
is
and psycho-
that
least
is
"meaning"
is
its
of the
given
notion
(e.g.,
horse),
and by the morphemes, those elements which are non-independent parts of words and express relations (e.g., horse-i'). That
terminology more or less coincides with the differentiation into
stems on the one hand and affixes and flexional elements on the
other. It
is
not
my
linguistic controversies
such matters.
What
is
of
important for us
is
the distinction
made
This touches
very
upon
305
problem
The
linguistics.
linguist
is
not interest-
is,
origin
is
the
etc.
to be avoided.
On
the
morphemes concerned.
meaning;
it
verbal signs,
and through
(e.g.,
is
connected with
It is
and
lexical
real objects
which are
reflected in thought-
various relations,
etc.).
meaning is, so to speak, an extension of grammatical meaning; it is sometimes interpreted so broadly that
the meaning of morphemes (grammatical meaning) becomes
Syntactic
one of
its
we always
is
morphemes, but also with the order of words fixed by the syntactic
rules and with what are known as auxiliary words. Syntactic
rules are particularly important in those languages where poorly
developed morphology forces the hearer or reader to estabhsh,
30(>
words
morphemes
is
played by such
tical
indefinite articles to
and "a"
in English)
be found
in certain
languages
(e.g.,
"the"
(e.g.,
the auxiliary
verbs in such forms as "I have come"). They differ from the
morphemes
morphemes
whereas the
since auxiliary
in the
purely formal,
is
company of
other
on
historical grounds.
The question
which
division,
xhe
Anton
and synsemantic
signs
word
which
signs
it
78
J.
as
morphemes.
in a given
dent TTieanings,
&
is
parts
their
semantic
Kaminsky,
New York
1956, p. 77:
fires
burning the
fires
Huppe
burning
See above
Grammar ik
all
his
1.
Halle
a.
S.
1908.
company of
307
is
analysis
language;
scientific
homonymy
of words
it
that
those cases in which the same phonic form of the sign covers
different,
ferent
(antonymy such
as, e.g.,
Now,
polysemy
it is
are grouped
The
linguistics.
distinction between
is
of
meaning of the
dif-
meanings
by
in the
meaning of verbal
result, as
signs.
already indicated,
from new,
specific contexts
of the
homonymy) of every
rylovich
is
verbal sign.
Russian "Za-
He
lays particular
says:
stress
on the grasping
308
"Universal meaning
whether and
how
far
is
it is
and applicable
will
show
to concrete lin-
guistic problems.
My
of that notion
is
different
most important
is
qualitatively,
(stylistic)
my
In
opinion, the
is
not defined
meanings add
meaning"80.
I
who contrary
among the logicians)
plaints (especially
to the universal
com-
its
expressions
assert that not only the ambiguity but also the vagueness of
verbal
signs
a necessary
is
of the sign to
reference
obscurity
among
make
a selection
is
related to the
is
a cor-
issue of context.
80
81
See above
all
Max
3.
'Vagueness"),
the chapter
in
JSs
82 Cf. e.g.,
p.
198.
'
namely communicative
shades.
ele-
Linguistic studies
that
words take of
of the
many
309
definite
meanings
possible meanings
(that
is,
made) only
is
in a context which
and to experimental
is
of view
it
Jena 1934).
names of
and
From
others.
L. Weisgerber, Jost
aimed
chiefly against
emphasize
an isolated study
is,
German
strata
gerber,
According to
Trier).
"Semantic field"
is
internally coherent
with which
it is
ments, weather,
(Weis-
tradition
language "creates"
Trier,
reality.
and
etc.,
delineated
strictly
in contact.
How
such
are formed
from other
"fields", e.g.,
"fields"
of joy, gar-
that depends
on the
spirit
way "semantic
fields"
make
is
strikingly
correlated with
make
of the
Ch. E. Osgood, G.
J.
Suci
& O.
310
that
method
ferential":
abstract
consists in analysing
meanings are
lexical
research as to
operations,
how
meanings by a "semantic
not on the
established
strength
of'j
a given word
dif-
is
understood, and
who speak
how
it
is'
The
linguists
distinguish
still
is
here
issue
being whether
study
etc.
'
jected.
They
are,
its
historical
and
social
reader
is
My
ters
significance.
on mat-
Chapter Four
Aufgaben,
Denken
ist
die Sprache.
Wie
Gedanken
Die
das Problem, aus der Sprache ins Leben herabzusteigen
Philosophen hatten ihre Sprache nur in die gewohnliche Sprache,
.
aus der
um sie als
Gedanken noch
sie
die Sprache
fiir
die
dass
The communication
i.e.,
process
and the
related
sign-situation,
processes
become
is,
is
and speech.
ment
in
Unfortunately
matters
etc.,
they
pertaining to
(311J
not
always
those categories.
in
agree-
They often
312
make
plicity
to
differences
in
disciplines
(mainly
standpoints
concerned, and
philosophical,
although
1.
It is
of language precisely
philosophical implications.
its
mean by "language"
and by "speech". Otherwise I should risk serious misunderstandings which might considerably diminish the value
analysis.
phenomena
mean
of further
of the subject.
many
I
those
apphed as names,
much
preci-
and "speech" as will make it posthe cognitive and the communicative func-
tion of language.
We
and
lies at
in civilized societies.
universahty,
it is
That
is
is
in the
properties
all
is
phonic language,
language par ex-
why, in view of
its
functions and
if no other
some other special
language
its
the root of
all
indicate
that
We know
come
analysis
of
and as a
of
aspect of language.
313
differ as
between
and the psychologist, and last but not least the manwho is no specialist in any of the social sciences.
Every one of them can, and often does, give his own, partial
definition of language. These partial definitions are often per-
and
tinent
correct.
is
language as a phenomenon
is
those partial
all
each of such definitions implies. Both the phonic and the semantic
aspect,
taken
separately,
human
process of communica-
language and
its
arbitrary nature,
others,
in connection with
its
its
denotative function,
afist,
or
behaviourist
still
standpoints^.
An
exhaustive
definition
314
One of such
requirements of research.
of extreme importance
is
aspects
in my
opinion
and conceptions
his perceptions
Kainz Language
in this natural
is
clear
is
structvire
and comprehensible
may be
way
to others to
its
effected,
may
medium through which human
not present, even things that are completely imperceptible to the senses,
be represented.
