University of Utah Western Political Science Association

University of Utah
Western Political Science Association

The Constitutionality of Legislative Councils
Author(s): David W. Smith
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Mar., 1955), pp. 68-81
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
DAVIDW. SMITH
Montana State University

and organizationally, the state legislature has not
STRUCTURALLY
changed since the early nineteenth century. It is the most primitive
of our organs of state government, yet it is charged with perhaps the
most important tasks. Various reforms, such as proportional representation,
have been proposed; but PR has an alien sound, and in any case the
structure of the legislature is fixed, apparently beyond hope of alteration,
in the state constitution. The state constitution also limits the length of
the regular session of the legislature, ordinarily to sixty days in two years.
The constriction of this limitation has produced pressures of which legislatures themselves have had to take account. They have been obliged to
adopt auxiliary devices to enable them to get through their work in the
allotted time. The executive budget was introduced in Wisconsin in 1911,
whereas it was adopted by the federal government only in 1921; the prior
adoption of this innovation on the state level, where financing is incredibly
more simple than on the federal, is no doubt to be explained in part by the
limitation on the sessions of the state legislature.
Interim committees to conduct studies and prepare business for consideration during the short sessions were also widely resorted to, in some
states as early as the pre-Civil War era. In 1921 the first Model State
Constitution, drafted by the National Municipal League, proposed the
establishment of a legislative council. This body would sit throughout the
period between sessions, would conduct investigations and studies, and
would present a well digested program to the legislature. In 1931 Wisconsin adopted an executive council patterned after the proposed legislative
council in the Model State Constitution as to its functions but differing
somewhat in its composition. In 1933 Kansas and Michigan created legislative councils closely resembling the recommended pattern, and other
states have followed suit. Today councils exist in thirty-four states and
the territory of Alaska.
For obvious reasons, the first Model State Constitution proposed a
council composed of the governor and representatives of both houses of the
legislature. This pattern was not adopted by any state. The Kansas and
Michigan councils were composed solely of legislators and established the
pattern which predominates at present. It was indorsed by the third Model
State Constitution, that of 1945. Today only four of the council states
permit nonlegislative members to sit on the council; these are Kentucky,
New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Utah.
68
CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
69
The council composed exclusively of legislators- hereafter called the