De Laguna:
co-operation
is
Speech
is
the great
state.
To
my
this I
opinion, are
Carnap:
of habits,
i.e.,
is
a system of
of a group. Gardiner:
use,
between
As
first
approximation
let
We
is
is
any intersubjective
set
language in the
set
full
shall call
lishing
usage
rules.
Szober:
own
thought.
in one's
mind
for
men
315
etc.,
And
phonic language.
in
signs
verbal
of
process
serve
to
formulate
thoughts
by subjective
of
communicate socially those thoughts about
reflecting
and
to
the
related emotional,
objective
reality
aesthetic,
requirements
defined as a system
is
volitional,
etc.
in
the
cognition,
reality,
as also
experiences.
phenomena which
of view, but
it
from
my
opinion,
The
first
verbal signs,
tactical
point
i.e.
is
and semantic
articulated
is
a system of
sound becomes a
given
that
is,
language
system.
of the
term that
is, it
last analysis
the conception
dissociates
it
from
all
316
voli-
The
distinction
The
literature
cultural circle
and
its
all
on
only by de Saussure,
the languages
(I
refer
distinction
rests
in
been adopted in
has
name of
a type
of action.
all
contemporary hnguistics.
an
activity
Gardiner
with clearly
utili-
S. L.
psychological,
etc.
In his Psychology
(in
Russian)
indi-
The
can
easily
above
other "languages".
place not only by
other
means of communication,
my
opinion,
it is
unneces-
As regards
e.g.,
Leonard Bloomfield.
'*
p. 62.
of one's face
guage"
is
tell
us something,
etc.).
By
317
The point
etc.
is
and to
we mean
human communication
the
of emotional,
etc.,
we may
and which
experiences)
(including
acts of cognition
in
certain cases
and
may
is,
cognition).
Two
(1)
(2)
the na-
compared
see, these
two
related.
First of all
signs
it
must be
and verbal
phonic language, which has thus risen to the status of the "natural"
language, this has been due to the particular usefulness of that
The
fact
people
is
who
is
to be found in the
both cases
we have
the purpose,
318
of signs are
in.
signs in the
dependent on
signs)
cation process.
in,
light (indispensable
tactile signs),
binations
all
the
and
differentiation
in
shades,
etc.
earliest
auxiliary in relation to
in turn
is
why
(all
signs
accompany speech,
system of signs
of
is
(e.g.,
or
etc.)
a translation of
ability to think
it
is
thus either
a specific
into
and
facial
another
must then
means of communi-
is
and
possible too,
languages
to
(e.g.,
languages of gestures,
touch,
etc.)
may
this is
make
language
disabilities
serve
reality,
which
we
are
Even
completely.
319
assimilated by
man
it
Some of such
no
less
we
cor-
languages,
being
is
(facial
and
and even
etc., signs.
Those
marks.
Let us begin with the statement of the linguist L. Bloomfield,
which
"Our numeral
digits
illustrate
domain can be
means of a
carried out by
we may
calculating
rules
is
The construction of a
of arrangement and substitution
of discourse.
machine or the
rules
calculating
in a system
them
for their
own
it
is
sake and
must be so planned
that, starting
No
if
serious
use
would be made of
which
failed
to
deliver
a linguistically
significant
consider
such
non-linguistic
systems
moves of
end
result.
it
as
musical notation,
or
320
pendent systems at the same time, they may resort to the metaphor
of calling these systems 'languages'. This metaphor is dangerous,
since it may lead to the notion that such systems can liberate
;
us from uncertainties or
difficulties
of language" 5.
shows
quotation
This
authority
on
linguistics, to
that
whom
L.
Bloomfield
an
eminent
name of "language"
calculi
(phonic) language
is
treated
These
may seem
only because
from
results
its
expressions.
met
that language.
What
is
at stake here is a
as to origin
and
inter-
We
shall
is
a short-
1,
Pt.
1,
it
when
it
its
321
The point now under discussion is very simple, but also very
As mentioned in Part I, at the stage when the phonic
important.
language already
exists,
all
can,
all
between thinking
in terms of language,
and
reahty
(2) the relation
2.
reality
An
answer to
this question
sign,
is
meaning, communication,
is
concerned
Two
etc.
Every
explicite or implireality.
One of them
starts
from con-
322
ventionalist assumptions
a prod-
is
is
an image of
of language resembles
my
opinion,
both these standpoints are erroneous and hamper a proper understanding of the role of language and
among
the neo-positivists.
as a
chess
was common
others.
and
mechanism.
It
and
its
game of
dif-
mon
to
logic
(cf.
all
of them.
It
constructed in an arbitrary
manner by adopting ad
etc.,
libitum such
(just
because language
is
one
of those elements of culture which are most resistant to all arbitrariness and novelty), it is worth while to analyse what was their
origin. Personally, I am convinced that the decisive role was
played by an analogy with deductive systems and by the confusion of natural languages with formalized languages. In the
case of a formalized language one can and
in
at will.
is
sis
may
in fact
vahd
behave
rules, etc.,
is
an
on
error, first of
what
to an analyall,
because
of their own.
And now
for
such
323
how
we
could
own
its
game,
signs,
why
is
played merely
sake,
they
words
objects
refer to
The
error appears
when
that conception
confronted with
is
it
may be
a relativization and
process only
is
is
intellect
an arbitrary
and ceases to be
which
treated as a product of
becomes a play of
if it
also
communi-
it
something.
cates
is,
when
it
ceases
Equally erroneous
is
is
being vulgarized,
can be refuted
it
easily.
As an example, one
in
his
is
to retort (as
Max
It
seems
sufficient
of a statement
Cf. e.g..
M.
Black, "Wittgenstein's
'Tractatus'
",
in
J.
M.
Black,
O. Urmson,
324
is
same
the
meaning. That
is
no comprehensible
consist of any
parts
of
sentences uttered.
Language
is
as counters, nor
is it
ture of reahty.
and from
its
treat
How
then
There
is
is
"Speech
real consciousness
myself.
reality.