legislative council - is in a legal and constitutional sense nothing but an
interim committee of the legislature. There are differences: under the
constitutive statute the council is a permanent body, whereas the interim
committee normally expires with the legislature which created it; moreover,
the agenda of the council are more numerous, since it is charged with the
preparation of an entire legislative program, whereas the interim committee
is created for a narrower purpose. Nevertheless the legislative council
is generically a special form of the interim committee; and so the legal
opinions in general hold.
The mixed council, as we may call the council which contains both
legislative and nonlegislative members, cannot be viewed as a simple
interim committee. Since it contains nonlegislative members, it cannot be
a committee of the legislature; since it contains legislators, it cannot be
executive, for legislators are invariably forbidden by the state constitutions
to hold "civil office." In fact, however, the joint executive-legislative
commission of which the mixed council is an example has not encountered
greater legal obstacles than the interim committee.
In five states the proposal or enactment of a statute creating a legislative council led to requests for advisory opinions from the attorney
general of the state on one or more constitutional questions.' These
opinions of the attorneys general invariably upheld the validity of the
council. In two states the council after its creation was subjected to a court
test. The statute was upheld in Washington, but the Montana statute was
declared invalid.2
In the Montana case the motives behind the challenge to the council
appear to have been chiefly political. All interim committees, and not
particularly the legislative council itself, were the objects of attack. The
action was initiated by Hon. Sam W. Mitchell, Secretary of State and
Democratic party leader. A change of administration in 1953 placed the
Republican party in control of the governorship and the legislature. Three
interim committees in addition to the legislative council were createdone for the purpose of investigating the awarding of contracts for state
construction during the previous Democratic administration. Action was
taken against the newly organized legislative council rather than the other
committees in the expectation that they would fall if the council were
invalidated.3 Interim committee and council activity was suspended during
1 Attorney General's opinion to Honorable Charles B. Duffy, Chairman, Judicial Committee No. 2, Senate
Chamber, February9, 1937 (Oklahoma); Attorney General's Biennial Report for 1937-1938(Michigan), p. 96; 26 Opinions of the Attorney General of Maryland 236 (1941); Attorney General's
opinion to Mr. F. 0. Eastaugh, Secretary of Legislative Council, May 5, 1953 (Territory of Alaska);
Attorney General's opinion to Mr. Isaac McClellan, June 9, 1953 (Arkansas).
2 State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 29 Wash.2d 68, 185 P.2d 723 (1947); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes, 274
P.2d 611 (Mont. 1954).
3 This writer observed that it was a common opinion among public officials in Montana, during the seven
month period that the case was pending, that the court would hold, in a 3-2 decision, against the
council.
70
THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY
the period of litigation. The decision against the validity of the council
had the anticipated effect -the three interim committees never resumed
activity.
The Montana decision in State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes offers a
serious challenge to the legislative council. In every state this body has
been created by statute and is subject to attack on the constitutional
grounds cited in the Mitchell case. There are five principal issues. The
first is the question of the power of a legislative committee to function
between sessions of the legislature-the
whole question, that is, of the
validity of interim committees. The second is the question of compensation: does the payment of expenses to members of the council violate the
constitutional prohibition against an act increasing the salary of legislators
during the term in which the act was passed, or the common prohibition
against increasing the total compensation of legislators? The third issue
turns upon the fact that the statute ordinarily provides that the council,
whose members are necessarily chosen during one session, shall report to
the next legislature; this raises the question whether the act unconstitutionally extends the term of office of the legislators. The fourth question
is whether the legislative council violates the separation of powers by
entrusting legislators with executive or judicial powers. The fifth question
is whether appointment of a legislator to the council is appointment to a
civil office, which is universally forbidden. Both the fourth and the fifth
questions are rather more difficult in the case of the mixed council than
in the case of the legislative council.
The Mitchell case declared the act creating the legislative council
invalid on all these grounds. In this, however, it went contrary not only
to the other opinions on the legislative council but to the well settled law
on interim committees, which is unanimous on some points and on others
supports the council by majority opinion. Although the problems of the
mixed council are not in all cases concluded by the decisions on interim
committees, it is proper to say that the weight of authority on the problems
peculiar to the mixed council also supports the validity of this institution.
The first constitutional question is that of the validity of interim
committees functioning after the adjournment of the legislature. With the
exception of the Mitchell case, the question has invariably been made to
turn on the method by which the committee was created. There is a
division in judicial authority over the manner in which the legislature may
create an interim committee. There appears to be no question that interim
committees may be created by statute, and some jurisdictions maintain that
this is the only way that such committees may be formed.4 The majority
4 Annotation, 28 ALR 1154 (1924), citing Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.W. 130 (1915); Dickinson v.
Johnson, 117 Ark. 582, 176 S.W. 116 (1915); In re Davis, 58 Kan. 368, 49 P.160 (1897); and Branham
v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497 (1861). More recent cases are Lockwood v. Jordan, 72 Ariz. 77, 231 P.2d 428
(1952), and Swing v. Riley, 13 Cal.2d 513, 90 P.2d 313 (1939).
CONSTITUTIONALITYOF LEGISLATIVECOUNCILS
71
of jurisdictions, however, hold that the legislature, by resolution of both