And
which
exists
is
a practical,
We
known
from the
in
linguistic
Our
focal issue
is
language on the one hand, and the thought process and the
reahty referred to in language, on the other.
An
was
notion.
defence was
K. Marx,
made
meaning
1958, p. 30.
^
By way of example
cit.,
pp. 97
ff.
Can
be defended when
and thinking? In
comes
it
my
to the relation
325
between language
on an
essential misunderstanding.
The
fact
that
the
On
is
the
based
psycho-
them representations
(i.e.,
independent of linguistic
is
processes, are
possibility
who
are able to
of
light
criteria,
its
More
such an opinion
untenable.
is
frequently, a
is
is
to be encountered
stated, for
example, that
and
visible
versa,
vice
theless,
is
elements,
Russell
who
In
is
is
An
is
Inquiry into
Meaning and
Trutit,
London
is
knowledge that
is
22
326
states,
moods,
etc.,
states,
exist certain
etc.,
connected
are two
different
which
as
That principal
issue,
however,
ry, it
is
is
with the
is
is
rejects together
But
Such an attitude
things.
issue.
When we
treat language as
when we
interpret the
its
products
we assume
that language
is
of
The mutual
light
relation between
in a hnguistic
the
is
signs).
As
327
if
v^^e
language,
we must conclude
that there
is
no
essential connection
left
for us
is
we
game
And now
We
let
dijfferent angle.
are concerned not with language "in itself", but with the
human
stage of
its
development, that
is
is
in a stage of the
specific to
human
beings.
(which
tive process
a linguistic process) to
is
reality,
appears
Here the problem cannot be dismissed with a conventionahst explanation of language as play. Here we have to
give an exphcit answer to the question: what is the relation between
in full light.
our
i.e.
cognition
(Unguistic)
The answer
reahty?
may deny
may
by language, one may
But
this
point.
And
reflection of reality
tantamount
is
and makes
e.g.,
it
to
one's
philosopliical
declaration,
that
is
328
the issue
more
is
make
often to
And
would
there
than
practically impossible.
is
and
known
one's standpoint
which
we could
positivist declarations
its
relation
versies in philosophy, if
we could show
tions of conventionalism,
Im
who had
boldness
are not
(if
prestige
scientific
The
reality
in
extra-philosophical
issue
circles).
thought-language
and
tonomously,
in
abstraction
same
issue in a
approaches
it
less "philosophically",
so to speak.
Two
and extra-verbal
reality,
is
in
the
reality
(the denial being justified in various ways) the other admits the ex;
istence of
The
and extra-verbal
reality
in
the
sense
of the
possibility
of
all,
there
direct cognition,
to
both
cognition
is
of
based,
on various arguments.
Bergson's
is
is
of!
intuitionism
is
and Husserl's
non-linguistic.
theses,
This
is
"true"
typical
329
it
cognition:
makes
stand
it.
it
and
said to
is
sense of a re-
the
reality, in
flection
and to under-
approach
similar
is
is
different)
or
different
linguistic systems.
cognition,
is
is
it
human
with
which
reality
is
reality lead
study
linguistic
facts
is
it is
autonomous phenomena,
as
The
was
it
consequent-
also reached
thesis
neo-
object of philosophical
by
It
is
analysis.
This
characteristic that
is
now
criticizing
reahty, a
ticism.
denial
which
This criticism
is
is
an expression of a
agnos-
specific
I
think
it
to be
330
it
now
criticizes.
can
among
positivists,
ical
treat
log-
from other
But
results.
I think
it
is
easy
is,
of language
of the world
As already
understand
help us to
the
may
structure
"11.
reality
on the
level
relation
be-
of thought-language makes
controversy around that issue must be based on general philosophical foundations and
is
we
I see
and reahty.
reflection,
as
imparted to
it
by Marxist philosophy.
In view of existing distortions
and misunderstandings,
of,
the
present
analysis
name
as held
by
should be sup-
B. Russell,
An
Inquiry into
Meaning and
Truth, p. 341.
on
warning possible
I shall
331
not embark
critics against
such
misunderstandings.
The theory of
reflection rejects
which
is
to information obtained
connected with
linguistics,
form of the interpretation of cognition as a subreflection of objective reality. Taking all this into ac-
practice in the
jective
same function on which the specific nature of human cognition is based, is formed in the process of human experience and
is itself an empirical fact, and not a product of an arbitrary convention. This means that thought-language gives a specific
reflection of reahty, and that its development is caused by the
development of reality itself and by the development of human
understanding of that reality both in theory and in practice.
Is the reflection of reahty by thought-language to be understood
to imply that we have to do with some picture of reality in
the
the structure of language? It has been stated above that the theory
may not be
identified
specific nature
332
specific nature
all in its
in a position to
straction
it
is
elements of
reality.
is
some
something
artificial,
which
systems,
hnguistic
prevents
fact
neither
the
cognition
may
arise
on
this point).
The
mapping
an "image" of
no necessary
and
deny that?);
it
duced to
product
of convention,
of reflecting
etc.
functions which
is,
signs of language
reality,
dissociated
essential functions of
lie
from
reality
human com-
namely that of the so-called Lautbilder, is repEugen Lerch: "Vom Wesen des sprachlichen Zeichens".
in Acta Lingiiistica, 1939, Vol. 1, No. 3, and Emile Benveniste: ''Nature du
signe linguistique", in Acta Liiiguistica, 1939, Vol. 1, No. 1.
12
different idea,
resented e.g. by
analogon
above)
How
all this
is
their
way of
(as
333
It will suffice
disciplines
as
nature of the verbal signs and explain where to look for more
detailed information.
reflection
is
dialectics
of the relation
beyond
all
anthropology,
etc.)
as a reflection
also
consists
doubt by
linguistics,
in that thought-language,
human
shaped
cognition,
is
why
Let
is
will
it
it
now
This dialectics
and
extra-linguistic reahty.
be analysed in greater
That
detail.
not the relation between language and thinking, and vice versa,
of
reality.
human
between
cognition.
The
thought-language
results
of these disciplines
and of the
may
clarifies
some
dialectics of the
issue.