houses and with the concurrence of the governor, may create joint committees empowered to function following adjournment.5 A minority of
opinion contends that a resolution of the two houses is sufficient.6 Invariably it is said in all of the cases concerned with the question that a
resolution of one house will not suffice to create an interim committee.
The division of opinion results from differences as to the relative force
of a resolution and a statute. In most jurisdictions the constitutions provide
a mandatory procedure through which a bill becomes a law, and this has
sometimes been held to give a statute some degree of "solemnity and
strictness" which does not accompany a resolution.7 The joint and concurrent resolutions differ in purpose and form in the various states, but
nowhere need they conform to the procedure imposed on the legislature in
the passage of bills.8
At the federal level a single house may, by resolution, create an
interim committee consisting of its own members; however, the House
committees may not serve beyond the term of the Congress.9 The Senate,
as a continuing body, may create committees empowered to serve after
the expiration of a Congress and until the next session or until successors
to its members are elected. Joint committees may be appointed to sit
following the adjournment of Congress by joint or concurrent resolutions.10
In respect to legislative councils the conflict is of little significance.
Councils have, without exception, been created by statute. No doubt one
reason for this procedure is that the council statute serves also as the
initial appropriation act; since a statute is necessary for this latter purpose,
it appears that there is little possibility of any future councils being created
by resolution. In one case, however, the Montana case of State ex rel.
Mitchell v. Holmes, the legislative council and inferentially all interim
committees were held invalid, even though created by statute. The
Montana Supreme Court held that no legislative agency might function
beyond the sixty-day period to which sessions were limited. No reason
was assigned and no authority was cited.
The next issue is that of compensation. By constitutional provision
legislatures in most states are authorized to establish their own compensation but are prohibited from granting any increase in salary or mileage to
5 Re Opinion of the Justices, 248 Ala. 590, 29 So.2d 10 (1947); People v. Hofstadter, 258 N.Y. 425, 180
N.E. 106 (1932); Terrell v. King, 118 Tex. 237, 14 S.W.2d 786 (1920); Gilbreath v. Willett, 251
S.W. 910 (Tenn. 1923); People v. Backer, 113 Misc. 400, 185 N.Y.Supp. 458 (1920); Commonwealth
v. Constello, 21 Pa.Dist.R. 232 (1912); Commercial and Farmers' Bank v. Worth, 117 N.C. 146, 23
S.E. 160 (1895).
6 State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 191 P.2d 241 (Wash. 1948); People v. Learned, 5 Hun. 626
(1875).
7 Martin R. Fountain, "Validity of the Functioning of Interim Committees after
Legislature Has Adjourned," 23 Temple Law Quarterly 414 (1950).
8 Robert E. Moore, "Legislative Resolutions: Their Function and Effect," 31 Texas Law Review 417
(1953).
In most states the joint resolution requires the approval of the governor; in some states - in Texas
and Utah, at least - the concurrent rather than the joint resolution requires this approval.
9 4 Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives ?4545 (1907).
10Ibid., ?4544. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 71 L.Ed. 580, 59 ALR 1 (1927).
72
members during the session in which they are serving. Without exception,
council statutes contain provision for some compensation for performance
of duties. In some states members are granted "actual expenses and
mileage"; in other states per diem and mileage rates are specified in the
council statute. Interim committee statutes include provisions of this
same sort.
In cases involving interim committees, the majority of the courts have
upheld payment of compensation to committee members for services performed after the adjournment of the legislature in excess of the compensation prescribed as salary for legislators." These courts hold that:
the allowance of reasonable expenses incurred in the discharge of duties of a public officer
is neither salary, compensation, nor an emolument of office within a constitutional prohibition of a change in the salary during the term, or a provision limiting the amount of
compensation which a public official shall receive for his services, even though the effect
of the allowance is to relieve the recipient of the necessity of paying such expenses out
of his salary.2
Necessary expenses granted to committee members have been considered

"legitimate legislative expenses essential to the exercise of the state's legislative power"; but it has been said that they should not exceed the daily
rate fixed by the constitution or statute for compensation to members of the
legislature.13 It has also been said that since the members of the interim
committees are not serving "as members of the legislature" the compensation for such services "not having been prescribed and limited by the constitution might be fixed at such sum as the General Assembly saw proper." 14
There appears to be only one case outside Montana holding that members
of an interim committee may not receive compensation in addition to that
prescribed in the constitution.15
Attorneys general's opinions on the question of compensation for
members of legislative councils have been given in Oklahoma, Arkansas,
and Alaska and have followed rather closely the holdings on interim committees. The Washington case concerning the validity of the state legislative council16 was not concerned directly with the issue of compensation
and made no reference to it. However, in the following year the same
court approved provision for payment of actual expenses to members of
an interim committee.l7 The Mitchell case held that payment of compensation to council members for actual expenses incurred while engaged
"See Annotation in 2 ALR 2d 1154; see also Manning v. Sims, 308 Ky. 587, 213 S.W.2d 577 (1948);
Terrell v. King, supra; Re Wilkins, 116 Neb. 748, 219 N.W. 9 (1928); Russ v. Commonwealth, 210
Pa. 544, 60 A. 169 (1905).
12 Manning v. Sims, supra.
13Terrell v. King, supra. The attorneys general's opinions from Oklahoma and Alaska, supra, follow this
line of argument.
14See Annotation, 5 ALR 2d 1185; Dixon v. Shaw, 122 Okla. 211, 253 P. 500 (1927); Russel v. Cone, 168
Ark. 989, 272 S.W. 678 (1925).
5 Fergus v. Russel, supra.
1State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, supra.
17 State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, supra.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
73
in council business violated two constitutional prohibitions. The first