Each
reality.
will
be
and thus
shifts the
334
problems that
stress to
cerned with.
and
On
differ
principally con-
cultural anthropology
may, in
my
which
interest
us here.
As
regards psychopathology,
i.e.,
we
be interested mainly
shall
domain of the
and the
specialists,
all, it
must be
does
it
it;
neither, in principle,
undergo a modification. These modifications are of special theoretical interest, since they reveal the inter-relationship as between
thought-language and the cognitive process. The extreme forms
latter
he utters
i.e.,
he utters
when
and think
at least
H. Head
1926, Vols.
mechanism of the
in his
& 2, differentiates
New York
in
word-
combining words into grammatically correct whole), nominal aphasia (disfunction in using words as
general names), and semantic aphasia (disfunction in associating words with
formation),
their
corresponding meanings).
335
them
not as general names but as words connected with a given, concrete situation,
which in the
The
a given word.
mind
patient's
is
associated with
"set"
and
mind
both to concrete
tion of reality
facts
objects
of the
latter ability.
but he does not completely lose the ability to use words in a given
context. This
says
is
on that
subject:
"What we have
make
it
But does
objects?
this explain
why he
The elucidation of
analysis of the
fact that
is
naming
particularly in
phenomenon
impeded
obtains from an
is
this
its
such as a table,
we do not mean
a special
if
The
nature of naming.
It is
is
a confirma-
speech
is
336
to him.
He
words
find
fit
'red' to different
The
who cannot
patient
can
etc.,
in relation to corresponding
which appears
teristic
in
modifications of that
result of the
impairment
fers
situations.
Hence the
who
suf-
is
level
articles,
limited
adverbs,
ing
is
by the patients
as
proved by experiments
of the general
word
signs
of which have
Another interesting
loss of ability to
is
definite
fact
to
meanings.
which Goldstein
refers
is
etc.,
the
which
com-
into Its
15 Ibid., p.
25.
Goldstein's conclusion
"If
one
considers
is
their
as follows:
(the
patients'
A.
S.)
is
337
correspondingly changed.
condition
live,
one can
What appear
'world'.
One can
in the
itself
above-mentioned
and
of men
The words of the patients have lost their symbolic function and with that the ability to work as mediating agent
between sense experiences and the world in which man alone
can be man. The change in the patient's personaHty, which excludes him from the normal human community, brings the essential significance of the symbolic power to the fore and with
that the significance of the symbohc character of language''^^.
What conclusions can be drawn from researches on aphasia
istics
. .
of
First
all,
definite
language-and-thought
and
This
is
abilities,
quite clear
is
functions
abilities to
are
perform
by sensory percep-
linguistic
results in the
abihties,
impairment
16 Ibid., pp. 28-29. Note that the author uses a specific terminology: the
word "symbol" means here what we call "the verbal sign".
338
terms of concepts
is
is
a point
epistemological
But our
interest lies
on
interest in researches
aphasia.
is
no
Are we,
we
do not have
to do with any impairment of the physiological functions of the brain, it is only the lack of language which causes the
lack of abstract thinking? That hypothesis, so important for the
known
is
is
made
it
cases
is
why
the case of Hellen Keller, deaf-mute and blind since her birth
special language
and
writing,
is
of particular
interest.
how
how
she "discovered"
it was covered.
Someone was drawing water and my teacher placed my hand
under the spout. As the cool stream gushed over my hand she
spelled into the other the word water; first slowly, then rapidly.
I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her
fingers.
Suddenly
forgotten
I felt
thrill
of returning thought;
knew then
that w-a-t-e-r
my
my
free.
it
soul, gave
still,
is
it
it
339
light,
hope,
life.
sight
that
when she
reflects
of the term
is
inseparable
ability to
it
cognitive pro-
may
sensation
A. S.)
into the
brought
warm sunshine.
me my
hat,
This thought,
and
knew
if a wordless
be called a thought,
skip with
pleasure"i8.
may
exist
for
is
that
it is
a phonic language.
Thirdly,
cited
it
follows
what
is
the role
of the verbal signs as a means of making abstractions and arriving at abstract cognition in terms of concepts.
is
shed on that
issue, so
important
face (and
it is
a problem, in
my
opinion,
H.
Keller,
The Story of
Langer, Philosophy
18 Ibid,
(italics
in
A.
New
S.).
My
practical experi-
S.
K.
340
way of thinking
and
guage),
(i.e.,
developed system of
thought-language influences the whole of man's practical experience and, consequently, his cognitive processes as well? There
this is
by the Marxist philosopher in view of his predilection to approach epistemological issues from the point of view of historical and sociological analysis. That is why, even if the anthropological data so far at our disposal are too scanty to
any
final
ther discussion
by stating that
may
the
aUow
anticipate fur-
it is
not possible
hypotheses based
on such data.
At one time, Levy-Bruhl formulated a hypothesis, based
on the study of the psychology of primitive peoples (including
on the existence of pre-logical
thinking and, consequently, a-logical thinking. That hypothesis,
but also
rejected.
raised,
among
supposed to be on so low a
of Levy-Bruhl included
many
And
the hypothesis
known
this
had been
Bruhl
all
341
the level of
and
known
as
first,
a careful investigation,
requires
it
and secondly,
is
speaking
strictly
between
connections
thought-language
formulated in what
much
Whorf
and
been
at
it
certainly
is
known
One of
the exceptions
is
O. C. AxManoBa
MocKBa
cology],
who
it
in her
practically
amounts
work OuepKu
my
on the Sapir-Whorf
opinion, is wrong)
20 E.g.,
the
first
(ed.
Paul Henle,
after
many more
features of a
This
is
Ann Arbor
1958), says
would
it
not, of course, to
but merely to point out that they stand at the beginning of a vast inquiry.
More data are required before it is even possible to formulate specific hypotheses; but this
is
new
science" (op.
cit.,
p. 24).
23
342
systems of counting,
primitive thinking
Now,
order.
was
"different",
and
has nothing to do with Levy-Bruhl's, as can be proved by a statement made by Sapir, who openly disagrees with Levy-Bruhl:
"The lowliest South African Bushman speaks in the forms
of a rich symbohc system that is in essence perfectly comparable
to the speech of the cultivated Frenchman. It goes without
saying that the more abstract concepts are not nearly so plentifully represented in the
rich terminology
and the
finer definition
is
there the
of nuances that
reflect
at best,
later
its
the
development
all
manner of
and systematized
relations
all
modern
this
in every language
meets us rigidly
known
to us.
Many
a latent luxuriance
to
the languages of
civilization"^^.
The idea
York
E. Sapir, Language.
1921,
p.
22
(italics
An
A.
New
343
"It seems,
guages
is
not
less
is
63).
"...
instructive fields
The
ethnic ideas.
respect
is
common
in ethnology, so
much
so that
"Language
is
a guide to 'social
is
his
paper
Though language
reality'.
of social science,
it
powerfully conditions
social
Human
all
particular language
for their society. It
communication or
'real
world'
is
reflection.
The
reality.
ficiently similar to
in
No two
is
that the
upon
the
The worlds
in
which
344
We
see
...
we do
largely as
And
his
in
"The
relation
between
misunderstood. Language
language
is
and experience
is
often
system-
less
atic
is
a self-contained, creative
acquired without
by reason of
its
its
is
also
formal completeness
its
implicit ex-
we
use.
made
has
it
how
Whorf
of the
what
is
who
The
first
issue has
light
of
Hopi language (the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis was further illuminated by the study of other American
Indian languages, e.g., Hoijer's researches on the Navajo
the data supphed by the
23
and
Personality,
-'^
Science,
cit..
p.
1.).
345
language).
Sapir's
When
rise
to
if
it.
He
intended a com-
other.
That programme
is
that the
so slight as
may
be treated
may be summed up
two questions:
in
(1)
forms of experience to
all
between
(a)
cultural
(2)
(b)
As a
preted statically,
and
also conditions
a specific interpretation
is
Whorf draws
no general category of
a certain analogy with
p.
138.
346
"At the same time, the Hopi language is capable of accounting for and describing correctly, in a pragmatic or operational
sense, all observable
it
felt
possible to have
Euchdean which
figurations, so
it is
all
is
in
is
Whorf formulates
number
One of them
is
way
He
"This fact
that
says:
is
no individual
partiality
but
is
modern
constrained to certain
is
science, for
it
means
free.
im-
modes of interpretation
The person most nearly
widely different
such position.
relativity,
We
all
new
principle of
same
backgrounds are
calibrated"27.
26
B. L. Whorf,
"An American
Reality,
p.
58.
p. 214.
B. L.
Whorf, Language,
The second
347
linguistic system,
"Actually, thinking
upon
est light
it
that
is
most mysterious, and by far the greatis thrown by the study of language.
we have
This study shows that the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled
These patterns
are
own language
his
unperceived,
shown
intricate
readily
is
unconscious.
systematizations
of
pattern-system,
different
from
And
others,
itself is in
a language
every language
in
is
a vast
is
his consciousness"28.
fine ourselves to
and
it
alone, there
conventionahst
interpretations.
ventionahsm.
This
is
how Whorf
SAE
Hopi
group:
we read
it,
we should
find a different
28
working together.
B. L.
p. 252.
in B. L.
in a land of
Whorf, Language'.
348
made
successful
Hopi language,
specific
guage, in particular
ditions
and the
upon vocabulary.
we
by
It is
mental
upon
lan-
call
when
it
comes
to the lack of
words
own
in
like
other contemporary
From
all this it
L. Whorf,
dif-
human
perception
to
that cognition
is
349
somehow
unilaterally
is
shaped by
reality,
by
its
are
little
principal ideas
known
in Poland.
It is also interesting
and the
results
to the studies
and above
Problem of Meaning
in
should hke to
by Malinowski concerning
splendid work, "The
all his
Primitive Languages".
In the light of what has been said here on the relation be-
it is
issue of the
Psychological,
and anthropological
re-
those facts
facts;
show
by the relation of
that language
reflection,
is
role in
reality.
What then
is
transform
it
Two main
(1)
The
causes
may be mentioned
here:
world. This
e.g.,
is
and
in shaping our
image of the
Ajdukiewicz's
radical
conventionahsm
stress
the
role
350
(2)
The
incorrect transition
from that
is
to an arti-
ophical
analysis,
and
following
conclusions
common
language and
in
neither
is
reality,
the process
of reflecting reality in
we
as
an
For while we
human
consciousness.
integral social
phenomenon
something about
reality.
reality,
we support
Thus the
process,
and
of objective
The
(2)
acquiring
analysis of language
is
reality.
it is
we may
results.
It
is
an object
351
fairly
may
process
cognitive
independent
of
interest.
have had
it
the
own and
Thus language problems
be regarded as philosophy's
field
clarification
of meanings of expressions
is
is
mean-
mentioned above,
I see
One
semantic analysis.
aspect
called the
is
method of
a moderate
an analysis be made,
connected with
is
in the
fully
acceptable:
but what
it
actually
means
is
made then
is
is
to semantic anal-
is
it:
from using
it
in the material,
and
and for
it
implies a subjective
is
not acceptable to
it
seems that
and
scientific appraisal
who
physical declarations.
352
3.
Distinguishing
in
language
communicative
its
"
function,
we always think
some language (some authors are of the opinion that this
is actually one and the same function, since speechless thinking
is interpreted as a dialogue with oneself), we shall now concentrate attention on a special aspect of the communicative
of formulating thoughts, which consists in that
in
We shall be interested in
communication which results
function.
that
is,
between
at least
communication,
effective
in
an actual understanding
certain language
understands
The understanding of
is
signs, the
understanding of language,
we must
perceive
act, either
sign
is
it
and
at the
all
ogist
They are
dis-
regarded here, together with the whole complex of accompanying issues (understanding as
tion, etc).
We
an
act,
understanding as a disposi-
will lead
353
who
little
goes to the railway track, waves the red flag and thus stops the
oncoming
The engine
train.
driver
wave the
is
its
user.
For the
child
he did not
who
The
in-
may
serve as an example.
and the
be
trivial
to analyse
the
difference between
understanding certain ambiguous or vague terms and understanding the intention of the author of those terms.