provides that members of the legislature "shall receive no other compensation, perquisite or allowance whatsoever" than that prescribed by
law; 18 the second, that legislators shall receive no increase in salary or
mileage under any law passed during their term of office.19
The next constitutional question concerns the provisions of interim
committee and council statutes which allow the members to hold their
committee positions beyond their legislative terms. In the Mitchell case
the Montana court held that the statute for the legislative council, in
providing that council membership should extend to the "last day of
the regular session of the legislature next succeeding their appointment," 20
extended the members' legislative terms beyond that provided by the
constitution. This appears to be the only case that has ever passed on the
question. Of course it is well established that a nonlegislative public
officer will continue to hold office until his successor qualifies, even though
this extends his tenure beyond the constitutional or statutory term.21 The
reason for this is obvious: public interest requires that public offices be
staffed, and that de facto officers be employed if de jure officers are not
available. The same argument would not apply to a legislator in the
ordinary case, since a legislature is a collegial body and the existence of
one or even several vacancies will not prevent it from discharging its
functions. But it might be argued that the reasoning which supports the
status of the de facto civil officer would apply equally to the post of a
member of the legislative council, since in the nature of things new members cannot be chosen until the new legislature has met and organized.
Indeed, the practical effect of denying de facto status to members of the
council is more serious than such a policy would be in the case of civil
officers, since, as the Montana case shows, it may have the startling consequence of denying them de jure status during the term for which they
are elected as well. If the council actually performed lawmaking functions
there would be the strongest of political objections to recognizing a de facto
status, since this would enable legislators who had been repudiated by the
voters to continue to act; but the council has no power except to recommend. What Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals said
in another connection is pertinent: "Undoubtedly the members of the
committee will be permitted to report, for to say that they do this is to say
little more than that the Legislature is at liberty to hear them if it will." 22
18Constitution of Montana, Article V, ?5.
19 Ibid.,
?8.
20 Session Laws of Montana, 1953, c. 143, ?2.
2143 American Jurisprudence 20. Other authorities are collected in 97 ALR 1443. The Montana court
has taken this position with regard to civil officers, State ex tel. Sandquist v. Rogers, 93 Mont. 355,
18 P.2d 617 (1933).
22People v. Hofstadter, supra.
74
THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY
Continuous and efficient operation seems to require that members of the