We
have
from the
who
simplest, in
mukh"
is
means
flies"
"marriage
no
or
"flies
is
more complicated,
interpretation
of the speaker's
misunderstanding
may
intentions.
in the text
in a
wrong
Another cause
of
consists
in
distinguishing
In other words,
we have
354
communication
in
If,
and communication
sions
contradistinction
communication
is
we
misunderstandings,
to
agree
that
by
same
the
convictions.
in a forest discuss
their
When
tvv^o
is
finally
more-
accompanied by
men who have lost their way
signs
in order to find
map that
"Now they
is
way
understand
to reach
one another"
Enghsh:
may
(or,
more
though more
strictly,
"Now communication
the only
artificially
in
is
same way the meaning of the statement that they have to turn
no understanding between them
if one of them had a poor knowledge of his companion's language),
communication
necessary
first
to estabhsh
is
effective
communication
in
Among
difficult,
in different
ones
(if it is
human communication
i.e.,
the principal
parties,
parties concerned
know
well the
and
linguistic
hypostases.
is
is
The method of
precising
human
limits, i.e., if
it is
precise, then
it
may
be stated once
let it
355
examine what
is
clear distinction
vague expressions,
This distinction
is
is
be completely eliminated.
trivial case is
essentially
appears
known
in
two
hom-
as
onyms, where one and the same phonic form stands for quite
different
may sometimes
indicate connexions
is
much more
We
do with homonymy
"last",
in the case of
such a word as
have to
which
may mean
and
final",
is
latest
motion to an external
make
object",
Of course, there is no clear-cut demarcation line between homonymy and polysemy; but these two forms of ambiguity of words may be eliminated (thereby removing the danger
move").
them
sible
in contexts or
meanings the
by stating
given word
is
explicitly in
which of
its
pos-
35()
it
many
authors, has
Max
Black
dififerentiaties
"The
finite
a sign of
its
now
a comideas^o.
fertile
difference thus:
area of this
field
generality, while
its
finite
many
its
is
indicated by the
is
boundary"3i.
who
is
field
Marty
names
referred to
only,
the
is
phenomenon
not strictly
a vague word
is
that the
outlined''''^^.
The point
that
is
strictly outlined
field
word
is,
or
it
is
not, apphcable to
it.
Marty's examples
are:
we
established
by convention, vagueness
all
of
all classification
is
is
a property of practically
or,
30
studied by Peirce
(cf.
W.
B. Gal-
a. S. 1908,
known
and
pp. 52
ff.).
1.
1923),
31
p. 31.
32
Marty, op.
Max
Black, a
cit.,
p.
52.
much
richer
classification,
classification.
of words. Such
we
call
"bound-
the vagueness
is
an
is
and of pheno-
transitions, these
of words
and by the
In objective reality,
357
objective
phenomenon. Black
resorts to a dif-
ferent argumentation:
"Vagueness
clearly
is
That
is
why
is
the only
convention which
to
strictly
boundaries exist in
terms by
way of an
series to
which
applied"33.
way
to avoid vagueness of
words
is
refers (although
reality).
no such
outhned
strictly
arbitrary convention.
For
we may
instance,
and
if
shall
be called a "rivu-
a "river", etc.
Can
shall
it
Of
be called
into
itself
and therefore
it
such "sharply"
statements,
is
compartments,
outlined
great deal
it
does draw
we can
fully
is
only
for
an "ideal" language
arise
out
33
M.
24
358
of language, sources of
many
mistakes in
human
cognition.
son) to oppose
linguistic
ditations,
unreliable
cognition.
Bacon
in
linguistic
Other thinkers,
Novum Organum,
Me-
Descartes in his
like
Berg-
"true" non-
cognition to
and
and
illusions,
process of cognition.
others,
Still
who adopt
ing
upon reality and accounts for its faulty interand that we wrongly take properties of words to be
properties of things (e.g., Russell in "Vagueness"); on the other
hand, they see the benefits of a "good" language mainly in that
verbalism projects
pretation,
especially
experts in mathematical
logic.
self-evident
is
and
logicians,
Those
people
who
construct
most
formalized systems
temptation to
make
make an
possible to
it
ideal, perfect
remove
all
those
Russell
and Wittgenstein.
es-
of philosophy. Russell
359
(p. 347).
This conception
is
dealt with
by Wittgenstein. Russell states in his "Foreword" to Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given
the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is determinate as soon
as the
is
sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language
constructed, be something in
common
it
at all
8).
rightly or falsely
What
"2.18
this thesis:
common
(p.
firmly
affirms
may be
is
is,
the
form
of reality."
On
an
ideal
"3.323
language and on
its
functions
In
life
it
same word
osition
...
3.324 Thus
there
easily arise
we must employ
signifies in
is
full).
symbolism, that
is
rules
of logical
grammar
Russell
is
in the
to say,
still
not exclude
all
errors)."
"Foreword":
"A
which prevent
nonsense, and has single symbols which always have a definite and unique
meaning.
Mr
Wittgenstein
perfect language
is
is
logically perfect,
only
fulfils this
function in proportion as
which we postulate"
(p.
8).
it
is
or that
we
logically perfect
to have meaning,
and
it
360
The conception of an
cipally because of
its
ideal language
Thus, a perfect
of reality.
of
But here
reality.
circle in
is
became bankrupt
prin-
is
language
would
would have
to
possess
reasoning. The
becomes knowable,
structure of reality
advance what
in
But that
is
know
is
of the problem
is
if
we abandon
may seem
It
we completely ehm-
inate,
we should
as
has
and so
restrict its
the result
paradox,
like a
is
is
Max
Black's con-
Tractatus:
would
in the character
tary
suggest.
The
is
not
as if they were
complete analyses"36.
35 I.
M.
ed. P. Henle.
'6
M.
361
mean
maximum
possible precision.
a renunciation of striv-
We may
property. But
restrict
it,
and even
an objective
totally eliminate
certain
for
we may
not absolutely
is
tions.
We
point
to
them
in their contexts,
are in a position
eliminate the
We
and that
is
it
conven-
most important
the
by adopting
due to
linguistic
hypostases.
This
is
issue,
and yet
it
ly
is
its
solution depends
on the standpoint
There
name could be
to the
men
found,
it
was
something
of sense"37.