council hold office until their successors have been chosen. In virtually all
of the council states this practice is followed and has never been challenged.23 Upholding the practice would not actually strain existing legal
concepts or raise a political hazard.
The fourth constitutional issue is the question of the power of the
legislature to authorize a joint committee, whether an interim committee
or a legislative council, to carry on investigative functions. Apparently
the power of the legislature to authorize investigations during the session
has never been denied.24 If investigation is a legislative function, there
seems to be no barrier to a delegation of this power to interim committees
except the theory that the legislature cannot act beyond the constitutionally prescribed limit of the session. This problem, as we have seen,
has already been resolved in favor of the interim committee. The Montana
Supreme Court, however, held in the Mitchell case that the investigating
function is judicial and executive rather than legislative and that to entrust
a legislative council with this power violates the separation of powers. All
other cases which have passed on the general question have upheld the
granting of investigative and subpoena powers to interim committees.25
It has been "recognized from the earliest times in the history of American
legislation, both federal and state" that the power of investigation is an
"indispensable incident and auxiliary to the proper exercise of legislative
26 It would be
power."
very regrettable if the Montana decision should
the
denies the capacity not only of the council but
for
reasoning
stand,
of the legislature itself to investigate.
The precedents on interim committees are not directly applicable to
what we have called the mixed council. But even though we call the
mixed council a nonlegislative body, it is clear that such a body may be
intrusted with the power of subpoena.27
23 In 16 states the council member holds his seat on the council until his term expires or a successor is
appointed; in nine states, until the beginning of the next regular session or the appointment of a
successor; in three states, until the end of the next regular session or the appointment of a successor.
In Kentucky and Alabama the law seems to terminate council membership at the end of the
legislator's term. In Kentucky, however, the practice is for council members to continue to hold
office until their successorshave been chosen. In Alabama the council members usually resign at the
end of their terms; apparently the resignation is regarded as legally necessary to create a vacancy.
In Texas the statute provides that failure to achieve renomination or re-election immediately
disqualifies a member of the council from serving further. The council members in Florida hold
office at the pleasure of their respective houses of the legislature. Successors to members whose
legislative terms have expired are named by the remaining council members immediately after the
election. In Nebraska and Oklahoma no term is specified, for the reason that in each state all
members of the legislature are members of the legislative council. In Oklahoma no council meetings
are held during the period between the general election and the opening of the legislative session.
In Nebraska both the retiring members and the members-elect of the legislature attend meetings of
the legislative council held between the general election and the next meeting of the legislature,
but only the retiring members are allowed to vote on council matters.
24See Annotation, 50 ALR 21.
25 Ex parte Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 217 P. 725, 65 ALR 1497 (1929); Burnham v.
Morrissey, 14 Gray 226,
74 Am.Dec. 676 (Mass. 1859); Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821); McGrain v.
Daugherty, supra.
26Ex parte Battelle, supra.
27 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 38 L.Ed. 1125 (1894).
75
The last constitutional issue is the question whether membership

on an interim commission or a legislative council constitutes appointment
to a civil office. State constitutions always forbid legislators to hold civil
office. With the exception of the Mitchell case, it is uniformly held by the
courts that appointment to membership on an interim committee does not
constitute appointment to a new or additional office but consists of the
addition of duties which are essentially the same as those performed by
members of the legislature.28
An earlier decision of the Montana Supreme Court has become a
leading case in delineating the requisites of civil office. In State ex rel.
Barney v. Hawkins29 the court listed five elements, "indispensable in any
position of public employment, in order to make it a public office of a civil
nature." These five requirements are: (1) that the office be created by
constitutional or legislative authority; (2) that it possess a delegation of
a portion of the sovereign power of government; (3) that powers and
duties be defined through legislative authority; (4) that the office be
independent of superior authority, other than the law, unless it is an
inferior or subordinate office created by the legislature, and by it placed
under control of a superior officer or body; (5) that it have permanency
and continuity. In Hamblen v. Yelle, the Washington case concerning the
legislative council, the court held that the other elements of civil office
were present in the council, but that that of possession of a portion of the
sovereign power of government was lacking; it concluded that "since it
[the council] is not engaged in making laws, executing them, or administering them, no member of the council is a holder of a civil office."
It appears that the members of a legislative council, though armed
with the authority to investigate, collect information, and report to the
legislature, are hardly equal in substantive power to administrative officers
or members of an administrative board. As council members, the legislators
are devoid of the power to enact legislation which they possess as members
of the legislature; hence they do not possess a portion of the sovereign
power of government. The legislative council appears to be a simple
adjunct to the legislature created for the purpose of assembling information, submitting reports, and performing other service functions which
assist the legislative process. By no reasonable interpretation can council
members be regarded as civil officers in the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition against legislators holding other public offices of trust during
their terms of legislative office.
28 See
Annotation, 118 ALR 183; 42 American Jurisprudence 929, 934; State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle,
supra; State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 P. 411 (1927); Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal.2d
57, 113 P.2d 873 (1941); Special Assembly Interim Committee v. Southard, supra; 18 Opinions of the
Attorney General, State of Montana 16.
29 Supra.
76
In State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins the Montana court mentioned an

additional requirement of civil office imposed by Montana law which in
itself appears to rule out the possibility that membership on the Montana
council constituted a civil office. "In addition, in this state," the court held,
"an officer must take and file an official oath, hold a commission or other
written authority, and give an official bond, if the latter be required by
proper authority."
As was suggested earlier, the presence of nonlegislative members on
the mixed councils presents a somewhat different problem. In composition, councils of this type resemble the joint commissions on government
reorganization which have been created on the federal and state levels.30
They resemble also the joint committee on budget preparation which exists
as the permanent budget agency in Indiana, North Dakota, and South
Carolina.31
Judicial authority upholds the validity of the joint commission and
sustains legislative membership on grounds similar to those used in sustaining the interim legislative committee. Membership on commissions
created for a special purpose, such as budget review and reorganization
surveys, is not considered a public office because the individual exercises
no governmental power and discharges duties incidental to his legislative
office.32 It is likewise held that a public officer does not violate a constitutional prohibition against serving in two offices by accepting membership
on a special commission the duties of which are compatible with his
primary responsibility.33This suggests the presence of an area, a "no-man's
land" in government, wherein officers of all three branches of government
may serve jointly in the performance of duties which are not incompatible
with their primary offices and which do not involve the exercise of "the
sovereign power of government." The doctrine of the separation of powers
does not attempt to define separate spheres of activity wherein each branch
of government must operate independently; rather, it merely defines the
major responsibility of each branch without precluding co-operation among
the branches in matters not expressly prohibited by the constitution.
In all jurisdictions except Montana, where the question of constitutionality has been raised, the legislative council has survived legal challenge.
Athough the problems involved were identical with issues that had already
been settled in litigation concerning interim committees, it was inevitable
that a new institution like the legislative council should be subjected to
30Karl A. Bosworth, "The Politics of Management Improvement in the States," American Political Science
Review, XLVII (1953), 88.
31The Book of The States, X (1954-55), 168-9.
92 See Annotation, LRA 1917A, 231; see also State ex rel. Ray v. Blease, 95 S.C. 403, 79 S.E. 247 (1913);
Mulnix v. Elliott, 62 Colo. 46, 156 P. 216 (1916); State ex rel. Allen v. Clausen, 107 Wash. 667, 182
P. 610 (1919); State ex rel. Harris v. Watson, 201 N.C. 661, 161 S.E. 215 (1931); Curtin v. State,
61 Cal. App. 377, 214 P. 1030 (1923); 18 Opinions of the Attorney General, State of Montana 16.
83See Annotation, 26 ALR 143; 42 American Jurisprudence929, 934, 936.
77
question. Accordingly, a body of decision directed specifically at legislative

councils has been built up in five opinions of attorneys general and two
court opinions, and it may be useful to review briefly this cumulation of
authority.
The first question of constitutionality arose in Oklahoma in 1937,
rather early in the history of the legislative council movement. The attorney general was requested to advise the senate judiciary committee on the
constitutionality of the provision for payment of compensation in the proposed council statute. The opinion34 reviewed the leading cases on payment of compensation to interim committee members and agreed with the
majority. The attorney general advised in favor of payment of expenses
to council members not to exceed the constitutional allowances to legislators.
An attorney general's opinion in Michigan in 1937 35 passed on the
validity of interim committees created by resolution of the two houses of
the legislature. After reviewing the body of law on the validity of interim
committees created by statute, the opinion held that interim committees
created by resolution of either or both houses of the legislature were powerless to function, but that the legislative council, "created not by legislative
resolution, but by statute," was valid.36
A minor question on organization of the legislative council was the
subject of an opinion of the Maryland attorney general in 1941.37 In advising as to the proper manner in which the council should fill a vacancy in
the office of chairman, the attorney general expressed no constitutional
objection to the existence of the council. Of course, an inference from
silence is of very little weight.
The next occasion was the first court test of constitutionality; this occurred in Washington in 1947.38 The issues in the case were the authority
of the council to function during the interim between sessions of the legislature and the question whether membership on the council constituted
appointment to a civil office. The court, following the established law
concerning interim committees, held that the council was empowered to
function as an interim committee and that its members were not civil
officers within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. "Where a
statute merely makes available new machinery and new methods by which
particular legislators may keep themselves informed upon specific problems,
it cannot be said to have imposed any new office or trust." 39
34 Attorney General's opinion to Honorable Charles B. Duffy, supra.
35 Attorney General's Biennial Report for 1937-1938,p. 96.
36 Ibid., p. 103.
37 26 Opinions of
Attorney General of Maryland 236 (1941).
38 State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, supra.
39185
P.2d at 730.
78
The issue of payment of compensation to legislative council members