We
ditional
it
name
guistic issue. It is
which
is
philosophical
37
ing,
But
is
tra-
Quoted
London
less is
it,
as
some authors
controversy
between
K. Ogden
XXIV.
after C.
1953, p.
&
I.
is-
contemporary fundamental
materialism
and idealism,
362
disciphnes.
is
who
(Von den
are
reism orig-
his hfe
1915;
Russell,
inated by
of that statement.
is
realized even
Orman
by
as for
finest
existence
question
when
still
there
To
linguistic.
is
prefixed to the
is
see Naples
words
is
to bear a
name
which,
a true sentence;
a sense in which
exists
is
we say
word
"exists" (that
is
in such
is
not to eliminate
if
38
W.
V.
(Mass.), 1953.
O.
i.e.,
a general
Quine,
of
View,
Cambridge
is
is
363
used in formaliz-
is
re-
to bear in
As
communication
stated above,
of the same
For an
effective
communication
it is
by both
is
communi-
same way
concerned should
share the convictions connected with that statement. This, however, is a socio-psychological issue rather
Nevertheless,
it
must be borne
in
mind
that that
is
problem
so
closely connected
its
com-
ponent part.
In this
field,
worthy tradition to
Novum Organum
fori
and
its
credit.
idola theatri,
is
knowledge
{idola
ed to remove, or at
communication.
The
necessity,
emphasized by the
adherents
of that school, to make people assimilate the principles of concrete thinking (appending of indices to general
names
which
is
in order
a desig-
364
scription
is
name
is
it
words; the use of the hyphen to indicate that words often separate things which should not be separated from one another
etc.)
is
is
it
As often happens,
who always
practice, greatly
fear
is
on
lay stress
the
abhor "abstraction-
disciplines
and
re-
searches which seem abstract, though in fact they are most closely
We
are
now
witnessing
its
is
Not only
rehabilitation.
in linguis-
mechanical
memory
devices, etc. It
is
also
worth while
to
draw
is
a scientific theory
book and is connected with our knowledge of effective communication and with improving that communication, belongs to the
theoretical
foundations
of the
science
of mass
propaganda,
litera-
and which
That
some
in our countries
issue, too,
365
is
practically non-existent.
here, since
it
requires
more
detailed
in future.
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INDEX OF NAMES
Ackerman, Wilhelm
55,
81,
80,
79,
26
Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz
362
45, 46,
84,
Bridgman, P.W.
231.
Brutyan, G.A.
324
306,
Ayer, Alfred
71,
J.
85,
Francis
Baldwin,
201,
177,
Burali-Forti, Cesare
86.
363
358,
Mark
J.
168,
9,
12.
11,
5.
20
309
70
63,
322, 323
Bacon,
Karl
Biihler,
61,
L.A.
297
St.
Avenarius, Richard
252, 253,
108
Bulakhovsky,
Augustine,
100.
259
X,
Cantor, Georg
25, 362
108
Rudolph
Carnap,
221
38
Bykhovsky, B.
42,
26,
44,
Bentham, Jeremy
113
45,
Benveniste, Emile
332
Bergson,
Henri
244,
130,
325.
328, 358
George
Berkeley,
60,
80,
168, 177,
28
Black,
Max
98,
107,
116,
191,
229.
Chase,
360
106,
Blake, F. R.
316,
192,
W. M.
Bernard
Michel
3,
4,
5,
9,
164,
168.
93,
101,
102.
107
Leon
32,
26,
35
M. 360
Croce, Benedetto
236
Czarnowski, Stefan
Gushing, F.H.
14,
283,
327
242
280
219,
3,
225,
Cornforth, Maurice
342
M.
Joseph
Boguslavsky,
Bolzano,
17,
259,
212
Stuart X,
Copi, Irving
16,
86,
85,
83,
258,
60,
59,
Cohen, Marcel 16
319,
320
Boas, Franz
50,
82,
Lewis
Chwistek,
Leonard
Bloomfield,
Bochenski,
49,
Cassirer, Ernst
Berry
19,
81,
79,
93,
Carroll,
Breal,
47,
62,
61,
46,
Czezowski,
16,
300
20
[391]
92,
108
313
172,
Tadeusz
210
114
26,
231,
392
Index of Names
Arsene
Darmesteter,
Head, Henry
19
4,
137,
210, 314
Dittrich
Ottmar
146
313
Hans
Hempel, Carl G.
Hilbert,
Doroszewski, Witold
Driesch,
134, 135,
144
143,
Dietzgen, Joseph
Friedrich
'
Rene 358
Dewey, John 87, 121,
Descartes,
136,
200, 334
Georg Wilhelm
Hegel,
6,
David
Hofler, Alois
201
70
309
26
Hoijer,
Durkheim, Emile 12
8.
16,
309, 329
Hume, David
Hermann
Ebbinghaus,
Einstein, Albert
313
210,
53,
252,
345
Eisler,
Rudolf
313
X, 62,
Eubulides
67,
Erdmann, Benno
313
28, 39
Ludwig
141,
62,
65,
Franklin, Benjamin
Frcge, Gottlob
219,
Frobes
217,
219,
228,
230,
231,
232,
233,
234,
235,
236.
237.
238,
239,
240,
241,
242,
243,
244,
245,
275,
277.
299,
230,
31,
359
Gunther
Karl
Joachim,
Jodl,
10
W.B. 356
Gardiner, Alan 137,
224,
121,
Otto
Harold,
138,
225,
144,
226,
H. 250
E.S.
69
220,
Johnson, Wendell
222,
Goldstein, Kurt
106, 108
278
314
Kainz, F.
J.
Kant, Immanuel
313
Hayakawa,
S.I.
Keller,
Helen
Kemeny,
J.
G.
226
314, 316
Gorsky, D.P.
132
314
Friedrich
Johnson,
131,
314
9,
Jorgensen, Jorgen
Gallie,
223,
309
Jespersen,
313
220,
328
122
229,
Gaertner, Henryk
300,
69
228,
170,
216,
Ipsen,
Philip
169,
142.
143
Frank,
168,
276
Fessalonitsky, S.A.
Feuerbach,
167,
Friedrich
142,
306
Edmund
165,
Engels,
141,
Husserl,
62
60, 61,
Hupp6, Bernard F.
133
338, 339
50
Index of Names
Keyes,
Kenneth
Kokoszynska, Maria
Korzybski,
92,
93,
99,
100,
15,
5,
94,
96,
102,
91,
97,
98,
103,
104,
106, 107
61,
70
63,
130
16,
17.
Marr, N.
17, 18
I.
Edouard
Martinak,
167
166,
Kotarbiriska, Janina
191, 192,
230,
Kovtun, L.
26,
351,
31,
362
353,
276, 278
S.
Kraft, Victor
69
Kraus, Oskar
239
Kronasser, Heinz
Kuipe, Oswald
Marty, Anton
9,
314, 356
Kotarbin&ki, Tadeusz
216,
Ernst
Maeterlinck, Maurice
Malinowski, Bronislaw
XI, 90,
95,
19
48
Alfred
101,
Mach,
107
Jr.
S.,
Klemensiewicz, Zenon
393
Marx,
Karl
X,
122,
23,
12,
141,
142,
143,
144,
149.
152,
163,
198,
224,
273,
274,
280,
311,
324
Mauthner, Fritz 68
Mead, George H.
19
3,
70
251
Meader, C.L.
314
Antoine
Meillet,
14,
15.
16.
273
Laguna, Grace de
314
Susanne K.
177, 192, 209
Langer,
Larsen, Otto N.
Lee, Irving
Leibniz,
J.
153
89,
Wilhelm
87
332
Le Roy, Edouard
9,
283
W.
Charles
Morris,
63, 209
Lerch, Eugen
Lesniewski,
168,
Gottfried
Lenin, V.I.
158,
96,
105,
160,
87,
88.
164,
168,
177,
181,
191,
192,
225,
248,
259,
260,
261,
300.
314
79
Stanislaw
26,
32,
29,
50
35, 36
L6vy-Bruhl, Lucien
Neurath,
341, 342
Lewis, G. C.
215
Linsky, Leonard
45, 48, 90
Locke, John
212
87,
Otto
Lucian of Samosata
Lundberg, George A.
113,
153
114
81,
214,
215,
220,
39, 97
83
16,
118.
226.
361
Los, Jerzy 50
82.
19
Occam, William 87
Ogden, Charles K.
Orwell, George
Lukasiewicz, Jan
63,
Nyrop, Kristoffer
Ossowski, Stanistaw
196
394
Index of Names
Pavlov,
Pei,
P.
J.
202,
205,
Mario
184.
249
248,
313
160,
236,
164,
168,
177,
179,
249,
250,
251,
283,
356
198,
203.
W.P.
Pillsbury,
Plato
130,
244,
245,
250,
252,
254.
255,
256,
257,
263,
269,
298,
308,
325.
239,
330,
356,
358,
359,
360,
362
314
Edward
Sapir,
176,
192,
323
Ryle, Gilbert
9,
341,
342,
345,
348,
349
273, 358
Poincare, Henri
Popov, P.S.
70, 80
209,
343,
Ferdinand
Saussure,
de
Popper, Karl R.
11,
12,
199,
22,
16,
204,
309
273,
274,
Adam
302, 362
Schlick, Moritz
18
259,
P.
28,
32,
91,
94,
95.
105,
50
W.
Read, Allen
254
107,
Rasiowa, Helena
198, 245
214,
Hugo
X,
Stalin, J.V.
162
314
61
17
12,
13
18, 198
Stebbing, L. Susan
Stern,
28, 38
LA.
215,
Suci,
226,
220,
M.M.
Rozental,
Schuchardt,
177.
164,
191, 192
Reznikov, L.O.
Richards,
von
Richard
61
Smirnitsky, A.I.
324.
289
285,
Shemyakin, F. N.
325, 326
J.
275,
Schuppe, Wilhelm
Rehmke, Johannes 61
Reichenbach, Hans 62, 69
Revesz, Geza 313, 314,
Richard,
255,
Schubert-Soldern,
Anatol
104,
26,
41
40,
39,
251,
256
Schiller, Friedrich
Ramsey, Frank
314,
81
Ramishvili, D.l.
302,
316
Schaff,
96,
8,
202,
259
Porzig, Walter
38,
4,
276, 281
9,
Rapoport,
344,
361
108
Rubinshtein, S.L.
G. 10
George
Suszko,
Swift,
196,
309
51, 52
Jonathan
Szober,
9,
J.
Roman
155
Stanislaw
298
10, 21,
203,
274, 316
24,
25,
Tannenbaum, Percy H.
26,
28,
31,
32,
33,
34,
35,
Tarski,
39,
53,
54,
62,
64,
65,
67,
68,
69,
70,
71,
74,
75,
Russel,
100,
Bertrand
200,
XI,
220,
228,
98.
229,
37,
51,
Alfred
26,
40,
42,
39,
59,
90,
30,
309
31,
43, 48,
91,
93.
36,
49,
116
Index or Names
UUmann, Stephen 3, 8,
Urban, Wilbur M. 121,
133,
19
122,
134. 146,
Urmson,
Ushenko, Andrew
Whitney, W.D.
341,
323
P.
Joseph
18,
16,
20,
342,
Walpole,
Hugh
Weil, R.
107
78,
79,
177,
68,
18
358,
359,
360
Wundt, Wilhelm
Yudin, P.F.
107
38,
309, 329
40,
106,
347,
41
70
Zvegintsev, V.A.
3,
277,
255,
323,
61,
71,
257,
325,
283
55
Ziehen, Theodor
276,
70,
108
Zhdanov, A.A.
69
119
9,
XI,
69,
254,
269,
Hermann
67,
259,
132
Weinert, Erich
Weyl,
15,
66,
258,
Weinberg, Julius R.
84,
346,
Ludwig
65,
304
Vinogradov, V.V.
Vossler, Karl
L.
345,
348, 349
13,
5,
202
Benjamin
Wittgenstein,
Vendryes,
25. 26.
Whorf,
116, 323
J.O.
395
278,
7,
19, 203,
279,
296
Date Due
Due
OCT
2 s
Returned
,9,
J3
j
OCT
519a
Due
Returned
Wstep
to
semantyki.
main
149.94S296iC.2