was the subject of an opinion of the Arkansas attorney general in 1953.40
In accordance with previous decisions of the state court in Arkansas41and
the weight of authority concerning the payment of compensation to members of interim committees, the attorney general held that a study of the
provisions of the statute "discloses no conflict with the Constitution." The
council members "are merely given a per diem and travel allowance to
defray out-of-pocket expenses in attending to the business of the Council."
Later in 1953, the attorney general of Alaska was requested to advise
on the validity of the newly enacted statute creating the legislative council.
The reply42upheld the council statute but drew attention to the compensation provision, which granted a per diem allowance exceeding the amount
authorized by statute to members of administrative boards and commissions. The attorney general recommended on policy grounds that the
council members be paid the same compensation as the administrative
officers.
The second court decision on the validity of the legislative council 43
marks the most recent addition to the body of law governing the question.
In the Mitchell case the Montana court held the council statute to be
unconstitutional on eight grounds. The reasons represent substantially the
questions covered in the five issues previously discussed, with one addition.
The court took exception to the authority granted to the council to accept
contributions of money from private sources.44 The court reasoned that
acceptance of money, "whether attempted to be sanctioned or not [by
statute], would encourage an unwholesome condition" and would violate
the constitutional oath taken by all public officers of the state. As members
of the state legislature, the council members had taken an oath by which
each swore:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect and defend the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the state of Montana, and that I will
discharge the duties of my office with fidelity; . . . that I will not knowingly receive,
directly, or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing for the performance or nonperformance of any act or duty pertaining to my office other than the compensation
allowed by law, so help me God."
The voluntary contribution of money from private sources for public

purposes and the acceptance of such gifts are not unknown in Montana.
The recently constructed building housing the state historical library and
the pioneer memorial museum stands as concrete evidence of the generosity
of Montana citizens and public-spirited organizations-- chiefly, the state
40Attorney General's opinion to Mr. Isaac McClellan, supra.
Russell v. Cone, supra; Dickinson v. Johnson, supra.
4 Attorney General's opinion to Mr. F. 0. Eastaugh, supra.
43 State ex rel. Mitchell v. Holmes, supra.
44Session Laws of Montana, 1953, c. 143, ?8. A similar provision is found only in Maine.
46 Constitution of Montana, Article XIX, ?1.
41
79
veterans' organizations. The famed Charlie Russell art collection, acquired

at considerable expense to generous interested persons, was given to the
state and is housed in the state library building. It hardly appears that
there was an ulterior motive present in the acceptance of these grants
by the public officers of the state, yet the Mitchell case seems to say that
these officers acted contrary to their constitutional oath.
As we have seen, the Montana decision is unique. In holding that
the legislature may not, even by statute, create a joint committee to act
after the adjournment of the session the court decided contrary to the
holding of every other case on the question. In holding that membership
on the council constituted civil office, the court again decided contrary to
the weight of judicial authority and apparently deviated from two earlier
decisions from its own jurisdiction and an attorney general's opinion.46
Except on these two issues, the court might have resorted to the
customary practice of separating out objectionable parts of a statute while
allowing the remainder to remain operative and thus might have held the
council to be a valid agency. It might have struck down the subpoena
power without striking down the council. It might have taken exception
to the provision for payment of compensation, as was done in an earlier
Illinois case,47yet allowed the council to continue - its members serving
without recompense for expenses during the term in which the bill was
enacted. The provision extending the life of the council beyond the
legislative term of some of its members could likewise have been struck
and the council members whose terms expired could have left the council.
The council could have continued its existence by virtue of the surviving
members' retaining their legislative office.48
Threats of court action in Arizona following the establishment of the
legislative council in 1953 caused some consternation among proponents
of the council. Presumably opposition to the council resulted from the high
initial expense involved in establishing the research staff of the council and
the purchase of equipment and supplies necessary to carry out the intent
of the statute.49 The litigation in Montana over the council served as a
stimulant to the opponents of the council; however, the threats subsided
as the council began to assume an active role in performing its legislative
service functions.50
Litigation in the lower state courts of Arkansas concerning the constitutionality of an interim committee, the joint audit committee created
4 State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, supra; State ex rel. Sandquist v. Rogers, supra; 18 Opinions of the
Attorney General, State of Montana 16.
47
Fergus v. Russel, supra.

48 Since the term of office for members of the senate is four years, several council members would ordinarily
continue as qualified members.
49 Letter from Mr. Jules M. Klagge, Director of the Arizona Legislative Council, September 29, 1954.
60 Opposition to the council continued to plague the council from other sources. The bill-drafting service
received a request to draft legislation abolishing the council and its research staff. In accordance
with council policy, the request was fulfilled. Ibid.
80
in 1953, is presently pending. According to a close observer of the action,

the possibility exists that the court decision will determine the constitutionality of the Arkansas council as well.51
Of course constitutional questions relating to the existence and operation of the legislative councils, and interim committees as well, can be
solved by constitutional amendment. Such a solution was advocated as
early as 1921 in the Model State Constitution52 prepared by the National
Municipal League. However, the proposal was not incorporated in an
actual constitution until 1944, when provision was made for a "permanent
joint committee on legislative research" in the revised Missouri constitution.53 The California constitution was amended in 194054 to authorize
legislative committees to operate beyond adjournment of the legislature
provided an appropriation act was passed giving evidence that such action
was the intent of the legislature as a body and was approved by the
governor. A similar provision was incorporated into the New Jersey
constitution in the revision of 1948, which authorized the legislature to
appoint, to act during the interim period, "any commission, committee or
other body whose main purpose is to aid or assist it in performing its
function." 55 The New Jersey legislature has recently created a legislative
council by granting permanency to an interim committee on law revision.
Although constitutional provision for legislative councils is a sure
remedy against the arbitrary action of the state courts, conditions do not
appear to require such action. All state legislatures, with the exception
of that of Montana, are presently equipped with research agencies of one
type or another. In many jurisdictions, the activity of such interim committees and legislative councils is supported by the sanction of the courts.
In other jurisdictions, the weight of custom and practice seems to assure
relative security to the procedure. Generally speaking, the state courts
hold no resentment against the operation of councils and interim committees, even though in many states these agencies possess the power to
issue subpoenas and compel the attendance of witnesses.56
The legislative council has proved that it is a valuable service agency
in the field of legislative activity. The council, along with the interim
committee and the mixed commission or joint executive-legislative commission, has contributed to the improvement of the legislative process.
The investigatory function is important, but does not constitute the only
advantage of this type of agency. Through interim study the legislative
61 Letter from Mr. Marcus Halbrook, Director of the Arkansas Legislative Council, March 24, 1954.
2
?29.
63 Article
III, ?35.
"4Article IV, ?37.

5 Article IV, ?5.
S6 The legislatures of fifteen states have granted this authority to the legislative councils; however, exercise
of the power is extremely rare.
81
members obtain firsthand knowledge of the perplexing problems awaiting

consideration in future sessions. Periodic reporting of the activities of the
council and the holding of public hearings are means of extending information to the general public and other interested legislators.
It is to be hoped that the future course of judicial decision on the
constitutionality of the legislative council will follow the weight of judicial
authority supporting the interim committee, as the Washington court
has done.

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The council composed exclusively of legislators- hereafter called the

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

of jurisdictions, however, hold that the legislature, by resolution of both

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Necessary expenses granted to committee members have been considered

in council business violated two constitutional prohibitions. The first

20 Session Laws of Montana, 1953, c. 143, ?2.

Continuous and efficient operation seems to require that members of the

The last constitutional issue is the question whether membership

In State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins the Montana court mentioned an

question. Accordingly, a body of decision directed specifically at legislative

The issue of payment of compensation to legislative council members

The voluntary contribution of money from private sources for public

veterans' organizations. The famed Charlie Russell art collection, acquired

Fergus v. Russel, supra.

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

in 1953, is presently pending. According to a close observer of the action,

"4Article IV, ?37.

members obtain firsthand knowledge of the perplexing problems awaiting

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